Office of the President

Of the Philippines
Malacañang

MESSAGE

In behalf of the Office of the President and

the Anti-Terrorism Council, it is my pleasure to
congratulate the men and women behind the
successful formulation of this Inter-Agency
Protocol on Explosives-Related Incidents
Investigation.

With this Primer, the members of the various Explosive Ordnance

Disposal (EOD) Units from the uniformed service and other law enforcement
agencies are provided with an added tool that advocates effective and efficient
inter-operability. Its imperativeness must never be under estimated
considering the continuing threats, not only to the life and limbs of the
innocent victims caused by the wanton use of explosives but also to their
properties and other critical infrastructures that provide necessities and
conveniences to the Filipino people.

As Chairperson of the Anti-Terrorism Council, I wish to extend my

deepest appreciation to the members of the AFP/PNP/NBI/PCG and BFP who
made this undertaking possible.

LEANDRO R. MENDOZA
Executive Secretary
Chairman, Anti-Terrorism Council
 Republic of the Philippines
Office of the President
Anti-Terrorism Council
National Counter Terrorism Unit

MESSAGE
Consistent with its mandate to ensure a
coordinated and calibrated response to a specific
terrorist threat or incident, the National Counter-
Terrorism Unit (NCTU) as integrator of efforts
among the AFP, PNP, NBI, PCG and BFP came
up with this Inter-Agency Protocol for Explosives-
Related Incidents Investigation.

This Protocol shall serve as a comprehensive guideline not only to first

responders, Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Bomb Technicians, Investigators,
and Forensic Experts but also to every personnel involved in responding and
investigating explosive-related incidents especially those who operate in the
field.

Indeed, with this modest accomplishment, the AFP, PNP, NBI, PCG, BFP
and the NCTU will achieve a more coordinated response towards the
fulfillment of our common struggle against terrorism.

Thus, I take this opportunity to congratulate and commend the men

and women who laboured in structuring this Protocol. Their laudable
resilience and unparalleled dedication has largely contributed to the
successful accomplishment of this endeavor.

USEC FERNANDO L MESA

Chief
 CHIEF OF STAFF
Armed Forces of the Philippines
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City

MESSAGE

This primer on the Inter-Agency

Protocol for Explosives-Related Incidents
Investigation provides the AFP/PNP/NBI/PCG first
responders a summary of the guidelines for the
investigation of bombings and other explosives
related incidents.

What is presented in this protocol is a product of valuable experience

from the field which has been carefully studied in order to distill the best
practices which in turn provided the cornerstone for the rationalization of
procedures. Its importance therefore is not to be underestimated especially
now when the terrorist threat is a reality we all have to reckon with.

This primer provides the responder instructions on how to properly

investigate an explosives related incident. As this is a condensed version of the
actual protocol, the reader is given a concise yet comprehensive guide which is
valuable to units on the ground who rarely have the luxury of time to go over
the actual protocol.

It is therefore highly encouraged that the members of the AFP/PNP/

NBI/PCG Explosive Ordnance Disposal units and investigators to read this
primer. It will provide lessons that will be valuable in the field.

I would like to commend the personnel behind the undertaking for their
hard work and commitment in coming up with this primer. Their efforts will
prove invaluable in this fight against terrorism.

DELFIN N BANGIT
GENERAL AFP
 HEADQUARTERS
Philippine National Police
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF PNP
NHQ PNP Building, Camp Crame, Quezon City
Manila, Philippines

MESSAGE

Our commitment in keeping our people safe from

the perils, dangers and unimaginably savage devastation
of terrorism has been intensified and reinvigorated with
the finalization and signing of the Inter-Agency Protocol
on Explosives-Related Incidents Investigation. Under
my watch, the PNP stands in the forefront of ensuring the
high possible standards of policing that will be potent
enough to thwart terrorism, one of the most serious threats to public safety and
national security.

Together with our reliable allies and partners in law enforcement and public
safety – the AFP, NBI, PCG and BFP – the PNP stands committed in working towards
providing timely dispensation of justice to those innocent victims of terrorist
incidents. Through the Inter-Agency Protocol on Explosives-Related Incidents
Investigation we hope that our campaign against terrorism will bring successes
particularly in the investigation of explosive related incidents.

The signing of the protocol is a landmark achievement in public safety and

ushers in a renewed hope in the capability of our law enforcement agencies to
effectively combat terrorism. Its signing comes at a time when the need to ensure
peace and security is challenged and tested to the limits by the enemies of the State.

Nonetheless, this milestone cannot be achieved without the painstaking efforts

and assistance provided by the National Counter-Terrorism Unit. It is thus fitting and
proper that I extend my profound gratitude to its Chief, USEC FERNANDO L MESA,
who personally and diligently pursued the signing of the Protocol paving the
way for seamless coordination, integration and consolidation of efforts among all law
enforcement agencies involved in fighting terrorism.

It is expected therefore, that this Protocol will serve as a useful guide to all
personnel of concerned agencies in the fulfilment of our common objective of a
peaceful, safer and more progressive Philippines.

JESUS A VERZOSA, CEO VI

Police Director General
Chief, PNP
 Republika ng Pilipinas
(Republic of the Philippines)
Kagawaran ng Katarungan
(Department of Justice)
PAMBANSANG KAWANIHAN NG PAGSISIYASAT
(NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION)
Maynila

MESSAGE

The Protocol for Explosive Related Incidents

is an indispensable tool towards the success of this
kind of inter-agency activity. This is an inclusive
rather than exclusive procedure that harnesses the
skills of personnel of the major law enforcement
agencies with their respective mandates working with the military who has an
edge over them in their specialized line of work.

This document would serve as a guide to our men in the field on

whose shoulders the burden of implementing this Protocol is laid. To those
who formulated this Protocol, let me extend my warm congratulation for a job
well done.

ATTY. NESTOR M MANTARING

Director
 TANGGAPAN NG KOMANDANTE
(OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT)
PUNONGHIMPILAN TANOD BAYBAYIN NG PILIPINAS
(HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE COASTGUARD)
139 25th Street, Port Area
Manila

MESSAGE

We, the officers, men and women of the

Philippine Coast Guard wish to express our deepest
salutation to the NCTU for spearheading a very timely
and relevant initiative designed to synergize and
collaborate efforts of concerned agencies in
conducting investigation on explosive-related
incidents.

With our country’s lengthy coastline and vast marine domain, the
Philippine Coast Guard welcomes this Inter-agency Protocol for Explosives
Related Incidents Investigation as an added milestone and with renewed vigor
in our efforts to sustain and strengthen interoperability and cooperation
among government agencies, and with our partners.

The timely passage of RA 9993, otherwise known as “Philippine Coast

Guard law of 2009”, is a manifestation of the endearing commitment by our
Government to address not only the traditional but also the new or non-
traditional challenges, to include transnational threats in our maritime com-
munity.

With the birth of the New Philippine Coast Guard, we wish to further
assure you of our continuing commitment to serve our nation by ensuring
safe, clean and secure maritime environment.

More power and God Bless!

WILFREDO D TAMAYO
Admiral PCG
 Republic of the Philippines
Department of The Interior and Local Government
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION
Rm. 618, 145 Union Square Condominium, 15th Ave
Cubao, Quezon City
Tel No. 911-7085 Fax (02) 911-1603

MESSAGE

In the 21st Century, breakthroughs in

technology ushered in advancement in every aspect
of life. Sadly, same technology is available to the bad
elements who want to disturb the peace and order in
the country. That is why it is of utmost importance
that every law enforcer is equipped with accurate information and
knowledgeable on the course of action to take in any situation, even if it
involves explosive and ordnance.

This Protocol for Explosive Related Incidents would provide the

standard operating procedure that will guide our men in the performance of
their duties. The Bureau of Fire Protection takes pride for its inclusion in this
inter-agency endeavour. It is hoped that with this primer, our organizations
would have smooth coordination, with every agency aware of its respective
role.

ROLANDO M BANDILLA JR, CESO IV

Director BFP
Chief, Bureau of Fire Protection
 Republic of the Philippines
National Police Commission
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE

MESSAGE

I would like to thank the National Counter-

Terrorism Unit, Anti-Terrorism Council for giving
me the opportunity to share the expertise of the
PNP Crime Laboratory in the formulation of the “Protocol for Explosives-
Related Incidents Investigation”.

The protocol will be an effective guide for investigators of the PNP, AFP,
NBI, PCG and the BFP so that perpetrators of explosive related incidents can
be identified, prosecuted, and convicted by the courts. It will thus have a posi-
tive impact in the Counter-Terrorism effort of the government.

Congratulations is in order for all the members of the Technical Working

Group for a job well done. Mabuhay kayong lahat!

CSUPT ARTURO G CACDAC JR, CEO VI

INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Brief History …………………………………. 1

Purpose …………………………………. 5

Conduct of Investigation

Definition of Terms

General Principles

Concept of Operation …………………… 7

1. General Considerations …….. 7

2. On Bomb Threat8
3. On Attempted Bombing 9
4. Discovery of Explosives/IED and its
Components as a Result of AFP/PNP/
PCG/BFP Operation …………….. 10
5. Bombing Incident …………….. 11

Coordinating Instructions ……………… 21

Frequently Asked Questions ………….….. 24

Report Forms and Format ………………. 30

INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

BRIEF HISTORY

The Philippine Bomb Data Center (PBDC) drafted the PNP-AFP

Protocol on Explosive-Related Incidents Investigation sometimes in July 2007
following by a presentation made by the then C, PBDC, PSUPT ALBERT
IGNATIUS D FERRO, to the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) in NICA re
bombings that transpired in 2006. In his presentation, he cited that in
majority of the IED bombing incidents, military ordnance such as mortars
was used as its expedient charges. He further stated that the Center as the
mandated repository of information on the illegal used of explosives, had
limited information since no reports was provided particularly on incidents
attended by the Armed Forces Philippine EOD personnel. On that rationale,
PBDC and J2, AFP were directed by ASEC MARLU QUEVEDO, Executive
Director of ATC Coordinating Center to come up with a protocol that would
provide guideline for the AFP-PNP first responders, AFP's Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) units and PNP Investigators, Bomb Technicians, and Scene of Crime
Operation (SOCO) personnel during the investigation of an incident where explosive
devices and materials are involved. The purpose of the said protocol is to lay down
procedures and ethics that will govern investigation of explosives-related incidents
with the end view of enhancing the handling, documentation and preservation of the
explosives devices and other materials and to optimize its use as evidences in the
identification and successful prosecution of the responsible individual(s).

The first meeting of the PNP-AFP Technical Working Group was held
on August 16, 2007 at OJ2 Conference Room in Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon
City. The members were representative from the AFP Explosive Ordnance Disposal
units, PBDC key personnel, legal officers (AFP and PNP), and representative from the
PNP Crime Laboratory. Series of meeting followed after.

A final draft was endorsed to ATC on

October 8, 2007 for comments. However, the
draft was put on hold since it envisioned the
inclusion of other government agencies who
also responded to said incidents such as the
National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of
Fire Protection and Philippine Coast Guard.
No further action was taken on the draft
protocol after this.
MGEN MESA (Ret) presiding over a
Coordinating Meeting re the EOD Sometime on March 2009, then Acting
Chief, National Counter-Terrorism Action Group
Protocol with officers of the ATC-CC and
representatives from concerned agencies.
(NACTAG), MGEN FERNANDO L MESA (Ret),
instructed/tasked the Plans and Programs Staff
through its Division Director, PSUPT JONATHAN M URETA to coordinate with
the agencies concerned with the investigation of explosives related incidents.

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INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

The PPD staffs then facilitated the sending of letter requests

specifically addressed to AFP, PNP, NBI and PCG asking for inputs,
recommendations and comments regarding the proposed protocol. It was the
same Division who also compiled and consolidated the data/inputs from the
aforementioned agencies.

On a meeting called by MGEN FERNANDO L MESA (RET), C,

NACTAG on July 13, 2009, the draft was presented to him to address the
concern of the SOCO personnel responding on bombing incidents; and of
the PBDC as repository of all information relative to the illegal use of
explosives. Further, C, NACTAG also observed the same problem between
SOCO and PA EOD personnel on a bombing incident in Cotabato City last
July 6, 2009. C, NACTAG directed the representative of CL, PBDC, and
Philippine Army EOD Battalion for comments and additional inputs for the
updating of the said Protocol and designated the D, CL as repository of
comments and inputs from the PNP.

On the First and Second Joint

Bilateral Counter Improvised Explosive Device
Conference which were held on May 16-17
and September 10-11, 2009 respectively, the
said protocol were jointly reviewed and
updated by representative from the PNP, AFP
and PCG together with the US Navy EOD
counterpart as moderator. The final draft
was presented to C, National Counter
Terrorism Unit (new name of NACTAG by
virtue of ATC Resolution No. 27: Changing the
name of NAGTAG to NCTU) as the Guest of
Honor and Speaker on the occasion. On his
part, he assured the stakeholder for the COL. LOPENA of the EODBN
immediate signing of the protocol of the head ASCOM, PA, AFP presenting the
of agency concerned. final draft of the Protocol to C,
NCTU .

On 21 October 2009, a meeting was

called by the Chief, NCTU at the NCTU
Office, No. 5 V Luna Road, Quezon City
which was participated in by PCSUPT
ARTURO CACDAC JR, Director, CLG-PNP;
FSSUPT PABLITO CORNETA of BFP, NCR;
PSUPT IRENE RIGONAN of PBDC-IG, PNP;
COL ERNESTO LOPENA, CO, EODBN and
LT JIM P RAZO of the AFPMCC for the
finalization of the Inter-Agency Protocol for
Explosives Related Incidents
Investigation.

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INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

Finally, on November 26, 2009,

after two (2) years, the Inter-Agency
Protocol on Explosive-Related Incident’s
Investigation was finally signed during
the 25th ATC Meeting at Malacañang,
Manila.

Representatives from NBI headed by

Atty. Ricardo Diaz incorporating their
final inputs to the Protocol.

3
 INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR
EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS
INVESTIGATION

among

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE

Camp Crame, Quezon City

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NBI Building, Taft Avenue, Ermita
Manila

PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD

139 25th St., Port Area, Manila

and

BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION

15TH Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City
Manila, Philippines
INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

1. PURPOSE

The increasing challenges posed by the growing sophistication of terrorist organizations not only
in the Philippine but elsewhere in the world have become a major concern among law enforcement and
security officers. In light of this concern, the PNP, AFP, NBI and PCG under the watch of the Anti-
Terrorism Council formulated this protocol to guide AFP/PNP/NBI/PCG first responders. AFP/PNP/NBI/
PCG Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD)/Bomb Technicians, PNP/NBI investigators and PNP Crime
Laboratory Scene of Crime Operation (SOCO) personnel /NBI Forensic Experts during the investigation
of bombing incidents and other incidents involving explosive devices and materials.

2. CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION

In case of an explosive incident, the responsibility for responding is often but not always shared
by a variety of professionals. PNP foot and mobile patrol personnel, firefighters, medical teams and
local volunteer organizations, invariably are the first to respond to calls for assistance. Medical
personnel are expected to treat those injured and evacuate them to hospitals, firefighters from BFP and
local fire brigades to put out fires, and the PNP first responders to cordon the area to secure and
preserve the crime scene.

EOD and bomb technicians from the nearest PNP/AFP/NBI/PCG units and the PNP Crime
Laboratory/ NBI Forensic Laboratory must be notified. Before the EOD and bomb technicians are
allowed entry to the bomb site, they shall allow themselves to be swabbed by PNP CL personnel/ NBI
Forensic Experts. If no secondary device exist and the area is declared safe by the EOD and bomb
technicians, the PNP CL/ NBI Forensic Experts can proceed with Scene of Crime Operation (SOCO) to
document and collect pieces of evidence.

Investigation can proceed with the PNP taking the lead role with the active support of the NBI,
PCG, BFP and AFP. The objective is to preserve pieces of evidence, identify and arrest perpetrators
and prosecute them until convicted by the courts.

In cases of military operations that results to the discovery or recovery of an explosive device,
handling and preservation of pieces of physical evidence from the scene is very crucial. As what is
stated above, success of the operation also includes the identification, documentation, and prosecution
of responsible individual (s).

The Philippine Bomb Data Center of the PNP as the main repository of information, data and
photographs related to the illegal use of explosives and explosive ingredients should be furnished a
copy of duly accomplished Explosive-Related Incident (ERI) Form and other related reports.

3. DEFINITION OF TERMS

Attempted Bombing - Incidents in which a device designed or purposely made to detonate/

ignite fails to function. Intent of activity is criminal in nature; this also pertains to malfunctioning,
recovered, and/or disarmed devices.

Bomb Threat – An information or warning, written or oral, claiming knowledge that a dangerous
device, such as a bomb or similar type of explosives, has been or will be placed in a building, aircraft,
sea craft or other facilities with the intent to harm people and destroy properties.

Bombing - Any incident which uses a device constructed with criminal intent and using high
explosives, low explosives, or blasting agents explodes. This term also refer to incidents where
premature detonation occurs during preparation, transportation, or placement of a constructed device.

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INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

Crime Scene Investigation - Comprehensive inquiry of a crime incident by conducting

systematic procedure of various investigative methodologies which involves recovery of physical and
testimonial evidence for the purpose of identifying the witnesses, and arrest of perpetrator(s) for
prosecution.

Evidence - The means sanctioned by the Rules of Court, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding
the truth respecting a matter of fact. These include but are not limited to documentary, testimonial,
electronic and object evidence, gathered in the course of the investigation.

Explosive Incidents - Any explosives-involved situation that encompasses

bombings, incendiary bombings, attempted bombings, stolen and recovered explosives, threats to
government facilities involving explosives, hoax devices and bomb threats.

Explosives - Any chemical compound, mixture or device, the primary or common purpose of
which is to function by explosion. The term includes, but it is not limited to, high explosives, black
powder, pellet powder, initiating' explosives, detonators, safety fuses, squibs, detonating cord, igniter
cord and igniter.

First Responders – any person or unit who first arrived at the scene and shall endeavor and
render assistance to the victim and to protect and secure the incident scene.

High Explosives - Explosives that when subjected to heat, shock or friction will detonate by
means of a blasting cap when unconfined at a speed of 20,000-27,000 feet per second or more.

Improvised Explosive Device - A homemade device consisting of an explosives/incendiary

and firing components necessary to initiate explosion.

Low Explosives - Explosives that when subjected to heat, shock or friction will deflagrate rather
than detonate at a speed of 5,000 feet per second or less. (e.g. black powder, safety fuses, and "special
fireworks" defined as Class B explosives)

Physical Evidence - Encompasses any or all of object that can be addressed to the senses of
the court that is capable of being exhibited, examined, or viewed by the court.
Post Blast Investigation - Comprehensive forensic inquiry specifically on a bombing incident
through conduct of various investigative techniques which involves recovery of physical evidence mainly
for reconstruction of explosive fragments recovered to determine the device components, the modus
operandi and subsequently to identify the perpetrator(s).

Recovered Explosives & Explosive Components - Any seized, found/discovered,

abandoned, or illegally purchased (undercover) explosive materials taken into custody by AFP/PNP/
PCG and NBI including those turned-in by civilian or private entity.

Scene Of Crime Operation (SOCO) – Is a forensic procedure performed by the trained

personnel of the PNP Crime Laboratory and NBI Forensic Laboratory Experts through scientific methods
of investigation for the purpose of preserving the crime scene, gathering information, documentation,
collection and examination of all physical evidence.

4. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

4.1 Consistent with its mandates, the PNP and the NBI will jointly conduct investigation of any
case of explosive incident with the PNP as the lead agency.

4.2 The AFP/PCG shall make available to the PNP and NBI units, investigative, legal and
technical assistance in the investigation and prosecution of the explosives related incidents.

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INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

4.3 The AFP EOD Teams / PCG / BFP shall extend technical assistance and other necessary
support to the PNP / NBI to ensure the effective and efficient investigation as well as the prosecution of
the abovementioned cases.

4.4 Render safe procedures (RSP) and IED recovery will be the sole discretion of the AFP/PNP/
NBI/PCG EOD team that has already taken first cognizance of an IED in the incident scene.

4.5 Security/Protection of the crime scene shall be the responsibility of the local police unit or
the military units in the area. Police line must be established immediately. In case of bombing/explosion
incident, the police line should be extended at a distance of 50% of the total distance from the seat of
explosion to the farthest fragment. Functional units must identify the area designated for the command
post, media area, etc. outside the police line. Only authorized persons are allowed to enter the scene.

4.6. When local agencies herein are unable to conduct higher level technical exploitation of
evidence (i.e. DNA, radio frequency, cell phone and latent fingerprints), the use of allied foreign partners
and laboratory resident in the region is encouraged subject to existing evidence management
procedure.

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

5.1 General Considerations

5.1.1. First responders shall cordon the area to preserve and secure crime scene. They
will cause the immediate evacuation of the injured, maintain order, and control the crowd.

5.1.2. The PNP/AFP/NBI/PCG EOD and Bomb Technicians shall conduct RSP of
primary or secondary devices found in the area. Prior to their entry into the crime scene, they should
allow themselves to be swabbed by PNP Crime Laboratory personnel/NBI Forensic Experts.

5.1.3 DO NOT TOUCH, REMOVE, OR ALTER ANY PIECE OF EVIDENCE. SOCO

personnel and NBI Forensic Experts are the only authorized persons to process, document, and conduct
laboratory examination of gathered physical evidence. PNP/AFP/NBI/ PCG EOD and bomb technicians
however, may join the search for bomb parts/fragments in tandem with PNP Crime Laboratory personnel
and NBI Forensic Experts.

5.1.4 In the absence or non-availability of PNP SOCO, the local police with the
assistance of the responding AFP/PNP/NBI/PCG EOD can process (identify, search, pre-mark, take
photograph and collect) possible pieces of evidence in a blast site following the appropriate procedures
to avoid contamination of said pieces of evidence. That after the documentation and collection of said
pieces of evidence; same will be transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory or NBI Forensic Laboratory
for laboratory tests and analysis and maintain chain of custody.

5.1.5. Only authorized personnel can enter the crime scene and MUST wear gloves,
shoe covers, mask, and if needed hard hats before entering the crime scene and avoid touching any
piece of evidence thereat to ensure that no cross contamination will occur.

5.1.6. The AFP/NBI/PCG EOD will provide the PNP and NBI with significant information
such as Technical Evaluation Report or Post Blast Investigation and other reports. AFP personnel
should not be included in the order of precedence of court witnesses because of the mobile nature of
assignment unless otherwise compelled by court. Upon receipt of subpoena and coordination with the
court, the AFP can designate representative with equal or higher technical expertise belonging to the
same unit of the same area of jurisdiction to appear in court.

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INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

5.1.7. In the event that “Hand Entry” procedure was used by the PNP/AFP/NBI/PCG
EOD in rendering safe an IED, he/she must be subjected to fingerprint by the PNP Crime Laboratory
and NBI Forensic Experts for suspect elimination.

5.1.8 In the absence of PNP SOCO or NBI Forensic Experts in the area, EOD personnel
may swab themselves (exposed part of the body such as hands, face, including garment and sole of the
shoes) using sterile cotton and alcohol, before and after processing. The swabbing should be placed in
a plastic bag with complete label and be submitted to concerned PNP Crime Laboratory or NBI Forensic
Laboratory.

5.1.9 Chemical examination/analysis of collected evidence will be the joint responsibility

of the PNP Crime Laboratory and the NBI Forensic Laboratory experts.

5.1.10 All information pertaining to incidents related to the illegal use of explosives,
including seizures of explosives during raids/operations shall be reported to the Philippine Bomb Data
Center for inclusion in its database.

5.2 On Bomb Threat

5.2.1 The following duties and responsibilities shall be performed by PNP patrol
personnel and mobile patrol units responding to bomb threats, found/discovered suspected devices or
explosives:

5.2.1.1 Upon receipt of information:

5.2.1.1.1 Determine the exact location of the establishment

under threat.

5.2.1.1.2 Instruct the security officer of the establishment to

conduct a bomb search while proceeding to the area

5.2.1.1.3 Proceed immediately to the scene.

5.2.1.1.4 Alert EOD team for bomb search mission and Fire
Department before departure.

5.2.1.1.5 Notify higher Headquarters of the report

5.2.1.2 Upon arrival at the scene:

5.2.1.2.1 Confirm the reported bomb threat: Notify EOD team

for a bomb sweep.

5.2.1.2.2 Cause a suspicious/suspected device search to be

made with person familiar with the location.

5.2.1.2.3 Unless a device is found, first responder may not

order an evacuation of the affected area but may inform the person in charge of the property of the need
to evacuate. Assist in evacuation of personnel should it be necessary.

5.2.1.3 Do not touch, tamper with or disarm any suspected device, explosive or
ordinance.

5.2.1.4 If a suspected device is located/found, cause the evacuation of the

affected area at least 300 meters away, and maintain security for the protection of life and property.

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INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

5.2.1.5 Isolate the suspected device.

5.2.1.6 Report discovery of suspected device.

5.2.1.7 No radio transmission.

5.2.1.8 Turn-off all electricity and gas unit of the premises/building.

5.2.1.9 Secure the area and prevent people from approaching it. Establish
traffic control.

5.2.1.10 Summon ambulance and fire trucks to the scene. Wait for the arrival of
bomb disposal team (EODT).

5.2.1.11Conduct immediate investigation if the threat\crisis is over. Determine

the following:

5.2.1.11.1. Name of person who received the call, date and

time was made.
5.2.1.11.2. Exact words of person making the threats.

5.2.1.11.3. Reasons for the threat.

5.2.1.11.4. Time and duration of call.

5.2.1.11.5. Voice characteristics of the caller-male or female:

young. middle age or old: tone: accents etc.

5.2.1.11.6. Identity of suspects, if known

5.2.1.12 Assist in the conduct of investigation by responding units when

requested to do so.
5.2.1.13 Report incident to Higher Headquarters.

5.2.2. In case where AFP/NBI/PCG EOD and PNP Bomb Squad Unit are available in
the same area, whoever takes first cognizance of the threat shall immediately respond and advice the
other units to standby for possible assistance. Concerned EOD units may provide technical assistance
when needed.

5.2.3. K-9 units if available will be utilized during search operations.

5.2.4. If possible, apply the general considerations.

5.3 On Attempted Bombing

5.3.1. AFP/PNP/NBI/PCG EOD/bomb technician personnel responding to an

attempted bombing MUST notify PNP Crime Laboratory or NBI Forensic Laboratory as the case maybe,
for SOCO to process the scene for trace evidence. Applicable general considerations MUST be
considered.

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INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

5.4. Discovery of Explosives/IED and its components as a result of AFP/PNP/PCG/BFP

Operation

5.4.1 On discovery of explosives and explosive components, EOD Team thru channel
shall inform the concerned local PNP unit upon compliance of the necessary security measures.

5.4.2 On the discovery of IED/s in an area, after the conduct of RSP, EOD Unit shall call
the assistance of local police unit and SOCO Team who has jurisdiction on the area.

5.4.3 In the absence of local police and SOCO Team particularly in a critical area, the
responding EOD Team shall inform the Chief of Police or Provincial Director or Regional Director who
has jurisdiction on the area. After coordination, EOD Team may conduct the documentation and proper
collection (wearing of sterile latex gloves), markings and preservation (using appropriate containers) of
explosive items. In any case that an EOD personnel touched the evidence with his bare hands, he must
be fingerprinted by SOCO for suspect elimination.

5.4.4 All collected components of explosive device/s, documents (video recordings or

photographs) and corresponding Spot Report on the incident must be turned over to the concerned local
police unit within reasonable time. Technical Evaluation Report (TER) / Post Blast Investigation report
must also be submitted by the EODT afterwards.

5.4.5 The concerned local police unit in turn shall verify the reported incident; conducts
own investigation; and evaluates the evidentiary value of items submitted. SOCO assistance should be
requested for the processing of explosive items submitted.

5.4.6 In case suspect/s were immediately identified and charged in court in relation with
the recovered explosive items, PBDC personnel shall be dispatched to the area to conduct technical
analysis on the materials. On the other hand, in cases where no suspect was identified and no case
was filed, all turned over improvised explosive device/s and related materials (after processing by the
Crime Laboratory) shall be forwarded as soon as possible to the following: Philippine Bomb Data Center
in Camp Crame for recoveries in Luzon and Visayas; PBDC Satellite Office in Camp Catitipan, Davao
City for recoveries in Mindanao, for the conduct of technical analysis and subsequent disposition. PBDC
personnel who shall receive the items must sign in the CL’s Chain of Custody Form.

5.4.7 After the technical analyses have been conducted by PBDC, non-explosive items
part of the recovered evidence such as battery; alarm clock; cellular phone; wires; containers;
fragmentation, etc., shall be turned over to concerned Crime Laboratory office for custody. Explosive
evidence items such as explosives, military ordnance, detonating cord, safety/time fuse, blasting caps;
shall be submitted to the PNP Bomb Squad Unit, who has jurisdiction on the area, for custody. The
designated unit custodian shall sign on the CL’s Evidence Chain of Custody Form.

5.4.8 In the absence of PNP Bomb Squad Unit, concerned AFP EOD unit in the area
shall be designated as Custodian of the explosive evidence. The designated custodian of AFP EOD unit
shall sign on the CL’s Evidence Chain of Custody Form.

5.4.9. Upon evaluation of the EOD unit of the criticality of the explosive evidence as
extreme hazard, they (EOD) shall inform the PNP investigating unit who has jurisdiction who in turn,
request the court of jurisdiction for its immediate disposal.

5.4.10 Upon approval of the court, disposal of hazardous explosives to be conducted by

Bomb Squad/EOD Unit shall be witnessed by representative from the investigating PNP unit and
concerned Crime Laboratory Office. The disposal shall be covered by corresponding reports. CL shall
be likewise furnished with disposal report for documentation.

5.4.11 Bomb, explosives and other IED’s seized by the NBI during its operations should

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INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

be turned-over to the PNP for custody. The NBI shall inform the PNP on the case status and other
developments.

5.5 Bombing Incident

When applicable, above general considerations MUST be applied. The

following guidelines are highly recommended in the conduct of bombing/explosion incident investigation
and must be observed by all parties involved in the investigation.

5.5.1 Conduct a Preliminary Evaluation of the Crime Scene

5.5.1.1 First responders must access the scene quickly yet thoroughly to
determine the course of action to be taken. This assessment should include the scope of the incident,
emergency services required, safety concerns and evidentiary considerations.

5.5.1.2 Should a bombing incident occur while the vessel is underway, Post
Blast Investigation (PBI) will be conducted by the PNP Maritime Group or designated investigating
police unit to be assisted by SOCO Team. PNP Maritime Group or designated investigating police shall
furnish a copy of their findings to HPCG for legal reference by the Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI).

5.5.1.3 Bomb Blast Response on aircraft and other air transportation facilities,
Post Blast Investigation (PBI) will be conducted jointly by the PNP and NBI to be assisted by the SOCO
Team and NBI Forensic Experts. Designated investigating teams shall furnish copy of their findings to
AVSEGROUP for legal reference by the NOC-PNP, airline and airport management.

5.5.1.4 BEWARE OF SECONDARY DEVICES! The scene may contain

secondary devices designed specifically to kill or maim First Responders. DO NOT TOUCH ANY
SUSPICIOUS ITEMS. If a suspected secondary device is discovered, immediately leave the area and
contact AFP/PNP/NBI/PCG EOD personnel or bomb technicians.

5.5.1.5. Upon receipt of the report, first responders should:

5.5.1.3.1 Identify exact location of the incident.

5.5.1.3.2 Alert EOD teams and Fire department.

5.5.1.3.3 Notify higher headquarters and request assistance of

medical personnel.
5.5.1.3.4 Proceed to the scene immediately.

5.5.1.6. Upon Arrival at the scene.

5.5.1.4.1. Cause immediate evacuation of the injured.

5.5.1.4.2. Direct occupants of building/establishment to evacuate the

area.
5.5.1.4.3. Maintain order and control crowd.

5.5.1.7. Notify higher headquarters of the situation.

5.5.1.8. Seal off location until EOD Team determines if a secondary device
exists.
5.5.1.9. Arrest the suspect/s, if any.

5.5.1.10. Conduct rescue operations at the scene when necessary.

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5.5.1.11. Initiate immediate investigation (when investigators have not arrived

yet). Determine the following:

5.5.1.11.1. Time of detonation/explosion.

5.5.1.11.2. Time call (bomb threat) was received.
5.5.1.11.3. Type of device.
5.5.1.11.4. Other matters as in Paragraph 1.

5.5.1.12. Turnover the case to responding investigators and be prepared to

assist in the investigation.

5.5.1.13. Submit incident report immediately.

5.5.1.14. Avoid “speculative” press release. It is the job of the Incident

Commander or his designated spokesperson.

5.5.2. Exercise Scene Safety

5.5.2.1 Safety overrides all other concerns. First responders must take steps to
identify and remove or mitigate safety hazards that may further threaten victims, bystanders and public
safety personnel. They must exercise due caution while performing emergency operations to avoid
injuries to themselves and others.

5.5.2.2 Following the preliminary evaluation of the scene, first responders

should:
5.5.2.2.1 Request additional resources to mitigate hazards.

5.5.2.2.2 Utilize tools and personal protective equipment appropriate to

the task during all operations.

5.5.2.2.3 Request and/or conduct a safety sweep of the area by

personnel qualified to identify and evaluate additional hazards and safety concerns.

5.5.2.2.4 Mark hazards clearly and designate safety zones to receive

victims and evacuees.

5.5.3 Administer Lifesaving Efforts

5.5.3.1 First responders' primary responsibility is to rescue live victims and

provide treatment for life-threatening injuries. While performing emergency operations, they are to
preserve evidence and avoid disturbing areas not directly involved in the rescue activities, including
those that contain fatalities.

5.5.3.2 After performing a preliminary evaluation and establishing scene safety,

first responders should:

5.5.3.2.1 Initiate rescue of severely injured and/or trapped victims.

5.5.3.2.2 Evacuate ambulatory victims.
5.5.3.2.3 Perform triage.
5.5.3.2.4 Treat life-threatening injuries.
5.5.3.2.5 Leave fatalities and their surroundings undisturbed.
5.5.3.2.6 Avoid disturbing areas not directly involved in the rescue.

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5.5.4 Establish Security and Control

5.5.4.1 First responders will establish control and restrict scene access to
essential personnel, thereby aiding rescue efforts and scene preservation. First responders should also
initiate documentation.

5.5.4.2 To establish security and control, first responders should:

5.5.4.2.1 Set up a security perimeter.

5.5.4.2.2 Restrict access into and out of the scene through security
perimeter.
5.5.4.2.3 Establish staging areas to ensure that emergency vehicles
have access to the area.

5.5.4.2.4 Initiate documentation of the scene as soon as conditions

permit.

5.5.5 Define the Investigator Role

5.5.5.1 Upon confirmation of a bombing incident, the investigator must address

legal requirements for scene access, search and evidence seizure.

5.5.5.2 Only AFP/PNP/NBI/PCG EOD of qualified bomb technicians should

handle any suspected device located in the scene. The investigator should take no further action until
the device have been identified and rendered safe.

5.5.5.3 The investigator must coordinate with the Incident Commander and
First Responders to determine what occurred and assess the current situation. Subsequent procedures
will vary depending on the magnitude of the incident.

5.5.5.4 Upon arriving at and prior to entering the scene, the investigator should:
5.5.5.4.1 Introduce himself or herself to the Incident Commander.

5.5.5.4.2 Talk to the Incident Commander and first responders to

evaluate the situation, including safety concerns in order to evaluate the investigative assistance
needed.
5.5.5.4.3 Conduct briefing with essential personnel (e.g. law
enforcement, military, fire, EMS, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) personnel and utility service
personnel) to:
5.5.5.4.3.1 Evaluate initial scene safety prior to entry.
5.5.5.4.3.2 Ensure that a search for secondary explosive
devices has been conducted.
5.5.5.4.3.3 Ensure that the scene has been secured, that
perimeter and staging areas for the investigation have been established and that all personnel have
been advised of the need to prevent contamination of the scene.

5.5.6 Ensure Scene Integrity

5.5.6.1 The first responder and/or investigator must ensure the integrity of the
scene by establishing security perimeters, and staging areas and contamination control procedures.
Ensure preservation and/or collection of transient evidence.

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5.5.6.2 Prior to evidence collection, the investigators should:

5.5.6.2.1 Establish procedures to document personnel.

5.5.6.2.2 Establish procedures to prevent scene contamination.

5.5.7 Secure Necessary Resources

5.5.7.1 The Incident Commander should meet with available emergency

responders and investigative personnel to determine what resources, equipment and additional
personnel may be needed.

5.5.7.2 During the course of this meeting, the Incident Commander should:

5.5.7.2.1 Assess the nature and scope of the investigation through

information obtained during the walkthrough and from available personnel.

5.5.7.2.2 Advise personnel of any secondary devices or other hazards

found at the scene.

5.5.7.2.3 Ensure that a single list of victims/potential witnesses is

developed and their accounts of the incident are documented.

5.5.7.2.4 Ensure that the required evidence collection equipment as

well as processing and storage facilities are available.

5.5.7.2.5 Secure required equipment as determined by the scene

condition such as light and heavy equipment, hand tools, specialty equipment and personal safety items.

5.5.7.2.6 Ensure that sufficient utilities and support services are

requested (e.g. electricity, food, trash removal, sanitary services, security services and other public
services)

5.5.7.2.7 Advise emergency responders and the investigation team of

their specific assignments.

5.5.7.2.8 Remind personnel that evidence can take many forms; it is not
limited solely to components of the device(s).

5.5.8 Locate and Interview Victims and Witnesses

5.5.8.1 The investigators should obtain victims'/witnesses identities, statements

and information concerning their injuries.

5.5.8.2 The investigators should:

5.5.8.2.1 Identify and locate witnesses and prioritize interviews.

5.5.8.2.2 Attempt to fully identify witnesses and victims prior to their

departure.
5.5.8.2.3 Establish the relationships between witnesses, victims and
the scene.

5.5.8.2.4 Establish the basis for the witness' knowledge:

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How does the witness have knowledge of the incident?

5.5.8.2.5 Obtain statements from each witness.

5.5.8.2.6 Document thoroughly the victims' injuries and correlate

victims' locations at the time of the incident, with the seat(s) of the explosion(s).

5.5.8.2.7 Interview the medical examiner/coroner and hospital

emergency personnel regarding fatalities and injuries

5.5.9 Request for SOCO assistance from PNP Crime Laboratory and NBI Forensic
Laboratory. Upon confirmation of a bombing incident, the investigator should immediately request the
nearest Crime Laboratory unit or NBI Forensic Laboratory for SOCO.

5.5.10 Upon receipt of the request, the Crime Laboratory will assemble and dispatch the
SOCO Team to conduct Scene of Crime Operation

5.5.11 Effective organization and composition of the evidence processing team must be
addressed to ensure the proper search, collection, care, handling, preservation, and transportation of
pieces of evidence from the scene of the crime to the Crime Laboratory until its presentation to the
courts.

5.5.11.1 The size of the processing team depends on the magnitude of the
crime scene. The SOCO Team shall be composed of the following:

5.5.11.1.1 Team Leader

5.5.11.1.2 Assistant Team Leader
5.5.11.1.3 Photographer
5.5.11.1.4 Sketcher
5.5.11.1.5 Evidence Recorder/Custodian
5.5.11.1.6 Forensic Specialists
5.5.11.1.7 Driver/Security
5.5.11.1.8 AFP/NBI/PCG EOD/PNP bomb technician(s)

5.5.11.2 Additional SOCO Teams maybe requested to facilitate the processing of the
crime scene. EODT as part of the PBI team shall assist the PNP and NBI in the conduct of processing.

5.5.12 Organize the Evidence Processing by the SOCO Team.

5.5.12.1 Preparation Prior to the conduct of SOCO

5.5.12.1.1 Ensure the availability of packaging and collection materials

necessary for typical search circumstance.

5.5.12.1.2 Prepare the preliminary format for the paperwork needed to

document the conduct of the search

5.5.12.1.3 Make preliminary personnel assignments before arrival at the

scene, if practicable

5.5.12.1.4 Discuss upcoming search with the involved personnel

5.5.12.1.5 Consider the safety and welfare/convenience of search

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personnel. Be prepared for probable impediments which maybe poised by weather or terrain. Ensure
that basic crime scene search equipment are functional. These should consist of the communication,
lighting, first aid, and security equipment.

5.5.12.1.6 Ensure that all SOCO Team elements tasked to enter the
crime scene are wearing surgical gloves, protective suit, shoe cover, and if necessary hard hats.

5.5.12.1.7 Assess the personnel assignments normally required to

successfully process a crime scene and ensure that such assignments are in keeping with the training,
experience, attitude and aptitude of each individual.

5.5.12.2 Before deploying the team, the SOCO Team Leader should:

5.5.12.2.1 Review and reevaluate:

5.5.12.2.1.1 Scene boundaries

5.5.12.2.1.2 Safety concerns

5.5.12.2.1.3 Command Post/Staging Locations

5.5.12.2.1.4 Evidence processing/Storage Locations

5.5.12.2.1.5 Personnel and equipment needs

5.5.12.2.2 Identify the search procedure

5.5.12.2.3 Ensure that transient evidence has been collected

5.5.12.2.4 Consider onsite explosive detection by qualified personnel.

5.5.12.2.5 Brief the SOCO Team members and review the

assignments.

5.5.13 Security, Protection and Control of Contamination

5.5.13.1 Preventing contamination protects the integrity of the scene and other
search areas, the integrity of the evidence for forensic analysis and safety of personnel.

5.5.13.2 The SOCO Team and other authorized personnel who would want to
enter the crime scene shall use clean protective outer-garments and equipment. PNP/AFP/NBI/PCG
EOD/bomb technicians must be swabbed by Crime Laboratory personnel before entering the crime
scene to prevent cross contamination

5.5.13.3 Consider obtaining control samples, as applicable.

5.5.13.4 Package collected evidence in a manner that will prevent loss,

degradation or contamination.

5.5.13.5 Package, store and transport evidence from different scenes or

searches in separate external containers.

5.5.13.6 Additional local police to assist First Responders in preventing

unauthorized personnel from entering the crime scene, and record those who enter and leave the place
of interest.

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5.5.14 Conduct Scene Walkthrough

5.5.14.1 The respective Team Leader of SOCO and EOD unit must conduct a
walkthrough to establish scene parameters and acquire an overview of the incident.

5.5.14.2 During the scene walkthrough, the investigators should:

5.5.14.2.1 Reevaluate scene requirements.

5.5.14.2.2 Establish an entry and exit path for personnel.
5.5.14.2.3 Be alert to safety concerns.
5.5.14.2.4 Be alert to the location of physical evidence.
5.5.14.2.5 Locate the seat(s) of the explosion.

5.5.15 Develop Written Documentation

5.5.15.1 The SOCO Team will prepare written scene documentation to become
part of the permanent record.

5.5.15.2 Likewise, the SOCO Team should:

5.5.15.2.1 Document who had access to the scene.

5.5.15.2.2 Document activities, noting dates and times associated with

the incident and investigation.

5.5.15.2.3 Describe the overall scene in writing, noting physical and

environmental conditions.

5.5.15.2.4 Diagram and label scene features using sketches, floor

plans and architectural or engineering drawings.

5.5.15.2.5 Describe and document the scene with measuring

equipment which may include surveying equipment or GPS technology.

5.5.16 Photograph/Videotape the Scene

5.5.16.1 The SOCO Team must ensure that photographic documentation is

included in the permanent scene record. This documentation should be completed prior to the removal
or disturbance of any items.

5.5.16.2 The SOCO Team should:

5.5.16.2.1 Record overall views of the scene to spatially relate items

within and to the scene and surrounding area.

5.5.16.2.2 Consider muting the audio portion of any video recording

unless there is narration.

5.5.16.2.3 Minimize the presence of scene personnel in the

photographs/video.

5.5.16.2.4 Consider photographing/video graphing the assembled

crowd.

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5.5.16.2.5 Maintain photo and video logs.

5.5.17 Collect, Preserve, Inventory, Package and Transport of Evidence by the

SOCO Team.

5.5.17.1 The search focuses on the discovery of physical evidence that can be
used to identify/link the possible suspects.

5.5.17.2 To maximize the recovery and evaluation of all types of physical

evidence, the PNP SOCO Team should ensure:

5.5.17.2.1 The preparation of an evidence recovery log (See the

sample) that documents information, such as:

5.5.17.2.1.1 Item number

5.5.17.2.1.2 Description
5.5.17.2.1.3 Location found (grid number if used)
5.5.17.2.1.4 Collector’s name
5.5.17.2.1.5 Markings (either directly on the items)
5.5.17.2.1.6 Packaging method
5.5.17.2.1.7 Miscellaneous comments

5.5.17.2.2 The identification of evidence by the Bomb Squad/EOD

personnel

5.5.17.2.2.1 Assigning personnel to the designated search

area.

5.5.17.2.2.2 Initiating scene-specific search pattern(s) and

procedures including examination of immobile structures for possible evidence.

5.5.17.2.2.3 Assist the EOD in determining the method of bomb

delivery.

5.5.17.2.2.4 Establishing the seat(s) of the explosion(s), if

present.

5.5.17.2.2.5 The SOCO Team shall document blast effects.

5.5.17.2.2.6 The SOCO Team shall examine the crater,

vehicles, structures, etc.

5.5.17.2.2.7 The SOCO Team shall document the location(s) of

victims prior to and after the explosion.

5.5.17.2.2.8 The SOCO Team shall ensure that victims are

examined for bomb component/fragments. Autopsies should include full-body x-rays.

5.5.17.2.3 The collection of evidence, including:

5.5.17.2.3.1 Suspected bomb components and fragments,

including those recovered from the victims.

5.5.17.2.3.2 Suspected materials used in the construction and

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transportation of the explosive device(s).

5.5.17.2.3.3 Crater material.

5.5.17.2.3.4 Residues and other trace evidence.
5.5.17.2.3.5 Additional items of evidence.
5.5.17.2.3.6 Comparison samples of indigenous materials.

5.5.17.2.4 That evidence is:

5.5.17.2.4.1 Photographed.
5.5.17.2.4.2 Packaged and preserved in containers.
5.5.17.2.4.3 Labeled properly
5.5.17.2.4.4 Recorded in the evidence recovery log.
5.5.17.2.4.5 Secured in the designated storage location.

5.5.17.2.5 The labeling, transportation and storage of evidence by:

5.5.17.2.5.1 Placing evidence from different locations or

searches in separate external containers.

5.5.17.2.5.2 Labeling evidence for storage and shipment,

including identification of hazards.

5.5.17.2.5.3 Arranging for transportation of the evidence.

5.5.18 Ensure that Scene Processing is Completed

5.5.18.1 The scene may be released only upon conclusion of the onsite
investigation and a thorough evidence collection process.

5.5.18.2 The SOCO Team should perform a critical review of the scene
investigation with all personnel, to include the following actions:

5.5.18.2.1 Discuss with team members about the preliminary scene

findings and critical issues that arose during the incident.

5.5.18.2.2 Ensure that all identified pieces of evidence in custody.

5.5.18.2.3 Recovery and inventory of equipment.

5.5.18.2.4 Decontaminate equipment and personnel.

5.5.18.2.5 Photograph and/or video the final condition of the scene just
before it is released.

5.5.18.2.6 Address legal considerations.

5.5.18.2.7 Discuss post-scene issues.

5.5.18.2.8 Designate post-scene responsibilities.

5.5.19 Release of Scene by SOCO to Investigator-on-case

5.5.19.1 Ensure that appropriate inventory has been provided.

5.5.19.2 Release the scene with the notion that there is only one chance to

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perform the job correctly and completely.

5.5.19.3 Release is accomplished only after completion of the final survey and
proper documentation.

5.5.20 Ensure that All Investigative Steps are Documented.

5.5.20.1 To ensure that the permanent record will be completed, the

investigators should review all documentation before releasing the scene.

5.5.20.2 The investigator/s on case should verify that the following have been
addressed:
5.5.20.2.1 Documentation of series of activities undertaken and
decisions made related to investigation of the incident.

5.5.20.2.2 Personnel access log.

5.5.20.2.3 Activity log.
5.5.20.2.4 Review of interviews and events.
5.5.20.2.5 Narrative description of the scene.
5.5.20.2.6 Photo and Video Logs.
5.5.20.2.7 Diagrams, sketches and evidence mapping.
5.5.20.2.8 Evidence Recovery Log.

5.5.21 Turn-over of Crime Scene by Investigator-on-case to Authorized Person

5.5.21.1. Upon releasing the scene, the investigator should:

5.5.21.1.1 Address public health and safety issues by performing the

following tasks:

5.5.21.1.1.1 Contact public utilities.

5.5.21.1.1.2 Evaluate biological and chemical hazards.
5.5.21.1.1.3 Evaluate structural integrity issues.
5.5.21.1.1.4 Assess environmental issues.

5.5.21.1.2. Identify a receiving authority for the scene.

5.5.21.1.3 Ensure disclosure of all known health and safety issues to

a receiving authority.

5.5.21.1.4 Document the time and date of release, to whom the scene
is being released and by whom.

5.5.22 Reconstruction of Bomb Components

5.5.22.1 Upon completion of processing on all recovered items by the

Crime Laboratory, EOD unit may start the reconstruction process within the Crime Laboratory
facility.
5.5.22.2 The reconstruction process of IED using the actual collected
pieces of IED components (for purposes of determining the original appearance of the explosive
device before explosion) by the EOD Team should be documented (preferably by videotape or
photographs) by the Crime Laboratory for court presentation.

5.5.22.3 Pieces of evidence shall remain with the PNP Crime Laboratory
and NBI Forensic Laboratory custody.

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5.5.23.2.1 Accomplished Explosive-Related Incident (ERI) Form (to be

accomplished by concerned EOD Unit);

5.5.23.2.2 Post Blast Investigation Report/Technical Evaluation

Report (TER)
5.5.23.2.3 Final Investigation Report
5.5.23.2.4 Accomplished SOCO Form
5.5.23.2.5 Result of laboratory examination
5.5.23.2.6 Other relevant reports/documents

Note: Submission can be on digital copy (preferably PDF format for reports and JPEG format for
photographs. Please email at do_pbdc@yahoo.com.ph)

5.5.23.3 In return, bulletins produced by PBDC and approved by the Director

of Intelligence of the PNP from submitted reports shall be disseminated to designated AFP Liaison
Officer or other agencies.

6. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

6.1 On Exchange of Information Between PNP, AFP, NBI and PCG

6.1.1 Concerned division within AFP J2 shall serve as repository of Explosive Related
Incident (ERI) data from all AFP units and designation of a Liaison Officer to whom PBDC shall
coordinate and follow-up for the ERI report requirements. NBI and PCG (CG2) shall likewise do the
same.

6.1.2 All information related to the illegal use of explosives collected from the PNP, AFP,
NBI and PCG and stored at the PBDC shall be open for official use/purpose to all law enforcement
agencies and AFP Units and shall be released thru the agency’s designated Liaison Officer.

6.2 In Cases Wherein an Explosion Caused Subsequent Conflagration

6.2.1 Responding BFP/Fire Volunteer Brigade personnel should be advised beforehand

of the location/site of explosion.

6.2.2 Fire on the specific area of explosion should only be contained and not be over
flooded with water to ensure the collection and usefulness of pieces of evidence.

6.3 On Jurisdictional Issues

6.3.1 Existing policies, memorandum of agreement or circulars pertaining to

jurisdictional issues shall be adopted in this protocol.

6.3.2 All PNP/AFP/NBI/PCG EOD and Bomb Technicians, and SOCO personnel will
coordinate with the PNP Regional Director, the designated Incident Commander who has jurisdictional
authority in the area or his authorized representative in the event of an explosives-related incident.
Likewise, the AFP/NBI/PCG EOD units will coordinate with their respective military commanders/heads
of offices in the area prior dispatch to the explosive incident scene.

6.3.3 Lateral coordination within PNP/AFP/NBI/PCG is highly encouraged.

6.3.4. Similarly, all heads/chiefs of other responding units including volunteer

organizations should coordinate with the PNP Regional Director or his authorized representative, the

21
INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

designated Incident Commander.

6.3.5 If the initial investigation points to arson as the motive for the bombing, the case
should be referred to the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation and prosecution of suspects.

6.4 On the Prosecution of Cases

6.4.1 All PNP and NBI personnel involved in the processing of the explosive incident
scene shall make themselves available as witness during court proceeding. However, when AFP
personnel, upon request of the PNP are made to testify in court, incidental expenses must be
shouldered by the PNP.

6.5 On Information Dissemination to the Media and Public

6.5.1 Existing SOPs, policies and protocols on information dissemination to the

media and public shall be adopted in this protocol.

6.6 Disposition of Explosive Evidence

6.6.1 After the thorough processing and exploitation of pieces of explosive evidence,
materials should be subjected for immediate disposal, if the same possess hazard to public safety and
the same is not be used as physical evidence in court, provided, that the disposal is covered by proper
documentation. If a case is filed in the prosecutor’s office, disposal thereof must be with the consent of
the prosecutor concerned. If the case is in court, an order to that effect is necessary.

6.7 Explosive Related Incident Report

6.7.1. The most senior PNP/AFP/NBI/PCG EOD or bomb technicians involved in the
investigation should accomplish the Explosive Incident Report for uniformity and submit a copy to the
PBDC-IG.

6.8 Others

6.8.1 Validation of compliance to the Protocol at the operational level through case
studies of any explosive-related incident shall be conducted at least twice a year by the Counter-
Terrorism Unit (CTU), Anti-Terrorism Council and representative/s from concerned agencies.

6.8.2 Other issues not discuss herein including problems encountered MUST be
brought to the Protocol Committee for solution, correction, adoption or revision.

6.8.3 The PBDC will initiate regular coordinating conference pertaining to IED Trends,
updates on development of IED’s local and neighboring ASEAN countries.

22
INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereby sign and adopt this protocol this 26th day
of November, 2009 at Bonifacio Hall, Malacañang, Manila.

23
INTER-AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR EXPLOSIVES-RELATED INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

FAQs
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

1. Q: What is the primary responsibility of responding EOD units in anexplosive

related incident?

A: The primary responsibility of responding EOD unit in an explosive related

incident is to eliminate the explosive threat.

2. Q: Since PNP SOCO and NBI Forensic experts are the only authorized persons to
process, document, and conduct laboratory examination of gathered physical evidence in a
explosive related incident as stated in paragraph 5.1.3, can AFP and other agency EOD Teams
request their availability when needed given only a short time of notification?

A: Yes, as stated in paragraph 5.4.2, an EOD Team after a discovery of IED/s

in an area and after the conduct of RSP, it can request the assistance of local police and
SOCO Team who have jurisdiction over the area.

3. Q: In case the SOCO Team and the local Police Investigators are not available in an
explosive related incident due to security concerns, can the AFP EOD unit proceed to conduct
investigation?

Answer: Yes, in the absence of the local police and the SOCO Team due to
security, responding EOD Team shall inform the Chief of Police or the Provincial and/or
Regional Director of the incident who has jurisdiction over the area. After coordination, the
responding EOD Team can now proceed with identification, marking, collection and proper
documentation and preservation of evidence. In cases where the pieces of evidence were
handled with bare hands by members of EOD Team, subject(s) will be fingerprinted by the
SOCO for suspect elimination as stated in paragraph 5.4.3.

4. Q: In a post blast incident, is there a “time table or waiting time” for PNP SOCO in
order that responding AFP EOD unit and the local police can commence the conduct of post blast
investigation in case the former will not be able to respond on time?

Answer: There is no specific “waiting time”, the start of the post blast investigation
will be the “call” of the designated “Incident Commander”. If the latter determines that
extending the time to wait for the SOCO and NBI forensics experts will jeopardize the
investigation, the incident commander can commence the Post Blast Investigation (PBI) as
stated in paragraph 5.1.4. However, EOD personnel must see to it that they will swab
themselves with sterile cotton and alcohol before and after processing the crime scene and
that the swabbing shall be placed in a plastic container and properly labeled before
submission to PNP Crime Laboratory (CL) or NBI Forensics Laboratory to avoid “cross
contamination” of the crime scene as stated in paragraph 5.1.8.

5. Q: In cases of explosive related incidents where PNP SOCO, NBI and local PNP
investigators are unavailable, can the responding EOD unit be obliged to turn-over and/or
provide corresponding reports to the local police having jurisdiction over the area where the
explosive related incident transpired?

Answer: Yes, paragraph 5.4.4 states that, all collected components of explosive
device/s, documents such as video recordings or photograph and corresponding spot reports
on the incident shall be turned-over to the concerned local police within a reasonable period
of time. Explosive-Related Incident Report and/or Post Blast Investigation Report must also
be submitted in due time.

25
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

6. Q: Can EOD units other than PNP EOD units retain or take custody of explosives
evidence?

A: Yes, in cases when there are no PNP EOD units in areas where an explosive
related incident occur, the responding EOD unit can retain the collected pieces of explosive
evidence and shall be designated as custodian of said items and will sign in the Crime
Laboratory’s Evidence Chain of Custody Form. However, non-explosive components of IEDs
collected such as power sources, switches, containers and fragments shall be properly turned-
over to the concerned PNP Crime Laboratory for forensics examination and custody as stated
in paragraph 5.4.7.

7. Q: How do EOD units dispose of hazardous pieces of explosive evidence in custody?

A: Upon determination that the collected pieces of explosive evidence in their

custody are already extremely hazardous to store, concerned EOD unit shall immediately
inform the PNP investigating unit who has jurisdiction over it in order for the latter to request
the court of jurisdiction for its immediate disposal. Upon approval of the court, the concerned
EOD unit shall undertake the appropriate disposal operations witnessed by the PNP
investigating unit and the CL unit concerned. The activity will be properly documented for
reference as stated in paragraphs 5.4.9 and 5.4.10.

8. Q: If no case is filed in court, how do EOD units dispose of hazardous pieces of

explosive evidence in custody?

A: In cases where no lawsuit is filed in court, the EOD units taking custody of
the explosives evidence shall dispose of said items according to the existing policies.

9. Q: In cases of multiple EOD units respond to an explosive related incident, what

EOD unit will undertake the necessary render safe procedure in order to eliminate the threat?

A: In case where AFP/NBI/PNP and PCG EOD units are present in an

explosive incident, the EOD unit who first took cognizance of the IED threat will respond and
conduct appropriate render safe procedure. Likewise, said unit shall also advise all other EOD
units in the area to standby and provide assistance when needed as stated in paragraph 4.4
and 5.2.2 respectively.

10. Q: Can EOD Bomb Technicians from other agency form part of an Evidence
Processing Team (EPT) or SOCO Team that will conduct PBI?

A: Yes, the EOD/Bomb Technicians can be members of an EPT or SOCO

Team. In case of larger magnitude explosive related incidents, additional SOCO teams maybe
created or requested to process the crime scene. The EOD/Bomb Technicians as part of the
PBI Team shall assist the PNP CL and the NBI in the conduct of processing as stated in
paragraph 5.5.11.2 One other important role of EOD/Bomb Technicians in a SOCO team is
the reconstruction of IED using the actual collected pieces of evidence to determine the actual
appearance of the IED prior to explosion. Said reconstruction should be documented by PNP
CL preferably by videotape or photograph for court presentation as stated in paragraph
5.5.22.2.

11. Q: During prosecution of cases, is the AFP EOD personnel that formed part of SOCO
team obliged to become witness in court?

A: No, as stated in paragraph 5.1.6, AFP personnel should not be included in

the order of precedence of court witnesses because of the mobile nature of assignment unless

26
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

otherwise compelled by court. Upon receipt of subpoena and coordination with the court, the
AFP can designate representative with equal or higher technical expertise belonging to the
same unit of the same area of jurisdiction to appear in court. Likewise, when requested by the
PNP, AFP EOD Technicians that formed part of the SOCO team can stand as witness in court
proceedings. However, incidental expenses must be shouldered by the PNP as stated in
paragraph 6.4.1.

12. Q: What is the Philippine Bomb Data Center (PBDC) and what are its
responsibilities?

A: The Philippine Bomb Data Center was established in 2005 as a coordinating

office to support the government’s campaign against terrorism. The center’s responsibility is
to provide technical, operational support, and monitors all unlawful use of explosives, both
domestics and international. It has a link with other international bomb data centers for
technical information sharing. The center is maintaining a Local Incidents Database that
contained information on all explosive-related incidents from 1990 to date. At present, PBDC
is under the supervision of the PNP Directorate for Intelligence.

13. Q: What are the explosive-related incidents needed to be reported to PBDC?

Bombing – any incident in which a device constructed with criminal intent and
using high explosives, low explosives, or blasting agents explodes (note: These terms also refer
to incidents where premature detonation occurs during preparation, transportation, or
placement of a device so constructed);
Explosion – an unplanned or premature detonation/ignition of explosive/
incendiary material possessing explosive properties (note: The activity leading to the
detonation/ignition had no criminal intent. Usually associated with legal, industrial or
commercial activities.);
Attempted Bombings / Attempted Incendiary – incidents in which a device
designed or purposely contrived to detonate/ignite fails to function (note: Intent of activity
was criminal in nature. Pertains to malfunctioning, recovered, and/or disarmed devices.);
Incendiary Bombing – any criminally motivated bombing incident in which an
incendiary/chemical device is used (e.g. molotov cocktail);
Theft – the theft of explosives and associated materials;
Cache/Recovered or Found of Explosive/IED – any seized, abandoned, or
purchases (undercover) explosives/military ordnance materials taken into custody by PNP or
other law enforcement agencies;
Hoax Device – an inactive or “dummy” device designed and intended to appear
as a bomb or explosive material; and
Bomb Threat - an information or warning claiming knowledge that a
dangerous device, such as a bomb or similar type of explosive, has been or will be placed in a
building, aircraft or other facilities.

14. Q: What are the significant reports needed to be furnished to PBDC?

A: Incident Report (with photographs)

Accomplished Explosive-Related Incident (ERI) Form (to be accomplished by
responding EOD Unit)
Post Blast Investigation Report / Technical Evaluation Report
Final Investigation Report
SOCO and Laboratory Report
Other relevant reports/documents

27
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

15. Q: How can EOD units forward report to PBDC and can EOD units seek technical
assistance from them?

A: You could send your reports and contact PBDC by means of mail or email.
For hard copy: Please mail it to 2nd Floor PNP Training Service Annex, Camp Crame, QC

For digital/electronic copy: Please email your report (preferably in word or PDF format) to
do_pbdc@yahoo.com.ph.

For technical assistance, you can contact PBDC to following contact numbers:

PBDC Hotline:

Direct Line: (02) 412-0065

Through CRAMETEX: 7230401 local 4496 / 4497

16. Q: How can PBDC provide technical advices?

A: PBDC produces two types of bulletins which contained significant

information that resulted from the technical analysis conducted based on the reports
forwarded to the Center and actual examination made on the discovered explosive device. The
Intelligence Bulletin can be used in formulating analysis/ plans for future operations; while
the Technical Bulletin updates local EOD and SOCO personnel with the latest IED trend.

Further, PBDC is also planning to have a semestral IED Trend Seminar wherein
EOD/Bomb Technicians/PBI Investigators/SOCO personnel nationwide will be updated of the
latest development on the use of improvised explosive device (IED) both national and
international.

17. Q: What PBDC do in case of found/recovered IED/IED components?

A: In case suspect/s were immediately identified and charged in court in

relation with the recovered explosive items, PBDC personnel shall be dispatched to the area to
conduct technical analysis on the materials. On the other hand, in cases where no suspect
was identified and no case was filed, all turned over improvised explosive device/s and related
materials (after processing by the CL) shall be forwarded as soon as possible to the following:
Philippine Bomb Data Center in Camp Crame for recoveries in Luzon and Visayas; PBDC
Satellite Office in Camp Catitipan, Davao City for recoveries in Mindanao, for the conduct of
technical analysis and subsequent disposition. PBDC personnel who shall receive the items
must sign in the CL’s Chain of Custody Form (paragraph 5.4.6)

18. Q: Can the PCG EOD Unit conduct PBI when bombing incident happens while the
vessel is underway?

A: No, the PCG EOD Unit will conduct intensive search for possible secondary
device and will conduct RSP if necessary while the PNP Maritime Group or designated
investigating police unit to be assisted by SOCO Team will conduct PBI as stated in
paragraph 5.5.1.2.

28
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

19. Q: What is the role of BFP in cases of reported presence of explosive in any structure
or establishment?

A: BFP shall act as a support unit to the responding EOD Unit.

20. Q: What is the role of BFP In cases of an actual fire incident due to an explosive?

A: In coordination with responding EOD Unit, the BFP shall act upon its duty
to carry out fire suppression operation and medical and rescue services.

21. Q: What is the role of BFP in investigation activities of cases where an actual fire
incident due to an explosive?

A: The BFP Arson Investigators shall coordinate with EOD/PNP investigators in

determining the matters pertaining to the occurrence of fire. The BFP Arson Investigators
shall be supplementary to EOD/PNP investigators but shall be provided as well with reports
pertaining to the incident for documentation purposes. In all matters, a BFP EXPLOSIVE
CRISIS/INCIDENT FORM shall be accomplished.

22. Q: In case an explosive was accidentally found during the conduct of Fire Safety
Inspection in all kinds of establishment, bus terminals ,and/or shipyards, what is the role of
BFP?

A: : BFP shall immediately inform the nearest EOD Unit in the area and act as
support unit.

23. Q: In cases of large explosion where a joint investigation among the AFP, PNP, NBI,
PCG and BFP was created, who will be the lead agency?

A: Paragraph 4.1 of the Protocol provides that consistent with its mandates, the
PNP and the NBI will jointly conduct investigation of any case of explosive incident with the
PNP as lead agency. However, the respective heads (AFP, PNP,NBI, BFP and PCG) of the
investigating agencies will each sign in the report or transmittal in cases of prosecution
considering that there is an existing Joint Task Force created for that purpose.

24. Q: On discovery of explosives/IEDs and its components as a result of NBI legitimate

operation where shall the seized explosives/IEDs be turned over?

A: After conducting proper standard operating procedures and documentation

of evidence, the NBI EOD shall turn over the seized explosives or IEDs to the Philippine Army
EOD, Battalion who has sufficient explosives magazine for safekeeping prior to disposal upon
approval of the trial court who has jurisdiction of the case (Pls. refer to paragraph 5.4 of the
Protocol).

25. Q: Who will assist in the Prosecution of Cases?

A: Paragraph 6.4 of the Protocol states that all PNP (CIDG) and NBI (Agents/
Special Investigators) personnel involved in the processing of the explosion incident scene
shall make themselves available as witness during court proceeding.

29
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

Technical Evaluation Report Format

HEADQUARTERS
EXPLOSIVES ORDNANCE DISPOSAL BATTALION, ASCOM, PHILIPPINE ARMY
Fort Andres Bonifacio, Metro Manila

EODBX Date: ______________

SUBJECT: Technical Evaluation Report on the Recovered IED on

______ at vicinity ___________ by __________________.

TO: Commander, ASCOM, PA

Post
(Attn: ACS for Intelligence, G2)

1. References:

The materials/documents used as basis for the accomplishment of this report.

2. Task Organization:

The composition and names of personnel involved in the conduct of the technical
inspection.

3. Background:

Brief summary on how the IED was detected; when and where it was recovered; and by
whom. (It is recommended t hat pictures depicting the above actions will be incorporated along with the
narrative of the background for clearer understanding.)

4. Tactical Characterization: (A description of how an IED incident was conducted or planned

to be conducted. This characterization provides context for how a specific device is used/intended to be
used).

a. Tactical Design (The specific design of an IED attack. Tactical design addresses the
questions of “why here, why now, and why in this way.” Terms used to describe a specific type of device
or component of a device (e.g. VBIED) are often used to describe all or part of the tactical design.

1) Method of Employment (Suicide/Non Suicide; VBIED, Underbelly,

Person-borne IED, postal IED, etc.)

2) Method of Emplacement (Sub-surface/Boobytrapped; Surface

Overhead)

3) Role of IED (Primary; Secondary or Tertiary Device)

4) Incident Geometry (Distance to target; angle of attack (device); Line

of sight)

5) Attack Geography (Ingress/Egress routes; Cover and concealment

and aim point)

30
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

6) Environmental Conditions (Time of Day; Visibility; and Weather)

b. Intended Outcome (Immediate and direct goals or objectives of an enemy’s IED

attack. Such objectives include anti-armor, anti-vehicle, anti-infrastructure, anti- personnel, anti-aircraft,
TTP identification, and criminal

5. Nomenclature:

a. Make (Standard or Improvised)

b. Functioning (How does the device function or initiated)

c. Technical Categorization (A description of an IED using a hierarchical construct to

identify its key components. The components identified in this categorization are the elements from
which technical and forensic information is recovered and exploited)

1) Switch (A device for making, breaking, or changing a connection)

2) Power Source (The source of power – that either stores or releases

electrical or mechanical energy – for the initiation of an IED or improvised weapon. The key elements of
information about a power source are its type/source, its voltage, and how the power source is
connected.

3) Initiator (Used to describe any device that may be used to start a detonation
or deflagration. May or may not be a detonator.

4) Container (An item or vessel that commonly houses the whole IED or
principal components of an IED).

5) Explosive Filler/Main Charge (The bulk explosive component of an IED

capable of providing an explosion by its own energy when initiated)

6) Enhancements (Are optional additional component deliberately added as

opposed to a secondary hazard that modifies the effects of the IED. The IED would be effective, yet
produce a different measurable result if this effect was not added. This effect can be additional physical
destruction, proliferation of dangerous substances or other effects to enhance the outcome of the IED. )

6. Analysis and Conclusion:

Based on the facts presented on the Tactical Characterization of the IED incident and
the Nomenclature of the IED

7. Recommendations:

Commanding Officer

31
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

Post Blast Investigation Report Format

HEADQUARTERS
EXPLOSIVES ORDNANCE DISPOSAL BATTALION, ASCOM, PHILIPPINE ARMY
Fort Andres Bonifacio, Metro Manila

EODBX Date: ________________

SUBJECT: Post Blast Investigation Report on the Explosion that transpired on

______ at vicinity ___________.

TO: Commander, ASCOM, PA

Post
(Attn: ACS for Intelligence, G2)

1. References:

The materials/documents used as basis for the accomplishment of this report.

2. Task Organization:

The composition and names of personnel involved in the conduct of the Post Blast
Investigation on the above explosive/IED incident.

3. Background:

Brief summary on how the IED was detected; when and where it was recovered; and by
whom. (It is recommended that pictures depicting the above actions will be incorporated along with the
narrative of the background for clearer understanding.)

4. Result of the Explosion:

Damages and casualties incurred as a result of the explosion. (It is recommended that
pictorials depicting the cited result of explosion will be incorporated)

5. Recovered Pieces of Evidence:

List down all recovered pieces of evidence (It is also recommended that pictorials
depicting the listed recovered pieces of evidence will be incorporated)

6. Analysis of the Incident:

a. Tactical Characterization: (A description of how an IED incident was conducted or

planned to be conducted. This characterization provides context for how a specific device is used/
intended to be used).

1. Tactical Design (The specific design of an IED attack. Tactical design

addresses the questions of “why here, why now, and why in this way.” Terms used to describe a specific
type of device or component of a device (e.g. VBIED) are often used to describe all or part of the tactical
design.
a) Method of Employment (Suicide/Non Suicide; VBIED, Underbelly,
Person-borne IED, postal IED, etc.)

32
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

b) Method of Emplacement (Sub-surface/Boobytrapped; Surface

Overhead)

c) Role of IED (Primary; Secondary or Tertiary Device)

d) Incident Geometry (Distance to target; angle of attack (device); Line

of sight)

e) Attack Geography (Ingress/Egress routes; Cover and concealment

and aim point)

f) Environmental Conditions (Time of Day; Visibility; and Weather)

2. Intended Outcome (Immediate and direct goals or objectives of an enemy’s

IED attack. Such objectives include anti-armor, anti-vehicle, anti-infrastructure, anti- personnel, anti-
aircraft, TTP identification, and criminal.

b. Technical Categorization (A description of an IED using a hierarchical construct to

identify its key components. The components identified in this categorization are the elements from
which technical and forensic information is recovered and exploited)

1) Switch (A device for making, breaking, or changing a connection)

2) Power Source (The source of power – that either stores or releases

electrical or mechanical energy – for the initiation of an IED or improvised weapon. The key elements of
information about a power source are its type/source, its voltage, and how the power source is
connected.

3) Initiator (Used to describe any device that may be used to start a detonation
or deflagration. May or may not be a detonator.

4) Container (An item or vessel that commonly houses the whole IED or
principal components of an IED).

5) Explosive Filler/Main Charge (The bulk explosive component of an IED

capable of providing an explosion by its own energy when initiated)

6) Enhancements (Are optional additional component deliberately added as

opposed to a secondary hazard that modifies the effects of the IED. The IED would be effective, yet
produce a different measurable result if this effect was not added. This effect can be additional physical
destruction, proliferation of dangerous substances or other effects to enhance the outcome of the IED. )

7. Conclusion:

Based on the facts presented on the Tactical Characterization of the IED incident and
the Nomenclature of the IED

8. Recommendations:

Commanding Officer

33
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

EXPLOSIVE-RELATED INCIDENT REPORT FORM (Revised 7/2009)

For Bombing - to be accomplished by PBI Responding Teams (Bomb Squad/EOD Unit, SOCO and
investigators)
For Recovery – to be accomplished by responding Bomb Squad/EOD unit.

BDC Incident No.____________(Please leave this blank) Date Submitted:

Police Blotter Number:

Reporting PNP/AFP Units
Chief of Police / Incident
Rank/Name
Commander
Investigator-on-Case Rank/Name
Address
Unit Contact Details Phone
E-mail
EOD/Bomb Squad Unit:
Team Leader Rank/Name
Address
Unit Contact Details Phone
E-mail
SOCO Unit:
Team Leader Rank/Name
Address
Unit Contact Details Phone
E-mail
Date/Time of Incident
Location

Bombing Theft
Incident Cate-
gory Others
Attempted Bombing Recovery

Injuries Number:
Yes No
Deaths Number:
Yes No

Pre Incident Threat Method of Threat:

Yes No

Post Incident Threat Method of Threat:

Yes No

34
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

Government Private
Target

Commercial Others
Details

Details:
Suspect/s and Group Affiliation:

Switch Components
Details:
a. Printed Circuit Board (PCB)

b. Wire Details:

c. Switch Details:

d. Indicator Light Details:

e. Resistor Details:

f. Capacitor Details:

g. Transistor Details:

h. Integrated Circuit Details:

i. Relay Details:

j. Mobile Phone Details:

k. SIM Card Details:

l. Match Stick Details:

m. Clothes Pin Details:

n. Door Bell / Chime Details:

Details:
o. Silicon-Controlled Rectifier

p. 2-way Radio Details:

q. Others, please describe:

Power Source

Battery Details:

Direct Current Details:

35
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

Initiator
Details:
a. Electric Blasting Cap

Details:
b. Non-Electric Blasting Cap

Details:
c. Shock Tube

Details:
d. Fuse

Details:
e. Others

Container

Details:
Explosives
Details:
a. Military Ordnance

Details:
b. Military Explosive

Details:
c. Grenade

Details:
d. Commercial Explosive

Details:
e. Home-Made

Details:
f. Liquid Explosive

Details:
g. Pyrotechnics

Details:
h. Others

Fragmentation
Details:
a. Nails

Details:
b. Ball Bearing

Details:
c. Steel Rebar

Details:
d. Others

36
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

Incident Details (Narrative)

Include information on injuries, property damage, motive and incident description, device location, mode of de-
vice delivery and any other relevant information.

Render Safe Procedure Utilized

List action/s taken by reporting unit and any information that needs to be disseminated to other bomb technicians
and/or EOD personnel. e.g. Device rendered safe by remote approach utilizing disruptor.

37
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

Attachments

List and describe digital photos (particularly close-up photographs of recovered explosive device components),
IED diagram/layout attached to this form.

Submitted by:

Signature: _________________________________ Date: / /

Rank/Name/Designation:

Notes:
Use of extra sheets if necessary.
Pictures for submission are requested to be in digital form and in JPEG format.
Please transmit this accomplished form through Email at do_pbdc@yahoo.com.ph or mail to Philippine
Bomb Data Center at 2nd Floor PNP Training Service Building 2, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

38
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Disposition Form
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
When answering please refer to : SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (IF ANY)
Corresponding entry No.

( CONFIDENTIAL)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(FILE NO.) : SUBJECT/ S : " Unknown"

Re: Explosion Incident

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For: From: Date: Comment No.

FINAL REPORT ON EXPLOSION INCIDENT

Reference:

Facts of the Case:

Comments/ Recommendations:

39
REPORT FORMS AND FORMAT

Republic of the Philippines

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
BUREAU OF FIRE PROTECTION
National Capital Region

BFP EXPLOSIVE CRISIS/INCIDENT FORM

Name of Caller : ________________________________________

Designation : ________________________________________

Location/Structure Involved : ________________________________________

Date and Time of Call : ________________________________________

* NOTE: A SPOT INVESTIGATION REPORT SHOULD BE ATTACHED IN CASE OF A FIRE INCIDENT

First Responding Unit/s :

Estimated Area Involved (in sqm) :

Estimated No. of People Involved :

Brief Operation Details :

Investigator on Case: EOD/PNP Ground Officer: BFP Ground Commander

__________________________ _______________________ ________________________

__________________________ _______________________ ________________________

40
 INTER-AGENCY TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP

The members and representatives of the EOD Primer TWG. Standing from left: MAJ RAMON
TORRES (EODBN), LTC ROGELIO ULANDAY (AFPMCC), COL ANTONIO SUGAROL (NCTU),
FSUPT ARNEL LOGRONIO (BFP), LT JOSELITO MALUYO (PCG), SI 1V ROMEO COTINGJO
(NBI) and PSUPT JONATHAN URETA (NCTU). Seated from left: Ms. MERCY SAB-IT (NCTU),
PSSUPT REYNALDO TAÑADA (NCTU) and PSUPT IRENE RIGONAN (PBDC-IG, PNP).