NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), PETITIONER, V.

SPOUSES RUFO AND TOMASA

LLORIN, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CORAZON CANDELARIA,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 195217, January 13, 2021

Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) 1 assails the Court of Appeals' Decision2 dated June 27,
2008 and Resolution3 dated January 12, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101986 upholding the order for NPC
to vacate subject property and to pay monthly rentals thereon.

Antecedents

A complaint of unlawful detainer was filed against NPC docketed Civil Case No. 12712
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)-Naga City by respondents Sps. Rufo and Tomasa
LLorin represented by their attorney-in-fact, Corazon Candelaria.
Sps LLorin alleged that they are the registered owners of a 102,606 square meters parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29725 (Lot 31662-B-2 of subdivision survey PSD-
050020261) located in Brgy. San Felipe, Naga City. In 1978, a total of 10500 square meters of the
property was occupied by the NPC where the 69 kV Naga Tinambak power transmission lines was
instaled without the consent of the predecessors-in-interest. But the predecessors-in-interest
tolerated the occupation of the NPC provided, the structures of the NPC was only temporary, and
that NPC would vacate the property when the owners will need the property and monthly rentals
would be paid by the latter.
Unfortunately, when they demanded the return of the property and the monthly rentals,
NPC continuously failed and refused to heed with their demand. Thus, on August 30, 2006, last
formal letter of demand was served to NPC.
NPC’s answer was a compulsory counterclaim, claiming that the case should be dismissed
for it has no cause of action against it, for the said transmission assets was transferred to the
National Transmission Corporation (TRNSPO) by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136 (RA 9136). The
complaint was barred by prescription and laches.

Ruling of the MTCC:

On June 19, 2007, MTCC ruled in favor of Spouses Llorin ordering NAPOCOR to vacate the subject
properties and turnover it to the plaintiff, to pay the monthly rental to the plaintiff which amounted
to P5,000.00 per month for the use of the land from September 2006 until the land is finally vacated
and lasty, to pay the plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fee plus cost.
SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

On appeal, RTC-Naga City, Branch 26, affirmed under Decision dated December 7, 2007.
NPC consequently went to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)

The decision in the MTCC and RTC has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient for unlawful
detainer to prosper. The right of Spouses Llorin to recover possession of their property cannot be
defeated by laches or prescription. The non-inclusion of TRANSCO in the case was not fatal
considering that the parties, during the pre-trial, had already agreed that the ownership of the
transmission lines remained with NPC and TRANSCO is its operator.

Under Resolution dated January 12, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied NPC's motion for
reconsideration.

The Present Petition

NPC argues in the main that (1) the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint, (2) the complaint was already barred by laches and prescription, (3) TRANSCO, an
indispensable party, was not impleaded, and (4) the proper remedy of Spouses Llorin was to claim
for just compensation.
Considering that Spouses Llorin failed to file the required comment, the Court resolved to dispense
with it per Resolution dated October 9, 2019.

Issue

Does an action for unlawful detainer lie to oust the NPC (TRANSCO) from the property which holds
its 69 kV Naga-Tinambac power transmission lines since 1978?

Ruling

We reverse.

There is no dispute that since 1978, subject property has been devoted for a public purpose serving
as site for the government's 69 kV Naga-Tinambac power transmission lines. Under RA 9136,
TRANSCO has assumed the electrical transmission functions of the NPC, including the latter's
power of eminent domain necessary for the discharge of these functions. Sec. 8 of RA 9136
provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 8. Creation of the National Transmission Company. There is hereby created a National
Transmission Corporation, hereinafter referred to as TRANSCO, which shall assume the electrical
transmission function of the National Power Corporation (NPC), and have the power and functions
hereinafter granted. The TRANSCO shall assume the authority and responsibility of NPC for the
planning, construction and centralized operation and maintenance of its high voltage transmission
facilities, including grid interconnections and ancillary services.

Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, the transmission and sub transmission
facilities of NPC and all other assets related to transmission operations, including the nationwide
franchise of NPC for the operation of the transmission system and the grid, shall be transferred to
the TRANSCO. The TRANSCO shall be wholly owned by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM Corp.).

The sub transmission functions and assets shall be segregated from the transmission functions,
assets and liabilities for transparency and disposal: Provided, That the sub transmission assets shall
be operated and maintained by TRANSCO until their disposal to qualified distribution utilities
which are in a position to take over the responsibility for operating, maintaining, upgrading, and
expanding said assets. All transmission and sub transmission related liabilities of NPC shall be
transferred to and assumed by the PSALM Corp.

TRANSCO shall negotiate with and thereafter transfer such functions, assets, and associated
liabilities to the qualified distribution utility or utilities connected to such sub transmission
facilities not later than two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act or the start of open access,
whichever comes earlier: x x x.
For reasons of public policy and public necessity, as well as equitable estoppel, the remedy of
unlawful detainer is unavailing to compel a public utility to vacate subject property. "The proper
recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner filing
the proper action for recovery of just compensation and consequential damages; or (2) to dismiss
the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation or
condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and consequential damages assessed
therein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the just
compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of
Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the value of the subject land." Thus, it is well-
settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment against a public
utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied the land
belonging to the former in the interest of public service without prior acquisition of title thereto by
negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel the
public utility corporation to vacate such property is unavailing since the landowner is denied the
remedies of ejectment and injunction for reasons of public policy and public necessity as well as
equitable estoppel. The proper recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the case without
prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action for recovery of just compensation and
consequential damages; or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to
institute the proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation
and consequential damages assessed therein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an
expropriation case and determine the just compensation and consequential damages pursuant to
Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the value
of the subject land.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 27, 2008 and Resolution dated
January 12, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101986 as well as the Decision dated
June 19, 2007 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities-Naga City, Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 12712
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for unlawful detainer filed before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities-Naga City, Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 12712 is DISMISSED, without prejudice to
the filing of the action for just compensation and consequential damages.

SO ORDERED.
 DOLORES DE VERA, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. CENON J. NAVARRO, RESPONDENT.

A.C. No. 12912, January 18, 2021

The present administrative case arose from a verified Sumbong Salaysay filed by
complainant Dolores De Vera (Dolores) against respondent Atty. Cenon J. Navarro (Atty. Navarro)
for his alleged failure to furnish the Archive Office of Malolos City, Bulacan a copy of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment and Use of Surname (Affidavit) executed by Dolores' deceased husband, Manuel De
Vera, Jr. (Manuel) on August 7, 2007.

Antecedents
1996, Dolores gave birth to Donna Belle but because she not married yet to the biological
father of Donna Belle, the child had to use the maiden name of Dolores, “Angeles.” It was two years
after that Dolores and Manuel got married.
July 2007, Dolores discovered that Donna Belle’s Certificate of Live Birth on record at
National Statistics Office did not reflect her first name, for what appears only was her middle initial
and her last name “Angeles” only. After due consideration, Dolores and Manuel, secured the
services of Atty. Navarro- in preparation of the affidavit and notarizing it. In the affidavit, Donna
Belle was recognized by Manuel as his illegitimate child and giving her the full consent in using his
surname as provided by law.
Year 2016, Dolores and Donna Belle secured a Certificate of Live Birth from the Civil
Registrar of Manila for the purposes of working abroad. But when they secured certified true copy
of the affidavit, it contained a certification dated June 16, 2016 issued by the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, which stated that the Notarial Report submitted by Atty.
Navarro for the month of August 2007, entitled Affidavit of Acknowledgment and use of Surname is
not included in the aforementioned monthly report.
With grievance, Dolores filed a complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Bulacan
Chapter against Atty. Navarro. After the mediation hearing, Atty. Navarro, was willing to assist
Dolores in filing the case for the correction of the entry of Donna Belle’s birth certificate and settled
to an amount of P55,000.00, which Dolores received for several cash installments. Several months
of attempts, Dolores failed to contact Atty. Navarro, prompting Dolores to file for an administrative
complaint against Atty. Navarro.
In defense, Atty. Navarro denied in notarizing the Affidavit and that his signature was
forged. He insisted for Dolores to produce the original copy of the Affidavit. HE averred that
Dolores was conspiring others to harass him considering that it took Dolores 9 long years before
rectifying the error in her daughter’s birth certificate. Though, he offered financial assistance to
Dolores, it should be not a reason for Dolores to make unreasonable demands.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

IBP Commissioner found Atty. Navarro guilty of lack of diligence in performing his services to his
client causing serious injury and recommended Atty. Navarro for suspension in a period of one year
from the practice of law, with a warning with the repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely. The Commissioner found the allegations of Dolores more credible than Atty
Navarro’s denial, as Dolores would not be going to Malolos Archive Office if she had no idea what
she was requesting for. And if it is true that Atty. Navarro’s signature was forged as he claimed it,
then why Dolores can give the notarial details reflected on the document. Dolores cannot be put in
fault when she felt the urge to rectify eh error in Donna Belle’s birth certificate only after nine (9)
years considering it was only the time that Donna Belle needed the birth certificate for her
employment abroad. Lastly, Atty. Navarro offered a pecuniary assistance to Dolores
notwithstanding his denials.

In a Resolution dated July 1, 2018, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of fact and
recommendation of the IBP Commissioner with the modification reducing the period of suspension
from the practice of law to one (1) month. Atty. Navarro moved for reconsideration thereof, which
was denied in the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution 15 dated June 17, 2019. Hence, this petition.cr

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not grounds exist to hold Atty. Navarro
administratively liable in this case.
 The Court's Ruling

After a judicious review of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendations
of the IBP Commissioner that Atty. Navarro should be held administratively liable in this case.

The act of notarization is not an ordinary routine but is imbued with substantive public interest. A
notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgment and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these
notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on
documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after
which it may be presented as evidence without need of proof of its genuineness and due execution.
A notarized document is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Thus, a notary public should
observe utmost care in performing his duties to preserve public confidence in the integrity of
notarized documents.19

The Court has examined the original copy of the Affidavit that Atty. Navarro denied notarizing and
finds the same to be regular and valid on its face, bearing as it does his notarial seal, notarial details,
and signature. On this score, and as aptly pointed out by the IBP Commissioner, if Atty. Navarro's
signature thereon was forged as he maintains, the question of where and how Dolores was able to
obtain the notarial details remains. More importantly, the Affidavit is evidently stamped with Atty.
Navarro's notarial seal, an irrefutable and concrete evidence of notarization.

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, particularly Rule VI thereof, is explicit on the duties and
obligations of the notary public with respect to entries in the Notarial Register, as
follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RULE VI
NOTARIAL REGISTER

SECTION 1. Form of Notarial Register. - (a) A notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide
for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial
acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages.

SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. - (a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the
notarial register at the time of notarization the following:

(1) the entry number and page number;

(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;

(3) the type or notarial act;

(4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;

(5) the name and address of each principal;

(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not
personally known to the notary;

(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's
identity;

(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;

(9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of
work or business; and

(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem or significance or relevance.

(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on
the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line
shall be left between entries.

(g) At the end of each week, the notary public shall certify in his notarial register the number of
instruments or documents executed, sworn to, or acknowledged, or protested before him; or if
none, this certificate shall show this fact.
As certified by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC in Malolos City, Bulacan,
the Affidavit which Atty. Navarro notarized and bore his notarial seal was not included in the
latter's report for the month of August 2007. Given the evidentiary value accorded to notarized
documents, Atty. Navarro's failure to record the document in his notarial register corresponds to
falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when, in fact, it was not. "If the
document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein,
doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a
public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document." It cannot be
overemphasized that notaries public are urged to observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.

Indubitably, Atty. Navarro was remiss in his duties as a notary public, causing prejudice and injury
not only to Dolores but more importantly, to Donna Belle, whose Certificate of Live Birth contained
inaccuracies when she needed the same for employment purposes. Undeniably, this failure on the
part of Atty. Navarro constitutes a transgression of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, for which
he must be held administratively liable.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cenon J. Navarro (Atty. Navarro) is found GUILTY of violating the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. Moreover, his notarial commission,
if any, is hereby IMMEDIATELY REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as
a notary public for a period of two (2) years.

Atty. Navarro is DIRECTED to immediately file a manifestation to the Court that his suspension has
started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he had entered his appearance as
counsel.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (1) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
Atty. Navarro's personal record as an attorney; (2) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance; and (3) the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.

SO ORDERED.

MIGDONIO RACCA AND MIAM GRACE DIANNE RACCA, PETITIONERS, V. MARIA

LOLITA A. ECHAGUE, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 237133, January 20, 2021

Personal notice to the heirs whose places of residence are known is mandatory. Trial courts cannot
simply abdicate their duty under Section 4, Rule 76 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court by
indiscriminately applying the rule on publication. To do so would render nugatory the procedure
laid down in Sec. 4 and the purpose for which it was intended.

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
to reverse and set aside the twin orders of the Regional Trial Court, Palawan and Puerto Princesa
City, Branch 51 (RTC), issued on August 16, 20171 and November 20, 20172 in SPL. PROC. No. 2391.
The August 16, 2017 Order declared petitioners in default while the November 20, 2017 Order
denied their Motion to Lift Order of General Default.

Antecedents

Petition for the allowance of the will of the late Amparo Ferido Racca and issuance of letters
testamentary was filed before the RTC by Maria Lolita Echague on March 2, 2017. Maria Lolita
Echague averred in the petition that Amparo signed a notarial will before her death on September
9, 2015, bequeathing an undivided portion of a parcel of land to her nephew named Mignon Chris
Ferido. Respondents also included Amparo’s known heirs, who are Migdonio Racca (Migdonio) and
Miam Grace Dianne Ferido Racca (Miam), Amparo’s husband and daughter, as petitioners.
RTC issued an Order on April 18, 2017 setting the hearing on June 21, 2017 at 8:30 am after
checking the forms and substance are sufficient. At the same date, the trial court issued a Notice of
Hearing. The hearing proceeded on the same date as scheduled but the petitioners failed to appear,
prompting the trial court to declare them in default.
On July 11, 2017, Motion to Lift order of General Default on the ground of excusable
negligence was filed by the petitioners. They alleged that Migdonio only received the copy of the
Notice of Hearing two (2) days before the scheduled hearing. Due to the advanced age of Migdonio,
not on perfect health, he cannot act on the notice immediately within such short period on time.
And Miam, did not receive the Notice of Hearing. Due to their ignorance of procedural rules and
financial constraint, petitioners did not able to secure a counsel to represent their interest. In the
motion, petitioners manifested that Amparo is mentally incapable of making a will based on the
medical certificate issued by the attending physician.
On August 16, 2017, the RTC denied the petitioners’ motion. It held that jurisdictional
requirements of publication and posting of notices had been substancially complied with.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but RTC denied it also. Aggrieved, petitioners
filed the petition before the Court.

Issues

Petitioners attribute the following errors on the part of the RTC: C

hanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PUBLICATION AND POSTING
BAR THE PARTICIPATION OF (SIC) HEREIN PETITIONERS;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE HEREIN COMPULSORY HEIR[S]
WITH THE RIGHT TO OPPOSE THE PROBATE OF THE WILL.

Petitioners argue that being compulsory heirs, they have an interest in the probate of the will; that
there are clear grounds to question the will, such as the subject of the devise being a conjugal
property, as well as the mental condition of the deceased prior to her death; that posting of the
notice and its publication does not bar the lifting of the order of general default; that the order of
general default may be lifted after a good and reasonable cause is shown; that the order of general
default should be lifted because their failure to appear during the jurisdictional hearing is due to
excusable negligence; and that substantial justice requires the relaxation of the rules in their favor.

In her August 12, 2018 Comment, respondent contended that the petition should be expunged and
dismissed on the basis of procedural grounds; that the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum
Shopping failed to refer to the issues in the instant petition or the issues in the probate proceedings
before the RTC because it merely stated that "we further certify that we have not commenced
and/or am not aware of any other action or proceeding involving the same land, or a portion
thereof, or involving the same issue in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency;" that
petitioners' Explanation only mentioned service of the petition to the adverse party through
registered mail; that the petition raises mixed questions of fact and law which should have been
filed with the CA under the principle of hierarchy of courts; and since an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 is discretionary upon the Court, petitioners failed to cite sufficient reasons why the Court
should exercise such discretion.

On the substantive aspects of the petition, respondent maintained that the RTC's declaration of
general default on June 21, 2017 was in accordance with law and jurisprudence. The Notice of
Hearing had been published for three (3) consecutive weeks from May 6 to May 26, 2017 in
Palawan Times, a newspaper of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City and the Province of
Palawan. Respondent further argued that publication is a jurisdictional requirement while notice
upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience, not a jurisdictional requisite.

Respondent also asserted that Amparo's will clearly states that the property being bequeathed to
the devisee shall be taken from the free portion of her estate which she can freely dispose of by
will. She likewise alleged that Miam's status as a compulsory heir is questionable because her birth
was registered after Amparo's death or almost thirty-four (34) years from Miam's alleged date of
birth.

In their Reply, petitioners countered that there is no controversy involving the nature of their
relationship with Amparo, considering that respondent even recognized them as heirs. As regards
their Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping, the same covers issues in the instant
petition and before the probate court.

At bottom, the issues for resolution by the Court are: (a) may the Order of General Default issued by
the RTC against the petitioners be set aside? and (b) are known heirs of the testator still entitled to
personal notice despite the publication and posting of the notice of the hearing?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious. Petitioners were not properly notified in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule
76 of the Revised Rules of Court.

A petition for review under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law is the appropriate remedy.

Petitioners brought the instant appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
Sec. 1 of which provides that the subject of the appeal shall be a judgment, final order or resolution
of the RTC, among others. A final order is defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A party declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of his loss of standing, a party in
default cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be entitled to notice. A party in
default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered by the court, unless he flies a motion to set
aside the order of default under the grounds provided in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
By virtue of the assailed orders of the RTC, herein petitioners, who claim to be the husband and the
daughter of Amparo, had been barred from participating in the allowance of her alleged last will
and testament. Their non-participation in the probate proceeding would prevent them from raising
matters that may cast serious doubts on the genuineness and authenticity of Amparo's will. By
reason of the default order, they cannot participate in the proceedings, oppose the probate of the
will which they believe to be unauthentic, or even appeal the judgment of the trial court thereon. As
such, the August 16, 2017 and November 20, 2017 Orders of the trial court are final and, therefore,
proper subjects of an appeal under Rule 45.

Significantly, the present petition is concerned with whether petitioners, being known heirs of the
testator, are still entitled to notice under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 despite the publication of the notice of
hearing. This issue indubitably involves a question of law which the Court may entertain in a
petition filed under Rule 45.

An order of general default does not apply in probate proceedings.

The crux of petitioners' appeal pertains to the issuance of the order of general default by the trial
court in the probate of Amparo's will. Apparently, the RTC based the issuance of such order on Sec.
3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RULE 9
Effect of Failure to Plead

Section 3. Default; declaration of. - If the defending party rails to answer within the time allowed
there for, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to
render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in
its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be
delegated to the clerk of court.
However, Sec. 3, Rule 9 does not apply in probate proceedings. A careful reading of Sec. 3 reveals
that an order of default avails only in litigious proceedings. Thus, it cannot be validly issued in a
special proceeding such as the probate of a will.

It should be emphasized that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. By extrinsic validity, the
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Due execution of the will or its
extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. These
matters do not necessitate the issuance of an order of default against parties who failed to appear in
the proceedings despite the publication of the notice of hearing. After all, the probate of a will is
mandatory and cannot be left to the discretion of the persons interested in the estate of the
deceased.

Moreover, Rule 76 does not expressly provide for the issuance of a default order in the absence of
persons contesting the will. In the event that no persons appear to contest the will, Sec. 5 thereof
only directs the court to grant allowance of the will based on the testimony of a witness that it was
executed pursuant to law, or in the case of holographic will, that the handwriting and signature
were those of the testator.

Without legal support, the RTC cannot validly issue an order of default in probate proceedings.
Hence, the RTC palpably erred in issuing the order of general default due to the non-appearance of
petitioners in the June 21, 2017 hearing.

Notice to the designated and known heirs, devisees and legatees under Section 4, Rule 76 of
the Rules of Court is mandatory; publication of Notice of Hearing is not sufficient when the places of
the heirs, devisees and legatees are known.

The notice requirement in the allowance or disallowance of a will is found in Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 76
of the 1997 Rules of Court, which read: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will

Section 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. - When a will is
delivered to, or a petition for the allowance or a will is filed in, the court having jurisdiction, such
court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks
successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the
testator himself.

Section 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. - The court shall
also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at
their places or residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least
twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must
in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not the petitioner; also, to any
person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal
service of copies of the notice at [least] (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to
mailing.

If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will notice shall be sent only to his compulsory
heirs.
Notable that Secs. 3 and 4 prescribe two (2) modes of notification of the hearing: (1) by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation or the Official Gazette, and (2) by personal notice to the
designated or known heirs, legatees and devisees. Under Sec. 3, publication of the notice of hearing
shall be done upon the delivery of the will, or filing of the petition for allowance of the will in the
court having jurisdiction. On the other hand, personal notice under Sec. 4 shall be served to the
designated or known heirs, legatees and devisees, and the executor or co-executor, at their
residence, if such are known.
In here, the RTC declared petitioners to have defaulted. The RTC held the view that the publication
of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 76,
sufficiently notified petitioners of the scheduled hearing.

Once again, the RTC is mistaken.

We shall expound on Our ruling by reviewing the antecedents of Secs. 3 and 4 of Rule 76, as well as
jurisprudence on the matter.

The earliest progenitor of the above rules can be traced to Sec. 630 of Act No. 190, otherwise known
as the Code of Civil Procedure, enacted on August 7, 1901. Sec. 630 provides for the procedure in
notifying the parties interested in the allowance of the will. It reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 630. Court to Appoint Hearing on Will. - When a will is delivered to a court having
jurisdiction of the same, the court shall appoint a time and place when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance of the will, and shall cause public notice thereof to be given by publication in
such newspaper or newspapers as the court directs of general circulation in the province, three
weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such
notice has been given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to writing
and signed by the witnesses.

The publication requirement under Sec. 630 conformed with the nature accorded to probate
proceedings, all interested persons in proving the will are deemed constructively notified by the
publication of the notice of hearing.

While Sec. 3, Rule 77 of the 1940 Rules maintained the requirement of publication under Sec. 630,
the 1940 Rules added Sec. 4 which required personal notification to the known heirs, legatees and
devisees. Hence, Secs. 3 and 4 read as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Rule 77
Allowance or Disallowance of Will

SECTION 3. Court to Appoint Time for Proving Will. Notice Thereof to Be Published. - When a will is
delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the court having jurisdiction, such
court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks
successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province,
or in the Official Gazette, as the court shall deem best.
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. - The court shall
also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to he addressed to the
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of
residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty days
before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy or the notice must in like manner
be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not the petitioner; also, to any person named as
co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the
notice at least ten days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
Petitioners maintain that no notice was received by them partly because their residence was not
Dagupan Street No. 83 as alleged in the petition for probate. If the allegation of the petition was
wrong and the true residence of petitioners was not known, then notice upon them individually
was not necessary. Under the provision above-quoted, individual notice upon heirs, legatees and
devisees is necessary only when they are known or when their places of residence are known. In
other instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction
simply upon the publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. What is, therefore,
indispensable to the jurisdiction of the court is the publication of the notice in a newspaper or
general circulation, and the notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is merely a matter of
procedural convenience to better satisfy in some instances the requirements of due
process. (emphasis supplied)

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir
of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, arc neither compulsory nor
testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules.
Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to
personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is
cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of
procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.

The non-inclusion of petitioners' names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify
them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in
court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case
before the probate court.

In here, Miam was indicated as a known heir of Amparo in the petition filed by respondent. While
her status as a compulsory heir may still be subject to confirmation, the petition, on its face, had
already informed the probate court of the existence of Miam as one of Amparo's heirs. The petition
also provided Miam's residence. By respondent's own averments, Miam is entitled to the notice of
hearing under Sec. 4.

Respondent's contention that notice to Migdonio redounded to Miam since they live in the same
residence does not avail. Sec. 4 requires that each known heir whose residence is known be
individually served a copy of the notice of hearing. Although petitioners live in the same residence,
it should not deprive Miam of her right to receive her own copy of the notice. Sec. 4 does not
distinguish between heirs with the same address and those who reside in different locations.

To reiterate, the court has the obligation to serve personal notices to petitioners under Sec. 4 of
Rule 76 because they are known heirs of Amparo and their places of residence were made known in
the petition for probate. Verily, it was erroneous of the RTC to rule that petitioners had been
sufficiently notified by the publication of the notice under Sec. 3. The trial court cannot simply
abdicate the mandatory duty under Sec. 4 by indiscriminately applying the rule on publication. To
do so would render nugatory the procedure laid down in Sec. 4 and the purpose for which the Court
had intended it.

The notice sent too Migdonio failed to comply with the procedural requirements under Section
4 of Rule 76

As regards the notice sent to Migdonio, the Court also finds that the same fell short of the
procedural requirements laid down by Sec. 4.

Under Sec. 4 of Rule 76, personal notice must either be (1) deposited in the post office with the
postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, or (2) personally served at
least ten (10) days before the day of hearing.

ln Migdonio's case, there was no evidence that the notice of hearing addressed to him was
deposited in the post office at least 20 days before June 21, 2017. Even if it were assumed that the
notice of hearing was personally served to Migdonio, the same cannot be said to be substantial
compliance. Based on records, Migdonio received a copy of the notice on June 19, 2017 or two (2)
clays prior to the hearing on June 21, 2017. This is short of the 10-day period fixed by Sec. 4. Hence,
the notice served to Migdonio did not satisfy the requirement provided by Sec. 4.

Moreover, we cannot expect Migdonio, an ailing 78-year-old who is not knowledgeable of legal
procedures, to intelligently and promptly act upon receipt of the notice of hearing. The two-day
period was undoubtedly insufficient to look for a counsel, ask for advice, and collate all the needed
documents to support the formal opposition to the petition. His failure to attend the June 21, 2017
hearing should be excused due to negligence. It is settled that "negligence, to be 'excusable,' must be
one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against." 6

The other procedural challenges raised by respondent do not deserve consideration by the Court
for being trivial and patently without merit.

In fine, the RTC committed reversible error in entering an order of default against petitioners.
Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which requires a copy of the notice of hearing
to be sent to the known heirs whose residences are known, is mandatory and cannot be satisfied by
mere publication under Sec. 3 of the same Rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 16, 2017 and November 20, 2017 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 51 in SPL. PROC. No. 2391
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES BENNY AND NORMITA ROL, PETITIONERS, V. ISABEL URDAS RACHO,

RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 246096, January 13, 2021

 DECISION

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 13, 2018 and
the Resolulion3 dated February 13, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 105722,
which affirmed with modification the Decision 4 dated July 8, 2015 and the Resolution5 dated
September 3, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8 (RTC), and accordingly
declared, inter alia, that the sale of Lot No. 1559 to petitioners Spouses Benny and Normita Rol
(petitioners) is valid only insofar as half of the aggregate undivided interest of Fausto Urdas, Sr.
(Fausto), Chita Urdas (Chita), and Maria Urdas Baclig (Maria) therein are concerned.

Antecedent

Isabel Urdas RAcho, the respondent, alleged that her brother Loreto was the registered owner of a
1,249 square meters of land located in Municipality of Gonzaga, Cagayan, denominated as Lot No.
1559, as reflected in the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1061. Loreto died without an issue last
August 6, 1963, leaving his siblings, namely, FAusto, Chita, Maria and Isabel as his intestate heir to
the said lot. Isabel discovered that Lot No. 1559 was subdivided into two equal portions,
denominated as Lot No. 1559-A and Lot No. 1559-B and despite the death of Loreto in 1963, the
petitioners made it appear that Loreto sold them the subdivided lots through a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Portion of Registered Land dated September 1, 2006 and Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land
dated June 19, 2012 respectively and in light of the said deed, new titles covering the subdivided
lots were issued in the petitioners’ name. As such Isabel prompted to file a complaint for
reivindicacion and damages before the RTC against the petitioners.

Sometime in 1993, petitioners were looking for a parcel of land to purchase and that is where they
meet Fausto’s wife and son, namely, Leoncia and Allan who offered to sell the Half of Lot No. 1559
for P25,000.00, tp which they agreed. So, on September 13, 1993 Fausto, Chita, Maria and Allan
executed an extra-judicial settlement with Sale concerning the said lot; whereby the said lot was
divided by two equal portions, denominated as Lot No. 1559-A and Lot No. 1559-B. Lot No. 1559-A
was then sold to the petitioners and the other portion was adjudicated to Allan. After the sale, the
petitioners built a house and lived there until Isabel filed the complaint in June 2013.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated July 8, 2015, the RTC ruled in Isabel's favor, and accordingly, declared null and
void the following: (a) the EJSS dated September 13, 1993; (b) the Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land
dated September 26, 2011; (c) the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Registered Land dated
September 1, 2006; and (d) the Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land dated June 19, 2012. The RTC also
ordered petitioners to reconvey to Isabel the total area of 312.25-sq. m. from Lot No. 1559, and to
pay her P5,646.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

The RTC found the Deeds of Sale dated September 1, 2006 and June 19, 2012 void for being
forgeries, pointing out that there was no way Loreto could have signed those instruments as he died
in 1963. It also declared void the EJSS as it was executed without the knowledge and consent of one
of Loreto's intestate heirs, i.e., Isabel, and consequently, the Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land dated
September 26, 2011 for being a subsequent transfer that emanated from the EJSS. Nonetheless, the
RTC found petitioners to be purchasers in good faith, opining that they acquired Lot No. 1559 for
valuable consideration, not knowing beforehand that their title thereto was a product of fraud. As
such, they are only required to reconvey to Isabel an area of 312.25-sq. m. out of the total area of
1,249-sq. m. of Lot No. 1559, in order to satisfy the latter's share in Loreto's intestate estate.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated
September 3, 2015. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

ln a Decision dated September 13, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modifications, in that:
(a) the sale by Fausto, Chita, and Maria to petitioners are valid and binding but only insofar as their
respective undivided interests in the half of Lot No. 1559 is concerned; and (b) the award of actual
damages to Isabel was deleted.23

Echoing the RTC, the CA declared void the EJSS, considering that, inter alia, Isabel, a legal heir to
Loreto's intestate estate, was excluded therefrom. As such, the CA rendered void the adjudication of
Lot No. 1559-B to Allan as he is not a legal heir to Loreto's intestate estate; and consequently,
Allan's transfer of the same to petitioners through the Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land dated
September 26, 2011 is likewise void, pursuant to the maxim nemo dat quod non habet. Nonetheless,
the CA deemed valid the sale of Lot No. 1559-A to petitioners, but only insofar as Fausto, Chita, and
Maria's respective aliquot shares therein, i.e., a total area of 468.375-sq. m., are concerned.
Relatedly, the CA ruled that petitioners are buyers in bad faith due to their failure to further inquire
as to the capacity of Allan and Leoncia to sell Lot No. 1559 and investigate the whereabouts of
Loreto, the registered owner thereof.

Further, the CA held that Isabel is not guilty of laches because she was deprived of her hereditary
share without her knowledge and consent; and as such, she is not barred from invoking her right to
her inheritance in Loreto's estate.

Finally, the CA deleted the award of actual damages in Isabel's favor for her failure to show her
entitlement thereto; but upheld the award of attorney's fees and costs of suit in her favor as she
was forced to litigate in order to assert her rights over Lot No. 1559.

Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
February 13, 2019; hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the
conveyance of Lot No. 1559 to petitioners is null and void, except as to the portion in Lot No. 1559-
A pertaining to Fausto, Chita, and Maria which is deemed valid.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

Records show that there are a total of four (4) documents which supposedly transferred the two (2)
subdivided portions of Lot No. 1559, namely, Lot Nos. 1559-A and 1559-B, to petitioners. On the
one hand, Isabel alleged that the documents were the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Registered
Land dated September 1, 2006 covering Lot No. 1559-A and the Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land
dated June 19, 2012 covering Lot No. 1559- B, both purportedly executed by Loreto in favor of
petitioners. On the other hand, petitioners anchor their claim of ownership on: (a) the EJSS dated
September 13, 1993 executed by Fausto, Chita, Maria, and Allan - which adjudicated a half
portion of Lot No. 1559, i.e., Lot No. 1559-A, to Fausto, Chita, and Maria who thereafter sold it to
petitioners, and adjudicated the other half, i.e., Lot No. 1559-B to Allan; and (b) the Deed of Sale of a
Port1on of Land dated September 26, 2011 executed by Allan in favor of petitioners.

As for the documents pointed out by Isabel, suffice it to say that they are null and void for being
forgeries, as it is simply impossible that Loreto, who died in 1963, could have executed said
documents in 2006 and 2012, respectively. It is settled that forged deeds of sale are null and void
and convey no title.

As for the EJSS dated September 13, 1993, the CA correctly declared the same to be null and void,
considering that it was executed without the knowledge and consent of Isabel, a co-heir of Fausto,
Chita, and Maria, to the estate of their deceased brother, Loreto. In a catena of cases, the Court had
consistently ruled that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed to the total exclusion of any of the
legal heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the execution of the same, is fraudulent,
vicious, and a total nullity, as in this case. As such, it produced no effect whatsoever either against
or in favor of anyone. Therefore, the contents of the EJSS, namely: (a) the subdivision of Lot No.
1559 to two (2) equal halves, namely Lot Nos. 1559-A and 1559-B and (b) alienation of the
aforementioned halves, first, to petitioners with consideration and second, to Allan gratuitously,
are null and void and cannot be given any legal effect as well.

At this juncture, it is well to reiterate that the subdivision of Lot No. 1559 into two (2) equal
halves, i.e., Lot Nos. 1559-A and 1 559-B, as well as the attempted conveyance of these definite
portions to petitioners and Allan, resulted from the execution of the EJSS - which again, was without
the knowledge and consent of Isabel. CnRobIf the alienation precedes the partition; the co-owner
cannot sell a definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co-owners. He or she could
only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned property. "If he is the owner of an undivided half of
a tract of land, he has a right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the
lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds."

The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to as the "ideal or abstract quota" or
"proportionate share." On the other hand, the definite portion of the land refers to specific metes
and bounds of a co-owned property.

Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property requires the consent of all
co-owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling his or her
share. The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion should redound to his or her
autonomous ownership upon future partition.

The rules allow respondent to sell his undivided interest in the co-ownership. However, this was
not the object of the sale between him and petitioner. The object of the sale was a definite portion.
Even if it was respondent who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract to petitioner,
respondent has "no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing
owned in common, because his right over the thing is represented by quota or ideal portion without
any physical adjudication."
In this case, when Loreto died, his siblings, namely, Fausto, Chita, Maria, and Isabel all became co-
owners of Loreto's intestate estate, i.e., Lot No. 1559, pursuant to Article 1078 of the Civil Code,
with all of them having equal interest therein, i.e., 1/4 of the property. Thus, for the alienation of
definite portions of Lot No. 1559 to be valid, it must be with the consent of all of them. However, the
alienations of definite portions made in the EJSS was without the knowledge and consent of Isabel,
and hence, are null and void.

Nonetheless, as co-owners of Lot No. 1559, Fausto, Chita, Maria, and Isabel are free to dispose of
their undivided aliquot shares therein, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to
them upon partition. Otherwise stated, before an actual partition of an estate, an heir can only
alienate his successional rights or undivided interest thereto, and not specific portions thereof.

Thus, Fausto, Chita, and Maria could not sell a definite portion of an undivided property, i.e., one
half of Lot No. 1559 (which formerly pertained to Lot No. 1559-A), to petitioners. However, the
Court nevertheless recognizes their intent to sell one-half (1/2) of their inchoate interest over Lot
No. 1559 to the latter - not through the EJSS but via an oral contract of sale as in fact, they were able
to do so as they received proper compensation therefor from petitioners. 37 Thus, petitioners were
able to validly acquire one half(1/2) of Fausto, Chita, and Maria's aggregate three-fourths (3/4)
interest, or a total of 3/8 interest, over Lot No. 1559.

In the same vein, Fausto, Chita, and Maria could also not gratuitously convey a definite portion of
the same undivided property, i.e., one half of Lot No. 1559 (which formerly pertained to Lot No.
1559-8) to Allan. In contrast, however, to petitioner's case, the Court could not give life to the three
(3) siblings' intent to convey one-half (1/2) of their inchoate interest over Lot No. 1559 to Allan,
absent compliance with the requirements of the law. To reiterate, the foregoing conveyance to Allan
was made gratuitously, and hence, essentially partakes of a donation of a real property. As such, it is
required, inter alia, that the donation must be made in a public instrument, and that the acceptance
is made either in the same deed or in a separate instrument. Since the only document of record
showing compliance with the foregoing requirements is the EJSS - which is, as discussed, null and
void - Fausto, Chita, and Maria's donation over such portion to Allan is void as well. Consequently,
Allan and Leoncia's sale of the same portion of land to petitioners had no legal effect whatsoever,
following the maxim nemo dat quod non habet. Hence, Fausto, Chita, and Maria are deemed to have
retained their remaining inchoate interest, i.e., 1/8 each, over Lot No. 1559.

Finally, since Isabel had no knowledge of, and thus, did not give her consent to, the foregoing, she
retains her 1/4 inchoate interest over Lot No. 1559.

On a related matter, petitioners cannot claim to be innocent purchasers for value. According to
jurisprudence, "An innocent purchaser for value refers to someone who 'buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full
and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person's claim.'"
Here, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioners should have already been put on guard as to the
true ownership of the property when they learned that it was registered in the name of another
person with whom they were not dealing. Their failure to question the authority of the sellers thus
negated their claim that they were innocent purchasers for value.

Furthermore, petitioners' contention that Isabel is guilty of laches is unavailing. "Laches is defined
as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." In this case, petitioners' self-serving allegation that
Isabel knew of the sale of Lot Nos. 1559-A and 1559-B to them for more than twenty (20) years was
not substantiated by evidence on record. Absent any clear and convincing proof, Isabel's claim
cannot be said to be barred by laches.

To summarize the foregoing discussions, in view of the nullity of the EJSS, the subdivision of Lot No.
1559 equally to Lot Nos. 1559-A and 1559-B should be invalidated as well. Furthermore, the
following have an interest over the said lot, namely: petitioners, with 3/8 interest Isabel, with 1/4
interest; and Fausto, Chita, and Maria, with 1/8 interest each.

As a final point, however, it is equally important to point out that since the EJSS is invalidated, it is
as if Loreto's intestate, which includes Lot No. 1559, has yet to undergo proper settlement
proceedings in accordance with prevailing law. Thus, while Loreto's heirs, namely, Fausto, Chita,
Maria, and Isabel, have indeed acquired rights over Lot No. 1559 at the exact moment of Loreto's
death - and consequently, may convey such rights to third parties, such as what happened in this
case when Fausto, Chita, and Maria sold their rights over the property to petitioners - what they
have are only inchoate rights over the said lot. Otherwise stated, absent any proper settlement
proceeding for Loreto's estate due to the nullity of the EJSS, the ownership of Lot No. 1559 remains
in the said estate, with the aforementioned parties only having inchoate interests therein.

Accordingly, Lot No. 1559 should revert back to Loreto's estate, and only the parties' respective
inchoate interests should be recognized in this case. In particular, these inchoate interests over Lot
No. 1559 are as follows: petitioners, with 3/8 interest Isabel, with 1/4 interest and Fausto, Chita,
and Maria, with 1/8 interest each. It goes without saying that each of them is free to resort to the
available remedies in order to settle Loreto's intestate estate, and subsequently,
distribute/partition the property under prevailing laws, rules, and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 13, 2018 and the Resolution
dated February 13, 2019 of the Court of Appeals m CA-G.R. CV No. 105722
are AFFlRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
(a) The subdivision of Lot No. 1559 to Lot Nos. 1559-A and 1559-B is
hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID; and "justify”

(b) Ownership over Lot No. 1559 is RECONVEYED back to the intestate estate of Loreto
Urdas. Furthermore, the following are declared to have inchoate interests over the
same: "justify"

(i) petitioners Benny and Normita Rol, to 3/8 of Lot No. 1559;

(ii) respondent Isabel Urdas Racho, to 1/4 of Lot No. 1559;

(iii) Fausto Urdas, Sr., to 1/8 of Lot No. 1559;

(iv) Chita Urdas, to 1/8 of Lot No. 1559; and

(v) Maria Urdas Baclig, to 1/8 of Lot No. 1559. "justify"

The rest of the ruling STANDS.

MARCELO M. CORPUZ, JR., Petitioner, v. GERWIL CREWING PHILS., INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 205725, January 18, 2021

DECISION
 Licensed recruitment agencies are subject to a continuing liability to ensure the welfare of the
Filipino workers they deployed abroad. Their carelessness and wanton disregard of such
responsibility that result to the substitution of employment contracts previously approved by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), shall render them liable for damages

Antecedent

We resolve this appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the September 28, 2012
Decision1 and January 30, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120720,
which affirmed the March 30, 2011 Decision3 and May 30, 2011 Resolution4 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 10-000818-10. The NLRC decision reversed and set
aside the September 11, 2010 Decision5 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) that granted petitioner's claim for
disability benefits

Facts of the case

Marcelo Corpuz, the petitioner was hired by the Gerwil Crewing Phils., Inc. (respondent) as an Able
Seaman with a contract of 12 months in the Echo Cargo and Shipping LLC and a salary of $461.00,
the deployment of the petitioner was on Augst 5, 2008.

May 17, 2009, the petitioner suffered from Left Cerebellar Hemorrhage with Intraventricular
Hematoma, as he sustained a fall while lifting heavy motor parts on board to vessel whereby, he
suffered an episodic low back pain radiating to his left posterior thigh accompanied by a severe
pain of the foot. So, medications were given and underwent external ventricular drain (EVD) to
relieve the hydrocephalus. Eventually, petitioner was repatriated to undergo further evaluation
and treatment.

September 9, 2009, the petitioner arrived in Manila on a wheelchair. He claimed that he reported to
the office of the respondent the next day but the CEO of the company, Rommel Valdez denied his
request for medical assistance on the ground that his illness was not work related, furthermore
Valdez humiliated him in front of many people present in the agency.

As a result, petitioner sought medical consultation with Dr. Balgomera, a neurologist in Sta. Rosa
Medical Center. October 2, 2009, the doctor issued a medical certificate declaring that the
petitioner is not fit for sea duty in any capacity and suffering Severe Complex Cerebral Function
Disturbance or Post traumatic Psychoneurosis- a Grade I disability.

Anso, petitioner consulted Dr. Donald Camero, an internist who also gave him an assessment of
POEA Disability Grade I. With both medical assessments, petitioner demanded a disability benefit
from respondent.

April 10, 2010. Petitioner instituted a compliant against respondent and Valdez for payment of
disability benefits, among others.

Labor Arbiter Ruling:

Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner should be given permanent disability in the amount of
$64,000.00, should be given a sickness allowance of $1,844.00 per month, should have a moral and
exemplary damages with a total amount of P300,000.00 and Attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of
the total reward.

Labor Arbiter solely based its decision on the evidence submitted by the petitioner in view of
respondent’s failure to file a position paper. The LA provides since the respondent refused to
provide medical assistance to the petitioner then it is just rightful for the petitioner to consult his
personal doctors. Both issued medical certificates showed the petitioners’ injury was related to his
exposure to toxic and hazardous materials.

Aggrieved, the respondent appealed to NLRC.

NLRC Ruling

On March 30, 2011, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and dismissed the petitioner’s
complained for lack of merit. The NLRC noted that, in the petitioner’s logbook, petitioner did not
report to the agency on September 10, 2009, failure too report upon repatriation was fatal for his
claim for disability benefits.

Also, NLRC held that petitioner’s injury was not work related. As an Able- Seaman, his duty is only
confined to deck and navigational work and did not include lifting heavy motor parts. Furthermore,
the medical certificates failed to establish that the injury he sustained was work related for his
doctors readily concluded that he had been exposed to hazardous chemicals, although evidence
filed does support such findings.

Petitioner filed a motion for consideration which NLRC denied in its May 30, 2011. Unsatisfied,
petitioner filed a petition on certiorari before the CA.

CA Ruling

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It agreed with the NLRC decision, the
petitioner is not entitled for disability compensation and other benefits due to his failure in
complying the compulsory examination upon repatriation. It was noted that the petitioner does not
appear to the respondent’s visitor logbook for the period of Sept 4, 2009 to October 6, 2009. And
the petitioner failed to submit supporting evidence that his disability was work related.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which CA denied in its January 30, 2013 resolution.

Issue

Whether or not the NLRC and the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed decisions and denied
resolutions.

Petitioner pointed out two procedural defects in respondent’s appeal before the NLRC: 1. Appeal
was filled out of time because they receive a copy of the LA decision on September 30, 2010 but
filed the Notice of Appeal only on October 11, 2010. 2. The respondent did not post a cash or
surety bond.

Petitioner’s agued too, that his disability entitles him for a disability benefits and attorney’s fees but
NLRC reversed the decision so NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion.

Finally, petitioner maintains that he has a prerogative to consult a physician of his choice. Hence,
CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the company designated physician is the sole authority to
determine the degree of disability of an ailing seafarer.

The court resolve to require respondent to comment on the petition in its June 19, 2013 resolution.
Despite such notice, respondent failed to file its comment till the third time. The failure of the
respondent to comment for several times, the Court dispense with the filing of the same and
proceed with the resolution on the instant petition.

Our ruling

The court finds the claim of the petitioner to have no basis both in fact and in law.

As Section 1 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of NLRC, period of appeal is 10 days but if it will
fall on Saturday, Sunday and holidays, the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the first working
day following such Saturday, Sunday and holiday.

Respondent received the copy of LA decision on September 30, 2010 therefore he had until October
11, 2010 to file an appeal so the respondent filed the appeal within the reglementary period.

As with regards with bond, court find the same, it is without basis, it had secured supersedeas bond
covering monetary award from CAP General Insurance Corporation to which the latter issued CGI
Bond No. JCL (15) 00001\00242. The respondent perfected its appeal in the NLRC.

Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, two element must be concur for an injury to be compensable. First,
injury or illness must be work related and second work related injury must have existed during the
term of the seafarer’s employment contract. Paragraph 3, Section 20(8) of the same contract also
requires him to submit to a post- employment medical examination within 3 days from repatriation
and upon signoff the seafarer is entitled for sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he
is declared fit to work or the physician of the company will assess the degree of permanent
disability but the period shall exceed to 120 days. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above
benefits.

Petitioner forfeited his right to claim disability benefits but it is proper to award him with moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Gerwil Crewing Phil., is hereby ordered to indemnify Marcelo Corpuz, Jr. the amount of one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for moral damages; one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) for exemplary damages and Attorney’s fees equal to 10 percent of the total monetary
reward and cost of suit.

So, ordered.

JEROME I. MARIVELES, Petitioner, v. WILHELMSEN-SMITHBELL* MANNING, INC. AND

WILHELMSEN SHIP MANAGEMENT, ** LTD., Respondents.

G.R. No. 238612, January 13, 2021

DECISION
In determining whether a disease is compensable, it is enough that there exists a reasonable work
connection.1 It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable
since probability, not certainty is the touchstone. 2

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of
petitioner Jerome I. Mariveles (Mariveles) that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 4 dated
November 27, 2017 and the Resolution5 dated April 11, 2018, both of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 138754 and prays for the reinstatement of the Decision 6 dated September 23, 2014
by the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrators (Arbitration Panel) of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) granting Mariveles disability benefits in the amount of US$ 93,154.00 and
10% thereof as and for attorney's fees.

Facts of the case

Mariveles was engaged by Wilhelmsen-Smithbell Manning, Inc as able-bodied Seaman on April 8,

2013 with a monthly salary of $689.00 for nine months as indicated in the POEA contract of
employment. But prior to his deployment, March 19, 2013, Mariveles underwent a pre-
employment medical examination and the physician’s referral slip dated March 19, 2013 indicated
that Mariveles had Cardiac Arrythmia (TET Impression). Respondents referred Mariveles for 2D
Echo with Doppler Study. However, despite such findings, on March 25, 2013, respondents
declared Mariveles fit to work, but the physician prescribed maintenance medicines for Mariveles
condition.

In November 2013, while on board the vessel, Mariveles experienced chest pain, dizziness, difficulty
in sleeping and breathing, he immediately informed his officers of his condition. November 18,
2013, the ship captain referred Mariveles at the Canadian Specialist Hospital in Dubai for medical
examination and treatment; and the physician diagnosed MAriveles to be suffering from coronary
artery disease; Hyperlipidemia; Leukocytosis and Thrombicythemia; Hyperuricemia; and
Htperparathyroid Gland.” Thereafter, Mariveles was confined in the hospital from November 19,
2013 to November 29, 2013 as indicated in the Medical Report. After, he was discharged, he was
repatriated to the Philippines. Upon arrival, Mariveles reported immediately to respondents, and
was immediately referred to Dr. Esther G. Go, a marine medical service where he was examined and
diagnosed as suffering from Coronary Artery Disease; SIP Percutaneous Coronary Intervention of
the Right Coronary Artery - Right Posterolateral Branch; Essential Thrombocytosis; Dyslipidemia;
and Hyperuricemia. On February 17, 2014, Dr Go issued a medical certificate and assessed
MAriveles disability as Grade 7- moderate residual or disorder. Subsequently, Mariveles consulted
Dr. Leonardo Raymundo, an independent physician and indicated in the Medical Certificate dated
April 29, 2014 executed Dr. Raymundo, Mariveles was “unfit to withstand the rigors of sea duty.”

Mariveles instituted grievance proceedings at the Associated Marine Officers and Seamen’s Union of
the Philippines. Thereafter, he requested the referral of the case to the NCMB for mediation
conferences. Since the parties failed to settle, the case was elevated to Arbitration Panel, and the
Arbitration Panel eventually ordered the submission of the party’s respective pleadings.

In his position paper, Mariveles enumerated his function as an able-bodied seaman which includes
“performing navigational, gangway, performing duties of a lookout and helmsman; keeping the
bridge and the gangway clean and obey the orders of the deck when carrying out maintenance or
using navigation equipment, accessories in rescue boats, lifesaving appliances, pilot ladder, steering
gear and other bridge accessories; perform duties assigned and guide ordinary seamen. Moreover,
in his rejoinder, Mariveles also asseverated that he has no choice of what to eat on board except
hose provided in the vessel which consisted mainly of high-fat, high cholesterol, and low fiber food
and that the work of a seaman is strenuous and demanding. Such working conditions and the food
provided to them on board surely caused his illness.

The Arbitration Panel’s Ruling

September 23, 2014, The Arbitration Panel found Mariveles totally and permanently disabled
because of the coronary artery disease he suffered while on board the vessel MV Perseverance, and
granted him disability benefits and attorney’s fees.

Whereby, Wilhelmsen-Smith Bell Manning, Inc., and Wilhelmsen Ship Management Ltd., are
ordered to pay jointly and solidarily, Complainant Jerome I. MAriveles, the amount of Ninety- three
thousand one hundred fifty-four US Dollars (93,154.00) representing total permanent disability
benefits and ten percent (10%) thereof as and for attorney’s fees.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

So ordered.

November 13, 2014, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on the aforementioned
decision but motion for reconsideration was denied on December 9, 2014 by the Arbitration Panel
for lack of merit.

Not satisfied with the Arbitration Panel decision, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

November 27, 2017, the CA set aside the decision issued by the Arbitration Panel and instead,
dismissed the complaint filed by Mariveles.

The CA ruled that the Arbitration Panel erred in ruling that Mariveles illness (Coronary Artery
Disease) was work related.

Under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), for a disability to be compensable,
two requisites must be present: 1. The injury or illness must be work related; and 2. The work-
related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract.
The absence of one element would not justify a disability award. The CA ruled that even though
MAriveles was diagnosed with coronary artery disease, he failed to adduce substantial evidence to
show that his illness was work-related.

Furthermore, CA predisposes that Arbitration panel was erred in ruling that Mariveles Disease was
work related. And that work related diseases were the ones entitled for disability compensation.

Mariveles, refused to concede filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, having issues on the CA, as CA committed a serious error of law when the petitioner was
granted on disability compensation alleging that disease was not work related, Ca committed a
grave error of law when it allowed the petition and whether or not Mariveles is deemed to be
totally and permanently disabled.

On June 20, 2018, the court issued a Resolution, requiring the respondents to file their Comment
within 10 days from Notice.

In their Comment, the respondents argued that Petition should be dismissed for it failed to raise a
question of law but a question of fact so it must be dismissed right away. Respondents rebutted
that causal disease of Mariveles was not work related so he is not entitled for disability
compensation, company physician categorized Mariveles disease as not work related and Mariveles
failed to show connection between the development of his disease and the nature of his job as able-
bodies seaman.

So, Mariveles was required by court to submit his Reply within 10 days. In his Reply, he raised that
there is a question of law since there is doubt as to what law is applicable based on the facts
presented by the parties especially that Arbitration Panel and CA decided on the matter differently.
Mariveles, also argued that under POAE-SEC, work aggravation of an illness is compensable. Finally,
Mariveles argued that CA committed grave error of law when it allows the petition of the
respondents when it is beyond the reglementary period. Hence, the act of CA is grave abuse of
discretion in excess of jurisdiction.

The Court Ruling

The issue should be answered, whether or not Mariveles is entitled to total and permanent
disability benefits.

After the review of factual issues and settled the controversy, the court ruled that Mariveles is
entitled to total and permanent disability benefits. Because Coronary Artery Disease is considered
as an occupational disease pertaining to cardiovascular diseases were held compensable in their
Section32-A (11) of the POEA-SEC.

With regards to the CA’s acceptance of the petition of the respondent, the court does not agree as
there is lapse of time in respondent’s petition.

So, the Petition on Review of Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of petitioner Jerome
Mariveles was granted. The decision and resolution of the CA was reversed and set aside and the
decision of the Arbitration Panel was reinstated, giving MAriveles the disability benefits in the
amount of $93,154.00 and the 10% thereof as and for attorney’s fees.

AGRO FOOD AND PROCESSING CORP., Petitioner, v. VITARICH CORPORATION,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 217454, January 11, 2021

DECISION
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the August 28, 2014 Decision2 and March 9, 2015
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals inCA-GR. CV. No. 90550.4 The assailed Decision set aside the
December 29, 2005 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 83 of Malolos City, Bulacan
which ordered petitioner Agro Food and Processing Corp. (Agro) to pay respondent Vitarich
Corporation (Vitarich) the amount of P4,770,916.82 with interest, and Vitarich to pay Agro the
amount of P25,430,292.72 with interest;6 and instead ordered Agro to pay Vitarich the amounts of
P4,734,906.57 and P3,989,851.82 with interest.7 In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court
denied Agro's Motion for Reconsideration.8

Facts of the case

On October 5, 1995, Agro and Vitarich executed two agreements: first, a Memorandum of
Agreement under which Vitarich offered to buy Agro’s chicken dressing plant located in Bulacan,
and second, a toll agreement under which Agro agreed to dress the chickens supplied by Vitarich
for a toll fee.

Pursuant to the MOA, Vitarich paid P20 million as deposit to Agro and was given 45 days to
evaluate the dressing plant facilities. At the end of the period, Vitarich formally made its offer to
purchase but Agro did not accept it so Agro needed to return the P20 million deposit.

With the refusal of the Agro, Vitarich agreed the manner of returning the money to them by
deduction of 15% of the gross receipts on the weekly billing of the toll fees until the obligation is
satisfied. During that period, Vitarich sold on credit live broiler chickens to Agro.

Two years after, Vitarich filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against Agro before the
RTC which amounted to P4,770,916.82 plus interest, representing the balance from the
P20,000,000.00 deposit and second, P4,322,032.36 plus interest, representing the balance on the
sale of live broiler chicken to Agro.

Agro disputed the computation made by Vitarich, argued that amount of P4,770,916.82 was
inaccurate as it was based on the verbal amendments to the toll fees which were made by Agro
Finance Manager, Chito Del Castillo which has no authority to amend the original Toll Agreement
from Agro’s board of directors.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

December 29, 2005, RTC ruled that Vitarich was not entitled for its claim for documents submitted
and presented by Vitarich was lack of any signature or do not conform with the evidence presented.
But RTC granted the counterclaim of Agro in the amount of P25,430,292.72 plus interest
representing Vitarich unpaid account with Agro. However, regarding the unpaid account of Agro to
Vitarich, court held that payment shall be made after the reconciliation of the accounts.

Further, RTC held that Vitarich and Agro shall bear thee payment of their respective lawyers.

Ruling of the Court of Appeal

Appellate Court, set aside the decision of the RTC, held that verbal amendments made by Agro was
valid and obligatory. Vitarich was able to establish the existence of amendments based on the
eighty nine (89) weekly billings reflecting such amendments which was prepared by Agro, testified
by the Agro’s President who admitted that billings where prepared by his firm and that del Castillo
was authorized to implement the amendments.

So, appellate Court applied the DICTRINE OF apparent authority in arriving the conclusion that DEL
Castillo WAS CLOTHED WITH AUTHORITY by Agro board of directors in concurring and
implementing amendments. Also, appellate court set aside the decision of trial court on the
P25,430,292.72 to Agro for lack of basis.

Agro Food and processing Corporation was ordered by CA to pay Vitarich an amount of
P4,734,906.57 (representing the deficiency of plaintiff-appellant Vitarich Corporation’s
P20,000,000.00 deposit) and P3,989,851.82 (representing defendant-appellee Agro Food and
Processing Corporation’s obligation on the sale of the live broilers), subject to 24% interest
computed from November 1997 until fully paid.
The Agro Food and Processing Corporation file for motion for reconsideration but the CA denied its
assailed Resolution. Henc, this Petition.

The Petition

In its petition, Agro argues that the appellate court erroneously applied the doctrine of apparent
authority, which is determined based on the acts of the principal and not by the acts of the agent.
Since the CA relied on the weekly billings prepared by del Castillo and his testimony that he was
authorized to implement the amendments and not on Agro conduct per se, it erred in applying the
doctrine of apparent authority. Further, Vitarich was barred from pproving the existence of the
verbal amendments pursuant to the parol evidence rule.

IN ITS COMMENT, Vitarich counters that the CA is correct I applying the doctrine of apparent
authority as Agro never contest the payment of such billings and never questioning the authority of
del Castillo too agree to the amendments in their two years of doing business together. Further,
Vitarich maintains that the issue of the verbal amendments was raised in the Amended Complaint,
thus not covered by the parol evidence rule.

Issues

The CA committed a eversible error of law when it applied the Doctrine of apparent authority and
held that the reduced toll dressing rates prepared by Mr. del Castillo are binding to Agro, despite the
fact that the reduction of the toll dressing rates were never authorized or ratified by Agro’s Board of
Directors.

The CA committed a reversible error of law when it held that the reduction of the toll dressing rates
is not barred by the parol evidence rule.

OUR RULING

The petition is devoid of merit.

Agro is correct that "apparent authority is determined by the acts of the principal and not by the
acts of the agent." As applied to corporations, the doctrine of apparent authority provides that "a
corporation is estopped from denying the [officer's] authority if it knowingly permits such officer to
act within the scope of an apparent authority, and it holds him out to the public as possessing the
power to do those acts."

Thus, it is the corporation's acts which determine the existence of apparent authority, i.e., whether
the corporation knowingly permits its officer to act on its behalf and holds such officer out to the
public as having the authority to do those acts.

Here, it is easy to see that Agro, reasonably appearing to have knowledge of the amendments,
acquiesced to the same. Indeed, Agro never contested nor protested the amendments; on the
contrary, it even accepted the benefits arising therefrom. “When a corporation intentionally or
negligently clothes its officer with apparent authority to act in its behalf, it is estopped from
denying its officer's apparent authority as to innocent third parties who dealt with this officer in
good faith."

Considering the foregoing, We do not find a reversible error in the appellate court's finding that the
amendments were binding on Agro under the doctrine of apparent authority.

Finally, We need not belabor the second point raised by Agro - that the existence of the verbal
amendments may not be proved pursuant to the parol evidence rule - because it has absolutely no
basis in fact and in law. The appellate court is correct that the issue of the amendments was raised
in Vitarich's Amended Complaint, and therefore covered by the exception to the parol evidence
rule.

Wherefore, the petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs on
petitioner.

So ordered.
 MIGUEL D. GOCOLAY, PETITIONER, VS. MICHAEL BENJO GOCOLAY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 220606. January 11, 2021

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 137096. The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Regional Trial
Court's March 31, 2014 and June 20, 2014 Orders, which granted Miguel Gocolay's motion to
dismiss or recall the trial court's April 21, 2008 and April 1, 2009 Orders requiring him to undergo
DNA testing to determine Michael Gocolay's paternity.

Facts of the case

In 2005, Michael Benjo Gocolay (Michael) filed in the RTC a petition for paternity, seeking to be
recognized by Migguel Gocolay as his biological and nonmarital son. According to Michael, in 1976,
Miguel and Priscilla met and had an affair which resulted to pregnancy, knowing his responsibility,
Miguel promised to support Priscilla and Micheal which he never did. In support of his petition,
Michael presented his birth certificate which his father is Miguel and stating that Miguel and
Priscilla were married.

In Miguel’s answer, he denied having a child with Priscilla, and that the claim of Priscilla as he is the
father and he is married to her in the live birth were falsified.

In the trial, Michael requested a Motion for DNA Examination/Testing, which Miguel opposed for it
will violate his right on self-incrimination and against involuntary servitude. The RTC granted the
motion which Miguel appealed, until the case reached on this court, which ultimately affirmed the
grant in 2012. By November 18, 2013, Miguel filed a motion too dismiss or recall the orders
allowing the conduct of DNA Testing. In his motion, he alleged a supervening event whom Priscilla
had been charged and pled guilty of violating Presidential Decree No. 651, for making false entries
in Michael’s birth certificate. To Miguel, the conviction of Priscilla invalidates the establishment of
the paternity that would support DNA testing, prima facie.

On March 31, 2014, RTC issued an Order granting the motion of Miguel as Michael birth certificate
cannot be relied on so there is no prima facie case in Michael favor. Michael motion was denied on
June 20, 2014.

Upon denial, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s March 31, 2014 and June 20, 2014 Orders.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ May 28, 2015 Decision stated: wherefore, premises
considered, the Orders dated March 31, 2014 and June 20, 2014 of public respondent Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the court a
quo is directed to set the date for the conduct of the DNA examination.

The CA directed to set the date for the conduct of the DNA examination.
For Priscilla’s pleading guilty on Presidential Decree 651 was not supervening event and it does not
change the fact on Michael being a son to Miguel, only changed his status as marital too nonmarital
child. Moreover, to the CA. birth certificate was not the only evidence that would show Michael’s
paternity. Priscilla’s testimony in court, her pregnancy and Michael’s birth, constitute the prima
facie case that supported the final and executory orders to conduct DNA testing. Priscilla was
convicted in her criminal act June 18, 2012 while the order to conduct DNA testing was issued on
Supreme court on August 3, 2012. And Miguel only raised Priscilla’s conviction one year later, in
November 18, 2013. To the CA, Miguel’s failure to inform the court to the existence of a
supervening event should be deemed his waiver of that defense. Thus, RTC erred in granting
Miguel’s motion. So, CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration on September 7, 2015.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner, argues that Priscilla’s criminal act was a supervening event, he did not provide the
information in the birth certificate and he did not sign it. Priscilla’s lying about the marital status, it
could be she lied about the respondent’s paternity, too. Further, petitioner claims, false entry in the
respondent’s birth certificate is prima facie evidence that does not established his paternity and
affiliation case. Article 172 and 175 of the family code, are ways where children can establish their
marital or nonmarital filiation. Moreover, Priscilla’s testimony on her alleged relationship is a self-
serving and uncorroborated, so there is no support in issuance of a DNA testing order.

In his comment, respondent argues that decision in the CA is correct, that Priscilla’s conviction of a
criminal case is not a supervening power which will defeat the immutability of the judgment on the
order for DNA testing. To the respondent, the second motion for reconsideration is prohibited
under the Rule 37, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, seeking to overturn a ruling already entered into
judgment by no less than this Court. Also, he argues that Priscillas conviction does not affect the
birth certificate but only, falsified entries. Respondent’s claim for paternity was supported by
Priscilla’s testimony and petitioner’s sexual relationship to his mother.
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates that doctrine of immutability of judgment did not apply to this
case, and Priscilla’s conviction was a supervening event, because her conviction tarnished the birth
certificate so insufficiency of the evidence to support for his prima facie case to justify the DNA
testing.

Issue

Whether or not, the conviction of Priscilla Castor making false entries in the birth certificate of
Michael Gocolay is a supervening event that warrants setting aside the final and executory Regional
Trial Court Orders for the DNA testing of Micahel Gocolay and Miguel Gocolay.

Ruling of the Court

It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified or amended even if the purpose of
modification or amendment is to correct perceived error of law or fact. This doctrine of
immutability is a matter of sound public policy, which rests upon the practical consideration that
every litigation must come to an end.

The doctrine of immutability has two-fold purpose: 1. To avoid delay in the administration of
justice and thus procedurally, to make orderly judgment of judicial business, and 2. To put an end of
judicial controversy, at the risk of occasional errors, which why courts exist. Controversy cannot
drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an
infinite period of time.

One exception of doctrine of immutability of judgment is when there is supervening event or facts
which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances which
developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which are newly discovered,
prior to trial or while trial is on going as they were not yet existing at that time. A supervening
event renders the execution of the judgment impossible or unjust, requiring new relief to be
granted as the new facts or circumstances warrant.

The supervening event which the petitioner pointed out does not change the party’s situation and
did not materially affect the execution of judgment, it cannot be considered a supervening event.

In this case, the Order of RTC was undisputed. DNA testing must go on.

Wherefore, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is denied. The May 28, 2015 decision and
September 7, 2015 Resolution of the CA are affirmed.

So ordered.

JOEL G. NOLASCO, Petitioner, v. PURENCE REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 252715. October 12, 2022

Facts of the case

On February 2, 2017, Purence Realty Corporation filed an action for recovery of possession and
quieting of title with damages against Nolasco and Elizardo Francisco in the RTC of Binan, Laguna.
Purence alleged that it is the absolute owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 131670 and 131671 at
Don Jose Zavalla Subdivision in Santa Rosa, Laguna. Sometime in 1990, it discovered that defendant
illegally entered and occupied the properties through stealth and strategy and without its consent.
In March 2004, the defendants filed a complaint against Purence before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) claiming that they acquire the properties from Celso and Apolonia
Dichoso (Sps. Dichoso); while Francisco purchases the lot from Roberto Nolasco (Roberto). The
HLURB found out that defendant do not have the cause of action against Purence for lack of privity
of contract. On appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners affirmed the ruling. By virtue of his
decision, Purence sent demand letters to the defendant for them to vacate the properties but they
refused causing the filing of the case.

Only Nolasco was successfully served with summons. However, Nolasco failed to answer to the
complaint prompting Purence to file a motion to declare him in default. Subsequently, Nolasco filed
his answer, claiming that his parents (Roberto and Flaviana) bought the properties from Sps.
Dichoso, who in turn, purchased them from Purence. Roberto fully paid the property with Purence
as evidence by an official receipt. A certification was issued by Prescilla Lijauco and Pablo Cerdena
stating that they personal knowledge that Roberto had fully paid Block 3, Lot 14 to Purence.
Purence opposed the admission of Nolasco’s answer.

May 8, 2018, RTC declared Nolasco in default after finding that it took him more or less 87 days to
file his answer. Nolasco reasoned out fir his delay was caused by his sickness and ignorance, but
Nolasco do not even attached a valid medical certificate for his claim. Nolasco’s answer was
stricken form the records and Purence was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte before the
Branch Clerk of Court.

The RTC Ruling

November 12, 2018, RTC favored Purence, ordering respondent Joel Nolasco and all persons
claiming rights under hin to vacate subject premises and surrender possession to the petitioner,
ordering respondent and all claiming right under him must demolish any and all structure built
therein in their own cost and to pay the cost of suit.

RTC explained that case filed is accion publiciana to determine the better right of possession of a
realty independent of title. RTC found that Purence has a better right over the property than
Nolasco, because the titles of the lots have been in the name of Purence since 1985. Hence, it must
be returned to its lawful possession in pursuant to Art. 539 of the New Civil Code. So, it has the
right to eject Nolasco from the property. As for Francisco, no ruling can validly be made against him
since he wa neither served with summons nor did he voluntarily appear to the court. The RTC held
that it is not necessary to dwell on issue of quieting the title. Also, it rejected on Purence prayer for
Attorney’s fees for lack of merit.

Nolasco filed an appeal to the CA.

The CA’s Ruling

In its resolution dated August 30, 2019, the CA considered the appeal abandoned and dismissed the
case for failure to file an appellant’s brief under Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Nolasco’s counsel received the letter from Judicial Records Division (JRD) last May 8, 2019,
requiring him to file an appellant brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. Thus, Nolasco has until
July 22, 2019, to file a brief or a motion of extension. However, the motion for an extension of 300
days was filed 16 days after the lapse of the reglementary period. The CA observed that instead of
filing an appellant’s brief, it filed two Motion for Extension which was filed beyond the prescribed
period. Nolasco filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied, for it is clear from the
records from JRD, the counsel of Nolasco received the letter on May 8, 2019 as evidence by the
registry return receipt. Yet, the counsel failed to submit the Appellant’s Brief within the prescribed
period and his explanation is not compelling enough for the reversal of the Court earlier Resolution.

The CA explained to Public Attorney’s Office- Special and Appealed Cases (PAO-SACS) received two
notices to file brief yet no appellant’s brief was filed. The counsel reasoned out for the non-filing of
appellant brief was the volume of pleadings for filing as well as other cases requiring urgent
attention. The CA ruled that the reasons are not compelling enough for the reversal of eh dismissal
of the case.
 Issue

Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the appeal of Nolasco.

The Court Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

Contrary to Purence claim, the petition of Nolasco was seasonably filed on September 1, 2020.
Nolasco received the CA’s resolution dated June 10, 2020 on July 1, 2020. Under Section 2 Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, he has 15 days from the notice of the said resolution, that is until July 16, 2020
to file a petition for an extension of time for review on certiorari for 30 days or until August 30,
2020. We granted the motion in our resolution dated August 26, 2020.

WE now proceed to the crux of the controversy. The CA has the discretionary authority to dismiss
an appeal for non-filing of an appellant’s brief pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court. So, in this section of the Rule 50, the CA has discretion for the dismissal of the case provided
this directory must be exercised soundly and in accordance in the tenets of justice and fair play
having in mind the circumstances of each case.

Consequently, the appellate court has the power to allow the appeal notwithstanding with the delay
of the appellant’s brief. If such delay was due to the inadvertence of the appellant’s counsel, any of
the following circumstances must be shown to exist to warrant the appellate court’s liberality: (a)
the recklessness or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client due process of law; (b) the
application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of property; or (c) the interests of justice
so require. The second and third exceptions obtain in this case.

Nolasco is the possessor of the properties in question. And with his appeal in the CA which was
denied due to his failure of filing the appellant’s brief is tantamount of losing his home. We do not
condone the non-compliance of the with the reglementary periods under the rules but the pressing
concern of substantial justice impels us to SET ASIDE the CA’s dismissal of the case. Nolasco’s
appellant’s brief is crucial in determination of the case. Nolasco was able to present his defense of
payment and ownership in the RTC because he was declared in default and in the CA because his
appeal was dismissed. Indeed, if payment has been made, then it would be the height of injustice
for Nolasco to be evicted from his own properties.

Time and again, we rule that technical rules must not suppress substantial justice. After all,
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the court. These procedural rules and
technical are intended to ensure, not suppress substantial justice.

In fine, we deem it appropriate to reinstate the appeal of Nolasco and afford him the fullest
opportunity too establish the merits of his appeal, rather than to deprive him of his properties
outright.

Wherefore, the petition is partly granted. The resolutions dated August 30, 2019 and June 10,
2020 of the CA are reversed and set aside, Petitioner’s appeal is reinstated. The case is
remanded to the Court of Appeals for proper resolution of the case on its merits.

So, ordered.

MERLITA JANEO RAMOS, Petitioner, v. EMELITA JANEO SOL, * Respondent

G.R. No. 232755. October 12, 2022

Assailed in this Petition1 for review on certiorari (Petition) is the Decision2 dated November 29,
2016 and the Resolution3 dated June 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 05935
which reversed the Decision4 dated March 24, 2010 and the Resolution5 dated March 31, 2011 of
the Office of the President (OP) in OP Case No. 08-E-190.

Facts of the case

Deogracias Janeo (Deogracias) was declared a farmer beneficiary of a 2.5-hectare land situated in
San Vicente, Leganes, Iloilo with Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 077984. Died on May 15,
1976, leaving nine heirs, namely: LAdeslao Janeo (Ladeslao), Marietta J. Quiros (Marietta), Merlita
Janeo Ramos (Petitioner Merlita),, Mercedita J. Ramos (Mercedita), Reynaldo Janeo (Reynaldo),
Ricardo Janeo (Ricardo), Melita j. JAgunap (Melita), Emelita Janeo Sol (respondent Emelita), and
Marjorita J, Baltazar (Marjorita).

After the death of Deogracias, Respondent Emelita assumed the duties and responsibilities of his
father. She filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO), Region VI,
Iloilo City, an application and confirmation and designation as Deogracias’ successor, the
cancellation of CLT No. 077984, and the issuance of the new CLT in her favor.

In the investigation report of David Grande (agrarian reform technologist of Leganes, Iloilo) dated
January 8, 1987, brought the application of Emelita to the attention of San Vicente Samahang
Nayon. The Samahang NAyon issued Resolution No 6, Series of 1986, recommending respondent
Emelita, petitioner Merlita, and MArjorita as priority successors of Deogracias.

In an Order dated, June 10, 1987, the Regional Director confirmed the selection of respondent
Emelita,and designated her as the sole owner-cultivator of the subject land. The same Order
cancelled the previous CLT and a new CLT was issued in her favor.

Ricardo filed a motion for reconsideration assailing respondent Emelita’s designation as the
successor of their father.

DAR Secretary’s Ruling

In an Order dated July 11, 1988, Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary Philip Ella Juico
(DAR Secretary Juico) denied Ricardo’s motion of reconsideration and directed the issuance of a
new CLT for Emelita’s name. He found out that majority of the Heirs namely: Marietta, petitioner
Merlita, Mercedita, Melita and MArjorita waived their rights and interests over the subject land in
favor to the respondent Emelita as evidenced by a waiver of rights dated November 26, 1986.
Emelita directed to compensate the other heirs to the exent of their legal interest in the subject
land, subject to the payment of Deogracias’ outstanding obligations.

Petitioner Merlita, Ladeslao, Reynaldo and Melita filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation
of the Order dated July 11, 1988 alleging that there is fraud in their alleged Waver of rights in favor
of respondent Emelita.

In an Order dated April 3, 1989, DAR Secretary Juico set aside his order dated July 11, 1988 and
directed the remand of the entire records of the case to the Regional Director, DARRO VI, Iloilo City,
for further investigation.

May 31, 1996, an Order from the Regional Director directed the issuance of EP in favor of the
petitioner Merlita as the sole heir for there was no unanimous waiver made by the heirs of
Deogracias in favor to respondent Emelita so Regional Director declared the order of priority of the
heir. Since, Ladislao, the eldest was already cultivating 3 hectares under the leasehold tenancy and
Marietta was already s CLT beneficiary, so the Regional Director designated petition Merlita, who
had not cultivated any landholding and was chosen by the majority of the heirs to be the successor
of the subject land.

In an Order dated December 4, 1996, a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Emelita,
Marietta and Reynaldo were denied by Regional Director; it found that the right to succeed was
established in favor to Merlita. DAR Secretary denied their motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated April 14, 2008.
So, a petition for review was filed by respondent Emelita, Marietta and Reynaldo before the Office of
the President.

Office of the President Ruling

March 24, 2010, the decision of the President is the denial of their Petition for Review. It found that
decision for legal issues and determination of the validity of the Waiver of Right was within the
competence of the DAR. The issue on the validity of the waiver of the rights should resolve first
before the issue as to who among the heirs of Deogracias should be declared the rightful successor
to the subject land.

OP ruled that the waiver of rights in favor of Emelita was a fraud and that the waiver of rights of
petitioner Merlita was attested by the majority of the heirs, aside from Merlita is the eldest of the
siblings so more likely to succeed in cultivating the subject land.

So, respondent Emelita, Marietta and Reynaldo filed their Motion for Reconsideration, but the OP
denied the motion dated March 31, 2011.

Not satisfied, respondent Emelita filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
assailing the OP Decision and Resolution with the CA.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The CA ruled in favor of respondent Emelita. Petition is granted to Emelita.

The decision of the Office of the President, the Order and Resolutions made by the DAR are reversed
and set aside. CA ruled that DAR has no authority to order the issuance of a new Emancipation
Patent in favor to Merlita over the same property which is issued in favor of Emelita. It held that the
registration of EP and issuance of TCT by the Registry of Deeds in favor to Emerita divested the DAR
secretary of administrative authority to summarily cancel that EP. According to the CA, it is only
when an EP or a CLT is not yet registered with the Land Registry Authority (LRA), that the Dar
Secretary retains authority to cancel them in the exercise of his administrative functions.

Petitioner Merlita filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in a Resolution dated June
23, 2017.
Present Petition

Petitioner Merlita before the court alleged that CA committed a grave and reversible error:

 In holding that, Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform has no jurisdiction over
the case.
 In holding that the secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform has no jurisdiction
over the case in resolving the issue involving the validity of the waiver.
 In holding that the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform has no jurisdiction
to exercise continuing jurisdiction in the case at bar.
 In holding that Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1978 iis not applicable in the
case at bar.

Petitioner Merlita argues that DARAB Rules of Procedures took effect only on December 26, 1988,
thus, not applicable to the case which started on Auguust 17, 1988nwhen she and her siblings filed
a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the Order of the DAR Regional Director designating
Emelita as their late father substitute farmer-beneficiary. Merlita, further argues that at the time of
their filing of their motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation, the prevailing law was CARL or
Republic Act No. 6657, which took effect on July 10, 1988. Citing Section 50 of the CARL, petitioner
contends that it is the DAR, not the DARAB, that has jurisdiction over the case.

Finally, petitioner Merlita insists that she is entitled to the subject land awarded to their father
under MC 19, s. 1978.

Respondents Comment

Respondent Emelita argues that the CA’s decision dated November 29, 2016 was simply anchored
on the rule that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack so it cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with the law. Also, she contends
that CA is correct when it brought the matter before the DAR Secretary does seek directly in the
annulment of title but only qualification to succeed as an allocatee to her deceased father’s
landholding. Further, contends that DAR Secretary and Regional Director has no jurisdiction to rule
the validity of the title indirectly through the issuance of the new EP in favor of another person
because it is a collateral attack on her title; and the DAR Secretary has no authority to order the
issuance of an EP over an agricultural land already covered by a TCT as this authority exclusively
belongs to the DARAB.

Petitioners Reply

In her Reply, petitioner Merlita asserts that there was no collateral attack on the title considering
that at the tie of the issuance of the New EP, the title issued was just an administrative title, that the
mere issuance of the New EP did not put the ownership of an agrarian reform beneficiary beyond
attack and scrutiny; and that the EP’s may be cancelled for violation of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations.

Issues

1. Whether the CA erred in finding that the DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction to order the
issuance of a new EP in favor of petitioner Merlita.

2. Whether there is a collateral attack on respondent Emelita’s TCT.

Our Ruling

The court grant the petition.

Executive Order No. (EO) 229, signed on July 22, 1987, vests on the DAR quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the DENR and the DA.

Here, the DAR Secretary affirmed the Regional Director's Order invalidating the Waiver of Rights in
favor of respondent Emelita, designating petitioner Merlita as the sole heir-cultivator of the subject
land based on MC 19, s. 1978, and directing the issuance of an EP in petitioner Merlita's favor. The
DAR Secretary's action was done in the exercise of his administrative powers and pursuant to his
duty to implement agrarian reform laws, rules, and regulations.

To stress, Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules provides that matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARL and other agrarian reform laws and pertinent rules
shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the DAR Secretary. Therefore, the CA erred
in finding that the DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the instant case.

The assailed resolution of the DAR Secretary ordering the issuance of an EP in favor of the
petitioner Merlita do not amount to a collateral attack on TCT No. EP-5840 in the name of
respondent Emelita.

Indeed, a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a

certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding, and thus cannot be collaterally
attacked. However, herein petitioner Merlita is questioning respondent Emelita's title her
qualification to succeed as allocatee to their deceased father's landholding in accordance with
existing agrarian laws, rules, and regulations.

The DAR's scrutiny of the Waiver of Rights was necessary to validate the qualifications of the
allocatee and to resolve the issue as to who among the heirs of the deceased CARP beneficiary
should be the rightful successor to the subject landholding in accordance with the provisions of MC
19, s. 1978. Corollary thereto, to expedite the reallocation of lands left by deceased beneficiaries, all
DAR Regional Directors are authorized to confirm the selection of the sole owner-cultivator made
by the surviving heirs or, in appropriate cases, to designate such sole owner-cultivator in
accordance with existing rules and regulations of the DAR.

We cannot simply brush aside the DAR's pronouncements regarding the status of the subject property
as not exempt from CARP coverage considering that the DAR has unquestionable technical expertise
on these matters. Factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and
even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, a situation that
obtains in this case. The factual findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who, by reason of his
official position, has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect
and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
November 29, 2016 and the Resolution dated June 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 05935 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated March 24, 2010 and the Resolution
dated March 31, 2011 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 08-E-190, as well as the Order
dated December 10, 1997 and the Resolution dated April 14, 2008 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform in Adm. Case No. 02-17-88-134, are REINSTATED.

So ordered.

EUFROCINA RIVERA, Petitioner, v. ROLANDO G. VELASCO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 242837. October 05, 2022

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing
the Decision dated February 15, 2018 and Resolution dated September 17, 2018 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA?G.R. SP No. 151231.

The assailed issuances reversed and set aside the Decision dated October 31, 2016 and Order dated
May 12, 2017 issued by Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija in
Civil Case No. 4767-15 which, in turn, affirmed the Decision dated July 6, 2015 of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of General Tinio, Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 1017, finding merit in the
complaint for forcible entry filed by Eufrocina Rivera (petitioner) against Rolando G: Velasco
(respondent).

Antecedents

Three parcels of land located in Rio Chico, General Tinio, Nueva Ecija containing an aggregate area
of 27,076 square meters, more or less and registered in the name of the plaintiff Eufrocina G. Rivera
complained that she discovered that respondent Rolando G. Velasco by means of strategy and
stealth, possessed and occupied a portion of her titled land, to the extent of 6,397 square meters,
constructing a house without her permission or consent, the respondent refused to vacate the land
despite demand and that no settlement was reached before the barangay Lupong Tagapamayapa.

Respondent, in his Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss, countermanded that he is a
lawful owner of the portion of the subject property, having occupied it since 1995; that petitioner
lied when she stated in her free patent applications that she had been occupying the subject
properties since 2000; as a result, respondent lodged on September 1, 2014 a Protest against her
before the DENR; and that, accordingly, the requisites of an action for forcible entry were not met in
the instant case.

The MTC Ruling

On July 6, 2015, the MTC rendered a decision in favor to the petitioner. The petitioner was able to
establish her prior physical possession of the titled lands since 1992, as evidenced by a barangay
certification dated January 26, 2003 issued by the barangay captain Gerardo A. Quijano; that such
possession is likewise supported by a CENRO reported August 25, 2003 and that she is the owner of
the portion of the subject property being occupied by the respondent. Since the petitioner occupied
the subject land first, in 1992 and the respondent only occupied the same only sometime in 1995,
the MTC decreed that the former must prevail.

The MTC rejected the respondent’s defense that petitioner acquired her titles through fraud
because same amounts to a collateral attack on Torrens titles which is not allowed.

In fine, the MTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
Eufrocina G. Rivera and against the defendant Rolando G. Velasco, as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Rolando G. Velasco and all persons claiming rights under his
authority to peacefully evict and vacate the parcels of land situated in Brgy. Rio Chico,
General Tinio, Nueva Ecija, covered by Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-27012,
Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-27013, and the Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo
Blg. P-27014 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija, and to turn over
the physical possession thereof to the plaintiff;cralawlawlibrary
2. Ordering the defendant Rolando G. Velasco to pay reasonable rent for the use and
occupation of the subject properties in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (Php
5,000.00), per month commencing on June 21, 2014, until he and/or all person claiming
rights under him finally vacate and surrender the physical possession of the subject
properties to the plaintiff;

3.c Ordering the defendant Rolando G. Velasco to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount
of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 20,000.00);

4. Ordering the defendant Rolando G. Velasco to pay the plaintiff the cost of this suit in the
amount of Php 2,245.00.

SO ORDERED.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Dauntless, respondent launched an appeal before the RTC.

In his Appellant's Memorandum, respondent bewailed the MTC's Decision, arguing that he is the
lawful owner and possessor of the land in question; that the MTC did not have any jurisdiction over
the case because the elements of forcible entry are absent; and that, accordingly, the MTC should
have dismissed petitioner's complaint.

In her Plaintiff-Appellee's Memorandum,31 petitioner retorted that she was able to provide enough
evidence to show her prior physical possession of the subject properties; and that the affidavits
presented by respondent attesting to their own occupation of the piece of land in question were a
mere afterthought.

The RTC Ruling

The RTC denied the petition of the respondent on October 21, 2016.

Stamping the imprimatur on the judgment of the MTC, the RTC ruled that petitioner’s complaint
properly alleges the requisites for a valid action for forcible entry and the respondent’s avowal that
petitioners title was acquired through fraud is an unproven and unsubstantiated claim; that a
collateral attack on petitioner’s Torrens titles is prescribed and under the circumstances, petitioner
is entitled to the possession of that portion of real property being occupied by respondent.

Wherefore, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision dated
July 6, 2015 is hereby affirmed in toto.

So ordered.

Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 12, 2017.

Believing that facts and law are on his side, respondent beseeched the CA’s intercession through a
Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

The CA Ruling

The CA granted the plea and ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.

The CA elucidated that the case was not just a simple ejectment but involves a complex ownership
issue that must be settle in accion reivindicatoria which is cognizable before the RTC. The CA
further explained that the protest before the CENRO and a civil case for reconveyance of Tile before
the branch 36 of the RTC of Gapan City, justify why the controversy cannot be fully resolved in an
ejectment case.

So, CA’s decision, the petition is granted and the assailed decision dated October 21, 2016 of the
RTC of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 34, is set aside. Respondent’s complaint for forcible entry is
dismissed.

Issue

The Court is tasked to resolve whether the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of petitioner's
complaint for forcible entry on the ground that the controversy cannot be resolved without arriving
at a definite ruling on the issue of ownership over the portion of the subject properties occupied by
respondent.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is clear that the petitioner case filed was forcible entry, alleging her prior physical possession of
the subject properties and respondent’s act of forcibly entering the same by means of strategy and
stealth. Such allegations was filed within a one year period from the time of discovery by the
petitioner of respondent’s possession of the property and not from the time of occupation. Most
importantly, the factual findings of the MTC, as affirmed by he RTC, confirm the veracity of the
allegations in petitioner’s complaint and ruled in her entitled to the possession of the subject
properties.
The court disagrees with the CA when it essentially allowed to prevail respondent’s collateral attack
on petitioner’s three torrent titles, thereby resulting in the dismissal of the latter’s complaint for
forcible entry. A torrent title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until has
been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction.

It may be recalled that in the instant case, petitioner applied for a free patent over the subject
properties before the CENRO, and that the same was granted by the said office. This led to the
issuance of OCT Nos. P-27012, P-27013, and P-27014 in petitioner's name. Thereafter, after
discovering respondent's forcible entry into an area encompassing a 6,937-square meter portion of
the three titled parcels of land, petitioner sent the former a demand letter dated July 4, 2014
requiring him to vacate the same. And in response to said demand, respondent filed before the
CENRO on September 1, 2014 a Protest alleging irregularities with regard to the issuance of
petitioner's Torrens titles. This was conveniently set up by respondent as a defense against
petitioner's impending ejectment suit.

Respondent's allegation that petitioner's free patent applications were improvidently granted by
the DENR constitutes a collateral attack on petitioner's titles which is barred under the Torrens
system. Apart from her prayer for damages, all that petitioner asked from the MTC was that she be
given the possession of the property in question. Having obtained three valid Torrens titles over the
subject properties, she is entitled to protection from indirect attacks against the same.

In fine, an ejectment suit is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the property. The CA committed an egregious error in rendering the herein
assailed issuances.

The evidence on record firmly establishes petitioner as the registered owner of the parcel of land
that was forcibly breached by respondent. Since the relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence
dictate that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including
possession, the MTC correctly ruled in favor of petitioner. Its ruling must, perforce, be reinstated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2018 and the Resolution
dated September 17, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 151231 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

The Decision dated July 6, 2015 of the Municipal Trial Court of General Tinio, Nueva Ecija in Civil
Case No. 1017 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum is imposed on the total monetary award due petitioner Eufrocina Rivera,
reckoned from the time of finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.
 A Case Digest
A project in Civil Procedure II

Presented to:
Atty. Benedict Balberia

Presented by:
Janice V. Lee
JD-2C