TITLE DOCTRINE DIGEST AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

People vs. Mazo Doctrine: Facts:

BALONGLONG The failure of the prosecution to
offer in evidence the affidavit The Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon charged appellant Dennis Mazo before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
allegedly executed by Yap after the killing one Rafael Morada, Jr. In the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the above charges.
killing does not give rise to the
presumption that evidence willfully The prosecution presented Rommel Abrenica, who testified that he and the deceased, Rafael Morada, Jr., were
suppressed would be adverse if having a drink in the "Rendezvous” . In court, Rommel identified Exhibit "D" as the same knife that the accused
produced. Such presumption is not allegedly used in stabbing the deceased. Dr. Victorio F. Benedicto, the Municipal Health Officer of Romblon
applicable when the omitted conducted the autopsy on Rafael's remains. He concluded that the victim sustained 5 stab wounds that led to his
evidence is at the disposal of both death.
parties, because it would have the
same weight against the one as The accused interposed self-defense, claiming that it was the victim who initially possessed the knife and started
against the other party. the fight. The foregoing account was corroborated by Dennis' companions in their respective testimonies. Dennis
further testified that he sustained an injury in his right forefinger as he parried Rafael's thrust. Dr. Victorio
Benedicto confirmed that he treated Dennis for the injury on his finger, stating that while the injury could have
been caused by a kitchen knife, it could also have been sustained before or after the said incident. To prove the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the defense presented Senior Police Inspector Harry B. Mazo.

On rebuttal, the prosecution again presented Rommel Abrenica and SPO2 De la Cruz, who both affirmed their
earlier testimonies. The prosecution also offered for the first time the testimony of Adrian "Dianne" Yap, 20, a
make- up artist. Adrian and his friends were having a stroll at around midnight to look for men. Adrian later left
his companions at the side of the belfry and the church and saw Dennis and Rafael running. He witnessed that
Rafael fell in front of the school, kicking, as if defending himself from Dennis. Then, Adrian got a glimpse of
Rafael's intestines. Another rebuttal witness, Louel Manzo, observed that Exhibit "D", the knife that was allegedly
used in the stabbing of Rafael Morada, looked familiar. According to Louel, he and Dennis had an altercation two
days before the stabbing and Dennis had chased him with a knife.
The Romblon RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the appellant insisted that the killing of Rafael Morada, Jr., was done in
self-defense, a justifying circumstance, or at least it constituted incomplete self-defense, a privileged mitigating
circumstance. More importantly, Mazo argued that Yap's trustworthiness, whose appearance as a rebuttal witness,
it is claimed, is most "irregular and improper" since he should have testified during the prosecution's presentation
of its evidence-in-chief.

Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to offer in evidence the affidavit executed by Yap gives rise to the
presumption that suppressed evidence would be adverse if produced

Held:
No.

In any case, evidence offered in rebuttal is not automatically excluded just because it would have been more
properly admitted in the case in chief. Whether evidence could have been more properly admitted in the case in
chief is not a test of admissibility of evidence in rebuttal. Thus, the fact that testimony might have been useful and
usable in the case in chief does not necessarily preclude its use in rebuttal.

In this case, Mazo’s argument that Yap’s testimony, as a rebuttal witness, is the most irregular and improper since
he should have testified during the prosecution’s presentation of its evidence-in-chief is without merit. This
argument loses its value in the face of the defense's failure to object to the offer of the witness' testimony or to
move for such testimony to be struck off the record when the impropriety thereof became apparent. The failure of
the prosecution to offer in evidence the affidavit allegedly executed by Yap after the killing does not give rise to
the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. Such presumption is not
applicable when the omitted evidence is at the disposal of both parties, because it would have the same weight
against the one as against the other party. Moreover, the prosecution has discretion to decide on who to call as
 witness during trial. Its failure to present Ronnie Manzo or any of Adrian's companions does not give rise to the
presumption that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" since the evidence was merely
corroborative or cumulative and was not proven to be willfully suppressed. Like the affidavit Adrian executed,
which was not offered by the prosecution in evidence, appellant could have subpoenaed Adrian's companions to
testify on his behalf if he believed that their testimonies were vital to his defense.

Lee vs. Romillo, Jr., Doctrine: Facts:

QUINATADCAN ● A real party in ● The complaint was based on a contract for arrastre services at Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila executed
interest-plaintiff is one between respondent Mendioro and William Lines Inc., represented by Benito Chiongbian as evidenced
who has a legal right while by the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 28, 1973.
a real party in ● In 1975, a motion to dismiss the complaint was filed and was denied by the court.
interest-defendant is one ● In 1977, the trial court granted the motion to include Jose Millares, Cesar Almario, and Henry
who has a correlative legal Chiongbian as indispensable parties in the case.
obligation whose act or ● In 1981, the trial court rendered its decision against the petitioners. This decision was mailed to the
omission violates the legal petitioners’ counsel at William Lines Building, Pier 14, North Harbor Manila. On October 9, 19, and 22,
right of the former. 1981 the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd notices of the registered mail were delivered respectively to the guard-on-duty
● It is a well-settled rule that at counsel’s offices but the mailed decision remained unclaimed at the post office despite the proper
when a party is represented notices.
by counsel, notice should ● The trial court granted an ex-parte motion and issue accordingly a writ of execution. A notice of
be made upon the counsel garnishment was likewise issued to certain banks.
of record at his given ● The trial court denied the motion to set aside judgment and to quash/ recall the writ of execution.
address appearing in the
counsel's entry of Court of Appeals
appearance, to which ● The petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order and/or
notices of all kinds preliminary injunction wherein petitioners questioned the issuance of the said order by the trial court
emanating from the court judge.
should be sent in the ● CA dismissed the petition
absence of a proper and
adequate notice to the Supreme Court
court of a change of ● The instant petition was initially resolved in 1982 wherein it was denied by SC for being unmeritorious.
address ● It was then reconsidered by SC and gave due course to the petition.

Issues and Ruling: The petition was denied by the SC.

1. Whether or not the parties in the case at bar are real parties-in-interest
- Yes. Mendioro’s interest arose from his ownership of the amounts paid by the persons and firms
for his arrastre service during the period.
- Lee, Tan, and Benito Chiongbian, are also real parties in interest as they are receiving the income
from the arrastre operations at Pier 14 where Mendioro conducted arrastre services for William
Lines.

2. Whether or not petitioner Henry Chiongbian can be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the
other co-petitioners despite the fact that in the original complaint he was not included as a
party-defendant
- SC held that Chiongbian was impleaded as an indispensable party by the petitioners’ own
counsel and Chiongbian also filed a motion to that effect.
 3. Whether or not the judgment against the petitioners was premature in the absence of a formal
accounting to be made by the petitioners
- The SC ruled in the negative. In lieu of the document referred to be the petitioners (the
accounting), the trial court relied on the evidence presented in court in a span of three years
(1978-1981) during which time all the parties were afforded the chance to deduce their evidence.
The absence of said formal document and the reliance on testimonial and documentary evidence
adduced during trial are justified by the trial court.
4. Whether or not the lower court's decision was validly served on the petitioners,
- Yes. The SC held that there is valid proof that copies of the lower court’s decision were mailed to
the petitioners’ counsel at the address on record. The 1st-3rd notices were delivered to Pier 14
North Harbor and the petitioners’ counsel failed to claim the mailed decision at the post office.
Hence, there was a presumption of valid service.
5. Whether or not the delegation of the reception of the evidence ex-parte to the lower court's legal
researcher is illegal.
- The SC held that the ruling in Lim Tanhu v Ramolete cannot be applied in this case. It was also
emphasized by SC that the petitioners had almost three years (July 20, 1978 - May 22, 1981) to
participate in the trials and present their evidence.

Sarmiento vs. Juan The petitioner had manifested to Facts:

DURAN the Court that his inability to ● Private respondent Belfast Surety and Insurance Co filed a case against Petitioner Andres Sarmiento and his father
appear before the pre-trial was due Benjamin for indemnification under an Indemnity agreement executed connected with a bail bond
to a sudden ailment that befell him ● Petitioner filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim and private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case
while he was preparing to go to against Benjamin Sarmiento and to schedule the case for pre trial.
Court. While it is true that the ● Pre-Trial was set on Feb 5, 1980, at 8:30am but no one appeared except the counsel of private respondent.
motion for postponement was not ○ But petitioner sent to the Court on the same date an urgent motion to postpone saying that he felt severe
accompanied by a medical stomach pain followed by loose bowels and prayed that the pre-trial be postponed to another date
certificate, it must be considered ○ Motion was denied
that not every ailment is attended ● Atty Castillo, counsel of private respondent, filed a motion declaring the petitioners nonsuited and private
to by a physician, or if so, a respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte
medical certificate under oath as ○ Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by Judge Juan
required by the Rules could be ● Petitioner thus filed petition for certiorari with the Court of Appels assailing the order declaring him in default
secured within the limited time ○ Pre-trial was premature
available. There has been no ○ No valid pre-trial, no default
refutation of the cause of the ○ Grave abuse of discretion
non-appearance of the petitioner ● Court of Appeals refused to change the decision
as claimed by the latter. Said cause
had been reiterated under oath in Issue: Whether Judge Juan's denial of the motion to postpone was valid
the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration to which the trial Ruling: NO - it was not valid
court turned a deaf ear. Any ● The denial by Judge Juan of the petitioner's motion to postpone the pre-trial scheduled on February 5, 1980 may
suspicion that the petitioner was have appeared valid at the outset, considering that it was filed at the last minute and was not accompanied by a
merely suing for delay is readily medical certificate although the ground alleged was illness on the part of the petitioner. Nonetheless, a different
dispelled by the fact that the appraisal of the petitioner's plea should have been made after the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
pre-trial was being set for the first which was made under oath. Due regard should have been given to the repeated pronouncements by this Court
time, and that the petitioner took against default judgments and proceedings that lay more emphasis on procedural niceties to the sacrifice of
immediate steps against the refusal substantial justice.
of the trial court to set aside the ● As it turned out, the procedure adopted by the trial court proved unprofitable and disadvantageous to all parties
default declaration and to pursue concerned, including the courts. The case would have been disposed of in a much easier and more expeditious
remedies steadfastly against the manner if the trial court had heeded the petitioner's simple plea for a chance to be heard. Thereby, all the
same in the higher tribunals. proceedings taken subsequent to the disputed orders of the trial court could have been avoided, and the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court spared from the trouble of resolving the petitions filed before them.
● While it is true that the motion for postponement was not accompanied by a medical certificate, it must be
considered that not every ailment is attended to by a physician, or if so, a medical certificate under oath as required
by the Rules could be secured within the limited time available. There has been no refutation of the cause of the
non-appearance of the petitioner as claimed by the latter. Said cause had been reiterated under oath in the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration to which the trial court turned a deaf ear. Any suspicion that the petitioner
was merely suing for delay is readily dispelled by the fact that the pre-trial was being set for the first time, and that
 the petitioner took immediate steps against the refusal of the trial court to set aside the default declaration and to
pursue remedies steadfastly against the same in the higher tribunals.

Laluan vs. Malpaya No provision of law or principle of In the Court of First Instance, petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession of
UY public policy prohibits a court certain properties, basing their claim on their alleged right to inherit from Marciana Laluan who died intestate.
from authorizing its clerk of court
They contested the validity of two documents: a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property, dated June 26, 1948,
to receive the evidence of a party involving paraphernal real property of the deceased, who was wife of Malpaya (one of the respondents) who
litigant. After all, the reception of allegedly took advantage of her senility in disposing of the property; and an Absolute Deed of Sale, dated July
evidence by the clerk of court 21, 1948, disposing of the entirety of some conjugal property of the said spouses, which was executed by the
constitutes but a ministerial same respondent who had the right to dispose of only one-half thereof.
task.This task of receiving
evidence precludes, on the part of The parties entered into a partial stipulation of facts, but several postponements of the scheduled hearings
the clerk of court, the exercise of followed. At the hearing on August 1, 1957, where neither respondents nor counsel appeared despite notice
judicial discretion usually called served on them, the court allowed the petitioners to adduce their evidence before the Clerk of Court.
for when the other party who is Thereafter, the court rendered judgment annulling both documents and declaring the petitioners owners
present objects to questions pro-indiviso of the entirety of the property involved in the first document and also owners pro-indiviso of
propounded and to the admission one-half of the property involved in the second document.
of the documentary evidence On appeal, the Court of Appeals voided the procedure whereby the court a quo allowed petitioners to present
proffered their evidence before the Clerk of Court and therefore, set aside the appealed decision and remanded the case to
the trial court for further proceedings.
The case was brought to the Supreme Court for review. Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
upheld the trial court in authorizing the Clerk to receive testimonial evidence of witness. It thus affirmed the
annulment by the trial court of the "Absolute Deed of Sale," but with respect to the "Deed of Absolute Sale" it
held that the property involved was not sufficiently identified. As per the petitioner’s allegation that the
proceedings are void due to the Court allowing the respondents to present evidence to the clerk of Court, the
SC ruled that No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of
court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of court
 constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the
pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This task of receiving evidence
precludes, on the part of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually called for when the other
party who is present objects to questions propounded and to the admission of the documentary evidence
proffered|||
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Yu vs. Mapayo Doctrine: FACTS:

MENDOZA
Since the answer admitted Yu filed a suit against Mapayo for the recovery of the sum of P2,800.00 representing the unpaid balance of
defendant's obligation as stated in the purchase price of a Gray Marine Engine sold by Yu to Mapayo, plus attorney’s fees before the CFI of Davao
the complaint, albeit special City. Mapayo admitted the transaction and the balance due but contended that there was hidden defects to the
defenses were pleaded, plaintiff object which forced him to spend P2,800.00 for repairs and labor, further, Mapayo allege that Yu waived the
had every right to insist that it was balance due and made a counterclaim for damages and attorneys’ fees.
for defendant to come forward
with evidence in support of his CFI of Davao City ordered Mapayo to pay P2,500.00 and costs. Mapayo then appealed to the CFI. filing an
special defenses. Section 2 of answer therein that was a virtual reproduction of his original defenses in the City Court. The case was called for
Revised Rule of Court 129 plainly hearing on 13 March 1968, however, Mapayo nor his counsel failed to appear on the scheduled hearing, the case
supports appellant: was then scheduled for an ex parte proceedings on the same day.

Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.— CFI then ordered Yu to present his evidence, which the latter failed to do so. Yu’s counsel also refused to
Admissions made by the parties in present their evidence and instead of calling its witnesses, it moved the Court to present them after Mapayo
the pleadings, or in the course of presented their evidence. Yu’s counsel consisted that he would only present his witness in rebuttal.
the trial or other proceedings do
not require proof and can not be CFI then ordered for the dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to prosecute the case. Yu’s counsel
contradicted unless previously then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this appeal.
shown to have been made through
palpable mistake. ISSUE:
 Whether or not the case was validly dismissed by the CFI on the ground of failure to prosecute.

HELD:

No. The case was not validly dismissed by the CFI.

Since the answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the complaint, albeit special defenses were
pleaded, plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his
special defenses. Section 2 of Revised Rule of Court 129 plainly supports appellant:

Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.— Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial
or other proceedings do not require proof and can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been
made through palpable mistake.

While this appeal is not a complaint against the presiding judge, We can not refrain from observing that the
trial judge's despotic and outrageous insistence that plaintiff should present proof in support of allegations that
were not denied but admitted by the adverse party was totally unwarranted, and was made worse by the trial
judge's continual interrupting of the explanations of counsel, in violation of the rules of Judicial Ethics.

Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the dismissal of the case was manifestly untenable
and contrary to law.

The CFI is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
P2,800.00, plus attorney's fees which this Court considers just and reasonable.

CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE (Rule 31, Sections 1 and 2)

 TITLE DOCTRINE DIGEST AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company Facts:
vs. Sandoval JUICO
The Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages in
Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos and other defendants, for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses and dummies. Among the properties subject of the action were two parcels of land
registered in the names of Spouses Genito. As it appears that Asian Bank claimed ownership of the two
parcels of land and was in possession of the properties by virtue of writ of possession, the Republic moved
for the amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The motion was
granted by the Sandiganbayan.

When its presentation of evidence against the original defendants was about to terminate, Republic moved to
hold a separate trial against Asian Bank. Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion until it was
first given the opportunity to test and assail testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the Republic.
Furthermore, Asian Bank contended that if a separate trial without having been sufficiently apprised about the
evidence the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant would amount to
deprivation of its day in the court.

The Republic, in its reply, maintained that separate trial is proper because it has entirely different and independent
cause of action from the original defendants. Nonetheless, Sandiganbayan granted the Republic's motion for a
separate trial. Metrobank commenced Special civil action for Certiorari as the successor-in-interest of Asian Bank

Issue: Whether or not a motion for separate trial is proper.

Held: No. The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
 Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate
trial of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of
claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.

The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.

Further, Corpus Juris Secundum makes clear that neither party had an absolute right to have a separate trial of an
issue; hence, the motion to that effect should be allowed only to avoid prejudice, further convenience, promote
justice, and give a fair trial to all parties.

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate
trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or
when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.

Superlines Trans. Co. FACTS:

vs. Victor
RICOHERMOSO - Bus No. 3008 of the Pantranco South Express, driven by Rogelio Dillomas, collided with Bus No. 331 of
the Superlines Transportation Co., then driven by Erlito Lorca, resulting in the death of Cayetano Moralde
Sr., a passenger in the Pantranco Bus.
- Superlines instituted an action for damages before the CFI of Quezon, Gumaca Branch, against Pantranco
and and Rogelio, alleging that the recklessness and negligence of the Pantranco bus driver was the
proximate cause of the accident and that there was want of diligence on the part of Pantranco in the
selection and supervision of its driver.
 - Private respondents Timoteo Moralde, widow of the deceased, and her children also filed a complaint for
damages with the RTC of Cavite City, against Superlines and its driver, based on quasi-delict, and Pantranco
and its driver, based on culpa-contractual.
- Petitioners Superline and its driver Erlito filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of pendency of another
action vef the RTC of Quezon, Gumaca Branch.
- Respondent Judge Luis Victor denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the two cases involved
different parties as well as different causes of action.
- Superlines moved for reconsideration, which was then denied.
- Superlines filed with the IAC a petition for certiorari with prohibition, which was also denied. Hence this
present recourse.
- Petitioner argues that:
- private respondents Moraldes should pursue their claim for damages by intervening in the Gumaca
action, pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court
- since the right of private respondents to claim damages is founded on the same facts involved in the
Gumaca action, any judgment rendered therein will amount to res judicata in the Cavite case
- Such intervention would prevent multiplicity of suits.
-
ISSUE: Won the Gumaca case should be consolidated with the Cavite Case

HELD: Yes.
- A more pragmatic solution to the controversy at bar is to consolidate the Gumaca case with the Cavite case.
- Considerations of judicial economy and administration, as well as the convenience of the parties for which
the rules on procedure and venue were formulated, dictate that it is the Cavite court, rather than the Gumaca
court, which serves as the more suitable forum for the determination of the rights and obligations of the
parties concerned.
- As observed by both the trial and appellate courts, to require private respondents who are all residents of
Kawit, Cavite, to litigate their claims in the Quezon Court would unnecessarily expose them to considerable
expenses. On the other hand, no like prejudice would befall the defendants transportation companies if they
 were required to plead their causes in Cavite, for such change of venue would not expose them to expenses
which are not already liable to incur in connection with the Gumaca case.

- The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely
available for justice.
- The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and
perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which,
in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the count to transmute themselves into
concrete acts of justice between the parties before it.
- The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to
give it effective facility in righteous action.
- It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the
character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and
unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism."

TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER (Rule 32, Sections 1 to 13)

TITLE DOCTRINE DIGEST AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Aljem’s Corp. vs. FACTS:

Court of Appeals Rudy Chua sued the petitioner for a sum of money and for damages. In his complaint he alleged that according
QUIA to the financial report prepared by a certified public accountant commissioned by him, the logging operations of
the joint venture earned an income of P3,659,710.07 from January to August 1990.

In its answer, petitioner alleged that private respondent's auditor bloated the joint venture's net operating income
for the year 1990 to P3,659,710.07 and that the correct amount, as found by petitioner's accountant, was only
P2,089,141.80. Petitioner alleged that pursuant to a partial liquidation of the joint venture on August 2, 1990,
private respondent received P2,632,719.85 which represents his share in the assets as well as in the net operation
income of the venture. What was left to be liquidated, according to petitioner, were the disposition of undivided
equipment and collection of receivables, payment of taxes, and adjustment of private respondent's share upon
the arrangement on the value of petitioner's equipment share in the amount of P55,970.32

During the pre-trial conference of the case, the parties agreed to refer the case to a commissioner. The
commissioner thereafter required the parties to produce the records of the company, consisting of the joint
venture agreement, books of accounts from the start of the joint venture's operations up to its liquidation, sales
invoices, cash vouchers, journal vouchers, payrolls, and other documents pertaining to business transactions,
monthly bank statements, used and canceled checks, bank reconciliations, savings passbooks, if any, financial
statements, and statement of joint venture liquidation. The commissioner interviewed petitioner's representative
as well as private respondent, after which she filed her report in court, furnishing copies of the same to the
parties on March 15, 1993.

Petitioner filed its comments and objections to the commissioner's report, praying that the commissioner be
directed to identify the transactions, receipts, or documents which she disallowed, disapproved, or excluded,
covering the variances, and be ordered to correct the errors which she had allegedly committed.

RTC the trial court issued an order confirming the commissioner's report and adopting her findings of facts and
conclusions as those of the court

Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's assertion that it was not afforded the opportunity to object to the
disallowance or disapproval of certain items in the computation of the assets of petitioner. It pointed out that,
among the persons who were interviewed by the commissioner, were petitioner's representative, Pacifico V.
Dizon, Jr., and private respondent. Petitioner, therefore, had an adequate opportunity to inquire about the
progress of the audit and challenge the commissioner's report if there were certain items therein that in its
opinion should be disallowed, disapproved, or excluded
 ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of the trial court confirming and adopting the commissioner's report should be set aside
on the ground that the commissioner merely based her report on her interview of the parties and did not hold any
formal hearing

HELD:
YES. Under Rule 32, Sec 3 and 5 it indicates quite clearly the necessity for a formal hearing and the swearing of
witnesses; otherwise, the commissioner cannot determine factual questions which arise in the course of his
examination of the accounts. For this purpose, the witnesses must necessarily be sworn in and offered for
cross-examination by the parties so that the truth of any question may be determined. This would not be possible
were the commissioner merely to interview the parties. Where controversial questions are involved, such as
whether certain items must be allowed or disallowed, an adversary proceeding is particularly indicated. That is
why the last sentence of Section 3 says that "The trial or hearing before him shall proceed in all respects as it
would be held before the court." For the fact is that the commissioner substitutes for the judge, and whatever the
judge can or cannot do, the commissioner also can or cannot do. Consequently, if a judge cannot decide a
question without hearing the parties on oath or affirmation, neither can the commissioner. Indeed, what Section
3 authorizes to be limited is the scope of the proceedings before the commissioner, but not the modality thereof.
Thus, the order of reference may specify only particular issues to be determined by the commissioner. It may
direct him to do only particular acts or just to receive and report evidence. Whichever may be the case, the
requirement for the commissioner to hold a hearing is clear, for this is the essence of due process.

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (Rule 33, Sections 1 and 2)

TITLE DOCTRINE DIGEST AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Uy vs. Chua The essential question to be resolved Uy v Chua

ALVAREZ in a demurrer to evidence is whether GR No. 183 965 September 18, 2009
petitioner has been able to show that
she is entitled to her claim and it is FACTS In a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation, petitioner JOANIE UY claimed that she
incumbent upon the court to make and her brother Allan are illegitimate children born out of the illicit relationship between Irene Surposa and
such a determination. The special respondent JOSE NGO CHUA. Petitioner claimed that respondent was the only father she knew, he provided all the
proceeding herein did not take into support she needed and even came on special family occasions.
consideration any of the evidence
presented by the petitioner. It should Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that this Petition is already barred by the Decision rendered
be deemed as having been dismissed in a similar special proceeding for the same petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation formerly
on the ground of res judicata rather instituted. The Decision in the first case, in consideration of the Compromise Agreement executed between the
than an adjudication on the merits of parties, provides that petitioner had admitted that there is no blood relation or affiliation between her, Allan and
respondent’s demurrer to evidence. herein respondent.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: In its opposition, Petitioner argued that Demurrer cannot set up the affirmative grounds
for a Motion to Dismiss and that the question on the civil status cannot be subject to compromise.

The RTC, upon looking at the arguments of the parties, held that the Demurrer to Evidence should be dismissed. It
believes that its hands are tied, and it cannot attempt to vacate or annul the judgment by an equal court, which had
long become final and executory.

ISSUE Whether or not the Demurrer should have been granted

HELD The Court found that although respondent’s pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more
appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.

Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit
evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not entitled to the
relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a
motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.
 The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
Where the plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom
does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to
evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his
favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of
the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It
should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.

Nevertheless, the Court clarified that even though the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent is
void for being contrary to law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be appreciated.

The Court thus REMANDED this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Casent Realty Rule 33, Section 1: FACTS:

Development Corp.
vs. Philbanking Corp Demurrer to evidence. After the Herein petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare Realty
NATAN plaintiff has completed the Corporation (Rare Realty) involving the amounts of PhP 300,000 (PN No. 84-04) and PhP 681,500 (PN No.
presentation of his evidence, the 84-05). It was agreed in PN No. 84-04 that the loan it covered would earn an interest of 36% per annum and a
defendant may move for dismissal penalty of 12% in case of non-payment by June 27, 1985, while the loan covered by PN No. 84-05 would earn an
on the ground that upon the facts interest of 18% per annum and 12% penalty if not paid by June 25, 1985.
and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. If his motion is August 18, 1986 – the 2 promissory notes were assigned to respondent Philbanking Corporation through a Deed of
denied, he shall have the right to Assignment. Despite repeated demands, petitioner failed to pay the promissory notes upon maturity.
present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of July 20, 1993 - As a result, a complaint was filed before the RTC of Makati by the respondent for the collection of
dismissal is reversed, he shall be the obligation. In its Answer, petitioner raised the following as special/affirmative defenses:
deemed to have waived the right to 1. The complaint stated no cause of action or if there was any, the same was barred by estoppel, statute of
present evidence. frauds, statute of limitations, laches, prescription, payment, and/or release; Petitioner presented a
Confirmation Statement issued by respondent stating that petitioner had no loans with the bank.
2. On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago which conveyed petitioner's property in Iloilo
City to respondent, with the intention of totally extinguishing petitioner's outstanding accounts with
respondent.
3. Petitioner complied with the condition in the Dacion regarding the repurchase of the property since the
obligation was fully paid. Respondent sent confirmation statements in the latter months of 1989, which
showed that petitioner had no more outstanding loan.
4. Assuming that petitioner still owed respondent, the latter was already estopped since in October 1988, it
reduced its authorized capital stock by 50% to wipe out a deficit of PhP 41,265,325.12.

In its compulsory counterclaim, petitioner alleged that it made an overpayment. The parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement during the pre-trial conference.
Thereafter, the respondent presented its evidence and formally offered its exhibits. Petitioner then filed a Motion
for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence, pointing out that the plaintiff's failure to file a Reply to the Answer
which raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and execution of
said documents, which means that the bank had no right to collect anymore.

Respondent subsequently filed an Opposition which alleged that:

1. the grounds relied upon by petitioner in its demurrer involved its defense and not insufficiency of evidence;
2. the Dacion and Confirmation Statement had yet to be offered in evidence and evaluated; and
3. since respondent failed to file a Reply, then all the new matters alleged in the Answer were deemed
controverted.

RTC – granted the Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to Evidence; the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
having been extinguished by a Dacion en Pago duly executed by said parties, the complaint is dismissed.
CA – reversed and set aside; the only issue to be resolved in a demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any
right to relief under the facts presented and the law. Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the
Answer which alleged the Dacion, and that its genuineness and due execution were not at issue. It added that the
court a quo should have resolved whether the two promissory notes were covered by the Dacion, and that since
petitioner's demurrer was granted, it had already lost its right to present its evidence. Under the Deed of
Assignment, respondent clearly had the right to proceed against the promissory notes assigned by Rare Realty.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in excluding the petitioner’s affirmative defenses in its answer in resolving a
demurrer to evidence;
2. Whether the petitioner is liable to pay the respondent

HELD:
1. Yes. Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.

Demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a
case or sustain the issue.
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is
entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. However, the plaintiff's evidence should not be the
only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence. The "facts" referred to should include all the means
sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial
admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and
presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendant's evidence.

Petitioner points out that the defense of Dacion and Confirmation Statement, which were submitted in the
Answer, should have been specifically denied under oath by respondent in accordance with Rule 8, Section
8 of the Rules of Court.

Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted the genuineness and due execution of
said documents. This judicial admission should have been considered by the appellate court in resolving
the demurrer to evidence, as provided under Rule 129, Section 4 of the ROC.
As to the respondent’s claim that even though it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters alleged in the
Answer are deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10. The Court agrees with petitioner.
Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written instrument and
provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the
effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document,
a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of
the document will be deemed admitted.

Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the
demurrer to evidence.
2. Yes. Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement does not
prevent the introduction of evidence showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory notes. Petitioner, by
way of defense, should have presented evidence to show that the Dacion includes the promissory notes.

The promissory notes matured in June 1985, and Rare Realty assigned these promissory notes to
respondent through a Deed of Assignment dated August 8, 1986. It is clear from the deed that the
promissory notes were given as security for the loan granted by respondent to Rare Realty. Through the
Deed of Assignment, respondent stepped into the shoes of Rare Realty as petitioner's creditor.

Thus, when petitioner and respondent executed the Dacion on August 27, 1986, what was then covered was
petitioner's loan from the bank. The language of the Dacion is unequivocal: the property serves in full
satisfaction of petitioner's own indebtedness to respondent, referring to the loan of PhP 3,921,750. For this
reason, the bank issued a Confirmation Statement saying that petitioner has no unpaid obligations with the
bank as of December 31, 1988.

Hence, the decision of CA is affirmed. The petitioner is still liable.

David et. al. vs. FACTS:
Rivera LUNA Respondent Agustin Rivera filed a Complaint for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction" before PARAB of San Fernando, Pampanga against petitioners
heirs of Spouses Cristino and Consolacion David. The respondent averred that the petitioners had been harassing
him for the purpose of making him vacate the subject land although it had already been given to him sometime in
1957 by the parents of the petitioners as "disturbance compensation", in consideration of his renunciation of his
tenurial rights over the original 18-hectare farmholding.

The petitioners filed a Complaint for ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat and
Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that the respondent was occupying the subject land without paying rentals and
that they need the subject land for their personal use but the respondent refused to vacate it despite repeated
demands.

In his Answer to the ejectment complaint, the respondent asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case
in light of the tenancy relationship and reiterated his claim of ownership over the subject land and informed the
court of the complaint he had earlier filed before the PARAB.

PARAB’s Decision:
During the pendency of the ejectment case, the PARAB rendered its Decision declaring the respondent as tenant of
the land and ordering that his peaceful possession thereof be maintained. Expectedly, the petitioners appealed the
PARAB Decision to the DARAB.

MCTC’s Decision:
The MCTC rendered its Decision ordering the respondent to vacate the subject land. The court found that there was
a dearth of evidence supportive of the respondent's claim that the land is agricultural or that it is devoted to
agricultural production. Further, it ruled that the petitioners as the registered owners have a better right to possession
of the subject land.

Without appealing the MCTC Decision but within the period to appeal, the respondent filed before the RTC of
Angeles City a Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the
nullification of the MCTC Decision. The thrust of the petition was that the MCTC had no jurisdiction as the issue
before it was agrarian in nature.
RTC’s Decision:
The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the petitioners from enforcing the MCTC Decision.
Thereafter, it proceeded to hear the respondent's application for preliminary injunction. Subsequently, the RTC
granted the motion and ordered the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction upon the posting of bond in the
amount of P500,000.00.

The case went to trial with the respondent as petitioner presenting his evidence in chief. However, after the
respondent had rested his case, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss.

The RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. The court ruled that the motion, which was filed after the
presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, partakes of a demurrer to evidence which under Section 1, Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court, may be granted only upon a showing that the plaintiff has shown no right to the relief prayed for.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied.

The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. The CA rendered a Decision finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the motion to dismiss. Hence, the instant petition, seeking the
nullification of the CA’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the denial of the motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted with grave abuse of
discretion

HELD:
No, it was not. The court denied the petition and upheld the CA’s decision. The SC pointed out that Certiorari does
not lie to review an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in the form of a demurrer to
evidence filed after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case. Being interlocutory, an order
denying a demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.

After such denial, the petitioners should present their evidence and if the decision of the trial judge would be
adverse to them, they could raise on appeal the same issues raised in the demurrer. However, it is also settled that
the rule admits of an exception, i.e., when the denial of a demurrer is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition to correct
what he perceived was an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC.
 One of the court’s considerations in denying the petition:
The RTC could have ruled on the matter without the reception of the parties' evidence. The very issue determinative
of the question of jurisdiction is the real relationship existing between the parties. It is necessary that evidence
thereon be first presented by the parties before the question of jurisdiction may be passed upon by the court.

It should be pointed out that the petitioners elevated to the appellate court the Order of the RTC denying their
motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one party to the
adequacy of the evidence of his adversary to make out a case. Otherwise stated, the party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. In this case, the trial court ruled that respondent's evidence in
support of his application for a writ of prohibition was sufficient to require the presentation of petitioners'
contravening proof. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in so ruling.

The Court of Appeals is therefore correct in upholding the lower court's denial of the petitioners' motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. e

Republic vs. FACTS:

Sandiganbayan On 17 December 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
GUIDO represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan,
entitled Republic of the Philippines vs Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos,
under RA 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

Petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than
US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were
previously held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks.

Also, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the
Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful income as well as income from the legitimately acquired property. The
treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, under the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 18 October 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R.
Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.

Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements dated 28 December
1993, were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated 7 December 1995 for
the approval of said agreements and the enforcement thereof.

It is sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos
family under the conditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its premises or “whereas
clauses” the fact that petitioner “obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on 21 December 1990, that
US$356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x
x.” The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney
Consandey, granting the petitioner's request for legal assistance. Consandey declared the various deposits in the
name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final
verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.

The Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements.
Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as a witness to establish the partial implementation of said agreements.
On 18 October 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent
Mrs Marcos filed her opposition to it which was later adopted by Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. In
its resolution dated 20 November 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion on the ground that the
motion to approve the compromise agreement “took precedence over the motion for summary judgment.”
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on 26 May 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for
approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to
the Marcos estate.

Meanwhile, on 10 August 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional
request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was then granted.
On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated 10 December 1997, upheld the
ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds then
remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed in
custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by the petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan’s resolution dated 8 September 1998, granted the motion.

After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated 28 October 1999 and
21 January 2000, respectively, the case then set for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on 10 March 2000, filed
another motion for summary judgment on the forfeiture of the US$356 million. Petitioner contended that, after the
pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting a summary judgment on the funds sought to be
forfeited.

Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, while her
co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc later adopted opposition, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. On 24 March 2000, a
hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted.

In a decision dated 19 September 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted the petitioner's motion for summary judgment.
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawfully acquired
as ill-gotten wealth.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their
motion for reconsideration. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs.
Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. Subsequently, the petitioner filed its opposition.

In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its 19 September 2000 decision, thus denying
petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not
prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record
as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.

Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing its 19
September 2000 decision, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the respondents’ motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise
stated, it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of authenticated translations of the decisions
of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the basis for reversing itself because respondent’s themselves never raised
this issue in their motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, this
particular issue relating to the translation of the Swiss court decisions could not be revived anymore because the
Sandiganbayan itself had previously utilized said decisions in resolving a “decisive issue” before it.

In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the petition on 22 May 2002. After
several motions for an extension which were all granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the
separate comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on 27 May 2002.

Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law given
the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 31 January 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated
translations of the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now elevates the matter to this
Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules
may be dismissed. Corollarily, the Sandiganbayan’s ruling to set the case for further proceedings cannot and should
not be considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in
their comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

ISSUE:
WON the respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment

HELD:
No. The Court ruled that the respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus,
on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place as a matter of right. A genuine issue is an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and
contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Respondents’ defenses of “lack of knowledge for lack of privity” or “(inability to) recall because it happened a long
time ago” or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that “the funds were lawfully acquired” are wholly insufficient to tender
genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses’ defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the
issues.

The pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications of a spurious defense like Demurrer to
Evidence dated 2 May, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos children. All the pleadings again
contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful acquisition of the funds. Respondents merely made general
denials without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise
genuine issues of fact.

Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated 21 October 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated that his
client was just a beneficiary of the funds, contrary to petitioner Republic’s allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed
ownership of or interest in the funds. This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense
because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss
funds.
 The Court is convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse petitioner Republic as to what facts
they would prove or what issues they intended to pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt that they were
leading petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag this forfeiture case to eternity.

Hence, the Petition of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court file by the petitioner Republic is granted.

Radiowealth Finance FACTS:

Corp. Vs. Del Rosario 1. Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed and delivered in
AZUL favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory Note for PHP 138,948, without need of notice or
demand, in installments of PHP11,579.00, payable for 12 consecutive months, leaving the period for the
installments blank.
2. Radiowealth filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
3. During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and collection officer of Radiowealth, presented in evidence
the Spouses’ check payments, the demand letter, Spouses’ customer’s ledger card, another demand letter
and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips.
4. Famatico admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the execution of any of
these pieces of documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him.
5. Spouses filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action.
6. RTC dismissed the motion for Radiowealth’s failure to substantiate the claims, the evidence it had
presented being merely hearsay.
7. CA reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
8. During the pre-trial, through judicial admissions, the spouses admitted the genuineness of the Promissory
Note and demand letter. Their only defense was the absence of an agreement on when the installment
payments were to begin.
ISSUE: Whether the spouses can still present evidence after the appellate court’s reversal of the dismissal on
demurrer of evidence
 HELD: NO.
1. The Rules of Court provide that: After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.
2. In this case, Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to present their
own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the
appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right
to present their own evidence.
3. The appellate court shall resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims
to discourage prolonged litigations.

JUDGMENTS OF THE PLEADINGS/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Rule 34, Sections 1 and 2; and Rule 35, Sections 1 to 6)

TITLE DOCTRINE DIGEST AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Adolfo vs. Adolfo DOCTRINE: FACTS:

CABRERA Judgment on the pleadings is proper The center of dispute in this case is Civil Case No. MAN-4821, whereby the petitioner Teofilo Adoflo
“Where an answer fails to tender an raised the decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 as part of his evidence.
issue, or otherwise admits the In Civil Case No. MAN-4821, Petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition for
material allegations of the adverse judicial separation of property against his estranged wife. Parties were married on November 26, 1966, the union
party’s pleading.” bore one child; that during the marriage, they acquired through conjugal funds real properties that later on the
Summary judgment, on the parties separated due to irreconcilable differences.
other hand, will be granted “if the Since reunion was no longer feasible, petitioner suggested a separation of the conjugal property, but
pleadings, supporting affidavits, respondent adamantly refused; that respondent denied petitioner's co-ownership of the subject property, claiming
deposition, and admissions on file, the same as her paraphernal property; that several earnest efforts to amicably settle the matter between them proved
show that, except as to the amount unavailing; and that a judicial separation of property is proper under the circumstances and pursuant to Article 135
of damages, there is no genuine (6) of the Family Code. Petitioner thus prayed that judgment be rendered decreeing a separation of the conjugal
issue as to any material fact and that property.
the moving party and that the Respondent contended that she is the sole owner of the property which is her paraphernal property inherited
moving party is entitled to a from her mother. That petitioner is lazy, gambler drunkard, wife abuser and neglectful father. Respondent bought on
judgment as a matter of law.” installment a tricycle for the petitioner's use in business, but he kept the proceeds thereof to himself and used the
same in his gambling and drinking sprees; that respondent alone took the initiative to support the family and found
ways to take care of the daily needs of her child. One day, petitioner destroyed the roof of the house that was then
being built; that petitioner subsequently abandoned her and their child in 1968, and transferred to Davao City where
he took a mistress and begot four children by her; that in 1986, petitioner returned to Cebu City seeking
reconciliation with respondent; that respondent took petitioner back, but in 1987 they once more separated; that
thereafter, respondent never again saw or heard from petitioner.
In Civil Case No. MAN-2683, Respondent sold the property to her brother, her brother mortgaged it to DBP,
foreclosed and DBP sold it to the
Garcias and the Garcias sold it to respondent with new TCT. Respondent executed a deed of sale in favor of the
Gingoyons but refused to partition even Gingoyons paid the taxes and selling expenses. That when the sale to the
Gingoyons was made, the subject property constituted conjugal property of her marriage with petitioner; when the
Garcias executed the deed of sale, the subject property became a conjugal asset; since petitioner did not sign the
deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons as he was in Davao at the time and knew nothing about the sale, the sale was
null and void. RTC nullified the DOS. The Gingoyons filed an appeal to the CA.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
During the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, petitioner submitted as part of his evidence
and for marking certified true copies of the Gingoyons' Complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, respondent's
Answer thereto, and the trial court's May 15, 2002 Decision in said case.
Respondent failed to file her answer or response to the request for admission.
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, 18 stating that since respondent failed to
answer his request for admission, the matters contained in the request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26,
Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules); that as a consequence of the application of the rule,
respondent is in effect considered to have admitted that the subject property is a conjugal asset of their subsisting
marriage which may thus be the subject of his petition for judicial separation of property; and that on account of
said admission, a hearing on the merits becomes unnecessary and, instead, Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules on judgments
on the pleadings should apply. Petitioner thus prayed that the trial court render judgment in his favor based on the
pleadings.
Respondent filed an Opposition. In her Opposition to Plaintiff's Memorandum, respondent argued among
others that the request for admission was premature considering that the decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 was
the subject of an appeal, and thus not yet final.
RTC found that it’s a conjugal property and dismissed the case. Respondent appealed to CA. Decision was
reversed and set aside. Petitioner
moved to reconsider but in a March 2, 2012 Resolution, he was rebuffed. Hence, the present Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s claim that the CA erred in deciding the case on a question of substance not
in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules, and applicable jurisprudence.
RULING:
Judgment on the pleadings is proper “Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.”
Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted “if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, deposition,
and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Thus, instead of resolving petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court should have
denied it or held it in abeyance. It should have guided petitioner to this end, instead of aiding in the hasty resolution
 of his case. In the first place, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 was transferred to it from Branch 56 precisely for the
reason that it was the court which tried the closely related Civil Case No. MAN-2683.

Municipality of Tiwi
vs. Betito SANEZ

Bungcayao vs. Fort Facts:

Ilocandia OBINA Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the two entrepreneurs who introduced improvements
on the foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when Fort Ilocandia Hotel started its construction in the area.
Thereafter, other entrepreneurs began setting up their own stalls in the foreshore area. They later formed
themselves into the D’Sierto Beach Resort Owner’s Association, Inc. (D’Sierto).

In July 1980, six parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now Calayad) were transferred, ceded, and conveyed to the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1704. Fort Ilocandia Resort Hotel was
erected on the area. In 1992, petitioner and other D’Sierto members applied for a foreshore lease with the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and was granted a provisional permit. On 31
January 2002, Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation (respondent) filed a foreshore
application over a 14-hectare area abutting the Fort Ilocandia Property, including the 5-hectare portion applied
for by D’Sierto members. The foreshore applications became the subject matter of a conflict case, docketed
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Case No. 5473, between respondent and D’Sierto
members. In an undated Order, DENR Regional Executive Director Victor J. Ancheta denied the foreshore lease
applications of the D’Sierto members, including petitioner, on the ground that the subject area applied for fell
either within the titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for by respondent.

The D’Sierto members appealed the denial of their applications. In a Resolution dated 21 August 2003, then
DENR Secretary Elisea G. Gozun denied the appeal on the ground that the area applied for encroached on the
titled property of respondent based on the final verification plan.
Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who attended the meeting, manifested that he still had to
consult his parents about the offer but upon the undue pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment
and signed the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of respondent.

Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag,
City, Branch 13 (trial court), docketed as Civil Case Nos. 12891-13, against respondent. Petitioner alleged that
his son had no authority to represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon him.

Petitioner and respondent agreed to consider the case submitted for resolution on summary judgment. Thus, in its
Order dated 28 November 2003, the trial court considered the case submitted for resolution. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, alleging that he manifested in open court that he was withdrawing his earlier
manifestation submitting the case for resolution. Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

The trial court ruled that the only issue raised by petitioner was his claim for damages while respondent’s issue
was only his claim for possession of the property occupied by petitioner and damages. The trial court noted that
the parties already stipulated on the issues and admissions had been made by both parties. The trial court ruled
that summary judgment could be rendered on the case. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for
summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact. it had the right to
recover its possession from any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted the property.

ISSUE: Whether summary judgment is appropriate in this case?

HELD:
Summary judgment has been explained as follows:

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
delays. where the pleadings tender a genuine issue. counterclaim. the court is allowed to decide the case
summarily by applying the law to the material facts. summary judgment has been properly rendered in this case.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in this case, when the facts are not in dispute, contrived or false claim. Hence.
except for the amount of damages. depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or
any part thereof.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the counterclaims raised by respondent were compulsory in nature. The Court of
Appeals ruled that respondent was the rightful owner of the subject property and as such. The Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court in resorting to summary judgment as a valid procedural device for the prompt disposition
of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue and not a genuine issue as to any material fact. Rule 35
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Conversely,that is. summary judgment was properly rendered by the trial court, the facts are not in
dispute and the only issue to be resolved is whether the subject property was within the titled property of
respondent, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. Summary
Judgment for claimant. and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.
violence or intimidation that could vitiate consent.

A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. it was established that the property occupied by petitioner was within
the titled property of respondent.

As regards respondent’s counterclaim. or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may. A “genuine issue” is
such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham.A party seeking to
recover upon a claim. summary judgment is not proper.

A summary judgment is proper if. . at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served. move with
supporting affidavits. the trial court ruled that based on the pleadings and admissions made.The trial court ruled
that the alleged pressure on petitioner’s sons could not constitute force. as they arose out of or were connected
with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and did not
 require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court could not acquire jurisdiction.
fictitious.When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried. Since we have
limited the issues to the damages claimed by the parties. while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues.
depositions. and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.

Bitanga vs. Pyramid For a summary judgment to be FPH: Respondent filed with the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and damages with application for the
Construction proper, the movant must establish issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the petitioner (president of macrogen) and Marilyn.
ALMARINES two requisites: (a) there must be
no genuine issue as to any Respondent entered into an agreement with Macrogen Realty to construct for the latter the Shoppers Gold
material fact, except for the Building in Sucat. However, Macrogen Realty failed to settle respondent’s progress billings. Respondent
amount of damages; and (b) the suspended work on the construction project since the conditions that it imposed for the continuation thereof,
party presenting the motion for including payment of unsettled accounts, had not been complied with by Macrogen Realty.
summary judgment must be
entitled to a judgment as a matter They tried to settle this through arbitration but before the arbitration case could be set for trial, respondent and
of law. Where, on the basis of the Macrogen Realty entered into a Compromise Agreement. However, contrary to petitioner’s assurances,
pleadings of a moving party, Macrogen Realty failed and refused to pay all the monthly installments agreed upon in the Compromise
including documents appended Agreement. Respondent tried to sheriff Macrogen’s property but failed and petitioner refused to cooperate.
thereto, no genuine issue as to a
material fact exists, the burden to Thus, according to respondent, petitioner’s obligation as guarantor was already due and demandable. As to
produce a genuine issue shifts to Marilyn’s liability, respondent contended that Macrogen Realty was owned and controlled by petitioner and
the opposing party. If the Marilyn and/or by corporations owned and controlled by them. Macrogen Realty is 99% owned by the Asian
opposing party fails, the moving Appraisal Holdings, Inc. (AAHI), which in turn is 99% owned by Marilyn.
party is entitled to a summary
judgment. Prior to the trial proper, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.15 Respondent alleged that it was
entitled to a summary judgment on account of petitioner’s admission during the pre-trial of the genuineness and
due execution of the Contract of Guaranty. The contention of petitioner and Marilyn that they were entitled to the
benefit of excussion was not a genuine issue.
Petitioner and Marilyn countered that there were genuinely disputed facts that would require trial on the merits.
Petitioner never received the respondent's demand letter. as Ms. Dette Ramos, the person who received it, was
not an employee of Macrogen Realty nor was she authorized to receive the letter on his behalf. As a guarantor,
petitioner could resort to the benefit of excussion at any time before judgment was rendered against him.

RTC and CA ruled in Respondents favor but CA held that Marilyn was not liable and declared that a contract
cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it. That the substantial ownership of shares in Macrogen
Realty by Marilyn Bitanga was not enough basis to hold her liable.

I: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE VALIDITY OF THE PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 96,
DESPITE THE CLEAR EXISTENCE OF DISPUTED GENUINE AND MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE
THAT SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.

H: For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine
issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for
summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a
moving party, including documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to
produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a
summary judgment.

In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by the opposing party not genuine so as to
justify a summary judgment?

A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue
which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. To forestall summary judgment, it is essential for the
non-moving party to confirm the existence of genuine issues, as to which he has substantial, plausible and fairly
 arguable defense, i.e., issues of fact calling for the presentation of evidence upon which reasonable findings of
fact could return a verdict for the non-moving party, although a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment will be insufficient to preclude entry thereof.

Petitioner does not deny the receipt of the demand letter from the respondent. He merely raises a howl on the
impropriety of service thereof, stating that "the address to which the said letter was sent was not his residence but
the office of Macrogen Realty, thus it cannot be considered as the correct manner of conveying a letter of
demand upon him in his personal capacity.

Moreover, under Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, there is sufficiency of service when the papers, or in this
case, when the demand letter is personally delivered to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with
his clerk or with a person having charge thereof, such as what was done in this case.

We have consistently expostulated that in summary judgments, the trial court can determine a genuine issue on
the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When
the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any
fact, and summary judgment is called for.

The issue of non-receipt of the letter of demand is a sham or pretended issue, not a genuine and substantial issue.
Indeed, against the positive assertion of Mr. Roberto O. Pagdilao (the private courier) in his affidavit that he
delivered the subject letter to a certain Ms. Dette Ramos who introduced herself as one of the employees of
[herein petitioner] Mr. Benjamin Bitanga and/or of the latter’s companies, said [petitioner] merely offered a bare
denial. But bare denials, unsubstantiated by facts, which would be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment

Meneses vs Sec. of A judgment on the pleadings is FACTS

Agrarian Reform proper when an answer fails to Petitioners are co-owners of a rice-land in Bulacan registered in the name of their grandparents.
ALANO render an issue or otherwise The rice-land was distributed to farmer beneficiaries by virtue of PD No. 27.Petitioners filed with the RTC for
determination of just compensation.
admits the material allegations of Petitioners alleged that from the time the land was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries in 1972 up to the time of
the adverse party's pleading. the filing of the complaint, no payment or rentals has been made, and titles have already been issued to the
farmer-beneficiaries. Petitioners also alleged that the fair market value of the property is P6,000,000.00.
The essential question is whether
there are issues generated by the The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action since the determination for
pleadings. A judgment on the just compensation must be filed in the DAR and not the special agrarian court. Petitioners filed a motion for
pleadings may be sought only by reconsideration. The RTC partially granted the reconsideration setting aside the order of dismissal and archiving
a claimant, who is the party the case until the amount of just compensation has been determined.
seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim; or to Petitioners then filed a complaint with the DARAB, however DARAB dismissed the complaint on the ground
obtain declaratory relief. that it had no jurisdiction on valuation cases under PD. No. 27 as such it was under the administrative powers of
the Office of the Secretary. Because of the foregoing dismissal, petitioners filed with the RTC, a motion to
reopen and calendar of case for hearing, which was granted by the RTC. The RTC by agreement of the parties,
constituted commissioners to determine just compensation but the same was dissolved. After Pre-trial, petitioners
were scheduled to present their evidence. During the hearing the parties agreed as to the issues. Whether or not
plaintiff’s were entitled to just compensation as provided for under RA 6657 and not PD No. 27 as per the
contention of defendants.

The RTC dismissed the complaint saying that since the property was taken from petitioners on October 21, 1972
under the DAR’s Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27, the just compensation must be based on the value
of the property at the time of the taking.

Petitioners appealed to the CA praying that the case be remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings and reception of evidence on the just and fair market value of the property. CA dismissed the appeal.
Petitioner’s filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on the ground that it was filed (44) days
late, and the CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify its decision.

Hence this PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.

 ISSUE
Whether or not that the CA has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has
sanctioned such departure from the lower court.

HELD
Yes. Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides that a judgment on the pleadings is proper when an
answer fails to render an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. The
essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. A judgment on the pleadings may be
sought only by a claimant, who is the party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to
obtain declaratory relief.

In this case, the separate Answers filed by the respondents definitely tendered issues, as it made specific denials
of the material allegations in the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses, which would bar recovery by
petitioners. Moreover, it was erroneous for the RTC to require the filing of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings and for the LBP and the DAR Secretary to file the same since in the first place, the latter are neither
plaintiffs in the case nor counter-claimants or cross-claimants.

What the RTC obviously meant to be filed was a motion for summary judgment, a procedural device designed
for the prompt disposition of actions, which may be rendered if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions
and admissions on file show that, after a summary hearing, there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact,
except as to the amount of damages, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and which
may be applied for by either a claimant or a defending party. This is obvious from the fact that although the
Answers raised issues, these were not factual ones requiring trial, nor were they genuine issues,31 as the parties
were able to agree to limit the same to whether petitioners are entitled to just compensation under R.A. No. 6657
and not P.D. No. 27

Tan vs. Dela Vega CO A summary judgment is not Facts: The parties are Edwardo Roco Tan and Edwin Roco Tan as the petitioners; and Benigno De La Vega,
warranted for cases wherein a Angela Tuason Staley, and Antonio Perez y Tuason as respondents. This is a petition for review regarding the 3
genuine issue arises. A “genuine February 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the 21 March 2003 order of the RTC of Pasig City,
issue” is an issue of fact which granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the respondents; and the CA’s 6 July 2005 Resolution
requires the presentation of which denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
evidence as distinguished from a On 3 August 1992, the respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Free
sham, fictitious, contrived, or Patent No. 495269, Original Certificate of Title No. 711 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 186516, against the
false claim. When the facts as heirs of Macario Mencias (defendant heirs), namely: Aquiliana Mencias, Aurora M. Gabat, Merlyn M. Cadete,
pleaded appear uncontested or Myrna M. Quirante; and the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Director of
undisputed, there is no real or the Land Management Bureau, and the Register of Deeds of Marikina. The complaint was later amended to
genuine issue or question as to implead the petitioner purchasers of the disputed lot and to nullify TCT No. 272191 issued in their name.
the facts, and summary judgment The Amended Complaint averred that respondents are the co-owners of a 159,576 sqm parcel of land located in
is called for. Marikina, Rizal, Metro Manila and covered by TCT No. 257152, issued on 20 June 1969. Said title was a
The party who moves for a transfer from TCT No. 22395 in the name of J. Antonio Araneta as trustee of the children of Angela I. Tuason.
summary judgment has the Among the lots covered by TCT No. 257152 is the controverted Lot 89 containing an area of 54,197 sqm.
burden of demonstrating clearly Sometime in April 1992, respondents learned that the defendant heirs are causing the ejectment of the occupants
the absence of any genuine issue of a 29,945 sam portion of Lot 89; and that Macario Mencias was able to obtain Free Patent No. 495269 on 31
of fact, or that the issue posed in July 1971, and OCT No. 711 on 11 August 1971, over said portion. Upon Macario’s death, OCT No. 711 was
the complaint is patently cancelled and TCT No. 186516 was issued to the defendant heirs on 5 July 1990. By virtue of a Deed of Sale
unsubstantial so as not to inscribed on 14 November 1994, TCT No. 186516 was further cancelled and TCT No. 271604 was issued on the
constitute a genuine issue for same date in favor of New Atlantis Real Estate & Development, Inc., represented by its President, Victor C.
trial. Trial courts have limited Salvador, Jr. The questioned lots were thereafter sold to the petitioners. TCT No. 271604 was cancelled and in
authority to render summary lieu thereof, TCT No. 272191 was issued to petitioners on 17 November 1994.
judgments and may do so only Respondents contended that Macario’s OCT No. 711 and its derivative titles - TCT No. 186516, in the name of
when there is clearly no genuine defendant heirs and petitioners’ TCT No. 272191 - are void because the area they cover is entirely within their
issue as to any material fact. (respondents’) land, specifically, Lot 89. Respondents further averred that since the controverted lot is already a
When the facts as pleaded by the private land, the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had no jurisdiction to
parties are disputed or contested, approve Macario’s application and to issue Free Patent No. 495269.
proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of In their Answer, the defendant heirs contended that Lot 89 was never part of respondents’ TCT No. 257152
trial. which originated from OCT No. 730. Respondents’ own exhibits show that Lot 89 was covered by OCT No. 734
and not OCT No. 730. The defendant heirs also raised the defenses of laches and prescription.
On the other hand, petitioners asserted, inter alia, that they are purchasers in good faith and for value and that
they have no knowledge of any defect in the title of the purchased lot. The notice of lis pendens alleged to have
been inscribed did not appear in their titles. Absent said notice, the petitioners claim that they cannot be charged
with knowledge of any defect in the title.
For failure to file their Answer, defendant Aurora M. Gabat, public defendants Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Director of Land Management Bureau and the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, were declared in default.
On 4 March 2003, respondents filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was granted by the trial court.
It was held that the disputed lot is within Lot 89 covered by the respondents TCT No. 257152, issued on 20 June
1969. The said lot therefore became private land long before the Free Patent was issued to Macario on 31 July
1971. Hence, the titles derived or issued on the basis of the Free Patent are void because the Public Land Act
applies only to public lands and not private lands. On the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source,
the trial court concluded that the petitioners cannot be purchasers in good faith considering that their tite was
derived from Macario who acquired the property by virtue of a void title.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the assailed order of the trial court. They filed a
motion for reconsideration but were denied in a resolution dated 6 July 2005.

Issue: Whether or not a judgment on the pleadings is proper in the instant case.

Ruling: NO, the trial court erred in rendering judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings filed by the
parties generated ostensible issues that necessitate the presentation of evidence.
In the instant case, presentation of evidence is necessary to determine the validity of the TCT from which the
respondents’ title was derived. As alleged by the heirs, TCT No. 22395 was a mere reconstitution of TCT No.
45046, which per verification from the Register of Deeds of Rizal, pertains to a different piece of land measuring
 only about 356 sqm and located in San Juan, Rizal. These allegations were never refuted by the respondents,
hence, they cannot be simply brushed aside by the trial court.
Even assuming that the title of respondents’ predecessors-in-interest is valid, the evidence at this stage is still
insufficient to sustain the conclusion of the trial court that Lot 89 is inside the respondents’ land now covered by
TCT No. 257152. The title appended by the respondents in their complaint is a mere photocopy. Likewise, the
documents allegedly issued by the Bureau of Lands and presented by the respondents to prove that Lot 89 is
inside their land are also mere photocopies and not authenticated by said office. Furthermore, the title referred to
in the said documents as the origin of TCT No. 257152, is a different title, that is OCT No. 734 and not OCT No.
730. There is a need to present evidence to settle the issues in a full blown trial.
If the evidence showed that the Free Patent and the OCT issued to the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is
valid and or Lot 89 is not inside TCT No. 257152, then judgment should be rendered in favor of petitioners; and
whether the latter acted in good or bad faith will no longer be a decisive issue in the case. On the other hand, if
the title of the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is declared void, the defense of good faith may still be
available to the petitioners who claim to be purchasers in good faith and for value. Since good faith is always
presumed, it was premature for the trial court to conclude that the petitioners are not purchasers in good faith.

Wood Technology Doctrine: In a proper case for

Corp. vs. Equitable judgment on the pleadings, there · Facts:
Bank PANGILINAN is no ostensible issue at all
o Equitable Banking filed a complaint against the petitioners herein, Wood Technology (WTC), Chi
because of the failure of the
Tim Cordova, and Robert Tiong King Young. Equitable alleged that WTC obtained a loan from them
defending party's answer to raise
in the amount of $75,000, evidenced by a promissory note signed by Cordova and Young as
an issue. On the other hand, in
representatives.
the case of a summary judgment,
issues apparently exist — i.e. o Cordova and Young bound themselves as sureties of WTC for the loan. The loan went unpaid
facts are asserted in the complaint
even after the final demand on April 19, 1996.
regarding which there is as yet no
admission, disavowal or o On the other hand, WTC and Cordova and Young argued that the promissory note did not set a
qualification; or specific denials due date for payment, as it was to be set at a later date. They thus claimed the action was premature.
or affirmative defenses are in
truth set out in the answer — but They also argued that the instruments were excessive and unconscionable, and that they did not
the issues thus arising from the reflect the parties’ true intention, and that it was actually a contract of adhesion. Thus, they prayed
pleadings are sham, fictitious or for reformation of promissory note and surety agreement to make it fair, just, and reasonable.
not genuine, as shown by
affidavits, depositions, or o Respondent moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the RTC rendered judgment on the
admissions. (Citing Narra pleadings, ordering petitioners to pay the respondent.
Integrated Corporation v. CA)
o On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling, noting that the petitioners admitted the material
allegations of the complaint due to their admission of the due execution of the promissory note and
surety agreement, and the final demand. Thus, the CA ruled that there was no need to present
evidence to prove the maturity date as it was payable on demand.

o Hence this present petition for review.

§ Petitioner claims that the Answer tended genuine issues, and disputed the material
allegations, and had they been allowed, they could have presented witnesses to prove their
defenses.

§ Respondent claims that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC as the petitioner already
admitted the material allegations, and the defenses could be resolved based on pleadings and
applicable laws and jurisprudence.

· Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s judgment on the pleadings.

· Ruling: CA did not err, but the judgment rendered by the RTC was actually a summary judgment.

o In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so
as to justify a summary judgment?
 o A "genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a
genuine issue for trial.

o Applying the requisites of a judgment on the pleadings vis-à-vis a summary judgment, the
judgment rendered by the RTC was not a judgment on the pleadings, but a summary
judgment. Although the Answer apparently raised issues, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
after considering the parties' pleadings, petitioners' admissions and the documents attached to the
Complaint, found that the issues are not factual ones requiring trial, nor were they genuine
issues.

o As to factual findings:

§ Petitioners contended that the obligation has not matured. RTC and CA found the defense
as not a factual issue for trial.

§ Petitioners also argued that their defense tendered a genuine issue claiming that the loan
documents were a contract of adhesion. CA ruled that there was no ambiguity.

o SC thus found no cause to disturb the findings of the CA, affirming the RTC. The judgment
rendered by the trial court is valid as a summary judgment, and its affirmance by the CA as
herein clarified, is in order.

YKR Corp. vs. Doctrine: The disposition of a Facts:

Philippine civil action via summary
Agri-Business Center judgment is a method sanctioned On 27 September 1988, plaintiff-in-intervention (Now respondents) PABC (Philippine Agri Business Center
Corp MACASAQUIT under the Rules where there Corp) filed a Motion for Intervention and a Complaint-in-intervention to recover possession (not title) of real
exists no question or controversy properties registered in its name (PABC's Busuanga Properties). As a result, PABC filed a motion for summary
as to the material facts. Thus, judgment on the ground that there were no genuine issues of fact existing in the case at bar. According to the
when a party moves for summary Sandiganbayan, When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the
judgment, this is premised on the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. Rule 35 of the
assumption that a scrutiny of the Rules of Court which gives authority to trial courts to grant relief by summary judgment is intended to
facts will disclose that the issues expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings,
presented need not be tried either admissions and affidavits. That is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case
because these are patently devoid summarily by applying the law to the material facts. In other words, in a motion for summary judgment,
of substance or that there is no the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by
genuine issue as to any pertinent affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?
fact. A judgment on the motion
must be "rendered forthwith if The following questions of law raised were: “1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to resolve PABC’s
the pleadings, supporting claim over the subject lands; and 2. Whether or not the government has a superior right than that of PABC’s over
affidavits, depositions, and the subject properties by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1387 and Presidential Decree No. 1297.”
admissions on file show that,
except as to the amount of The Republic, defendants-in-intervention, (now petitioners) denied that the properties are legally owned by
damages, there is no genuine PABC, that such properties are owned by YKR Corp.
issue and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter Issue:
of law." Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in law when it granted PABC’s motion for summary judgment even if
the same is not supported by deposition, affidavit, or admission on the records.

Held:
YES, the Sandiganbayan erred in its judgment. According to the Rules on Civil Procedure, The disposition of a
civil action via summary judgment is a method sanctioned under the Rules where there exists no question or
controversy as to the material facts. Thus, when a party moves for summary judgment, this is premised on the
 assumption that a scrutiny of the facts will disclose that the issues presented need not be tried either because
these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. A judgment on the
motion must be "rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."

Except when there is a doubt as to such facts and there is an issue joined by the parties, then neither one of them
can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings
for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The party who moves for summary judgment has the
burden of proving the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial.

Here, both parties failed to establish that a genuine issue of fact does not exist, with supporting documents.
Hence, the judgment rendered in the summary proceeding made by the Sandiganbayan must be dismissed.

Requisites:
1. A party files a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documents
2. Notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition supported by the same.
3. Vigilance of the court is complied with.

Definition of a genuine issue of fact: is an issue "which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished
from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed,
then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for.”

Calubaquib vs. "A summary judgment is permitted Facts:

Republic CUENTO only if there is no genuine issue as On August 17, 1936, Proclamation No. 80 was issued declaring a 39.3996-hectare landholding located at Barangay
to any material fact and [the] Caggay, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a military reservation site. The proclamation was issued "subject to private rights, if
moving party is entitled to a
any there be." Original Certificate of Title No. 13562 was issued over the property.
judgment as a matter of law." The
test of the propriety of rendering On January 16, 1995, respondent filed before the RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan a complaint for recovery of
summary judgments is the existence possession alleging that in 1992, petitioners unlawfully entered the military reservation through strategy and stealth
of a genuine issue of fact, "as and took possession of a five- hectare portion thereof. Petitioners allegedly refused to vacate the subject property
distinguished from a sham, despite repeated demands to do so.
fictitious, contrived or false claim."
"A factual issue raised by a party is In their answer, petitioners denied the allegation and maintained that they and their predecessor-in-interest, Antonio
considered as sham when by its
Calubaquib (Antonio), have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the early 1900s.
nature it is evident that it cannot be
proven or it is such that the party That when Antonio died in 1918, his six children inherited the subject property through a private document entitled
tendering the same has neither any Convenio and they applied for a homestead patent in 1926 but the same was not acted upon by the Bureau of Lands.
sincere intention nor adequate
evidence to prove it. Pre-trial conference was held and yielded the following admissions of fact:

1. Based on Proclamation No. 80, OCT No. 13562 covering the subject lot was issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
2. The defendants are in actual possession of a 5-hectare portion of said property.
3. The Administrator of the Camp Marcelo Adduru Military Reservation demanded the defendants to vacate but
they refused.
4. The Office of the President has referred the matter to the proper administrative agencies and up to now there
has been no definite action on said request for assistance.

The trial court advised the parties to file a motion for summary judgment but neither party filed the motion.
Respondent expressed its objection to a summary judgment arguing the existence of a genuine and vital factual
issue which can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits.

The RTC issued an order for a summary judgment and subsequently rendered its decision, without trial, dismissing
petitioner’s claim.
Petitioners appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA explained that petitioners failed to
establish any vested right pertaining to the subject property and did not state what evidence they had of an
imperfect title under the Public Land Act. The CA denied reconsideration of its decision, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether rendering a summary judgment is proper.

Ruling:
No. Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the
answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.

In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a summary judgment, the court is
obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath
by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they submitted with the motion and the corresponding
opposition. Thus, it is held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is
proper so long as "the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such
issues are not genuine."

The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these enable the
court to determine if the parties' pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient
to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly
meritorious or there is no defense to the action. The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a
motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.

In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with neither of the parties filing a motion
therefor. In fact, the respondent itself filed an opposition when the trial court directed it to file the motion for
summary judgment. Respondent insisted that the case involved a genuine issue of fact. Under these circumstances,
it was improper for the trial court to have persisted in rendering summary judgment. Considering that the remedy of
 summary judgment is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case, the trial court cannot railroad the
parties' rights over their objections.

It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary judgment were all ignored by the trial
court. The sad result was a judgment based on nothing else but an unwarranted assumption and a violation of
petitioners' due process right to a trial where they can present their evidence and prove their defense.

JUDGMENT, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY (Rule 36, Sections 1 to 6)

TITLE DOCTRINE DIGEST AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sumbilla vs. Matrix General Rule: FACTS:

Finance Corp Under the doctrine of finality and Petitioner, Julie Sumbilla, obtained a cash loan from respondent Matrix Finance Corporation. As partial payment
MALABANAN immutability of judgments, a for her loan, petitioner issued six checks with uniform face value of P6,667.00 each.
decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by respondent to the drawee bank for payment. However, all the
and may no longer be modified in checks were dishonored on the ground that they were drawn against a closed account. Due to the petitioner's refusal
any respect, even ifthe to pay the dishonored checks after demand by the respondent, she was indicted for six counts of violation of Batas
modification is meant to correct Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22). The cases were docketed and raffled off to MeTC of Makati.
erroneous conclusions of fact or
law, and whether it will be made by MeTC of Makati
the court that rendered it or by the In its decision, the MeTC of Makati found the petitioner criminally and civilly liable for the issuance of the six
highest court of the land. Upon rubber checks. Petitioner was fined P80,000 per count of violation with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non
finality of the judgment, the Court payment, plus civil liability.
loses its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (instead of a Notice of Appeal) before the MeTC which was denied for
being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Section 19). MeTC noted that the
Exception: prohibited motion will not suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a
The Court has the power and Notice of appeal which was also denied for being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
prerogative to suspend its own rules
and to exempt a case from their Regional Trial Court
operation if and when justice Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the RTC of Makati City. The trial court dismissed the
requires it. notice and held that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the Notice of Appeal. The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied by the Trial court.
The Court has relaxed this rule in
order to serve substantial justice Court of Appeals
considering: Petitioners filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules to the Court of Appeals. The petition was
a. matters of life, liberty, honor or dismissed on the ground that the proper remedy for a decision in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RTC
property, in exercise of its original jurisdiction is ordinary appeal under Rule 41, Section 2 (a) of the Rules. The CA likewise
b. the existence of denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. After receipt of a copy of the resolution denying her Motion for
special/compelling Reconsideration, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review, and filed such petition
circumstances, within the extended period.
c. the merits of the case,
d. a cause not entirely attributable Contention of the Petitioner
to the fault or negligence of the Petitioner acknowledged her mistake in filing a petition for review under Rule 65 instead of an ordinary appeal
 party favored by the suspension under Rule 41, Section 2 (a) before the CA, as well as her mistake in filing a Motion for Reconsideration (a
of the rules, prohibited motion) to challenge the MeTC’s decision instead of a notice of appeal. Petitioner, given the finality of
e. a lack of any showing that the her conviction, seeks that the procedural rules be relaxed for the modification of the erroneous penalty imposed by
review sought is merely the MeTC.
frivolous and dilatory, and
f. the other party will not be Contention of the Respondent Corporation
unjustly prejudiced thereby. The respondent corporation disagreed with the contentions of the petitioner. According to the respondent, the right
to appeal is a mere statutory privilege that is exercisable only in accord with the rules, and that if such right is lost, a
petition for review on certiorari cannot be remedy that will revive such right.

ISSUE:
Whether the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is already final and executory,
may still be modified. YES.

RULING:
According to Section 1 of BP 22, the court may impose any of the following alternative penalties against an
accused found criminally liable for violating BP 22:
1. Imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; or
2. A fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, and shall in no case exceed P200,000.00; or
3. Both such fine and imprisonment.
The discretion to impose a single (imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive (fine and imprisonment) penalty pertains to
the court.
In the present case, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is P6,667.00. Under Section 1 of BP 22,
the maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed on petitioner is only P13,334.00, or the amount double the face
value of each check. Indubitably, the MeTC incorrectly computed the amount of fine. The petitioner was fined way
beyond the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22.

It must be noted, however, that in this case the MeTC decision is already final and executory due to the Petitioner’s
failure to file a Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period. Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of
judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will
be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court
loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.

As an exception, the Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their
operation if and when justice requires it. After all, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice
(Note Rule 1, Section 2.).

In Barnes v. Judge Padilla, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of
the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
 In the present case, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22.
Moreover, since the term of the subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total amount of the fine or one day for
each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition
of judgment of conviction by the trial court, if petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer a longer prison sentence.

Substantial justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted on the petitioner be accordingly corrected within the
maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the penalty of fine of P80,000.00 meted on petitioner
for each count of violation of BP 22 is corrected to double the face value of each rubber check involved or
P13,334.00 only.

Club Filipino, Inc. vs. A decision or resolution is This is a decision of SC on WON the grant of leave to file 2nd MR toll the 15-day period for a decision to be
Bautista MAGNO deemed final and executory after deemed final and executory.
the lapse of 15 days from the
parties' receipt of a copy of the FACTS:
decision or resolution. The grant
of leave to file the second Club Filipino Inc. and Club Filipino Employee Association had a CBA agreement. Before the expiration of the
Motion for Reconsideration does agreement, the latter demanded to negotiate a new agreement but failed. CLUFEA filed with the National
not toll the 15-day period. It only Conciliation Mediation Board a request for preventive mediation. However, the meeting ended with the parties'
means that the Entry of respective panels declaring a deadlock in negotiation. Strike was staged. Club Filipino filed before NLRC a
Judgment first issued may be Petition to declare strike illegal.
lifted should the second Motion
for Reconsideration be granted. Labor Arbiter & NLRC

- The Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal and all officers deemed terminated from service. There is
failure from union to comply with procedural requirements of staging strike pursuant to Rule XXII, Section 4 of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which ‘requires attachment of counter proposal to the Notice
of Strike’.
- NLRC sustained the ruling

CA
- The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and ruled that strike is legal.

Supreme Court- The strike is legal, and wholesale dismissal of officers invalid.

- In a June 13, 2009, decision, The Supreme Court agreed with the CA' Decision that strike is legal. It ruled
that the union could not have attached Club Filipino, Inc.'s counter proposals in the Notice of Strike since Club
Filipino, Inc. submitted it only after the union had filed the Notice of Strike. It was, therefore, "not practicable”
for the union to attach Club Filipino, Inc.'s counterproposal to the Notice of Strike. Union did not violate Rule
XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
- The law requires "'knowledge' of the illegality of the strike as a condition sine qua non before a union
officer can be dismissed . . . for participating in an illegal strike." However, nowhere in the ruling of the labor
arbiter can there be any discussion of how respondents, as union officers, knowingly participated in the alleged
illegal strike. Thus, even assuming . . . that the strike was illegal, the automatic dismissal officers had no basis.

Aug 17, 2009

- Club Filipino filed Motion for Reconsideration.
Sept 09, 2009
- MR denied with finality
Sept 14, 2009
- Club Filipino filed Motion for Leave to file and admit Supplemental MR
Oct 26, 2009
- [Ruling had become final and executory]
Jan 11, 2010
- SC granted Motion for Leave and noted Supplemental MR
Oct 26, 2010
- Entry of Judgment was issued declaring that Sept 09 2009 ruling had become final and executory as of
Oct 26 2009.

Club Filipino, Inc. subsequently filed the very urgent Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, very urgent Omnibus
Motion, and second very urgent Omnibus Motion, all arguing that the implementation of the Writ of Execution
would result in double compensation to respondents. All of these Motions were noted by this court.

ISSUE:
Whether Club Filipino, Inc.'s filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prevented SC Resolution
dated July 13, 2009, from becoming final and executory. – No.

HELD:

No. A decision or resolution is deemed final and executory after the lapse of 15 days from the parties' receipt of a
copy of the decision or resolution. The grant of leave to file the second Motion for Reconsideration does not toll
the 15-day period. It only means that the Entry of Judgment first issued may be lifted should the second Motion
for Reconsideration be granted.

As a general rule, the filing of second Motions for Reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution is
prohibited. Rule 52, Section 2:
Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

Prohibition is reiterated in Rule 15, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court:
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. — The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court
en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher
interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion
for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by
operation of law or by the Court's declaration.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the
Court En Banc.

For the court to entertain second Motions for Reconsideration, the second Motions must present "extraordinarily
persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first obtained." Once leave to file is granted, the second Motion
for Reconsideration is no longer prohibited.

In the present case, the court granted leave to petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. to file the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration in the Resolution dated January 11, 2010. The Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
therefore, is no longer prohibited.

The grant of leave to file the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, however, did not prevent the court's July
13, 2009 Resolution from becoming final and executory. A decision or resolution is deemed final and executory
after the lapse of 15 days from the parties' receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution. The grant of leave to
file the second Motion for Reconsideration does not toll the 15-day period. It only means that the Entry of
Judgment first issued may be lifted should the second Motion for Reconsideration be granted.

This case became final and executory on October 26, 2009, after the lapse of the 15th day from petitioner Club
Filipino, Inc.'s receipt of the Resolution denying its first Motion for Reconsideration. Entry of Judgment,
therefore, was in order.
 Since this court did not issue any temporary restraining order to enjoin the execution of the Court of Appeals'
Decision, the NLRC correctly proceeded in implementing the Court of Appeals' Decision in the illegal strike
case.
|||

Delfino vs. Anasao

DELIGENCIA A decision that has acquired Facts: Delfino owned parcels of land in Laguna totaling 35.4 hectares of which 20.8 was coconut land and 14.6 was
finality becomes immutable and Riceland. He sold all of the coconut land leaving him only Riceland of which 9.8 hectares are tenanted. The
unalterable, and may no longer be tenanted portion being tilled by respondents was placed under Operation Land Transfer under PD 27. After full
modified in any respect, even if the payment to the Land Bank of the Philippines of the amortizations, the farmer-beneficiaries were issued
modification is meant to correct Emancipation Patents (EPs).
erroneous conclusions of fact or
law, and whether it will be made by Before the EPs were registered, Delfino filed an Application for Retention over the entire 14.6-hectare Riceland.
the court that rendered it or by the The Secretary of DAR gave him a maximum of 5 hectares as his right of retention. Respondents filed an MR to the
highest court of the land. This order of the DAR Secretary arguing that the order will have the effect of cancelling the EPs and consequently
doctrine of finality and deprive them of ownership of the landholdings they acquired pursuant to PD 27. The MR was denied for lack of
immutability of judgments is merit. A petition for review in the CA was likewise denied for being insufficient in form and substance. MR was
grounded on fundamental likewise denied and entry of judgment was issued by the CA.
considerations of public policy and
Delfino then sold 2 hectares of his tenanted Riceland to SM Prime Holdings. No EP had been issued to this
sound practice to the effect that, at
particular parcel of land. Delfino subsequently filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
the risk of occasional error, the
(PARAD) for cancellation of the EPs previously issued to respondents on the basis of the DAR Secretary’s Order
judgments of the courts must
granting him 5 hectares. This was granted by the PARAD and affirmed by the Secretary of DAR.
become final at some definite date
set by law. The respondents filed a Petition to Annul and/or Cancel the DAR Secretary’s Orders which was also denied by a
new DAR Secretary (Pangandaman). This new DAR Secretary however clarified the extent of the 5-hectare
retention right given to Delfino by the previous DAR Secretary. Whereas the previous DAR Secretary (Garilao) did
There are, however, exceptions to not clarify which parts of the Riceland the 5-hectares were to be taken from, the new DAR Secretary held that the
the general rule, namely: land sold to SM Prime Holdings will form part of the 5-hectares.

(1) the correction of clerical errors; Delfino believing that the previous DAR Secretary’s orders were final and executory filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, the petition.
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to Issue: Whether the February 2, 2006 Order of Secretary Pangandaman (new DAR secretary), insofar as it clarified
any party; the February 28, 1995 Order of Secretary Garilao (previous DAR secretary), violated the rule on immutability of
final judgments.
(3) void judgments; and
Ruling: NO.
(4) whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the Delfino was granted five hectares “from the tenanted portion as his retained area.” Said order had become final and
decision rendering its execution executory.
unjust and inequitable.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. This doctrine of finality and immutability of
judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice to the effect that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law.

There are, however, exceptions to the general rule, namely:

(1) the correction of clerical errors;

(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and

(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.
 The exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment has been applied in several cases in order to serve
substantial justice.

In this case, the clarification made by Secretary Pangandaman in his February 2, 2006 Order falls under the fourth
exception.

It is true that the February 28, 1995 Order of Secretary Garilao stated that the five hectares shall be taken from the
tenanted area, which pertains to the 9.8597 hectares of which 6.5671 hectares were already issued with EPs in
favor of respondents. Subsequently, however, without prior clearance from the DAR, Delfino sold two hectares of
land covered by OLT to SM Prime Holdings, Inc. The DAR Secretary thus found it fair and equitable to include the
said portion to Delfino's retention area, which meant that Delfino is entitled only to the balance of three hectares.

As explained by Secretary Pangandaman in his order denying Delfino's motion for reconsideration, this clarification
was made in order not to circumvent the five-hectare limitation as said landowner "cannot [be allowed to]
simultaneously enjoy . . . the proceeds of the [sale] and at the same time exercise the right of retention" to the
maximum of five hectares.

NTC vs. Aplhaomega

Integrated Corp. CHOI Doctrine: Specialis derogat Facts:
generali. When two rules apply
petition for review on certiorari
to a particular case, that which
was specially designed for the AIC, a duly licensed transmission line contractor, participated in the public biddings conducted by TRANSCO and
said case must prevail over the was awarded six (6) government construction projects
other.
In the course of the performance of the contracts, AIC encountered difficulties and incurred losses allegedly due to
It is well-settled that no relief TRANSCO's breach of their contracts, prompting it to surrender the projects to TRANSCO under protest.
can be granted to a party who
does not appeal and that a party
who did not appeal the decision In accordance with an express stipulation in the contracts that disagreements shall be settled by the parties through
may not obtain any affirmative arbitration before the CIAC, AIC submitted a request for arbitration before the CIAC on August 28, 2006, and,
relief from the appellate court thereafter, filed an Amended Complaint against TRANSCO alleging that the latter breached the contracts
other than what he had obtained
from the lower court, if any, AIC prayed for judgment declaring all six (6) contracts rescinded and ordering TRANSCO to pay, in addition to
whose decision is brought up on what had already been paid under the contracts, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees at
appeal. P100,000.00 each, and a total of P40,201,467.19 as actual and... compensatory damages

TRANSCO further argued that AIC was estopped from asking for standby fees to cover its overhead expenses
during project suspensions considering that the delays, such as the unresolved right-of-way issues and
non-availability of... materials, were factors already covered by the time extensions and suspensions of work
allowed under the contracts.

Procedural History:

CIAC: On April 18, 2007, the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Final Award ordering the payment of actual and
compensatory damages which AIC would not have suffered had it not been for the project delays attributable to
TRANSCO. It found ample evidence to support the claim for the increase in subcontract cost in BTRP Schedule I,
as well as such items of cost as house and yard rentals, electric bills, water bills, and maintained personnel, but
disallowed the claims for communications bills, maintenance... costs for idle equipment, finance charges, and
materials cost increases.

According to the Arbitral Tribunal, even if AIC itself made the requests for contract time extensions, this did not
bar its claim for damages as a result of project delays since a contrary ruling would allow TRANSCO to profit from
its own negligence and leave AIC to suffer serious material prejudice as a direct consequence of that negligence
leaving it without any remedy at law.

The Arbitral Tribunal upheld AIC's right to rescind the contracts.

Unconvinced, TRANSCO instituted a petition for review with the CA.

Before filing its comment to the petition, AIC moved for the issuance of writ of execution, not for the amount of
P17,495,117.44 awarded in the Final Award, but for the increased amount of P18,967,318.49.

It sought correction of the discrepancies between the amount of the award appearing in the dispositive portion and
the body of the Final Award. The Arbitral Tribunal, however, denied AIC's motion, holding that while the CIAC
Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration (CIAC Rules) would have allowed the correction
of the Final Award for evident miscalculation of figures, typographical or arithmetical errors, AIC failed to file its
motion for the purpose within the time limitation of 15 days from its receipt of the Final Award.

CA:

affirmed the Arbitral Tribunal's factual findings that TRANSCO failed to exercise due diligence in resolving the
problems regarding the right-of-way and the lack of materials before undertaking the bidding process and entering
into the contracts with AIC.

The CA upheld the Arbitral Tribunal's Final Award as having been sufficiently established by evidence but
modified the total amount of the award after noting a supposed mathematical error in the computation.

Issues:

whether or not the CA erred in increasing the total amount of compensation awarded in favor of AIC despite the
latter’s failure to raise the allegedly erroneous computation of the award before the CIAC in a timely manner, that
is, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Final Award as provided under Section 17.1 of the CIAC Rules.

Held:
it improperly modified the amount of the award in favor of AIC, which modification did not observe the proper
procedure for the correction of an evident miscalculation of figures, including typographical or arithmetical errors,
in the arbitral award.

AIC admitted that it had ample time to file a motion for correction of the Final Award but claimed to have
purposely sat on its right to seek correction supposedly as a strategic move against TRANSCO34 and, instead, filed
with the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal on June 13, 2007 a "Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for the Total
Amount of 18,967,318.49 as Embodied in the Final Award."

The Arbitral Tribunal eventually denied AIC’s aforesaid motion for execution because, despite its merit, the
Arbitral Tribunal could not disregard the time-limitation under the CIAC Rules.

Clearly, having failed to move for the correction of the Final Award and, thereafter, having opted to file instead a
motion for execution of the arbitral tribunal’s unopposed and uncorrected Final Award, AIC cannot now question
against the correctness of the CIAC’s disposition. Notably, while there is jurisprudential authority stating that "a
clerical error in the judgment appealed from may be corrected by the appellate court," the application of that rule
cannot be made in this case considering that the CIAC Rules provides for a specific procedure to deal with
particular errors involving "an evident miscalculation of figures, a typographical or arithmetical error." Indeed, the
rule is well entrenched: Specialis derogat generali. When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was
specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the petition for review before the CA was filed by TRANSCO. AIC never
elevated before the courts the matter concerning the discrepancy between the amount of the award stated in the
body of the Final Award and the total award shown in its dispositive portion. The issue was touched upon by the
CA only after AIC raised the same through its Comment (With Motion to Acknowledge Actual Amount of Award)
to TRANSCO’s petition for review. The CA should not have modified the amount of the award to favor AIC
because it is well-settled that no relief can be granted a party who does not appeal and that a party who did not
appeal the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he had obtained
 from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. The disposition, as stated in the fallo of the
CIAC Arbitral Tribunal's Final Award, should therefore stand.

DBP vs. Guarina

Agricultural and FACTS:
Realty Development
Guariña Corp. applied for a loan of P3, 387,000.00 from DBP to finance the development of their resort complex
Corp. USISA
in Iloilo. Guariña executed a promissory note, a real estate mortgage, and a chattel mortgage on different dates to
secure the performance of the obligation. The loan was released on several installments but only amounting to
P3.003M which DBP held approximately P148,000.00 as interest. Guariña demanded for DBP to release the full
amount of the loan applied for but DBP refused and opted to pay some suppliers of Guariña directly, and found
upon inspection that Guariña Corp had not completed the construction works. Thereafter, DBP demanded that
Guariña expedite the completion of the project and warned that it would initiate foreclosure proceedings if
Guariña failed to do so. Unsatisfied with the non-action and objection of Guariña Corporation, DBP initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. A notice of foreclosure sale was sent to Guariña Corporation. The notice
was eventually published, leading the clients and patrons of Guariña Corporation to think that its business
operation had slowed down, and that its resort had already closed.

PH:

RTC: Guariña Corporation sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific performance of the latter's obligations under
the loan agreement, and to stop the foreclosure of the mortgages. DBP moved for the dismissal of the complaint,
stating that the mortgaged properties had already been sold to satisfy the obligation of Guariña Corporation at a
public auction. Guariña Corporation amended the complaint to seek the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings
and the cancellation of the certificate of sale. DBP filed its answer and trial followed upon the termination of the
pre-trial without any agreement being reached by the parties. In the meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a
writ of possession by the RTC. At first, the RTC denied the application but later granted it upon DBP's motion for
reconsideration. Aggrieved, Guariña Corporation assailed the granting of the application before the CA on
certiorari. After the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, DBP sought the implementation of the order for the
issuance of the writ of possession. Over Guariña Corporation's opposition, the RTC issued the writ of possession in
favor of Guariña.

CA: DBP appealed the judgment of the RTC but the CA sustained the judgment of the RTC. DBP timely filed a
motion for reconsideration but the CA denied its motion. Hence, this appeal by the DBP.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the CA’s denial for the motion of reconsideration was issued in accordance with the law, prevailing
jurisprudential decision, and supported by evidence.
2. W/N the CA adhered to the usual course of judicial proceedings and in accordance with the Law of the Case
Doctrine

RULING:

On the first issue: YES. To start with, considering that the CA thereby affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, the
Court is bound to uphold such findings, for it is axiomatic that the trial court's factual findings as affirmed by the
CA are binding on appeal due to the Court not being a trier of facts. Guariña Corporation did not elevate the
actionability of DBP's negligence to the CA, and did not also appeal the CA's deletion of the award of attorney's
fees allowed by the RTC. With the decision of the CA consequently becoming final and immutable as to Guariña
Corporation, we will not delve any further on DBP's actionable actuations.

On the second issue: The doctrine of Law of the Case did not apply herein. Law of the case has been defined as the
opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as
the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
 whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court. As explained in Mangold v. Bacon, legal conclusions announced on a first
appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribe the duty and limit
the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the law of the
case in all other steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and
reason. The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared the
law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that
the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. The law of the case, as the name implies, concerns
only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal. DBP’s insistence is unwarranted. To start
with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP's application for the issuance of the writ of possession was entirely
independent from the judicial demand for specific performance herein. Being the interlocutory appeal concerning
the issuance of the writ of possession while the main case was pending, was not at all intertwined with any legal
issue properly raised and litigated in the appeal to determine whether or not DBP's foreclosure was valid and
effectual. And, secondly, the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not settle any question of law involved herein
because this case for specific performance was not a continuation of C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP (which was limited to
the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of DBP), and vice versa.
CIT

EIAS

Lacurom vs. Tienzo The exception to the application FACTS:

SEVILLA of Section 1 of Rule 36 is in the An administrative complaint was filed by Atty. Lacurom against respondent Judge Tienzo in connection with
case of Francisco v. Permskul: Civil Case No. 4884 alleging that Judge Tienzo rendered a Decision in violation of the constitutional mandate to
state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of
The memorandum decision, to be Court echoing the same requisite. However, complainant discloses that the inclusion of the foregoing matter in
valid, cannot incorporate the his administrative complaint was merely at the behest of his former colleague, Feliciano Buenaventura, a retired
findings of fact and the conclusions presiding judge of RTC, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City.
of law of the lower court only by
remote reference, which is to say Respondent Judge opposed and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint due to the following:
that the challenged decision is not
easily and immediately available to a. The complainant has no locus standi to raise the issue concerning Civil Case No. 4884 considering he is
the person reading the not a person directly affected by the Decision of the Court. Respondent emphasizes that Atty.
memorandum decision. For the Buenaventura did not, in fact, appeal the decision;
incorporation by reference to be b. The Decision of the Court dated July 21, 2005 is made in accordance with Section 24 of the Interim Rules
allowed, it must provide for direct and Guidelines of BP Blg. 129 and the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Francisco v.
access to the facts and the law Permskul , G.R. No. 81006 dated May 12, 1989, thus it is lawful.
being adopted, which must be
contained in a statement attached OCA considered the complaint partly meritorious. The OCA noted that if the decision had already attained
to the said decision. In other finality, then the absence of an appeal evinces the parties' satisfaction with the judgment. Otherwise, a challenge
words, the memorandum decision thereto would have been brought before the higher courts. Accordingly, the OCA believed that the complainant
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. lacked standing to question the said decision.
Blg. 129 should actually embody
the findings of fact and conclusions Nevertheless, the OCA found the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure in her
of law of the lower court in an blatant disregard of the constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
annex attached to and made an therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
indispensable part of the decision.
ISSUE:
It is expected that this requirement Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure in her blatant disregard
will allay suspicion that no study of the constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
was made of the decision of the and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, which is also in connection with Section 1 of Rule 36 of
lower court and that its decision the Rules of Court.
was merely affirmed without a
proper examination of the facts and HELD:
law on which it is based. The Yes, the respondent judge is guilty. The Decision of the respondent judge does not measure up to the clear
proximity at least of the annexed constitutional command:
statement should suggest that such
an examination has been SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
undertaken. It is, of course, also and the law on which it is based.
understood that the decision being
adopted should, to begin with, Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court likewise reflects the foregoing mandate, thus:
comply with Article VIII, Section
14 as no amount of incorporation SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final order determining the merits of the
or adoption will rectify its case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
violation. the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.

The Court finds it necessary to Notwithstanding this unequivocal rule, respondent judge insists that her decision is in accord with our holding in
emphasize that the memorandum Francisco v. Permskul:
decision should be sparingly used
lest it become an addictive excuse The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the
for judicial sloth. It is an additional conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
condition for its validity that this challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
kind of decision may be resorted memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide
only in cases where the facts are in for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a
the main accepted by both parties statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
or easily determinable by the judge authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact
and there are no doctrinal and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an
complications involved that will indispensable part of the decision.
require an extended discussion of
the laws involved. The It is expected that this requirement will allay suspicion that no study was made of the
memorandum decision may be decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper
employed in simple litigations examination of the facts and law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the
only, such as ordinary collection annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of
cases, where the appeal is course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with
obviously groundless and deserves Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its
no more than the time needed to violation.
dismiss it.
 The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be
sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional
condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted only in cases where the
facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge and there
are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the
laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only,
such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves
no more than the time needed to dismiss it.

It is obvious that the decision rendered by the respondent judge failed to conform to this requirement. The cryptic
decision simply referenced the appealed decision of the MTCC and forthwith found the same as compliant with
procedural due process under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Nowhere in the decision does the respondent
judge make a statement of the facts which led to the filing of the appeal. More importantly, the decision does not
contain the respondent judge's factual findings, albeit affirming those of the MTCC, from which she based her
conclusions of law. Ineluctably, the respondent judge transgressed the constitutional directive.

Although not every judicial error signifies ignorance of the law which warrants administrative sanction, this
holds true only in instances of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, an elementary constitutional mandate is
violated, the blunder constitutes ignorance of the law.

Pena vs. GSIS YES, the right to an appeal is a Facts:

FREGIL statutory right and not a Petitioner Pena acquired three subdivision lots which were covered by TCT from Queens Row Subdivision through
constitutional right. As such the it’s president Arrieta by virtue of a deed of absolute sale, with a right to repurchase after two months for the sum of
perfection of an appeal in the 126,000p plus interest.
manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only Petitioner alleges however that Queens Row failed to recover the said lots and failed to deliver to him the title to the
mandatory but also properties because the same properties were mortgaged to GSIS, without the approval of the HLURB.
jurisdictional. As such a party
must conform to the procedure
 required, if not the decision Petitioner then filed for specific performance, annulment of title and damages before the HLURB against Queens
appealed for shall become final Row and GSIS. the president of Queens Row
and executory and unappealable
Queens Row did not file any responsive pleading, GSIS did. Stating that the titles have passed to them even before
the deed of sale to the petitioners.

HLURB: Ruled in Favor of the petitioners, stating that the deed of sale between Queens row and Pena is valid and
subsisting. The mortgage of subject lots to GSIS is voidable, merely evidence of indebtedness.

GSIS filed a motion for appeal which was denied.

GSIS then filed a motion to declare the HLURB Regional Office decision void ab initio stating that the regional
office had no jurisdiction over the case stating that RTC should have jurisdiction over such since it was a real
action.

The HLURB board of commissions dismissed such a complaint.

As such GSIS filed a petition with the Office of the President. Which decided the case in favor of GSIS stating that
the failure of GSIS to file a petition for review would be an injustice as such they revered the decision of the
HLURB.

Petitioner then filed a petition for appeal with the CA, stating that the office of the president had no authority to
alter the decision of the HLURB, and holding that the decision of the HLURB regional office was already final
since GSIS failed to seasonably file their appeal

CA: Denied the petition for review

 ISSUE: W/N the decision of the HLURB’s Regional office had become final and executory?

HELD:
YES, the right to an appeal is a statutory right and not a constitutional right. As such the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. As such a party
must conform to the procedure required, if not the decision appealed for shall become final and executory and
unappealable.

Under the Rules of HLURB, no motion for reconsideration or notice of petition shall be entertained. What is needed
is a petition for review within 30 days from the receipt of the decision.

In this case The HLURB decision was rendered on December 20, 1995 and GSIS filed a mere notice of appeal on
January 30, 1996 at which point it’s decision became final and executory.

As such since the HLURB decision was already final and executory, no court, not even the highest court in the land,
can revive or change the case.

NEW TRIAL, RECONSIDERATION/RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS (Rule 37, Sections 1 to 9; and Rule 38, Sections 1 to 7)

TITLE DOCTRINE DIGEST AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

SJS Officers vs. Lim

OBINA

Tadeja vs. People Newly discovered evidence refers Facts:

LACAP to that which (a) is discovered
after trial; (b) could not have been
discovered and produced at the The incident happened while prosecution witnesses Maria Elena Bernardo Almaria (Elena) and Jacinta del
trial even with the exercise of Fierro (Jacinta) were watching a public dance around midnight on 3 May 1994, during the celebration of the
reasonable diligence; (c) is annual .fiesta of Barangay Talabaan, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. It was then that they witnessed Ruben
material, not merely cumulative, Bernardo (Elena's brother and Jacinta's uncle) being hacked to death by the brothers Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo,
corroborative or impeaching; and and Ferdinand (petitioners), and petitioners’ first cousin Plaridel – all surnamed Tadeja. They also testified that
(d) is of such weight that it would Plaridel accidentally hit Reynante while trying to hack Ruben; hence, Reynante's injuries. According to them,
probably change the judgment if they stayed at the scene of the incident until Ruben was brought to the hospital.
admitted.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that Ruben and his sons, Russell and Robenson Bernardo, went to the
barangay plaza shortly after Rusell had been twice prevented by barangay tanods from entering the dance hall
due to his drunken state and inappropriate attire (no upper garment). Ruben was brandishing a knife and
cursing at the crowd. The Bernardos challenged Reynante, who was then waiting for his children and sisters
still inside the dance hall. Reynante's brothers (Ricky, Ricardo, and Ferdinand) testified that they were together
at their mother's house at the time.

Reynante was able to evade the first knife attack by Ruben. Barangay Chairperson Lolito Tapales tried to
intervene, but he was threatened by Ruben as well. The latter then turned his attention back to Reynante, who
tried to run away, and gave chase. Russell and Robenson blocked the path of Reynante, causing him to lose his
balance and fall to the ground. Bernardos then took turns in attacking him. Ruben got hold of Reynante's right
hand and shouted to his two sons to run away. He then stabbed Reynante on the right part of the chest and the
left side of the body before running away.

Reynante struggled back to the plaza. From there, he was taken to the hospital by Eddie Eraso (Eddie) and two
others, using a jeep. Upon boarding the jeep and turning on its lights and engine, they all saw Ruben about 15
meters away, still holding a knife. Thereafter, Eddie reported the incident to the police. In response, Police
Officer 3 Ronaldo Flores went to the hospital to question Reynante. The latter narrated how he was stabbed by
Bernardos. The inquiry was interrupted when Ruben arrived at the emergency room of the hospital in serious
condition. He later died of "hypovolemic shock secondary to acute blood loss" due to multiple stab wounds and
a hacking wound.

The next day, 4 May 1994, Senior Police Officer 3 Rogelio Tomayosa went to the hospital to continue
questioning Reynante. Based on the latter’s account, an Official Signal Dispatch was sent to the Philippine
National Police Provincial Headquarters in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, stating: "VICTIM REYNANTE
TADEJA ARRIVED TO FETCH HIS CHILDREN BUT WAS CHASED BY RUBEN BERNARDO AND
STABBED [BY] HIM WHEN HE LOST BALANCE."

On 15 July 1994, an Information for homicide for the death of Ruben was filed against Reynante, Ricky,
Ricardo, Ferdinand, and Plaridel. Thus, Criminal Case No. Z-814 was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro (RTC).

Meanwhile, Reynante filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against Russell and Robenson, later docketed as
Criminal Case No. Z-815 before the RTC. Criminal Case Nos. Z-814 and Z-815 were tried jointly.

On 15 July 1997, the RTC issued a Decision in Criminal Case No. Z-814 found Reynante, Ferdinand, Plaridel,
Ricardo and Ricky guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. In Criminal Case No. Z-815, the RTC
acquitted Russell and Robenson of frustrated homicide in its 14 July 1997 Decision.

Except for Plaridel, who absconded, all the other accused (petitioners herein) appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA).

On 8 March 2000, the CA issued a Decision affirming the findings and Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case
No. Z-814.

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that nothing in the transcripts provided would
affect the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses Elena and Jacinta.
Petitioners then filed with this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the CA Decision and Resolution.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, alleging that this Court had failed to reconcile the testimonies of
witnesses Elena and Jacinta on the one hand and Regina on the other. On 23 October 2006, we denied the
motion with finality.

On 2 November 2010, petitioners filed a letter manifesting the hope that their last motion would be favorably
acted upon by this Court and reiterating their request for the reopening of the case to receive newly discovered
evidence. Petitioners also filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to Set Aside Conviction and Remand the Case to
the Trial Court for Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.

Issue: Whether or not there should be reopening of the homicide case against the accused on the ground of
newly discovered evidence

Held:

We resolve to DENY petitioners’ motion to reopen the case for reception of further evidence in the trial court.

Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate that, at the risk of occasional errors,
the judgment or orders of courts should attain finality at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there
would be no end to litigation.
Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by the court on
motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of
conviction becomes final." In this case, petitioners’ judgment of conviction already became final and executory
on 26 July 2007 – the date on which the Decision of this Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of
the CA was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial
court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained.

Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.

The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered." The confession of Plaridel does not meet this
requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense. It was only
after he and the petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his
confession could not have been obtained during trial does not hold water.

It is also noteworthy that Plaridel’s confession does not jibe with Reynante’s narration of what happened during
the incident. According to Reynante, Ruben stabbed him in his right chest and the left side of his body. Upon
seeing him bleeding profusely, Ruben ran away. This narration contradicted the confession of Plaridel that
when he saw the stabbing incident, he approached and grabbed the knife from Ruben and immediately stabbed
the latter with it.

Furthermore, Plaridel stated in his confession that as he stabbed Ruben, Reynante was being transported to the
hospital. Plaridel then left Ruben on the road and followed Reynante. If this version is true, then in no way can
the story of Reynante be plausible, considering that he allegedly still saw Ruben about 15 meters away holding
the knife while the former was being transported to the hospital.

Clearly, the cousins chose not to tell the truth during trial. Whatever their reasons were, the inevitable
conclusion is that Plaridel’s version in his extrajudicial confession is not newly discovered evidence that can be
a ground for a new trial within the contemplation of the rules.
Gonzales vs. Solid - As a rule, a second
Cement Corporation motion for FACTS: The current petition arose from the execution of the final and executory judgment in the parties’ illegal
TAN reconsideration is a dismissal dispute (“the original case”), where on December 12, 2000, the Labor Arbiter (LA) resolved the case by
prohibited pleading finding that an illegal dismissal took place.
under the Rules of
Solid Cement reinstated petitioner Gonzales in the payroll on January 22, 2001. The case was appealed to the
Court. (Rule 37, Section
NLRC and from there to the CA on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The original case eventually came to
5, par. 2) and this reason
the SC, where the Court denied the petition (Rule 65) of Solid Cement for lack of merit. SC’s ruling became final
alone is sufficient basis
and entry of judgment took place on July 12, 2005. Soon after its finality, the original case was remanded to the
for us to dismiss the
LA for execution.
present second motion for
reconsideration. Gonzales moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, he included several items as components in
computing the amount of his backwages. Acting on the motion, the LA issued an execution order dated August
18, 2009, which stated that Gonzales was entitled to a total of P965,014.15. The NLRC, on February 19, 2010 and
- A definitive final judgment,
resolution dated May 18, 2010, affirmed but modified the LA’s execution order by increasing Gonzales’
however erroneous, is no
entitlement to P2,805,698.04.
longer subject to change or
revision. On May 31, 2011, on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the CA set aside the NLRC’s decision and reinstated
- A decision that has the LA’s order, prompting Gonzales to come to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
acquired finality becomes the Rules of Court. In Minute Resolutions, SC denied Gonzales’ Rule 45 petition and Gonzales moved for a
immutable and second MR asking for his case to be referred to the En Banc. At this point came the two motions now under
unalterable consideration.

For easier tracking and understanding, the developments in the original case and in the current petition are
chronologically arranged in the table below:

· October 5, 1999 - Solid Cement terminated Gonzales' employment;

· December 12, 2000 - The LA declared that Gonzales was illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement;

· January 5, 2001 - Gonzales filed a Motion for Execution of reinstatement aspect;

· January 22, 2001 - Solid Cement reinstated Gonzales in the payroll;

· March 26, 2002 - The NLRC modified the LA decision by reducing amount of damages awarded by the LA
but otherwise affirmed the judgment;

· June 28, 2004 - The CA dismissed Solid Cement's certiorari petition;

· March 9, 2005 - The Court ultimately denied Solid Cement's petition for review;

· July 12, 2005 - The judgment became final and an entry of judgment was recorded;

· July 15, 2008 - Gonzales was actually reinstated;

· August 4, 2008 - Gonzales filed with the LA a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution (with
computation of monetary benefits as of August 28, 2008 — the day before his termination anew, allegedly due
to redundancy, shall take effect);

· August 18, 2009 - The LA issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution;

· February 19, 2010 - The NLRC rendered a decision affirming with modification the LA's Order by
including certain monetary benefits in favor of Gonzales;

· May 31, 2011 - The CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the LA's Order;

· November 16, 2011 - The Court denied Gonzales' petition for review, questioning the reinstatement of the
LA's Order;
· February 27, 2012 - The Court denied Gonzales' 1st motion for reconsideration;

· April 12, 2012 - Gonzales again moved for reconsideration and asked that his case be referred to the En
Banc.

ISSUE: Is a second motion for reconsideration allowed?

HELD: As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Court.
(Rule 37, Section 5, par. 2) and this reason alone is sufficient basis for us to dismiss the present second motion for
reconsideration. The ruling in the original case, as affirmed by the SC on July 12, 2005, has been expressly
declared final. A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.

This postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in
the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The CA did not only legally err but
even acted outside its jurisdiction when it issued its May 31, 2011 decision. Specifically, by deleting the awards
properly granted by the NLRC and by reverting back to the LA’s execution order, the CA effectively varied the
final and executory judgment in the original case, as modified on appeal and ultimately affirmed by the SC, and
thereby acted outside its jurisdiction. The CA’s actions outside its jurisdiction cannot produce legal effects
and cannot likewise be perpetuated by a simple reference to the principle of immutability of final
judgment.
 A void decision can never become final. "The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments
are:

1. The correction of clerical errors,

2. The so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and

3. Void judgments.

For these reasons, the Court sees it legally appropriate to vacate the assailed Minute Resolutions of November 16,
2011 and February 27, 2012, and to reconsider its ruling on the current petition.

Purcon Jr. Vs. MRM RULE 38 RELIEF FROM Facts: In his verified position paper, petitioner alleged that on January 28, 2002, respondent MRM Philippines,
Philippines Inc. et al, JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR Inc. hired him as a seaman on board the vessel M/T SARABELLE 2. He signed a contract for three (3) months
YAMAMOTO OTHER PROCEEDINGS with a monthly salary of $584.00. According to petitioner, his work involved a day-to-day activity that required
Section 1. Petition for relief from exertion of strenuous effort, and that he often worked overtime due to the pressure of his work. His contract was
judgment, order, or other extended for another three (3) months. On the second week of June 2002, he felt an excruciating pain in his left
proceedings. – When a judgment testicle. After being examined by a doctor at the port of France, he was diagnosed with hernia. On June 26, 2002,
or final order is entered, or any he was repatriated due to his ailment.
other proceeding is thereafter
taken against a party in any court Respondents, on the other hand, countered that since petitioner’s ailment, hernia, is not work-related, he is not
through fraud,accident, mistake, entitled to disability benefit and related claims. In fact, he was declared fit to resume work on July 23, 2002 by the
or excusable negligence, he may company-designated physician. Respondents likewise argued that his ailment is not to be considered a permanent
file a petition in such court and in disability as this is easily correctable by simple surgery. More importantly, petitioner signed a Quitclaim and
the same case praying that the Release which was notarized.
judgment, order or proceeding be
set aside. On March 31, 2005, Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered its decision5 dismissing the complaint for utter
lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter explained that petitioner was fit to resume work as a seafarer as of July 23, 2002
as his "hernia" was already cured or non-existent. In fact, petitioner was ready to resume work. Unfortunately, he
was not accommodated due to lack of vacancy. The fact that he was not re-hired by respondent did not mean that
he was suffering from disability.

Issue: Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure from Our resolution denying his petition for review?

Held: Negative. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court.

First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must
be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court,
thus:

Section 1. Original cases cognizable. – Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme Court.

A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this Court.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this
remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only questions of law. A petition for
relief raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which are beyond the
concerns of this Court.ALF-itc

Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed. The late filing of
the petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Petitioner’s lack of devotion in discharging his
duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief.
 For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must
be shown.

The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for
that matter; otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already
been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel.

Uy vs. First Metro 1. MOTION FOR A NEW FACTS:

Integrated Steel TRIAL TO BE GRANTED DUE
CABAUATAN TO INEXCUSABLE This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
NEGLIGENCE; THERE MUST CA-G.R. SP No. 81046 dated August 27, 2004 dismissing petitioner Elpidio S. Uy's petition for certiorari and its
BE A GOOD AND Resolution dated February 22, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration.
SUBSTANTIAL DEFENSE
The facts show that on July 5, 1999, private respondent First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation (FMISC) filed a
In order for a motion for new trial complaint for sum of money with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment against Robert Juan Uy (Robert),
to be granted using inexcusable Midland Integrated Construction Company (MICC) and herein petitioner Elpidio Uy, with the Regional Trial
negligence as a defense, the Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94408 and raffled to Branch 3.
movant must show that he has
good and substantial defense
shown in the affidavit which
should accompany the motion for a PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
new trial, which he may prove if
the petition were granted. During the October 25, 2001 hearing, the petitioner was represented by Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. who appeared
In the instant case, the court finds as Atty. Molina's collaborating counsel. The hearing was cancelled and rescheduled to December 13, 2001.
the negligence of petitioner's However, on December 10, 2001, Atty. Molina withdrew his appearance as petitioner's counsel with the latter's
counsel in failing to attend the consent. On December 13, 2001, Atty. Danilo Bañares entered his appearance and requested for a resetting on
February 14 and 28, 2002 which was granted by the trial court. On February 14, 2002, Atty. Bañares appeared
hearings for the reception of but instead of presenting evidence for the petitioner, he requested for a postponement and resetting of the
evidence inexcusable. hearing.

During the scheduled hearing on February 28, 2002, Atty. Bañares arrived late. Upon the motion of FMISC, the
trial court ordered that petitioner's right to present evidence be deemed waived and the parties were directed to
2. IN THE CASE AT BAR, file their respective memorandum. This is because the trial court scheduled the hearing for the reception of
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL petitioner's evidence seven times and yet the petitioner still fails to present its evidence. The case was deemed
DEFENSE submitted for decision on November 18, 2002. Hence, the party filed a motion for new trial using excusable
negligence as a ground for the negligence of his counsel.
In the instant case, the court finds
the negligence of petitioner's ISSUE:
counsel in failing to attend the Whether or not the motion for a new trial should be granted?
hearings for the reception of
evidence inexcusable. Scrutiny of HELD:
the records discloses that the NO. In order for a motion for new trial to be granted using inexcusable negligence as a defense, the movant must
hearings were postponed or show that he has good and substantial defense shown in the affidavit which should accompany the motion for a
cancelled without any justification. new trial, which he may prove if the petition were granted.
However, the trial court In the instant case, the court finds the negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the hearings for the
accommodated the requests for reception of evidence inexcusable. Scrutiny of the records discloses that the hearings were postponed or
postponement or resetting in order cancelled without any justification. However, the trial court accommodated the requests for postponement or
to accord petitioner due process. resetting in order to accord petitioner due process. Under the circumstances, the court finds petitioner's counsel's
Under the circumstances, the court failure to attend the seven scheduled hearings without justifiable reason tantamount to inexcusable neglect. As
finds petitioner's counsel's failure such, it cannot be a ground for a new trial.
to attend the seven scheduled
hearings without justifiable reason
tantamount to inexcusable neglect.
As such, it cannot be a ground for a
new trial.
Yusuke Fukuzumi vs. Such party is not entitled to relief FACTS:
Sanritsu Great under Rule 38, Section 2 of the The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs Sanritsu Great International Corporation, Tetsuji
International Corp. et Rules of Court if he was not Maruyama, Akira Kubota and Yukio Matsuzaka, ordering defendant Yusuke Fukuzumi to pay to the plaintiffs
al. CAPULONG prevented from filing his notice of sums of money. The defendant received a copy of the decision on February 9, 1999 and on February 23, 1999,
appeal by fraud, accident, mistake or filed his motion for reconsideration of the decision. On April 27, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying the
excusable negligence. Such relief defendants motion. The latter received a copy of the order on May 5, 1999. Instead of perfecting his appeal on
will not be granted to a party who May 6, 1999, he filed his notice of appeal only on May 7, 1999, or one day beyond the reglementary period
seeks to be relieved from the effects therefor. The court issued an Order on June 2, 1999 denying the defendants notice of appeal. The defendant
of the judgment when the loss of the received the courts order on June 10, 1999. On June 22, 1999, the defendant filed a Verified Petition for Relief
remedy of law was due to his own from the order of the trial court denying his notice of appeal.
negligence, or a mistaken mode of
procedure for that matter; otherwise, In his petition for relief, the petitioner averred that his counsel suffered high blood pressure on May 6, 1999 which
the petition for relief will be impelled said counsel to rest for three days, upon the advice of his doctor, thus, hindered him from filing the
tantamount to reviving the right of notice of appeal on May 6, 1999. On August 5, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying the defendants
appeal which has already been lost petition on the ground that Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was not applicable. The defendants motion for
either because of inexcusable reconsideration of the order was denied by the court per its Order dated October 22, 1999.
negligence or due to a mistake of
procedure by counsel. ISSUE: WON petitioner can invoke Rule 38 of the Rules of Court: NO

RULING:

The remedy of a party whose notice of appeal is denied by the trial court, although such notice is filed within the
period therefor, is to file a motion for reconsideration of such order and, if the court denies such motion, to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. If the party is prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing his notice of appeal within the reglementary period therefor, his remedy is to file
a petition for relief, in the same case, from the order of the trial court denying his notice of appeal. This is
provided in Section 2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads: SEC. 2. Petition for relief from
denial of appeal. When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course.

Such party is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court if he was not prevented from
filing his notice of appeal by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Such relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his
own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or
due to a mistake of procedure by counsel. The petitioners failure to file his notice of appeal within the period
therefor is far from excusable. It, rather, shows negligence no less. The medical certificate issued to his counsel
shows that he was examined by Dr. Lakambini Cruz-Crespo on May 6, 1999 and was advised to rest for three
days from May 6, 1999 or until May 8, 1999. The petitioner would like the trial court and this Court to believe
that his counsel was unable to file the notice of appeal on or before May 6, 1999 because he was even advised to
take a rest for three days. But his counsel was able, well enough, to prepare and file the notice of appeal on May 7,
1999 when he was supposed to be resting. The petitioner even failed to allege in his notice of appeal that the same
was filed one day late because his counsel was suffering from high blood pressure on May 6, 1999. It was only
after the petitioner received the order of the trial court denying his notice of appeal and filed his petition for relief
on June 22, 1999 did he allege that his counsel was suffering from high blood pressure on May 6, 1999.

Thus, we are not convinced by the petitioners claim that his counsel was suffering from high blood pressure on
May 6, 1999, which prevented him from filing said notice of appeal on said date. Said allegation is a mere
afterthought to cover up his and his own counsel's collective negligence. It is settled that clients are bound by the
mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. It bears stressing that perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well and failure to perfect an
appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment or resolution final and executory. After all, the right to appeal is
 not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. While we have ruled that delay in the filing of a notice of
appeal does not justify the dismissal of the appeal, however, the petitioner has not shown any exceptional
circumstances justifying a reversal of the assailed order of the trial court and the reinstatement of his appeal.

Cansino vs. Court of It is implicitly clear from Rule 37 Facts:

Appeals DURAN that a motion for reconsideration ● Respondents Sps Castro filed a case for unlawful detainer against Danilo Cansino, Linda De Jesus, and Elena Mesa
cannot be used as a vehicle to before the MTC over a parcel of land in Maligaya Park, Kalookan City
introduce new evidence. ○ Petitioners stealthily built their houses thereon
Petitioners correctly contend that ● In the answer, petitioners claimed that their possession was premised upon the honest belief that they were
if respondents wanted to present occupying a public land and they had been in possession of the premises since 1977.
further evidence, they should ● MeTC took cognizance of the case and treated it as one for ejectment
have filed a motion for new trial ● The MeTC dismissed the complaint since respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving prior physical
based on newly discovered possession of the property
evidence. However, for newly ○ On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision.
discovered evidence to warrant a ● Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration appending more documentary evidence and the RTC reversed its
new trial, (a) it must have been previous decision, saying respondents proved their burden
discovered after trial, (b) it could ● Petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the right of the RTC to decide the issue of ownership
not have been discovered or based on the Motion for Reconsideration
produced at the trial despite ● CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
reasonable diligence, (c) it must
be material and not merely Issue: Whether the evidence attached to the motion for reconsideration should be admitted
collateral, cumulative,
corroborative or purely for Ruling: NO - the evidence should not be admitted
impeaching a witness, merely ● It is true that the rules provide that courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them
important evidence being not conformable to law and justice. This prerogative, however, is not absolute. The rules do not contemplate
enough, and (d) if presented, amendments that are substantial in nature. They merely cover formal changes or such that will not affect the crux
 would probably alter the result of of the decision, like the correction of typographical or clerical errors. Courts will violate due process if they make
the action. substantial amendments in their decisions without affording the other party the right to contest the new evidence
presented in a motion for reconsideration.
● It is implicitly clear from Rule 37 that a motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new
evidence. Petitioners correctly contend that if respondents wanted to present further evidence, they should have
filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. However, for newly discovered evidence to
warrant a new trial,
○ (a) it must have been discovered after trial,
○ (b) it could not have been discovered or produced at the trial despite reasonable diligence,
○ (c) it must be material and not merely collateral, cumulative, corroborative or purely for impeaching a
witness, merely important evidence being not enough, and
○ (d) if presented, would probably alter the result of the action.
● In the case at bar, respondents attached for the first time in their motion for reconsideration, evidence to prove
their ownership over the parcel of land subject matter of this controversy. This cannot be countenanced. For one,
possession is the only issue in a case for unlawful detainer. More importantly, there is no justification for the delay
in presenting said evidence. We note that although it was respondents who filed an appeal to the RTC, they failed
to submit their memorandum as required by the said court. It was only after the RTC rendered an unfavorable
decision that respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and appended their new evidence. Piecemeal
presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.

City of Dagupan vs.

Maramba MAURICIO

Afdal vs. Carlos FACTS:

HERNANDEZ Rule 38 of the Rules of Court Respondent Carlos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners before the
provides: Municipal Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna. Respondent alleged that petitioners, Guijabar, and all other persons
claiming rights under them were occupying, by mere tolerance, a parcel of land in respondent’s name.
SEC. 1. Petition for relief from He claimed that petitioner Abubakar sold the property to him but that he allowed petitioners to stay.
judgment, order or other
proceedings. - When a judgment or There were three attempts to serve the summons and complaint on petitioners. However, petitioners failed to
final order is entered, or any other file an answer. Respondent filed an ex-parte motion and compliance with position paper submitting the case for
proceeding is thereafter taken decision based on the pleadings on record.
against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake or PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
excusable negligence, he may file a The MTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The Court ordered the defendants to vacate the subject property and
petition in such court and in the turn over the same to the plaintiff, pay rental arrears, reasonable compensation for the use of the subject
same case praying that the premises until they finally vacate the same, attorney’s fees and the costs of suit. Subsequently, the MTC issued
judgment, order or proceeding be a Writ of Execution.
set aside.
Petitioners filed a petition for relief from judgment with the RTC alleging that they never received respondent's
A petition for relief from judgment, demand letter nor were they informed of, much less participated in, the proceedings before the Lupon; and that
if allowed by the Rules and not a they were not served a copy of the summons and the complaint. The RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing
prohibited pleading, should be filed the petition for relief.
with and resolved by the court in the
same case from which the petition The RTC said that it had no jurisdiction over the petition because the petition should have been filed before the
arose. MTC in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for relief
should be filed "in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside."
A petition for relief from
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
judgment in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, as in the
ISSUE:
present case, is a prohibited
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment
pleading. The reason for this is to
achieve an expeditious and
HELD:
inexpensive determination of the
No, the RTC did not err in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment.
cases subject of summary
procedure.
 Section 13(4) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
The remedy of petitioners in such a
situation is to file a petition for SEC. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed:
certiorari with the RTC under Rule x x x
65
4. Petition for relief from judgment; x x x

Section 19(d) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure also provides:

SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed
in the cases covered by this Rule: x x x

(d) Petition for relief from judgment; x x x

Clearly, a petition for relief from judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, as in the present case, is
a prohibited pleading. The reason for this is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases
subject of summary procedure.

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. - When a judgment or final order is entered,
or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.

A petition for relief from judgment, if allowed by the Rules and not a prohibited pleading, should be filed with
and resolved by the court in the same case from which the petition arose.

In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for relief with the MTC because it is a prohibited pleading
in an unlawful detainer case. Petitioners cannot also file the petition for relief with the RTC because the RTC has
no jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from judgments of the MTC. Therefore, the RTC did not err in
dismissing the petition for relief from judgment of the MTC.

The remedy of petitioners in such a situation is to file a petition for certiorari with the RTC under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the MTC over the person of petitioners in view of the
absence of summons to petitioners. Here, we shall treat petitioners’ petition for relief from judgment as a petition
for certiorari before the RTC.