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SETA

This document summarizes a research paper that investigated critical success factors for effective Security Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) programs. Through a multi-stage research process including interviews and surveys of cybersecurity practitioners, the study identified 11 critical success factors for SETA program effectiveness. It also identified 5 guiding principles related to specific critical success factors. The study provides insights to help organizations better design and implement effective SETA programs to improve cybersecurity behaviors and awareness among employees.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
99 views21 pages

SETA

This document summarizes a research paper that investigated critical success factors for effective Security Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) programs. Through a multi-stage research process including interviews and surveys of cybersecurity practitioners, the study identified 11 critical success factors for SETA program effectiveness. It also identified 5 guiding principles related to specific critical success factors. The study provides insights to help organizations better design and implement effective SETA programs to improve cybersecurity behaviors and awareness among employees.

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Min Myanmar
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:

https://www.emerald.com/insight/2056-4961.htm

Critical
Critical success factors for success factors
Security Education, Training and
Awareness (SETA) programme
effectiveness: an empirical 53

comparison of practitioner Received 6 August 2022


Revised 3 October 2022

perspectives 28 February 2023


29 March 2023
Accepted 1 April 2023

Areej Alyami, David Sammon, Karen Neville and Carolanne Mahony


Business Information Systems Department, Cork University Business School,
University College Cork, Cork, Ireland

Abstract
Purpose – Cyber security has never been more important than it is today in an ever more connected
and pervasive digital world. However, frequently reported shortages of suitably skilled and trained
information system (IS)/cyber security professionals elevate the importance of delivering effective
Security Education,Training and Awareness (SETA) programmes within organisations. Therefore, the
purpose of this study is the questionable effectiveness of SETA programmes at changing employee
behaviour and an absence of empirical studies on the critical success factors (CSFs) for SETA
programme effectiveness.
Design/methodology/approach – This exploratory study follows a three-stage research design to
give voice to practitioners with SETA programme expertise. Data is gathered in Stage 1 using semi-
structured interviews with 20 key informants (the emergence of the CSFs), in Stage 2 from 65
respondents to a short online survey (the ranking of the CSFs) and in Stage 3 using semi-structured
interviews with nine IS/cyber security practitioners (the emergence of the guiding principles). Using a
multi-stage research design allows the authors to propose and evaluate the 11 CSFs for SETA
programme effectiveness.
Findings – This study conducted a mean score analysis to evaluate the level of importance of each CSF
within two independent groups of IS/cyber security professionals. This multi-stage analysis produces a
ranked list of 11 CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness, while the difference in the rankings leads to the
emergence of five CSF-specific guiding principles (to increase the likelihood of delivering an effective SETA
programme within an organisational context). This analysis also reveals that most of the contradictions/
differences in CSF rankings between IS/cyber security practitioners are linked to the design phase of the
SETA programme life cycle. While two CSFs, “maintain quarterly evaluation of employee performance”
(CSF-DS6) and “build security awareness campaigns” (CSF-EV1), represent the most significant contradiction
in this study.
Originality/value – The 11 CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness, along with the five CSF-specific
guiding principles, provide a greater depth of knowledge contributing to both theory and practice and lays the

© Areej Alyami, David Sammon, Karen Neville and Carolanne Mahony. Published by Emerald
Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0)
licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for Information & Computer Security
Vol. 32 No. 1, 2024
both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication pp. 53-73
and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/ Emerald Publishing Limited
2056-4961
legalcode DOI 10.1108/ICS-08-2022-0133
ICS foundation for future studies. Therefore, the outputs of this study provide valuable insights on the areas that
practice needs to get right to deliver effective SETA programmes.
32,1
Keywords SETA programme, Effectiveness, Security, Cyber, CSFs, Training, Critical success factors,
Information security, Education
Paper type Research paper

54
1. Introduction
Cybersecurity and securing information system (IS) assets have never been more important
than it is today in an ever more connected and pervasive digital world (Khando et al., 2021).
In fact, the cybersecurity market size is expected to surpass $400bn by 2027 (fortune.com,
2022). Organisations cannot afford the disruption brought by digital attacks and are
constantly seeking to protect their critical systems and sensitive data. To mitigate against
major cybersecurity incidents, organisations are constantly looking for ways to ensure that
their internal (e.g. employee) and external (e.g. supplier) stakeholders are aware of potential
IS/cyber security threats and have the “know how” to respond. However, it is argued that
“cybercrime actors” are reinventing themselves (developing new capability) at a far quicker
pace than organisations are investing in cybersecurity capabilities (fortune.com, 2022).
Hence, there is a need for “remarkable changes in how companies prioritise and address
their cyber risks” (fortune.com, 2022).
Extant research suggests that organisations use various strategies to safeguard their
information assets against IS/cyber security threats, and the Security Education, Training
and Awareness (SETA) programme is one of the most prominent strategies used for
controlling IS/cyber security threats and protecting information assets (Alshaikh et al., 2018;
Kirova and Baumoel, 2018; Tsohou et al., 2015; D’Arcy et al., 2009). In fact, according to
Global Market Estimates (2022), the market for IS/cyber security awareness training is
anticipated to increase to a value of $12.1bn by 2027, representing a compound annual
growth rate of 45.6% from 2022 to 2027. However, SETA programmes often produce
questionable results around effectiveness and fail to build an acceptable level of awareness
and know-how among employees. In fact, employees having a greater appreciation of “what
to do when” is a key outcome for SETA programme effectiveness. Furthermore, frequently
reported shortages of suitably skilled and trained IS/cyber security professionals further
elevate the importance of delivering effective SETA programmes within organisations.
A SETA programme is viewed as an educational process designed to reduce the number
of accidental security breaches that occur due to a lack of individuals’ awareness of IS
security (Whitman and Mattord, 2008; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010;
Han et al., 2017; Alshaikh et al., 2018; Barlow et al., 2018; Yoo et al., 2018; Dhillon et al., 2020).
The significance of SETA programmes is widely accepted by academics and practitioners
(Alshaikh et al., 2018; Tsohou et al., 2015; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Wilson and Hash, 2003).
However, despite the prominence of SETA programmes for organisational IS security, “only
a small portion of practitioners” claim that their SETA programmes are “very effective” (Hu
et al., 2021, p. 1). It is reported that poor SETA programme effectiveness is linked to the
programme’s failure to positively impact employee security-related behaviours (Alshaikh
et al., 2021; Hu et al., 2021; Alshaikh et al., 2019). Therefore, the key motivation for this study
is the questionable effectiveness of SETA programmes at changing employee behaviour
and an absence of empirical studies on the critical success factors (CSFs) for SETA
programme effectiveness. However, more than focusing on a specific research question, this
paper presents the evolution of 11 CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness. Through the
execution of a multi-stage research design, we theorise from the SETA programme stories of
IS/cyber security professionals to produce the ranked list of CSFs. Furthermore, given the Critical
perceived difference in importance for some of the CSFs, we also present five CSF-specific success factors
guiding principles to further clarify the importance of these specific CSFs to achieving
SETA programme effectiveness.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a background to
SETA programme effectiveness and CSFs. Section 3 describes the three-stage research approach.
Section 4 presents the findings and discussion, organised around the five CSF-specific guiding
principles, proposed to increase the likelihood of delivering an effective SETA programme within
55
an organisational context. Section 5 presents the conclusions and implications of the research.
Lastly, Section 6 proposes some recommendations for future research.

2. Security Education, Training and Awareness programme effectiveness and


critical success factors – why?
The importance of a SETA programme to protect information assets in an organisation has
led many researchers to recommend establishing a SETA programme and making it part of
any organisation’s overall security strategy (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Kirova and Baumoel, 2018).
SETA programmes include the following functions:
 provide employees with knowledge regarding organisational information threats
and IS security (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Yoo et al., 2018; Dhillon et al., 2020);
 clarify existing technical and procedural countermeasures available to employees
(Pastor et al., 2010; Silic and Lowry, 2020);
 determine the possible sanctions for security policy violations in the organisation
(Siponen and Vance, 2010; Karjalainen et al., 2013; Herath et al., 2018); and
 improve employees’ awareness of their roles and responsibilities in protecting the
organisation’s information assets (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Lebek et al., 2014).

Where empirical studies investigating the effectiveness of SETA programmes exist, they
fail to examine all phases of the SETA programme life cycle (design, development,
implementation, evaluation), tending to focus more on one or two of the life cycle phases (c.f.
Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010; Okenyi and Owens, 2007; Silic and Lowry, 2020; Rantos
et al., 2012). Therefore, while there are several guidelines from academia available to
organisations to support the introduction of SETA programmes, a question remains about
the theoretical grounding and empirical evidence available, in current literature, around
these guidelines when it comes to “developing an effective SETA programme to change
employee behaviour” (Alshaikh et al., 2021, p. 2). A lack of a “systematic understanding” of
the “nature of SETA programmes” and their impacts on “security-related beliefs” is viewed
as a possible reason for this lack of effectiveness (Hu et al., 2021, p. 1). In fact, Alshaikh et al.
(2021, p. 1) argue that existing SETA programmes are “suboptimal” as they “aim to improve
employee knowledge acquisition rather than behavior and belief”. Therefore, more
theorising and conceptual clarity is needed in investigating the effectiveness of SETA
programmes (c.f. Alshaikh et al., 2021; Hu et al., 2021; Kirova and Baumoel, 2018;
Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010). In particular, guidance in the form of CSFs is seen as
particularly useful by helping organisations understand where to focus their efforts (c.f.
reference withheld for review purposes). In fact, CSFs have been widely investigated and
used in IS research and practice over the past three decades to make sense of problems by
identifying the factors that could influence business activities and outcomes (c.f. Alhassan
et al., 2019). Throughout this period, researchers have identified CSFs, which need more
ICS attention from managers, in areas ranging from “project-type” operational initiatives to
32,1 more “mindset shift” strategic initiatives (c.f. Alhassan et al., 2019).
It is argued that CSFs are an established approach for providing guidance as a “popular
simplification mechanism to assist managers” (Borman and Janssen, 2013, p. 86). Numerous
studies within IS have used the CSFs lens to establish those key areas that demand
favourable results to ensure a successful performance (c.f. Rockart, 1979). Several studies
56 have also evaluated the level of importance of CSFs for various phenomena, for example, the
implementation of enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems (c.f. Reitsma and Hilletofth,
2018; Ahmad and Cuenca, 2013), the introduction of public-private partnerships (Osei-Kyei
and Chan, 2017; Soomro et al., 2016) and delivering shared services (Borman and Janssen,
2013). Within these studies, the research is conducted across multiple stages and uses
various techniques to show the similarities and differences in the importance of the CSFs.
To date, little or no research has documented the CSFs for SETA programme
effectiveness, especially because the effectiveness of SETA programmes is routinely called
into question. In fact, research shows that “failure rates” for the introduction of IS initiatives
still remain high. The rate of failure suggests the need to focus the attention of IS
professionals and academics on addressing and developing a list of factors that will enable
the successful delivery of IS initiatives (c.f. Alhassan et al., 2019). Therefore, we argue that
understanding the CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness will lend itself to increasing the
effectiveness of a SETA programme within an organisation.
In the next section, we present further details on the research approach.

3. Research approach
To fulfil the research objective, we adopt an exploratory research approach (following a
three-stage research design). We use this exploratory approach to give “extraordinary voice
to informants, who are treated as knowledgeable agents” (Gioia et al., 2012, p. 18) to
investigate a little-understood phenomenon (Marshall and Rossman, 1989). In the context of
this research project, this translates as IS/cyber security professionals with SETA
programme expertise. Therefore, being inspired by features of the Gioia Methodology,
which is positioned as a “systematic inductive approach to concept development” (Gioia
et al., 2012, p. 17), we aim to conceptualise the practitioner voice and not “substitute
practitioners’ understandings for theory” (Markus and Rowe, 2021, p. 273). Therefore, we
embrace the Gioia Methodology because it encourages originality in our theorising, where
what we already know does not limit “what we can know” (Gioia et al., 2012, p. 16).
In Stage 1, we use an inductive open coding approach to produce 11 CSFs from our
analysis of 20 key informant interviews. These CSFs are ranked in a prioritised order
(descending) based on the frequency count of coded excerpts across the 20 interview
transcripts. Interpretive qualitative research is an appropriate research design to apply
when exploring CSFs and several scholars have investigated and explored CSFs in IS by
applying qualitative methods (c.f. Alhassan et al., 2019). In Stage 2, we use mean score
ranking to generate a ranked list of the 11 CSFs based on our analysis of 65 responses to a
short survey. The answer to each survey question involved ranking the importance of a
specific CSF (high/medium/low). In Stage 2, we also compare this ranked list to the ranked
list generated in Stage 1. This comparison highlights the position of each CSF in the
respective lists and suggests the similarities and differences between the lists. We also use
the Mann–Whitney U test to check if there is a difference in the rank sum between the two
ranked lists of 11 CSFs (Stage 1 list from 20 key informants and Stage 2 list from 65 survey
respondents). The Mann–Whitney U test is a non-parametric test used to study the
association of ordinal (rank order) data from two independent groups where the data sets are
not assumed to follow any normal distribution pattern (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017; Hair et al., Critical
2007). In Stage 3, we present our hermeneutics-inspired analysis of nine follow-up probing success factors
interviews with IS/cyber security practitioners involved in Stage 1 (4) and Stage 2 (5) of this
research study. All of these practitioners have expertise in organisational SETA
programmes. Therefore, our hermeneutics-inspired analysis affords us the opportunity to
“understand what people say and do, and why” (Myers, 2009, p. 182). This analysis adds
further insights in the five key areas of difference that emerged from our comparative
analysis of the ranked lists of 11 CSFs in Stage 2. Thereafter, these differences inform five 57
CSF-specific guiding principles to increase the likelihood of delivering an effective SETA
programme within an organisational context.

3.1 Stage 1: 20 key informants (the emergence of the critical success factors)
Stage 1 of this exploratory research follows a systematic inductive approach to concept
development. We adopt the “key informant” approach for data gathering and engage with key
informants through semi-structured interviews. The main advantage of using the key informant
approach is gaining rich data in a short period of time through in-depth interviews. When using
semi-structured interviews as part of the key informant technique, it is not uncommon to have a
smaller number of interviewees; this can range from six interviewees (c.f Flores and Ekstedt,
2012) to 32 interviewees (Benova et al., 2019). In using the key informant technique, it is more
important to have appropriately qualified (quality) individuals participating in a study over a
larger quantity of individuals. Therefore, we believe that our use of 20 key informants is
appropriate for this stage of the exploratory research study. Therefore, key informants were
selected based on their position, experience and professional knowledge about IS/cyber security,
particularly SETA programmes. Twenty individual semi-structured interviews were conducted
with selected key informants from various geographic locations, including the Gulf nations
(Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait), the Middle East (Egypt and Lebanon),
the USA, the UK and Ireland. All of the interviews started by introducing the objective of the
research. Each interviewee was then asked to provide a brief summary of their background.
Thereafter, topics relating to the factors critical to the success of SETA programmes throughout
the life cycle phases (design, development, implementation, evaluation) were discussed. The
following questions were asked to explore the CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness across
these life cycle phases. Questions 1–4 are also asked for the development, implementation and
evaluation phases:

Q1. What are the factors that are important in the design of a SETA programme?
Q2. Why are these factors important in the design of a SETA programme?
Q3. How can organisations ensure that these factors exist in their design efforts?
Q4. Who should be responsible for the design of a SETA programme?
Q5. What makes a SETA programme succeed/fail?
All the interviews were transcribed line-by-line and checked against the voice recordings,
where necessary, to ensure the accuracy of the transcription of the interviews. This research
adopted an inductive open coding approach as part of our qualitative data analysis (Corbin
and Strauss, 1990). When all 20 key informant interviews were transcribed, the data
analysis commenced using sentence-by-sentence coding to identify relevant codes. The open
coding procedure for the 20 key informant interviews resulted in 212 coded excerpts relating
to the factors impacting on the effectiveness of a SETA programme. These 212 coded
concepts led to the emergence of 15 categories mapped across the four SETA programme
ICS life cycle phases (design, development, implementation and evaluation). Specifically, the
32,1 code/category distribution is as follows:
 design phase  95 codes  8 categories;
 development phase  27 codes  4 categories;
 implementation phase  50 codes  5 categories; and
 evaluation phase  40 codes  3 categories.
58
The category with the highest coding frequency across each of the SETA programme life
cycle phases is as follows:
 design phase  18 coded concepts in the “Assessment Needs” category;
 development phase  12 coded concepts in the “Communication” category;
 implementation phase  17 coded concepts in the “Communication Channel”
category; and
 evaluation phase  20 coded concepts in the “Periodic Assessment” category.

See Figure 1 for a sample of our inductive open coding. Thereafter, unpacking the categories
with at least five key informant voices (25% coverage) led to the emergence of the 11 CSFs
for SETA programme effectiveness.
Table 1 presents these 11 CSFs organised by SETA programme life cycle phase. See
reference withheld for review purposes for a more detailed discussion on these 11 CSFs.

Figure 1.
A sample of our
inductive open coding
(a snapshot of the
highest frequency
categories across the
four life cycle phases)
Life cycle phase CSF Category Description

Design CSF-DS1: Conduct an Initial Assessment needs Determining what the employee understands about the organisation’s
Assessment of Employee Security security policy and their appreciation of the risks associated with current
Awareness IS/cyber security threats
CSF-DS2: Know Your Audiences to Target audiences Identifying “who your audiences are” to ensure appropriate content is
Ensure Content Suitability delivered to the various employee types
CSF-DS3: Make a Yearly Plan to Align Goal/Objective Knowing what is required to be delivered to the employee to ensure that
Goals and Objectives the SETA programme goals meet the specific needs of the organisation
CSF-DS4: Design for Cultural Context Culture Understanding the diversity of employee backgrounds (e.g. language,
and Employee Cultural Diversity culture, knowledge, level of education, age, gender) so that the IS/cyber
security message can be interpreted by all employees
CSF-DS5: Adhere to Organisational Policy Focusing on the guidelines and procedures needed to protect the IS assets
Security Policy and the “Law of the of the organisation, to ensure that all of the organisational IS/cyber
Land” security policies and the “law of the land” are adhered to when designing
a SETA programme
CSF-DS6: Build Security Awareness Communication Updating the employee on how to mitigate against the potential risks
Campaigns associated with an IS/cyber security threat, and keeping them informed
on what is coming, and most crucially, why they need to care
Development CSF-DV1: Sustained Communication Communication Repeating the IS/cyber security message in various ways to avoid a lapse
of Relevant Messages in employee concentration
Implementation CSF-IM1: Apply Diverse Methods to Communication channel Using various approaches to deliver IS/cyber security awareness
Deliver Security Awareness Messages messaging (e.g. SMS, emails, online courses, face-to-face meetings, videos,
quizzes, posters, screens in public corridors, etc.) so that the employee is
reminded frequently of the IS/cyber security issue
CSF-IM2: Motivate Employees to Motivation Encouraging the employee to adhere to IS/cyber security policies by
Engage in Security Awareness earning a bonus, or other recognition (rewards), based on their practices
Evaluation CSF-EV1: Maintain Quarterly Periodic assessment Providing a year-end evaluation summary to measure each employee’s
Evaluation of Employee Performance performance (e.g. level of awareness, number of training sessions
completed, etc.) and to provide guidance on necessary improvements
CSF-EV2: Measure Employee Incident indication Using phishing campaigns to simulate attacks (knowing how many
Reporting of Security Incidents employees click the suspicious links) to measure the employee awareness
and knowledge regarding IS/cyber security issues

Source: Authors’ own creation/work

programme
Table 1.

cycle phase)
(presented by life
Critical

effectiveness
11 CSFs for SETA
59
success factors
ICS Furthermore, Figure 2 (the left-hand side of the visual) presents these CSFs in a ranked
32,1 prioritised order (descending) based on the frequency count of coded excerpts across the 20
interview transcripts. The mean score is also presented for each CSF based on the following
formula ([coded concepts* numerical value of a CSF importance of “high”]/total number of
key informants). For example, the mean score of CSF-DV1 (ranked eighth in Figure 2) is 1.8,
calculated as ([12*3]/20). Therefore, having generated a ranked order list of CSFs for SETA
60 programme effectiveness (in Stage 1), we now needed to evaluate if this ranked order list is
appropriate for others in the IS/cyber security practitioner community. This evaluation is
presented in the next section.

3.2 Stage 2: 65 survey respondents (the ranking of the critical success factors)
In Stage 2 of this exploratory research study, we adopted a Request-For-Comment (RFC)
approach (c.f. Chen et al., 2013) to evaluate the ranked importance of the 11 CSFs. Online
surveys are an effective way “to elicit feedback from a wide range of participants in a scalable
way” (Lo et al., 2015, p. 416). Surveying practitioners (using short simply surveys) to determine
(i) their confidence in academic outputs or (ii) their perception of research relevance is a
common practice (c.f. Kitchenham and Pfleeger, 2008). However, it is important to design these
surveys such that participants require “as little effort as possible to complete it” (Lo et al., 2015,
p. 416). To achieve this, we designed a short 11-question survey (one question per CSF using an
ordinal scale of high/medium/low) to gather practitioner perspectives on the ranked importance
of each of the CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness (see Appendix 1 for a sample of the
survey questions). Therefore, we limited our response type to numerical (ordinal scale) but
subjective data, capturing the respondent’s preferences (Kitchenham and Pfleeger, 2008, p. 67).
Therefore, we viewed the short survey as a data gathering instrument that would provide
numerical descriptions of the importance of each CSF (based on the perception of the sample
population). Overall, our approach is similar in style to that taken by Nah et al. (2001, p. 295)
where they refer to the use of a “survey questionnaire” to evaluate the importance of their 11
CSFs for ERP implementation and “how the perceived importance of these factors may differ”
among respondents. In our survey, a respondent was required to answer all 11 questions to
submit a valid survey response. This RFC approach ensured that each respondent evaluated
each one of the 11 CSFs. The facility also existed for respondents to provide additional

Figure 2.
CSF ranked list
comparison (Stage 1
and Stage 2)
comments following completion of the survey. These comments were also factored into the Critical
follow-up probing interviews conducted in Stage 3. success factors
The survey was designed on Google Forms and was distributed electronically to
practitioners in the IS/cyber security professional community (SETA programme
specialists). These practitioners were initially invited by email, and if they agreed to
participate were then sent the link to the survey. For example, we invited participants from
the Cyber Research Conference Ireland 2022, along with members of several cyber security
groups, including Women in Cyber Security Middle East, Hemaya Cyber Ladies and 61
Information Security Association – Hemaya. Some of the cyber security group members also
shared the invite with professionals within their networks. None of the 20 key informants
from Stage 1 was invited to participate in Stage 2.
The survey went live on 5 May 2022 and remained open for five days (until 9 May). A
total of 65 responses were gathered during this time (25 responses on Day 1, 26 on Day 2, 7
on Day 3, 5 on Day 4 and 2 on Day 5), with responses coming mainly from Ireland, the UK
and the Middle East. Once the survey was closed, the data were downloaded to MS Excel. A
data analysis table was generated containing the min/max, the mean, median and standard
deviation for all 11 CSFs. Figure 2 (the right-hand side of the visual) presents these CSFs in a
ranked, prioritised order (descending) based on the mean score of each CSF. Figure 2 is
inspired by similar comparative type visual displays used in other studies [e.g. Table 3 from
Wong (1998) and Figure 4 from Ahmad and Cuenca (2013)].
In this stage, we also compare both ranked lists of the 11 CSFs emerging from the two
independent groups (Stage 1 list from 20 key informants and Stage 2 list from 65 survey
respondents). Figure 2 presents a visual of this comparison (similarities and differences) and
highlights the position of each CSF in the respective lists. We also use the Mann–Whitney U
test to check if there is a difference in the rank sum between the two ranked lists. In this
research, the statistical test was performed by hand, following the steps outlined in the
following video (www.youtube.com/watch?v¼BT1FKd1Qzjw). The workings of the Ustat for
Stage 1 (n1) and Stage 2 (n2) are available in Appendix 2. We use the mean value for each of the
11 CSFs across both groups, rank each of the CSFs and calculate the rank sum for Stage 1
(109.5 with a Ustat ¼ 43.5) and Stage 2 (143.5 with a Ustat ¼ 77.5). The null hypothesis is
stated as follows: in the population, the rank sum (sum of the rankings) in the two groups does
not differ, whereas the alternative hypothesis suggests that the sum of the rankings does differ.
The critical values of the Mann–Whitney U (two-tailed testing) are available at this links
(https://ocw.umb.edu/psychology/psych-270/other-materials/RelativeResourceManager.pdf).
The value of the Ucrit at a ¼ 0.05 (95% confidence interval) is 30 (where n1 and n2 are both
11). Based on our calculations, the null hypothesis was accepted (Ustat > Ucrit), suggesting
that there is no significant difference in the CSFs between the two groups (Stage 1: 20 key
informants and Stage 2: 65 survey respondents). For example, in our analysis, Ucrit ¼ 30
and the lowest Ustat ¼ 43.5.
However, as seen in Figure 2, there is a somewhat contradictory element to the CSF
rankings between Stage 1 and Stage 2. For example, CSF-EV1 is the 1st ranked CSF from
Stage 1 but is the 11th ranked CSF from Stage 2. Furthermore, the inverse is also true, where
CSF-DS6 is the 11th ranked CSF from Stage 1 but is the 1st ranked CSF from Stage 2. In
total, five critical areas of difference emerge from our comparative analysis of the ranked
lists of 11 CSFs. In Figure 2, the three red lines represent a significant difference in the
ranking (between both practitioner groups) of three specific CSFs (CSF-EV1, CSF-DS5 and
CSF-DS6). The two orange lines represent a modest, but of interest, difference in two
specific CSFs (CSF-DS2 and CSF-DS4). Finally, the six green lines represent insignificant
differences in the ranking (between both practitioner groups) of six specific CSFs (CSF-DS1,
ICS CSF-IM1, CSF-DS3, CSF-EV2, CSF-DV1 and CSF-IM2). Therefore, we progress our
32,1 understanding of the differences (captured by the red and orange lines) in the next section.

3.3 Stage 3: 9 follow-up probing interviews (the emergence of the guiding principles)
In Stage 3 of this exploratory research study, we use a hermeneutics-inspired approach to
analyse and interpret the answers provided by nine IS/cyber security practitioners (four
62 from Stage 1 and five from Stage 2) to the questions emerging from the differences in the
ranking of the CSFs between Stage 1 (20 key informants) and Stage 2 (65 survey
respondents) (see Figure 2). In this stage, we are trying to make sense of the “seemingly
contradictory” (Myers, 2009, p. 170) text that has emerged around five specific CSFs
(difference in their ranked importance). Furthermore, we take these differences as a sign of
“confused, incomplete, cloudy, and contradictory views” (Myers, 2009, p. 171) among the IS/
cyber security community (specifically those with expertise in SETA programmes).
Therefore, our interpretative work aims to bring to light an underlying sense of clarity, and
the following questions were asked to qualify the importance of the five specific CSFs:
(1) Is building a security awareness campaign important (CSF-DS6)? Why?
(2) Is maintaining a quarterly evaluation of employee performance important (CSF-
EV1)? Why?
(3) How can adherence to policy (organisational and legislative) be improved (CSF-
DS5)?
(4) Is tailored content for employees important (CSF-DS2)? Why?
(5) Is the cultural context and the employee background important (CSF-DS4)? Why?

Ultimately in this stage, we discovered reasons for the importance of CSF-DS6, CSF-EV1, CSF-
DS5, CSF-DS2 and CSF-DS4. Four of these contradictions (CSF-DS2, CSF-DS4, CSF-DS5, CSF-
DS6) are linked to the design phase of the SETA programme life cycle, while one contradiction
(CSF-EV1) highlights the challenging nature of SETA programme evaluation. Therefore, these
contradictions afford us the opportunity to present five guiding principles (four in design and
one in evaluation) to complement the ranked list of 11 CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness
within an organisational context (see Table 2). These guiding principles are ordered by the
degree of difference (contradiction) between the Stage 1 and Stage 2 rankings (see Figure 2).
In the next section, we present a discussion of our research findings (the five CSF-specific
guiding principles emerging from Stage 3).

4. Discussion of findings
The outcome of this research suggests that there is no significant difference between the 20 key
informants (Stage 1) and 65 survey respondents (Stage 2) in terms of their perception of the
ranked importance of the 11 CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness. However, this research
also highlights that there are five specific CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness that need to
be examined, given the differences that emerged from our comparative analysis. These five
guiding principles are now discussed to further improve the likelihood of delivering an effective
SETA programme. We also reflect these findings against existing literature.

4.1 Principle 1: raise employee IS/cyber security awareness and knowledge to enhance
organisational maturity
CSF-DS6: Build Security Awareness Campaigns focuses on updating the employee on how to
mitigate against the potential risks associated with an IS/cyber security threat, keeping them
Ranking
Critical
(Stage) success factors
CSF One Two Guiding principle

CSF-DS6: Build Security Awareness 11 1 Raise employee IS/cyber security awareness and
Campaigns knowledge to enhance organisational maturity
CSF-EV1: Maintain Quarterly 1 11 Evaluate employee performance at a frequency
Evaluation of Employee Performance that aligns with the organisational IS/cyber 63
security strategy
CSF-DS5: Adhere to Organisational 9 2 Secure top management support to encourage all
Security Policy and the “Law of the employees to comply with IS/cyber security policy
Land”
CSF-DS2: Know Your Audiences to 3 6 Avoid a one size fits all approach to programme Table 2.
Ensure Content Suitability content to promote employee engagement
CSF-DS4: Design for Cultural Context 6 9 Appreciate employee cultural differences to shape
Guiding principles
and Employee Cultural Diversity programme content for five CSFs with
difference/
Source: Authors’ own creation/work contradiction

informed on what is coming, and, most crucially, why they need to care. Figure 2 visualises
the contradictory rankings between Stage 1 and Stage 2 for this CSF. We believe that this
difference exists because the perspectives of the experts (involved in delivering
SETA programmes) differ regarding where to position awareness building along the SETA
programme lifecycle. For example, in the early stage of the design phase of the SETA
programme (to clarify all security issues for their employees to achieve the SETA programme
goals) or in the final stage of the evaluation phase (to assess employee knowledge of IS security
and to determine whether or not the programme is effective at changing employee behaviour).
Based on our review of the story of the importance of this CSF (CSF-DS6), the IS/cyber
security practitioners highlighted that security awareness campaigns simply keep
employees updated about what is going on (e.g. new cyberattack methods) and how to
protect themselves and the organisation. For example, one practitioner states, “[. . .] as
technology develops, fraud and security incidents are constantly updated, and new attack
techniques are developed”. The campaign also aims to enhance organisational IS/cyber
security maturity, and this is especially challenging where employees have varying levels of
IS/cyber security knowledge and experience (e.g. new hires vs senior leaders) and may fail to
recognise an IS/cyber security issue. As one practitioner states, “the campaign can provide
detailed information about phishing, social engineering, and other technical attacks”. As a
result, the main goal of an IS/cyber security awareness campaign is to raise employee
awareness and knowledge.
In comparing these findings with those presented in the literature, several observations
can be made around the criticality of building an IS/cyber security awareness campaign as
part of a SETA programme. For example, Rantos et al. (2012) discuss launching an
awareness campaign across the company to cover all IS security topics as a vital element of
measuring the effectiveness of the SETA programme. Several studies highlight the need to
design an awareness campaign as a periodic short communication to clarify the importance
of the SETA programme in terms of protecting the IS assets, personal data, enhancing IS/
cyber security awareness, complying with IS/cyber security policy and reducing IS/cyber
security risks (Vroom and Solms, 2002; Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010). Therefore, formal
awareness campaigns are communications with employees with the specific aim of
ICS increasing the understanding of, and reducing the likelihood of, harmful IS practices within
32,1 the organisation (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Hearth et al., 2018).

4.2 Principle 2: evaluate employee performance at a frequency that aligns with the
organisational IS/cyber security strategy
CSF-EV1: Maintain Quarterly Evaluation of Employee Performance focuses on providing a
64 year-end evaluation summary (e.g. metrics) to measure each employee’s performance (e.g.
level of awareness, number of training sessions completed, etc.) and to provide guidance on
necessary improvements. Figure 2 visualises the contradictory rankings between Stage 1
and Stage 2 for this CSF. We believe that this difference exists because the perspectives of
the experts differ on whether an assessment should be conducted at the start or at the end
of the year. Some experts believe in assessing employee knowledge, to determine their level
of awareness and then building the SETA programme around that, while others believe that
the assessment should be done at the end of the year to evaluate the effectiveness of the
current programme (while also informing the design of the forthcoming year).
Based on our review of the story of the importance of this CSF (CSF-EV1) to SETA
programme effectiveness, the IS/cyber security practitioners highlight the criticality of
conducting employee assessments to assess security awareness and knowledge levels and
motivate employees to participate in the SETA programme. However, IS/cyber security
practitioners have differing views on whether the time frame for evaluating employee
performance should be quarterly or annually. A significant number of practitioners prefer to
conduct annual assessments. For example, one practitioner states, “if you ask employees to
do evaluations every quarter, some organisations will simply fail because employees will get
tired and fatigued”. However, there is a strong preference for quarterly assessment also. For
example, one practitioner states, “while it is very important to evaluate the employee at least
once a year, I prefer to conduct employee assessments every three months to track their
progress”. Therefore, it appears as if the time frame for conducting employee assessments
can be determined based on the organisational IS/cyber security strategy. Furthermore,
while organisations use various tools to assess employee performance, one practitioner calls
out the importance of defining the correct KPIs, for example, “we must ensure that 90% of
employees, preferably 98%, have successfully completed the training courses”. In contrast,
another practitioner states, “we can evaluate employee performance by using phishing
simulation (e.g. did they get the security awareness message, did they report suspicious
links)”. Ultimately, the evaluation results also inform the next cycle of designing an effective
SETA programme within the organisation.
In comparing these findings with those presented in the literature, several studies
discuss approaches to evaluate SETA programmes. For example, Rantos et al. (2012)
illustrate several methods for evaluating a SETA programme. One of those methods is using
a survey/questionnaire to evaluate the success of the programme overall. Other methods
evaluate security awareness campaigns by highlighting some IS security issues and
measuring the effectiveness of the SETA programme in addressing the existing gaps
(Alshaikh et al., 2018; Johnson, 2006). However, this is an area that still requires further
research.

4.3 Principle 3: secure top management support to encourage all employees to comply with
IS/cyber security policy
CSF-DS5: Adhere to Organisational Security Policy and the “Law of the Land” is concerned
with focusing on the guidelines and procedures needed to protect the IS assets of the
organisation, to ensure that all of the organisational security policies and the “law of the land”
are adhered to when designing a SETA programme. Figure 2 visualises the contradictory Critical
rankings between Stage 1 and Stage 2 for this CSF. We believe that this difference is linked to success factors
the fact that some organisations design their SETA programmes in-house and ensure that their
security policies comply with localised legal requirements. In contrast, other organisations use
a more generic CBT (computer-based training) design that simply informs employees of the
country’s regulations (but does not link back to the organisational security policy).
Based on our review of the story of the importance of this CSF (CSF-DS5), the IS/cyber
security practitioners highlight the need to obtain top management support to ensure that 65
all organisational employees adhere to the IS/cyber security policy. The practitioners
express the view that top management can improve employee security awareness and
practices because their acts of policy compliance encourage other employees to follow their
lead. For example, one practitioner states, “in order to get employees to commit to security
policies and regulations, we need top management support”. Therefore, improving SETA
programme effectiveness begins with top management demonstrating the importance of
implementing security regulations and policies and then training employees on these
security regulations and policies. It also appears that for some IS/cyber security
professionals enforcing severe penalties for IS/cyber security policy violations can help
improve SETA programme effectiveness. For example, one practitioner states, “we have a
security policy, and if you fail to follow the policy three times in a row, you will be fired”.
The view exists that this enhances employee commitment and adherence to the
fundamentals of IS/cyber security awareness. Furthermore, implementing the appropriate
IS/cyber security standards is identified as a key to reducing IS security risks and is critical
to delivering an effective SETA programme (assisting organisational employees to manage
cyberattacks and IS/cyber security threats). For example, one practitioner states, “once ISO
27000 certified, you will have regular audits, and the system will be audited. The audits will
ensure continuous improvement [. . .]”. Typically, organisations conduct internal or external
audits every six months to motivate employees to follow their IS security policies.
In comparing these findings with those presented in the literature, several observations
can be made around the criticality of top management support to IS/cyber security policy
adherence as part of a SETA programme. For example, Puhakainen and Siponen (2010)
conducted an empirical investigation into the significance of the role of top management in
ensuring employee compliance with IS policy. Hu et al. (2012) also provided a detailed
explanation of the significance of top management support to IS policy compliance and the
changes to organisational culture. Active participation by top management in the
development, implementation and enforcement of security policy can enhance employees’
perceptions that IS policy and procedures are legitimate and fair (Hu et al., 2012). Therefore,
top management plays an important role in encouraging employees to adhere to IS/cyber
security policy to deliver an effective SETA programme.

4.4 Principle 4: avoid a one size fits all approach to programme content to promote employee
engagement
CSF-DS2: Know Your Audiences to Ensure Content Suitability focuses on identifying “who
your audiences are” to ensure appropriate content is delivered to the various employee
types. Figure 2 visualises the contradictory rankings between Stage 1 and Stage 2 for this
CSF. We believe that the slightly different stories highlight how organisational size and
resources play an important role in delivering appropriate security awareness materials to
employees at various levels. Employee differences (e.g. culture, knowledge, age, etc.) should
be considered when preparing resources, and content customisation should align with the
organisation’s own strategies and IS/cyber security plans. Therefore, IS/cyber security
ICS awareness content should be designed in such a way as it is neither too technical nor too
32,1 general for the target audiences.
Based on our review of the story of the importance of this CSF (CSF-DS2) to SETA
programme effectiveness, the IS/cyber security practitioners highlight the criticality of tailoring
the content of the IS/cyber security message to the audience level (e.g. level of education, age, role,
etc.) to provide them with the appropriate training materials. The aim of this is to increase IS/
66 cyber security policy compliance and achieve the organisational goals. For example, one
practitioner states, “we will tailor the content, based on the audience targets, in order to get people
to engage with it”. Therefore, customising content is essential to ensure SETA programme
effectiveness. As one practitioner states, “it is absolutely essential to tailor the content of the cyber
security awareness message and make it simple, direct, and attractive [. . .]”. As a result, it is
impossible to apply the concept of “one-size-fits-all”, and the same IS/cyber security awareness
message cannot be delivered to everyone in the organisation.
In comparing these findings with those presented in the literature, several observations
can be made. For example, Peltier (2005) discusses establishing an IS/cyber security
awareness programme by classifying the audience to ensure the IS/cyber security message
is communicated effectively. Accordingly, a SETA programme must comprise a plan to
transmit the IS/cyber security message to the target audience (De Maeyer, 2007; Siponen,
2000). Therefore, it can be argued that identifying the target audiences in designing a SETA
programme is the main step towards its success; thereby, delivering thorough IS/cyber
security training to each employee with appropriately suitable material.

4.5 Principle 5: appreciate employee cultural differences to shape programme content


CSF-DS4: Design for Cultural Context and Employee Cultural Diversity focuses on
understanding the diversity of employee backgrounds (e.g. language, culture, knowledge,
level of education, age, gender) so that the IS/cyber security message can be interpreted by
all employees. Figure 2 visualises the contradictory rankings between Stage 1 and Stage 2
for this CSF. We believe this is linked to the fact that the IS/cyber security practitioners
involved in this research study come from different cultures (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Ireland, the US, the UK, etc.). As a result, given their differing backgrounds and experiences,
what works in one cultural context might not work in another.
Based on our review of the story of the importance of this CSF (CSF-DS4) to SETA
programme effectiveness, the IS/cyber security practitioners highlight that each culture has its
own sense of privacy, which should be considered when designing a SETA programme. For
example, one practitioner states, “it is critical to understand the culture from which they come.
To build security awareness content in simple language that adheres to the security policy”.
Thus, culture is an essential factor that can influence how individuals act, with differences and
similarities between individualist and collectivist cultures (Parks and Vu, 1994). For example,
one practitioner reveals, “in the context of country culture, Saudi Arabia is collectivist while
Ireland is individualist”. Therefore, employees from collectivist cultures tend to collaborate in a
more trusting fashion and will share their passwords, whereas employees from individualist
cultures tend to be more conscious and will not share their passwords (Moorman and Blakely,
1995). Essentially, navigating these cultural realities within an organisational context is
extremely important for SETA programme effectiveness.
In comparing these findings with those presented in the literature, a number of
observations can be made. Previous studies address “culture” in the context of IS/cyber
security practice. For example, Hovav and D’Arcy (2012) examine the influence of culture on
IS/cyber security policies, training and monitoring. To understand culture in terms of IS/
cyber security practice is to understand individual differences within each cultural context
(c.f. Walsham, 2002). These cultural differences can be beliefs, norms and values in a social Critical
setting, known collectively as a country. Thus, different cultures require different IS/cyber success factors
security interventions (Kirova and Baumoel, 2018; Karjalainen et al., 2013; von Solms and
von Solms, 2004). Thus, understanding the cultural context is an essential factor when
designing an effective SETA programme.

5. Conclusions and implications 67


It is reported that importance is the most critical dimension of relevance for IS practitioners.
Similar to Rosemann and Vessey (2008, p. 3), we view importance as research that “meets
the needs of practice by addressing a real-world problem in a timely manner [currently
significant], and in such a way that it can act as the starting point for providing an eventual
solution”. Therefore, while IS/cyber security is a current hot topic and a top concern for
many practitioners (both business and IT), the ability to lead an effective SETA programme,
and identify the CSFs for doing so, is an area of IS research not yet well established.
Therefore, this study is unique in its approach and contributes to the IS/cyber security
conversation in the following three ways:
(1) one of the first studies to produce a ranked list of CSFs for SETA programme
effectiveness; thereby, conceptualising SETA programme effectiveness in a
digestible, easy to understand, way (see Figure 2);
(2) one of the first studies to provide a set of guiding principles for the CSFs that could
be the most challenging to “get right” in practice (see Table 2); and
(3) one of the first studies to highlight that the “design” phase of a SETA programme
life cycle will be the most contentious in terms of building a shared understanding
(among all organisational stakeholders) of what is critical to delivering an effective
SETA programme within the organisation.

In this research, we capture the essence of the practitioners’ views on the importance of the
CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness. By comparing Stage 1 and Stage 2 outputs, we are
provided with a context against which a more accurate interpretation of the realities of SETA
programme effectiveness can be achieved. Therefore, the outcome of Stage 3 of this research
showcases that practice matters and the topic of SETA programme effectiveness (and the CSFs
to achieve it) matters to practice. In conclusion, we believe that we have taken practice into
consideration and delivered something of practical value in this research. For example, the
difference (as to the importance of each CSF) between the two groups of IS/cyber security
professionals showcases variation based on past experiences. This variation further advances
our theorising and brings further clarity to the SETA programme effectiveness story (through
the emergence of the five guiding principles). Furthermore, we are also aware that the research
team’s effort at qualitative data analysis (in Stage 1 of this research) sets the agenda for the
remaining stages. However, the similarity in perceived importance (for the majority) of the
CSFs (between Stage 1 and Stage 2) also highlights the shared theoretical sensitivities of both
the researchers and the practitioners in this research study.
Beyond the value of the 11 CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness, this paper also presents
an approach to evaluate the outputs of a multi-stage grounded (data-to-theory) study. For
example, we use an RFC approach to take the outputs from Stage 1 (the emergence of the CSFs)
and generate a comparative ranked order list to generate a new output in Stage 2 (the ranking of
the CSFs). Finally, the differences between the ranked order lists in Stage 1 and Stage 2 produce
the output for Stage 3 (the emergence of the guiding principles). This movement through the
stages showcases an innovative approach to evaluating outputs, emerging from iterative data
ICS gathering and analysis, where the views of participants are used to fuel our theorising and theory
32,1 development efforts. Therefore, this evaluation approach further increases the relevance of the
work (around accessibility and applicability). To note, as per Rosemann and Vessey (2008, p. 3),
accessibility is understood as “the research is understandable, readable, and focuses on results”,
and applicability is understood to be “whether it provides guidance and/or direction, and whether
it provides concrete recommendations” that are easy to apply in practice.
68 Finally, prefacing the five guiding principles (presented in Table 2) with “Do We” allows
each principle to serve as a pre-commencement readiness check to guide SETA programme
endeavours; and/or as an in-progress reflective aid for practitioners to assess the efficacy of
their existing SETA programme activities. We believe that asking and answering these five
questions will help to start conversations and build a shared understanding among
organisational IS/cyber security practitioners, with the aim of delivering an effective SETA
programme within an organisational context. For example, the “design” phase is the
preliminary phase in a SETA programme life cycle. The design phase activities are most
often concerned with identifying the target audiences and their needs, outlining and
budgeting for a training and awareness plan, setting up priorities and benchmarks, along
with risk management and business contingency planning (Alshaikh et al., 2018; Tsohou
et al., 2015; Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010; Wilson and Hash, 2003). Therefore, having
meaningful conversations around these design phase activities is of the utmost importance.

6. Recommendations for future research


Using a three-stage research approach to capture IS/cyber security practitioner voices
allowed their SETA programme stories to be interrogated, the outcome of which leads to the
emergence of the 11 CSFs for SETA programme effectiveness (across the life cycle phases)
and the five CSF-specific guiding principles to further improve the likelihood of delivering
an effective SETA programme within an organisational context. However, these CSFs and
guiding principles are not yet established as universal, so while these CSFs and guiding
principles provide guidance to all undertaking a SETA programme, organisations need to
be “mindful of the influence of their own context” (Borman and Janssen, 2013, p. 85).
Furthermore, we are also conscious that while adding to the number of key informants in
this study could be very beneficial and revealing for our “concept development” work on the
CSFs and five CSF-specific guiding principles for SETA programme effectiveness, it is
perhaps more beneficial to move to a larger population of IS/cyber security practitioners as
part of a study focused on “construct elaboration” (Gioia et al., 2012, p. 16).
Finally, providing a list of CSFs is only a partial aid to success; more is needed on the
implementation actions required around any list of CSFs stated (c.f. Alhassan et al., 2019).
Therefore, now that we have identified a ranked list of 11 CSFs for SETA programme
effectiveness, along with the five CSF-specific guiding principles, there is a need to examine
the “conjunctural” (Ragin, 1987) nature of these CSFs. Such an appreciation would further
improve our understanding regarding the complexity of SETA programmes. This would
lend itself to the development of a process model for SETA programme effectiveness,
embracing the life cycle phases (design, development, implementation, evaluation) and
chaining (c.f. Hubberman and Miles, 1994) the CSFs within and across these phases.

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Further reading
Alyami, A., Sammon, D., Neville, K. and Mahony, C. (2023), “The critical success factors for security
education, training and awareness (SETA) program effectiveness: a lifecycle model”,
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(accessed 29 September 2022).

Corresponding author
Areej Alyami can be contacted at: a.alyami1988@gmail.com
Appendix 1 Critical
success factors

73

Appendix 2

Mann-Whitney U Test
Key Informant (20) n¹ Survey (65) n²
Mean
CSF Mean Score Rank Mean Score Rank Rank
CSF# Score
CSF-DS1 Conduct an Inial Assessment of Employee Security Awareness 2.7 20.5 2.62 17 1 1.35
CSF-DS2 Know Your Audiences to Ensure Content Suitability 2.7 20.5 2.54 13 2.5 2 1.65
CSF-DS3 Make a Yearly Plan to Align Goals and Objecves 2.4 11 2.57 16 2.5 3 1.65
CSF-DS4 Design for Cultural Context and Employee Cultural Diversity 2.1 5.5 2.31 9 4 1.8
CSF-DS5 Adhere to Organisaonal Security Policy and the “Law of the Land” 1.65 2.5 2.66 18 5.5 5 2.1
CSF-DS6 Build Security Awareness Campaigns 1.35 1 2.69 19 5.5 6 2.1
CSF-DV1 Sustained Communicaon of Relevant Messages 1.8 4 2.26 8 7 2.22
CSF-IM1 Apply Diverse Methods to Deliver Security Awareness Messages 2.55 14.5 2.55 14.5 8 2.26
CSF-IM2 Movate Employees to Engage in Security Awareness 1.65 2.5 2.32 10 9 2.31
CSF-EV1 Maintain Quarterly Evaluaon of Employee Performance 3 22 2.22 7 10 2.32
CSF-EV2 Measure Employee Reporng of Security Incidents 2.1 5.5 2.51 12 11 2.4
Rank Sum 109.5 143.5 12 2.51
13 2.54
Stage Ustat Formula Ustat Value 14.5 14 2.55
One Ustat = rank sum - n¹(n¹+1)/2 43.5 14.5 15 2.55
Two Ustat = rank sum - n²(n²+1)/2 77.5 16 2.57
17 2.62
18 2.66
19 2.69
20.5 20 2.7
20.5 21 2.7
22 3

Source: Author’s own creation/work

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