Incident
Classification
/
Incident
Taxonomy
according
to
eCSIRT.net
–
adapted
International
Version
Don
Stikvoort,
11
Jan
–
19
Dec
2012
(version
mkVI
of
31
March
2015)
Many
thanks
to
various
reviewers,
most
notably
so
Andrew
Cormack,
Xander
Jansen,
Alf
Moens
and
Peter
Peters
What
is
in
italics
has
been
added
or
adapted
from
the
old
eCSIRT.net
Incident
Classification
(de
facto)
standard,
which
was
based
on
earlier
work
by
Jimmy
Arvidsson.
Note
that
only
the
following
changes
have
occurred
to
the
base
categories:
-‐ ‘information
security’
!
‘information
content
security’
:
because
the
term
‘information
security’
is
too
generic
and
wide
ranging
-‐ added
‘vulnerable’
-‐ added
‘test’
Also,
the
2nd
column
used
to
be
a
sub-‐classification
in
the
original
model.
However
this
will
only
give
rise
to
much
confusion
if
this
were
to
be
used
inbetween
organisations.
Therefore
it
is
strongly
advised
to
stick
to
the
main
categories,
and
only
use
the
2nd
column
as
examples,
for
clarification.
Of
course,
for
internal
purposes
one
could
use
these
subcategories
in
a
ticketing
system
–
but
the
question
is
still
then
:
is
that
worth
the
extra
analysis
effort.
Last
but
not
least
–
bear
in
mind
that
this
is
not
an
exclusive
taxonomy.
Incidents
can
well
involve
more
classifications.
How
to
handle
this
is
not
a
function
of
this
document,
but
rather
of
how
a
CSIRT
organises
their
incident
tracking
system.
The
choice
usually
is
–
is
it
allowed
that
an
incident
has
more
than
1
classification?
This
is
theoretically
the
best
approach,
though
it
can
muddle
up
incident
statistics
and
needs
to
be
carefully
considered.
Or
is
only
1
classification
allowed?
And
then
a
judgment
call
is
needed
what
is
the
most
significant
of
the
classifications
for
that
specific
incident.
Incident
Incident
Examples
Description
/
Explanation
Classification
or
"Unsolicited
Bulk
Email",
this
means
that
the
recipient
has
not
granted
verifiable
Spam
permission
for
the
message
to
be
sent
and
that
the
message
is
sent
as
part
of
a
larger
collection
of
messages,
all
having
a
functionally
comparable
content.
Abusive
Content
Discreditation
or
discrimination
of
somebody
(e.g.
cyber
stalking,
racism
and
threats
against
Harmful
Speech
1
one
or
more
individuals)
Child/Sexual/
Child
Pornography,
glorification
of
violence,
...
Violence/...
Virus
Worm
Trojan
Software
that
is
intentionally
included
or
inserted
in
a
system
for
a
harmful
purpose.
A
user
Malicious
Code
2
Spyware
interaction
is
normally
necessary
to
activate
the
code.
Dialer
Rootkit
Attacks
that
send
requests
to
a
system
to
discover
weak
points.
This
includes
also
some
kind
Scanning
of
testing
processes
to
gather
information
about
hosts,
services
and
accounts.
Examples:
Information
fingerd,
DNS
querying,
ICMP,
SMTP
(EXPN,
RCPT,
…),
port
scanning.
Gathering
Sniffing
Observing
and
recording
of
network
traffic
(wiretapping).
Gathering
information
from
a
human
being
in
a
non-‐technical
way
(e.g.
lies,
tricks,
bribes,
or
Social
Engineering
threats).
1
Was
“harassment”
–
legally
the
term
“harmful
speech”
is
more
correct,
as
it
includes
harassment,
discrimination
and
defamation
2
“Malicious
code”
refers
to
malicious
software
inserted
into
a
system.
The
vector
that
caused
the
insertion
is
not
apparent
here.
The
vector
can
be
an
“intrusion”
from
the
outside,
but
also
a
USB
stick,
or
other
internal
vector.
An
attempt
to
compromise
a
system
or
to
disrupt
any
service
by
exploiting
vulnerabilities
Exploiting
of
known
with
a
standardised
identifier
such
as
CVE
name
(e.g.
buffer
overflow,
backdoor,
cross
site
Intrusion
Vulnerabilities
scripting,
etc.).
Attempts
3
Login
attempts
Multiple
login
attempts
(Guessing
/
cracking
of
passwords,
brute
force).
New
attack
signature
An
attempt
using
an
unknown
exploit.
Privileged
Account
Compromise
Unprivileged
A
successful
compromise
of
a
system
or
application
(service).
This
can
have
been
caused
Account
Intrusions
4 remotely
by
a
known
or
new
vulnerability,
but
also
by
an
unauthorized
local
access.
Also
Compromise
includes
being
part
of
a
botnet.
Application
Compromise
Bot
DoS
By
this
kind
of
an
attack
a
system
is
bombarded
with
so
many
packets
that
the
operations
are
DDoS
delayed
or
the
system
crashes.
DoS
examples
are
ICMP
and
SYN
floods,
Teardrop
attacks
and
Sabotage
mail-‐bombing.
DDoS
often
is
based
on
DoS
attacks
originating
from
botnets,
but
also
other
scenarios
exist
like
DNS
Amplification
attacks.
Availability
However,
the
availability
also
can
be
affected
by
local
actions
(destruction,
disruption
of
Outage
(no
malice)
power
supply,
etc.)
–
or
by
Act
of
God,
spontaneous
failures
or
human
error,
without
malice
or
gross
neglect
being
involved.
Unauthorised
access
Besides
a
local
abuse
of
data
and
systems
the
information
security
can
be
endangered
by
a
to
information
Information
successful
account
or
application
compromise.
Furthermore
attacks
are
possible
that
Unauthorised
Content
Security
intercept
and
access
information
during
transmission
(wiretapping,
spoofing
or
hijacking).
modification
of
Human/configuration/software
error
can
also
be
the
cause.
information
3
An
“attempt”
refers
to
the
mechanism
used
to
try
and
create
an
intrusion.
The
intrusion
may
have
failed
–
or
not.
4
An
“intrusion”
will
as
rule
of
thumb
be
the
result
of
a
successful
intrusion
attempt.
Unauthorized
use
of
Using
resources
for
unauthorized
purposes
including
profit-‐making
ventures
(E.g.
the
use
of
resources
e-‐mail
to
participate
in
illegal
profit
chain
letters
or
pyramid
schemes).
Offering
or
Installing
copies
of
unlicensed
commercial
software
or
other
copyright
protected
Copyright
Fraud
materials
(Warez).
Type
of
attacks
in
which
one
entity
illegitimately
assumes
the
identity
of
another
in
order
to
Masquerade
benefit
from
it.
Phishing
Masquerading
as
another
entity
in
order
to
persuade
the
user
to
reveal
a
private
credential.
Open
resolvers,
world
readable
printers,
vulnerability
apparent
from
Nessus
etc
scans,
virus
Vulnerable
Open
for
abuse
signatures
not
up-‐to-‐date,
etc
All
incidents
which
don't
fit
in
one
of
the
If
the
number
of
incidents
in
this
category
increases,
it
is
an
indicator
that
the
classification
Other
given
categories
scheme
must
be
revised.
should
be
put
into
this
class.
Test
Meant
for
testing
Meant
for
testing
©
S-‐CURE
bv,
PRESECURE
GmbH
and
SURFnet
bv
:
this
document
can
be
freely
used
and
re-‐used,
providing
that
eCSIRT.net,
Jimmy
Arvidsson
and
Don
Stikvoort
are
acknowledged,
and
that
any
potential
improvements/changes
to
this
document
are
shared
with
the
author
at
don@elsinore.nl
for
the
sake
of
future
improved
versions
of
this
document.