BARQ&A

POLITICAL LAW
AND
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

2023 Edition

CARLO L. CRUZ
Examiner
Political Law and Public International Law
2018 Bar Examinations
 Philippine Copyright 2022, 2023

By

CARLO L. CRUZ

All Rights Reserved

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bearing the signature of the author shall be denounced
as proceeding from an illegal source.

__
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ISBN 978-621-02-1964-7

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 PREFACE

In this, his tenth work (his third under quaran-

tine), this writer, a teacher for a few decades now, took on
the role of a student, a bar candidate fresh from law
school.

He felt it necessary to do this if only to enable him to

present his answers to the bar examination questions
featured here properly, and from the proper, and a fair,
perspective.
His manner and method of answering these ques-
tions are offered here not as rules, but as mere sugges-
tions. He has never believed that there has ever existed
any precise formula for answers to bar examination ques-
tions.
He has always maintained though that short and fo-
cused answers, using but simple words in agreement with
each other and placed in proper order, are always best,
especially in light of the fact that examiners plow through
thousands of booklets, and even more answers, in the
most limited time given to them by their chairpersons.
Of course, this would be possible only if the questions
were on simple topics. Those that are purely hypothetical
(such as those on warrantless searches and custodial in-
vestigations), or technical (such as those on territory and
citizenship) may require longer answers; but never disser-
tations though.

111
 At any rate, the bar candidate must exert best ef-
forts, always, to make sure that any examiner must be
able to detect, almost immediately, the point he wishes to
make in any and all of his answers.
The answers written here are likewise merely offered
as suggestions,but are based on the writer’s careful as-
sessment of the concepts presented in the questions to
which they correspond. He presents here as well accept-
able answers, or those which differ from his, in acknowl-
edgment of the reality that all lawyers, and all students,
may have varying perspectives on legal issues.
He has as well in them made references to perti-
nent cases, and supplemented them, whenever appropri-
ate, with notes which may help the reader in his better
understanding of the precepts relevant to the questions.
The writer did this work with his students foremost
in his mind, and in his heart, as he worked.
It is hoped that they would nd this collection of Po-
litical Law and Public International Law bar examination
questions and answers helpful, not only in preparing them
for their test on these subjects, but also in providing them
with the requisite clarity of thought, calm hearts and
greater condence as they take it.
Bar examinations are always difficult.
But with discipline and diligence and sheer hard
work and, yes, prayer, they can be overcome.

iv
 The writer’s students have heard him say this many
times, usually when he adjourns his lectures, and after he
shares with them his nal words expressing his wish for
their success.
He now ends this note with these words and Wish for
all who may get to spend a few moments of their time with
this collection.
Bring it on.

CARLO L. CRUZ
August 11, 2020

V
 PREFACE
to the
SECOND EDITION

From and with his whole heart, the author dedicates

this edition to all of the bar examinees who took the 2020-
2021 Bar Examinations, so they may all somehow have a
memento, though modest and meager, of their ordeal and,
hopefully, also of their victory.

For good and understandable reasons, theirs can be

claimed, without contradiction, to be by far the most dif-
cult of all bar examinations.
This is so not necessarily in terms of the questions
that were asked, which were all good and fair and reason-
able, but more because of the countless protocols com-
manded by this continuing pandemic, and also because of
the many innovations, technical and otherwise, which,
though seen as both most challenging and limiting, were
nonetheless most Welcome.

They all needed to contend with all of these addi-

tional factors which were never dealt with by all previous
bar examinees and which, again hopefully, need not or
may not be faced by future bar examinees.

Indeed, they all deserve both loud and long applause

for their devotion to their goal of becoming lawyers, and
their meticulous dedication to all that was needed or re-
quired to enable them to take that nal step, in their case,
a last leap, toward their fulllment of their common
dream.

vi
 The author adds here, or to this second edition, only
his answers to the twelve questions asked in Political Law
and Public International Law, and a few revisions or re-
wordings of his answers in the earlier, the rst edition. It
is hoped that all of these revisions would be helpful to all
who may get to read them.

The author clearly could have waited a few years and

saved a bit more by way of new materials, which he could
have started and worked on after a few more bar exami-
nations.

He could not, and did not want to.

This, mainly, was because of his eagerness to,

through and with this edition, commend the 2020-2021
bar examinees and to congratulate them for all of their
unparalleled efforts which they made with evident cour-
age.

And so, to reiterate, this edition is dedicated to all

who took the 2020-2021 Bar Examinations.

It is hoped that this simple souvenir may somehow as

well serve as a reminder for all of them, and for all who
are now part of the fold, to be good lawyers who will do
good things for our country and our countrymen.

CARLO L. CRUZ
March 8, 2022

vii
 PREFACE
to the
THIRD EDITION

The intention, as announced, was for this academic

exercise “to fold back into its distinguished degree of
rigor.”
The perception, now generally acknowledged, is that
the effort was fundamentally successful.
Although the writer maintains that the bar examina-
tions held last February may ever remain unbeaten as the
most difcult, not only because of the quality of the ques-
tions asked, but also or especially because of the technical
requirements, technological innovations and the medical
protocols which attended them, the last bar examinations
also presented many basically new things, all generally
seen as a gradual and gentle discarding of decades-old
traditions.
There was last November clearly a continuation of
experiments evidently being done by the Court, perhaps
deemed necessary by it because of the changing times, and
the constant clamor through the years for them.
Multiple examiners, digitalized examinations, re-
gional testing centers, shorter bar examination period,
weekday examinations.
These were among the many changes that were done
if not all, to further improve
as efforts recognized by most,
the process.

viii
 The prevailing sentiment is that the questions asked
in the examination for Political Law and Public Interna-
tional Law were all excellent, and excellently written.
It should be added that the touch of levity which
opened the examination was quite appreciated by many of
the examinees, and did much to assuage the understand-
able anxiety that they had in their hearts as they began
their battle.
As always, it is hoped that this edition may be seen
as a souvenir for those who did battle last November, and
as a helpful guide for those who will have theirs this Sep-
tember, and in the years to come.

CARLO L. CRUZ
January 1, 2023

ix
 For my inquisitive Mother

SALVACION L. CRUZ
for her questions which I can never answer
or shall ever refuse to answer

with all my love.

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

2009 ........ U - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - . . . . . . .- - . . --.....---------.......------------------- -- 1

2010 ........ N 44
2011 ........ H - - - - -- - - - - - -- -..-----.-.-..-..---------- - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- 73
2012 ........ U 121
2013 ........ H 183
2014 ........ U - - - - - ------...---...--...-------------------------------------------- -- 216
2015 ........ n - - - - - - - - . . . . - - - - . - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - . . . . - - - . . . .- 252
2016 ........ U 287
2017 ........ H 321
2018 ...... U - - - - -- ---------.----------------------------------------------------- -- 350
2019 ........ N 382
2020-2021 420
2022 ........ H ........................................................................ "438

_-oooi

xi
 2009
PART I
I
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the state-
ment is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sen-
tences. (5%)

a. A law making “Bayan Ko” the new

national anthem of the Philippines, in lieu of
“Lupang Hinirang,” is constitutional.
TRUE.
Under Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution,
the Congress may, by law, adopt a new national anthem
which shall be truly reective and symbolic of the ide-
als, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall
take effect only upon its ratication by the people in a
national referendum.

b. Under the archipelago doctrine, the

waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago form part of the
territorial sea of the archipelagic state.
FALSE.
The Archipelago Doctrine, which is provided for in
Article I of the Constitution, states that the waters,
around, between and connecting the islands of the

1
2 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

archipelago, regardless of their breadth or dimensions,

shall form part of the internal waters, and not of the
“territorial sea,” of the archipelagic state.

A law that makes military service for

c.
women merely voluntary is constitutional.
FALSE.
Section 4 of Article II of the Constitution authorizes
the government to call upon the people to defend the
State and, in the fulllment thereof, all citizens, with-
out distinction as to gender, may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal, military
or civil service.

[Acceptable Answer: TRUE. Such a law may be upheld as a

reasonable condition in view of What may be considered as substan-
tial distinctions between men and women in terms of personal mili-
tary or civil service]

d. A law fixing the passing grade in the

Bar examinations at 70%, with no grade lower
than 40% in any subject, is constitutional.
FALSE.
Said law would serve to pre-empt the constitutional
and exclusive prerogative of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice
of law, under Section 5 [5] of Article VIII of the Consti-
tution, and would therefore be violative of the principle
of separation of powers. (In re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534)

e. An educational institution 100% for-

eign-owned may be validly established in the
Philippines.
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

TRUE.
Section 4 [2] of Article XIV of the Constitution pro-
vides that educational institutions established by reli-
gious groups and mission boards may be Wholly-owned
by non-Filipinos, or 100% foreign-owned.

II
Despite lingering questions about his Filipino
citizenship and his one-year residence in the dis-
trict, Gabriel filed his certificate of candidacy for
congressman before the deadline set by law. His
opponent, Vito, hires you as lawyer to contest
Gabriel’s candidacy.
a. Before election day, what action or
actions will you institute against Gabriel, and
before which court, commission or tribunal
will you file such action/s? Reasons. (2%)
I will le with the Commission on Elections a peti-
tion to deny due course to or cancel his certicate of
candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code for purposes of questioning his eligibility in terms
of citizenship and residence.
Said petition can be led for purposes of question-
ing the qualications of candidates for the House of
Representatives before an election. (Limkaichong u.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009)

b. If, during the pendency of such ac-

tion/s but before election day, Gabriel with-
draws his certificate of candidacy, can he be
substituted as candidate? If so, by whom and
why? If not, why not? (2%)
4 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Yes, he can be substituted, but only by a person be-

longing to, and certied by, the same political party.
This would be consistent with the general provi-
sions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
would allow such a substitution if, after the last day for
the ling of certicates of candidacy, an oicial candi-
date of a registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualied for any cause.
Under said law, the substitute candidate nomi-
nated by the political party concerned may le his cer-
ticate of candidacy for the oice affected not later than
mid-day of the day of the election.

[Note: A candidate who is disqualied under Section 68 can

validly be substituted under Section '77 of the OEC because he/she
remains a candidate until disqualied; but a person whose CoC has
been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.
(Miranda u. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617,
cited in De la Cruz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192221,
November 13, 2012 and Talaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
196804, October 9, 2012)]

[Note: Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a

valid candidacy (Bautista v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
133840, November 13, 1998, 298 SCRA 480, 493), there can be no
valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not
le a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person
without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same
way as any person who has not led a CoC is not at all a candidate.
(Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617)]

[Note: In Federico v. Commission on Elections (G.R. N0.

199612, January 22, 2013), the Supreme Court sustained the legality
of Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, which prescribed
different grounds and deadlines for the substitution of candidates,
and considered it to be within its authority “to prescribe such rules
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

so as to make efcacious and successful the conduct of the rst na-

tional automated election.” Said Section 13 provides:

SEC. 13. Substitution of Candidates, in case of death,

disqualification or withdrawal of another.—lf after the last day
for the ling of certicate of candidacy, an ofcial candidate of
a registered political party dies, withdraws or is disqualied
for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate belonging
to, and nominated by, the same political party. No substitute
shall be allowed for any independent candidate.
The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may le his
certicate of candidacy as herein provided for the ofce af-
fected not later than December 14, 2009.
The substitute for a candidate who died or suffered per-
manent incapacity or disqualied by nal judgment, may le
his certicate of candidacy up to mid-day of election day. If the
death or permanent disability should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day, the substitute
candidate may le the certicate with any board of election in-
spectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or
in the case of a candidate for President, Vice-President or
Senator, with the Law Department of the Commission on Elec-
tions in Manila.
No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a posi-
tion shall be eligible as substitute candidate for any other posi-
tion after the deadline for ling of certicates of candidacy.]

[Note: Different deadlines were set to govern the specic cir-

cumstances that would necessitate the substitution of a candidate
due to death, disqualication or withdrawal. In case of death or
disqualication, the substitute had until midday of the election day
to le the COC. In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at
bench, the substitute should have led a COC by December 14, 2009.
(Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution 8678 covering the May 10, 2010
Automated Elections, cited in Federico v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013)]

[Note: When Batangas Governor Armando Sanchez died on

April 27, 2010, Edna withdrew her candidacy as mayor and substi-
tuted her late husband as gubernatorial candidate for the province
on April 29, 2010. The party actually had the option to substitute
another candidate for Governor aside from Edna. By elding Edna
6 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

as their substitute candidate for Governor, the party knew that she
had to withdraw her candidacy for Mayor. Considering that the
deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed,
no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden
death of then Governor Armando Sanchez and the substitution by
his widow in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated sub-
stitution in the mayoralty race. (Federico v. Commission on Elec-
tions, G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013)]

c. If the action/s instituted should be

dismissed with finality before the election,
and Gabriel assumes office after being pro-
claimed the winner in the election, can the is-
sue of his candidacy and/or citizenship and
residence still be questioned? If so, what ac-
tion or actions may be filed and where? If not,
why not? (2%)
Yes, the issue of the candidacy and/or citizenship
and residence of a congressional candidate who has been
proclaimed may still be resolved in a petition for quo
warranto which can be led with the House of Repre-
sentatives Electoral Tribunal, which, under the provi-
sions of Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution,
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualications of members of the
House of Representatives (and of the Senate).

[Note: Indeed, the issue of citizenship may be resolved even

beyond the prescriptive period for ling petitions for quo warranto
before the HRET. Citizenship, being a continuing requirement, may
be questioned even beyond said period, but then only by the State,
through its representative designated by statute, usually in direct
proceedings, such as suits for quo warranto. The same principles
would be applicable with respect to the constitutional residence
requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, which
can likewise be characterized as a continuing qualication. (Lim-
kaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009)]
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

III
The Municipality of Bulalakaw, Leyte, passed
Ordinance No. 1234, authorizing the expropria-
tion of two parcels of land situated in the pobla-
cion as the site of a freedom park, and appropriat-
ing the funds needed therefor. Upon review, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte disapproved
the ordinance because the municipality has an
existing freedom park which, though smaller in
size, is still suitable for the purpose, and to pur-
sue expropriation would be needless expenditure
of the people’s money. Is the disapproval of the
ordinance correct? Explain your answer. (2%)
No, the disapproval of the ordinance is not correct
because, under Section 56 (c) of the Local Government
Code, a Sangguniang Panlalawigan may invalidate only
such ordinances or resolutions of a Sangguniang Bayan
as may be “beyond the power” conferred upon the same.
In other Words, a Sangguniang Panlalawigan may
only determine whether or not the ordinance passed by
a Sangguniang Bayan is within the authority conferred
upon it by law. Under Section 19 of the Local Govern-
ment Code, a Sangguniang Bayan clearly possesses the
power of eminent domain. (Velazco v. Blas, G.R. No. L-
30456, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 540, 544-545, cited in
Moday v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107916 February
20,1997)
Accordingly, the disapproval of the subject ordi-
nance is incorrect. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may
not pass upon the wisdom of said ordinance.
[Note: “The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when
8 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

such resolution, ordinance, or order is ‘beyond the powers conferred

upon the council or president making the same.’ Absolutely no other
ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before
the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order. The provincial (board’s) disapproval of any reso-
lution, ordinance, or order must be premised specically upon the
fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of
the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these
limits, it usurps the legislative function of the municipal council or
president. Such has been the consistent course of executive author-
ity.” (Velazco v.BZas, G.R. No. L-80456, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA
540, 544-545, cited in Moday v. Court 0fAppeaZs, G.R. No. 107916
February 20, 1997)]

IV
The Municipality of Pinatukdao is sued for
damages arising from injuries sustained by a pe-
destrian who was hit by a glass pane that fell from
a dilapidated window frame of the municipal hall.
The municipality files a motion to dismiss the
complaint, invoking state immunity from suit.
Resolve the motion with reasons. (3%)

The motion should be denied.

The injuries sustained by the victim were caused by
the apparent negligence of the Municipality in the
maintenance of a glass pane from a window frame of its
municipal hall, or a public building under its control or
supervision.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, provinces, cit-
ies and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision. This general law constitutes the consent of
the State, or, in this case, of the Municipality, to be sued
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 9
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

for the subject injuries. Accordingly, the Municipality

can be considered as having waived its immunity from
suit.

V
To address the pervasive problem of gam-
bling, Congress is considering the following op-
tions: (1) prohibit all forms of gambling; (2) allow
gambling only on Sundays; (3) allow gambling
only in government-owned casinos; and (4) re-
move all prohibitions against gambling but im-
pose a tax equivalent to 30% on all winnings.

a. If Congress chooses the first option

and passes the corresponding law absolutely
prohibiting all forms of gambling, can the law
be validly attacked on the ground that it is an
invalid exercise of police power? Explain
your answer. (2%)
No, the law prohibiting all forms of gambling can-
not be considered as an invalid exercise of the police
power.
The tests for a valid exercise of the police power
would be that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the exercise of the police power, and the means em-
ployed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon the indi-
vidual.
It is respectfully submitted that the subject law ab-
solutely prohibiting all forms of gambling complies with
both tests. (Stone v. Mississippi, 101 US 814; see also
10 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

U.S. u. Pacis, 31 Phil. 524 [1915], U.S. v. Espiritu-Santa,

23 Phil. 610 [1912]; U.S. v. Joson, 26 Phil. 1 [1913l; Peo-
ple v. Chan Hang, 65 Phil. 625 [1938]; U.S. v. Tam-
parong, 31 Phil. 321 [1915l); U.-5'. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil.
102 [1918])

b. If Congress chooses the last option

and passes the corresponding law imposing a
30% tax on all winnings and prizes won from
gambling, would the law comply with the
constitutional limitations on the exercise of
the power of taxation? Explain your answer.
(2%)

It is submitted that said tax measure fullls the

constitutional requirements that tax laws shall be both
uniform and equitable, as it appears to apply to all win-
nings or prizes from gambling, and is based on the ca-
pacity to pay of the winners, who shall be paying, not on
the basis of the fruits of their legitimate labor or em-
ployment, but on the basis of their earnings from their
mere participation in games of chance.
The last option, which would provide for a law im-
posing a 30% tax on all winnings and prizes won from
gambling, would likewise comply with the constitutional
limitations on the exercise of the power of taxation,
which has generally been accepted as an implement for
the attainment of a legitimate police objective. (Cruz
and Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2015 Edition, pages 95-
97; see Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 US 678 and Lutz v.
Araneta, 98 Phil. 148)
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 11
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

VI
In a criminal prosecution for murder, the
prosecution presented, as witness, an employee of
the Manila Hotel who produced in court a video-
tape recording showing the heated exchange be-
tween the accused and the victim that took place
at the lobby of the hotel barely 30 minutes before
the killing. The accused objects to the admission
of the videotape recording on the ground that it
was taken without his knowledge or consent, in
violation of his right to privacy and the Anti-Wire
Tapping law. Resolve the objection with reasons.
(3%)

The objection should be overruled on the ground

that the prohibition in the subject law covers only the
overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private com-
munications. (Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA
590 [1995], cited in Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 121087, August 26, 1999)
It
is clear that the “heated exchange” depicted in
the videotape occurred at the lobby of a hotel. Having
taken place in a public setting, it cannot be considered
as a private communication.
Moreover, said evidence may likewise not be sup-
pressed on the ground of the right to privacy of the ac-
cused. The constitutional right to privacy is not absolute
and may be waived, as in this case, Where the accused
may be considered as having subjected himself to the
security videotape monitoring policies of the Manila
Hotel when he entered the same as a guest.
12 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

VII
Crack agents of the Manila Police Anti-
Narcotics Unit were on surveillance of a cemetery
where the sale and use of prohibited drugs were
rumored to be rampant. The team saw a man with
reddish and glassy eyes walking unsteadily to-
wards them, but he immediately veered away
upon seeing the policemen. The team approached
the man, introduced themselves as peace officers,
then asked what he had in his clenched fist. Be-
cause the man refused to answer, a policeman
pried the fist open and saw a plastic sachet filled
with crystalline substance. The team then took
the man into custody and submitted the contents
of the sachet to forensic examination. The crystal-
line substance in the sachet turned out to be
shabu. The man was accordingly charged in court.
During the trial, the accused:
a. challenged the validity of his arrest;
(2%) and

b. objected to the admission in evidence

of the prohibited drug, claiming that it was
obtained in an illegal search and seizure.
(2%)
Decide with reasons.
a. The arrest Was unlawful, not falling under any
of the situations covered under Section 5 of Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, which would authorize peace officers
to arrest a person, even without a warrant, to Wit ~
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 13
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(1) when such person has in fact just commit-

ted, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense in his presence
(2) when an offense has in fact just been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has com-
mitted it
(3)when the person to be arrested is a pris-
oner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving nal judgment or tem-
porarily conned while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one conne-
ment to another.

A warrantless arrest of a person just because he

had “reddish and glassy eyes” or that he was “walking
unsteadily towards” the police agents cannot be consid-
ered as lawful, as he cannot, on the basis of those facts
alone, be considered as falling under any of the situa-
tions stated above.
[Acceptable Answer: The warrantless arrest can be upheld con-
sidering that, as stated in the problem, the policemen “were on sur-
veillance of a cemetery where the sale and use of prohibited drugs
were rumored to be rampant” and they saw there the accused,” a
“man with reddish and glassy eyes walking unsteadily towards
them” and who “immediately veered away upon seeing the police-
men.” (Manalili u. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 9,
1997) The fact that he “acted suspiciously and attempted to ee” can
be considered as valid basis for the policemen validly to stop and
frisk him. (Posadas us. Court 0fAppeaZs (G.R. No. 89139, August 2,
1990)]

[Notez The writer acknowledges that the generally accepted

answers to the foregoing questions are based on the case of Manalili
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997), where a
warrantless arrest, and the subsequent warrantless search and
seizure of the evidence, under circumstances “similar” to those speci-
ed in the problem were upheld. Thus —
 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

“Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the police-

men alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a
male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on
drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and
to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person
tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and in-
troduced themselves as police ofcers. The policemen then
asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The
male person tried to resist. Pat Romeo Espiritu asked the male
person if he could see what said male person had in his hands.
The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu
to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and exam-
ined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside.
He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.”
The Court further relied in said case on the following tes-
timony of the arresting officer —

Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?

A We asked him what he was holding in his hands,
sir.
Q And what was the reaction of the person when you
asked him what he was holding in his hands?

A He tried to resist, sir.

Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?

A I requested him if I can see what was he was (sic)

holding in his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your re-
quest?

A He allowed me to examine that something in his

hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was he holding‘?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it,
there was a marijuana (sic) crushed residue.
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 15
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoonsrso ANSWERS

The writer is of the view though that the Manalili case can be
considered as not applicable in view of the statement in the problem
to the effect that, in effecting the subject search upon the accused,
the policeman “pried the st open and saw a plastic sachet lled
with crystalline substance.” This fact specied in the problem differ-
entiates it from the said case.
In Manalili, the accused clearly consented to the search. No
such consent can be gleaned from the subject problem. It is submit-
ted that the “prying open of the fist” of the accused, or the use of
violence upon his person, necessarily invalidates the warrantless
search and seizure.
Moreover, as explained in the writer’s answer (a), the fact that
the accused simply had “reddish and glassy eyes” as he was “walking
unsteadily towards them,” and that “he immediately veered away
upon seeing the policemen” should not be considered as falling under
any of the grounds for a warrantless arrest.]

b. The evidence is inadmissible, having been

forcibly obtained from the accused without a valid war-
rant prior to or before his lawful arrest, the rule being
that there must rst be a lawful arrest before a lawful
warrantless search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. (People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432)
It is submitted that the search and seizure effected
by the policeman cannot be justified as a valid “stop and
frisk” because the accused simply had “reddish and
glassy eyes” while “walking unsteadily towards” him.
The man could have just awakened from a deep sleep
(hence, the “reddish and glassy eyes”) and therefore also
a bit dizzy. Neither can the fact that he “immediately
veered away upon seeing the policemen,” which can be
considered as but a natural reaction of ordinary persons
upon seeing a group of policemen, justify the arrest and
subsequent search and seizure, as they cannot be con-
sidered as creating “a reasonable inference of criminal
activity which would constitute a ‘genuine reason’ to
16 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

conduct a ‘stop and frisk’ search.” (See Comerciante v.

People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015)
Neither could the same have been validly seized on
the basis of the “plain view doctrine,” which requires for
its applicability, among others, that the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent. (Revaldo v. Peo-
ple, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009) It is emphasized
that the evidence obtained and sought to be admitted
against the accused was seized after forcibly opening his
closed palm or prying open his st.

[Acceptable Answer: The evidence is admissible, having been

obtained on the basis of a valid “stop and frisk search.” It must be
noted that the policemen were on a legitimate surveillance operation
in a place “where the sale and use of prohibited drugs were rumored
to be rampant.” The fact that the accused had “reddish and glassy
eyes walking unsteadily towards them” and that “he immediately
veered away upon seeing the” policemen necessarily justied the
latter in conducting the stop and frisk search. (Manalili v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118447, October 9, 1997)]

VIII
Congressman Nonoy delivered a privilege
speech charging the Intercontinental Universal
Bank (IUB) with the sale of unregistered foreign
securities, in violation of R.A. 8799. He then filed,
and the House of Representatives unanimously
approved, a Resolution directing the House
Committee on Good Government (HCGG) to con-
duct an inquiry on the matter, in aid of legisla-
tion, in order to prevent the recurrence of any
similar fraudulent activity.
The HCGG immediately scheduled a hearing
and invited the responsible officials of IUB, the
Chairman and Commissioners of the Securities
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 17
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Gover-

nor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). On
the date set for the hearing, only the SEC Com-
missioners appeared, prompting Congressman
Nonoy to move for the issuance of the appropri-
ate subpoena ad testificandum to compel the at-
tendance of the invited resource persons.
The IUB officials filed suit to prohibit HCGG
from proceeding with the inquiry and to quash
the subpoena, raising the following arguments:
The subject of the legislative investi-
a.
gation is also the subject of criminal and civil
actions pending before the courts and the
prosecutor’s office; thus, the legislative in-
quiry would preempt judicial action; (3%) and
Compelling the IUB officials, who are
b.
also respondents in the criminal and civil
cases in court, to testify at the inquiry would
violate their constitutional right against self-
incrimination. (3%)
Are the foregoing arguments tenable?
Reasons.

a. This contention is untenable.

It is established that the mere ling of a criminal,
civil or administrative action before a court or quasi-
judicial body, as the case may be, should not automati-
cally bar the conduct of a legislative inquiry. (Standard
Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, Finan-
cial Institutions and Currencies, G.R. N0. 167173, De-
cember 17, 2007)
18 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

For the subpoena to be validly quashed, there must

be a showing that no legislation was apparently being
contemplated in connection with said investigation.
(Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA
767)
b. Neither may the right against self-incrimination
be validly invoked by the IUB ofcials for purposes of
quashing the subject subpoena.
The right against self-incrimination, although ex-
tended to respondents in administrative investigations
(including witnesses in legislative inquiries) that par-
take of the nature of or are analogous to criminal pro-
ceedings, may not properly be invoked by the IUB of-
cials since they neither stand as accused in a criminal
case nor will they be subjected by the HCGG to any
penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they can-
not altogether decline from appearing before the HCGG,
although they may invoke this right when a question
calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.
(Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, GR. No.
167173, December 17, 2007, citing Bengzon v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, November 20,
1991, 203 SCRA 767, 784)

c. May the Governor of the BSP validly

invoke executive privilege and, thus, refuse to
attend the legislative inquiry? Why or why
not? (3%)
The Governor of the BSP may not validly invoke
executive privilege and refuse to attend the legislative
inquiry.
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 19
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Only the President may be exempted from the

power of the Congress to conduct legislative inquiries.
The only Way for the Governor of the BSP to exempt
himself therefrom is by a valid claim of executive privi-
lege done or invoked by the President, or under his ex-
press and unequivocal authorization. (Senate v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)

IX
Warlito, a natural-born Filipino, took up per-
manent residence in the United States, and even-
tually acquired American citizenship. He then
married Shirley, an American, and sired three
children. In August 2009, Warlito decided to visit
the Philippines with his wife and children:
Johnny, 23 years of age; Warlito, Jr., 20; and
Luisa, 17.
While in the Philippines, a friend informed
him that he could reacquire Philippine citizen-
ship without necessarily losing U.S. nationality.
Thus, he took the oath of allegiance required un-
der R.A. 9225.
a. Having reacquired Philippine citi-
zenship, is Warlito a natural-born or a natu-
ralized Filipino citizen today? Explain your
answer. (3%)
Warlito is today to be considered a natural-born,
and not just a naturalized, Filipino.

Natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their Fili-

pino citizenship under the provisions of RA 9225 are
restored to their natural-born Status for they “are
% BmQ&A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

deemed not to have lost” their Philippine citizenship

when they avail themselves of the dual citizenship privi-
lege provided for under said law. (Section 2; Re: Applica-
tion for Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente D.
Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA
1, 7-8) Moreover, it is established that a natural born
citizen who is naturalized as an American, shall, upon
repatriation, be considered a natural born citizen again.
(Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
357 SCRA 545)
It may further be pointed out that RA 9225 is a re-
patriation statute which has been described as an “ab-
breviated repatriation process that restores one’s Fili-
pino citizenship,” (Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 692
Phil. 407), and under which “the repatriation of the
former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-
born citizenship.” (Tabasa v. Court ofAppeals, 531 Phil.
407) It is signicant that, in Parreno o. Commission on
Audit (551 Phil. 368), the Supreme Court categorically
ruled that if a natural-born Filipino who had in the
meantime lost his citizenship by reason of his naturali-
zation in another country “reacquires his Filipino citi-
zenship (under RA 9225), he will recover his natural-
born citizenship.” (See Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8,
2016)

b. With Warlito having regained Philip-

pine citizenship, will Shirley also become a
Filipino citizen? If so, why? If not, what
would be the most speedy procedure for
Shirley to acquire Philippine citizenship? Ex-
plain. (3%)
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 21
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

It is submitted that Shirley can be considered also

as a Filipino citizen upon Warlito’s regaining of his Phil-
ippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
As noted earlier, under Section 2 of R.A. No 9225,
natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their Filipino
citizenship thereunder are restored to their natural-
born citizenship status and “are deemed not to have
lost” their Philippine citizenship when they avail them-
selves of the dual citizenship privilege provided for un-
der said law. In other words, the effect of their re-
acquisition of their natural-born Philippine citizenship
can be said to retroact to the date of their loss of the
same with their naturalization in another country. (See
David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015)
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
In Moya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration
(GR. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971), this provision was
interpreted to mean that an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto
a Filipina provided she is not disqualied to be a citizen
of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided she does not suffer
from any of the disqualications under said Section 4.
Therefore, in view of the fact that Warlito, because
of the retroactive effect of his re-acquisition of his Phil-
ippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225
in or after 2009, can be considered as a Filipino at the
22 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

time that he married Shirley, the latter can also be con-

sidered as a Filipino citizen, following the ruling in
Moya Lim Yao.
This would be true even if Warlito’s re-acquisition
of his natural-born Philippine citizenship were to be
given only prospective effect, or would be effective only
after he takes his citizenship oath under RA 9225 in
2009, because the rule, as prescribed in said Section 15
of CA 473 and affirmed in Moya Lima Yao, is that an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of
her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
citizen, provided she does not suffer from any of the
disqualications under said Section 4.
Accordingly, consistent with the pronouncements of
the Supreme Court in the Moya Lim Yao case, the pro-
cedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of
Filipino citizenship upon her would be for the alien
woman to le a petition for the cancellation of her alien
certicate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is
not disqualied from acquiring her husband’s citizen-
ship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. Upon the ling of said petition, which
should be accompanied or supported by the joint affida-
vit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the
groups disqualied by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates
its order or decision granting or denying the petition.
[Note: The foregoing answer is essentially based on the pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court in the case of David v. Agbay,
which was decided more than four years after this question was
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 23
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoossrso ANSWERS

asked in the 2009 Political Law Bar Examination. Thus, it was

claried in said case that —
In ne, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country,
they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a
foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship
may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing
away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also
provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine
citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite
having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of
allegiance under the new law. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113,
March 18, 2015)]
[Acceptable Answer: No, Shirley will not also become a Filipino
citizen upon Warlito’s re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Under Section 4 of said law, derivative
citizenship shall be extended only to the unmarried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age,
of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship thereunder.]

c. Do the children — Johnny, Warlito

Jr., and Luisa — become Filipino citizens
with their father’s reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship? Explain your answer. (3%)
Under Section 4 of RA 9225, derivative citizenship
shall be extended only to the unmarried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18)
years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizen-
ship thereunder.
Therefore, only Luisa, Warlit0’s minor child who is
seventeen years old, or was a minor at the time of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, assuming she is
unmarried or single, shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
24 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Johnny, who is 23 years old, and Warlito, Jr., who

is 20 years old, are not covered by said provision.

Maximino, an employee of the Department of

Education, is administratively charged with dis-
honesty and gross misconduct. During the formal
investigation of the charges, the Secretary of
Education preventively suspended him for a pe-
riod of sixty (60) days. On the 60th day of the pre-
ventive suspension, the Secretary rendered a ver-
dict, finding Maximino guilty, and ordered his
immediate dismissal from the service.
Maximino appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), which affirmed the Secre-
tary’s decision. Maximino then elevated the mat-
ter to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed
the CSC decision, exonerating Maximino. The
Secretary of Education then petitions the Su-
preme Court (SC) for the review of the CA deci-
sion.

a. Is the Secretary of Education a

proper party to seek the review of the CA de-
cision exonerating Maximino? Reasons. (2%)
N0, the Secretary of Education cannot be consid-
ered as a proper party to seek the review of the Court of
Appeals decision exonerating Maximino.
This would be consistent with the rule to the effect
that the government party that can appeal is not the
disciplining authority or tribunal which previously
heard the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 25
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

from the service. The government party appealing must

be one that is prosecuting the administrative case
against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situa-
tion will result where the disciplining authority or tri-
bunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and
detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting
the respondent. (Mathay, Jr. v. Court ofAppeals, 378
Phil. 466 [1999]; The National Appellate Board of the
National Police Commission, G.R. No. 153624, October
24, 2008; Office of the Ombudsman v. Liggayu, G.R. No.
174297, June 20, 2012)

b. If the SC affirms the CA decision, is

Maximino entitled to recover back salaries
corresponding to the entire period he was out
of the service? Explain your answer. (3%)
No, Maximino is not entitled to recover back sala-
ries corresponding to the entire period that he was out
of service. Specically, he is not entitled to recover his
salaries for the period during which he was under pre-
ventive suspension (pending investigation) for sixty
days. (Gloria v. Court 0fAppeals, 306 SCRA 287)
He is however entitled to back salaries correspond-
ing to the period of his preventive suspension pending
appeal, i.e., from the implementation of the order of
dismissal by the Secretary of Education until his exon-
eration by the Supreme Court, considering that the con-
ditions for his entitlement to said back salaries would
have been met, to wit: a) the employee must be found
innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be
unjustified. (Bangalisan v. CA, 342 Phil. 586 [1997],
cited in Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No.
187858, August 9, 2011)
26 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

An employee of the civil service who is ordered re-

instated is also entitled to the full payment of his or her
backwages during the entire period of time that he or
she was wrongfully prevented from performing the du-
ties of his or her position and from enjoying its benets.
(Campol v. Balao, G.R. No. 197634, November 28, 2016)
Indeed, he should be paid his back salaries and
other benets for the entire time that he should have
been automatically reinstated at the rate owing to his
position that he last received prior to his preventive
suspension. (Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
188681, March 8, 2017)

[Note: “An employee who is exonerated is not entitled to the

payment of his salaries because his suspension, being authorized by
law, cannot be unjustified. To be entitled to such compensation, the
employee must not only be found innocent of the charges but his
suspension must likewise be unjustified. But though an employee is
considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of his
appeal in the event he Wins, his suspension is unjustified because
what the law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not
exceeding 90 days. Beyond that period the suspension is illegal.
Hence, the employee concerned is entitled to reinstatement with full
pay.” (Miranda u. Commission on Audit, 200 SCRA 657 [1991], at
662 [l991], citing Gabriel v. Domingo, 189 SCRA 672 [1990]; Rubio
v. PHHC, 185 SCRA 656 [1990]; Gementiza v. Court ofAppeals, 113
SCRA 477 [1982]; Balquiedra v. CFI of Capiz, 80 SCRA 123 [1977];
Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175 [1977], cited in Gloria v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999, 306 SCRA 287; see also
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v.
Manalang-Demigilio, G.R. No. 176343, September 18, 2012)]
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 27
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

PART II

XI
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the state-
ment is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sen-
tences. (5%)

a. Aliens are absolutely prohibited from

owning private lands in the Philippines.
FALSE.
Under Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution,
aliens may acquire private lands by hereditary succes-
sion.
Moreover, Under Section 8, also of Article XII, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

b. Ade facto public officer is, by right,

entitled to receive the salaries and emolu-
ments attached to the public office he holds.
FALSE.
As a general rule, the de facto officer is not entitled
as a matter of right to a salary and other compensation
for services rendered by him as such. He may, however,
collect said salaries as such if he assumes his office in
good faith (Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil. 724; Menzon v.
Petilla, 197 SCRA 251) and there is no de jure officer
claiming title to the office. (Patterson v. Benson, 112
Pac. 32)
28 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND Posuc INTERNATIONAL LAW

c. The President exercises the power of

control over all executive departments and
agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
TRUE .

Under Section 17 of Article VII of the Constitution,

the President shall have control of all the executive de-
partments, bureaus, and ofces.

d. Decisions of the Ombudsman impos-

ing penalties in administrative disciplinary
cases are merely recommendatory.

FALSE.
The Ombudsman’s decisions imposing penalties for
disciplinary action are not merely recommendatory but
are actually mandatory. (Oice of the Ombudsman v.
Court of Appeals and Armilla,, G.R. No. 160675, June
16, 2006; Estarija v. Ranada, G.R. No. 159314, June 26,
2006, 492 SCRA 652; Office of the Ombudsman v.
Santiago, G.R. No. 161098, September 13, 2007; Repub-
lic of the Philippines v. Bajao, G.R. No. 160596, March 20,
2009)

e. Dual citizenship is not the same as

dual allegiance.
TRUE.
Dual citizenship can be considered as different from
dual allegiance. VVhile dual citizenship may be involun-
tary, as in the case of a person born of parents Whose
country follows the jus sanguinis principle in a country
which adopts the jus soli principle, dual allegiance is
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 29
BAR QUESTIONS AND Soccssrsn ANSWERS

generally considered to be the result of an individual’s

volition. (Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630; AASJS
[Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School
Teachers and Allied Workers] v. Datumanong, G.R. No.
160869, May 11, 2007)

XII
William, a private American citizen, a univer-
sity graduate and frequent visitor to the Philip-
pines, was inside the U.S. embassy when he got
into a heated argument with a private Filipino
citizen. Then, in front of many shocked witnesses,
he killed the person he was arguing with. The
police came, and brought him to the nearest po-
lice station. Upon reaching the station, the police
investigator, in halting English, informed William
of his Miranda rights, and assigned him an inde-
pendent local counsel. William refused the ser-
vices of the lawyer, and insisted that he be as-
sisted by a Filipino lawyer currently based in the
U.S. The request was denied, and the counsel as-
signed by the police stayed for the duration of the
investigation.
William protested his arrest.
a. He argued that since the incident
took place inside the U.S. embassy, Philippine
courts have no jurisdiction because the U.S.
embassy grounds are not part of Philippine
territory; thus, technically, no crime under
Philippine law was committed. Is William cor-
rect? Explain your answer. (3%)
Williams is not correct.
30 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

It is established that Philippine courts have juris-

diction over acts done even within said U.S. embassy
grounds because the “ground occupied by an embassy is
not in fact the territory of the foreign State to which the
premises belong through possession or ownership. The
lawfulness or unlawfulness of acts there committed is
determined by the territorial sovereign.” (2 Hyde, Inter-
national Law Chiey as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States, pp. 1285-1286 (1947), cited in Reagan v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-26379,
December 27, 1969)

b.He also claimed that his Miranda

rights were violated because he was not given
the lawyer of his choice; that being an Ameri-
can, he should have been informed of his
rights in proper English; and that he should
have been informed of his rights as soon as he
was taken into custody, not when he was al-
ready at the police station. Was William de-
nied his Miranda rights? Why or why not?
(3%)

No, William cannot claim that his “Miranda rights”

were violated.
The rule is that a person under investigation for an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice, prior to any ques-
tioning (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), and
not necessarily upon his arrest.
Moreover, even if he was informed of his rights in
“halting” English, the essential thing is that he under-
stood the same, as evidenced by his rather unreasonable
request to be assisted by his Filipino lawyer then based
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

in the U.S. Said request, Which was patently impracti-

cable, Was correctly addressed by the police who instead
assigned a lawyer to assist him for the duration of the
investigation.

c. If William
applies for bail, claiming
that he is entitled thereto under the “interna-
tional standard of justice” and that he comes
from a U.S. State that has outlawed capital
punishment, should William be granted bail
as a matter of right? Reasons. (3%)

No, he is not entitled to bail as a matter of right.

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution provides
that all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable. Therefore,
assuming that his offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and the evidence of his guilt is strong, his peti-
tion for bail may be properly denied.
His reliance on the “international standard of jus-
tice” in support of his petition for bail cannot take
precedence over our municipal rules on the matter, for it
is settled that, in case of a conict between a principle of
international law and a municipal requirement, the
latter should be made to prevail. (lchong v. Hernandez,
101 Phil. 1155)
Indeed, there is no showing that our constitutional
rule on entitlement to bail as a matter of right is in con-
ict or not compliant with the “international standard of
justice” invoked or claimed by William.
32 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

XIII
A terrorist group called the Emerald Brigade
is based in the State of Asyaland. The government
of Asyaland does not support the terrorist group,
but being a poor country, is powerless to stop it.
The Emerald Brigade launched an attack on
the Philippines, firing two missiles that killed
thousands of Filipinos. It then warned that more
attacks were forthcoming. Through diplomatic
channels, the Philippines demanded that Asya-
land stop the Emerald Brigade; otherwise, it will
do whatever is necessary to defend itself.
Receiving reliable intelligence reports of an-
other imminent attack by the Emerald Brigade,
and it appearing that Asyaland was incapable of
preventing the assault, the Philippines sent a
crack commando team to Asyaland. The team
stayed only for a few hours in Asyaland, suc-
ceeded in killing the leaders and most of the
members of the Emerald Brigade, then immedi-
ately returned to the Philippines.
a. Was the Philippine action justified
under the international law principle of “self-
defense”? Explain your answer. (3%)
Yes, the Philippines’ limited action against the pri-
vate terrorist group located in Asyaland can be consid-
ered as justified under the international law principle of
“self-defense.”
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations ac-
knowledges the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense. The presence of an “armed attack” to jus-
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 33
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

tify the exercise of the right of self-defense under this

article suggests that forcible measures may be taken by
a state only in the face of “a necessity of self-defense
instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means
and no moment for deliberation.” (Caroline, 1 VVhart,
Sec. 50, cited in Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020
Edition, page 138)
It is submitted that these conditions were present
in the situation presented.
[Acceptable Answer: No, the Philippines’ limited action against
the private terrorist group located in Asyaland cannot be considered
as justied under the international law principle of “self-defense.”
Mere apprehended danger or any direct threat to the state does not,
by itself alone, warrant the employment by that state of any force
against a suspected or potential enemy. (Caroline, 1 Whart, Sec. 50,
cited in Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020 Edition, page 138)]

b. As a consequence of the foregoing in-

cident, Asyaland charges the Philippines with
violation of Article 2.4 of the United Nations
Charter that prohibits “the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or po-
litical independence of any State.” The Phil-
ippines counters that its commando team nei-
ther took any territory nor interfered in the
political processes of Asyaland. Which con-
tention is correct? Reasons. (3%)
Asyaland’s claini that the Philippines violated Arti-
cle 2.4 of the United Nations Charter is Without merit.
The limited self-defense measure or action taken by
the Philippines against the Emerald Brigade Was, as
stressed earlier, clearly undertaken only against the
forces of this private terrorist group, and did not result
in any real prejudice to Asyaland. It bears emphasis
34 BAR Q & A
PoLITIcAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

that the Philippines undertook said measures only after

it rst invoked “diplomatic channels” to demand that
“Asyaland stop the Emerald Brigade; otherwise, it will
do whatever is necessary to defend itself.”
The Philippines’ retaliatory measure, pursued by it
strictly as a measure of self-defense, cannot or should
not be considered as a “threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence” of Asya-
land. Indeed, said retaliatory act is sanctioned under
the aforecited Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
which, it is submitted, is a special provision in the Char-
ter which should take precedence as against the general
pronouncement in said Article 2.4.

[Acceptable Answer: The Philippines’ action taken against the

Emerald Group can be considered as violative of the provisions of
Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter because of what may be
considered as unwarranted intrusion into the territory of Asyaland,
thereby undermining its territorial integrity and political independ-
ence. At the very least, the Philippines ought to have sought the
cooperation and consent of Asyaland before it undertook the subject
self-defense measures.]

c.Assume that the commando team

captured a member of the Emerald Brigade
and brought him back to the Philippines. The
Philippine Government insists that a special
international tribunal should try the terror-
ist. On the other hand, the terrorist argues
that terrorism is not an international crime
and, therefore, the municipal laws of the Phil-
ippines, which recognize access of the ac-
cused to constitutional rights, should apply.
Decide with reasons. (3%)
The member of the Emerald Brigade should be sub-
jected to the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines.
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 35
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Although “terrorism” has largely been acknowl-

edged as an international crime, the commission thereof
can still be cognizable by the courts of the country
where they are considered to have been committed, fol-
lowing the international law principles on criminal ju-
risdiction, to Wit, objective territorial jurisdiction, Where
the state assumes jurisdiction over an offense, which
produces, as in this case, results in its state, although
initiated in another state; or the passive personality
principle, where jurisdiction over the offense is vested in
the state of the offended party, in this case, the Philip-
pines; or even on the basis of the universality principle,
where criminal jurisdiction is vested in the state which
has custody of the offender, as in this case.

XIV
The Philippine Government is negotiating a
new security treaty with the United States which
could involve engagement in joint military opera-
tions of the two countries’ armed forces. A loose
organization of Filipinos, the Kabataan at Mata-
tandang Makabansa (KlVIlVI) wrote the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Depart-
ment of National Defense (DND) demanding dis-
closure of the details of the negotiations, as well
as copies of the minutes of the meetings. The DFA
and the DND refused, contending that premature
disclosure of the offers and counter-offers be-
tween the parties could jeopardize on-going nego-
tiations with another country. KMM filed suit to
compel disclosure of the negotiation details, and
be granted access to the records of the meetings,
invoking the constitutional right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
36 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

a. Decide with reasons. (3%)

The suit should be dismissed.

Details relevant to pending treaty negotiations are
generally considered privileged and may validly not be
disclosed. The Supreme Court has invariably ruled that
secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not vio-
lative of the constitutional provisions on freedom of
speech or of the press or of the right of access to infor-
mation. (Pe0ple’s Movement for Press Freedom v.
Manglapus, G.R. No. 84642, Resolution of the Court En
Bane dated September 13, 1988, cited in AKBAYAN v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008)

b. Will your answer be the same if the

information sought by KMM pertains to con-
tracts entered into by the Government in its
proprietary or commercial capacity? Why or
why not? (3%)
No.
It is submitted that contracts entered into by the
Government in its proprietary or commercial capacity
should be considered as transactions involving public
interest which are, under Section 28 of Article II of the
Constitution, subject to the policy of full public disclo-
sure, subject only to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law. (Serene u. Committee on Trade and Related Matters
ofthe NEDA, G.R. No. 175210, February 1, 2016)
[Acceptable Answer: Yes, provided it can be shown that infor-
mation sought to be disclosed with respect to the contracts entered
into, or which are sought to be executed, are in connection with
treaties or executive agreements being negotiated or concluded with
a foreign country. But only the details relevant to their negotiation
may be considered as privileged, involving as they do our country’s
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 37
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

diplomatic and economic relations With that other state, and may
lawfully not be disclosed. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountabil-
ity, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008)]

XV

The KKK Television Network (KKK-TV) aired

the documentary, “Case Law: How the Supreme
Court Decides,” without obtaining the necessary
permit required by P.D. 1986. Consequently, the
Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB) suspended the airing of KKK-TV
programs. MTRCB declared that under P.D. 1986,
it has the power of prior review over all television
programs, except “newsreels” and programs “by
the Government”, and the subject documentary
does not fall under either of these two classes. The
suspension order was ostensibly based on Memo-
randum Circular No. 98-17 which grants MTRCB
the authority to issue such an order.
KKK-TV filed a certiorari petition in court,
raising the following issues:
a. The act of MTRCB constitutes “prior
restraint” and violates the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression; (3%) and
b. While Memorandum Circular No. 98-
17 was issued and published in a newspaper
of general circulation, a copy thereof was
never filed with the Office of the National
Register of the University of the Philippines
Law Center. (2%)
Resolve the foregoing issues, with rea-
sons.
38 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

a. The act of the MTRCB constitutes “prior re-

straint” and its order suspending the airing of KKK-TV
programs can be considered as “subsequent punish-
ment.” Both are therefore violative of freedom of expres-
sion. Any system of prior restraint has against it a
heavy presumption against its validity. (New York
Times v. US, 403 US 713)
There is no showing that the airing of the subject
documentary would create a clear and present danger
which may warrant the exercise by the MTRCB of its
“power of prior review,” which, concededly can be ac-
knowledged as a valid exercise of the police power. (IgZe-
sia ni Cristo v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 119673, July
26, 1996)
b. Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 is unenforce-
able considering that it was never registered with the
Ofce of the National Register of the University of the
Philippines Law Center, as required under Sections 3[1]
and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code
of 1987. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. v. Torres, 212 SCRA 298)

XVI
a. Angelina, a married woman, is a Division
Chief in the Department of Science and Technol-
ogy. She had been living with a married man, not
her husband, for the last fifteen (15) years. Admin-
istratively charged with immorality and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, she
admits her live-in arrangement, but maintains
that this conjugal understanding is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. As members of the
religious sect, Yahweh’s Observers, they had exe-
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 39
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoossnan ANSWERS

cuted a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness

which has been confirmed and blessed by their
Council of Elders. At the formal investigation of
the administrative case, the Grand Elder of the
sect affirmed Angelina’s testimony and attested to
the sincerity of Angelina and her partner in the
profession of their faith. If you were to judge this
case, will you exonerate Angelina? Reasons. (3%)

I will exonerate Angelina.

It has been ascertained, after appropriate proceed-
ings and on the basis of adequate evidence, that Ange-
lina’s claimed religious belief is sincere and that her
live-in arrangement is in conformity with her and her
live-in partner’s religious beliefs. Accordingly, absent
any evidence on the state’s “compelling interest” to
override respondent’s religious belief and practice, to
convict her would result in a violation of her religious
freedom. Indeed, the state is duty-bound to pursue or
adopt only such means in pursuing its interests as
would be the least restrictive to religious freedom.
(Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1)

b. Meanwhile, Jenny, also a member of

Yahweh’s Observers, was severely disappointed at
the manner the Grand Elder validated what she
considered was an obviously immoral conjugal
arrangement between Angelina and her partner.
Jenny filed suit in court, seeking the removal of
the Grand Elder from the religious sect on the
ground that his act in supporting Angelina not
only ruined the reputation of their religion, but
also violated the constitutional policy upholding
the sanctity of marriage and the solidarity of the
40 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

family. Will Jenny’s case prosper? Explain your

answer. (2%)

No. The separation of church and state shall be in-

violable. (Constitution, Article II, Section 6)
Accordingly, intramural disputes regarding reli-
gious dogma and other matters of faith are outside the
jurisdiction of secular authorities. (Cruz and Cruz, Con-
stitutional Law, 2015 Edition, page 443) It is only where
said intramural disputes somehow involve property or
civil rights that courts may intervene, but only to the
extent of such property or civil issues. Courts may not
take cognizance of purely ecclesiastical matters. (F0na-
cier v. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 417; Gonzales v.
Archbishop of Manila, 51 Phil. 420)

XVII
Filipinas Computer Corporation (FCC), a lo-
cal manufacturer of computers and computer
parts, owns a sprawling plant in a 5,000-square
meter lot in Pasig City. To remedy the city’s acute
housing shortage, compounded by a burgeoning
population, the Sangguniang Panglungsod au-
thorized the City Mayor to negotiate for the pur-
chase of the lot. The Sanggunian intends to sub-
divide the property into small residential lots to
be distributed at cost to qualified city residents.
But FCC refused to sell the lot. Hard pressed to
find a suitable property to house its homeless
residents, the City filed a complaint for eminent
domain against FCC.
a. If FCC hires you as lawyer, what de-
fense or defenses would you set up in order to
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 41
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

resist the expropriation of the property? Ex-

plain. (5%)
As counsel for FCC, I can claim that there is no ne-
cessity for the expropriation and that the same cannot
be considered as being for a public purpose.

The taking of the property would clearly result in a

closure of the manufacturing plant and the consequent
loss of employment for FCC’s employees, which cannot
be justied. These adverse effects can be invoked to
reject the claimed public purpose underscoring the ac-
quisition of the subject land for later subdivision and
sale, though at cost, only to a few members of the City’s
population.
It is signicant that the expropriation sought to be
done by the City appears to be based on its general
grant of authority to expropriate under the provisions of
the Local Government Code, or not on the basis of a
specic grant of legislative authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain with respect to the subject
land. Accordingly, the matter of it being for a public
purpose can be subject to judicial review, being a justi-
ciable question. (City of Manila v. Chinese Community
of Manila, C-.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919, 40 Phil.
349)

b. If the
Court grants the City’s prayer
for expropriation, but the City delays pay-
ment of the amount determined by the court
as just compensation, can FCC recover the
property from Pasig City? Explain. (2%)
All that FCC may do would be to insist on the
No.
payment of just compensation. It may not demand the
return of the property. (Forfom Development Corpora-
42 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

tion v. Philippine National Railways, G.R. No. 124795,

December 10, 2008; see De Ynchausti u. Manila Electric
Railroad & Light Co., 36 Phil. 908, 911-912 [1917l; De-
partment of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses
Heracleo and Ramona Tecson, GR. No. 179334, July 1,
2013, 700 SCRA 243)

c. Suppose the expropriation succeeds,

but the City decides to abandon its plan to
subdivide the property for residential pur-
poses having found a much bigger lot, can
FCC legally demand that it be allowed to re-
purchase the property from the City of Pasig?
Why or why not? (2%)

Yes, since the “public purpose” or the reason for the

expropriation or taking no longer exists, the City is
bound to reconvey the property back to FCC, on condi-
tion that FCC return to the City whatever it may have
received as and by way of just compensation. (Mactan
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Tudtud, G.R.
No. 174012, November 14, 2008; Mactan-Cebu Interna-
tional Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., G.R. No. 176625,
February 25, 2010)

XVIII
What are the essential elements of a valid pe-
tition fora people’s initiative to amend the 1987
Constitution? Discuss. (2%)
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution pro-
vides that amendments to the Constitution may be di-
rectly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total num-
 2009 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 43
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

ber of registered voters, of which every legislative dis-

trict must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein.
It is further provided under Section 4, paragraph 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution that any amendment
under Section 2 of Article XVII shall be valid when rati-
ed by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the certication by the Commission on
Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has declared that, for
there to be a valid initiative under the foregoing consti-
tutional provisions, two essential elements must be pre-
sent — first, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf, and, second, as an initiative upon a peti-
tion, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. The
full text of the proposed amendments may be either
written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of such at-
tachment. (Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153,
October 25, 2006)
44 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

2010
PART I
I
The dictatorial regime of President A of the
Republic of Gordon was toppled by a combined
force led by Gen. Abe, former royal guards and
the secessionist Gordon People’s Army. The new
government constituted a Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission to look into the serious crimes
committed under President A’s regime. After the
hearings, the Commission recommended that an
amnesty law be passed to cover even those in-
volved in mass killings of members of indigenous
groups who opposed President A. International
human rights groups argued that the proposed
amnesty law is contrary to international law. De-
cide with reasons. (4%)
The proposed amnesty can be considered as con-
trary to international law.
The mass killings of members of indigenous groups
constitutes genocide, which is universally and customar-
ily recognized as a crime, and as acknowledged and
dened in several international covenants, among them
being the Convention for the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide and the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court.
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 45
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

II
Compare and contrast the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court and International
Court of Justice. (3%)
The International Criminal Court is a permanent
tribunal which prosecutes individuals for genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression. (Article 5, Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court)
The International Court of Justice is the judicial
organ of the United Nations which shall exercise juris-
diction over all cases which the parties refer to it and all
matters specially provided for in the Chapter of the
United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force,
including all legal disputes concerning the interpreta-
tion of a treaty, any question of international law, the
existence of any fact which, if established, would consti-
tute a breach of an international obligation, and the
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation. (UN Charter, Ar-
ticle 36) It may likewise give advisory opinions on any
legal question at the request of Whatever body may be
authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations. (Ibid., Article 65)

III
A, a British photojournalist, was covering the
violent protests of the Thai Red-Shirts Movement
in Bangkok. Despite warnings given by the Thai
Prime Minister to foreigners, specially journal-
ists, A moved around the Thai capital. In the
course of his coverage, he was killed with a stray
46 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

bullet which was later identified as having come

from the ranks of the Red-Shirts. The wife of A
sought relief from Thai authorities but was re-
fused assistance.

a. Is there state responsibility on the

part of Thailand? (2%)

The Thai Government is liable.

Under the Doctrine of State Responsibility, a state
may be held responsible for an international delin-
quency directly or indirectly imputable to it which
causes injury to the national of another state. It may be
held liable if it does not make reasonable efforts to pre-
vent injury to the alien or, having done so unsuccess-
fully, as in this case, fails to repair such injury by em-
ploying the necessary diligence to arrest and punish the
malefactors or otherwise redress the wrong committed.
(See Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020 Edition,
page 358.)
Although A’s death is not directly imputable to the
Thai Government, its “refusal” to assist his wife when
she “sought relief” for her husband’s death constitutes a
failure to employ the necessary diligence to arrest and
punish the malefactors or otherwise redress the wrong
committed. It is established that a state can be held
liable for its indifference in preventing or punishing a
crime. In such a case, it can be considered as having
connived in effect in its commission. This would be true
notwithstanding A’s contributory negligence.

b. What is the appropriate remedy

available to the victim’s family under interna-
tional law? (3%)
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 47
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

The victim’s family may resort to diplomatic protec-

tion and seek the assistance of Great Britain, which
may le an international claim for damages, but only
after the family shall rst have exhausted all local
remedies Without success. (See Cruz and Cruz, Interna-
tional Law, 2020 Edition, page 359.)
This claim may also be resolved through negotia-
tion or, if this fails, any of the other methods of settling
disputes, like good ofces, arbitration and judicial set-
tlement. (See Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020
Edition, Chapter 17.)

IV

Choose the statement which appropriately

completes the opening phrase:
“A State which resorts to retorsion in interna-
tional law
a. must ensure that all states consent to
its act.”
b. cannot curtail migration from the of-
fending state.”
c. can expel the nationals of the offend-
ing state.”
d. should apply proportionate response
within appreciable limit.”
e. None of the above.
Explain your answer. (2%)
48 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Retorsion, as understood in International Law, is a

retaliation by a state Where the acts complained of do
not constitute a legal ground of offense but is rather in
the nature of an unfriendly act done primarily in pursu-
ance of legitimate state interests but indirectly hurtful
to other states. (Fenwick, 532) This act of retaliation is
also unfriendly but not illegal and may be in kind or of a
different nature than the act that provoked it. (See Cruz
and Cruz, International Law, 2020 Edition, page 384.)
Itis generally acknowledged as a measure of self-
defense and therefore should be limited by necessity and
should be proportionate to the act complained of. (Op-
penheim’s International Law, 9”‘ Edition, Volume I,
page 420)

V
Congresswoman A is a co-owner of an indus-
trial estate in Sta. Rosa, Laguna which she had
declared in her Statement of Assets and Liabili-
ties. A member of her political party authored a
bill which would provide a 5-year development
plan for all industrial estates in the Southern
Tagalog Region to attract investors. The plan in-
cluded an appropriation of 2 billion pesos for con-
struction of roads around the estates. When the
bill finally became law, a civil society watchdog
questioned the constitutionality of the law as it
obviously benefitted Congresswoman A’s indus-
trial estate. Decide with reasons. (3%)
The constitutional challenge is without merit.
Congresswoman A, consistent with the provisions
of Section 12 of Article VI of the Constitution, duly dis-
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 49
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

closed in her Statement of Assets and Liabilities her co-

ownership of the subject industrial estate upon her as-
sumption into ofce. She did not author the questioned
law and was therefore not obliged to notify the House of
Representatives of the potential conict of interest aris-
ing from her co-ownership of the same.

VI
The “Poverty Alleviation and Assistance Act”
was passed to enhance the capacity of the most
marginalized families nationwide. A financial as-
sistance scheme called “conditional cash trans-
fers” was initially funded 500 million pesos by
Congress. One of the provisions of the law gave
the Joint-Congressional Oversight Committee
authority to screen the list of beneficiary families
initially determined by the Secretary of Depart-
ment of Social Welfare and Development pursuant
to the Department implementing rules. Mang
Pandoy, a resident of Smokey Mountain in Tondo,
questioned the authority of the Committee.
a. Does Mang Pandoy have legal stand-
ing to question the law? (2%)
b. Is the grant of authority to the Over-
sight Committee to screen beneficiaries con-
stitutional? (3%)
Decide with reasons.
a. Yes, Mang Pandoy has legal standing to ques-
tion the law, as he is among those who may be directly
beneted by the same, and may, in turn, suffer a direct
50 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

injury in case of its defective or decient implementa-

tion.
b.No, such grant would partake of the nature of
a legislative veto, and would therefore be unconstitu-
tional, as it would entitle Congress to pre-empt the ex-
ecutive department’s implementation of a law.
Moreover, the requirement that the implementa-
tion of a law would be subjected to approval by Con-
gress, through its Joint-Congressional Oversight Com-
mittee, which is, as in this case, authorized “to screen
the list of beneciary families initially determined by
the Secretary of Department of Social Welfare and De-
velopment pursuant to the Department implementing
rules,” would violate the cardinal constitutional princi-
ples of bicameralism and the rule on presentment.
(Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10,
2003; Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No.
166715, August 14, 2008)

VII
True or False.
a. A proclamation of a state of emer-
gency is sufficient to allow the President to
take over any public utility. (0.5%)
False.

[Note: Article XII, Section 17 of the Constitution is not a self-

executing provision. There must be a law authorizing the President
to take over any public utility. (David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396,
May 3, 2006)]
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 51
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

b. A treaty which provides tax exemp-

tion needs no concurrence by a majority of all
the Members of the Congress. (0.5%)
False.

[Notez This rule does not imply, though, that the President is
given carte blanche to exercise this discretion. Although the Chief
Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign rela-
tions, this power must still be exercised within the context and the
parameters set by the Constitution, as Well as by existing domestic
and international laws. There are constitutional provisions that
restrict or limit the President’s prerogative in concluding interna-
tional agreements, such as those that involve the following: a. The
policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within Philippine territory.
b. The xing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, which must be pursuant
to the authority granted by Congress. c. The grant of any tax
exemption, which must be pursuant to a law concurred in by
a majority of all the Members of Congress. d. The contracting or
guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines, of foreign loans that must
be previously concurred in by the Monetary Board. e. The authoriza-
tion of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in
the country must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate. f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the
concurrence of the Senate is required, should the form of the gov-
ernment chosen be a treaty. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 212426, January 12, 2016)]

VIII
Distinguish “presidential communications
privilege” from “deliberative process privilege.”
(3%)

The Presidential Communications Privilege applies

to the decision-making prerogative of the President. Its
elements are —
52 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

a. The protected communication must relate

to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.”
b. The communication must be authored or
“solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test
is that an advisor must be in “operational prox-
imity” with the President.
c.The presidential communications privi-
lege remains a qualied privilege that may be over-
come by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evi-
dence” and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating author-
ity.

On the other hand, the Deliberative Process Privi-

lege applies to decision-making prerogative of executive
ofcials and is based on common law privilege.
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presi-
dential communications privilege applies to documents
in their entirety, and covers nal and post-decisional
materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As a conse-
quence, congressional or judicial negation of the presi-
dential communications privilege is always subject to
greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process
privilege. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
0/‘Public Officers, G.R. N0. 180643, March 25, 2008)

IX
The League of Filipino Political Scientists
(LFPS) organized an international conference on
the human rights situation in Myanmar at the
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 53
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Central Luzon State University (CLSU). An exiled

Myanmar professor Sung Kui, critical of the mili-
tary government in Myanmar, was invited as key-
note speaker. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
informed the President of the regional and na-
tional security implications of having Prof. Kui
address the conference. The President thereupon
instructed the immigration authorities to prevent
the entry of Prof. Kui into Philippine territory.
The chancellor of CLSU argued that the instruc-
tion violates the Constitution. Decide with rea-
sons. (4%)

The instruction of the President is not unconstitu-

tional.
Every sovereign power has the inherent right to ex-
clude from its territory upon such grounds as it may
deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest.
(Lao Tan Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 [1948], cited in
Harvey v. Santiago, 162 SCRA 840; Rosas v. Montor,
G.R. No. 204105, October 14, 2015)
The Philippine Government’s national security con-
cerns justify said instruction. States may regulate the
entry, immigration and stay of aliens and to provide for
their deportation whenever warranted. (See Cruz and
Cruz, International Law, 2020 Edition, pages 364-365.)

A, the wife of an alleged victim of enforced

disappearance, applied for the issuance of a Writ
of Amparo before a Regional Trial Court in Tar-
lac. Upon motion of A, the court issued inspection
and production orders addressed to the AFP
54 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Chief of Staff to allow entry at Camp Aquino and

permit the copying of relevant documents, includ-
ing the list of detainees, if any. Accompanied by
court-designated Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) lawyers, A took photographs of a suspected
isolation cell where her husband was allegedly
seen being held for three days and tortured be-
fore he finally disappeared. The CHR lawyers re-
quested one Lt. Valdez for a photocopy of the
master plan of Camp Aquino and to confirm in
writing that he had custody of the master plan. Lt.
Valdez objected on the ground that it may violate
his right against self-incrimination. Decide with
reasons. (4%)

The requests for a photocopy of the master plan of

Camp Aquino and for Lt. Valdez’s conrmation in writ-
ing that he had custody of the master plan would not be
violative of the latter’s right against self-incrimination.
The kernel of the right is against not all compulsion
but testimonial compulsion only. (4 Wigmore, Sec. 2263;
People v. Malimit, G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996;
see Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Eliza B.
Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017)
While the prohibition generally applies to the com-
pulsion for the production of documents, papers and
chattels that may be used as evidence against persons,
it may not be properly invoked in cases where the State
has a right to inspect the same, such as the books of
accounts of corporations, under the police power. (See 4
Wigmore, Sec. 2264)
The subject requests were merely consistent with
the production orders made in connection with the ap-
plication for the issuance of a Writ of amparo. Moreover,
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 55
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

said requests pertained to public records. Accordingly,

Lt. Valdez may not validly invoke his right against self-
incrimination if said master plan were truly under his
custody. (See Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,
G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008)

XI
Which statement best completes the following
phrase: (1%)
“Freedom from torture is a right
a. subject to derogation when national
security is threatened.”
b. confined only during custodial inves-
tigation.”
c. which is non-derogable both during
peacetime and in a situation of armed con-
ict.”
d. both (a) and (b)
e. none of the above.

[Notez Under Article 2, Section 2 of the Convention Against

Torture and Other Criminal, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, torture may not be justied under any exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency]

XII
A witnessed two hooded men with baseball
bats enter the house of their next door neighbor
56 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND Pusuc INTERNATIONAL LAW

B. After a few seconds, he heard B shouting, “Hu-

wag Pilo babayaran kita agad.” Then A saw the
two hooded men hitting B until the latter fell life-
less. The assailants escaped using a yellow motor-
cycle with a fireball sticker on it toward the di-
rection of an exclusive village nearby. A reported
the incident to PO1 Nuval. The following day, PO1
Nuval saw the motorcycle parked in the garage of
a house at Sta. Ines Street inside the exclusive
village. He inquired with the caretaker as to who
owned the motorcycle. The caretaker named the
brothers Pilo and Ramon Maradona who were
then outside the country. PO1 Nuval insisted on
getting inside the garage. Out of fear, the care-
taker allowed him. PO1 Nuval took 2 ski masks
and 2 bats beside the motorcycle. Was the search
valid? What about the seizure? Decide with rea-
sons. (4%)

Both the warrantless search and the seizure, which

were made one day after the murder of B, were invalid.
They cannot be considered as falling within the coverage
of any of the instances when warrantless searches and
seizures are allowed or can be done.
PO1 Nuval had adequate opportunity to obtain a
search warrant after he saw the subject motorcycle
parked in the garage of the house, where the search was
made. Moreover, there was no effective consent for the
house to be searched, as the same was given “out of
fear,” even if the caretaker could have validly given said
consent, but only upon prior authorization of the owners
of the house. (People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August
12, 1992) Ski masks and baseball bats are not unlawful
per se, and their seizure cannot be justified as having
been effected on the basis of a valid plain view search.
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 57
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Accordingly, the warrantless search not having

been lawfully made, the items seized would be inadmis-
sible in evidence.

XIII
True or False.
a. A valid and definite offer to buy a
property is a pre-requisite to expropriation
initiated by a local government unit. (0.5%)
True.

[Notez Under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, a local

government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursu-
ant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose or welfare for the benet of the poor and the land-
less, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and denite offer has been previously made to the owner,
and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the prop-
erty upon the ling of the expropriation proceedings and upon mak-
ing a deposit with the proper court of at least fteen percent (15%) of
the fair market value of the property based on the current tax decla-
ration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, nally, That, the
amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined
by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.]

b. Re-classification of land by a local

government unit may be done through a reso-
lution. (0.5%)

False.
58 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

lN0te: Section 20 of the Local Government Code provides, in

part, that a city or municipality may, through an ordinance
passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the
purpose, authorize the reclassication of agricultural lands and
provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition xxx.]

c. Boundary disputes between and

among municipalities in the same province
may be filed immediately with the Regional
Trial Court. (0.5%)

False.

[Note: See Municipality of Sta. Fe v. Municipality of Aritao,

G.R. No. 140474, September 21, 2007]

d. The Metropolitan Manila Develop-

ment Authority is authorized to confiscate a
driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic
regulations. (0.5%)
False.

[Notez The MMDA generally has no statutory authority to con-

scate driver’s licenses without a prior authorization from the Land
Transportation Oice. (RA 4136, Section 29)]
[Acceptable Answer: True. (The MMDA may conscate driver’s
licenses, if duly deputized by the Land Transportation Office and
only in certain instances, e.g. when the driver was involved in a
traffic accident or when he has accumulated three or more unsettled
trafc violati0ns.)]

XIV
ABC operates an industrial waste processing
plant within Laoag City. Occasionally, whenever
uid substances are released through a nearby
creek, obnoxious odor is emitted causing dizzi-
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 59
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

ness among residents in Barangay La Paz. On

complaint of the Punong Barangay, the City
Mayor wrote ABC demanding that it abate the
nuisance. This was ignored. An invitation to at-
tend a hearing called by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod was also declined by the president of
ABC. The city government thereupon issued a
cease and desist order to stop the operations of
the plant, prompting ABC to file a petition for
injunction before the Regional Trial Court, argu-
ing that the city government did not have any
power to abate the alleged nuisance. Decide with
reasons. (3%)

The cease and desist order is unlawful and its im-

plementation may be properly enjoined by the Regional
Trial Court.
An industrial waste processing plant cannot be
considered as a nuisance per se, or as a nuisance under
any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a di-
rect menace to public health or safety, and, for that rea-
son, may thus be abated summarily under the unde-
ned law of necessity. (Aquino v. Municipality 0fMalay,
Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014)
It is rather a nuisance per accidens which “depends
upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its exis-
tence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated with-
out due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to de-
cide Whether such a thing does in law constitute a nui-
sance;” it may only be so proven in a hearing conducted
for that purpose and may not be summarily abated
without judicial intervention. (Cruz and Dela Cruz v.
Pandacan Hikers’ Club, Iric., G.R. No. 188213, January
11, 2016)
60 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Accordingly, the operations of the industrial waste

processing plant may be ordered stopped only after judi-
cial proceedings. (Parayno u. Jovellanos, G.R. No.
148408, July 14, 2006)

XV

True or False.
a. A person who occupies an office that
is defectively created is a de facto officer.
(0.5%)

False.

[Notez There must be a de jure office. (Tuanda v. Sandiganba-

yan, G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995; Arroyo v. Court ofAppeals,
G.R. N0. 202860, April 10, 2019)]

b.The rule on nepotism does not apply

to designations made in favor of a relative of
the authority making a designation. (0.5%)
False.

[Notez See Laurel u. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 71562

October 28, 1991.]

c. A discretionary duty of a public offi-

cer is never delegable. (0.5%)
True.

[Notez An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot

delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen
because he was deemed t and competent to exercise that judgment
and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his
place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to an-
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 61
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

other. In those cases in which the proper execution of the ofce

requires, on the part of the ofcer, the exercise of judgment or dis-
cretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was
deemed t and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion,
and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given
to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. (State v. Patterson,
34 N. 567; 46 Corpus Juris, 1038; Mechem, Law of Public Officers, p.
567, cited in Binamira v. Garrucho, G.R. N0. 92008 July 30, 1990,
188 SCRA 154)]

[Acceptable Answer: False.]

[Notez A delegate can exercise the discretionary duty if duly
authorized. (See Cruz, The Law of Public Officers, 2018 Edition,
pages 316-317; American Tobacco C0. v. Director 0fPatents, G.R. No.
L-26803 October 14, 1975, 67 SCRA 286)]

d. Acquisition of civil service eligibility

during tenure of a temporary appointee does
not automatically translate to a permanent
appointment. (0.5%)
True.

[Notez See Maturan v. Maglana, G.R. No. L-52091 March 29,

1982.]

XVI
Rudy Domingo, 38 years old, natural-born
Filipino and a resident of the Philippines since
birth, is a Manila-based entrepreneur who runs
KABAKA, a coalition of peoples’ organizations
from fisherfolk communities. KABAKA’s opera-
tions consist of empowering fisherfolk leaders
through livelihood projects and trainings on good
governance. The Dutch Foundation for Global
Initiatives, a private organization registered in
The Netherlands, receives a huge subsidy from
62 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

the Dutch Foreign Ministry, which, in turn is al-

located worldwide to the Foundation’s partners
like KABAKA. Rudy seeks to register KABAKA as
a party-list with himself as a nominee of the coali-
tion. Will KABAKA and Rudy be qualified as a
party-list and a nominee, respectively? Decide
with reasons. (4%)

No, KABAKA and Rudy cannot be considered as

qualied to be a party-list and a nominee, respectively.
Although Rudy may appear to be qualied as a
nominee of KABAKA, being a bona de member of the
party and a natural-born Filipino with the requisite age
and residence (Section 9, RA 7941), KABAKA is not
qualied to be registered as a party-list because it re-
ceives support from a foreign foundation, which receives
a “huge subsidy from the Dutch Foreign Ministry.” This
is among the grounds for the refusal or cancellation of
registration of a party-list. (Section 6(4), RA 7941)

PART II
XVII
During his campaign sortie in Barangay
Salamanca, Mayor Galicia was arrested at a PNP
checkpoint for carrying high-powered firearms in
his car. He was charged and convicted for viola-
tion of the COMELEC gun ban. He did not appeal
his conviction and instead applied for executive
clemency. Acting on the favorable recommenda-
tion of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the
President granted him pardon. Is he eligible to
run again for an elective position? Explain briey.
(5%)
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 63
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Yes, he may be qualied to run again for an elec-

tive position, provided his pardon would have been
granted in his favor upon prior favorable recommenda-
tion of the Commission on Elections, his crime being an
election offense. (Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 5)
A pardon exempts the individual on whom it is be-
stowed from the punishment Which the law inicts for
the crime he has committed. (Pellobello v. Palatine, GR.
No. L-48100, June 20, 1941) and renders him eligible for
elective local ofce. (Section 40, Local Government
Code; See Moreno v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
168550, August 10, 2006.)

XVIII
The House Committee on Appropriations
conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation into
alleged irregular and anomalous disbursements of
the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) and
Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA) of Con-
gressmen as exposed by X, a Division Chief of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
Implicated in the questionable disbursements are
high officials of the Palace. The House Committee
summoned X and the DBM Secretary to appear
and testify. X refused to appear, While the Secre-
tary appeared but refused to testify invoking ex-
ecutive privilege.
a. May X be compelled to appear and
testify? If yes, what sanction may be imposed
on him? (2%)

Yes, X may be compelled to appear and testify, as

his testimony would be crucial to the conduct of the
64 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

legislative inquiry. (Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. N0. 174340,

October 17, 2006) His failure or refusal to testify may
subject him to arrest and punishment for legislative
contempt. (Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July
18, 1950)

b. Is the Budget Secretary shielded by

executive privilege from responding to the
inquiries of the House Committee? Explain
briey. If the answer is no, is there any sanc-
tion that may be imposed upon him? (3%)
The Secretary may not validly invoke executive
privilege, as the same pertains only to the President.
Unless and until said privilege is invoked directly by the
President with respect to the testimony of the Secretary,
the latter may be punished for legislative contempt for
his refusal to testify. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777, April 20, 2006; Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, Sep-
tember 4, 2008)

XIX

instill religious awareness in the students

To
of Doa Trinidad High School, a public school in
Bulacan, the Parent-Teacher's Association of the
school contributed funds for the construction of a
grotto and a chapel where ecumenical religious
services and seminars are being held after school
hours. The use of the school grounds for these
purposes was questioned by a parent who does
not belong to any religious group. As his com-
plaint was not addressed by the school officials,
he filed an administrative complaint against the
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 65
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

principal before the DECS. Is the principal liable?

Explain briey. (5%)
The principal is not liable.
The grotto and chapel were not constructed using
public funds and were established “Without additional
cost to the Government.” It therefore cannot be said that
their construction was violative of the constitutional
prohibition against appropriations for sectarian pur-
poses. (Article VI, Section 28 [2])
Moreover, the ecumenical religious services and
seminars are held “after school hours” and therefore can
be considered as consistent with the constitutional pres-
cription on religious instruction. (Article XIV, Section 3
[Z-3])

The construction of the subject grotto and chapel

can be justified as a mere religious accommodation
which has been acknowledged as not being offensive to
or violative of the general precepts pertinent to religious
freedom. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-
4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

XX

Define/explain the following:

a. Doctrine of operative facts (1%)

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recog-

nized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconsti-
tutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be
left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In
fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an
admission that the law is unconstitutional. The opera-
tive fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be
66 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

applied as an exception to the general rule that an un-

constitutional law produces no effects. It can never be
invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional
act. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modi-
es only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the
unconstitutional law itself. (League of Cities of the Phil-
ippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, August 24,
2010)
The doctrine of operative fact only applies as a mat-
ter of equity and fair play. It nullies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of
a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The doctrine is applicable
when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an
undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid
law. (Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,
G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008)

b. De facto municipal corporation (1%)

A de facto municipal corporation is one organized

under color of a statute before this was declared uncon-
stitutional, its officers having been either elected or
appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged
its corporate functions preceding the institution of an
action challenging the validity of its existence, and re-
sulting in a declaration of its unlawfulness. (See Mu-
nicipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No. L-28113,
March 28, 1969.)

c. Municipal corporation by estoppel

(1%)
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6'7
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

A municipal corporation by estoppel is one which is

neither de jure nor de facto but is dealt or transacted
with as such by individuals who are thereby precluded
or estopped from denying their existence as municipal
corporations by reason of said acknowledgment by said
individuals of their existence.

d. Doctrine of necessary implication

(1%)

Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the

grant of an express power carries with it all the powers
that may be reasonably inferred from it. (Angara v.
Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936)

e. Principle of holdover (1%)

The principle of holdover entitles the public officer

who occupies an office with a xed term to stay in ofce
during the succeeding term, or after his original term
had expired, and to remain in said ofce until his suc-
cessor shall have been duly elected or appointed and
qualied. (Lecaroz u. Sanaliganbayan, G.R. No. 130872,
March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 396)

XXI

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Pasay City

passed an ordinance requiring all disco pub own-
ers to have all their hospitality girls tested for the
AIDS virus. Both disco pub owners and the hospi-
tality girls assailed the validity of the ordinance
for being violative of their constitutional rights to
privacy and to freely choose a calling or business.
Is the ordinance valid? Explain. (5%)
68 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

The ordinance is valid and may be justied as a

lawful exercise by the City of its police power under the
General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code.
(Section 16)

XXII
Governor Diy was serving his third term
when he lost his governorship in a recall election.
a. Who shall succeed Governor Diy in
his office as Governor? (1%)
The winner in the recall election shall be his suc-
cessor. (Local Government Code, Section 72)

b. Can Governor Diy run again as gov-

ernor in the next election? (2%)
Yes, he would be qualied to run in the next elec-
tion because his third term was interrupted by his loss
in the recall election. Accordingly, the three-term limit
rule shall be inapplicable to him. (Socrates v. Commis-
sion on Elections, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002,
391 SCRA 457; Mendoza v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
149736, December 17, 2002)

c. Can Governor Diy refuse to run in

the recall election and instead resign from his
position as governor? (2%)
He may not refuse to run in the recall election be-
cause, under the provisions of the Local Government
Code, ofcials sought to be recalled shall automatically
be considered as duly registered candidates and, like
other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 69
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(Local Government Code, Section 71) Neither is he al-

lowed to resign. (Ibid., Section 73)

XXIII
A was a career Ambassador when he accepted
an ad interim appointment as Cabinet Member.
The Commission on Appointments bypassed his
ad interim appointment, however, and he was not
re-appointed. Can he re-assume his position as
career Ambassador? (5%)
No, A cannot re-assume his position as a career
Ambassador.
A’s acceptance of his ad interim appointment as a
Cabinet Member, which is a permanent appointment
(Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002;
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-65439, November 13, 1985),
necessarily resulted in his forfeiture of his position as
Ambassador.

XXIV

Compare and contrast “overbreadth doctrine”

from “void-for-vagueness” doctrine. (5%)
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. The overbreadth doctrine is an ana-
lytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes
in free speech cases. It is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that “reects legitimate state interest
70 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,

constitutionally unprotected conduct.”
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained
in cases involving statutes Which, by their terms, seek
to regulate only “spoken words” and again, that “over-
breadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct.”
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a law is
rendered invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its ap-
plication.
Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void
for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is fa-
cially invalid if men of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion.” It is subject to the same principles governing
overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical
tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech
cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in
all its possible applications. (David v. Arroyo, G.R. N0.
171396, May 3, 2006)

XXV

a. What is the rotational scheme of ap-

pointments in the COMELEC? (2%)
The Chairman and the Commissioners of the
Commission on Elections shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Ap-
pointments for a term of seven years without reap-
pointment. Of those rst appointed, three Members
 2010 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 71
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

shall hold ofce for seven years, two Members for ve

years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity. (Constitution, Article IX-
C, Section 1[2])

b. What are the two conditions for its

workability? (2%)

The two conditions are —

that the terms of the rst

(1) commissioners
should start on a common date; and
(2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or
disability before the expiration of the term should be
lled only for the unexpired balance of the term. (Re-
public v. Imperial, G.R. No. L-08684, March 31, 1955, 96
Phil. 7 70)

To what other constitutional offices does

c.
the rotational scheme of appointments apply?
(2%)

The rotational scheme applies to —

1. the Commissioners of the Civil Service

Commission (Constitution, Article IX-B, Section 1
l2J),

2. the Commissioners of the Commission on

Audit (Ibid., Article IX-D, Section 1 [2]),

3.the Senators (Ibid., Article VI, Section 4,

in relation to Article XVIII, Section 2) and
72 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

4. the regular members of the Judicial and

Bar Council (Ibid., Article VIII, Section 8 [2]).

XXVI

Distinguish between “pocket veto” and “item

veto.” (2%)
A pocket veto is when the President is considered to
have rejected a bill submitted to him for his approval
when Congress adjourns during the period given to the
President to approve or reject a bill.
On the other hand, an item veto, or partial veto, is
the power of a President to nullify or cancel specic
provisions of a bill, usually a budget appropriations bill,
without vetoing the entire legislative package.

XXVII

What is the concept of association under in-

ternational law? (2%)
An association is formed when two states of un-
equal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the
basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while main-
taining its international status as a state. In interna-
tional practice, the “associated state” arrangement has
usually been used a transitional device of former colo-
nies on their way to full independence. (The Province of
North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No.
183591, October 14, 2008)
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 73
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suocnsrno ANSWERS

2011
(1) Filipino citizenship may be acquired
through judicial naturalization only by an alien
(A) born, raised, and educated in the Philippines
Who has all the qualications and none of the dis-
qualications to become a Filipino citizen.
(B) who has all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications to become a Filipino
citizen.
(C) born and raised in the Philippines who has all
the qualications and none of the disqualications
to become a Filipino citizen.
(D) whose mother or father is a naturalized Fili-
pino and who himself is qualied to be naturalized.

(2) J ax Liner applied for a public utility bus

service from Bacolod to Dumaguete from the
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (LTFRB). BB Express opposed. LTFRB
ruled in favor of Jax. BB appealed to the Secre-
tary of the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), who reversed the LTFRB
decision. Jax appealed to the Office of the Presi-
dent which reinstated the LTFRB’s ruling. BB
Express went to the Court of Appeals on certio-
rari questioning the decision of the Office of the
President on the ground that Office of the Presi-
dent has no jurisdiction over the case in the ab-
sence of any law providing an appeal from DOTC
to the Office of the President. Will the petition
prosper?
74 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(A) No, exhaustion of administrative remedies up

to the level of the President is a pre-requisite to ju-
dicial recourse.
(B) No, the action of the DOTC Secretary
bears only the implied approval of the Presi-
dent who is not precluded from reviewing the
decision of the former.
(C) Yes, when there is no law providing an appeal
to the Oice of the President, no such appeal may
be pursued.
(D) Yes, the doctrine of qualied political agency
renders unnecessary a further appeal to the Oice
of the President.

(3) Where A is set for promotion to Adminis-

trative Assistant III and B to the post of Adminis-
trative Assistant II vacated by A, the appointing
authority must
(A) submit to the CSC the two promotional
appointments together for approval.
(B) not appoint B until the CSC has approved A’s
appointment.
(C) submit to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
the second appointment after its approval of the
rst.
(D) simultaneously issue the appointments of A
and B.

(4) When a witness is granted transactional

immunity in exchange for his testimony on how
his immediate superior induced him to destroy
public records to cover up the latter’s act of mal-
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 75
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

versation of public funds, the witness may NOT be

prosecuted for

(A) direct contempt.

(B) infidelity in the custody of public re-
cords.
(C) falsication of public documents.
(D) false testimony.

(5) Mario, a Bureau of Customs’ examiner,

was administratively charged with grave miscon-
duct and preventively suspended pending inves-
tigation. The head of office found him guilty as
charged and ordered his dismissal. The decision
against him was executed pending appeal. The
Civil Service Commission (CSC) subsequently
found him guilty and after considering a number
of mitigating circumstances, reduced his penalty
to only one month suspension. Is Mario entitled to
back salaries?
(A) Yes, the reduction of the penalty means resto-
ration of his right to back salaries.
(B) No, the penalty of one month suspension car-
ries with it the forfeiture of back salaries.
(C) No, he is still guilty of grave misconduct,
only the penalty was reduced.
(D) Yes, corresponding to the period of his sus-
pension pending appeal less one month.

(6) Althea, a Filipino citizen, bought a lot in

the Philippines in 1975. Her predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
76 BAR Q & A
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and notorious possession of the lot since 1940, in

the concept of owner. In 1988, Althea became a
naturalized Australian citizen. Is she qualified to
apply for registration of the lot in her name?
(A) Yes, provided she acquires back her Filipino
citizenship.
(B) No, except when it can be proved that Austra-
lia has counterpart domestic law that also favors
a
former Filipino citizens residing there.
(C) Yes, the lot is already private in charac-
ter and as a former natural-born Filipino, she
can buy the lot and apply for its registration
in her name.
(D) No, foreigners are not allowed to own lands in
the Philippines.

(7) The privacy of communication and corres-

pondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court or when
(A) public safety or public health requires other-
wise as prescribed by law.
(B) dictated by the need to maintain public peace
and order.
(C) public safety or order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law.
(D) public safety or order requires otherwise as
determined by the President.

(8) One advantage of a written Constitution

is its
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 77
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(A) reliability.
(B) permanence.
(C) exibility.
(D) expediency.

(9) An appointment held at the pleasure of

the appointing power
(A) is essentially temporary in nature.
(B) requires special qualications of the ap-
pointee.
(C) requires justifiable reason for its termination.
(D) is co-extensive with the term of the public of-
cer who appointed him.

(10) The city government filed a complaint

for expropriation of 10 lots to build a recreational
complex for the members of the homeowners’ as-
sociation of Sitio Sto. Tomas, the most populated
residential compound in the city. The lot owners
challenged the purpose of the expropriation. Does
the expropriation have a valid purpose?

(A) No, because not everybody uses a recreational

complex.
(B) N0, because it intends to benefit a pri-
vate organization.
(C) Yes, it is in accord with the general welfare
clause.
(D) Yes, it serves the well-being of the local resi-
dents.
78 BAR Q & A
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(11) An example of a content-based restraint

on free speech is a regulation prescribing

(A) maximum tolerance of pro-government

demonstrations.
(B) a no rally-no permit policy.
(C) when, Where, and how lawful assemblies are
to be conducted.
(D) calibrated response to rallies that have be-
come violent.

(12) The President forged an executive

agreement with Vietnam for a year supply of ani-
mal feeds to the Philippines not to exceed 40,000
tons. The Association of Animal Feed Sellers of
the Philippines questioned the executive agree-
ment for being contrary to R.A. 462 which prohib-
its the importation of animal feeds from Asian
countries. Is the challenge correct?
(A) Yes, the executive agreement is contrary
to our existing domestic law.
(B) No, the President is the sole organ of the gov-
ernment in external relations and all his actions as
such form part of the law of the land.
(C) No, international agreements are sui generis
which must stand independently of our domestic
laws.
(D) Yes, the executive agreement is actually a
treaty which does not take effect without ratica-
tion by the Senate.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 79
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(13) Jose Cruz and 20 others filed a petition

with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite on their
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution
by shifting to a unicameral parliamentary form of
government. Assuming that the petition has been
signed by the required number of registered vot-
ers, will it prosper?

(A) No, only Congress can exercise the power to

amend the Constitution.
(B) Yes, the people can substantially amend the
Constitution by direct action.
(C) Yes, provided Congress concurs in the
amendment.
(D) No, since they seek, not an amendment,
but a revision.
(14) The Comelec en banc cannot hear and
decide a case at first instance EXCEPT when

(A) a Division refers the case to it for direct ac-

tion.
(B) the case involves a purely administrative
matter.
(C) the inhibition of all the members of a Division
is sought.
(D) a related case is pending before the Supreme
Court en banc.

(15) Each of the Constitutional Commissions

is expressly described as “independent,” exempli-
fied by its
80 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(A) immunity from suit.

(B) fiscal autonomy.
(C) nality of action.
(D) collegiality.

(16) There is double jeopardy when the dis-

missal of the first case is
(A) made at the instance of the accused invoking
his right to fair trial.
(B) made upon motion of the accused without ob-
jection from the prosecution.
(C) made provisionally without objection from the
accused.
(D) based on the objection of the accused to
the prosecution’s motion to postpone trial.
(17) The new Commissioner of Immigration,
Mr. Suarez, issued an Office Order directing the
top immigration officials to tender courtesy res-
ignation to give him a free hand in reorganizing
the agency. In compliance, Director Sison of the
Administrative Department tendered his resigna-
tion in writing which Mr. Suarez immediately
accepted. Director Sison went to court, assailing
the validity of his courtesy resignation and Mr.
Suarez’s acceptance of the same. Will the action
prosper?
(A) No, Director Sison tendered his resignation
and it was accepted.
(B) No, estoppel precludes Director Sison from
disclaiming the resignation he freely tendered.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 81
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(C) Yes, for so long as no one has yet been ap-

pointed to replace him, Director Sison may still
withdraw his resignation.
(D) Yes, Director Sison merely complied with
the order of the head of office; the element of
clear intention to relinguish office is lacking.
(18) An administrative rule that fixes rates is
valid only when the proposed rates are
(A) published and led with the UP Law Center.
(B) published and hearings are conducted.
(C) published and posted in three public places.
(D) published and all stakeholders are personally
notied.

(19) The government sought to expropriate a

parcel of land belonging to Y. The law provides
that, to get immediate possession of the land, the
government must deposit the equivalent of the
land’s zonal value. The government insisted, how-
ever, that what apply are the rules of court which
require an initial deposit only of the assessed
value of the property. Which should prevail on
this matter, the law or the rules of court?
(A) Both law and rules apply because just com-
pensation should be xed based on its zonal or as-
sessed value, Whichever is higher.
(B) Both law and rules apply because just com-
pensation should be xed based on its zonal or as-
sessed value, Whichever is lower.
82 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(C) The law should prevail since the right to

just compensation isa substantive right that
Congress has the power to define.
(D) The rules of court should prevail since just
compensation is a procedural matter subject to the
rule making power of the Supreme Court.
[Notez (D) is offered as an acceptable answer because this
would be consistent with the rule that the determination of just
compensation is exclusively a prerogative of the Judiciary. (Land
Bank of the Philippines u. Escandor, G.R. No. 171685, October 11,
201, 632 SCRA 504; Land Bank v. Heirs ofListana, G.R. No. 182758,
May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 416; see also Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Umandap, G.R. No. 166298, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 116,
and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Trinidad S. Vda. De
Arieta, G.R. No. 161834, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 43)]

(20) After X, a rape suspect, was apprised of

his right to silence and to counsel, he told the in-
vestigators that he was waiving his right to have
his own counsel or to be provided one. He made
his waiver in the presence of a retired Judge who
was assigned to assist and explain to him the con-
sequences of such waiver. Is the waiver valid?

(A) No, the waiver was not reduced in writing.

(B) Yes, the mere fact that the lawyer was a re-
tired judge does not cast doubt on his competence
and independence.
(C) Yes, the waiver was made voluntarily,
expressly, and with assistance of counsel.
(D) No, a retired Judge is not a competent and in-
dependent counsel.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 83
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(21) Governor Paloma was administratively

charged with abuse of authority before the Office
of the President. Pending hearing, he ran for re-
election and won a second term. He then moved to
dismiss the charge against him based on this su-
pervening event. Should the motion be granted?
(A) Yes, Governor Paloma’S reelection is an ex-
pression of the electorate’s obedience to his Will.
(B) No, Governor Paloma’S reelection cannot ex-
tinguish his liability for malfeasance in office.
(C) No, Governor Paloma’s reelection does not
render moot the administrative case already pend-
ing when he led his certificate of candidacy for his
reelection bid.
(D) Yes, Governor Paloma’s reelection is an
expression of the electorate’s restored trust.

(22) The decision of the Regional Trial Court

on appeals pertaining to inclusions or exclusions
from the list of voters
(A) is inappealable.
(B) is subject to an action for annulment.
(C) may be brought straight to the Supreme
Court.
(D) is appealable to the Commission on Elections.

[Notez (C) is offered as an acceptable answer in view of the ba-

sic certiorari (grave abuse discretion) jurisdiction of the Court. It
should be noted though that said Rule 65 petition is an original
action and is not by way of appeal. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribu-
nal, G.R. N0. 221538, September 20, 2016)]
84 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw

(23) The equal protection clause allows valid

classification of subjects that applies
(A) only to present conditions.
(B) so long as it remains relevant to the govern-
ment.
(C) for a limited period only.
(D) for as long as the problem to be cor-
rected exists.
(24) The President wants to appoint A to the
vacant post of Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court because of his qualications, competence,
honesty, and efficiency. But A’s name is not on the
list of nominees that the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) submitted to the President. What should
the President do?

(A) Request the JBC to consider adding A to the

list.
(B) Decline to appoint from the list.
(C) Appoint from the list.
(D) Return the list to JBC.

(25) Courts may still decide cases that have

otherwise become academic when they involve
(A) the basic interest of people.
(B) petitions for habeas corpus.
(C) acts of the Chief Executive.
(D) Presidential election protests.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 85
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(26) The right of the State to prosecute

crimes by available evidence must yield to the
right of
(A) the accused against self-incrimination.
(B) another State to extradite a fugitive from jus-
tice.
(C) the State to deport undesirable aliens.
(D) the complainant to drop the case against the
accused.

(27) A temporary appointee to a public office

who becomes a civil service eligible during his
tenure
(A) loses his temporary appointment without
prejudice to his re-appointment as permanent.
(B) has the right to demand conversion of his ap-
pointment to permanent.
(C) automatically becomes a permanent ap-
pointee.
(D) retains his temporary appointment.

(28) Upon endorsement from the Senate

where it was first mistakenly filed, the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice found the
verified complaint for impeachment against the
President sufficient in form but insufficient in
substance. Within the same year, another im-
peachment suit was filed against the President
who questioned the same for being violative of the
Constitution. Is the President correct?
86 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(A) No, “initiated” means the Articles of Im-

peachment have been actually led with the Senate
for trial; this did not yet happen.
(B) No, the rst complaint was not deemed initi-
ated because it was originally led with the Senate.
(C) Yes, the dismissal of the rst impeachment
proceeding bars the initiation of another during the
same term of the President.
(D) Yes, no impeachment proceeding can be
filed against the President more than once
within a year.
(29) The Solicitor General declines to insti-
tute a civil action on behalf of a government
agency due to his strained relation with its head,
insisting that the agency’s lawyers can file the
action. Is the Solicitor General correct?
(A) Yes, when he deems he cannot harmoniously
and effectively work with the requesting agency.
(B) No, he must, in choosing whether to
prosecute an action, exercise his discretion
according to law and the best interest of the
State.
(C) Yes, as in any lawyer-client relationship, he
has the right to choose whom to serve and repre-
sent.
(D) No, the Solicitor General’s duty to represent
the government, its ofces and ofcers is manda-
tory and absolute.

(30) A department secretary may, with the

President’s consent, initiate his appearance be-
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 87
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

fore the Senate or the House of Representatives

which
(A) must seek the concurrence of the other House
before acting.
(B) must hold an executive session to hear the
department secretary.
(C) may altogether reject the initiative.
(D) must accept such initiated appearance.

(31) The Metro Manila Development Author-

ity (MMDA) passed a rule authorizing traffic en-
forcers to impound illegally parked vehicles, for
the first offense, and confiscate their registration
plates for the second. The MMDA issued this rule
to implement a law that authorized it to suspend
the licenses of drivers who violate traffic rules. Is
the MMDA rule valid?
(A) No, since the MMDA does not have rule-
making power.
(B) Yes, it isvalid exercise of the power of sub-
a
ordinate legislation.
(C) Yes, it is an implicit consequence of the law
upon which it acted.
(D) No, the rule goes beyond the sphere of
the law.
(32) Senator Bondoc was charged with mur-
der and detained at the Quezon City Jail. He in-
voked, in seeking leave from the court to attend
the session of the Senate, his immunity from ar-
88 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

rest as a Senator. How should the court rule on

his motion?
(A) Deny the motion unless the Senate issues a
resolution certifying to the urgency of his atten-
dance at its sessions.
(B) Grant the motion provided he posts bail since
he is not a ight risk.
(C) Grant the motion so as not to deprive the peo-
ple who elected him their right to be represented in
the Senate.
(D) Deny the motion since immunity from
arrest does not apply to a charge of murder.
(33) X, an administrative officer in the De-
partment of Justice, was charged with grave mis-
conduct and preventively suspended for 90 days
pending investigation. Based on the evidence, the
Secretary of Justice found X guilty as charged
and dismissed him from the service. Pending ap-
peal, X’s dismissal was executed. Subsequently,
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reversed the
Secretary’s decision and the reversal became final
and executory. What is the effect of X’s exonera-
tion?
(A) X is entitled to reinstatement and back sala-
ries both during his 90 day preventive suspension
and his suspension pending appeal.
(B) X is entitled to reinstatement and back sala-
ries corresponding only to the period of delay
caused by those prosecuting the case against him.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(C) X is entitled to reinstatement but not to back

salaries on ground of “damnum absque injuria.”
(D) X is entitled to reinstatement and back
salaries during his suspension pending ap-
peal.

(34) Courts may dismiss a case on ground of

mootness when

(A) the case is premature.

(B) petitioner lacks legal standing.
(C) the questioned law has been repealed.
(D) the issue of validity of law was not timely
raised.

(35) Alfredo was elected municipal mayor for

3 consecutive terms. During his third term, the
municipality became a city. Alfredo ran for city
mayor during the next immediately succeeding
election. Voltaire sought his disqualification cit-
ing the 3 term limit for elective officials. Will Vol-
taire’s action prosper?
(A) No, the 3 term limit should not apply to a per-
son who is running for a new position title.
(B) Yes, the 3 term limit applies regardless of any
voluntary or involuntary interruption in the service
of the local elective official.
(C) Yes, the 3 term limit uniformly applies to
the office of mayor, whether for city or mu-
nicipality.
90 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(D) No, the 3 term limit should not apply to a lo-

cal government unit that has assumed a different
corporate existence.

(36) In what scenario is an extensive search

of moving vehicles without warrant valid?
(A) The police became suspicious on seeing some-
thing on the car’s back seat covered with blanket.
(B) The police suspected an unfenced lot covered
by rocks and bushes was planted to marijuana.
(C) The police became suspicious when they saw a
car believed to be of the same model used by the
killers of a city mayor.
(D) The driver sped away in his car when the
police flagged him down at a checkpoint.
(37) Pre-proclamation controversies shall be
heard
(A) summarily without need of trial.
(B) through trial by commissioner.
(C) ex parte.

(D) through speedy arbitration.

(38) When the President orders the Chief of

the Philippine National Police to suspend the is-
suance of permits to carry firearms outside the
residence, the President exercises
(A) the power of control.
(B) the Commander-in-Chief power.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 91
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(C) the power of supervision.

(D) the calling out power.

(39) Carlos, a foreign national was charged

with and convicted of a serious crime in State X
and sentenced to life imprisonment. His country
applied for relief with the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), arguing that State X did not inform
Carlos of his right under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention to be accorded legal assistance by his
government. State X, as signatory to the Vienna
Convention, agreed to ICJ’s compulsory jurisdic-
tion over all disputes regarding the interpretation
or application of the Vienna Convention. ICJ
ruled that State X violated its obligation to pro-
vide consular notification to the foreign national’s
country. ICJ also required State X to review and
reconsider the life sentence imposed on the for-
eign national. State X then Wrote the United Na-
tions informing that it was withdrawing from the
Optional Protocol on Vienna Convention and was
not bound by the ICJ decision. What principle of
international law did State X violate?
(A) Pacta Sunt Servanda
(B) Act of State Doctrine
(C) Protective Principle
(D) Jus Cogens

(40) An informer told the police that a Toy-

ota Car with plate ABC 134 would deliver an un-
specified quantity of ecstasy in Forbes Park,
Makati City. The officers whom the police sent to
92 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

watch the Forbes Park gates saw the described

car and agged it down. When the driver stopped
and lowered his window, an officer saw a gun
tucked on the driver’s waist. The officer asked the
driver to step out and he did. When an officer
looked inside the car, he saw many tablets strewn
on the driver’s seat. The driver admitted they
were ecstasy. Is the search valid?
(A) No, the rule on warrantless search of moving
vehicle does not allow arbitrariness on the part of
the police.
(B) Yes, the police oicers had the duty to verify
the truth of the information they got and pursue it
to the end.
(C) Yes, the police acted based on reliable in-
formation and the fact that an officer saw the
driver carrying a gun.
(D) No, police officers do not have unbridled dis-
cretion to conduct a Warrantless search of moving
vehicles.

(41) The Commission on Elections is an in-

dependent body tasked to enforce all laws relative
to the conduct of elections. Hence, it may
(A) conduct two kinds of electoral count: a slow
but ofcial count; and a quick but unofcial count.
(B) make an advance and unofcial canvass of
election returns through electronic transmission.
(C) undertake a separate and unofcial tabula-
tion of the results of the election manually.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 93
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(D) authorize the citizens arm to use election

returns for unofficial count.
(42) The President may proclaim martial law
over a particular province subject to revocation
or extension
(A) by Congress, subject to ratication by the Su-
preme Court.
(B) by the Supreme Court.
(C) by Congress alone
(D) by Congress, upon recommendation of the re-
spective Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

(43) During his incumbency, President Car-

los shot to death one of his advisers during a
heated argument over a game of golf that they
were playing. The deceased adviser’s family filed
a case of homicide against President Carlos be-
fore the city prosecutor’s office. He moved to dis-
miss the case, invoking presidential immunity
from suit. Should the case be dismissed?
(A) Yes, his immunity covers his interactions with
his official family, including the deceased adviser.
(B) N0, his immunity covers only work-related
crimes.
(C) Yes, his immunity holds for the Whole
duration of his tenure.
(D) No, his immunity does not cover crimes in-
volving moral turpitude.
94 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(44) The School Principal of Ramon Magsay-

say High School designated Maria, her daughter,
as public school teacher in her school. The desig-
nation was assailed on ground of nepotism. Is
such designation valid?

(A) No, because the law prohibits relatives from

working within the same government unit.
(B) Yes, because Maria’s position does not
fall within the prohibition.
(C) No, because her mother is not the designating
authority.
(D) No, because Maria is related to the supervis-
ing authority within the prohibited degree of con-
sanguinity.

(45) The President’s appointment of an act-

ing secretary although Congress is in session is
(A) voidable.
(B) valid.
(C) invalid.
(D) unenforceable.

(46) Congress passed a bill appropriating

P50 million in assistance to locally based televi-
sion stations subject to the condition that the
amount would be available only in places where
commercial national television stations do not
operate. The President approved the appropria-
tion but vetoed the condition. Was the veto valid?
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 95
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(A) Yes, since the vetoed condition may be sepa-

rated from the item.
(B) Yes, the President’s veto power is absolute.
(C) No, since the veto amounted to a suppression
of the freedom to communicate through television.
(D) No, since the approval of the item car-
ried with it the approval of the condition at-
tached to it.
(47) In the exercise of its power of legislative
inquiries and oversight functions, the House of
Representatives or the Senate may only ask ques-
tions
(A) that the official called is willing to answer.
(B) that are relevant to the proposed legislation.
(C) to which the witness gave his prior consent.
(D) material to the subject of inquiry.

(48) An ordinance prohibits “notorious street

gang members” from loitering in public places.
The police are to disperse them or, if they refuse,
place them under arrest. The ordinance enumer-
ates which police officers can make arrest and
defines street gangs, membership in them, and
public areas. The ordinance was challenged for
being vague regarding the meaning of “notorious
street gang members.” Is the ordinance valid?
(A) No, it leaves the public uncertain as to
what conduct it prohibits.
96 BAR Q & A
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(B) No, since it discriminates between loitering in

public places and loitering in private places.
(C) Yes, it provides fair warning to gang members
prior to arrest regarding their unlawful conduct.
(D) Yes, it is sufciently clear for the public to
know what acts it prohibits.

(49) The people may approve or reject a pro-

posal to allow foreign investors to own lands in
the Philippines through an electoral process
called
(A) referendum.
(B) plebiscite.
(C) initiative.
(D) certication.

(50) Where a candidate for the Senate stated

in his certificate of candidacy that he is single,
when he is very much married, though separated,
his certificate of candidacy
(A) may be canceled.
(B) will subject him to a quo warranto action.
(C) remains valid.
(D) may be denied due course.

(51) A candidate who commits vote buying

on Election Day itself shall be prosecuted by the

(A) COMELEC.
(B) Secretary of Justice.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(C) police and other law enforcement agencies.

(D) City or Provincial Prosecutor.

(52) A law authorized the Secretary of Agri-

culture to require the quarantine of animals that
suffer from dangerous communicable diseases at
such place and for such time he deems necessary
to prevent their spread. The Secretary of Agricul-
ture issued a regulation, imposing a penalty of
imprisonment for 10 days on persons transporting
quarantined animals without his permission. The
regulation is
(A) a valid exercise of the power of subordinate
legislation.
(B) invalid for being ultra vires.
(C) a valid exercise of police power.
(D) invalid for being discriminatory.

(53) Small-scale utilization of natural re-

sources by Filipino citizens may be allowed by

(A) Congress.
(B) either the Senate or the House of Representa-
tives.
(C) the President.
(D) the President with the consent of Congress.

(54) When the Civil Service Commission

(CSC) approves the appointment of the Executive
Director of the Land Transportation Franchising
98 BAR Q & A
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and Regulatory Board who possesses all the pres-

cribed qualifications, the CSC performs

(A) a discretionary duty.

(B) a mix discretionary and ministerial duty.

(C) a ministerial duty.
(D) a rule-making duty.

(55) Xian and Yani ran for Congressman in

the same district. During the canvassing, Yani
objected to several returns which he said were
tampered with. The board of canvassers did not
entertain Yani’s objections for lack of authority to
do so. Yani questions the law prohibiting the fil-
ing of pre-proclamation cases involving the elec-
tion of Congressmen since the Constitution grants
COMELEC jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation
cases, without distinction. Is Yani correct?

(A)Yes, the Constitution grants jurisdiction to

COMELEC on all pre-proclamation cases, without
exception.
(B) No, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation cases pertains only to elections
for regional, provincial, and city officials.
(C) No, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation cases does not include those that
must be brought directly to the courts.
(D) Yes, any conict between the law and the
Constitution relative to COMELEC’s jurisdiction
must be resolved in favor of the Constitution.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 99
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(56) When the Supreme Court nullified the

decisions of the military tribunal for lack of juris-
diction, it excluded from their coverage decisions
of acquittal where the defendants were deemed to
have acquired a vested right. In so doing, the Su-
preme Court applied

(A) the operative fact doctrine.

(B) the rule against double jeopardy.
(C) the doctrine of supervening event.
(D) the orthodox doctrine.

(57) Accused X pleaded not guilty to the

charge of homicide against him. Since he was ad-
mitted to bail, they sent him notices to attend the
hearings of his case. But he did not show up, des-
pite notice, in four successive hearings without
offering any justification. The prosecution moved
to present evidence in absentia but the court de-
nied the motion on the ground that the accused
has a right to be present at his trial. Is the court
correct?

(A) No, the court is mandated to hold trial in

absentia when the accused had been ar-
raigned, had notice, and his absence was un-
justified.
(B) Yes, it remains discretionary on the court
whether to conduct trial in absentia even if the ac-
cused had been arraigned and had notice and did
not justify his absence.
100 BAR Q & A
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(C) Yes, it is within the c0urt’s discretion to de-

termine how many postponements it will grant the
accused before trying him in absentia.
(D) No, the court may reject trial in absentia only
on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence.

(58) Following COIVIELEC Chairman Bocay’s

conviction for acts of corruption in the impeach-
ment proceedings, he was indicted for plunder
before the Sandiganbayan and found guilty, as
charged. Can he get Presidential pardon on the
plunder case?
(A) No, plunder is not a pardonable offense.
(B) N0, conviction in a criminal case for the same
acts charged in the impeachment proceedings is not
pardonable.
(C) Yes, convictions in two different fora for the
same acts, are too harsh that they are not beyond
the reach of the President’s pardoning power.
(D) Yes, conviction in court criminal ac-
in a
tion is subject to the President’s pardoning
power.

(59) A private person constituted by the

court as custodian of property attached to secure
a debt sought to be recovered in a civil proceed-
ing is
(A) a private sheriff.
(B) a public officer.
(C) a private warehouseman.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 101
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(D) an agent of the party to Whom the property

will ultimately be awarded.
(60) The COMELEC en banc shall decide a
motion for reconsideration of
(A) the House or Representatives and the Senate
electoral tribunals.
(B) the decision of the election registrar.
(C) the decision of the COMELEC division
involving an election protest.
(D) its own decision involving an election protest.

(61) Adela served as Mayor of Kasim for 2

consecutive terms. On her third term, COMELEC
ousted her in an election protest that Gudi, her
opponent, filed against her. Two years later, Gudi
faced recall proceedings and Adela ran in the re-
call election against him. Adela won and served as
Mayor for Gudi’s remaining term. Can Adela run
again for Mayor in the next succeeding election
without violating the 3 term limit?
(A) No, she won the regular mayoralty election for
two consecutive terms and the recall election con-
stitutes her third term.
(B) A. No, she already won the mayoralty election
for 3 consecutive terms.
(C) Yes, her ouster from office in her third
term interrupted the continuity of her service
as mayor.
102 BAR Q & A
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(D) Yes, the fresh mandate given her during the

recall election erased her disqualication for a
third term.

child born in the United States to a

(62) A
Filipino mother and an American father is
(A) a Filipino citizen by election.
(B) a repatriated Filipino citizen.
(C) a dual citizen.
(D) a natural born Filipino citizen.
[Note: (C) is offered as an acceptable answer because of the
concurrence in application of the jus soli and jus sanguinis princi-
ples.]

(63) Involuntary servitude may be required

as

(A) part of rehabilitation of one duly charged with

a crime.

(B) substitute penalty for one who has been duly

tried for a crime.
(C) punishment for a crime where one has
been duly convicted.
(D) condition precedent to one’s valid arraign-
rnent.

(64) Van sought to disqualify Manresa as

congresswoman of the third district of Manila on
the ground that the latter is a greencard holder.
By the time the case was decided against Man-
resa, she had already served her full term as con-
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIoNAL LAW 103
BAR QUEsTIoNs AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

gresswoman. What was Manresa’s status during

her incumbency as congresswoman?
(A) She Was a de jure officer, having been duly
elected.
(B) She was not a public officer because she had
no valid existing public office.
(C) She was a de jure officer since she completed
her term before she was disqualied.
(D) She was a de facto officer since she was
elected, served, and her disqualification only
came later.

(65) Whose appointment is NOT subject to

confirmation by the Commission on Appoint-
ments?

(A) Chairman of the Civil Service Commission

(B) Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
(C) Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Phil-
Ippines
(D) Executive Secretary

(66) The system of checks and balances op-

erates when
(A) the President nullifies a conviction in a
criminal case by pardoning the offender.
(B) Congress increases the budget proposal of the
President.
(C) the President does not release the countryside
development funds to members of Congress.
104 BAR Q & A
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(D) Congress expands the appellate jurisdiction of

the Supreme Court, as dened by the Constitution.

(67) The price of staple goods like rice may

be regulated for the protection of the consuming
public through the exercise of
(A) power of subordinate legislation.
(B) emergency power.
(C) police power.
(D) residual power.

(68) Associate Justice A retires from the Su-

preme Court 90 days before the forthcoming
Presidential election. May the incumbent Presi-
dent still appoint Justice A’s successor?
(A) No, it will violate the Constitutional prohibi-
tion against midnight appointments.
(B) Yes, vacancies in the Supreme Court
should be filled within 90 days from occur-
rence of the vacancy.
(C) Yes, vacancies in the Supreme Court should
be lled within 90 days from submission of JBC
nominees to the President.
(D) No, the incumbent President must yield to the
choice of the next President

(69) The President may set a limit on the

country’s import quota in the exercise of his
(A) delegated power.
(B) concurring power.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 105
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoossrsn ANSWERS

(C) residual power.

(D) inherent power.

(70) Amor sued for annulment of a deed of

sale of Lot 1. While the case was ongoing, Balta-
zar, an interested buyer, got a Certification from
Atty. Crispin, the Clerk of Court, that Lot 1 was
not involved in any pending case before the court.
Acting on the certification, the Register of Deeds
canceled the notice of lis pendens annotated on
Lot 1’s title. Amor filed a damage suit against
Atty. Crispin but the latter invoked good faith and
immunity from suit for acts relating to his official
duty, claiming he was not yet the Clerk of Court
when Amor filed his action. Decide.
(A) Atty. Crispin is immune from suit since he en-
joys the presumption of regularity of performance
of public duty.
invalid since he
(B) Atty. Crispin’s defense is
issued his certification recklessly without
checking the facts.
(C) Atty. Crispin’s defense is valid since he was
unaware of the pendency of the case.
(D) As Clerk of Court, Atty. Crispin enjoys abso-
lute immunity from suit for acts relating to his
Work.

(71) The Housing and Land Use Regulatory

Board (HLURB) found Atlantic Homes, Inc. liable
in damages arising from its delayed release of the
title to the house and lot that it sold to Josephine.
Atlantic appealed to the Office of the President
which rendered a one page decision, affirming the
106 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

attached HLURB judgment. Atlantic challenges

the validity of the decision of the Office of the
President for not stating the facts and the law on
which it is based. Is the challenge correct?
(A) No, the Ofce of the President is governed by
its own rules respecting review of cases appealed to
it
(B) Yes, the decision of the Oice of the President
must contain its own crafted factual ndings and
legal conclusions.
(C) Yes, administrative due process demands that
the Ofce of the President make ndings and con-
clusions independent of its subordinate.
(D) No, the Office of the President is not pre-
cluded from adopting the factual findings and
legal conclusions contained in the HLURB
decision.

(72) A collision occurred involving a passen-

ger jeepney driven by Leonardo, a cargo truck
driven by Joseph, and a dump truck driven by
Lauro but owned by the City of Cebu. Lauro was
on his way to get a load of sand for the repair of
the road along Fuente Street, Cebu City. As a re-
sult of the collision, 3 passengers of the jeepney
died. Their families filed a complaint for damages
against Joseph who in turn filed a third party
complaint against the City of Cebu and Lauro. Is
the City of Cebu liable for the tort committed by
its employee?
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 107
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(A) The City of Cebu is not liable because its

employee was engaged in the discharge of a
governmental function.
(B) The City of Cebu is liable for the tort commit-
ted by its employee while in the discharge of a non-
governmental function.
(C) The City of Cebu is liable in accord with the
precept of respondeat superior.
(D) The City of Cebu is not liable as a conse-
quence of its non-suitability.

(73) During promulgation of sentence, the

presence of the accused is mandatory but he may
appear by counsel or representative when
(A) he is charged with a light offense.
(B) he was able to cross-examine the prosecution’s
witnesses.
(C) he waives his right to be present.
(D) he is convicted of a bailable offense.

(74) An information for murder was filed

against X. After examining the case records for-
Warded to him by the prosecution, the trial judge
granted bail to X based on the prosecution’s mani-
festation that it was not objecting to the grant of
bail. Is the trial judge correct?
(A) Yes, the trial judge may evaluate the strength
or weakness of the evidence based on the case re-
cords forwarded to him.
108 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(B) No, the trial judge should have held a

hearing to ascertain the quality of the evi-
dence of guilt that the prosecution had
against X.
(C) No, the trial judge should have conducted a
hearing to ascertain rst whether or not X was val-
idly arrested.
(D) Yes, the trial judge may reasonably rely on
the prosecution’s manifestation that he had no ob-
jection to the grant of bail.

(75) The President CANNOT call out the

military
(A) to enforce customs laws.
(B) to secure shopping malls against terrorists.
(C) to arrest persons committing rebellion.
(D) to raid a suspected haven of lawless elements.

(76) Mass media in the Philippines may be

owned and managed by

(A) corporations wholly owned and managed

by Filipinos.
(B) corporations 60% owned by Filipinos.
(C) corporations wholly owned by Filipinos.
(D) corporations 60% owned and managed by
Filipinos.

(77) Procedural due process in administra-

tive proceedings
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 109
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(A) requires the tribunal to consider the

evidence presented.
(B) allows the losing party to le a motion for re-
consideration.
(C) requires hearing the parties on oral argu-
ment.
(D) permits the parties to le memoranda.

(78) The Constitution prohibits cruel and in-

human punishments which involve
(A) torture or lingering suffering.
(B) primitive and gross penalties.
(C) unusual penal methods.
(D) degrading and queer penalties.

(79) Judge Lloyd was charged with serious

misconduct before the Supreme Court. The Court
found him guilty and ordered him dismissed. Be-
lieving that the decision was not immediately
executory, he decided a case that had been sub-
mitted for resolution. The decision became final
and executory. But the losing party filed a certio-
rari action with the Court of Appeals seeking to
annul the writ of execution issued in the case and
bar Judge Lloyd from further acting as judge. Can
the relief against Judge Lloyd be granted?
(A) No, Judge Lloyd’s right to stay as judge
may be challenged only by direct proceeding,
not collaterally.
110 BAR Q & A
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(B) Yes, the action against lludge Lloyd may be

consolidated with the case before the Court of Ap-
peals and decided by it.
(C) Yes, Judge Lloyd’s right to stay as judge may
be challenged as a necessary incident of the certio-
rari action.
(D) No, the losing party has no standing to chal-
lenge Judge Lloyd’s right to stay as judge.

(80) Executive Secretary Chua issued an or-

der prohibiting the holding of rallies along Men-
diola because it hampers the traffic flow to Mala-
canang. A group of militants questioned the order
for being unconstitutional and filed a case against
Secretary Chua to restrain him from enforcing
the order. Secretary Chua raised state immunity
from suit claiming that the state cannot be sued
without its consent. Is the claim correct?
(A) No, public officers may be sued to res-
train them from enforcing an act claimed to
be unconstitutional.
(B) Yes, the order was not a proprietary act of the
government.
(C) No, only the president may raise the defense
of immunity from suit.
(D) Yes, Secretary Chua cannot be sued for acts
done in pursuance to his public ofce.

(81) Anton was the duly elected Mayor of

Tunawi in the local elections of 2004. He got 51%
of all the votes cast. Fourteen months later, Victo-
ria, who also ran for mayor, filed with the Local
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND Pusuc INTERNATIONAL LAW 111
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Election Registrar, a petition for recall against

Anton. The COMELEC approved the petition and
set a date for its signing by other qualified voters
in order to garner at least 25% of the total number
of registered voters or total number of those who
actually voted during the local election in 2005,
whichever is lower. Anton attacked the COME-
LEC resolution for being invalid. Do you agree
with Anton?
(A) No, the petition, though initiated by just one
person, may be ratied by at least 25% of the total
number of registered voters.
(B) No, the petition, though initiated by just one
person may be ratied by at least 25% of those who
actually voted during the 2004 local elections.
(C) Yes, the petition should be initiated by at
least 25% of the total number of registered voters
who actually voted during the 2004 local elections.
(D) Yes, the petition should beinitiated by at
least 25% of the total number of registered
voters of Tunawi.
(82) Using the description of the supplier of
shabu given by persons who had been arrested
earlier for selling it, the police conducted a sur-
veillance of the area indicated. When they saw a
man who fitted (sic) the description walking from
the apartment to his car, they approached and
frisked him and he did not object. The search
yielded an unlicensed gun tucked on his waist
and shabu in his car. Is the search valid?
112 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(A) No, the man did not manifest any suspi-

cious behavior that would give the police suf-
ficient reason to search him.
(B) Yes, the police acted on reliable information
which proved correct when they searched the man
and his car.
(C) Yes, the man should be deemed to have
waived his right to challenge the search when he
failed to object to the frisking.
(D) No, reliable information alone, absent any
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the man was
actually committing an offense, will not validate
the search.

law interfering with the rights of the

(83) A
person meets the requirements of substantive due
process when

(A) the means employed is not against public pol-

icy.
(B) it is in accord with the prescribed manner of
enforcement as to time, place, and person.
(C) all affected parties are given the chance to be
heard.
(D) the interest of the general public, as dis-
tinguished from those of a particular case,
requires such interference.
(84) A judge of the Regional Trial Court de-
rives his powers and duties from

(A) statute.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 13
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoossnao ANSWERS

(B) the President, the appointing power.

(C) Supreme Court issuances.
(D) the rules of court.

(85) When an elective official’s preventive

suspension will result in depriving his constitu-
ents of his services or representation, the court
may

(A) require the investigating body to expe-

dite the investigation.
(B) hold in abeyance the period of such suspen-
sion.
(C) direct the holding of an election to ll up the
temporary vacancy.
(D) shorten the period of such suspension.

(86) When the State requires private ceme-

teries to reserve 10% of their lots for burial of the
poor, it exercises its
(A) eminent domain power.
(B) zoning power.
(C) police power.
(D) taxing power.
(87) In the valid exercise of management
prerogative consistent with the company’s right
to protect its economic interest, it may prohibit
its e mployees from
(A) joining rallies during their work shift.
114 BAR Q & A
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(B) marrying employees of competitor companies.

(C) publicly converging with patrons of competi-
tor companies.
(D) patronizing the product of competitor
companies.

(88) The President issued an executive order

directing all department heads to secure his con-
sent before agreeing to appear during question
hour before Congress on matters pertaining to
their departments. Is the executive order uncon-
stitutional for suppressing information of public
concern?
(A) No, because those department heads are his
alter egos and he is but exercising his right against
self-incrimination.
(B) Yes, the President cannot control the initia-
tive of the department heads to conform with the
oversight function of Congress.
(C) Yes, the President cannot withhold consent to
the initiative of his department heads as it will vio-
late the principle of check and balance.
(D) No, the President has the power to with-
hold consent to appearance by his depart-
ment heads during question hour.
(89) When the President contracted a per-
sonal loan during his incumbency, he may be sued
for sum of money
(A) during his term of office.
(B) during his tenure of office.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 115
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(C) after his term of ofce.

(D) after his tenure of office.

(90) The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

summoned X, a former department secretary, to
shed light on his alleged illicit acquisition of
properties claimed by the Presidential Commis-
sion on Good Government. X sought to restrain
the Committee from proceeding with its investi-
gation because of a pending criminal case against
him before the Sandiganbayan for ill-gotten
wealth involving the same properties. Decide. The
investigation may
(A) not be restrained on ground of separation of
powers.
(B) be restrained on ground of prejudicial ques-
tion.
(C) not be restrained on ground of presumed va-
lidity of legislative action.
(D) be restrained for being sub judice.

[Note: (A) is offered as an acceptable answer as this would be

considered as consistent with the rule that the conduct and subjects
of legislative inquiries are political questions. (De la Paz v. Senate,
G.R. N0. 184849, February 13, 2009)]

(91) A government that actually exercises

power and control as opposed to the true and law-
ful government is in terms of legitimacy
(A) a government of force.
(B) an interim government.
(C) a de facto government.
116 BAR Q & A
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(D) an illegitimate government.

(92) The Special Committee on Naturaliza-

tion is headed by
(A) the Secretary of Justice.
(B) the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
(C) the National Security Adviser.
(D) the Solicitor General.

(93) The President issued Proclamation 9517

declaring a state of emergency and calling the
armed forces to immediately carry out necessary
measures to suppress terrorism and lawless vio-
lence. In the same proclamation, he directed the
government’s temporary takeover of the opera-
tions of all privately owned communication utili-
ties, prescribing reasonable terms for the take-
over. Is the takeover valid?

(A) Yes, it is an implied power owing from the

President’s exercise of emergency power.
(B) No, it is a power reserved for Congress
alone.
(C) Yes, subject to ratication by Congress.
(D) No, it is a power exclusively reserved for the
People’s direct action.

(94) A candidate for Senator must be at least

35 years old on

(A) the day he is duly proclaimed.

(B) the day the election is held.
 2011 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 117
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(C) the day he les his certicate of candidacy.

(D) the day he takes his oath of ofce.

(95) The Office of the Special Prosecutor may

file an information against a public officer for
graft
(A) on its own initiative subject to withdrawal of
the information by the Ombudsman.
(B) independently of the Ombudsman, except in
plunder cases.
(C) only when authorized by the Ombuds-
man.
(D) independently of the Ombudsman.

(96) Since the Constitution is silent as to who

can appoint the Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights, the President appointed W to that
position without submitting his appointment to
the Commission on Appointments for confirma-
tion. Is W’s appointment by the President valid?
(A) No, since the position of Chairman of the
Commission was created by statute, the appoint-
ment of its holder requires the consent of Congress.
(B) Yes, since the power to appoint in the
government, if not lodged elsewhere, belongs
to the President as Chief Executive.
(C) Yes, since the power to ll up all government
positions mentioned in the Constitution has been
lodged in the President.
118 BAR Q & A
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(D) No, because absent any express authority un-

der the Constitution, the power to appoint does not
exist.

(97) The Chief Justice appointed X, the

President’s sister, as Assistant Court Administra-
tor in the Supreme Court during the President’s
tenure. Claiming that the Constitution prohibits
the appointment in government of a President’s
relative, a taxpayer asks for its nullification. Will
the challenge prosper?
(A) Yes, since the appointment essentially vio-
lates the law against nepotism.
(B) Yes, because relatives of the President within
the fourth civil degree cannot be appointed as
heads of ofces in any department of government.
(C) No, X’s appointment, although in the govern-
ment, is not in the Executive Department that the
President heads.
(D) No, the position to which X was ap-
pointed is not among those prohibited under
the Constitution.
(98) May an incumbent Justice of the Su-
preme Court be disbarred as a lawyer?
(A) No, it will amount to removal.
(B) No, his membership in the bar is secure.
(C) Yes, by the Supreme Court itself.
(D) Yes, by Congress injoint session.
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(99) Mayor Lucia of Casidsid filed her cer-

tificate of candidacy for congresswoman of the
district covering Casidsid. Still, she continued to
act as mayor of Casidsid without collecting her
salaries as such. When she lost the election and a
new mayor assumed office, she filed an action to
collect the salaries she did not get while serving
as mayor even when she ran for congresswoman.
Is her action correct?
(A) No, salaries can be waived and she Waived
them.
(B) No, because her acts as de facto officer
are void insofar as she is concerned.
(C) Yes, public policy demands that a de facto of-
cer enjoy the same rights of a de jure ofcer.
(D) A. Yes, it is but just that she be paid for the
service she rendered.

(100) X, a Filipino and Y, an American, both

teach at the International Institute in Manila. The
institute gave X a salary rate of P1,000 per hour
and Y, P1,250 per hour plus housing, transporta-
tion, shipping costs, and leave travel allowance.
The school cited the dislocation factor and limited
tenure of Y to justify his high salary rate and ad-
ditional benefits. The same package was given to
the other foreign teachers. The Filipino teachers
assailed such differential treatment, claiming it is
discriminatory and violates the equal protection
clause. Decide.

(A) The classification is based on superficial

differences.
 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(B) The classication undermines the “Filipino

First” policy.
(C) The distinction is fair considering the burden
of teaching abroad.
(D) The distinction is substantial and uniformly
applied to each class.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIoNAL LAW 121
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2012
Set A
1. Constitution is defined by Cooley as:
a. of statutory, administrative and
a body
political provisions by which the three branches of
government are dened.
b. a body of rules and maxims in accor-
dance with which the powers of sovereignty
are habitually exercised.
c. a body of rules and edicts emanating from
the rulings of courts and written guidelines of the
executive and the legislature by which government
is governed.
d. a body of interpretations and rules by
which the three branches of government are judged
for purposes of sovereign compliance with good cor-
porate governance.

2. The three essential parts of a Constitu-

tion are:
a. the bill of rights, governmental or-
ganization and functions, and method of
amendment.
b. the preamble, the bill of rights, and provi-
sions on checks and balances.
c. the national territory, the declaration of
principles and state policies, and the transitory
provisions.
122 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

d. the executive department, the legislative

department and the judiciary.

3.The constitutional provision on initiative

and referendum is not self-executory. This is so
because it requires:

a. an implementing resolution from the

COMELEC.
b. an implementing resolution from the Su-
preme Court.
c. an implementing legislation.
d. an implementing resolution from the
party-list representative of the House of Represen-
tatives.

4. In an amendment to the constitution by

“initiative and referendum”, the “initiative” phase
is meant that the people propose the amendments.
There is a valid proposal when a proposition has
received the approval of:
a. at least 8% of the persons of majority age
of each district, and 12% of the registered voters of
the region from proposal emanates.
b. at least 3% of the registered voters of each
province and 12% of the total number of registered
voters nationwide.
c. at least 3% of the registered voters of
each district and 12% of the total number of
registered voters nationwide.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 123
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

more than 3% of the 3% of the registered

d.
voters of each district but less than 12% of the total
number of registered voters nationwide.

5. The Constitution declares that the Phil-

ippines is a republican state. Republicanism
means:

a. the form of government must be presiden-

tial.
the representatives of the govern-
b.
ment are elected by the people.
c. sovereignty resides in the elected repre-
sentatives of the government.
d. the form of government cannot be
changed by the people.

6. A chief characteristic of the presidential

form of government is:
a. concentration of power in the judiciary
thru the power of expanded judicial review.
b. supremacy of the presidency compared to
the totality of powers of the legislative.
c. regular periodic election of the
President for a fixed term.
d. unlimited term for the President for as
long as elected by the people in free and honest
elections.

7. Which of the following best exemplifies

how the system of checks and balances is carried
out:
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a. the legislature passes a law that prohibits

the president from commuting a judiciary imposed
sentence, as a check of the president.
b. the President pardons a convict as a
way to set aside or modify a judgment of the
judiciary.
c. the judiciary overturns a pardon granted
by the President as a check on executions.
d. the President pardons an accused after
arraignment in the interest of j ustice.

8. Which phrase best completes the state-

ment - The starting point of the principle of sepa-
ration of powers is the assumption of the division
of the functions of government into three distinct
classes:

a. the bill of rights, state policies, and social

justice and human rights.
b. the accountability of public officers, the
constitutional commissions, and the national econ-
omy and patrimony.
c. the self-executing provisions, the non-self-
executing provisions, and the self-evident social
justice provisions.
d. the executive, the legislative, and the
judicial.
9. The Constitution provides that the “sepa-
ration of church and state shall be inviolable.”
This is implemented most by the constitutional
principles embodied in:
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 125
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

a. the free exercise clause.

b. the non-establishment clause.
c. the freedom of religious belief clause.
d. the freedom of religion clause.

10. Which one of the following is a non-self-

executing provision of the Constitution:
a. no law shall be passed abridging the free-
dom of speech.
b. no law shall be made respecting an estab-
lishment of religion.
c. no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
d. the state shall encourage and support
researches and studies on the arts and cul-
ture.
11. Basic Philippine law, in respect of the
modes of acquiring citizenship, follows the rule(s)
of:

a. jus soli andjus sanguinis.

b. naturalization and provides for jus soli.
c. jus sanguinis and provides for natu-
ralization.
d. none of the above.

12. Dual allegiance by citizen is:

a. inimical to the national interest and is
therefore proscribed by law.
126 BAR Q & A
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b. inimical to the national interest and is

therefore prescribed by law.
c. inimical to the national interest and
therefore shall be dealt with by law.
d. inimical to the national interest and is
therefore outside of coverage of law.

13. Margarita was born in 1986 to a Filipino

mother and Swedish father. She has been living
and continues to live in the US for the last 20
years and has also been naturalized as a US citi-
zen. She recently reacquired Philippine citizen-
ship under RA 9225, the Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Can Margarita vote
in the next national elections?
a. Yes. Dual citizens who are not resi-
dents may register under the Overseas Absen-
tee Voting Law.
b. Yes. Margarita is a Filipino citizen and
thus may enjoy the right to suffrage like everyone
else without registering as an overseas absentee
voter.
c. No. Margarita fails the residency require-
ment under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
for Filipinos.
d. No. Dual citizens upon renunciation of
their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign
citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned
their domicile and severed their legal ties to their
homeland as a consequence.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 127
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

14. Identify which one is an invalid exercise

of the legislative power:
a. legislation by local government on purely
local matters.
b. law granting an administrative
agency the power to define policy and fix
standards on price control.
c. law authorizing the President, in times of
war or other national emergency, for a limited pe-
riod, subject to prescribed restrictions, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a de-
clared national policy.
d. law authorizing the President to x,
Within specic limits, tariff rates, import and ex-
port quotas, and other duties, within the frame-
work of the national development program of the
government.

15. Which one of the following theories does

not support the valid delegation of authority by
the Congress to an administrative agency:
a. an administrative agency may “ll up the
details” of a statute.
b. the legislature may leave to another body
the ascertainment of facts necessary to bring the
law into actual operation.
c.an administrative agency has equal
expertise with the legislature in crafting and
implementing laws.
d. contingent legislation.
128 BAR Q & A
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16. The rule in Article V1, Section 5 (3) of the

Constitution that “Each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, com-
pact and adjacent territory” is a prohibition
against:

a. re-apportionment.
b. commandeering of votes.
c. Gerrymandering.
d. re-districting.

17.Article V1, Section 5(3) of the Constitu-

tion requires that for a city to be entitled to have
at least one representative, its population shall be
at least:

a. 250,000.
b. 150,000.
c. 100,000.
d. 175,000.

A Senator or Member of the House of

18.
Representatives shall be privileged from arrest
while Congress is in session for all offenses pun-
ishable by imprisonment of not more than:
a. life imprisonment.
b. reclusion perpetua.
c. six years imprisonment.
d. four years imprisonment.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 129
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

19. No Senator or member of the House of

Representatives may personally appear as coun-
sel before:

a. any regional court.

b. any court of justice.
c. any inferior court.
d. any appellate court.

20. Which of the following can be changed by

an ordinary law enacted by Congress?

a.Commencement of the term of office

of Senators.
b. Date of regular election for President and
Vice Presidential.
c. Authority to transfer appropriation.
d. Regular election of the members of Con-
gress.

[Notez (d) is offered as an acceptable answer. (Constitution, Ar-

ticle VII, Section 4, 3"’ paragraph)]

21. Congress shall have the sole power to de-

clare the existence of a state of war by vote of:
a. three-fourths of both Houses in joint ses-
sion assembled, voting jointly.
b.two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting jointly.
c. two-thirds of both Houses in separate ses-
sion assembled, voting jointly.
130 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND Pusuc INTERNATIONAL LAW

d. two-thirds of both Houses in joint

session, voting separately.

22. If by the end of any fiscal year, the Con-

gress shall have failed to pass the general appro-
priations bill for the ensuring fiscal year, the gen-
eral appropriations law for the preceding fiscal
year shall be deemed:
a. referred.
b. unacted.
c. relled.
d. re-enacted.

23. Provisionsunrelated to an appropriation

bill are considered prohibited. These are called:
a. interlopers.
b. riders.
c. outriggers.
d. add-ons.

24. The requirement that “Every bill shall

embrace only one subject which shall be ex-
pressed in the title thereof” prevents:
a. rollercoaster legislation.
b. log-rolling legislation.
c. rolling elds legislation.
d. loggerhead legislation.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

25. The power of the President to veto any

particular part in an appropriation revenue, or
tariff bill, is called the:
a. specic veto.
b. revenue veto.
c. item veto.
d. monetary veto.

26. A tax is progressive when:

a. the rate uctuates as the tax base de-
creases.
b. the rate increases as the tax base remains
the same.
c. the rate increases as the tax base in-
creases.
d. the rate decreases as the tax base in-
creases.

27. When the Supreme Court sits en banc,

cases are decided by the concurrence of a major-
ity of the members who:
a. actually sent in memos on matters for de-
liberation and called in their votes thereon.
b. actually participated in the oral argu-
ments and voted thereon.
c. actually took part in the delibera-
tions on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
132 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

d. actually took part in the voting thereon

and took notes on the actual deliberations.

28. When the Supreme Court sits in division,

cases can be decided by as few as a minimum of:

a. three votes.
b. four votes.
c. ve votes.
d. six votes.

29. A person who has a personal and subs-

tantial interest in the case, such that he has sus-
tained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement is considered to have:
a. understanding to challenge the govern-
mental act.
b. standing to challenge the govern-
mental act.
c. opportunity to challenge the governmen-
tal act.
d. familiarity to challenge the governmental
act.

30. Congressman Sugar Oll authored a bill

called House Bill No, 0056 which legalizes jueteng.
When the Bill became law (RA 10156), Fr. Nosu
Gal, a priest, filed a petition seeking for the nulli-
fication of RA 10156 on the ground that it is un-
constitutional as it violates Section 13, Article II,
of the 1987 Constitution which states that “The
state recognizes the vital role of the youth in na-
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 133
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

tion-building and shall promote and protect their

physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being”. Fr. Gal filed the petition as a con-
cerned citizen and as taxpayer. Does Fr. Gal have
locus standi?

a. No, because Fr. Gal has no personal

and substantial interest that will be preju-
diced by the implementation of the law.
b. N0, the law concerns neither citizens nor
expenditure of public funds.
c. Yes, because the issue is of transcenden-
tal importance.
d. Yes, because as priest, Fr. Gal has special
interest in the well-being of the youth.

31. Where there is “the impossibility of a

court’s undertaking independent resolution with-
out expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentially of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncement by vari-
ous departments on a question,” describes what
kind of political question:
a. adherence kind.
b. prudential kind.
c. respectful kind.
d. deference kind.

32. The “operative fact” doctrine of constitu-

tional law is applied when a law is declared:
134 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

a. operative.
b. factual.
c. constitutional.
d. unconstitutional.
33. The totality of governmental power is
contained in three great powers:
a. police power, power of sequestration,
power of foreign policy.
b. power of immigration, municipal power,
legislative power.
c. executive power, legislative power,
judicial power.
d. police power, power of eminent domain,
power of taxation.

[Note: (d) can be considered also as an acceptable answer.]

34. The most essential, insistent and the least

limitable of (government) powers, extending as it
does to all the great public needs, is:

a. emergency power.
b. police power.
c. legislative power.
d. power to declare martial law.

35. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, which

right occupies the highest preferred position:
a. right to academic freedom.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 135
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

b. right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

c. right to freedom of expression and of
assembly.
d. right to equal health.
36. In which of the following would there be
no double jeopardy even if a subsequent case is
filed?
a.Pot is accused before the RTC of qualied
theft. After innumerable postponements against
Pot’s wishes, he moves for dismissal for denial of
the right to a speedy trial. Prosecutor objected.
Dismissal granted.
b. Pot is accused before the RTC of
qualified theft. After innumerable postpone-
ments against Pot’s wishes, the prosecutor
moves for dismissal with the consent of Pot.
Granted.
c. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualied
theft. After innumerable postponements against
Pot’s Wishes, he moves for dismissal for denial of
the right to a speedy trial. Prosecutor posts no ob-
jections. Dismissal granted.
d. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualied
theft. After innumerable postponements against
Pot’s wishes, the prosecutor moves for dismissal
over the objections of Pot. Granted.

37. Under Article III, Section 2 of the Bill of

Rights, which provides for the exclusion of evi-
dence that violates the right to privacy of com-
munication and correspondence, to come under
136 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

the exclusionary rule, the evidence must be ob-

tained by:
a. private individuals acting on their own.
b. government agents.
c. private individuals acting on orders of su-
periors.
d. former high government ofcials.

38. The complementing regime that best

characterizes the guarantees of freedom of speech
and of the press are:

a. prior punishment and moderate punish-

ment.
b. prior censorship and subsequent reme-
dies.
c. no prior restraint and subsequent pun-
ishment.
d. no prior restraint and no subsequent
punishment.
39. Thefree exercise and non-establishment
clauses pertain to which right under the Bill of
Rights:
a. Liberty of movement.
b. Liberty of abode.
c. Religion.
d. Life and liberty.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 137
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

40. The Gangnam Style’s Witnesses (whose

tenets are derogatory to the Catholic Church),
applied for a permit to use the public plaza and
kiosk to hold their religious meeting on the occa-
sion of their founding anniversary. Mayor Lebron
allowed them to use the northwestern part of the
plaza but not the kiosk (which is a few meters
away from the Catholic church). Members of the
Gangnam Style Witnesses claim that the act of
Mayor Lebron is a violation of their freedom of
assembly and religion. Is this correct?

a. N0, because this is valid exercise of police

power.
b. Yes, because the plaza being of public use
can be used by anybody regardless of religious be-
lief.
c. No, because historical experience shows
that peace and order may be disturbed whenever
two opposing religious groups or beliefs expound
their dogmas.
d. Yes, because there is no clear and
present danger in holding a religious meeting
by another religious group near a catholic
church.
41. Which one is NOT a recognized limitation
to the right to information on matters of public
concern:
a. national security matters.
b. trade secrets and banking transactions.
138 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

c. criminal matters or classied law en-

forcement matters.
d. government research data used as a
basis for policy development.

42. Which one of the following circumstances

is NOT an element of taking under eminent do-
main?

a. entering upon public property for a

momentary period.
b. under color of legal authority.
c. devoting it to public use.
d. as substantially to oust the owner of all
benecial ownership.

43. Market value for purposes of determining

just compensation in eminent domain has been
described as the fair value of property:
a. between one who desires to purchase and
one does not desire to sell.
b. between one who desires to purchase and
one who wants to delay selling.
c. between one who desires to purchase
and one who desires to sell.
d. between one who desires to purchase on
terms and one who desires to sell after a period of
time.

44. Under Article III, Section 12 of the Con-

stitution, any person under investigation for the
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

commission of an offense shall have the right to

be informed of his right to remain silent, etc. The
investigation referred to is called:
a. preliminary investigation.
b. summary investigation.
c. criminal investigation.
d. custodial investigation.
45. All persons charged shall, before convic-
tion, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except
those charged with:

a. offenses punishable by death when evi-

dence of guilt is strong.
offenses punishable by life impris-
b.
onment when evidence of guilt is strong.
c. offenses punishable by death when evi-
dence of guilt is weak.
d. offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong.

[Notez (d) is offered as an acceptable answer.]

46. Criminal trial may proceed, notwith-

standing the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified, and his failure to ap-
pear is unjustifiable, after:
a. preliminary investigation.
b. arraignment.
c. sentencing.
140 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

d. prosecution has rested its case.

47. The requisites of a valid trial in absentia

exclude:

a. Wherein his/her failure to appear is un-

justifiable.
b. Wherein he/she allows himself/herself
to be identified by the witness in his/her ab-
sence, without further unqualified admitting
that every time a witness mentions a name by
which he/she is known, it shall be understood
to refer to him/her.
c. Wherein he/she has been duly notied of
the trial.
d. Wherein the accused has already been ar-
raigned.

48. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

shall not be suspended except in cases of:
a. imminent danger of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it.
b. grave danger of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it.
c. clear and present danger of invasion or
rebellion when the public safety requires it.
d. invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it.

49. Theright of the accused against self-

incrimination will be violated if:
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

a. he is charged with violation of the

Anti-Money Laundering Act and he was re-
quired to produce his bank passbook.
b. he is a public ofcer charged with amass-
ing ill-gotten wealth and his statement of assets
and liabilities will be presented as evidence.
c. his gun was subjected to a ballistics test.
d. a sample of his blood was taken if his
blood type matches the blood type found at the
scene of the crime.

50. The death penalty shall not be imposed:

a. unless for compelling reasons involving
death penalty crimes and the executive hereafter
provides for it.
b. unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes and a constitutional amendment
provides for it.
c. unless for compelling reasons involv-
ing heinous crimes and Congress hereafter
provides for it.
d. unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes and the Supreme Court hereafter
upholds it.

51. An ex post facto law has been defined as

01162

a. which aggravates a crime or makes it

lesser than when it was committed.
b.which mitigates a crime or makes it lesser
than when it was committed.
142 BARQ&A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

C. which aggravates a crime or makes it

greater than when it was committed.
d. which aggravates a crime or makes it non-
criminal after it was committed.

52. A bill of attainder is:

8. an executive act which inicts punish-
ment without tender.
b. a judicial act which inicts punishment
Without tender.
C. a legislative act which inicts pun-
ishment without trial.
d. a legislative act which pardons punish-
ment after tender.

53. Which one of the following is NOT an in-

dependent Constitutional Commission under Ar-
ticle IX, Section 1 of the Constitution:
a. Commission on Elections.
b. Commission on Human Rights.
c. Civil Service Commission.
d. Commission on Audit.

54. The independent Constitutional Commis-

sions enjoy:

a. decisional autonomy.
b. organizational autonomy.
c. fiscal autonomy.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

d. quasi-judicial autonomy.

55. The Civil Service shall be administered

by the Civil Service Commission composed of a:

a. Chairman and a Commissioner.

b. Chairman and two (2) Commissioners.
c. Chairman and three (3) Commissioners.
d. Chairman and four (4) Commissioners.

56. In Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No.

101083,July 30, 1993, the Supreme Court held that
the personality of the petitioners to sue is based
on the concept of:
a. ecological responsibility.
b. environmental accountability.
c. intergenerational responsibility.
d. interdisciplinary responsibility.

57. In a unitary system of government, such

as the government under the Philippine Constitu-
tor, local government can only be:
a. an imperuim in imperio.
b. an infa-sovereign subdivision.
c. a sovereign nation.
d. a sovereign entity.

58. Which one is NOT among the Constitu-

tionally mandated grounds for impeachment of
impeachable officials:
144 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

a. culpable violation of the Constitution.

b. treason, bribery, graft and corruption and
other high crimes.
c. betrayal of public trust.
d. culpable violation of the duty to be at
all times accountable to the people.
59. Which is NOT an impeachable public offi-
cer?

a. A justice of the Supreme Court.

b. A commissioner of the Comelec.
c. The administrator of the Supreme
Court.
d. The Ombudsman.

60. Which has the exclusive power to initiate

all cases of impeachment?
a. The Senate.
b. The House of Representatives.
c. The Senate President.
d. The Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives.

61. At least one-third of all the members of

the House of Representatives may file articles of
impeachment by:
a. veried bill and resolution.
b. verified complaint and resolution.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 145
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

c. veried notice and resolution.

d. veried complaint and notice.

62. The President cannot grant pardon in

cases of impeachment. He may however exercise
such power when:

a. a person convicted in an impeach-

ment proceeding is subject to prosecution,
trial and punishment in an ordinary criminal
action.
b. a person convicted in an impeachment
proceeding is granted an absolute pardon.
c. a person convicted in an impeachment
proceeding les his appeal before the Supreme
Court.
d. None of the above.

63. A public officer impeached and removed

from office shall:
a. nevertheless be immune from prosecution,
trial and punishment according to law.
b. nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
c. nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according
to law.
d. nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment only for criminal
acts under the law.
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64. The Ombudsman and his deputies are

appointed by the President from a list prepared
by:

a. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

b. the Commission on Appointments.
c. the Judicial and Bar Council.
d. the Supreme Court.

65. SALN means:

a. Summary of assets, liabilities and net

Worth.
b. Statement of assets in banks, liabilities
and net worth.
c. Statement of assets, liabilities and
net worth.
d. Statement of personal assets, liabilities
and net worth.

66. The independent economic planning

agency of the Government as provided for by the
Constitution is the:
a. National Privatization Office.
b. National Productivity Commission.
c. National Economic Development Au-
thority.
d. National Economic Council.

67. The Independent Central Monetary Au-

thority of the Government is the:
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

a. Bankers Association of the Philippines.

b. Philippine Mission of the International
Monetary Fund.
c. Central Bank of the Philippines.
d. World Bank, Philippine Afliate.

68. The President may contract or guarantee

foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines only upon prior concurrence of the:
a. House of Representatives.
b. Senate.
c. Central Bank.
d. Monetary Board.
69. Bona fide associations of citizens which
demonstrate capacity of promote the public inter-
est and with identifiable leadership, membership,
and structure are:
a. independent party-list organizations.
b. independent sectoral organizations.
c. independent indigenous organizations.
d. independent people’s organizations.
70. The principal function of the Commission
on Human Rights is:
a. issue Writs of injunctionl restraining or-
ders
b. investigatory.
148 BAR Q & A
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c. quasi-judicial.
d. rule-making.

71. Optional religious instruction in public

elementary and high schools is allowed provided
it be:
a. without additional overtime cost to Gov-
ernment.
b. without additional cost to Govern-
ment.
c. Without additional cost for religious books
to Government.
d. without additional power consumption
costs to Government.

72. Academic freedom shall be enjoyed:

a. in all public institutions.

b. in all elementary and high schools.
c. in all schools.
d. in all institutions of higher learning.
73. Under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which one of the
following is NOT considered a source of interna-
tional law:
a. international conventions.
b. international custom.
c. international humanitarian law.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 149
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

d. general principles of law.

74. In international law, it is a norm which

States cannot derogate or deviate from their
agreements:

a. terra nullius.
b. opinio juris.
c. jus cogens.
d. jus cogentus.
[Notez (c) is selected because it is closest to the correct answer,
which is pacta sunt sevanda.]

75. In international law, the status of an en-

tity as a State is accepted by other States through
this act. It is the “act by which another State ac-
knowledges that the political entity recognized
attributes of statehood.”
possesses the

a. Accession.
b. Recognition.
c. Acknowledgment.
d. Attribution.

76. An act or process by which a State, in

compliance with a formal demand or request, sur-
renders to another State an alleged offender or
fugitive criminal who has sought refuge in the
territory of the first State, in order to stand trial
or complete his prison term.
a. Extramediation.
150 BAR Q & A
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b. Exterrertioriality.
c. Extradition.
d. extraterritoriality.
This doctrine considers the general or
77.
customary norms of international law as a part of
municipal law and are to be enforced as such,
without regard as to whether they are enacted as
statutory or legislative rules or not.
a. Accession.
b. Incorporation.
c. Accretion.
d. Adoption.

78. Under the United Nations Conference of

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the extent of the
contiguous zone is:
a. 3 nautical miles from the lowest Water
mark.
b. 12 miles from the outer limits.
c. 12 miles from the lowest water mark.
d. 200 miles from the outer limits.

79. It is a line from which the breadth of the

territorial sea and other maritime zones is meas-
ured.
a. contiguous line.
b. economic line.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 151
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

c. baseline.
d. archipelagic line.

80. It is a maritime zone adjacent to the ter-

ritorial seas where the coastal state may exercise
certain protective jurisdiction:
a. baseline zone.
b. contiguous zone.
c. transit zone.
d. appurtenant zone.

81. Butchoy installed a jumper cable. He was

prosecuted under a Makati ordinance penalizing
such act. He moved for its dismissal on the ground
that the jumper cable was within the territorial
jurisdiction of Mandaluyong and not Makati. The
case was dismissed. The City of Mandaluyong
thereafter filed a case against him for theft under
the Revised Penal Code (RCP). Is there double
jeopardy?
a. No. The rst jeopardy was terminated
with his express consent.
b.Yes. This is double jeopardy of the second
kind — prosecution for the same act under an ordi-
nance and a law.
c. Yes. He is prosecuted for the same offense
which has already been dismissed by the City of
Makati.
No. The second kind of double jeop-
d.
ardy under Section 21, Article III only con-
152 BAR Q & A
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templates conviction or acquittal which could

terminate a first jeopardy.
of the cardinal primary due process
82. One
rights in administrative proceedings is that evi-
dence must be “substantial.” “Substantial evi-
dence” is:

a. less than a mere scintilla.

b. less than preponderant scintilla.
c. more than a glint of scintilla.
d. more than a mere scintilla.
A statutory provision requiring the
83.
President or an administrative agency to present
the proposed implementing rules and regulations
of a law to Congress which by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or
“power” to approve or disapprove such regula-
tions before they may take effect, is a:
a. legislative encroachment.
b. legislative veto.
c. legislative oversight.
d. legislative scrutiny.

of the enumeration below does

84. Which one
not come under the Administrative Code defini-
tion of a “rule”?
a. Agency statement of general applicability
that implements or interprets a law.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

b. Fixes and describes the procedures in or

practice requirements of, an agency.
c. Includes memoranda and statements con-
cerning internal administration.
d. An agency process for the formula-
tion of a final order.
85. Under the Administrative Code, “adjudi-
cation” means:
a. whole or any part of any agency permit,
certicate, or other form of permission, or regula-
tion of the exercise of a right or privilege.
b. an agency process for the formula-
tion of a final order.
c. agency process for the formulation,
amendment, or repeal of a rule.
d. agency process involving the grant, re-
newal, denial, revocation or conditioning of a li-
cense.

86. The requirement of the Administrative

Code on “public participation” is that, if not oth-
erwise required by law, an agency shall:

a. in all cases, publish or circulate notices of

proposed rules and afford interested parties the Op-
portunity to submit their views prior to the adop-
tion of any rule.
b. in all clear and proper cases, publish or
circulate notices of proposed rules and afford inter-
ested parties the opportunity to submit their views
prior to the adoption of any rule.
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C. as far as practicable, publish or circulate

notices of proposed rules and afford the party-list
parties the opportunity to submit their views prior
to the adoption of any rule.
d. as far as practicable, publish or cir-
culate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit
their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
87. Under the Administrative Code, in the
fixing of rates, no rules or final order shall be
valid unless:
3. the proposed rates shall have been sub-
mitted to the U.P. Law Center for publication at
least two weeks before the rst hearing thereon.
b. the proposed rates shall have been pub-
lished in the Official Gazette at least two weeks be-
fore the nal hearing thereon.
C. the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circula-
tion at least two weeks before the first hear-
ing thereon.
d. the proposed rates shall have been pub-
lished in a newspaper of general circulation at least
two weeks before the nal hearing thereon.

88. In the judicial review of decisions of ad-

ministrative agencies, the Administrative Code
requires that the review shall be made:
a. on the basis of the pleadings taken as a
whole.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 155
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

b. on the basis of the record taken as a

whole.
c. on the basis of the evidence taken as a
whole.
d. on the basis of the memoranda taken as a
Whole.

89. In the judicial review of decisions of ad-

ministrative agencies, the Administrative Code
requires that, except when specifically provided
otherwise by law:
8. the ndings of law of agency when sup-
ported by substantial evidence, shall be nal.
b. the ndings of fact of the agency when
supported by preponderant evidence, shall be nal.
c. the findings of fact of the agency
when supported by substantial evidence,
shall be final.
d. the ndings of law of the agency when
supported by credible evidence, shall be nal.

90. The right of the accused to be informed is

violated if:
3. he was accused of killing his wife by
strangulation but it was proven that his wife
died of poisoning.
b. it Was proven that he killed somebody on
a date different from the one alleged in the infor-
mation.
156 BAR Q & A
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c. he was charged with parricide but was

convicted of murder, because it turned out that he
and the victim were not married.
d. the accused was charged with commission
of acts of lasciviousness and was convicted of unjust
vexation.

91. A criminal statute that “fails to give a

person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute” is:
a. void for fair notice.
b. void for arbitrariness.
c. void for vagueness.
d. void conclusively.

92. “Chilling effect” is a concept used in the

area of constitutional litigation affecting:

a. protected speech.
b. protected executive privilege.
c. protected legislative discretion.
d. protected judicial discretion.

93. In the law of libel and protected speech, a

person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or
mode of living, or by adopting a profession or call-
ing which gives the public a legitimate interest in
his doings, his affairs, and his character, has be-
001118 32

a. public figure.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 157
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

b. celebrity.
c. public official.
d. de facto public officer.

94. Which one of the following is not a proper

test in cases of challenges to governmental acts
that may violate protected speech?
a. Clear and present danger.
b. Balancing of interests.
c. Reasonable relation.
d. Dangerous tendency.

95. Commercial speech is entitled to:

a. more protection compared to other consti~
tutionally guaranteed expression.
b. equal protection compared to other consti-
tutionally guaranteed expression.
c. lesser protection compared to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression.
d. none of the above.

96. No liability can attach to a false, defama-

tory statement if it relates to official conduct,
unless the public official concerned proves that
the statement was with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. This is known as what rule?

a. Libel malice rule.

b. Actual malice rule.
158 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

c. Malice in fact rule.

d. Legal malice rule.

97. It is a form of entrapment. The method is

for an officer to pose as a buyer. He, however, nei-
ther instigates nor induces the accused to commit
a crime because in these cases, the “seller” has
already decided to commit a crime. The offense
happens right before the eyes of the officer. Un-
der these circumstances:
a. there is a need for an administrative but
not a judicial warrant for seizure of goods and ar-
rest of the offender.
b. there is need for a warrant for the seizure
of the goods and for the arrest of the offender.
c. there is no need for a warrant either
for the seizure of the goods or for the arrest
of the offender.
d. the offender can be arrested but there is a
need for a separate Warrant for the seizure of the
goods.

98. Where a police officer observes unusual

conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he
is dealing may be armed and dangerous and he
identifies himself and makes reasonable inquiries,
but nothing serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or other’s safety, he is entitled to con-
duct a carefully limited search of the outer cloth-
ing of such persons for weapons. Such search is
constitutionally permissible and is known as a:
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

a. stop and search.

b. stop and frisk.
c. stop and interrogate.
d. stop and detain.

99. Accused was charged with slight illegal

detention. On the day set for the trial, the trial
court proceeded as follows:

“Court: to the Q: “Do you have an attorney or

accused: are you going to plead guilty?”

A: “I have no lawyer and I will

plead guilty.”

Accused was then arraigned, pleaded guilty,

was found guilty and sentenced.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The
accused was deprived of his:

a. right to cross-examination.
b. right to be presumed innocent.
c. right to counsel.
d. right to production of evidence.
100. The constitutional right of an accused
“to meet the witnesses face to face” is primarily
for the purpose of affording the accused an op-
portunity to:
a. identify the witness.
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b. cross-examine the witness.

c. be informed of the Witness.
d. be heard.

Set B

I.

Mr. Violet was convicted by the RTC of

Estafa. On appeal, he filed with the Court of Ap-
peals a Motion to Fix Bail for Provisional Liberty
Pending Appeal. The Court of Appeals granted the
motion and set a bail amount in the sum of Five
(5) Million Pesos, subject to the conditions that he
secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor
of the place of his residence that he is a resident
of the area and that he will remain to be a resi-
dent therein until final judgment is rendered or
in case he transfers residence, it must be with
prior notice to the court”. Further, he was or-
dered to surrender his passport to the Division
Clerk of Court for safekeeping until the court or-
ders its return.

a. Mr. Violet challenges the conditions

imposed by the Court of Appeals as violative
of his liberty of abode and right to travel. De-
cide with reasons. (5%)
The challenge must be rejected.
The liberty of abode and right to travel are not ab-
solute rights and may be reasonably impaired, among
others, by upon the exercise by trial courts of their in-
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 161
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

herent power to limit the movements of persons charged

with a crime, including leaving the country, to ensure
that they can make themselves available at all times
whenever the Court requires their presence. (Silverio v.
Court ofAppeaZs, G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991)
It is submitted that the bail conditions imposed
upon Mr. Violet are reasonable and well within the
court’s authority. (Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-62100, May 30, 1986).

b. Are “liberty of abode” and “the right

to travel” absolute rights? Explain. What are
the respective exception/s to each right if
any? (5%)

The exercise of one’s right to travel or the freedom

to move from one place to another, as assured by the
Constitution, is not absolute. (Mirasol v. Department of
Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 158793, June 8,
2006, 490 SCRA 318, 353)
Under the provisions of Section 6 of Article III of
the Constitution, the liberty of abode and of changing
the same may be subject to “limits prescribed by law”
and may be impaired upon lawful order of the court.
Said provision likewise allows impairment of the
right to travel “in the interest of national security, pub-
lic safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.”
(Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017; Genuino
v. de Lima, G.R. No. 197930; Arroyo v. de Lima; G.R.
No. 199034; Arroyo v. ole Lima, G.R. No. 199046, April
17, 2018)
162 BAR Q & A
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II.
A verified impeachment complaint was filed
by two hundred (200) Members of the House of
Representatives against Madam Chief Justice
Blue. The complaint was immediately transmitted
to the Senate for trial.
a. Madam Chief Justice Blue challenges
such immediate transmittal to the Senate be-
cause the verified complaint 1) was not in-
cluded in the order of business of the House,
2) was not referred to the House Committee
on Justice for hearing and consideration for
sufficiency in form and substance, and 3) was
not submitted to the House Plenary for con-
sideration as enumerated in Paragraph (2),
Section 3, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Decide with reasons. (5%)

Her contentions are untenable.

Under Section 3 (4) of Article XI of the Constitu-
tion, “in case the veried complaint or resolution of im-
peachment is led by at least one-third of all the Mem-
bers of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.”
Considering that 200 Members of the House of
Representatives, or more than one-third of entire mem-
bership, led the complaint, there would be no need for
the inclusion of the matter in the order of business or
the referral of the same to the House Committee on
Justice.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 163
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

b. What is the purpose of Impeachment?

Does conviction prevent further prosecution
and punishment? Explain. (3%)

Impeachment, acknowledged as a method of na-

tional inquest into the conduct of public men, is an ex-
traordinary means of removal exercised by the legisla-
ture over a selected number of officials, the purpose
being to ensure the highest care in their indictment and
conviction and the imposition of special penalties in case
of a nding of guilt, taking into account the degree or
nature of the offense committed and the high status of
the wrongdoers. (Cruz and Cruz, Political Law, 2014
Edition, pages 730-731) The convicted ofcial may later
be prosecuted in an ordinary criminal action if the
ground for his conviction in the impeachment proceed-
ings is also an indictable offense. (Ibid., pages 749-750;
Constitution, Article XI, Section 3[7]).
c. Enumerate the grounds for im-
peachment. Is graft and corruption a ground
for impeachment? (2%)
Yes, graft and corruption are among the grounds
for impeachment.
The other grounds are culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, and
betrayal of public trust. (Constitution, Article XI, Sec-
tion 2)

III.
Mr. Brown, a cigarette vendor, was invited by
P01 White to a nearby police station. Upon arriv-
ing at the police station, Brown was asked to
stand side-by-side with five (5) other cigarette
164 BAR Q & A
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vendors in a police line-up. PO1 White informed

them that they were looking for a certain ciga-
rette vendor who snatched the purse of a passer-
by and the line-up was to allow the victim to point
at the vendor who snatched her purse. No ques-
tions were to be asked from the vendors.
a. Brown, afraid of a “set up” against
him, demanded that he be allowed to secure
his lawyer and for him to be present during
the police line-up. Is Brown entitled to coun-
sel? Explain (5%)

No, he is not.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of Article III
of the Constitution is available only during a custodial
investigation.
It is not available during a police line-up as this is
not considered part of the custodial investigation.
(Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 [1988]; People v. Lam-
sing, 248 SCRA 471; People v. Salvatierra, 276 SCRA
55; De la Torre v. Court ofAppeals, 294 SCRA 196; Peo-
ple v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012; People v.
Pepino, G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016)
A police line-up is not part of the custodial investi-
gation because during a police line-up, the process has
not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory
and it is usually the Witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of
the line-up. (People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13,
2012, citing People v. Amestuzo, 413 Phil. 500 [2001];
see People v. Pepino, GR. No. 174471, January 12, 2016)

b. Would the answer in (a.) be the same

if Brown was specifically invited by White be-
 2012 PoLITIcAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 165
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

cause an eyewitness to the crime identified

him as the perpetrator? Explain. (3%)

No, because, by reason of said invitation, it can now

be said that his custodial investigation has begun and,
because he is already considered as a suspect, he should
now be entitled to counsel.
A custodial investigation begins when there is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the
investigation has started to focus on a particular person
as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect
in connection with an alleged offense. (People v. Morial,
415 Phil. 310, 329 (2001); see People v. Lara, G.R. No.
199877, August 13, 2012)
It is signicant that, under Section 2 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 7438, “custodial investigation” shall in-
clude the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person
who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the “inviting” ofcer for any violation of law.
Briey
c. enumerate the so-called
“Miranda Rights”. (2%)
The so-called Miranda Rights are specied in Sec-
tion 12 (1) of Article III of the Constitution, which pro-
vides that any person under investigation for the com-
mission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
166 BAR Q & A
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IV.

Mr. Yellow and Mr. Orange were the leading

candidates in the vice-presidential elections. Af-
ter elections, Yellow emerged as the winner by a
slim margin of 100,000 votes. Undaunted, Orange
filed a protest with the Presidential Electoral Tri-
bunal (PET). After due consideration of the facts
and the issues, the PET ruled that Orange was the
real winner of the elections and ordered his im-
mediate proclamation.
a. Aggrieved, Yellow filed with the Su-
preme Court a Petition for Certiorari chal-
lenging the decision of the PET alleging grave
abuse of discretion. Does the Supreme Court
have jurisdiction? Explain. (3%)
It is submitted that the Supreme Court does not
have jurisdiction over the decision of the PET, because,
when it acted as such, or as the PET, it actually acted as
the Supreme Court, although referred to in that capac-
ity as the PET. In other words, the PET and the Su-
preme Court, in the resolution of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualications of the President
or Vice-President, are necessarily one and the same
institution. (Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribu-
nal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 and June 7,
2011)
Under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 167
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Would the answer in (a.) be the same

b.
if Yellow and Orange were contending for a
senatorial slot and it was the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) who issued the challenged rul-
ing? (3%)

No, because the Supreme Court may exercise juris-

diction over and review the decisions of the SET with
respect to contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualications of Senators for purposes of determining
whether or not they were promulgated with grave abuse
of discretion. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 221538, September 20, 2016)

c. What is the composition of the PET?

(2%)

The composition of the PET is the same as the

composition of the Supreme Court, i.e., the Chief Justice
and fourteen Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
sitting en bane. (Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4 [1],
in relation to Article VII, Section 4)

c. What is judicial power? Explain Briey.

(2%)

Under Section I of Article VIII of the Constitution,

judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discre-
tion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Govern-
ment.
168 BAR Q & A
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It further provides that judicial power shall be

vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
It should be added that the Supreme Court likewise
exercises judicial power when, as earlier noted, it acts
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualications of the President or Vice-
President (Constitution, Article VII, Section 4; Macalin-
tal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618,
November 23, 2010 and June 7, 2011); when it reviews,
in an appropriate proceeding led by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
or the extension thereof (Constitution, Article VII, Sec-
tion 18, 3“ paragraph; Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017); when it reviews on certiorari de-
cisions, orders or rulings of any of the Constitutional
Commissions (Constitution, Article IX-A, Section 7; see
Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017);
and whenever there are serious allegations that “a law
has infringed the Constitution,” in which case, “it be-
comes not only the right but the duty of the Court to
look into such allegations and, when warranted, uphold
the supremacy of the Constitution.” (Petitioner Organi-
zations v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147036-37,
April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 49) Verily, this duty includes
the power to set aside acts of government, even if not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (See Atong Paglaum, Inc. v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203766, April 2,
2013.)
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 169
BAR QUEsT1oNs AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

V.

Judge Red is the Executive Judge of Green

City. Red is known to have corrupt tendencies
and has a reputation Widely known among prac-
ticing lawyers for accepting bribes. Ombudsman
Grey, wishing to “clean up” the government from
errant public officials, initiated an investigation
on the alleged irregularities in the performance of
duties of Judge Red.
a. Judge Red refused to recognize the
authority of the Office of the Ombudsman
over him because according to him, any ad-
ministrative action against him or any court
official or employee falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Decide
with reasons. (5%)

Judge Red is correct. Any administrative action

against him or any court ofcial or employee falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and
may not be taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman.
(Constitution, Article VIII, Section 6; Orap v. Sandigan-
bayan, G.R. Nos. L-50508-11, October 11, 1985)
Administrative complaints against judges and their
appurtenant judicial staff are outside the Ombudsman’s
investigatory power. The reason for such exclusion is
quite evident: under Section 6, Article 10 of the Consti-
tution, it is the Supreme Court that exercises adminis-
trative supervision over all courts and their personnel
and, therefore, is the proper forum to which administra-
tive complaints involving judges and the court’s person-
nel should be lodged. (Judge Caoibes, Jr. u. Hon. Om-
budsman, 413 Phil. 717 (2001); and Fuentes v. Office of
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POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October

28, 2001, 868 SCRA 36)

b. Does the Ombudsman have authority

to conduct investigation over crimes or of-
fenses committed by public officials that are
NOT in connection or related at all to the of-
ficial’s discharge of his duties and functions?
Explain. (3%)
Yes, the Ombudsman possesses such authority to
conduct such investigations regarding crimes or offenses
committed by public officials that are not in connection
with or related at all to the ofcia1’s discharge of his
duties and functions.
Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own
or on complaint by any person any act or omission of
any public official or employee when such act or omis-
sion appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Thus,
even if the complaint concerns an act of the public offi-
cial or employee which is not service-connected, the case
is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law
does not require that the act or omission be related to or
be connected with or arise from the performance of offi-
cial duty. (Deloso v. Domingo, G.R. No. 90591, Novem-
ber 21, 1990; See Santos v. Rasalan, G.R. No. 155749,
February 8, 2007, citing Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio, G.R.
NOS. 118813-14, April 8, 1997, 271 SCRA 67, 74)

c. Who are required by the Constitution

to submit a declaration under oath of his as-
sets, liabilities, and net worth? (2%)
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 1
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Under Section 17 of Article XI of the Constitution,

a public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities,
and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress,
the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions
and other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armed forces with general or ag rank, the declaration
shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided
by law.

VI!
President Black of the Republic of Pasensya
(RP) had a telephone conversation with President
Blue of the People’s Republic of Conquerors
(PRC). In that conversation, both leaders agreed
that they will both pull-out all their vessels, civil-
ian or otherwise, sea crafts and other ships from
the hotly disputed Kalmado Shoal area within
eight (8) days in order to de-escalate the situation.
After eight days, all RP ships and vessels have left
the area. However, several military and civilian
ships carrying the PRC ag remained in the area
and began construction of a dock that could pro-
vide fuel and other supplies to vessels passing by.
a. Assuming that President Black and
President Blue both had full capacity to rep-
resent their states and negotiate with each
other under their respective systems of gov-
ernment, and further assuming that both
leaders acknowledge the existence of the
conversation, is the verbal agreement via
172 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

telephone binding under international law?

Explain. (5%)
Yes, said verbal agreement via telephone can be
considered as binding so long as both Presidents had
full powers with respect to the same, and absent any
showing that their consent to said agreement was at-
tended with any vice of consent.
This mode or method of agreement can be justied
on the basis of customary international law.
Official acts of heads of states, such as the recogni-
tion of states, done through customary methods, such as
through letters or telegrams or during ofcial calls or
conferences, have invariably been acknowledged as
binding. (Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020 Edi-
tion, page 124)

b. Assuming the answer to (a.) is in af-

firmative, does that agreement constitute a
Treaty under the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law on Treaties? (2%)
No, because under Article 2 (1) (a) of said Conven-
tion, treaties need to be in writing.

c. What are the sources of International

Law? (2%)
The sources of International Law are international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting state; in-
ternational custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted by law; the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations; and judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualied publicists of the
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 173
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoonsrsn ANSWERS

various nations, as subsidiary means for the determina-

tion of the rules of law. (Statute of the International
Court of Justice, Article 38)

d. What is opinio juris in International

Law? (1%)

Opinio juris is among the two elements of custom-

ary international law or international custom which, as
a source of international law, is dened as the general
and consistent practice of states recognized and followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation.
In order to establish the customary status of a par-
ticular norm, two elements must concur: State practice,
the objective element; and opinio juris sive necessitates,
the subjective element.
State practice refers to the continuous repetition of
the same or similar kind of acts or norms by States. It is
demonstrated upon the existence of the following ele-
ments: (1) generality; (2) uniformity and consistency;
and (3) duration. VVhile, opinio juris, the psychological
element, requires that the state practice or norm “be
carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief
that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it.” (Bayan Muna v. Romulo,
G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011)

VII.
Mayor Pink is eyeing re-election in the next
mayoralty race. It was common knowledge in the
town that Mayor Pink will run for re-election in
the coming elections. The deadline for filing of
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) is on March 23 and
the campaign period commences the following
174 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

day. One month before the deadline, Pink has yet

to file her CoC, but she has been going around
town giving away sacks of rice with the words
“Mahal Tayo ni Mayor Pink” printed on them,
holding public gatherings and speaking about
how good the town is doing, giving away pink t-
shirts with “Kay Mayor Pink Ako” printed on
them.

a. Mr. Green is the political opponent of

Mayor Pink. In April, noticing that Mayor
Pink had gained advantage over him because
of her activities before the campaign period,
he filed a petition to disqualify Mayor Pink
for engaging in an election campaign outside
the designated period.
a.1. Which is the correct body to rule on
the matter? Comelec en banc, or Comelec di-
vision? Answer with reasons. (2%)
The petition properly pertains to the jurisdiction of
the Comelec en bane, involving as it does an election
offense allegedly committed by one who, at the time of
the alleged commission of the same, was not yet a can-
didate.
The Comelec en bane may properly take cognizance
of this administrative matter.
The provisions of Article IX-B, Section 3 requiring a
motion for reconsideration before the Comelec en banc
may take action are conned only to cases where it ex-
ercises its quasi-judicial power. They nd no applica-
tion, however, in matters concerning the Comelec’s ex-
ercise of administrative functions.
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1'75
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

a.2. Rule on the petition. (5%)

The petition should be dismissed because it is
based on alleged election offenses, or acts, committed by
Mayor Pink before she officially became a candidate for
re-election.
It is established that a candidate can be held liable
for an election offense only for acts done during the
campaign period, not before. (Penera v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009)

b. Distinguish briey between Quo

Warranto in elective office and Quo Warranto
in appointive office. (3%)
Quo warranto petitions against elective officials are
for purposes of contesting their election on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Phil-
ippines and should be filed with the Commission on
Elections (in the case of regional, provincial or city offi-
cials), or the proper courts of general or limited jurisdic-
tion (with regard to other local elective officials), the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (insofar as
Members of the House of Representatives are con-
cerned), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (with respect to
Members of the Senate), and the Supreme Court, acting
as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (with respect to
candidates for President or Vice-President). Said peti-
tions must be sworn and filed within the reglementary
periods prescribed in the rules of said entities.
Quo warranto suits against appointive officials are
based on Rule 66 of the Rules of Court which allow said
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
176 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

franchise, or a public officer who does or suffers an act

which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for
the forfeiture of his ofce. (Section 1) The Solicitor Gen-
eral or a public prosecutor, when directed by the Presi-
dent of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or oth-
erwise he has good reason to believe that any case speci-
ed in the preceding section can be established by proof,
must commence such action. (Section 2)

VIII.
a. What is the doctrine of “overbreath”? In
what context can it be correctly applied? Not cor-
rectly applied? Explain (5%)
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper govern-
mental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regula-
tion, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily
sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
No. 203335, February 18, 2014)
The so-called overbreadth doctrine has likewise
been applied when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights. (White Light Corpo-
ration v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20,
2009, 576 SCRA 416)
This doctrine can be properly invoked in “as ap-
plied” challenges, where the petitioner can contest the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a viola-
tion of his own rights.
Itcan be applied as well in “facial” challenges
against the constitutionality of a statute even if the
petitioner claims no violation of his own rights under
the assailed statute where it involves free speech, which
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 177
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

includes religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the

right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances. After
all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom
of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. (Disi-
ni v. Secretary ofJustice, G.R. N0. 203335, February 18,
2014; Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014,
721 SCRA 146)
It has been pronounced though that this doctrine
may not be invoked in facial challenges against the con-
stitutionality of penal statutes, unless they involve free-
dom of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
No. 203335, February 18, 2014; Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R.
No. 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146)

b. What is the doctrine of “void for

vagueness”? In what context can it be cor-
rectly applied? Not correctly applied? Explain
(5%)

Under this doctrine, a statute or act suffers from

the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) res-
pects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice
of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary exing of the Government muscle.
(Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
178 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Like the overbreadth doctrine, this doctrine can be

properly invoked in “as applied” challenges and in “fa-
cial” challenges against the constitutionality of a statute
even if the petitioner claims no violation of his own
rights under the assailed statute where it involves, as
earlier discussed, free speech, (Disini v. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014; Imbong v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146)
but not in facial challenges against the constitutionality
of penal statutes, unless they involve freedom of expres-
sion. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. N0. 203335,
February 18, 2014; Imbong u. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819,
April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146)

IX.

In a protest rally’ along Padre Faura Street,

Manila, Pedrong Pula took up the stage and be-
gan shouting “kayong mga kurakot kayo! Magsi-
resign na kayo! Kung hindi, manggugulo kami
dito!” (“you corrupt officials, you better resign
now, or else we will cause trouble here!”) simulta-
neously, he brought out a rock the size of a fist
and pretended to hurl it at the agpole area of a
government building. He did not actually throw
the rock.
a. Police officers who were monitoring
the situation immediately approached Ped-
rong Pula and arrested him. He was prose-
cuted for seditious speech and was convicted.
On appeal, Pedrong Pula argued he was
merely exercising his freedom of speech and
freedom of expression guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. Decide with reasons. (5%)
 2012 POLITICAL LAw AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 179
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

It is submitted that Pedrong Pulo should be acquit-

ted.
His speech and his act of pretending to hurl a rock
toward the agpole of a government building presented
no clear and present danger which could justify or war-
rant his conviction. (Primicias v. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-
1800, January 27, 1948, 80 Phil. 71, citing Whitney u.
California, 274 U.S. 357)

What is “commercial speech”? Is it

b.
entitled to constitutional protection? What
must be shown in order for government to
curtail “commercial speech”? Explain. (3%)
Commercial speech is a form of free expression
which “does no more than propose a commercial trans-
action” and also comes under the coverage or protection
of Section 4 of Article III, which provides that “No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of ex-
pression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.” (Diocese of Bacolod v. Commis-
sion on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech
which is not accorded the same level of protection as
that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.
(Disini v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 203335, Febru-
ary 18, 2014)
It may be curtailed, or subject to review and pun-
ishment, only for purposes of promoting and protecting
the interests of the public in general against false and
deceptive claims. (Pharmaceutical Health and Care
180 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Association of the Philippines u. Duque, G.R. No.

173034, October 9, 2007)

c. What are the two (2) basic prohibi-

tions of the freedom of speech and of the
press clause? Explain. (2%)

The two basic prohibitions pertinent to freedom of

speech and of the press, which are otherwise known as
the elements of freedom of expression, are freedom from
prior restraint and from subsequent punishment. (Cruz
and Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2015 Edition, page 482)

X.

a. What do you understand by the term

“hierarchy of civil liberties”? Explain. (5%)

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free

expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
as against property rights as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political insti-
tutions; and such priority “gives these liberties the sanc-
tity and the sanction not permitting dubious intru-
sions.” (Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 and Thomas
vs. Collins (1945), 323 U.S., 516, 530, cited in Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization, v. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-31195 June 5,
1973)

b. Distinguish fully between the “free exer-

cise of religion clause” and the “non-estab1ish-
ment of religion clause”. (3%)
The free exercise clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
 2012 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 181
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

beliefs and practice. Under this part of religious freedom

guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfer-
ing with the outside manifestations of one’s belief and
faith. (lmbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014,
721 SCRA 146, citing Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-
02-1651, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 1; see also A.M. No.
P-02-1651, August 4, 2003, 455 Phil. 411)
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of
separation between Church and State. It simply means
that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one
religion over another nor force nor inuence a person to
go to or remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion;
that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining
or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activity or institution whatever they may be
called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or
practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly
participate in the affairs of any religious organization or
group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state
cannot establish or sponsor an official religion. (Re: Let-
ter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March
7, 2017)

c. When can evidence “in plain view” be

seized without need of a search warrant? Explain.
(2%)

The “plain view” doctrine applies when the follow-

ing requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
182 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain

view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
ofcer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement ofcer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evi-
dence incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
(Revaldo v. People, G.R. N0. 170589, April 16, 2009, 585
SCRA 341; see also Harris v. US, 390 US 234; People v.
Chi Chan Liu, G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015)
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 183
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

2013
ESSAY QUESTIONS

I
In the last quarter of 2012, about 5,000 con-
tainer vans of imported goods intended for the
Christmas Season were seized by agents of the
Bureau of Customs. The imported goods were re-
leased only on January 10, 2013. A group of im-
porters got together and filed an action for dam-
ages before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against the Department of Finance and the Bu-
reau of Customs.
The Bureau of Customs raised the defense of
immunity from suit and, alternatively, that liabil-
ity should lie with XYZ Corp., which the Bureau
had contracted for the lease of ten (10) high pow-
ered van cranes but delivered only five (5) of
these cranes, thus causing the delay in its cargo-
handling operations. It appears that the Bureau,
despite demand, did not pay XYZ Corp. the Php1.0
Million deposit and advance rental required un-
der their contract.
(A) Will the action by the group of im-
porters prosper? (5%)

No, the action will not prosper. The Bureau of Cus-

toms is part of the Department of Finance With no per-
sonality of its own apart from that of the national gov-
ernment. Its primary function is governmental, i.e., that
of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from im-
184 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

ported articles and all other tariff and customs duties,

fees, charges and penalties. (Mobil Philippine Explora-
tion, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120;
Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals, 217 SCRA 298)
Accordingly, it may not be sued without its consent,
particularly when it performs governmental functions,
as in this case, when its agents seized what they appar-
ently believed Were smuggled goods.

(B) Can XYZ Corp. sue the Bureau of

Customs to collect rentals for the delivered
cranes? (5%)

No, XYZ Corporation may not sue the Bureau of

Customs for uncollected rentals for the delivered cranes,
without its prior consent. Its contract with the Bureau
of Customs clearly has a governmental purpose, i.e., to
enable the latter to perform its function of assessing and
collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all
other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges and penal-
ties, which includes, the seizure of apparently smuggled
goods. (USA v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

[Note: Acceptable Answer: Yes, XYZ Corporation may sue the

Bureau of Customs because the latter had waived its immunity from
suit when it executed the subject contract, which can be considered
as proprietary in character.]

II
While Congress was in session, the President
appointed eight acting Secretaries. A group of
Senators from the minority bloc questioned the
validity of the appointments in a petition before
the Supreme Court on the ground that while Con-
gress is in session, no appointment that requires
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 185
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

confirmation by the Commission on Appoint-

ments, can be made without the latter’s consent,
and that an undersecretary should instead be des-
ignated as Acting Secretary.
Should the petition be granted? (5%)
No, the petition should not be granted.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in na-
ture, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those ins-
tances when the Constitution expressly allows it to in-
terfere. (Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October
13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587)

III
A robbery with homicide had taken place and
Lito, Badong and Rolliewere invited for question-
ing based on the information furnished by a
neighbor that he saw them come out of the vic-
tim’s house at about the time of the robberyl
killing. The police confronted the three with this
and other information they had gathered, and
pointedly accused them of committing the crime.
Lito initially resisted, but eventually broke
down and admitted his participation in the crime.
Elated by this break and desirous of securing a
written confession soonest, the police called City
Attorney Juan Buan to serve as the trio’s counsel
and to advise them about their rights during the
investigation.
Badong and Rollie, weakened in spirit by
Lito’s early admission, likewise admitted their
186 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

participation. The trio thus signed a joint extra-

judicial confession which served as the main evi-
dence against them at their trial. They were con-
victed based on their confession.
Should the judgment of conviction be af-
firmed or reversed on appeal? (5%)

The judgment of conviction should be reversed for

the following reasons —
1. Lito’s admission, which eventually served as
basis for Badong’s and Rollie’s confessions, was given
without his rst having been informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice. He clearly con-
fessed without the presence or assistance of counsel.
(People v. Lucero, G.R. No. 188705, March 2, 2011)
2. It does not appear that Lito, Badong and Rollie
were given a real opportunity to retain the services of
their own independent and competent counsel, as pro-
vided for or required under Section 12 (1) of Article III
of the Constitution. (People v. Lucero, G.R. No. 188705,
March 2, 2011; People v. Cachuela, G.R. No. 191752,
June 10, 2013)

IV
Congress enacted a law providing for trial by
jury for those charged with crimes or offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life impris-
onment. The law provides for the qualifications of
members of the jury, the guidelines for the bar
and bench for their selection, the manner a trial
by jury shall operate, and the procedures to be
followed.
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 137
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Is the law constitutional? (6%)

No, the law is not constitutional, as it contravenes

the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court, which,
under the Constitution, possesses the sole power to pres-
cribe rules pertinent to pleadings, practice and proce-
dure in all courts. (Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5
[5])

V
As a leading member of the Lapiang Mandi-
rigma in the House of Representatives, you were
tasked by the party to initiate the moves to im-
peach the President because he entered into an
executive agreement with the US Ambassador for
the use of the former Subic Naval Base by the US
Navy, for free, i.e., without need to pay rent nor
any kind of fees as a show of goodwill to the U.S.
because of the continuing harmonious RP-US re-
lations.
Cite at least two (2) grounds for impeachment
and explain why you chose them. (6%)

My impeachment complaint would be based on the

following grounds —
1. Betrayal of Public Trust, which has been de-
fined as “gross faithlessness against public trust, tyran-
nical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty,
favoritism and gross exercise of discretionary powers.”
(Gonzales v. Office of the President, 679 SCRA 614)
The President’s granting of the subject territory for
free in favor of the United States of America can clearly
be considered as a betrayal of the public trust.
188 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

2. Culpable violation of the Constitution, which is

generally understood as the “wrongful, intentional or
willful disregard or flouting of the fundamental law.”
The President’s Executive Agreement entitles the
United States to use the former Subic Naval Base for
free amounts to a surrender of a portion of our territory,
as dened in Article I, Section of the Constitution.

[Acceptable Answer: Graft and Corruption, which is a ground

based on the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
Section 3 (e) of which punishes “causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benets, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his ofcial administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of oices or govern-
ment corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.”
The President’s granting of the subject territory for free in fa-
vor of the United States of America would clearly cause injury to the
Government, and provide said country with “unwarranted benets,
advantage or preference” through “manifest partiality.” The USA is
not the only country with whom the Philippines enjoys “continuing
harmonious relations.”]

VI
Congress passed Republic Act No. 7711 to
comply with the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea.
In a petition filed with the Supreme Court,
Anak Ti Ilocos, an association of Ilocano profes-
sionals, argued that Republic Act No. 7711 dis-
carded the definition of the Philippine territory
under the Treaty of Paris and in related treaties;
excluded the Kalayaan Islands and the Scarbor-
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 189
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

ough Shoals from the Philippine Archipelagic

baselines; and converted internal waters into ar-
chipelagic waters.
Is the petition meritorious? (6%)

No, the petition is not meritorious for the following

reasons —
1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) has nothing to do with the acquisi-
tion, enlargement or, as the petitioner claims, any dimi-
nution of territory but merely provides for the regula-
tions of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply
with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.
2. The Kalayaan Islands and the Scarborough
Shoal have been constituted under the law as ‘Regime[s]
of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consis-
tent with Article 121 of UNCLOS. They are therefore
subject to the continuing authority of the Philippines.
3. Vlrhether referred to as Philippine internal wa-
ters under Article I of the Constitution or as archi-
pelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the
Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water
lying landward of the baselines, including the air space
over it and the submarine areas underneath. (UNCLOS
III, Article 49) (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167,
August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476)
[N0te: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as the petitioner claims, any diminution of territory
but merely provides for the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones
and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are out-
190 BAR Q & A
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side UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general
international law.
Had Congress enclosed in the subject law the Kalayaan Islands
and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued, i.e., the Philippines would
have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First,
Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that ‘[t]he drawing of such
baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
conguration of the archipelago.’ Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS
III requires that ‘the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles,’ save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of
baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. Although the
Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are
located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around
them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an appre-
ciable extent from the general conguration of the archipelago.
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as ‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the
Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS
III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its
pacta sunt seruanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article
121 of UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the
KIG, qualies under the category of ‘regime of islands,’ whose is-
lands generate their own applicable maritime zones.”
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article
I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
(Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of
water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it
and the submarine areas underneath. (UNCLOS III, Article 49)
(Magaltona u. Ermita, G. R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA
476)]

VII
As he was entering a bar, Arnold - who was
holding an unlit cigarette in his right hand - was
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handed a match box by someone standing near

the doorway. Arnold unthinkingly opened the
matchbox to light his cigarette and as he did so, a
sprinkle of dried leaves fell out, which the guard
noticed. The guard immediately frisked Arnold,
grabbed the matchbox, and sniffed its contents.
After confirming that the matchbox contained
marijuana, he immediately arrested Arnold and
called in the police.
At the police station, the guard narrated to
the police that he personally caught Arnold in
possession of dried marijuana leaves. Arnold did
not contest the guard’s statement; he steadfastly
remained silent and refused to give any written
statement. Later in court, the guard testified and
narrated the statements he gave the police over
Arnold’s counsel’s objections. While Arnold pre-
sented his own witnesses to prove that his posses-
sion and apprehension had been set-up, he him-
self did not testify.
The court convicted Arnold, relying largely
on his admission of the charge by silence at the
police investigation and during trial.
From the constitutional law perspective, was
the court correct in its ruling? (6%)
No, the court was incorrect in its ruling.
An accused’s right to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved (Constitution, Article III, Section
14 [2]) entitles him to remain silent, or not to testify in
his own behalf. It is the responsibility of the prosecution
to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; otherwise, he is entitled to acquittal. Conviction
192 BAR Q & A
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will depend not on the weakness of his own defense but

on the strength of the prosecution. (Cruz and Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 2015 Edition, pages 700-702; see
People v. Malilay, GR. No. L-27938. April 22, 1975; 63
SCRA 420; People v. Angus, G.R. No. 178778, August 3,
2010)
It is submitted that the prosecution’s evidence in
this case cannot be considered as adequate to establish,
with moral certainty, Arnold’s guilt, especially in light
of the fact that he was able to present witnesses in his
behalf to prove that his possession and apprehension
had merely been “set-up.” Accordingly, his constitu-
tional presumption of innocence entitles him to an ac-
quittal, notwithstanding his silence during the investi-
gation and trial.
[Acceptable Answer: Yes, the court correctly convicted Arnold.
It is established that, “although no inference of guilt may be
drawn against an accused for his failure to make a statement of any
sort,” (People v. Arciaga, 99 SCRA 1) “after the prosecution has
adduced evidence, the constitutional presumption of innocence must
yield to what has been so amply and persuasively demonstrated.”
(Joseph v. Villaluz, 89 SCRA, 665; People u. Sarmiento, 94 SCRA
944)
Moreover, while an accused has a right to be silent, he runs the
risk of an inference of guilt from the non-production of evidence in
his behalf. (People v. Solis, 128 SCRA 217) As there is no showing
that the prosecution’s evidence against Arnold was inadequate, it is
submitted that the same can serve as valid basis for his conviction,
notwithstanding his presentation of his own witnesses to prove that
his possession and apprehension had merely been “set-up.”
It must be noted that “once the presumption of innocence is
overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to show reason-
able doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Reasonable doubt is that
doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability aer such investigation to let the mind rest each upon the
certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the
law to convict a criminal charge, but moral certainty is required as
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 193
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.”

(People u. Santos, G.R. No. 175593, October 17, 2007)]

VIII
Bobby, an incoming third year college stu-
dent, was denied admission by his university, a
premiere educational institution in Manila, after
he failed in three (3) major subjects in his sopho-
more year. The denial of admission was based on
the university’s rules and admission policies.
Unable to cope with the depression that his
non-admission triggered, Bobby committed sui-
cide. His family sued the school for damages, cit-
ing the school’s grossly unreasonable rules that
resulted in the denial of admission. They argued
that these rules violated Bobby’s human rights
and the priority consideration that the Constitu-
tion gives to the education of the youth.
You are counsel for the university. Explain
your arguments in support of the university’s
case. (6%)

As counsel for the University, I would invoke the

provisions of the Constitution on academic freedom
(Constitution, Article XIV, Section 5 [2]), which states
that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institu-
tions of higher learning, and which necessarily entitles
them to prescribe fair, reasonable and equitable admis-
sion and academic requirements. (Ibid., Section 5 [4])
The concept of academic freedom “encompasses the
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.” (Camacho
194 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

vs. Corresis, GR. No. 103142, November 8, 1993, 227

SCRA 591-596)
“It therefore invariably vests in schools the right to
maintain a policy of non-readmission to students who
fail to meet their reasonable academic standards. A
school has no obligation to see every student to gradua-
tion no matter what the circumstances.” (Capitol Medi-
cal Center vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82499, October
13, 1989)

IX
Conrad is widely known in the neighborhood
as a drug addict. He is also suspected of being a
member of the notorious “Akyat-Condo Gang”
that has previously broken into and looted con-
dominium units in the area.
Retired Army Colonel Sangre - who is known
as an anti-terrorism fighter who disdained human
and constitutional rights and has been nicknamed
“terror of Mindanao” - is now the Head of Secu-
rity of Capricorn Land Corporation, the owner
and developer of Sagittarius Estates where a se-
ries of robberies has recently taken place.
On March 1, informed his
2013, Conrad
mother, Vannie, that uniformed security guards
had invited him for a talk in their office but he
refused to come. Later that day, however, Conrad
appeared to have relented; he was seen walking
into the security office anked by two security
guards. Nobody saw him leave the office after-
wards.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Conrad did not go home that night and was

never seen again. The following week and after a
week-long search, Vannie feared the worst be-
cause of Col. Sangre’s reputation. She thus re-
ported Conrad’s disappearance to the police.
When nothing concrete resulted from the police
investigation, Vannie - at the advice of counsel -
flled a petition for a writ of amparo to compel
Col. Sangre and the Sagittarius Security Office to
produce Conrad and to hold them liable and re-
sponsible for Conrad’s disappearance.

(A) Did Vannie’s counsel give the correct

legal advice? (6%)
No, Vannie’s counsel did not give the correct legal
advice.
Although a writ of amparo may lie against a pri-
vate individual or entity (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, Section
1), government involvement in any enforced disappear-
ance remains an indispensable element.
In other words, the disappearance subject of the
amparo proceedings must be attended by some govern-
mental involvement.
It would appear that only private security guards
working for Sagittarius Estates, a private entity, were
involved in Conrad’s disappearance. It is clear that they
did not work for the government and no proof whatso-
ever had been presented that would link or connect
them to some covert police, military or governmental
operation. There is no showing that the government was
involved in any manner in the disappearance of Conrad.
(Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012)
196 BAR Q & A
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(B) If the petition would prosper, can

Col. Sangre be held liable and/or responsible
for Conrad’s disappearance? (6%)
On the assumption that the petition would prosper,
Colonel Sangre can be held responsible, not necessarily
liable, for Conrad’s disappearance.
It has been ruled that amparo proceedings may be
instituted for purposes of determining the responsibility
of parties in an enforced disappearance. (Burgos v.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183712,
July 5, 2011)
There can be no determination of administrative,
civil or criminal liability in amparo proceedings, and
courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility
or accountability for the enforced disappearance or ex-
trajudicial killing. (Razon v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, 3
December 2009, 606 SCRA 598, cited in Rodriguez v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states
that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty
and security may be caused by either an act or an omis-
sion of a public ofcial. Moreover, in the context of am-
paro proceedings, responsibility may refer to the par-
ticipation of the respondents, by action or omission, in
enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other
hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappear-
ance. (Secretary 0fNational Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No.
180906, 7 October 2008, 568 SCRA 1, 42; see also Rod-
riguez u. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 197
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

15, 2011) Such identication of the responsible and ac-

countable superiors may well be a preliminary determi-
nation of criminal liability which, of course, is still sub-
ject to further investigation by the appropriate govern-
ment agency. (Boac v. Cadapan, G.R. No. 184461, May
31, 2011)
Moreoever, the Supreme Court has held that supe-
rior officers, such as the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, and, in the context of this case, Colonel Sangre,
can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances in the context of
amparo proceedings on the basis of the doctrine of com-
mand responsibility, the requisites of which are “a. the
existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between
the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime
as his subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason
to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and c. the superior failed to take the neces-
sary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal
acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.” (Rodriguez v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011
see also In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ ofAm-
paro and the Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Francis
Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183533, September
25, 2012, 681 SCRA 678, citing Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R.
No. 164007, August 10, 2006, 498 SCRA 445)

X
The Ambassador of the Republic of Kafiristan
referred to you for handling, the case of the Em-
bassy’s Maintenance Agreement with CBM, a pri-
vate domestic company engaged in maintenance
work. The Agreement binds CBM, for a defined
fee, to maintain the Embassy’s elevators, air-
198 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND Pusuc INTERNATIONAL LAW

conditioning units and electrical facilities. Sec-

tion 10 of the Agreement provides that the
Agreement shall be governed by Philippine laws
and that any legal action shall be brought before
the proper court of Makati. Kafiristan terminated
the Agreement because CBM allegedly did not
comply with their agreed maintenance standards.
CBM contested the termination and filed a
complaint against Kafiristan before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. The Ambassador wants you
to file a motion to dismiss on the ground of state
immunity from suit and to oppose the position
that, under Section 10 of the Agreement, Kafiris-
tan expressly waives its immunity from suit.
Under these facts, can the Embassy success-
fully invoke immunity from suit? (6%)
Yes, the Embassy may invoke immunity from suit.
While, as a general principle, its execution of its
Maintenance Agreement with CBM may be considered
as an implied waiver of its sovereign immunity (Santos
v. Santos, 92 Phil. 281), it has however been ruled that
suability would follow only if the contract were executed
by it in its proprietary capacity. Governmental or “sov-
ereign” contracts, such as the one subject of this case,
which pertains to the maintenance of the Embassy’s
elevators, air-conditioning units and electrical facilities,
all of which may be considered as vital to its “govern-
mental” operations, do not result in implied waiver of
the State from suit. (USA v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)
 2018 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 199
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

XI
In her interview before the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC), Commissioner Annie Amorsolo of
the National Labor Relations Commission claims
that she should be given credit for judicial service
because as NLRC Commissioner, she has the rank
of a Justice of the Court of Appeals; she adjudi-
cates cases that are appealable to the Court of
Appeals; she is assigned car plate No. 10; and she
is, by law, entitled to the rank, benefits and privi-
leges of a Court of Appeals Justice.
If you are a member of the JBC, would you
give credit to this explanation? (6%)

Yes, it has been held that, even if the

Commission-
ers of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), which is not a court, are technically not Mem-
bers of the Judiciary, and they therefore do not have the
privilege to use the title of Judge or Justice, they should
just the same not be deprived of “credit for judicial ser-
vice,” particularly with respect to their salaries and
retirement benets, considering that various laws re-
gard them, or these executive ofcials, to be “at par”
with their judicial counterparts with respect to said
salaries and retirement benets.
Said laws, which confer upon them the rank and
privileges of Justices of the Court of Appeals, provide
that their service in the NLRC ought to be credited as
judicial service, at least, as stated earlier, in terms of
salaries and retirement benets. (Re: Letter of Court of
Appeals Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso, Resolution on MR,
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, July 26, 2016)
200 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Note: This answer is based on a case which was decided by the

Supreme Court after this question was asked in 2013. Thus —
“In conferring upon certain officials in the Executive the same
salaries, aside from their rank, as those of their respective judicial
counterparts, Congress intended to make the salaries of the former
at par with the latter. xxx. Thus, Congress knew, or is presumed to
have known, the concept of longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 as part of the total salary of members of the
Judiciary when it enacted Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071,
which granted certain officials of the OSG, the NLRC, and the NPS,
respectively, the same salary as their respective counterparts in the
Judiciary. Moreover, armed with that knowledge, Congress is pre-
sumed to have intended to adopt the denition of ‘salary’ (as consti-
tuting basic monthly salary plus longevity pay) when it enacted
Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, which will be in keeping
with the legislative intent to equalize the salary of certain executive
oicials with members of the Judiciary. To do otherwise will negate
the express legislative intent.” (Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice
Vicente S. E. Veloso, Resolution on MR, A.M. N0. 12-8-O7-CA, July
26, 2016)]

[Acceptable Answer (based also on a case decided after this

question was asked in 2013):
Commissioner Amorsolo’s claim is untenable.
The NLRC is an agency attached to the Department of Labor
and Employment — an adjunct of the Executive Department — albeit
for policy and program coordination only. Her past service as N LRC
Commissioner cannot be credited as judicial service. Parity in rank
and salary does not automatically mean parity in rights. Service in
the NLRC, even with the rank of a CA Justice, is not service with
the Judiciary. (Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S. E.
Veloso, Resolution on MR, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, A.M. N0. 12-8-07-
CA, June 16, 2015 — reversed on Motion for Reconsideration, July 26,
20 16)]

[Acceptable Answer: Commissioner Amorsolo’s claim is unten-

able. A statutory grant in favor of an executive official of the privi-
leges of a Member of the Judiciary does not make him a part of the
Judiciary and therefore or consequently subject to all powers and
laws reserved for such Members. (Noblejas v. Teehankee, G.R. N0. L-
28790, April 29, 1968)]
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 201
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

XII
In the May 2013 elections, the Allied Workers’
Group of the Philippines (AWGP), representing
land-based and sea-based workers in the Philip-
pines and overseas, won in the party list congres-
sional elections. Atty. Abling, a labor lawyer, is its
nominee.
As part of the party’s advocacy and services,
Congressman Abling engages in labor counseling,
particularly for local workers with claims against
their employers and for those who need represen-
tation in collective bargaining negotiations with
employers. When labor cases arise, AWGP enters
its appearance in representation of the workers
and the Congressman makes it a point to be there
to accompany the workers, although a retained
counsel also formally enters his appearance and
is invariably there. Congressman Abling largely
takes a passive role in the proceedings although
he occasionally speaks to supplement the retained
counsel’s statements. It is otherwise in CBA nego-
tiations where he actively participates.
Management lawyers, feeling that a con-
gressman should not actively participate in cases
before labor tribunals and before employers be-
cause of the inuence a congressman can wield,
filed a disbarment case against the Congressman
before the Supreme Court for his violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and for
breach of trust, in relation particularly with the
prohibitions on legislators under the Constitu-
tion.
202 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Is the cited ground for disbarment meritori-

ous? (6%)

No, the grounds cited for Congressman Abling’s

disbarment are without merit.
Section 14 of Article VI of the Constitution prohib-
its legislators from personally appearing as counsel
before, among others, any court of justice or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies.
Congressman Abling does not appear to have vio-
lated this provision of the Constitution, which clearly
does not cover “labor counselling” or simply accompany-
ing, and not personally appearing as counsel for, work-
ers, who are formally and actually represented by their
own retained counsel, in labor cases.
Itis submitted that his “passive role” and occa-
sional remarks in support of said retained counsel’s
statements cannot be considered as a breach of this
constitutional proscription, which would also not cover
his participation in CBA negotiations, which, again,
cannot be considered as personally appearing as counsel
before any court or quasi-judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding.

ii; I.

on
IVIULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS

The equal protection clause is violated by

(170)

(A) a law prohibiting motorcycles from plying

limited
access highways.
(B) a law granting Value Added Tax exemp-
tion to electric cooperatives that sells electricity to
the “homeless poor.”
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 203
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoossmo ANSWERS

(C) a law providing that a policeman shall be

preventively suspended until the termination of a
criminal case against him.
(D) a law providing higher salaries to
teachers in public schools who are “foreign
hires.”
(E) a law that grants rights to local Filipino
workers but denies the same rights to overseas
Filipino workers.

II. Offended by the President’s remarks that

the Bureau of Customs is a pit of misfits and the
corrupt, the Bureau of Customs Employees Asso-
ciation composed of 3,000 Workers seeks your le-
gal advice on how best to protest what it views to
be the President’s baseless remarks.
A prudent legal advice is that . (1%)

(A) employees can go on mass leave of ab-

sence for one week.
(B) employees can march and rally at Men-
diola every Monday.
(C) employees can barricade the gates of the
Port of Manila at South Harbor and call for the res-
ignation of the incumbent Commissioner of Cus-
toms.
(D) employees can wear black arm bands
and pins with the word “UNFAIR” inscribed.
(E) None of the above can legally be done.

III. Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1234

requiring all candidates for public offices to post
204 BAR Q & A
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an election bond equivalent to the one (1) year

salary for the position for which they are candi-
dates. The bond shall be forfeited if the candi-
dates fail to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast.
Is Republic Act No. 1234 valid? (1%)

(A) It is valid as the bond is a means of ensur-

ing fair, honest, peaceful and orderly elections.
(B) It is valid as the bond requirement en-
sures that only candidates with sufcient means
and who cannot be corrupted, can run for public of-
ce.
(C) It is invalid as the requirement effec-
tively imposes a property qualification to run
for public office.
(D) It is invalid as the amount of the surety
bond is excessive and unconscionable.
(E) It is valid because it
is a reasonable re-
quirement; the Constitution itself expressly sup-
ports the accountability of public oicers.

IV. What is the legal effect of decisions of the

International Court of Justice in cases submitted
to it for resolution? (1%)
(A) The decision is binding on other countries
in similar situations.
(B) The decision is not binding on any coun-
try, even the countries that are parties to the case.
(C) The decision is binding only on the
parties but only with respect to that particu-
lar case.
 2013 PoLITIcAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 205
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(D) The decision is not binding on the parties

and is only advisory.
(E) The binding effect on the parties depends
on their submission agreement.

V. Under the UN Convention on the Law of

the Sea, the exclusive economic zone refers to an
area. (1%)

(A) that is at least 100 miles from the base-

lines from which the outer limit of the territorial
sea is measured.
(B) that is at least 200 miles but not to exceed
300 miles from the baselines from which the outer
limit of the territorial sea is measured.
(C) beyond and adjacent to a country’s
territorial sea which cannot go beyond 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which
the outer limit of the territorial sea is meas-
ured.
(D) that can go beyond 3 nautical miles but
cannot extend 300 nautical miles from the base-
lines from which the outer limit of the territorial
sea is measured.
(E) None of the above.

VI. A child born under either the 1973 or the

1987 Constitution, whose father or mother is a
Filipino citizen at the time of his birth, is
. (1%)

(A) not a Filipino citizen as his father and

mother must both be Filipino citizens at the time of
his birth.
206 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(B) not a Filipino citizen if his mother is a

Filipino citizen but his father is not, at the time of
his birth.
(C) a Filipino citizen no matter where he
or she may be born.
(D) a Filipino citizen provided the child is
born in the Philippines.
(E) a Filipino citizen if he or she so elects
upon reaching the age of 21.

VII. Who has control of the expenditure of

public funds? (1%)
(A) The Office of the President through
the Department of Budget and Management.
(B) The House of Representatives from where
all appropriation bills emanate.
(C) The Senate through its Committee on Fi-
nance.
(D) The Congress of the Republic of the Phil-
ippines.
(E) Both the members of Congress and the
President acting jointly, if so provided by the Gen-
eral Appropriations Act.

VIII. May the power of cities to raise reve-

nues be limited by an executive order of the
President? (1%)
(A) Yes, because local government units are
under the administrative control of the President
through the Department of Interior and Local Gov-
ernment.
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 207
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoossnzo ANSWERS

(B) No, because local government units now

enjoy full local scal autonomy.
(C) No, because only limitations estab-
lished by Congress can define and limit the
powers of local governments.
(D) Yes, because the President has the power
and authority to impose reasonable restrictions on
the power of cities to raise revenues.
(E) Yes, if so provided in a city’s charter.
IX. The provision under the Constitution -
that any member who took no part, dissented, or
inhibited from a decision or resolution must state
the reason for his dissent or non-participation —

applies . (1%)

(A) only to the Supreme Court.

(B) to both the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals.
(C) to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan.
(D) to the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
Tax Appeals.
(E) to all collegial judicial and quasi-judicial
adjudicatory bodies.

X. Choose the least accurate statement

about the independence guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution to the following constitutional bod-
ies: (1%)
208 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(A) The Constitution guarantees the COME-

LEC decisional and institutional independence
similar to that granted to the Judiciary.
(B) All bodies labeled“independent” by the
as
Constitution enjoy scal autonomy as an attribute
of their independence.
(C) Not all bodies labeled as “independ-
ent” by the Constitution were intended to be
independent from the Executive branch of
government.
(D) The Constitution guarantees various de-
grees of independence from the other branches of
government when it labels bodies as “independent”.
(E) The COMELEC, the COA, and the CSC
enjoy the same degree of independence.

XI. At the Senate impeachment trial of Jus-

tice Pablo P. San Quintin, Hon. Emilio A. Tan,
Congressman and Impeachment Panel Manager,
wrote the Supreme Court requesting that the
prosecutors be allowed to examine the court re-
cords of Stewards Association of the Philippines,
Inc. (SAP) v. Filipinas Air, et al., G.R. No. 987654, a
case that is still pending. The High Court
mm (1%)

(A) may grant the request by reason of inter-

departmental courtesy.
(B) may grant the request as the records of
the Filipinas Air case are public records.
(C) should deny the request since re-
cords of cases that are pending for decision
are privileged except only for pleadings, or-
 2018 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 209
BAR QUEsTIoNs AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

ders and resolutions that are available to the

public.
(D) should deny the request because it vio-
lates the Court’s independence and the doctrine of
separation of powers.
(E) should grant the request because of the
sui generis nature of the power of impeachment,
provided that the Bill of Rights is not violated.

[Notez (B) can also be considered as an acceptable answer.]

XII. Mr. Sinco sued the government for dam-

ages. After trial, the court ruled in his favor and
awarded damages amounting to P50 million
against the government. To satisfy the judgment
against the government, which valid option is
available to Mr. Sinco? (1%)
(A) Garnish the government funds deposited
at the Land Bank.
(B) File a claim with the Commission on
Audit (COA) pursuant to Commonwealth Act
327, as amended by Presidential Decree1445.
(C) Make representations with the Congress
to appropriate the amount to satisfy the judgment.
(D) File a petition for mandamus in court to
compel Congress to appropriate P50 million to sat-
isfy the judgment.
(E) Proceed to execute the judgment as pro-
vided by the Rules of Court because the State al-
lowed itself to be sued.
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POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

XIII. Which of the following provisions of

the Constitution does not confer rights that can
be enforced in the courts but only provides guide-
lines for legislative or executive action? (1%)
(A) The maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and promotion of the general welfare are es-
sential for the enjoyment by all the people of
the blessings of democracy.
(B) The State shall give priority to edu-
cation, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotism and national-
ism, accelerate social progress, and promote
total human liberation and development.
(C) The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the
Government.
(D) The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Ac-
cess to official records, and to documents and pa-
pers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or de-
cisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be af-
forded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
(E) All the above only provide guidelines and
are not self-executing.

[Notez (A), (B) and (C) are all acceptable answers because they
all refer to non-self-executing provisions of the Constitution]
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 211
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

XIV. The President entered into an execu-

tive agreement with Vietnam for the supply to the
Philippines of animal feeds not to exceed 40,000
tons in any one year. The Association of Animal
Feed Sellers of the Philippines questioned the
executive agreement for being contrary to R.A.
462 which prohibits the importation of animal
feeds from Asian countries. Is the challenge cor-
rect? (1%)

(A) Yes, the executive agreement is con-

trary to an existing domestic law.
(B) No, the President is solely in charge of
foreign relations and all his actions in this role
form part of the law of the land.
(C) No, international agreements are sui
generis and stand independently of our domestic
laws
(D) Yes, the executive agreement is actually a
treaty which does not take effect without ratica-
tion by the Senate.
(E) Yes, the challenge is correct because there
is no law empowering the President to undertake
the importation.

XV. The separation of Church and State is

most clearly violated when . (1%)

(A) the State funds a road project Whose effect

is to make a church more accessible to its adher-
ents.
212 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(B) the State declares the birthplace of a

founder of a religious sect as a national historical
site.
(C) the State expropriates church property in
order to construct an expressway that, among oth-
ers, provides easy access to the Church’s main ca-
thedral.
(D) the State gives vehicles to bishops to
assist them in church-related charitable pro-
jects.
(E) the State allows prayers in schools for
minor children without securing the prior consent
of their parents.

XVI. Patricio was elected member of the

House of Representative in the May 2010 Elec-
tions. His opponent Jose questioned Patricio’s
victory before the House of Representatives Elec-
toral Tribunal and later with the Supreme Court.
In promulgated in November 2011,
a decision
the Court ruled in Jose’s favor; thus, Patricio was
ousted from his seat in Coness. Within a year
from that decision, the President can appoint Pa-
tricio . (1%)

(A) only as a member of the board of di-

rectors of any government owned and con-
trolled corporation.
(B) only as a deputy Ombudsman.
(C) only as a Commissioner of the Civil Ser-
vice Commission.
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 213
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(D) only as Chairman of the Commission on

Elections.
(E) to any position as no prohibition applies
to Patricio.

XVII. Senator GSC proposed a bill increas-

ing excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol products.
The generated incremental revenues shall be used
for the universal health care program for all Fili-
pinos and for tobacco farmers’ livelihood. After
the Senate passed the bill on third reading, it was
transmitted to the House of Representatives
which approved the bill in toto. The President
eventually signed it into law. Atty. JFC filed a
petition before the Supreme Court, questioning
the constitutionality of the new law.
Is the law constitutional? (1%)
(A) The law is constitutional because it is for
a public purpose and has duly satised the three-
readings-on-separate-days rule in both Houses.
(B) The law is unconstitutional because it vio-
lates the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion; it is limited only to alcohol and liquor prod-
ucts.
(C) It is constitutional because of the Enrolled
Bill Theory.
(D) It is constitutional because it is valid in
form and substance and complied With the required
lawmaking procedures.
(E) None of the above is correct.
214 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

XVIII. Which of the following statements is

correct? (1%)

(A) The President, with the concurrence of

the Monetary Board, can guarantee a foreign loan
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
(B) Congress may, by law, provide limita-
tions on the President’s power to contract or
guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Re-
public of the Philippines.
(C) In order to be valid and effective, treaties
and executive agreements must be concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Sen-
ate.
(D) The President shall, at the end of every
quarter of the calendar year, submit to Congress a
complete report of the loans contracted or guaran-
teed by the Government or government-owned and
controlled corporations.
(E) All the above choices are defective in some
respects.

XIX. Candida has been administratively

charged of immorality for openly living with
Manuel, a married man. Candida argues that her
conjugal arrangement with Manuel fully conforms
with their religious beliefs and with the teachings
of their church.
In resolving Whether Candida should be ad-
ministratively penalized, which is the best test to
apply? (1%)
(A) Clear and Present Danger Test
 2013 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 215
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(B) Compelling State Interest Test

(C) Balancing of interests Test
(D) Conscientious Objector Test
(E) Dangerous Tendency Test

XX. Rafael questioned the qualifications of

Carlos as congressman of the Third District of
Manila on the ground that Carlos is a citizen of
the USA. The decision disqualifying Carlos for
being a US citizen came only in March 2010, i.e.,
after the adjournment of the session of Congress
on the 3’d year of the positi0n’s three-year term.
What was Carlos’ status during his incum-
bency as congressman? (1%)
(A) He was a de jure ofcer, having been duly
elected and proclaimed.
(B) He was not a public officer because he ef-
fectively was not entitled to be a congressman.
(C) He was a de jure officer since he com-
pleted the service of his term before he was dis-
qualied.
(D) He was a de facto officer since he had
served and was only disqualified later.
(E) He neither possesses de jure nor de facto
status as such determination is pointless.
2 16 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

2014
I
With the passage of time, the members of the
House of Representatives increased with the crea-
tion of new legislative districts and the corres-
ponding adjustments in the number of party-list
representatives. At a time when the House mem-
bership was already 290, a great number of the
members decided that it was time to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Senators,
however, were cool to the idea. But the members
of the House insisted. They accordingly convened
Congress into a constituent assembly in spite of
the opposition of the majority of the members of
the Senate. When the votes were counted, 275
members of the House of Representatives ap-
proved the proposed amendments. Only 10 Sena-
tors supported such proposals. The proponents
now claim that the proposals were validly made,
since more than the required three-fourths vote of
Congress has been obtained. The 14 Senators who
voted against the proposals claim that the pro-
posals needed not three-fourths vote of the entire
Congress but of each house. Since the required
number of votes in the Senate was not obtained,
then there could be no valid proposals, so argued
the Senators. Were the proposals validly adopted
by Congress? (5%)
No, the proposals were not validly adopted because
only ten of the twenty-four Senators approved the pro-
posed amendments.
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 217
BAR QUESTIONS AND Succssrsn ANSWERS

Section of Article XVII requires a vote of three-

1
fourths of all of the Members of the Congress for the
validity of the adoption of such proposals.
Although not expressly required under said provi-
sion, it is submitted that this three-fourths vote must be
done by each of the chambers of the Congress sepa-
rately, i.e., there must be a three-fourths vote in the
House of Representatives and a separate three-fourths
vote in the Senate.
This procedure nds justification in, rst, the fact
that the Congress is a bicameral body, and each of the
two chambers must necessarily have the competence to
make independent determinations and decisions with
respect to this constituent act of initiating the rst step
toward changing the Constitution, and, second, the
practical reason that, if bills, done by the Congress in its
purely legislative capacity, are required under the Cons-
titution to be separately deliberated and decided upon
by each chamber, then, with greater reason, there must
be as well the competence for each of the chambers to
make such independent deliberation and decision on the
constituent and therefore greater or more important
task of proposing constitutional amendments.
It may be added that many specic actions of the
Congress, such as the declaration of the existence of a
state of war (Article VI, Section 23 [1]) and the procla-
mation of the winning presidential candidate (Article
VII, Section 4) are required under the Constitution to be
done through the separate votes of the two chambers. It
is only in the revocation of a declaration of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas cor-
pus that a joint majority vote is prescribed. (Article VII,
Section 18)
218 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

II
Several citizens, unhappy with the prolifera-
tion of families dominating the political land-
scape, decided to take matters into their own
hands. They proposed to come up with a people’s
initiative defining political dynasties. They
started a signature campaign for the purpose of
coming up with a petition for that purpose. Some
others expressed misgivings about a people’s ini-
tiative for the purpose of proposing amendments
to the Constitution, however. They cited the
Court’s decision in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), as authority for
their position that there is yet no enabling law for
such purpose. On the other hand, there are also
those who claim that the individual votes of the
justices in Lambino v. Commission on Elections,
505 SCRA 160 (2006), mean that Santiago’s pro-
nouncement has effectively been abandoned. If
you were consulted by those behind the new at-
tempt at a people’s initiative, how would you ad-
vise them? (4%)

I would advise them to proceed with their intention

to le a petition for initiative for purposes of providing
for a law prohibiting political dynasties.
This can be done on the basis of and following the
procedure prescribed in R.A. No. 6735, which imple-
ments Section 32 of Article VI of the Constitution. It will
be recalled that the procedure for said initiative on na-
tional legislation, as prescribed in said law, has been
upheld as a valid enabling law with respect to initia-
tives on national and local legislation by the Supreme
Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elections.
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 219
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

I will further advise them not to pursue or le a pe-

tition for initiative on amendment of the Constitution
because, in the same case of Santiago v. Commission on
Elections, the Supreme Court considered said enabling
law, or R.A. No. 6735, as inadequate for purposes of
implementing Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitu-
tion, with respect to initiatives for amendment of the
Constitution. Accordingly, there exists no valid or en-
forceable enabling law which can implement said consti-
tutional provision.
The claim that Lambino v. Commission on Elec-
tions has reversed that part of the ruling in Santiago v.
Commission on Elections, i.e., on the inadequacy of R.A.
No. 6735 by reason of its failure to provide for an effec-
tive procedure for petitions for initiative on amendment
of the Constitution, is baseless or untenable.
It will be recalled that the Supreme Court did not
even consider Santiago as an issue in said Lambino
case, and dismissed the Lambino petition on other
grounds, i.e., the insufciency of the petition for initia-
tive led by the petitioners in said case.
It is submitted that there can be no reversal of a
doctrine by implication, especially in a case where said
doctrine was not even considered as among the legal
issues.

III
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.,
582 SCRA 254 (2009), the Supreme Court declared
as violative of the Equal Protection Clause the 5th
paragraph of §10 R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) for discrimi-
nating against illegally dismissed OFWs who still
220 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

had more than a year to their contract compared

to those who only had less than a year remaining.
The next year, Congress enacted R.A. No 10222, an
amendment to the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act, which practically reinstated the
provision struck down in Serrano.
Seamacho, an overseas seafarer who still had
two years remaining on his contract when he was
illegally terminated, and who would only be enti-
tled to a maximum of six-month’s pay under the
reinstated provision, engages you as his counsel.
How are you to argue that the new law is invalid
insofar as it brings back to the statute books a
provision that has already been struck down by
the Court? (5%)
When a law or a provision of law is null because it
is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot
be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same
or a similar law or provision.
A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances
have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
(Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles,
G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014)

IV
Beauty was proclaimed as the Winning candi-
date for the position of Representative in the
House of Representatives three (3) days after the
elections in May. She then immediately took her
oath of office. However, there was a pending dis-
qualification case against her, which case was
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 221
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoossrso ANSWERS

eventually decided by the COMELEC against her

10 days after the election. Since she has already
been proclaimed, she ignored that decision and
did not bother appealing it. The COMELEC then
declared in the first week of June that its decision
holding that Beauty was not validly elected had
become final. Beauty then went to the Supreme
Court questioning the jurisdiction of the COME-
LEC claiming that since she had already been
proclaimed and had taken her oath of office, such
election body had no more right to come up with a
decision that the jurisdiction had already been
—

transferred to the House of Representatives Elec-

toral Tribunal. How defensible is the argument of
Beauty? (4%)

Beauty’s argument is untenable.

The COMELEC properly had jurisdiction over her
disqualication case, and its decision providing for her
disqualication had indeed become nal in June.
Her claim that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which may properly exercise
jurisdiction over her is without merit.
It is established that the jurisdiction of the HRET
is limited only to Members of the House of Representa-
tives. For one to be considered as such, “there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (a) a valid proc-
lamation, (b) a proper oath, and (c) assumption of of-
ce.” A “proper oath” is one taken before the Speaker of
the House of Representatives “in open session,” consis-
tent with the provisions of Section 6 of Rule II (Mem-
bership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
(Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013)
222 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

It is clear that Beauty, upon the nality of the

COMELEC decision on her disqualication had yet to
become such a Member, because while she may then
already have been proclaimed as the winning candidate,
it is clear that she is yet to take her “proper oath” and
assume ofce.

V
Greenpeas is an ideology-based political
party fighting for environmental causes. It de-
cided to participate under the party-list system.
When the election results came in, it only ob-
tained 1.99 percent of the votes cast under the
party-list system. Bluebean, a political observer,
claimed that Greenpeas is not entitled to any seat
since it failed to obtain at least 2% of the votes.
Moreover, since it does not represent any of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society, Greenpeas is not entitled to participate
under the party-list system. How valid are the
observations of Bluebean? (4%)
The observations of Bluebean are not valid.
Greenpeas can be considered as qualied to a
party-list seat notwithstanding its having obtained only
1.99 percent of the votes cast under the party-list sys-
tem. Party-list groups or organizations garnering less
than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat
in the allocation of additional seats. (BANAT v. COME-
LEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009, 592 SCRA 294,
cited in Philippine Guardians v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
190529, April 29, 2010)
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 223
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Neither should Greenpeas be considered as dis-

qualied because, as alleged by Blueban, “it does not
represent any of the marginalized and underrepre-
sented sectors of society.”
It still can be considered as a sectoral party, which
refers to any organized group of citizens belonging to
any of the sectors enumerated in the law, Section 5 of
R.A. No. 7941, whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.
The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all nec-
essarily “marginalized and underrepresented.” It Would
be enough if a sectoral party’s principal advocacy per-
tains to the special interest and concerns of its sector, as
in the case of Greenpeas, which is an ideology-based
political party ghting for environmental causes. (Atong
Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
203766, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 477)

VI
A few months before the end of the present
Congress, Strongwill was invited by the Senate to
shed light in an inquiry relative to the alleged
siphoning and diverting of the pork barrel of
members of Congress to non-existent or fictitious
projects. Strongwill has been identified in the
news as the principal actor responsible for the
scandal, the leader of a non-governmental organi-
zation which ostensibly funnelled the funds to
certain local government projects which existed
only on paper. At the start of the hearings before
the Senate, Strongwill refused at once to cooper-
ate. The Senate cited him in contempt and sent
him to jail until he would have seen the light. The
224 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Congress, thereafter, adjourned sine die prepara-

tory to the assumption to office of the newly-
elected members. In the meantime, Strongwill
languished behind bars and the remaining sena-
tors refused to have him released, claiming that
the Senate is a continuing body and , therefore, he
can be detained indefinitely. Are the senators
right? (4%)
Although the senators are correct in declaring that
the Senate, as an institution, is a continuing body (Ar-
nault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950, 87
Phil. 29; Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008,
564 SCRA 152), it is also established that, in the con-
duct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Con-
gress acts separately and independently of the Senate of
the Congress before it. Accordingly, all pending matters
and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress
are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up such unnished mat-
ters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the
rst time. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, cited in Garcillano v.
House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December
23, 20085 575 SCRA 170)
Accordingly, it has been held that the period of im-
prisonment under the inherent power of contempt by
the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should
only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry
under which the said power is invoked, i.e., upon the
approval or disapproval of the Committee Report, or
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 225
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

upon the expiration of one Congress which necessarily

results in the termination of the legislative inquiry of
the Senate. As the legislative inquiry ends upon that
expiration, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses
likewise ends. (Balag v. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3,
2018)

[N0te: This answer is based on a case which was decided after

this question was asked in 2014.]
[Acceptable Answer: The senators are correct in declaring that
the Senate, as an institution, is a continuing body (Arnault v. Naza-
reno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950, 87 Phil. 29; Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, G.R. N0. 180643,
September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152). Accordingly, Storngwill can be
detained despite the adjournment of the Senate, provided that his
detention should not be for a period which can be considered as
violative of his right to due process. (Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No.
L-3820, July 18, 1950, 87 Phil. 29)]
[Acceptable Answer: Although the senators are correct in de-
claring that the Senate, as an institution, is a continuing body (Ar-
nault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950, 87 Phil. 29; Neri
v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, G.R. No.
180643, September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152), it is also established
that, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it. Accordingly, all pending matters and proceed-
ings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the
Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress. This should necessarily include the
continued detention of those it may have cited for contempt and
punished with detention, such as Strongwill, in connection with its
exercise of its power of legislative inquiry. (Neri v. Senate Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No.
180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, cited in Garcillano v. House
of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 28, 20085 575 SCRA
170)]
226 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND Pusuc INTERNATIONAL LAW

VII
Margie has been in the judiciary for a long
time, starting from the lowest court. Twenty (20)
years from her first year in the judiciary, she was
nominated as a Justice in the Court of Appeals.
Margie also happens to be a first-degree cousin of
the President. The Judicial and Bar Council in-
cluded her in the short-list submitted to the
President whose term of office was about to end —
it was a month before the next presidential elec-
tions. Can the President still make appointments
to the judiciary during the so-called midnight
appointment ban period? Assuming that he can
still make appointments, could he appoint Margie,
his cousin? (4%)
Yes, he can still make appointments to the judici-
ary during the so-called midnight appointment ban pe-
riod because the prohibition against such, which is
found in Section 15 of Article VII of the Constitution,
covers only appointments to executive positions.
The prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 15,
Article VII does not apply as well to all other appoint-
ments in the Judiciary. (De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)
It is submitted that the president can likewise val-
idly appoint his cousin, Margie, as a Justice in the Court
of Appeals, because the special rule against nepotism
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 227
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

with respect to appointments which may be made by the

president does not cover appointments to the judiciary.
Thus, it is there provided that “the spouse and rela-
tives by consanguinity or afnity Within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as members of the Constitutional Commis-
sions, or the Ofce of the Ombudsman, or as Secretar-
ies, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or
ofces, including government-owned or controlled corpo-
rations and their subsidiaries.”

VIII
The President, concerned about persistent
reports of widespread irregularities and shenani-
gans related to the alleged ghost projects with
which the pork barrel funds of members of Con-
gress had been associated, decided not to release
the funds authorized under a Special Appropria-
tions Act for the construction of a new bridge. The
Chief Executive explained that, to properly con-
serve and preserve the limited funds of the gov-
ernment, as well as to avoid further mistrust by
the people, such a project which he considered
—

as unnecessary since there was an old bridge near

the proposed bridge which was still functional -
should be scrapped. Does the President have such
authority? (4%)
It is submitted that the president does not have
such authority.
Although it is established that, in keeping with his
duty to faithfully execute the laws, the president has
sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget
228 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic

situation, said discretion being justified as a measure
indicative of his scal autonomy and the principle of
separation of powers (Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. N0.
103524, April 15, 1992, 208 SCRA 133), it is neverthe-
less submitted that his decision not to release, and
therefore not spend, the subject funds can be considered
as impoundment, which if not statutorily authorized,
should be considered as unlawful or unconstitutional.
Impoundment refers to a refusal by the president,
for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by
Congress. It is the failure, as in this case, to spend or
obligate budget authority of any type.
To allow him to do this, without prior or express
legislative authorization, would be to, in effect, permit
him to repeal a law, in this case, the pertinent appro-
priation measure, or to exercise a power which he does
not have. This should be considered as violative of the
principle of separation of powers. (Philippine Constitu-
tion Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August
19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506, cited in Araullo v. Aquino, G.R.
No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

IX
Gerrymandering refers to the practice of:
(1%)

(A) creating or dividing congressional

districts in a manner intended to favor a par-
ticular party or candidate.
(B) truancy as applied to Members of Con-
gress.
(C) loang among members of Congress.
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 229
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(D) coming up with guessing game when it

comes to legislation.
(E) commandeering large chunks of the
budget for favoured congressional districts.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a concept

which means that: (1%)

(A) ifa law is vague, then it must be void.

(B) any law which could not be understood by
laymen is a nullity.
(C) if a law is incomprehensible to ordi-
nary people such that they do not really know
what is required or prohibited, then the law
must be struck down.
(D) a government regulation that lacks clear
standards is nonsensical and useless as a guide for
human conduct.
(E) clarity in legal language is a mandate of
due process.
[Acceptable Answer: (A)]

XI
In keeping with the modern age of instant
and incessant information and transformation,
Congress passed Cybercrime Prevention Act to
regulate access to and use of the amenities of the
cyberspace. While ostensibly the law is intended
to protect the interests of society, some of its pro-
230 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

visions were also seen as impermissibly invading

and impairing widely cherished liberties of the
people particularly the freedom of expression.
Before the law could even be implemented, peti-
tions were filed in the Supreme Court questioning
said provisions by people who felt threatened, for
themselves as well as for the benefit of others who
may be similarly affected but not minded enough
to challenge the law. The Solicitor General coun-
tered that there is no basis for the exercise of the
power of judicial review since there has yet been
no violation of the law, and therefore, there is no
actual case or controversy to speak of, aside from
the fact that the petitioners have no locus standi
since they do not claim to be in imminent danger
of being prosecuted under the law. Can the Court
proceed to decide the case even if the law has not
yet become effective? (4%)
Yes, the Supreme Court can decide the case even if
the law has not yet become effective.
Itis established that, upon the mere enactment of
the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. “Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty.” (Taada v. An-
gara, G.R. N0. 118295, May 2, 1997, 2'72 SCRA 18, cited
in Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000,
336 SCRA 201)

XII
The Court had adopted the practice of an-
nouncing its decision in important, controversial
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND Pusuc INTERNATIONAL LAW 231
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

or interesting cases the moment the votes had

been taken among the justices, even as the final
printed decision and separate opinions are not
yet available to the public. In a greatly antici-
pated decision in a case of wide-ranging ramifica-
tions, the voting was close - 8 for the majority,
while 7 were for the other side. After the Court
had thus voted, it issued a press release announc-
ing the result, with the advice that the printed
copy of the decision, together with the separate
opinions, were to be issued subsequently. The
following day, however, one of the members of the
Court died. The Court then announced that it
would deliberate anew on the case since appar-
ently the one who died belonged to the majority.
Citizens for Transparency, a group of civic-
spirited professionals and ordinary citizens dedi-
cated to transparency and accountability in the
government, questioned the act of the Court. The
petitioners claimed the decision had already been
validly adopted and promulgated. Therefore, it
could no longer be recalled by the Court. At the
same time, the group also asked the Court to dis-
close to the public the original decision and the
separate opinions of the magistrates, together
with what they had deliberated on just before
they came up with the press release about the 8-7
decision. (6%)
(A) Was the announced 8-7 decision al-
ready validly promulgated and thus not sub-
ject to recall?
232 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

The press release on the subject decision cannot be

considered as a valid promulgation of said judgment
which may thus be recalled.
It is established that an unpromulgated decision is
no decision at all. A decision becomes binding only after
itis validly promulgated. (Limkaichong v. COMELEC,
G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009 Resolution on the
Motion for Reconsideration)
Until such operative act occurs, there is really no
decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices
have already affixed their signatures thereto. During
the intervening period from the time of signing until the
promulgation of the decision, anyone who took part in
the deliberation and had signed the decision may, for a
reason, validly withdraw one’s vote, thereby preserving
one’s freedom of action. (Limkaichong u. COMELEC,
G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009 Resolution on the
Motion for Reconsideration)

(B) If the decision was not yet finalized

at the time when the justice died, could it still
be promulgated?

It is submitted that, considering that one of the jus-

tices which voted for the majority had died before the
actual promulgation of the subject judgment, said deci-
sion can no longer be promulgated, as the resultant vote
(of 7-7) Would not be determinative of the case.
This would be consistent with the established rule
that judgments must be duly signed and promulgated
during the incumbency of those, or the judges, who
signed them. (People vs. So, 101 Phil. 1257; People vs.
Court of Appeals and Domaloan, 99 Phil. 786; Jimenez
vs. Republic, L-24529, February 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 622;
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 233
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Piazon vs. Judge of the CFI of Cotabato, L-29354, Janu-

ary 27, 1969, 26 SCRA 664; Sons vs. Court 0fAppeaZs,
L-29777-83, March 26, 1971, 38 SCRA 53)

(C) If
the decision was still being nal-
ized, should the Court release to the public
the majority decision and the separate opin-
ions as originally announced, together with
their deliberations on the issues?
It is submitted that the Court should not release
both the majority decision and the separate opinions
prior to their valid promulgation. These should be con-
sidered as parts of the condential internal delibera-
tions of the Court which must not be released to the
public. (Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-
32, July 30, 2009 Resolution on the Motion for Recon-
sideration)

XIII
Congress may increase the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court: (1%)
(A) anytime it wants.
(B) if requested by the Supreme Court.
(C) upon recommendation of the President.
(D) only with the advice and concurrence
of the Supreme Court.
(E) whenever it deems it appropriate, advis-
able or necessary.
234 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

XIV
The guarantee of freedom of expression signi-
fies: (1%)

(A) absolute freedom to express oneself.

(B) freedom from prior restraint.
(C) right to freely speak on anything without
limitations.
(D) the right of the government to regulate
speech.
(E) the right of broadcast stations to air any
program.

XV

Allmighty Apostles is a relatively new reli-

gious group and movement with fast-growing
membership. One time, DeepThroat, an investiga-
tive reporter, made a research and study as to
what the group’s leader, Maskeraid, was actually
doing. DeepThroat eventually came up with the
conclusion that Maskeraid was a phony who is
just fooling the simple-minded people to part with
their money in exchange for the promise of eter-
nal happiness in some far-away heaven. This was
published in a newspaper which caused much
agitation among the followers of Maskeraid. Some
threatened violence against DeepThroat, while
some others already started destroying properties
while hurting those selling the newspaper. The
local authorities, afraid of the public disorder
that such followers might do, decided to ban the
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 235
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

distribution of the newspaper containing the arti-

cle. DeepThroat went to court complaining about
the prohibition placed on the dissemination of his
article. He claims that the act of the authorities
partakes of the nature of heckler’s veto, thus a
violation of the guaranty of press freedom. On the
other hand, the authorities counter that the act
was necessary to protect the public order and the
greater interest of the community. If you were the
judge, how would you resolve the issue? (4%)
I would rule in favor of DeepThroat.
He is correct in complaining against the prohibition
and correctly considered it as a heckler’s veto, which
generally occurs when an acting party’s right to freedom
of speech is curtailed or restricted by the government in
order to prevent a reacting party’s behaviour, as in this
case.
Government regulations partaking of the nature of
a heckler’s veto have been considered as unconstitu-
tional. (Hill u. Colorado (530 US 703); see Constitu-
tional Law, Cruz and Cruz, 2015 Edition, pages 513-
515)

XVI
The overbreadth doctrine posits that the gov-
ernment: (1%)
(A) must know the extent of its power.
(B) when it exercises too much power it is like
someone with bad breath — it is not healthy to soci-
ety.
236 BAR Q & A
PoL1T1cAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(C) can enact laws which can reach outside its

borders, like long-arm statues.
(D) the government is prohibited in ban-
ning unprotected speech if a substantial
amount of protected speech is restrained or
chilled in the process.

XVII
Towards the end of the year, the Commission
on Audit (COA) sought the remainder of its ap-
propriation from the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM). However, the DBM refused
because the COA had not yet submitted a report
on the expenditures relative to the earlier amount
released to it. And, pursuant to the “no report, no
release” policy of the DBM, COA is not entitled to
any further releases in the meantime. COA count-
ers that such a policy contravenes the guaranty of
fiscal autonomy granted by the Constitution. Is
COA entitled to receive the rest of its appropria-
tions even without complying with the DBM pol-
icy? (4%)

COA is entitled to receive the rest of its appropria-

tions, the release of which cannot be conditioned on its
prior compliance with the DBM’s “no report, no release
policy.” This cannot be made to apply to the COA be-
cause of its scal autonomy which is guaranteed under
the Constitution. (Article IX-A, Section 5)
This is not to say that the COA, though vested with
scal autonomy, has no reporting responsibility at all to
the DBM. It is established that constitutional commis-
sions clothed with scal autonomy may submit reports
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 237
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

relative to its appropriation for records purposes only.

(Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and
Management, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005)

XVIII
The National Building Code and its imple-
menting rules provide, inter alia, that operators
of shopping centers and malls should provide
parking and loading spaces, in accordance with a
prescribed ratio. The Solicitor General, heeding
the call of the public for the provision of free
parking spaces in malls, filed a case to compel
said business concerns to discontinue their prac-
tice of collecting parking fees. The mall owners
and operators oppose, saying that this is an inva-
lid taking of their property, thus a violation of
due process. The Solicitor General justifies it,
however, claiming that it is a valid exercise of
police power. Could the mall owners and opera-
tors be validly compelled to provide free parking
to their customers? (4%)
No, they may not be so compelled.
A prohibition against mall owners from collecting
parking fees from their customers who use their parking
lots has been considered as a “taking” within the context
of the power of eminent domain, and cannot be justified
as a valid exercise of the police power. In totally prohib-
iting respondents from collecting parking fees from the
public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the State
would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power does not involve the taking or cons-
cation of property, with the exception of a few cases
238 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

where there is a necessity to conscate private property

in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace
and order and of promoting the general welfare; for in-
stance, the conscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and rearms. When there is a taking or
conscation of private property for public use, the State
is no longer exercising police power, but another of its
inherent powers, namely, eminent domain.
Although in the present case, title to and/or posses-
sion of the parking facilities remain/s with the mall
owners, the prohibition against their collection of park-
ing fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is
already tantamount to a taking or conscation of their
properties. The State is not only requiring that respon-
dents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use
as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give
the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is
already an excessive intrusion into the property rights
of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the
right to use a portion of their properties as they wish,
they are further prohibited from proting from its use
or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the
maintenance and operation of the required parking fa-
cilities, (Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land,
Inc., G.R. No. 177056, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA
617)

XIX
Surveys Galore is an outfit involved in con-
ducting nationwide surveys. In one such survey, it
asked the people about the degree of trust and
confidence they had in several institutions of the
government. When the results came in, the judici-
ary was shown to be less trusted than most of the
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND Pusmc INTERNATIONAL LAW 239
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

government offices. The results were then pub-

lished by the mass media. Assension, a trial court
judge, felt particularly offended by the news. He
then issued a show-cause order against Surveys
Galore directing the survey entity to explain why
it should not be cited in contempt for coming up
with such a survey and publishing the results
which were so unattering and degrading to the
dignity of the judiciary. Surveys Galore immedi-
ately assailed the show-cause order of Judge As-
sension, arguing that it is violative of the consti-
tutional guaranty of freedom of expression. Is
Surveys Galore’s petition meritorious? (4%)

Yes, its petition is meritorious.

Survey results constitute protected speech and
cannot be subjected to prior restraint or subsequent
punishment without a showing of any clear and present
danger. (Schenck v. US, 249 U.S. 97; Social Weather
Station v. Commission on Elections, GR. N0. 147571,
May 5, 2001)

XX

Under the so-called doctrine of qualified po-

litical agency, (1%)

(A) civil servants must rst qualify before

they could be appointed to ofce.
(B) all employees in the government are
merely agents of the people.
(C) the acts of subordinates presump-
tively of those of the heads of offices disap-
proves them. (sic)
240 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(D) members of the Cabinet must have the

absolute trust and condence of the President.

[Notez (C) appears to be the best answer despite the evident

typographical errors. It would appear that it should, properly, read —
(C) the acts of subordinates are presumptively those of the heads of
ofces who may disapprove them.]

XXI

Constituent power refers to the authority

(1%)

(A) of public officials to command respect.

(B) given to Congress to enact police power
measures.
(C) to propose constitutional amend-
ments or revisions.
(D) of the people to take back the power en-
trusted to those in government.
(E) of the President to call out the armed
forces to suppress lawless violence.

XXII
The National Power and Grid Corporation
(NPGC), a government entity involved in power
generation distribution, had its transmission lines
traverse some fields belonging to Farmerjoe.
NPGC did so without instituting any expropria-
tion proceedings. Farmerjoe, not knowing any
better, did not immediately press his claim for
payment until after ten years later when a son of
his took up Law and told him that he had a right
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 241
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoonsnao ANSWERS

to claim compensation. That was then the only

time that Farmerjoe earnestly demanded pay-
ment. When the NPGC ignored him, he instituted
a case for payment of just compensation. In de-
fense, NPGC pointed out that the claim had al-
ready prescribed since, under its Charter, it is
clearly provided that “actions for damages must
be filed within five years after the rights of way,
transmission lines, substations, plants or other
facilities shall have been established and that
after said period, no suit shall be brought to ques-
tion the said rights of way, transmission lines,
substations, plants or other facilities.” If you were
the lawyer of Farmerjoe, how would you protect
and vindicate the rights of your client? (4%)

I would le an action for payment of just compensa-

tion and contend that the same cannot be considered as
prescribed.
The establishment of the subject transmission lines
constitutes taking in the context of the power of eminent
domain, for which just compensation must be paid. (Na-
tional Power Corporation v. Heirs of Sangkay, GR. No.
165828, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 60; National Power
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113194,
March 11, 1996, 254 SCRA 577; National Power Corpo-
ration v. Santa Loro Vda. De Capin, G.R. N0. 175176,
October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 648; Vergara v. Melencio,
G.R. No. 185638, August 10, 2016)
The action, which would partake of the nature of an
inverse condemnation proceeding (National Power Cor-
poration u. Heirs of Sangkay, G.R. N0. 165828, August
24, 2011, 656 SCRA 60) or a “reversed eminent domain”
(National Power Corporation u. Santa Loro Vda. De
242 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Capin, G.R. No. 175176, October 17, Z008, 569 SCRA

648), considering the failure of the NPC to institute the
appropriate expropriation proceedings, would clearly be
justified or warranted under the circumstances and
should not be considered as prescribed. (Republic v.
Court 0fAppeaZs, G.R. No. 147245, March 31, 2005, 454
SCRA 520)

XXIII
The police got a report about a shooting inci-
dent during a town fiesta. One person was killed.
The police immediately went to the scene and
started asking the people about what they wit-
nessed. In due time, they were pointed to Edward
Gunman, a security guard, as the possible male-
factor. Edward was then having refreshment in
one of the eateries when the police approached
him. They asked him if he had a gun to which
question he answered yes. Then they asked if he
had seen anybody shot in the vicinity just a few
minutes earlier and this time he said he did not
know about it. After a few more questions, one of
the policemen asked Edward if he was the
shooter. He said no, but then the policeman who
asked him told him that several witnesses pointed
to him as the shooter. Whereupon Edward broke
down and started explaining that it was a matter
of self-defense. Edward was eventually charged
with murder. During his trial, the statements he
made to the police were introduced as evidence
against him. He objected claiming that they were
inadmissible since he was not given his Miranda
rights. On the other hand, the prosecution coun-
tered that there was no need for such rights to be
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 243
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

given since he was not yet arrested at the time of

the questioning. If you were the judge, how would
you rule on the issue? (4%)
If I were the judge, I would consider the confession
as inadmissible because he was not, prior to his admis-
sion, properly advised of his so-called Miranda rights.
It bears stressing that, when he was questioned,
Edward was already considered by the police as a sus-
pect, the witnesses who saw the killing having pointed
him out to them. Under said circumstances, the ques-
tioning done by the police then and there can be consid-
ered as partaking of the nature of a custodial investiga-
tion.
A custodial investigation commences when a person
is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in
the commission of a crime under investigation and the
police ofcers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s
participation therein and which tend to elicit an admis-
sion. (Miranda vs. Arizona 384 US 436; People v. Marra,
G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994, People v. Caba-
nada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017)

XXIV

Alienmae is a foreign tourist. She was asked

certain questions in regard to a complaint that
was filed against her by someone who claimed to
have been defrauded by her. Alienmae answered
all the questions asked, except in regard to some
matters in which she invoked her right against
self-incrimination. When she was pressed to elu-
cidate, she said that the questions being asked
might tend to elicit incriminating answers insofar
244 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

as her home state is concerned. Could Alienmae

invoke the right against self-incrimination if the
fear of incrimination is in regard to her foreign
law? (4%)

Yes, her right against self-incrimination with re-

gard to the penal laws in her home state may be invoked
by her even if she were abroad, or in another country.
This would be consistent with the rule prescribed
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which makes said right available to everyone.
(Article 14 [3])

XXV

Rosebud is a natural-born Filipino woman

who got married to Rockcold, a citizen of State
Frozen. By virtue of the laws of Frozen, any per-
son who marries its citizens would automatically
be deemed its own citizen. After ten years of mar-
riage, Rosebud, who has split her time between
the Philippines and Frozen, decided to run for
Congress. Her opponent sought her disqualifica-
tion, however, claiming that she is no longer a
natural-born citizen. In any event, she could not
seek elective position since she never renounced
her foreign citizenship pursuant to the Citizen-
ship Retention and Reacquisition Act (R.A. No.
9225). Is Rosebud disqualified to run by reason of
citizenship? (4%)
Rosebud, a dual citizen, can be considered as not
qualied on the ground of citizenship.
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 245
BAR QUEsT1oNs AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Her marriage to Rockold did not necessarily result

in her loss of her natural-born Philippine citizenship
status, as it is provided in Section 4 of Article IV of the
Constitution that citizens of the Philippines who marry
aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act
or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced it. There is no showing that Rosebud has
done any act or omission which, under said constitu-
tional provision, can lead to her being considered as
having renounced her natural-born Philippine citizen-
ship status. She therefore remains as a natural-born
Philippine citizen.
It is established though that dual citizens who wish
to run for elective office must renounce their foreign
citizenship prior to or upon ling of their certicates of
candidacy. There is nothing to indicate that she has
made such a renunciation. Absent such a renunciation,
she should be considered as ineligible for election on the
ground of citizenship, because it is equally established
that, for purposes of appointment or election to public
ofce, sole Philippine citizenship is required. (Mercado
u. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999; Valles v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 137000, August 9,
2000; Cordora u. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
176947, February 19, 2009)

[Acceptable Answer: Rosebud is not necessarily disqualied on

the basis of citizenship.
Her marriage to Rockold did not necessarily result in her loss
of her natural-born Philippine citizenship status, as it is provided in
Section 4 of Article IV of the Constitution that citizens of the Philip-
pines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced
it. There is no showing that Rosebud has done any act or omission
which, under said constitutional provision, can lead to her being
considered as having renounced her natural-born Philippine citizen-
ship status.
246 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

It is signicant that she became a dual citizen not by reason of

the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 but because of her marriage to Rock-
old which ipso facto made her, under the laws of Frozen, a citizen
thereof. Accordingly, the renunciation of foreign citizenship pres-
cribed under said law for eligibility for elective or appointive ofce
cannot be made to apply to her.]

XXVI

The one-year-bar rule in impeachment pro-

ceedings is to be reckoned from the time the (1%)

(A) rst impeachment complaint is led.

(B) impeachment complaint is referred
to the Committee on Justice.
(C) House of Representatives vote on the im-
peachment complaint.
(D) House of Representatives endorses the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

XXVII

Congress enacted a law exempting certain

government institutions providing social services
from the payment of court fees. Atty. Kristopher
Timoteo challenged the constitutionality of the
said law on the ground that only the Supreme
Court has the power to fix and exempt said enti-
ties from the payment of court fees.
Congress, on the other hand, argues that the
law is constitutional as it has the power to enact
said law for it was through legislative fiat that the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Spe-
cial Allowance for Judges and Justices (SAJJ), the
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 247
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

funding of which are sourced from the fees col-

lected by the courts, were created. Thus, Congress
further argues that if it can enact a law utilizing
court fees to fund the JDF and SAJJ, a fortiori it
can enact a law exempting the payment of court
fees.
Discuss the constitutionality of the said law,
taking into account the arguments of both par-
ties? (4%)

Said law is unconstitutional for being violative of

the principle of separation of powers, constituting as it
does as an encroachment by the Congress into the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court, and as an impair-
ment of its scal autonomy. (Re: Petition for Recognition
of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) for Payment ofLegaZ Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-
01-0, February 11, 2010; see Re: Exemption of the NPC
from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees, A.M. No. 05-10-20-
SC, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 1)
Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and author-
ity of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees (Bengzon
v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA
133, 150), including legal fees. The payment of legal fees
under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part
of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its
rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of
the Constitution. (Re: Petition for Recognition of the
Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) for Payment of Legal Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-O,
February 11, 2010)
Any exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled
corporations and local government units will necessarily
248 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

reduce the JDF and the SAJF and impair the Court’s
guaranteed scal autonomy and erode its independence.
(In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Pay-
ment 0fAll Court and Sheriffs Fees, A.M. No. 12-2-03-0,
March 13, 2012)

XXVIII
From an existing province, Wideland, Con-
gress created a new province, Hundred Isles, con-
sisting of several islands, with an aggregate area
of 500 square kilometres. The law creating Hun-
dred Isles was duly approved in a plebiscite called
for that purpose. Juan, a taxpayer and a resident
of Wideland, assailed the creation of Hundred
Isles claiming that it did not comply with the area
requirement as set out in the Local Government
Code, i.e., an area of at least 2,000 square kilome-
tres. The proponents justified the creation, how-
ever, pointing out that the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code states
that “the land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands.” Accordingly, since the new
province consists of several islands, the area re-
quirement need not be satisfied. How tenable is
the position of the proponents? (4%)
The contention of the proponents is more tenable.
VVhile Juan may be generally correct in his conten-
tion that the subject law did not comply with the re-
quirement on territory, as specied in the Local Gov-
ernment Code, the exemption of the Wideland from the
2,000 square kilometres requirement thereunder, con-
sisting as it does of several islands, is nevertheless pro-
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANswERs

vided for in the LGC-IRR, which has been acknowledged

by the Supreme Court as amounting to “both executive
and legislative construction of the LGC.”
Thus, in the case of Navarro v. Ermita (G.R. No.
180050, April 12, 2011), the Court ruled that the Con-
gress, in promulgating the law creating a province simi-
larly consisting of several islands had, in effect, afrmed
said provision in the LGC-IRR, as and by way of
amendment of the Local Government Code, which, con-
cededly, did not provide for an exemption of provinces
comprised of islands from said territory requirement.

XXIX

Ambassador Gaylor is State Juvenus’ diplo-

matic representative to State Hinterlands. During
one of his vacations, Ambassador Gaylor decided
to experience for himself the sights and sounds of
State Paradise, a country known for its beauty
and other attractions. While in State Paradise,
Ambassador Gaylor was caught in the company of
children under suspicious circumstances. He was
arrested for violation of the strict anti-pedophilia
statute of State Paradise. He claims that he is
immune from arrest and incarceration by virtue
of his diplomatic immunity. Does the claim of
Ambassador Gaylor hold Water? (4%)
No.
This claim would be inconsistent with Article 31 (1)
of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations,
which generally provides that a diplomatic agent, such
as Ambassador Gaylor, shall enjoy immunity from the
criminal jurisdiction only of the receiving state. It bears
250 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

emphasis that he is Juvenus’ diplomatic representative

to State Hinterlands, which is to be considered as his
receiving state, and not State Paradise, where he was,
when arrested, present as a mere tourist.
Itis signicant that he cannot claim diplomatic
immunity in State Paradise, Where he was arrested,
also because he was there only as a tourist, and was not
there because he was passing through to take up or
return to his diplomatic post, or to return to his country.
If either of these were the case, then he would have
been entitled to diplomatic immunity under the provi-
sions of Article 40 (1) of the Vienna Convention of Dip-
lomatic Relations.

XXX

Congress passed a law, R.A. No. 15005, creat-

ing an administrative Board principally tasked
with the supervision and regulation of legal edu-
cation. The Board was attached to the Depart-
ment of Education. It was empowered, among
others, to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission and minimum qualifications of faculty
members, the basic curricula for the course of
study aligned to the requirements for admission
to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness,
as well as to establish a law practice internship as
a requirement for taking the Bar which a law stu-
dent shall undergo anytime during the law
course, and to adopt a system of continuing legal
education. Professor Boombastick, a long-time
law practitioner and lecturer in several prestig-
ious law schools, assails the constitutionality of
the law arguing that it encroached on the pre-
rogatives of the Supreme Court to promulgate
 2014 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 251
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

rules relative to admission to the practice of law,

the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. If you were Professor Boombas-
tick’s understudy, how may you help him develop
clear, concise and cogent arguments in support of
his position based on the present Constitution
and the decisions of the Supreme Court on judi-
cial independence and fiscal autonomy? (4%)
I would assail the provisions of the subject law au-
thorizing the Board to prescribe minimum standards for
law admission and minimum qualications of faculty
members, the basic curricula for the course of study
aligned to the requirements for admission to the Bar,
law practice and social consciousness on the ground of
academic freedom, guaranteed under the provisions of
Article XIV, Section 5 (2) of the Constitution, which
consists of four essential freedoms to determine for itself
on academic grounds: (1) who may teach; (2) what may
be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be
admitted to study. (Camacho vs. Corresis, GR. No.
103142, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 591)
The authority given to the Board to establish a law
practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar
which a law student shall undergo anytime during the
law course and to adopt a system of continuing legal
education for lawyers, or those who have already been
admitted to the practice of law, can be considered as an
encroachment of the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under Article VII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitu-
tion, under Which, it has the sole authority to promul-
gate rules concerning the practice of law. (Pimentel v.
Executive Secretary and Legal Education Board, G.R.
No. 230642, September 10, 2019)
252 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

2015
I
The Philippines and the Republic of Kroi Sha
established diplomatic relations and immediately
their respective Presidents signed the following:
(1) Executive Agreement allowing the Republic of
Kroi Sha to establish its embassy and consular
offices within Metro Manila; and (2) Executive
Agreement allowing the Republic of Kroi Sha to
bring to the Philippines its military complement,
warships, and armaments from time to time for a
period not exceeding one month for the purpose
of training exercises with the Philippine military
forces and exempting from Philippine criminal
jurisdiction acts committed in the line of duty by
foreign military personnel, and from paying cus-
tom duties on all the goods brought by said for-
eign forces into Philippine territory in connection
with the holding of the activities authorized un-
der the said Executive Agreement.
Senator Maagap questioned the constitution-
ality of the said Executive Agreements and de-
manded that the Executive Agreements be sub-
mitted to the Senate for ratification pursuant to
the Philippine Constitution. Is Senator Maagap
correct? Explain. (4%)
Only the rst Executive Agreement regarding the
establishment of the embassy of Kroi Sha need not be
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence, following
the general rule that Executive Agreements need not be
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence, under the
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 253
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

provisions of Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitu-

tion. (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, GR. No. 159618, Febru-
ary 1, 2011, 641 SCRA 244)
The second Executive Agreement which allows the
Republic of Kroi Sha to bring to the Philippines its mili-
tary complement, Warships, and armaments from time
to time should be considered as subject to the provisions
of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, which
requiires that “foreign bases, troops or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress
so requires, ratied by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum held for that pur-
pose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
state.” (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
212426, January 12, 2016)
It should be noted that, under the Constitution, the
Senate merely provides its concurrence to, and does not
ratify, treaties. It is the President who raties treaties.
(Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 15808, July
16, 2008, 462 SCRA 622)

II
(1) A bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives in order to implement faithfully
the provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which the
Philippines is a signatory. Congressman Pat Rio
Tek questioned the constitutionality of the bill on
the ground that the provisions of UNCLOS are
violative of the provisions of the Constitution de-
fining the Philippine internal waters and territo-
254 BAR Q & A
PoLITIcAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

rial sea. Do you agree or not with the said objec-

tion? Explain. (3%)
I do not agree.
UNCLOS does not dene the internal and territo-
rial Waters of states but merely “prescribes the water-
land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archi-
pelagic States like the Philippines.”
UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition (or
loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones, i.e.,
the territorial Waters (12 nautical miles from the base-
lines), contiguous zone (24 nautical miles from the base-
lines), exclusive economic zone (200 nautical miles from
the baselines), and continental shelves that UNCLOS
III delimits. (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167,
August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476)
[Notez “UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no
role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminu-
tion of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States
acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on
the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with
the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are
instead governed by the rules on general international law.” (Magal-
lona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476)
“The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that
seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle
of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the
world’s marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of
international law. The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign
rights in varying degrees over the di"erent zones of the sea which
are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) ex-
clusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal
States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on
where the vessel is located. Insofar as the internal waters and terri-
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 255
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

torial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty,

subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such
sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well
as to its bed and subsoil.” (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, Septem-
ber 16, 2014)]

(2) Describe the following maritime regimes

under UNCLOS (4%)
(a) Territorial sea
Under the UNCLOS, every State has the right to
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit
not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from base-
lines determined in accordance with this Convention.
(Article 3) The outer limit of the territorial sea is the
line every point of which is at a distance from the near-
est point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea. (Article 4)
(b) Contiguous zone

Under Article 33 of the UNCLOS, the contiguous

zone of a state may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the terri-
torial sea is measured. The coastal state may, within
said zone, exercise the control necessary to prevent in-
fringement of its customs, scal, immigration or sani-
tary laws, rules or regulations Within its territory or
territorial sea, and punish infringement of said laws
and regulations committed Within its territory or terri-
torial sea.

(c) Exclusive economic zone

Under Article 57 of the UNCLOS, the exclusive

economic zone of a state, over which it may assert exclu-
256 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

sive jurisdiction and ownership over all living and non-

living resources found therein, shall not extend beyond
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

(d) Continental shelf

The continental shelf of states comprises the sea-

bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend be-
yond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolonga-
tion of its land territory to the outer edge of the conti-
nental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the terri-
torial sea is measured where the outer edge of the con-
tinental margin does not extend up to that distance.
(UNCLOS III, Article 77)

III
Professor Masipag who holds a plantilla or
regular item in the University of the Philippines
(UP) is appointed as an Executive Assistant in the
Court of Appeals (CA). The professor is consid-
ered only on leave of absence in UP while he re-
ports for work at the CA which shall pay him the
salary of the Executive Assistant. The appoint-
ment to the CA position was questioned, but Pro-
fessor Masipag countered that he will not collect
the salary for both positions; hence, he cannot be
accused of receiving double compensation. Is the
argument of the professor valid? Explain. (4%)
Professor Masipag is correct in saying that “he
cannot be accused of receiving double compensation” as
he would not actually be receiving additional or double
compensation.
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 257
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED Awswsns

[Notez It is submitted though that he may nevertheless not be

allowed to accept the position of Executive Assistant of the Court of
Appeals during his incumbency as a regular employee of the Univer-
sity of the Philippines, as the former would be an incompatible office
not allowed to be concurrently held by him under the provisions of
Article IX-B, Section 7 of the Constitution, the second paragraph of
which species that “unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other ofce in the Government.”]

IV.

When is a facial challenge to the constitution-

ality of a law on the ground of violation of the Bill
of Rights traditionally allowed? Explain your an-
swer. (3%)

A facial challenge is allowed to assail the validity of

statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also
all other rights covered thereunder, including religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the peo-
ple to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances. (lmbong v. Ochoa, G.R.
No. 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146)

V
BD Telecommunications, Inc. (BDTI), a Fili-
pino-owned corporation, sold its 1,000 common
shares of stock in the Philippine Telecommunica-
tions Company (PTC), a public utility, to Austra-
lian Telecommunications (AT), another stock-
holder of the PTC which also owns 1,000 common
shares. A Filipino stockholder of PTC questions
the sale on the ground that it will increase the
common shares of AT, a foreign company, to more
than 40% of the capital (stock) of PTC in violation
258 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

of the 40% limitation of foreign ownership of a

public utility. AT argues that the sale does not
violate the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor
of Filipino citizens decreed in Section 11, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution because Filipinos still
own 70% of the capital of the PTC. AT points to
the fact that it owns only 2,000 common voting
shares and 1,000 non-voting preferred shares
while Filipino stockholders own 1,000 common
shares and 6,000 preferred shares, therefore, Fili-
pino stockholders still own a majority of the out-
standing capital stock of the corporation, and
both classes of shares have a par value of
Php20.00 per share. Decide. (5%)

It is submitted that the equity structure in PTC af-

ter the sale by BDTI of 1,000 of its common (voting)
shares in favor of AT, an Australian corporation, can be
considered as violative of the 60-40 ownership require-
ment in favor of Filipino citizens decreed in Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The rule is that the term “capital” in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of
stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and
thus in the present case only to common shares, and not
to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both
common and non-voting preferred shares. (Gamboa v.
Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011)
Moreover, it is likewise established that mere legal
title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-
owned “capital” required in the Constitution. Full bene-
cial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital
stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is
required. The legal and benecial ownership of 60 per-
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 259
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

cent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the

hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the cons-
titutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is “con-
sidered as non-Philippine national[s].” To construe
broadly the term “capital” as the total outstanding capi-
tal stock, including both common and non-voting pre-
ferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter
of the Constitution that the “State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.” A broad denition unjustiably
disregards who owns the all-important voting stock,
which necessarily equates to control of the public utility.
(Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579, June
28, 2011)
Thus, although Filipino stockholders may be re-
corded as owning 70% of PTC, though with only 1,000
common voting shares, the fact remains that the corpo-
ration would be actually “controlled” by AT, by reason of
its greater number of common or voting shares, i.e.,
2,000 common voting shares.
Applying the control test, which is the prevailing
mode of determining whether or not a corporation is
Filipino, and which prescribes that shares belonging to
corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital
of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be consid-
ered as of Philippine nationality, it becomes clear that
AT, an Australian corporation, controls PTC. (Narra
Nickel Mining and Development, Corp. v. Redmont Con-
solidated Mines, C0rp., G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014;
Querubin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 218787,
December 8, 2015)
260 I BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

VI
Distinguish the President’s authority to
(1)
declare a state of rebellion from the authority to
proclaim a state of national emergency. (2%)
While both the power to declare a state of rebellion
and the power to proclaim a state of national emergency
may be justied under the President’s general Ordi-
nance Powers under the provisions of the Administra-
tive Code (Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No.
292, Administrative Code of 1987), the power to declare
a state of rebellion springs from the President’s so-called
“calling out power” under Section 18 of Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides that “whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,”
(Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, GR. No. 159085, Feb-
ruary 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656), while the power to pro-
claim a state of national emergency can be said to be
based primarily on his duty to enforce the laws as Well
as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws,
consistent with the provisions of Section 17 of Article
VII of the Constitution.
Under said provision, the President “sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department.” Moreover, “in the exercise of such
function, the President, if needed, may employ the pow-
ers attached to his ofce as the Commander-in-Chief of
all the armed forces of the country, including the Phil-
ippine National Police under the Department of Interior
and Local Government.” (David v. Arroyo, G.R. N0.
171396, May 3, 2006)
It must be noted though, that without a law prom-
ulgated pursuant to the provisions of Section 23 (2) of
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 261
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Article VI, and Section 17 of Article XII, both of which

authorize the statutory delegation of emergency powers
in favor of the President, he is limited to the exercise of
his calling-out power under Section 18 of Article VII of
the Constitution, and may not exercise emergency pow-
ers. (David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

(2) What are the limitations, if any, to the

pardoning power of the President? (3%)
The 1987 Constitution, specically Section 19 of
Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that
the President of the Philippines possesses the power to
grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clem-
ency, to wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeach-

ment, or as otherwise provided in this Consti-
tution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit nes
and forfeitures, after conviction by nal judg-
ment.
He shall also have the power to grant am-
nesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress. (Article VII)
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole,
or suspension of sentence for violation of elec-
tion laws, rules, and regulations shall be
granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission. (Article
IX-C)

“It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional

provisions that the only instances in which the Presi-
dent may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) im-
262 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

peachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in

a nal conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of
election laws, rules and regulations in which there was
no favorable recommendation coming from the COME-
LEC.” (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666,
January 21, 2015)
It may be added that pardons may not be extended
to a person convicted of legislative contempt, as this
would violate the doctrine of separation of powers, or of
civil contempt since this would involve the benet not of
the State itself but of the private litigant whose rights
have been violated by the contemner. Pardon cannot
also be extended for purposes of absolving the pardonee
of civil liability, including judicial costs, since, again, the
interest that is remitted does not belong to the State but
to the private litigant. (Philippine Political Law, Cruz
and Cruz, 2014 Edition, page 445)

VII
Senator Fleur De Lis is charged with plunder
before the Sandiganbayan. After finding the exis-
tence of probable cause, the court issues a war-
rant for the Senator’s arrest. The prosecution files
a motion to suspend the Senator relying on Sec-
tion 5 of the Plunder Law. According to the prose-
cution, the suspension should last until the ter-
mination of the case. Senator Lis vigorously op-
poses the motion contending that only the Senate
can discipline its members; and that to allow his
suspension by the Court would violate the princi-
ple of separation of powers. Is Senator Lis’s con-
tention tenable? Explain. (4%)
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 263
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

The Senator’s contention is untenable. He can be

validly preventively suspended under the Plunder Law.
The power of each House of Congress to “punish its
Members for disorderly behavior,” and “suspend or expel
a Member” by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members
subject to the qualication that the penalty of suspen-
sion, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days” under
Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is “distinct”
from the suspension under the Plunder Law, “which is
not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of
the House of Representatives.” (Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, et aZ., G.R. No. 118364, August 8, 1995,
cited in Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, C-.R. No. 128055,
April 18, 2001)

VIII
A law provides that the Secretaries of the De-
partments of Finance and Trade and Industry, the
Governor of the Central Bank, the Director Gen-
eral of the National Economic Development Au-
thority, and the Chairperson of the Philippine
Overseas Construction Board shall sit as ex-
officio members of the Board of Directors (BOD)
of a government owned and controlled corpora-
tion (GOCC). The other four (4) members shall
come from the private sector. The BOD issues a
resolution to implement a new organizational
structure, staffing pattern, a position classifica-
tion system, and a new set of qualification stan-
dards. After the implementation of the Resolu-
tion, Atty. Dipasupil questioned the legality of the
Resolution alleging that the BOD has no authority
264 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND Pusuc INTERNATIONAL LAW

to do so. The BOD claims otherwise arguing that

the doctrine of qualified political agency applies
to the case. It contends that since its agency is
attached to the Department of Finance, whose
head, the Secretary of Finance, is an alter ego of
the President, the BOD’s acts were also the acts of
the President. Is the invocation of the doctrine by
the BOD proper? Explain. (4%)
The invocation by the Board of Directors of the doc-
trine of qualied political agency is not proper.
The doctrine of qualied political agency essen-
tially postulates that the heads of the various executive
departments are the alter egos of the President, and,
thus, the actions taken by such heads in the perform-
ance of their ofcial duties are deemed the acts of the
President unless the President himself should disap-
prove such acts.
It should be noted though that the Cabinet mem-
bers sat on the Board of Directors ex officio, or by reason
of their ofce or function, not because of their direct
appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it
was the law, not the President, that sat them in the
Board.
Under the circumstances, when the members of the
Board of Directors effected the assailed reorganization,
they were acting as members of the Board of Directors
constituted pursuant to the law, not as the alter egos of
the President. (Trade and Investment Development Cor-
poration of the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigillo, G.R.
No. 185571, March 5, 2018; Manalang-Demigillo v.
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 168613, March 5, 2013)
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 265
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

IX

Several senior officers of the Armed Forces of

the Philippines received invitations from the
Chairperson of the Senate Committees on Na-
tional Defense and Security for them to appear as
resource persons in scheduled public hearings
regarding a wide range of subjects. The invita-
tions state that these public hearings were trig-
gered by the privilege speeches of the Senators
that there was massive electoral fraud during the
last national elections. The invitees Brigadier
General Matapang and Lieutenant Coronel
Makatuwiran, who were among those tasked to
maintain peace and order during the last election,
refused to attend because of an Executive Order
banning all public officials enumerated in para-
graph 3 thereof from appearing before either
house of Congress without prior approval of the
President to ensure adherence to the rule of ex-
ecutive privilege. Among those included in the
enumeration are “senior officials of executive de-
partments who, in the judgment of the depart-
ment heads, are covered by executive privilege.”
Several individuals and groups challenge the cons-
titutionality of the subject executive order be-
cause it frustrates the power of the Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation under Sec-
tion 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Decide
the case. (5%)
The subject Executive Order is unconstitutional.
Paragraph 3 of said Executive Order virtually pro-
vides that, once the head of ofce determines that a
266 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

certain information is privileged, such determination is

presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the
effect of prohibiting the ofcial from appearing before
Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of
the President that it is allowing the appearance of such
ofcial. These provisions thus allow the President to
authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is con-
trary to the exceptional nature of the privilege, which is
recognized with respect to information the condential
nature of which is crucial to the fulllment of the
unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch,
or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is
necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is
thus premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept condential in
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
denition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must
be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest
in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. (Senate
v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1)

The Secretary of the Department of Environ-

ment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 123-15 prescribing the
administrative requirements for the conversion of
a timber license agreement (TLA) into an Inte-
grated Forestry Management Agreement (IFMA).
ABC Corporation, a holder of a TLA which is
about to expire, claims that the conditions for
conversion imposed by the said circular are un-
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BAR QUESTIONS AND Suosssrsn ANSWERS

reasonable and arbitrary and a patent nullity be-

cause it violates the non-impairment clause under
the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution. ABC
Corporation goes to court seeking the nullifica-
tion of the subject circular. The DENR moves to
dismiss the case on the ground that ABC Corpora-
tion has failed to exhaust administrative remedies
which is fatal to its cause of action. If you were
the judge, will you grant the motion? Explain.
(4%)

I will not grant the motion.

The subject Memorandum Circular No. 123-15 was
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in its quasi-legislative or regulatory capacity,
and not pursuant its quasi-judicial competence. Accord-
ingly, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies may not be invoked for purposes of dismissing
the constitutional challenge. (See Monetary Board v.
Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 189571, January 21,
2015; see also Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Universal Rightfield Property Holding, lnc., G.R. No.
181381, July 20, 2015)
Moreover, the issue involves merely a question of
law, as the contention is that the subject regulation
violates the non-impairment clause. “Said question at
best could be resolved only tentatively by the adminis-
trative authorities. The nal decision on the matter
rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Ex-
haustion of administrative remedies does not apply,
because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or
can be done.” (United Overseas Bank of the Philippines
v. The Board of Commissioners-HLURB, No. 182133,
June 23, 2015)
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XI
(1) What is the concept of expanded judicial
review under the 1987 Constitution? (3%)
The concept of “expanded judicial power” is speci-
ed in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII
of the Constitution where it is provided that judicial
power includes the duty “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.”

Differentiate the rule-making power or

(2)
the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution and judicial legislation. (2%)
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court is
based on Section 5 (5) of Article VIII of the Constitution,
which confers upon it the authority to “promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitu-
tional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the inte-
grated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplied and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Su-
preme Court.”
This power would not entitle it to engage in judicial
legislation, which would essentially allow it to “amend”
laws, as this would be “abjured by the trias politica
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 269
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

principle” (Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 183891, October

19, 2011, 659 SCRA 681), or the principle of separation
of powers.
It is to be noted in this connection that the rules
that the Supreme Court may promulgate under Section
5 (5) of Article VIII of the Constitution “shall not dimin-
ish, increase, or modify substantive rights.”

XII
Discuss the evolution of the principle ofjus
sanguinis as basis of Filipino citizenship under
the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. (3%)
It was under the 1935 Constitution that reference
was rst made to parentage, or the principle of jus san-
guinis, as a mode of determining citizenship in our ju-
risdiction.
Thus, under said Constitution, those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines (Article 4, Section 3) and
those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citi-
zenship (Article IV, Section 4) are, under the jus san-
guinis principle, which confers citizenship upon a per-
son on the basis of blood relations, considered natural-
born citizens of the Philippines.
Thereafter, Section 2 of Article III of the 1973 Cons-
titution provided that those whose fathers and mothers
are citizens of the Philippine shall be considered as
natural-born Filipino citizens, or citizens of the Philip-
pines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. (Article III,
Section 4, 1973)
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Under Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution, it is

provided that those whose fathers or mothers are citi-
zens of the Philippines shall be considered as natural-
born citizens of the Philippines, following the jus san-
guinis principle.
In turn, Section 1 (3), in relation to Section 2, of the
same Constitution, provides that those born before
January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philip-
pine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, shall
be likewise be deemed natural-born citizens, also follow-
ing the jus sanguinis principle. It is similarly provided
in Section 2 thereof that natural-born citizens are those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. (See David v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016)

XIII
On August 15, 2015, Congresswoman Dina Ta-
talo filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5432, enti-
tled “An Act Providing for the Apportionment of
the Lone District of the City of Pangarap.” The
bill eventually became a law, R.A. No. 1234. It
mandated that the lone legislative district of the
City of Pangarap would now consist of two (2)
districts. For the 2016 elections, the voters of the
City of Pangarap would be classified as belonging
to either the first or second district, depending on
their place of residence. The constituents of each
district would elect their own representative to
Congress as well as eight (8) members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod. R.A. No. 1234 appor-
tioned the City’s barangays. The COMELEC
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 271
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

thereafter promulgated Resolution No. 2170 im-

plementing R.A. No. 1234.
Piolo Cruz assails the COMELEC Resolution
as unconstitutional. According to him, R.A. No.
1234 cannot be implemented without conducting
a plebiscite because the apportionment under the
law falls Within the meaning of creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution. Is the claim correct? Ex-
plain. (4%)
The claim of Piolo Cruz that R.A. No. 1234 is incor-
rect. There is no need for a plebiscite prior to the im-
plementation of R.A. N0. 1234.
The division of the lone district of the City of Pan-
garap did not involve any change in its existing terri-
tory. “(W)here no new territory or no change in an exist-
ing territory is made under a law, and only a reappor-
tionment or the creation of an additional legislative
district is done, no such plebiscite would be necessary.”
(Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. N0. 176970, December 8,
2008, 573 SCRA 290)

XIV
Congress enacted R.A. No. 14344 creating the
City of Masuwerte which took effect on Septem-
ber 25, 2014. Section 23 of the law specifically ex-
empts the City of Masuwerte from the payment of
legal fees in the cases that it would file and/or
prosecute in the courts of law. In two (2) cases
that it filed, the City of Masuwerte was assessed
legal fees by the clerk of court pursuant to Rule
272 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The City of

Masuwerte questions the assessment claiming
that it is exempt from paying legal fees under Sec-
tion 23 of its charter. Is the claim of exemption
tenable? Explain. (4%)

The claim of exemption from legal fees is unten-

able.
The payment of legal fees is a vital component of
the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court concern-
ing pleading, practice and procedure. It cannot be val-
idly annulled, changed or modied by Congress. To al-
low the Congress to do so would be to permit its en-
croachment upon the exclusive rule-making authority of
the Supreme Court as Well as to impair its scal auton-
omy and judicial independence. (Re: Petition for Recog-
nition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) for Payment of Legal Fees,
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 193;
see also In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corpo-
ration from Payment ofFiling/Docket Fees, A.M. No. 05-
10-20-SC, March 10, 2010; In the Matter of Clarication
of Exemption from Payment of All Court and Sheri"s
Fees, A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012; Emnace v.
Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 10, 22, cited in Bank of
Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. Nos.
154470-71, September 24, 2012)

XV

The President appointed Dexter I. Ty as

Chairperson of the COMELEC on June 14, 2011
for a term of seven (7) years pursuant to the 1987
Constitution. His term of office started on June 2,
 2015 PoLITIcAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 273
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

2011 to end on June 2, 2018. Subsequently, the

President appointed Ms. Marikit as the third
member of the COMELEC for a term of seven (7)
years starting June 2, 2014 until June 2, 2021. On
June 2, 2015, Chairperson Ty retired optionally
after having served the government for thirty (30)
years. The President then appointed Commis-
sioner Marikit as COMELEC Chairperson. The
Commission on Appointments confirmed her ap-
pointment. The appointment papers expressly
indicate that Marikit will serve as COMELEC
Chairperson “until the expiration of the original
term of her office as COMELEC Commissioner or
on June 2, 2021.” Matalino, a tax payer, files a pe-
tition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
asserting that the appointment of Marikit as
COMELEC Chairperson is unconstitutional for
the following reasons: (1) The appointment of Ma-
rikit as COMELEC Chairperson constituted a re-
appointment which is proscribed by Section 1 (2),
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution; and (2) the
term of office expressly stated in the appointment
papers of Marikit likewise contravenes the
aforementioned constitutional provision. Will the
constitutional challenge succeed? Explain. (4%)

It
is submitted that the constitutional challenge
will succeed. Commissioner Marikit’s promotional ap-
pointment is unconstitutional.
The rule is that, While a “reappointment” found in
Sec. 1(2),Art. IX (D) means a movement to one and the
same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chair-
man to Chairman), an appointment involving a move-
ment to a different position or ofce (Commissioner to
274 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and,

hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment
barred under the Constitution.
Accordingly, the promotion of Commissioner Ma-
rikit to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC to
replace Chairman Ty would appear to be not covered
under said prohibition against reappointments in the
Constitutional Commissions.
Moreover, consistent with jurisprudence on the
matter, it would seem that said promotional appoint-
ment may be considered valid by reason of the fact that
the vacancy in Chairman Ty’s ofce arose from his early
retirement or resignation, and not the expiration of his
term.
However, considering that such promotional ap-
pointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes
(death, resignation, disability or impeachment) are re-
quired to only be for the unexpired portion of the term of
the predecessor, and considering that, under the terms
of his promotional appointment, Commissioner Marikit
would be allowed to serve as Chairman of the COME-
LEC beyond the expiration of the original term of
Chairman Ty in 2018 (as, under his promotional ap-
pointment, Commissioner Marikit would be allowed to
serve until the expiration of his original term as Associ-
ate Commissioner in 2021), it is clear that his promo-
tional appointment from Associate Commissioner to
Chairman of the COMELEC is invalid. (Funa v. The
Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 192791,
April 24, 2012)
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

XVI

(1) Gandang Bai filed her certificate of can-

didacy (COC) for municipal mayor stating that
she is eligible to run for the said position. Pasyo
Maagap, who also filed his COC for the same posi-
tion, filed a petition to deny due course or cancel
Bai’s COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Elec-
tion Code for material misrepresentation as be-
fore Bai filed her COC, she had already been con-
victed of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Hence, she is disqualified perpetually from hold-
ing any public office or from being elected to any
public office. Before the election, the COMELEC
cancelled Bai’ s COC but her motion for reconsid-
eration (MR) remained pending even after the
election. Bai garnered the highest number of
votes followed by Pasyo Maagap, who took his
oath as Acting Mayor. Thereafter, the COMELEC
denied Bai’s MR and declared her disqualified for
running for Mayor. P. Maagap asked the Depart-
ment of Interior and Local Government Secretary
to be allowed to take his oath as permanent mu-
nicipal mayor. This request was opposed by Vice
Mayor Umaasa, invoking the rule on succession to
the permanent vacancy in the Mayor’s office. Who
between Pasyo Maagap and Vice Mayor Umaasa
has the right to occupy the position of Mayor?
Explain your answer. (5%)
Pasyo Maagap would be entitled to occupy the posi-
tion of Mayor upon the disqualication of Gandang Bai
on the basis of the petition to deny due course or cancel
her certicate of candidacy under the provisions of Sec-
tion 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
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POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

The rule is that, when a candidate is disqualied

on the ground of ineligibility under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, his certicate of candidacy
shall by reason thereof be considered as void ab initio.
A cancelled certicate of candidacy void ab initio cannot
give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid
votes (Bautista v. Commission on Elections, 359 Phil. 1,
16 l1998]. See Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642 [1999l;
Gador v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil. 395 [1980],
cited in Aratea v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
195229, October 9, 2012) Even without a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COME-
LEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certicate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special
disqualication to run for public ofce by virtue of a
nal judgment of conviction. (Aratea v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012)
Gandang Bai should therefore be considered as
never having been a candidate at all precisely because
of his disqualication on the basis of the petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code on the ground
of his perpetual disqualication by reason of his crime
involving moral turpitude.
Accordingly, Gandang Bai, being a non-candidate,
the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted.
This leaves Pasyo Maagap as the qualied candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore,
the rule on succession under the Local Government
Code will not apply. (Aratea v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012; Maquiling v. Com-
mission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)

(2) How do you differentiate the petition

filed under Section 68 from the petition filed un-
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

der Section 78, both of the Omnibus Election

Code? (3%)

In addition to the rule cited above that a certicate

of candidacy which is denied or cancelled under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code would make said cer-
ticate of candidacy void ab initio (Which would pre-
clude the application of the rules on succession for pur-
poses of replacing him upon his disqualication because,
up to that point of his disqualication, he shall be con-
sidered merely as a de facto oicer, unlike in the case of
disqualications under Section 68 of the Omnibus Elec-
tion Code, which would give rise to the de jure officer-
ship of the disqualied candidate up to his point of dis-
qualication), the other basic distinctions between peti-
tions for the disqualication of candidates and petitions
to reject or cancel certicates of candidacy are as fol-
lows —

Under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a

candidate may be disqualied if he commits any of the
election offenses or “prohibited acts” specied therein,
or if he is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country. On the other hand, under Section 78 of
the same law, a certicate of candidacy may be denied
due course or cancelled if found to be containing mate-
rial representations which are false and deliberately
made. These would include misrepresentations as to
age, residence, citizenship or non-possession of natural-
born status, registration as a voter, and eligibility, as
when one, although precluded from running for a fourth
term because of the three-term limit rule, claims to be
nonetheless qualied, or when one claims to be eligible
despite his disqualication on the basis of an accessory
penalty imposed upon him in connection with his con-
viction in a criminal case.
278 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

A petition for disqualication under Section 68 may

be led at any time after the last day for ling of the
certicates of candidacy but not later than the candi-
date’s proclamation should he win in the elections, while
a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certicate of
candidacy under Section 78 must be led at any time
not later than twenty-ve days from the time of the
ling of the certicate of candidacy.
While a person who is disqualied under Section 68
is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the per-
son whose certicate is cancelled or denied due course
under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all.
Thus, a candidate disqualied under Section 68 may be
validly substituted but only by an ofcial candidate of
his registered or accredited party.

XVII

The Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth

Association (GBTYA), an organization of gay, bi-
sexual, and transgender persons, filed for accredi-
tation with the COMELEC to join the forthcoming
party-list elections. The COMELEC denied the
application for accreditation on the ground that
GBTYA espouses immorality which offends reli-
gious dogmas. GBTYA challenges the denial of its
application based on moral grounds because it
violates its right to equal protection of the law.
(1) What are the three (3) levels of test
that are applied in equal protection cases?
Explain. (3%)
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2'79
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suocssnzo ANSWERS

The three levels of tests that may be applied in

equal protection cases are as follows: the strict scrutiny
test, for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or res-
tricting the political process; the rational basis standard
for the review of economic legislation; and heightened or
immediate scrutiny for evaluating classications based
on gender and legitimacy. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Ba-
nana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No.
189185, August 16, 2016; Samahan ng mga Progresi-
bong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, GR. No.
225442, August 8, 2017)

(2) Which of the three (3) levels of test

should be applied to the present case? Ex-
plain. (3%)

It is submitted that the strict scrutiny test should

be applied in this case because the challenged classica-
tion restricts the political process. (Kabataan Party-List
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. N0. 221318, December
16, 2015; see Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

XVIII
Around 12:00 midnight, a team of police offi-
cers was on routine patrol in Barangay Makata-
rungan when it noticed an open delivery van
neatly covered with banana leaves. Believing that
the van was loaded with contraband, the team
leader agged down the vehicle which was driven
by Hades. He inquired from Hades what was
loaded on the van. Hades just gave the police offi-
cer a blank stare and started to perspire pro-
fusely. The police officers then told Hades that
280 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

they will look inside the vehicle. Hades did not

make any reply. The police officers then lifted the
banana leaves and saw several boxes. They
opened the boxes and discovered several kilos of
shabu inside. Hades was charged with illegal pos-
session of illegal drugs. After due proceedings, he
was convicted by the trial court. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
In his final bid for exoneration, Hades went to
the Supreme Court claiming that his constitu-
tional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated when the police officers
searched his vehicle without a warrant; that the
shabu confiscated from him is thus inadmissible
in evidence; and that there being no evidence
against him, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the People of the Philippines
maintains that the case of Hades involved a con-
sented warrantless search which is legally recog-
nized. The People adverts to the fact that Hades
did not offer any protest when the police officers
asked him if they could look inside the vehicle.
Thus, any evidence obtained in the course thereof
is admissible in evidence.
Whose claim is correct? Explain. (5%)

Hades is correct. He must be exonerated.

There was neither probable cause nor valid consent
to be searched which would justify the warrantless
search and seizure resulting in the discovery of the
shabu hidden under banana leaves in his open delivery
van.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

The rule is that a valid Warrantless search may

generally be justified on the basis of a prior valid war-
rantless arrest, which would be allowed in this case if
Hades had been caught committing a crime in agrante
delicto. It must be noted that, when the team of police
ofcers, who were merely on routine patrol, approached
Hades’ van, the same was merely parked and Hades
was then not committing any crime. Accordingly, said
police ofcers cannot be said to have then validly ar-
rested him Without a warrant, as there could have been
no probable cause for the same. (Antiquera v. People,
G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013, 712 SCRA 339)

Neither can the warrantless search be justified on

the basis of Hades’ alleged consent, precisely because,
when the police officers asked if they could search his
van, Hades merely gave the ofcers “a blank stare” and
“did not make any reply.” This hardly constitutes the
consent required to make valid Warrantless searches
and seizures. Said consent to be searched, to justify a
Warrantless search and seizure, must be made or given
voluntarily, categorically and unequivocally. (People v.
Aruta, GR. No. 120915. April 3, 1998, 288 SCRA 626)

XIX
Pursuant to its mandate to manage the or-
derly sale, disposition and privatization of the
National Power C0rporation’s (NPC) generation
assets, real estate and other disposable assets, the
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
(PSALM) started the bidding process for the pri-
vatization of Angat Hydro Electric Power Plant
(AHEPP). After evaluation of the bids, K-Pop En-
ergy Corporation, a South Korean Company, was
the highest bidder. Consequently, a notice of
282 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

award was issued to K-Pop. The Citizens’ Party

questioned the sale arguing that it violates the
constitutional provisions on the appropriation
and utilization of a natural resource which should
be limited to Filipino citizens and corporations
which are at least 60% Filipino-owned. The
PSALM countered that only the hydroelectric
facility is being sold and not the Angat Dam; and
that the utilization of water by a hydroelectric
power plant does not constitute appropriation of
water from its natural source of water that enters
the intake gate of the power plant which is an
artificial structure. Whose claim is correct? Ex-
plain. (4%)
The claim of PSALM is correct.
Foreign ownership of a hydropower facility is not
prohibited under existing laws. The construction, reha-
bilitation and development of hydropower plants are
among those infrastructure projects which even wholly-
owned foreign corporations are allowed to undertake
under the Amended Build-Operate-Transfer (Amended
BOT) Law (R.A. No. 7718). (Initiatives for Dialogue and
Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc.
v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Cor-
poration, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)

XX

Typhoon Bangis devastated the Province of

Sinagtala. Roads and bridges were destroyed
which impeded the entry of vehicles into the area.
This caused food shortage resulting in massive
looting of grocery stores and malls. There is
power outage also in the area. For these reasons,
 2015 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 283
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suocssrso ANSWERS

the governor of the province declares a state of

emergency in their province through Proclama-
tion No. 1. He also invoked Section 465 of the Lo-
cal Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
which vests on the provincial governor the power
to carryout emergency measures during man-
made and natural disasters and calamities, and to
call upon the appropriate national law enforce-
ment agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence. In the same proclamation, the governor
called upon the members of the Philippine Na-
tional Police, with the assistance of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to set up checkpoints
and chokepoints, conduct general searches and
seizures including arrests, and other actions nec-
essary to ensure public safety. Was the action of
the provincial governor proper? Explain. (4%)
The action of the provincial governor is not correct.
A provincial governor, may not validly issue a proc-
lamation calling upon the Philippine National Police
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines to “set up
checkpoints and choke points, conduct general search
and seizures including arrests, and other actions neces-
sary to ensure public safety,” by reason of the typhoon,
and on the basis merely of a general provision in the
Local Government Code entitling him “to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropri-
ate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disor-
der and lawless violence.” It is only the President who is
authorized to exercise the calling-out power. (Kulayan v.
Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012)
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XXI

The Partido ng Mapagkakatiwalaang Pilipino

(PMP) is a major political party which has par-
ticipated in every election since the enactment of
the 1987 Constitution. It has fielded candidates
mostly for legislative district elections. In fact, a
number of its members were elected, and are ac-
tually serving, in the House of Representatives. In
the coming 2016 elections, the PMP leadership
intends to join the party-list system.
Can PMP join the party-list system without
violating the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7941? (4%)

Yes, the PMP can join the party-list system Without

violating the Constitution and the provisions of R.A. No.
7941.
Political parties can participate in party-list elec-
tions provided they register under the party-list system
and do not eld candidates in legislative district elec-
tions. A political party, whether major or not, that elds
candidates in legislative district elections can partici-
pate in party-list elections only through its sectoral
wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through
a coalition. (Atong Paglaum, Inc. u. Commission on Elec-
tions, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)

XXII
The President appoints Emilio Melchor as
Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Upon confirmation of Melchor’s appointment, the

President issues an executive order including him
as Ex-Officio member of the Board of Trustees of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and
the Board of Directors of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH). Alleg-
edly, this is based on the Administrative Code of
1997 (E.O. No. 292), particularly Section 14, Chap-
ter 3, Title I-A, Book V. This provision reads: “The
chairman of the CSC shall be a member of the
Board of Directors of other governing bodies of
government entities whose functions affect the
career development, employment, status, rights,
privileges, and Welfare of government officials
and employees...” A taxpayer questions the desig-
nation of Melchor as ex-officio member of the said
corporations before the Supreme Court based on
two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) it violates the constitu-
tional prohibition on members of the Constitu-
tional Commissions to hold any other office or
employment during his tenure; and (2) it impairs
the independence of the CSC. Will the petition
prosper? Explain. (4%)
The petition should be granted. The Executive Or-
der is unconstitutional.
It is violative of the strict prohibition under Section
2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which pres-
cribes that no Member of a Constitutional Commission
shall, during his tenure, hold any other ofce or em-
ployment.
Apart from violating this prohibition against hold-
ing multiple ofces, Melchor’s designation as a member
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of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH

and the ECC impairs the independence of the Civil Ser-
vice Commission.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
the President exercises control over all government of-
ces in the Executive Branch. An oice that is legally
not under the control of the President is not part of the
Executive Branch. (Funa v. The Chairman, Civil Service
Commission, G.R. N0. 191672, November 25, 2014)
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2016
I
The contents of the vault of ABC company
consisting of cash and documents were stolen.
Paulyn, the treasurer of ABC, was invited by the
Makati City Police Department to shed light on
the amount of cash stolen and the details of the
missing documents. Paulyn obliged and volun-
teered the information asked. Later, Paulyn was
charged with qualified theft together with other
suspects. Paulyn claims her rights under the
Constitution and pertinent laws were blatantly
violated. The police explained that they were just
gathering evidence when Paulyn was invited for a
conference and she was not a suspect at that time.
Rule on her defense. (5%)
Her defense is tenable.
She can be considered as having made admissions
Without being informed of her rights to be informed of
her right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel during a custodial investigation.
According to R.A. 7438, “custodial investigation
shall include the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense
he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to
the liability of the ‘inviting officer’ for any violation of
the law.” (Section 2)
The circumstances surrounding Paulyn’s question-
ing, and her eventual admission made, at the police
station fall within this denition of custodial investiga-
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tion.It can be said and considered that she would not

have been invited to the police station if she had not
been suspected of committing the theft. (Lopez v. People,
G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016)

[Acceptable Answer: Her defense is untenable. She was not un-

der “custodial investigation” when she “volunteered” the subject
information. Her admissions can be accepted as evidence.
A custodial investigation is generally understood as “any ques-
tioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any signicant manner. It begins when there is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to
focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police inves-
tigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect
in connection with an alleged offense.” (People v. Morial, 415 Phil.
310, 329 [2001]; see People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13,
2012),
This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a
crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a
confession from him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has
been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct
interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating state-
ments. Accordingly, it has been ruled that this right may not be
invoked in situations where the statements are spontaneously made,
as when it was the accused himself who went to the police station
and voluntarily made the statement eventually used as evidence
against him at his trial. (Jesalva u. People, G.R. No. 187725, January
19, 2011)]

II
Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution, provides:
“No franchise, certificate or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philip-
pines or to corporations or associations organized
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty

per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens xxx.” Does the term “capital” mentioned
in the cited section refer to the total common
shares only, or to the total outstanding capital
stock, or to both or “separately to each class of
shares, whether common, preferred non-voting,
preferred voting or any class of shares?” Explain
your answer. (5%)
The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors, and thus only to com-
mon shares, and not to the total outstanding capital
stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred
shares. (Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579,
June 28, 2011)
Since the constitutional requirement of at least 60
percent Filipino ownership applies not only to voting
control of the corporation but also to the benecial own-
ership of the corporation, it is therefore imperative that
such requirement apply uniformly and across the board
to all classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and
category, comprising the capital of a corporation.
The Constitution expressly declares as State policy
the development of an economy “effectively controlled”
by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Cons-
titution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation
of public utilities to Philippine nationals, who are de-
ned in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per-
cent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Fili-
pinos. (Heirs of Wilson Gamboa v. Finance Secretary,
G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012; see Roy v. Herbosa,
G.R. N0. 207246, November 22, 2016)
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III
A law converted the component city of Maln-
manay, Laguna into a highly urbanized city. The
Local Government Code (LGC) provides that the
conversion “shall take effect only after it is ap-
proved by the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite
to be held in the political units directly affected.”
Before the COMELEC, Mayor Xenon of Malu-
manay City insists that only the registered voters
of the city should vote in the plebiscite because
the city is the only political unit directly affected
by the conversion. Governor Yuri asserts that all
the registered voters of the entire province of La-
guna should participate in the plebiscite, because
when the LGC speaks of the “qualified voters
therein,” it means all the voters of all the political
units affected by such conversion, and that in-
cludes all the voters of the entire province. He
argues that the income, population and area of
Laguna will be reduced. Who, between Mayor Xe-
non and Governor Yuri, is correct? Explain your
answer. (5%)

Governor Yuri is correct. The registered voters of

the entire province of Laguna should participate in the
plebiscite.
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be al-
lowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primar-
ily be determined is Whether or not the unit or units
that desire to participate will be “directly affected” by
the change. (Tan v. COMELEC, No. L-73155, July 11,
1986, 142 SCRA 727; Padilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
103328, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 735)
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

In view of the changes in the economic and political

rights of the province of Laguna and its residents, the
entire province certainly stands to be directly affected
by the conversion of Malumanay City into a highly ur-
banized city.
Among such changes would be that it shall no
longer be subject to provincial oversight because the
complex and varied problems in a highly urbanized city
due to a bigger population and greater economic activity
require greater autonomy and it will also result in the
reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to
the province based on Sec. 285 of the LGC.
Accordingly, all the qualied registered voters of
Laguna should then be allowed to participate in the
plebiscite called for that purpose. (Umali v. Commission
on Elections, GR. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

IV
Several concerned residents of the areas
fronting Manila Bay, among them a group of stu-
dents who are minors, filed a suit against the
Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA),
the Department of Environment and Natural Re-
sources (DENR), the Department of Health (DOH),
the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Depart-
ment of Education (DepEd), the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), and a
number of other executive agencies, asking the
court to order them to perform their duties relat-
ing to the cleanup, rehabilitation and protection
of Manila Bay. The complaint alleges that the con-
tinued neglect by defendants and their failure to
prevent and abate pollution in Manila Bay consti-
292 BAR Q & A
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tute a violation of the petitioners’ constitutional

right to life, health and a balanced ecology.
(a) If the defendants assert that the stu-
dents/petitioners who are minors do not
have locus standi to file the action, is the as-
sertion correct? Explain your answer. (2.5%)
The assertion would not be correct.
As held by the Supreme Court in Oposa v. Factoran
(G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993), petitioners, though
they be or are minors, can, for themselves, and even for
others of their generation and for the succeeding gen-
erations, le the suit. Their personality to sue in behalf
of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

(b) In its decision which attained final-

ity, the Court ordered the defendants to clean
up, rehabilitate and sanitize Manila Bay
within eighteen (18) months, and to submit to
the Court periodic reports of their accom-
plishment, so that the Court can monitor and
oversee the activities undertaken by the
agencies in compliance with the Court’s di-
rectives. Subsequently, a resolution was is-
sued extending the time periods within which
the agencies should comply with the direc-
tives covered by the nal decision. A view
was raised that the Court’s continued inter-
vention after the case has been decided vio-
lates the doctrine of separation of powers
considering that the government agencies all
belong to the Executive Department and are
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

under the control of the President. Is this

contention correct? Why or why not? (2.5%)
The contention is not correct. The court’s interven-
tion after the case has been decided does not violate the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Judicial power covers as well the continuing au-
thority of the Supreme Court to enforce its nal deci-
sions because the execution of its decisions is but an
integral part of its adjudicative function. Accordingly, it
may issue a writ of continuing mandamus to ensure
compliance with its decision. (MMDA v. Concerned
Residents ofManiZa Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February
15, 2011; see also Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Prov-
ince ofAklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012)
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the
Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art.
VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the
Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative func-
tion of the Court. With the nal and executory judgment
in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in
MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have
shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the
Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until
full execution of the judgment. (MMDA v. Concerned
Residents ofManila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February
15, 2011)
The writ of continuing mandamus “permits the
court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the court’s decision” and, in order to do
this, “the court may compel the submission of compli-
ance reports from the respondent government agencies
as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance
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with its decision.” (Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The

Province 0fAkZan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012)

V
Section 8 of P.D. No. 910, entitled “Creating
an Energy Development Board, defining its pow-
ers and functions, providing funds therefor and
for other purposes,” provides that: “All fees, reve-
nues and receipts of the Board from any and all
sources xxx shall form part of a Special Fund to
be used to finance energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President.”
The Malampaya NGO contends that the pro-
vision constitutes an undue delegation of legisla-
tive power since the phrase “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” gives the President unbridled discre-
tion to determine the purpose for which the funds
will be used. On the other hand, the government
urges the application of ejusdem generis.

(a) Explain the “completeness test” and

“sufficient standard test.” (2.5%)
The completeness test requires the law to be com-
plete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature so that when it reaches the delegate, it will
have nothing to do but enforce it.
Under the sufficient standard test, the law must
specify the limits of the delegate’s authority. The legis-
lative policy must be announced and specify the condi-
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

tions under which it is to be implemented. (Abakada

Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September
1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1; Cruz, Philippine Administrative
Law, 2016 Edition, pages 48-49)

(b) Does the assailed portion of section 8

of PD 910 hurdle the two (2) tests? (2.5%)
No, the assailed portion of section 8 of PD 910 can-
not be considered as compliant With both tests.
The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of
PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient stan-
dard to adequately determine the limits of the Presi-
dent’s authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. (Belgica v. Execu-
tive Secretary, G.R. N0. 208566, November 19, 2013)

VI
Pornographic materials in the form of tab-
loids, magazines and other printed materials, pro-
liferate and are being sold openly in the streets of
Masaya City. The City Mayor organized a task
force which confiscated these materials. He then
ordered that the materials be burned in public.
Dominador, publisher of the magazine, “Play-
thing”, filed a suit, raising the following constitu-
tional issues: (a) the confiscation of the materials
constituted an illegal search and seizure, because
the same was done without a valid search war-
rant; and (b) the confiscation, as well as the pro-
posed destruction of the materials, is a denial of
the right to disseminate information, and thus,
296 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

violates the constitutional right to freedom of

expression. Is either or both contentions proper?
Explain your answer. (5%)
The contention regarding the need for a valid
search warrant is proper.
The summary conscation of the subject materials
could not have been done summarily. A search Warrant
must have rst been issued after a judge shall have
been convinced of the existence of probable cause that
the materials sought to be seized were indeed obscene.
(Pita v. Court 0/"Appeals, 178 SCRA 362)
On the assumption, however, that the seizure of
said materials was lawfully done, the proposed destruc-
tion of the subject materials may be allowed in accor-
dance with the provisions of Section 2 of Presidential
decree No. 969, which authorize the forfeiture and des-
truction of pornographic materials involved in the viola-
tion of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code and would
not constitute a violation of the constitutional right to
freedom of expression. (Nogales v. People, G.R. No.
191080, November 21, 2011)

[Acceptable Answer (re destruction of materials): Absent a clear

showing that the subject materials are pornographic, and consider-
ing that they were illegally seized, the same may not be destroyed.
This would be violative of the owner’s constitutional right to freedom
of expression.]

VII
Ernesto, a minor, while driving a motor vehi-
cle, was stopped at a mobile checkpoint. Noticing
that Ernesto is a minor, SPO1 Jojo asked Ernesto
to exhibit his driver’s license but Ernesto failed to
 2016 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 297
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

produce it. SPO1 Jojo requested Ernesto to alight

from the vehicle and the latter acceded. Upon
observing a bulge in the pants of Ernesto, the po-
liceman frisked him and found an unlicensed .22-
caliber pistol inside Ernesto’s right pocket.
Ernesto was arrested, detained and charged. At
the trial, Ernesto, through his lawyer, argued
that, policemen at mobile checkpoints are em-
powered to conduct nothing more than a “visual
search.” They cannot order the persons riding the
vehicle to alight. They cannot frisk, or conduct a
body search of the driver or the passengers of the
vehicle.
Ernesto’s lawyer thus posited that:

(a) The search conducted in violation of

the Constitution and established jurispru-
dence was an illegal search; thus, the gun
which was seized in the course of an illegal
search is the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and
is inadmissible in evidence. (2.5%)
(b) The arrest made as a consequence of
the invalid search was likewise illegal, be-
cause an unlawful act (the search) cannot be
made the basis of a lawful arrest. (2.5%)

Rule on the correctness of the foregoing ar-

guments, with reasons.
(a) The search was unlawful having been made in
connection with an unlawful arrest based on a simple
trafc violation, i.e., non-possession of a driver’s license.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traf-
c Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
298 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

violation is not the arrest of the offender. (Luz v. People,

G.R. N0. 197788, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 421)
It is established that there can be a valid war-
rantless search incidental to an arrest only if the war-
rantless were, to begin with, lawful. (People v, Chua Ho
San, 308 SCRA 432; People v. Aruta, G.R. N0. 120915,
April 3, 1998; People v. Delos Reyes, GR. No. 174774,
August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 417; People v. Manago, G.R.
No. 212340, August 17, 2016; Miguel v. People, G.R. No.
227038, July 31, 2017)

[Acceptable Answer: (a) The search was lawful, having been

made pursuant to an in agrante delicto arrest for driving without a
license. It can further be justied as a valid “stop and frisk” search.
Accordingly, the gun seized from Ernesto is admissible in evidence
against him.]

(b) The arrest was unlawful because it was made

after the unlawful search. “There must rst be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot
be reversed.” (People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432)

[Acceptable Answer: (b) The arrest was lawful. As previously

stated, it was an in flagrante delicto arrest made during a proper
inspection made at a mobile checkpoint. It was not made prior to an
“invalid” search. Also as previously stated, the search was lawful.]

VIII
A law is passed intended to protect women
and children from all forms of violence. When a
woman perceives an act to be an act of violence or
a threat of violence against her, she may apply for
a Barangay Protection Order (BPO) to be issued
by the Barangay Chairman, which shall have the
force and effect of law. Conrado, against Whom a
BPO had been issued on petition of his Wife, went
 2016 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

to court to challenge the constitutionality of the

law. He raises the following grounds:

(a) The law violates the equal protection

clause because, while it extends protection to
women who may be victims of violence by
their husbands, it does not extend the same
protection to husbands who may be battered
by their wives. (2.5%)
(b) The grant ofauthority to the Baran-
gay Chairman to issue a Barangay Protection
Order (BPO) constitutes an undue delegation
of judicial power, because obviously, the issu-
ance of the BPO entails the exercise of judi-
cial power. (2.5%)
Rule on the validity of the grounds raised by
Conrado, with reasons.

(a) The law is based on a valid classication. It

does not violate the equal protection clause by favoring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the State extends its protection because the “un-
equal power relationship between women and men; the
fact that Women are more likely than men to be victims
of violence; and the Widespread gender bias and preju-
dice against women all make for real differences justify-
ing the classication under the law.” (Garcia v. Drilon,
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352)
(b) The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order
by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by
any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to
the Woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
300 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the

Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature,
in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government
Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “main-
tain public order in the barangay. It is not violative of
the principle of delegation.” (Garcia v. Drilon, G. R. No.
179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352; Tua v. Mangro-
bang, GR. No. 170701, January 22, 2014)

IX
The Government, through Secretary Too-
goody of the Department of Transportation
(DOTr), filed a complaint for eminent domain to
acquire a 1,000- hectare property in Bulacan,
owned by Baldomero. The court granted the ex-
propriation, fixed the amount of just compensa-
tion, and installed the Government in full posses-
sion of the property.

(a) If the
Government does not immedi-
ately pay the amount fixed by the court as
just compensation, can Baldomero success-
fully demand the return of the property to
him? Explain your answer. (2.5%)

Baldomero cannot be allowed to demand the return

of the property.
The non-ling of the case for expropriation or de-
layed payment of just compensation will not necessarily
lead to the return of the property to the landowner.
VVhat is left to the landowner is the right of compensa-
tion. (See Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine
National Railways, G.R. No. 124795, December 10,
2008, 573 SCRA 341.)
 2016 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 301
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(b) If the
Government paid full compen-
sation but after two years it abandoned its
plan to build an airport on the property, can
Baldomero compel the Government to re-sell
the property back to him? Explain your an-
swer. (2.5%)

Yes, it may be “obliged to reconvey” the property it

had expropriated but never used on condition that the
landowners would return the just compensation they
received, plus interest. (Mactan Cebu International Air-
port Authority u. Tudtud, G.R. No. 174012, November
14, 2008, 571 SCRA 165)

The Philippines entered into an international

agreement with members of the international
community creating the International Economic
Organization (IEO) which will serve as a forum to
address economic issues between States, create
standards, encourage greater volume of trade
between its members, and settle economic dis-
putes. After the Philippine President signed the
agreement, the Philippine Senate demanded that
the international agreement be submitted to it for
its ratification. The President refused, arguing
that it is an executive agreement that merely cre-
ated an international organization and it dwells
mainly on addressing economic issues among
States.
Is the international agreement creating the
IEO a treaty or an executive agreement? Explain.
(5%)
302 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

It is submitted that the international agreement

creating the International Economic Organization can
be considered as an executive agreement, which there-
fore need not be submitted to the Senate for its concur-
rence.
There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of
entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an execu-
tive agreement as an instrument of international rela-
tions. The primary consideration in the choice of the
form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to
craft an international agreement in the form they so
wish to further their respective interests. Verily, the
matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effec-
tiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a
treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in ei-
ther international agreement each labor under the pacta
sunt servanda principle. Save for the situation and
matters contemplated in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Cons-
titution when a treaty is required, the Constitution does
not classify any subject, like that involving political
issues, to be in the form of, and ratied as, a treaty.
What the Constitution merely prescribes is that
treaties need the concurrence of the Senate by a vote
dened therein to complete the ratication process.
“The right of the Executive to enter into binding agree-
ments Without the necessity of subsequent Congres-
sional approval has been conrmed by long usage. From
the earliest days of our history, we have entered execu-
tive agreements covering such subjects as commercial
and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, pat-
ent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal
and navigation arrangements and the settlement of
claims. The validity of these has never been seriously
questioned by our courts.” (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R.
No. 159618, February 1, 2011)
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BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoonsrso ANSWERS

[Acceptable Answer: It is submitted that the international

agreement creating the International Economic Organization can be
considered as an executive agreement, which therefore need not be
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence.
The power of the President to enter into binding executive
agreements Without Senate concurrence is already Well-established
in this jurisdiction. That power has been alluded to in our present
and past Constitutions, in various statutes, in Supreme Court deci-
sions, and during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commis-
sion. They cover a wide array of subjects with varying scopes and
purposes, including those that involve the presence of foreign mili-
tary forces in the country. xxx. No court can tell the President to
desist from choosing an executive agreement over a treaty to embody
an international agreement, unless the case falls squarely within
Article VIII, Section 25. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G. R. N0.
212426, January 12, 2016)]

XI
The USS Liberty, a warship of the United
States (U.S.), entered Philippine archipelagic wa-
ters on its way to Australia. Because of the negli-
gence of the naval officials on board, the vessel
ran aground off the island of Palawan, damaging
coral reefs and other marine resources in the
area. Officials of Palawan filed a suit for damages
against the naval officials for their negligence,
and against the U.S., based on Articles 30 and 31
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 31 provides that the
Flag State shall bear international responsibility
for any loss or damage to the Coastal State result-
ing from noncompliance by a warship with the
laws and regulations of the coastal State concern-
ing passage through the territorial sea. The U.S.
Government raised the defenses that:
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(a) The Philippine courts cannot exer-

cise jurisdiction over another sovereign
State, including its warship and naval offi-
cials. (2.5%)

(b) The United States is not a signatory

to UNCLOS and thus cannot be bound by its
provisions. (2.5%)
Rule on the validity of the defenses raised by
the U.S., with reasons.
(a) The defense that the Philippine courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign State, in-
cluding its warship and naval officials, is not entirely
valid.
Although it may be considered as immune from
suits for damages, like the one presented in the prob-
lem, the Visiting Forces Agreement, which is an agree-
ment which denes the treatment of United States
troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote
“common security interests” between the US and the
Philippines in the region, provides for a waiver of im-
munity with respect to our exercise of our criminal ju-
risdiction. (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September
16, 2014)

(b) It is submitted that the United States can be

considered as bound by the provisions of the UNCLOS
despite the fact that it is not a signatory to the same.
Although the US to date has not ratied the UN-
CLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy, the US con-
siders itself bound by customary international rules on
the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codied in UN-
CLOS. Said customary international rules can, because
 2016 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 305
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

of their nature, be considered as binding upon all states.

(Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)

XII
Paragraphs c, d and f of Section 36 of Repub-
lic Act No. 9165 provide:
“Sec. 36. Authorized drug testing. xxx The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug test-
ing: xxx

c. Students of secondary and tertiary

schools xxx;
d. Officers and employees of public and
private offices xxx;
f. All persons charged before the prose-
cutor’s office with a criminal offense having
an imposable imprisonment of not less than 6
years and 1 day;”
Petitioners contend that the assailed portions
of Sec. 36 areunconstitutional for violating the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the equal protection
clause. Decide if the assailed provisions are un-
constitutional. (5%)
The law, as applied to students and employees, is
constitutional but unconstitutional as applied to persons
charged before the public prosecutor’s ofce with crimi-
nal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1)
day imprisonment.
Students essentially Waive their right to privacy
when they enroll in a school. Indeed, it is within the
306 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND Posuc INTERNATIONAL LAW

prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a

condition for admission, compliance with reasonable
school rules and regulations and policies. Authorities
are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to
certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the
state’s exercise of police power.
Employees have also been considered as having a
“a reduced expectation of privacy.” Based on the compel-
ling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the
Well-dened limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Moreover, civil servants, are, by constitutional com-
mand, required to be accountable at all times to the
people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and
efficiency.
However, with respect to persons charged before
the public prosecutor’s ofce with criminal offenses pun-
ishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment,
a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspi-
cionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspi-
cionless are antithetical to their being made defendants
in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons sus-
pected of committing a crime are charged, they are sin-
gled out and are impleaded against their will. The per-
sons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before
the prosecutor’s ofce and peaceably submitting them-
selves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not neces-
sarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their
right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on
the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical
test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the
stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case
 2016 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 307
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed

under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA
410; see also Office of the Court Administrator v. Reyes,
A.M. N0. P-08-2535, June 23, 2010, 621 SCRA 511)

XIII
While Congress was not in session, the Presi-
dent appointed Antero as Secretary of the De-
partment of Tourism (DOT), Benito as Commis-
sioner of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), Clodu-
aldo as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), Dexter as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), and Emmanuel as Philip-
pine Ambassador to Cameroon. The following day,
all the appointees took their oath before the
President, and commenced to perform the func-
tions of their respective offices.
(a) Characterize the appointments,
whether permanent or temporary; and
whether regular or interim, with reasons.
(2.5%)

The appointments of Antero as Secretary of the

Department of Tourism, Clodualdo as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission, and Emmanuel as Philippine
ambassador to Cameroon are ad interim and perma-
nent. (See Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April
2, 2002, 429 Phil. 554; Constitution, Article VII, Section
16)
308 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

The appointments of Benito as Commissioner of

Bureau of Immigration and Dexter as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights are permanent and regu-
lar. (Sarmiento and Arcilla v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549;
Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 169; Constitution, Arti-
cle VII, Section 16)

(b) A civil society group, the Volunteers

Against Misguided Politics (VAMP), files suit,
contesting the legality of the acts of the ap-
pointees and claiming that the appointees
should not have entered into the performance
of the functions of their respective offices, be-
cause their appointments had not yet been
confirmed by the Commission on Appoint-
ments. Is this claim of VAMP correct? Why or
why not? (2.5%)
The claim or contention of VAMP is not correct.
Ad interim appointments are immediately effective
and continue to be effective upon approval, or until dis-
approval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress. (Constitution,
Article 7, Section 16)
The appointments of Benito as Commissioner of
Bureau of Immigration and Dexter as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights being permanent and
regular, they could have validly assumed their offices
immediately, as their appointments are not required to
be conrmed by the Commission on Appointments.
(Sarmiento and Arcilla u. Mison, 156 SCRA 549;
Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 169; Constitution, Arti-
cle VII, Section 16)
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

XIV
Onofre, a natural born Filipino citizen, ar-
rived in the United States in 1985. In 1990, he
married Salvacion, a Mexican, and together they
applied for and obtained American citizenship in
2001. In 2015, the couple and their children —
Alfred, 21 years of age, Robert, 16, and Marie, 14,
who were all born in the U.S. — returned to the
Philippines on June 1, 2015. On June 15, 2015,
informed that he could reacquire Philippine citi-
zenship without losing his American citizenship,
Onofre Went home to the Philippines and took the
oath of allegiance prescribed under R.A. No. 9225.
On October 28, 2015, he filed a Certificate of Can-
didacy to run in the May 9, 2016 elections for the
position of Congressman in his home province of
Pala wan, running against re-electionist Con-
gressman Profundo.

(a) Did Onofre’sreacquisition of Philip-

pine citizenship benefit his wife, Salvacion,
and their minor children and confer upon
them Filipino citizenship? Explain your an-
swer. (2.5%)

It is submitted that Salvacion can be considered as

a Filipino citizen pursuant to the provisions of Section
15 of C.A. No. 478. (See Answer to Question IX (b), 2009
Examination, pages 20-23.)
Robert and Marie, Onofre’s minor children, can be
considered as having been conferred with Philippine
citizenship. This would be consistent with Section 4 of
R.A. No. 9225, which provides that the unmarried child,
whether, legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
310 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND Pusuc INTERNATIONAL LAW

eighteen years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine

citizenship shall likewise be deemed citizens of the Phil-
ippines.

(b) Before the May 9, 2016 elections, Pro-

fundo’s lawyer filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candi-
dacy against Onofre. What grounds can he
raise in his Petition to support it? Explain
your answer. (2.5%)
The Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certicate of Candidacy against Onofre can be based on
the ground of his having deliberately made a false ma-
terial misrepresentation as to his eligibility to be such a
candidate with respect to his residence, as it would ap-
pear that he re-established his residence in the Philip-
pines only on June 1, 2015, and cannot be considered as
having resided here for at least a year when he led his
certicate of candidacy some five months later on Octo-
ber 28, 2015. (Caballero v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015)
A second ground on which said Petition can be
based would be his having deliberately made a false
material misrepresentation as to his eligibility to be
such a candidate with respect to his citizenship. While
he may have taken his oath of allegiance prescribed
under R.A. N0. 9225, it does not appear that he had
renounced his American citizenship, which he retained
despite that oath of allegiance. He is therefore a dual
citizen and would not be eligible for election as a Con-
gressman, consistent with the provisions of Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution, which requires natural-
born citizenship for members of the House of Represen-
tatives, and Section 18 of Article XI of the Constitution 9
 2016 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

which provides that public officers and employees owe

the State and the Constitution allegiance at all times.
(Jacot v. Dal, G.R. N0. 179848, November 27, 2008;
Sobjana-Codon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
198742, August 10, 2012)

XV

Congress passed a bill appropriating PlOO-

billion. Part of the money is to be used for the
purchase of a 200-hectare property in Antipolo.
The rest shall be spent for the development of the
area and the construction of the Universal Tem-
ple for All the World’s Faiths (UTAW-F). When
completed, the site will be open, free of charge, to
all religions, beliefs, and faiths, where each devo-
tee or believer shall be accommodated and
treated in a fair and equal manner, without dis-
tinction, favor, or prejudice. There will also be
individual segments or zones in the area which
can be used for the conduct of whatever rituals,
services, sacraments, or ceremonials that may be
required by the customs or practices of each par-
ticular religion. The President approved the bill,
happy in the thought that this could start the
healing process of our wounded country and en-
courage people of varied and often conicting
faiths to live together in harmony and in peace.
If the law is questioned on the ground that it
violates Sec. 5, Article III of the Constitution that
“no law shall be made respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,” how will you resolve the challenge? Ex-
plain. (5%)
3 12 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

I will consider the law as violative of Section 5 of

Article III of the Constitution.
The “establishment clause principally prohibits the
State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any relig-
ion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neu-
trality in affairs among religious groups. Essentially, it
prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the
use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a
religion.” (lmbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8,
2014, 721 SCRA 146)
“The state cannot set up a church; nor pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one
religion over another.” (Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1)

[Acceptable Answer: The law can be upheld or justied as reli-

gious accommodation and therefore not unconstitutional. It merely
provides for the establishment of a temple which can be used for
religious purposes and by all faiths “in a fair and equal manner,
without distinction, favor, or prejudice.” It can be said that, in its
minimal sense, what the non-establishment clause provides is that
the state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion. It cannot be
said that the construction of the subject temple is by way of sponsor-
ship or establishment of a religion. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano,
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)]

XVI

Jojo filed a criminal complaint against Art for

theft of a backpack worth P150.00 with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila. The crime is
punishable with arresto mayor to prision correc-
cional in its minimum period, or not to exceed 4
years and 2 months. The case was assigned to
Prosecutor Tristan and he applied Sec. 8(a) of
Rule 112 which reads: “(a) If filed with the prose-
 2016 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 313
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

cutor. - If the complaint is filed directly with the

prosecutor involving an offense punishable by
imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in
Sec. 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
Prosecutor shall act on the complaint within ten
(10) days from its filing.”
On the other hand, Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112 pro-
vides: “(a) The complaint shall state the address of
the respondent and shall be accompanied by affi-
davits of the complainant and his witnesses as
well as other supporting documents to establish
probable cause. xxx”
Since Sec. 8(a) authorizes the Prosecutor to
decide the complaint on the basis of the affidavits
and other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant, Prosecutor Tristan did not notify
Art nor require him to submit a counter-affidavit.
He proceeded to file the Information against Art
with the Metropolitan Trial Court. Art vehe-
mently assails Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112 as unconstitu-
tional and violative of due process and his rights
as an accused under the Constitution for he was
not informed of the complaint nor was he given
the opportunity to raise his defenses thereto be-
fore the Information was filed. Rule on the consti-
tutionality of Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112. Explain. (5%)
It is submitted that Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112 is consti-
tutional.
The constitutional due process requirements are
not applicable to preliminary investigations which are
creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory
rights. A law can even abolish preliminary investiga-
314 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

tions without running afoul with the constitutional re-

quirements of due process. (Estrada v. Office of the Om-
budsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015)

XVII
(a) Define the archipelagic doctrine of
national territory, state its rationale; and ex-
plain how it is implemented through the
straight baseline method. (2.5%)
The Archipelago Doctrine provides that the outer-
most points of an archipelago are connected with
straight baselines and all waters enclosed thereby are to
be considered as internal waters. The entire archipelago
is regarded as one integrated unit instead of being
fragmented into so many thousand islands. Under our
Constitution, it is provided that “the waters around,
between and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal Waters of the Philippines.” (Article I, Sec-
tion 1; Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020 Edition,
pages 174-175)

(b) Section 2 of RA 9522 declared the

Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarbor-
ough Shoal as “Regimes of Islands.” Professor
Agaton contends that since the law did not
enclose said islands, then the Philippines lost
its sovereignty and jurisdiction over them. Is
his contention correct? Explain. (2.5%)
His contention is not correct.
The Kalayaan Islands and the Scarborough Shoal
have been constituted under the subject law as ‘Re-
 2016 PoLITIcAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 315
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

gime [s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines

consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS. They are there-
fore subject to the continuing authority, or sovereignty
and jurisdiction, of the Philippines.

[Notez “Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the

Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse
legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have com-
mitted a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47
(3) of UNCLOS III requires that the drawing of such baselines shall
not depart to any appreciable extent from the general conguration
of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires
that ‘the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,’
save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which
can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
“Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty
over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these
outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the near-
est shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight
baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevita-
bly ‘depart to an appreciable extent from the general conguration of
the archipelago.’
“Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as ‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the
Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS
III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its
pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article
121 of UNCLOS III, any ‘naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide,’ such as portions of the
KIG, qualies under the category of ‘regime of islands,’ whose is-
lands generate their own applicable maritime zones." (Magallona v.
Ermita, G.R. N0. 187167, August 16, 2011, 658 SCRA 476)]

XVIII
Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution pro-
vides that no elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms. Rule and ex-
plain briey the reason if the official is prohibited
3 16 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

to run for another term in each of the following

situations: (a) if the official is a Vice-Mayor who
assumed the position of Mayor for the unexpired
term under the Local Government Code; (b) if the
official has served for three consecutive terms
and did not seek a 4th term but who won in a re-
call election; (c) if the position of Mayor of a town
is abolished due to conversion of the town to a
city; (d) if the official is preventively suspended
during his term but was exonerated; and (e) if the
official is proclaimed as winner and assumes of-
fice but loses in an election protest. (5%)
(a) The three-term limit rule is inapplicable to the
Vice-Mayor because the interruption in his term when
he assumed the position of Mayor would be involuntary.
(Montebon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444,
April 8, 2005, 551 SCRA 50)
(b) The three-term limit rule is likewise inappli-
cable to the official who has served for three consecutive
terms and did not seek a 4”“ term but won in a recall
election because there would have been an involuntary
interruption in his terms after his third term (Adormeo
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147927, February
4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90 and Socrates v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, 391
SCRA 457), and a recall term is not a full term (Men-
doza u. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149736, December 17,
2002).
(c)The three-term limit rule would be applicable
against the Mayor of a town which is abolished due to
the conversion of the town to a city because the abolition
of an elective ofce due to the conversion of a municipal-
ity to a city does not, by itself, Work to interrupt the
 2016 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 317
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

incumbent ofcial’s continuity of service. (Latasa 0.

Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154829, December
10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601)

(d) The three-term limit rule is also inapplicable

to the official who has been placed under preventive
suspension during his term because a preventive sus-
pension is not an interruption. (Aldovino v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 603 SCRA 234)
(6) The three-term limit rule is nally inapplica-
ble to the official who is proclaimed as winner and as-
sumes ofiice but loses in an election contest because his
term is interrupted when he loses said election protest
and is ousted from ofce, thus disenabling him from
serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion
of his term had the protest been dismissed. (Lonzanida
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135150, July 28,
1999, 311 SCRA 602)

XIX
Fernando filed an administrative complaint
against his co-teacher, Amelia, claiming that the
latter is living with a married man who is not her
husband. Fernando charged Amelia with commit-
ting “disgraceful and immoral conduct” in viola-
tion of the Revised Administrative Code and,
thus, should not be allowed to remain employed
in the government. Amelia, On the Other hand,
claims that she and her partner are members of a
religious sect that allows members of the congre-
gation who have been abandoned by their respec-
tive spouses to enter marital relations under a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.” Having
made such Declaration, she argues that she can-
318 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

not be charged with committing immoral conduct

for she is entitled to free exercise of religion un-
der the Constitution.

(a) Is Amelia administratively liable?

State your reasons briey. (2.5%)

Amelia is not administratively liable.

Her conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as
she has made out a case for exemption from the law
based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
(Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006,
492 SCRA 1; see also Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-
1651, August 4, 2003, 455 Phil. 411, 506 [2003l)

(b)Briey explain the concept of “be-

nevolent neutrality.” (2.5%)

The concept of benevolent neutrality gives room for

accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. It could allow for accommodation
of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M.
No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 1; see also
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003,
455 Phil. 411, 506 [2003])

XX

Under Sec. 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,

the Supreme Court shall have the power to
“promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts xxx.” Section
 2016 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 319
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

23 of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Danger-

ous Drugs Act of 2002 provides that “any person
charged under any provision of this Act regard-
less of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed
to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.” Pa-
tricio, a user who was charged with alleged sale of
shabu but who wants to enter a plea of guilty to a
charge of possession, questions the constitutional-
ity of Sec. 23 on the ground that Congress en-
croached on the rule-making power of the Su-
preme Court under Sec. 5, Article VIII. He argues
that plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and
is within the exclusive constitutional power of the
Court. Is Patricio correct? Explain your answer.
(5%)

It is submitted that Patricio is correct.

Said Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is unconstitu-
tional, constituting as it does an unlawful encroachment
by the Congress into the exclusive rule-making author-
ity of the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section 5
(5) of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court’s sole prerogative to issue,

amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the pres-
ervation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not
diminish, increase or modify the latter. “Substantive
law is that part of the law which creates, denes and
regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed
to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions.”
320 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Plea bargaining has been dened as “a process

whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval.” The rules on plea bargaining neither
create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly ad-
ministering remedy and redress for a disregard or in-
fraction of them.
It is therefore within the exclusive rule-making
power of the Supreme Court. (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R.
No. 226679, August 15, 2017)
 2017 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 321
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

2017
I
A priority thrust of the Administration is the
change of the form of government from unitary to
federal. The change can be effected only through
constitutional amendment or revision.
(a) What are the methods of amending
the Constitution? Explain briey each
method. (3%)

Under Article XVII of the Constitution, proposals to

amend or revise the Constitution may be done or ap-
proved by the Congress, acting in its constituent capac-
ity, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members or by
a constitutional convention (Section 1) created by the
Congress, also in a constituent capacity, by a vote of
two-thirds of all its Members. The question or matter of
calling such a convention may be submitted by the Con-
gress to the electorate by a majority vote of all its Mem-
bers. (Section 3)
Amendments to the Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per cen-
tum of the registered voters therein. (Section 2)
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
under Section 1 shall be valid when ratied by a major-
ity of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held
not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days
after the approval of such amendment or revision.
322 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Any amendment under Section 2 shall be valid

when ratied by a majority of the votes cast in a plebi-
scite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the certication by the
Commission on Elections of the sufciency of the peti-
tion. (Section 4)

(b) Cite at least three provisions of the

Constitution that need to be amended or re-
vised to effect the change from unitary to fed-
eral, and briefly explain why? (3%)
Among the provisions in the Constitution that
would need to be amended or revised to effect the
change from unitary to federal would be the Preamble,
for purposes of introducing the concept of federalism
and providing for a declaration to the effect that its at-
tainment shall be among the aims of the provisions of
said document; the provisions on the Executive, Legisla-
tive and Judicial Departments, to provide for confer-
ments of and limitations on the powers of each of said
branches for purposes of precisely providing for a fed-
eral system of government, and the provisions on Local
Government, which, at present, merely prescribe for the
autonomy of local government units.

[Acceptable Answer: If the Congress or a constitutional conven-

tion would be foolish enough to propose the revision of the Constitu-
tion to provide for a federal system of government, among the provi-
sions in the Constitution that would need to be amended or revised
to effect the change from unitary to federal would be the Preamble,
for purposes of introducing the concept of federalism and providing
for a declaration to the effect that its attainment shall be among the
aims of the provisions of said document; the provisions on the Execu-
tive, Legislative and Judicial Departments, to provide for confer-
ments of and limitations on the powers of each of said branches for
purposes of precisely providing for a federal system of government,
 2017 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 323
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suoossrao ANSWERS

and the provisions on Local Government, which, at present, merely

prescribe for the autonomy of local government units.]
[N ote: Bar examination questions should be limited to concepts
actually taught, and ought not to include concepts which are not
discussed and are not based on existing laws or on the Constitution.]

II
A.

Under the doctrine of immunity from suit, the

State cannot be sued without its consent. How
may the consent be given by the State? Explain
your answer. (3%)
Consent to be sued may be expressly made, which
may be done with a general law, e.g. CA 327, as
amended (on money claims against government to be
led with the Commission on Audit) or a special law, as
in the case of Merritt v. Government of the Philippine
Islands (43 Phil. 311), Where a special law allowed a
person to sue the Philippine Government for injuries he
sustained when his motorcycle collided with a govern-
ment ambulance.
Consent may also be impliedly made, when the
State institutes a complaint, as in Froilan v. Pan Orien-
tal Shipping Co. (G.R. No. L-6060, September 30, 1950),
where the government was held to have impliedly al-
lowed itself to be sued when it led a complaint in in-
tervention for the purpose of asserting a claim against
the plaintiff, to wit, the recovery of a vessel (but not
where the complaint (in intervention) is led precisely
“to join the defendant in invoking the doctrine of State
immunity to secure the dismissal of the action” or to
resist the claim, as in Lirn u. Brownell (107 Phil. 345); or
324 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

when it enters into proprietary contracts, as in USA v.

Guinto (182 SCRA 644), which referred to the operation
of restaurants and barber shops, but not when it enters
into governmental contracts, such as in USA v. Ruiz
(136 SCRA 487), which involved the repair of Wharves.
(Cruz and Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2014 Edition,
pages 59-70)

BO

The doctrine of immunity from suit in favor

of the State extends to public officials in the per-
formance of their official duties. May such offi-
cials be sued nonetheless to prevent or to undo
their oppressive or illegal acts, or to compel them
to act? Explain your answer. (3%)
Yes, an officer of the state may be sued without in-
volving the State, as in a claim for recovery of taxes
unlawfully assessed or collected (Houston v. Houston,
252 U.S. 569); in a claim for recovery only of title to or
possession of property (Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil.
312); in a suit against the Director of Public Works, who
took over without authority property belonging to the
plaintiff and constructed thereon an irrigation canal
(Festejo v. Fernando, 50 O.G. 1556); and in a suit for the
recovery of the value of property which had been con-
verted into public streets Without payment of just com-
pensation, which can prosper even Without previously
ling a claim with the Auditor General. (Amigable v.
Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360)
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be suc-
cessfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensa-
tion arising from the taking without just compensation
and Without the proper expropriation proceedings being
 2017 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 325
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

rst resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. (Republic v.

Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212; Ministerio v. Court of
First Instance of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464; Santiago v. Repub-
lic, 87 SCRA 294)
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not an ins-
trument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. (De
los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 1;
Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, 644 SCRA 36; Cruz,
Notes on the Constitution, Volume I, 2016 Edition,
pages 140-141)

C.

Do government-owned or -controlled corpora-

tions also enjoy the immunity of the State from
suit? Explain your answer. (3%)

It is established that, if the government agency is

incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its char-
ter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says
so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is per-
forming. (Bermoy v. Philippine Normal College, G.R. No.
L-8670, May 18, 1956; Cruz and Cruz, Philippine Politi-
cal Law, 2014 Edition, pages 70-75)
Accordingly, it can be said that government-owned
or -controlled corporations do not enjoy immunity from
suit, provided their charters expressly prescribe that
they can sue and be sued. (Arcega v. Courtof Appeals,
G.R. NO. L-8760, May 18, 1956)
326 BAR Q & A
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III
State A and State B, two sovereign states, en-
ter into a 10-year mutual defense treaty. After five
years, State A finds that the more progressive
State B did not go to the aid of State A when it
was threatened by its strong neighbor State C.
State B reasoned that it had to be prudent and
deliberate in reacting to State C because of their
existing trade treaties.
(a) May State A now unilaterally with-
draw from its mutual defense treaty with
State B? Explain your answer. (2.5%)

Yes, State A may unilaterally withdraw from said

treaty by reason of State B’s clear breach of the same.
This would be in consonance with the provisions of
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, which prescribes that a material breach of a bilat-
eral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty
or suspending its operation in whole or in part

(b) What is the difference between the

principles of pacta sunt servanda and rebus
sic stantibus in international law? (2.5%)
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides for concept of pacta sunt servanda and
declares that every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith. Moreover, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights
and Duties of States adopted by the International Law
Commission in 1949 provides that every State has the
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising

from treaties and other sources of international law, and
it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its
laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty. (Ba-
yan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000)
Rebus sic stantibus is considered as “the equivalent
exception to the maxim pacta sunt seruanda.” The doc-
trine “constitutes an attempt to formulate a legal prin-
ciple which would justify non-performance of a treaty
obligation if the conditions with relation to which the
parties contracted have changed so materially and so
unexpectedly as to create a situation in which the exac-
tion of performance would be unreasonable.” (Jessup,
150, cited in Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020
Edition, pages 313-314)

(c) Are theprinciples of pacta sunt ser-

vanda and rebus sic stantibus relevant in the
treaty relations between State A and State B?
What about in the treaty relations between
State B and State C? Explain your answer.
(2.5%)

Yes, under the principle of pacta sunt servanda,

both States were clearly bound to comply with their
obligations under the subject treaty in good faith.
It is however submitted that State B may not in-
voke the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as justification
for its non-compliance with its obligations to aid State A
simply because of the threats of State C regarding their
existing trade treaties.
Itbears emphasis that among the limitations on a
valid application of said doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is
that the vital change in circumstances must have been
328 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

unforeseen or unforeseeable and should not have been

caused by the party invoking it. It is submitted that this
element is not present in this case. (Article 62, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties; Kelsen, 358-368;
Fenwick, 354-355; Wilson and Tucker, 222; Brierly, 245,
cited in Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020 Edi-
tion, pages 315)
[Acceptable Answer: Yes, under the principle of pacta sunt ser-
vanda, both States were clearly bound to comply with their obliga-
tions under the subject treaty in good faith.
State B may invoke the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as justi-
cation for its non-compliance with its obligations to aid State A
because of the threats of State C regarding their existing trade trea-
ties, considering that these threats in relation to their trade treaties
can be considered as unforeseen or unforeseeable and were not in-
tentionally caused by it.]

IV

A.

What is the pardoning power of the President

under Art. VIII, Sec. 19 of the Constitution?
Is the exercise of the power absolute? (4%)

Under Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution,

except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise pro-
vided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit nes
and forfeitures, after conviction by nal judgment. He
shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Con-
gress.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

It can be considered as not absolute in the sense

that its exercise is subject to the foregoing constitutional
limitations, as Well as to the limitation in Section 5 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides that no
pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be
granted by the President Without the favorable recom-
mendation of the Commission.
It should be added though that the exercise of the
pardoning power is discretionary in the President, and
may not be controlled by legislature or reversed by the
courts, save only when it contravenes the recognized
limitations. (Cruz and Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
2014 Edition, page 443) The pardoning power of the
President cannot be limited by legislative action. (Ris0s-
Vidal v. Commission on Elections, GR. No. 206666,
January 21, 2015)

BI

Distinguish pardon from amnesty. (4%)

The distinctions between an amnesty and a pardon

are —

(1)Amnesty is usually addressed to

crimes against the sovereignty of the State, to
political offenses, forgiveness being deemed
more expedient for the public welfare than
prosecution and punishment; pardon condones
infractions of the peace of the State.
 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(2) Amnesty is usually generally ad-

dressed to classes or even communities of per-
sons; pardon is usually addressed to an indi-
vidual.
(3) In amnesty, there may or may not be
distinct acts of acceptance, so that if other
rights are dependent upon it and are asserted,
there is affirmative evidence of acceptance; in
pardon, there must be distinct acts of accep-
tance.
(4) Pardon does not require the concur-
rence of the Congress; amnesty requires such
concurrence.
(5) Pardon is a private act of the Presi-
dent which must be pleaded and proved be-
cause the courts do not take judicial notice of
it; amnesty is a public act of which the courts
take judicial notice.
(6) Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of the of-
fense of which he has been convicted; while
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself; it so over-
looks and obliterates the offense with which he
is charged that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense. (Burdick v. United
States, 235 U.S. 476; Cruz and Cruz, Philip-
pine Political Law, 2014 Edition, pages 454-
455)
 2017 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 331
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

V
right of legation, and how is it
(a) What is the
undertaken between states? Explain your answer.
(2%)

The right of legation, which is considered as one of

the most effective ways of facilitating and promoting
intercourse among states, pertains to their active right
to send diplomatic representatives and their passive
right of receiving them to enable them to deal more di-
rectly and closely with each other in the improvement of
their mutual interests. (Cruz and Cruz, International
Law, 2020 Edition, page 242)

(b) Under this right, may a country like Ma-

laysia insist that the Philippines establish a con-
sulate in Sabah to look after the welfare of the
Filipino migrants in the area? Explain your an-
swer. (2%)

No.
Being purely consensual, the maintenance of dip-
lomatic relations is not a demandable right on the part
of either the sending or the receiving state. (Cruz and
Cruz, International Law, 2020 Edition, page 242)

VI
A.

The President appoints the Vice President as

his Administration’s Housing Czar, a position that
requires the appointee to sit in the Cabinet. Al-
though the appointment of the members of the
332 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Cabinet requires confirmation by the Commission

on Appointment (CA), the Office of the President
does not submit the appointment to the CA. May
the Vice President validly sit in the Cabinet?
(2.5%)

Yes, the Vice President may validly sit in the Cabi-

net as the President’s Housing Czar.
Under Section 3 of Article VII of the Constitution,
the Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no conrmation.

B.

The Executive Department has accumulated

substantial savings from its appropriations. Need-
ing P3,000,000.00 for the conduct of a plebiscite
for the creation of a new city but has no funds
appropriated soon by the Congress for the pur-
pose, the COMELEC requests the President to
transfer funds from the savings of the Executive
Department in order to avoid a delay in the hold-
ing of the plebiscite.
May the President validly exercise his power
under the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds
from the savings of the Executive Department,
and make a cross-border transfer of P3,000,000.00
to the COMELEC by way of augmentation? Is your
answer the same if the transfer is treated as aid to
the COMELEC? Explain your answer. (4%)
No, the President may not validly transfer funds
from the savings of the Executive Department in favor
of the COMELEC by way of augmentation. Neither can
 2017 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 333
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

this be considered as lawful even if it is to be treated as

aid to the COMELEC.
Under Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitu-
tion, the President, and the other ofcials mentioned
therein, may be allowed or authorized by law to transfer
from appropriations for their ofces to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respec-
tive oices from savings in other items of their respec-
tive appropriations.
It is therefore clear that said savings from the ap-
propriations for his ofce can be lawfully transferred to
augment any item in the general appropriations law but
only to any office within his ofce, or the executive
branch. Therefore, the transfer of said savings re-
quested by the COMELEC in its favor, being a cross-
border transaction, would be violative of the aforecited
constitutional provision as well as of the principle of
separation of powers. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014)

VII
Give the limitations on the power of the Con-
gress to enact the General Appropriations Act?
Explain your answer. (5%)
The following are the limitations on the power of
the Congress to enact the General Appropriations Act —
1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury ex-
cept in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(Constitution, Article VI, Section 29 [1])
2. No public money or property shall be appro-
priated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indi-
rectly, for the use, benet, or support of any sect,
334 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system

of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium. (Ibid., Section 29 [2])
3. All appropriations bills shall originate exclu-
sively in the House of Representatives (but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments) (Ibid., Section
24), and must be based on a budget of expenditures and
sources of nancing, including receipts from existing
and proposed revenue measures, submitted to it by the
President (within thirty days from the opening of every
regular session). (Ibid., Article VII, Section 22)
4. The Congress may not increase the appropria-
tions recommended by the President for the operation of
the Government as specied in the budget. The form,
content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall
be prescribed by law. (Ibid., Article VI, Section 25 [1])
5. No provision or enactment shall be embraced
in the general appropriations bill unless it relates spe-
cically to some particular appropriation therein. Any
such provision or enactment shall be limited in its op-
eration to the appropriation to which it relates. (Ibid.,
Article VI, Section 25 [2])
6. The procedure in approving appropriations for
the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for ap-
proving appropriations for other departments and agen-
cies. (Ibid., Article VI, Section 25 [3])
7. No law shall be passed authorizing any trans-
fer of appropriations; however, the President, the Presi-
dent of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
 2017 POLITICAL LAW AND Pusuo INTERNATIONAL LAW 335
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law,

be authorized to augment any item in the general ap-
propriations law for their respective ofces from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations. (Ibid.,
Article VI, Section 25 [5])
8. Discretionary funds appropriated for particu-
lar officials shallbe disbursed only for public purposes
to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to
such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. (Ibid.,
Article VI, Section 25 [6])
9. If, by the end of any scal year, the Congress
shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill
for the ensuing scal year, the general appropriations
law for the preceding scal year shall be deemed re-
enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
(Ibid., Article VI, Section 25 [7])

VIII
A bank acquired a large tract of land as the
highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the mort-
gaged assets of its borrower. It appears that the
land has been originally registered under the
Torrens system in 1922 pursuant to the provisions
of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the organic act of
the Philippine Islands as a colony of the USA. Sec.
21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 provided that “all
valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the
Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed,
are hereby declared to be 'ee and open to explora-
tion, occupation and purchase, and the land in
which they are found to occupation and purchase,
by citizens of the United States, or of said Is-
336 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

lands.” Sec. 27 of the law declared that a holder of

the mineral claim so located was entitled to all
the minerals that lie within his claim, but he
could not mine outside the boundary lines of his
claim.
The 1935 Constitution expressly prohibited
the alienation of natural resources except agricul-
tural lands. Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitu-
tion contains a similar prohibition, and proclaims
that all lands of the public domain, waters, min-
erals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, ora and fauna, and other natu-
ral resources are owned by the State. This provi-
sion enunciates the Regalian Doctrine.
May the Government, on the basis of the Re-
galian Doctrine enunciated in the constitutional
provisions, deny the bank its right as owner to the
mineral resources underneath the surface of its
property as recognized under the Philippine Bill
of 1902? Explain your answer. (5%)
No.
The provisions of the Constitution should be given
only a prospective application unless the contrary is
clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights al-
ready acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or
withdrawn even in the absence of an unmistakable in-
tention to place them within the scope of the Constitu-
tion.
Accordingly, the mining claim under consideration
no longer formed part of the public domain when the
provisions of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution be-
 2017 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 337
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

came effective, or even upon the effectivity of the 1935

Constitution, which provided for a similar limitation.
Mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935
and 1987 Constitutions should be considered as vested
rights that could not be impaired even by the Govern-
ment. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-43938, L-
44081, L-44092, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 228, cited in
Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation v. Trans-Asia Oil and
Energy Development Corporation, G.R. No. 207942,
January 12, 2015)

IX
A.

Ambassador Robert of State Alpha committed

a very serious crime while he headed his foreign
mission in the Philippines. Is he subject to arrest
by Philippine authorities? Explain your answer.
(3%)

It is
submitted that he may not be subject to arrest
for his “very serious crime.”
This would be consistent with Article 31 of the Dip-
lomatic Convention, which provides that “a diplomatic
agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the receiving state.”
It is a generally accepted principle of international
law that the diplomatic agent shall be immune from
such jurisdiction of the receiving state. This does not
mean that he can violate the local laws with impunity;
on the contrary, he is expected to observe them meticu-
lously as bets a person of his rank and prestige. If he
does not, he may not be punished for his offense by the
338 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

receiving state, but it can and usually will ask for his
recall. (Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020 Edition,
pages 251-252)

B.

Extradition is the process pursuant to a

treaty between two State parties for the surren-
der by the requested State to the custody of the
requesting State of a fugitive criminal residing in
the former. However, extradition depends on the
application of two principles — the principle of
specialty and the dual criminality principle. Ex-
plain these principles. (4%)
Under the principle of specialty, a fugitive who is
extradited may be tried only for the crime specied in
the request for extradition and included in the list of
offenses in the extradition treaty. (U.S. v. Rauscher, 119
U.S. 407, cited in Cruz and Cruz, International Law,
2020 Edition, page 368) Under this rule in international
law, a Requested State shall surrender to a Requesting
State a person to be tried only for a criminal offense
specied in their treaty of extradition. (Government of
Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Munoz, G.R.
N0. 207342, November 7, 2017)
On the other hand, the dual criminality principle
requires that the act for which the extradition is sought
must be punishable in both the requesting and the re-
quested state. (Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020
Edition, page 370; Government of Hongkong Special
Administrative Region v. Munoz, GR. No. 207342, No-
vember 7, 2017)
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

C.

The President signs an agreement with his

counterpart in another country involving recip-
rocity in the treatment of each country’s nationals
residing in the other’s territory. However, he does
not submit the agreement to the Senate for con-
currence.
Sec. 21, Art. VII of the Constitution provides
that no treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective without such concurrence.
Is the agreement signed by the President ef-
fective despite the lack of Senate concurrence?
Explain your answer. (4%)
Yes, said agreement can be considered as an execu-
tive agreement, which would therefore not require the
concurrence of the Senate for its validity or effectivity.
(Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. N0. 159618, 1 February
2011, 641 SCRA 258-259; Saguisag v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)

X
A.

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing

of a bill by both the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the President of the Senate and
the certification by the secretaries of both Houses
of Congress that the bill was passed on a certain
date are conclusive on the bill’s due enactment.
Assuming there is a conict between the enrolled
bill and the legislative journal, to the effect that
340 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

the enrolled bill signed by the Senate President

and eventually approved by the President turned
out to be different from what the Senate actually
passed as reected in the legislative journal,

(a) May the Senate President disregard

the enrolled bill doctrine and consider his
signature as invalid and of no effect? (2.5%)
No.
Under the Enrolled Bill Theory, the contents of an
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journal in
case of conict. This is justied under the principle of
separation of powers. (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, G.R. N0.
L-1123, March 5, 1947, 78 Phil. 1; Astorga v. Villegas,
G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 714) An en-
rolled bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also
of its due enactment. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995, 235 SCRA 630;
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056
September 1, 2005)
It bears emphasis that the subject bill had already
been “approved” by the President. Said approval has
transformed the same into a law which therefore cannot
be changed (or amended or repealed) with or by the
mere withdrawal of the signature by the Senate Presi-
dent. To change it would require an amendment (or
repeal) of said law. (Casco Chemical Co. v. Gimenez,
G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 374)

(b) May the President thereafter with-

draw his signature? Explain your answer.
(2.5%)

No.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Under Section 27 (1) of Article VI of the Constitu-

tion, every bill passed by the Congress shall, when ap-
proved and signed by the President upon presentment of
the same to him, be considered as, by reason of said
approval and signing, having become a law, subject only
to the requirement of publication for its effectivity.
Accordingly, the President may not thereafter nul-
lify thesame by mere withdrawal of his signature. To
allow him to do this would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers.
As earlier stated, to change it would require an
amendment (or repeal) of said law. (Casco Chemical Co.
v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963, 7
SCRA 374)

B.

Sec. 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution provides

that no bill passed by either House of Congress
shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days and printed copies of it
in its nal form have been distributed to the
Members of the House three days before its pas-
sage.
Is there an exception to the provision? Ex-
plain your answer. (3%)
Yes.
The exception is found in Section 26 (2) of Article
VI of the Constitution, which prescribes that said re-
quirements may be dispensed with when the President
certies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. (Tolentino v. Sec-
342 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

retary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995,

235 SCRA 630)

XI
Art. VI of the Constitution establishes
Sec. 17,
an Electoral Tribunal for each of the Houses of
Congress, and makes each Electoral Tribunal “the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members.” On the other hand, Sec. 2(1), C (Com-
mission on Elections), Art. IX of the Constitution
grants to the COMELEC the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations “relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.”
Considering that there is no concurrence of
jurisdiction between the Electoral Tribunals and
the COMELEC, state when the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals begins, and the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction ends. Explain your answer. (4%)
It is established that, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his proper oath, and assumed
ofce as a Member of the House of Representatives or of
the Senate, the jurisdiction of the House of Representa-
tives Electoral Tribunal and of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal begins over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualications. Consequently, it
would be at this point that the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regu-
lations “relative to the conduct of an election” ends.
(Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April
1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1; Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
 2017 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 343
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

207264, June 25, 2013; Lico v. Commission on Elections,

G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)

XII
The Congress establishes by law Philippine
Funds, Inc., a private corporation, to receive for-
eign donations coming from abroad during na-
tional and local calamities and disasters, and to
enable the unhampered and speedy disburse-
ments of the donations through the mere action of
its Board of Directors. Thereby, delays in the re-
lease of the donated funds occasioned by the
stringent rules of procurement would be avoided.
Also, the releases would not come under the ju-
risdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA).
(a) Is the law establishing Philippine
Funds, Inc. constitutional? Explain your an-
swer. (3%)

It is submitted that said law is unconstitutional.

Said law creating the subject private corporation
would be violative of the provisions of Section 16 of Arti-
cle XII of the Constitution, which prescribes that the
Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for
the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. (Liban u. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, Janu-
ary 18, 2011, July 15, 2009)
The purposes for the creation of this private corpo-
ration by the Congress, i.e., to receive and administer
foreign donations coming from abroad during national
and local calamities and disasters, cannot be invoked for
344 BAR Q & A
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purposes of allowing this breach of this constitutional

prohibition.

(b) Can the Congress pass the law that

would exempt the foreign grants from the ju-
risdiction of the COA? Explain your answer.
(3%)

No, it cannot.
This would be violative of the provisions of Section
3 of Article Di-D of the Constitution, which prescribes
that no law shall be passed exempting any entity of the
Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or
any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Audit.

XIII
Command responsibility pertains to the res-
ponsibility of commanders for crimes committed
by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in interna-
tional wars or domestic conicts. The doctrine
has now found application in civil actions for hu-
man rights abuses, and in proceedings seeking
the privilege of the writ of amparo.
(a) What are the elements to be estab-
lished in order to hold the superior or com-
mander liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility? (4%)
The requisites of the doctrine of command respon-
sibility are “a. the existence of
a superior-subordinate
relationship between the accused as superior and the
 2017 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 345
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the supe-

rior knew or had reason to know that the crime was
about to be or had been committed; and c. the superior
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators
thereof.” (Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
191805, November 15, 2011; see also In the Matter ofthe
Petition for the Writ ofAmparo and the Writ of Habeas
Data in Favor of Francis Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 678,
citing Gonzalesv. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10,
2006, 498 SCRA 445)

(b) May the doctrine of command res-

ponsibility apply to the President for the
abuses of the armed forces (AFP and PNP)
given his unique role as the commander-in-
chief of all the armed forces? Explain your
answer. (4%)

Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibil-

ity, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP, can be held liable for affront against the peti-
tioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as
substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had
exhibited involvement in or can be imputed With knowl-
edge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary
and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary
investigations required under the rules. Presidential
immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the
president’s incumbency. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal
Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011, citing
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738,
March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452)
346 BAR Q & A
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The President, as Commander-in-Chief, can be held

responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances in the context of amparo pro-
ceedings on the basis of the doctrine of command re-
sponsibility. The President, being the commander-in-
chief of all the armed forces, is to be considered as nec-
essarily possessing control over the military that quali-
es him as a superior within the purview of the doc-
trine. Moreover, he can be presumed to have knowledge
of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses
pertinent to said extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. “Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to
prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the com-
mander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the
power to effectively command, control and discipline the
military.” (Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
191805, November 15, 2011; see also In the Matter of the
Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas
Data in Favor of Francis Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 678,
citing Gonzales u. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10,
2006, 498 SCRA 445)
In amparo proceedings, “commanders may there-
fore be impleaded—not actually on the basis of com-
mand responsibility—but rather on the ground of their
responsibility, or at least accountability.” (Balao v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December 13,
2011, 662 SCRA 312)

XIV
To fulll the poor folk
a campaign promise to
in a area in Mindanao, the President
far-ung
requested his friend, Pastor Roy, to devote his
ministry to them. The President would pay Pastor
 2017 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 347
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Roy a monthly stipend of P50,000.00 from his dis-

cretionary fund, and would also erect a modest
house of worship in the locality in an area of the
latter’s choice.
Does the President thereby violate any provi-
sions of the Constitution? Explain your answer.
(3%)

It is submitted that this act of the President Would

be violative of Section 29 (2) of the Constitution, which
provides that no public money or property shall be ap-
propriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indi-
rectly, for the use, benet, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system
of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.

XV

A.

According to Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitu-

tion, the Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
What does the term scal autonomy signify? Ex-
plain your answer. (3%)
Fiscal autonomy contemplates a guarantee on full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recog-
nizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect
fees, x rates of compensation not exceeding the highest
rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans
348 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

of the government and allocate and disburse such sums

as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside con-
trol.
It vests in those expressly conferred with this pre-
rogative the independence and exibility needed in the
discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition
of restrictions and constraints on the manner the inde-
pendent constitutional ofces allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
scal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but, especially as regards
the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation
of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitu-
tional system is based. (Bengzon u. Drilon, G.R. No.
103524, April 15, 1992, 208 SCRA 133)

B.

May a complaint for disbarment against the

Ombudsman prosper during her incumbency?
Explain your answer. (3%)
No.
The rule is established that an impeachable ofcer
who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred Without
rst being impeached. (Marcoleta v. Borra, A.C. No.
7732, March 30, 2009; Jarque v. Ombudsman, A.C. N0.
4509, December 5, 1995, 250 SCRA xi, In Re: Raul M.
Gonzales, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
771; Cuenco v. Fernan; A.C. No. 3135, February 17,
1988, 158 SCRA 29)
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

To grant such a complaint for disbarment would in

effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the
constitutional mandate that impeachable ofcers, such
as the Ombudsman, who are constitutionally required to
be lawyers, may be removed from office only by im-
peachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed
in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. (Cuenco v. Fernan;
A.C. No. 3135, February 17, 1988, 158 SCRA 29)

C.

Sec. 3, Art. XI of the Constitution states that

“[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.”
What constitutes initiation of impeachment
proceedings under the provision? (3%)
“Initiation of impeachment proceedings takes place
by the act of ling of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House of Committee on Justice.” (Fran-
cisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, No-
vember 1O, 2003; Gutierrez v. The House of Representa-
tives, GR. No. 193459, February 15, 2011)
350 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

2018
I
Congress enacted a law to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, access
and information to a full range of modern family
planning methods, including contraceptives, in-
trauterine devices, injectibles, non-abortifacient
hormonal contraceptives, and family planning
products and supplies, but expressly prohibited
abortion. To ensure its objectives, the law made it
mandatory for health providers to provide infor-
mation on the full range of modern family plan-
ning methods, supplies and services, for schools
to provide reproductive health education, for
non-governmental medical practitioners to ren-
der mandatory 48 hours pro bono reproductive
health services as a condition to Philhealth ac-
creditation, and for couples desiring to marry to
attend a family planning seminar prior to the is-
suance of a marriage license. It also punishes cer-
tain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates. The
spouses Aguiluz, both Roman Catholics, filed a
petition to declare the law as unconstitutional
based on, among others, the following grounds:
(a) It violates the right to life, since it
practically sanctions abortion. Despite ex-
press terms prohibiting abortion, petitioners
claim that the family planning products and
supplies oppose the initiation of life, which is
a fundamental human right, and the sanction
of contraceptive use contravenes natural law
and is an affront to the dignity of man.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

It violates the constitutional prohibi-

(b)
tion against involuntary servitude because it
requires medical practitioners to render 48
hours of pro bono reproductive health ser-
vices which may be against their Will.
(c) It violates the Freedom of Religion,
since petitioners’ religious beliefs prevent
them from using contraceptives, and that any
State-sponsored procurement of contracep-
tives, funded by taxes, violates the guarantee
of religious freedom.
Rule on each of the above objections. (2.5%
each)
(a) The framers of the Constitution did not intend
to ban all contraceptives. Only contraceptives and de-
vices that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be
deemed as an abortive and thus prohibited, since life
starts from conception or upon fertilization. Conversely,
contraceptives and devices that actually prevent the
union of the sperm and the ovum, and those that simi-
larly take place prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive and constitutionally permissible.
(b) The notion of involuntary servitude connotes
the presence of force, threats, intimidation, or other
means of coercion and compulsion. The assailed provi-
sion only encourages private reproductive healthcare
service providers to render pro bono services. Other
than non-accreditation with Philhealth, no penalty is
imposed. These health service providers also enjoy the
liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish
to provide. Clearly, there is no compulsion, force or
threat upon them to render the pro bono services
against their will.
352 BAR Q & A
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(c) What is prohibited in the Constitution is the

establishment of a state religion. VVhile the establish-
ment clause in the Constitution restricts what the gov-
ernment can do with religion, it also limits What reli-
gious sects can or cannot do with the government. They
can neither cause the government to adopt their par-
ticular doctrine as policy for everyone, nor can they
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion,
and thus establish a state religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014.)

II
Agnes was allegedly picked up by a group of
military men headed by Gen. Altamirano, and was
brought to several military camps where she was
interrogated, beaten, mauled, tortured, and
threatened with death if she would not confess
her membership in the New People’s Army (NPA)
and point to the location of NPA camps. She suf-
fered for several days until she was released after
she signed a document saying that she was a
surenderee, and was not abducted or harmed by
the military. After she was released, and alleging
that her rights to life, liberty and security had
been violated and continued to be threatened by
violation of such rights, she filed with the Su-
preme Court (the Court) a Petition for the Writs
of Amparo and Habeas Data with prayers for
Temporary Protection Orders, Inspection of
Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties. The case was filed against President
Amoyo (who was the President of the Philippines
when the abduction, beating, mauling and life
 2018 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 353
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

threats were committed), General Altamirano,

and several military men whom Agnes was able to
recognize during her ordeal. The Court, after
finding the petition to be in order, issued the writ
of amparo and the writ of habeas data and di-
rected the respondents to file a verified return on
the writs, and directed the Court of Appeals (CA)
to hear the petition. The respondents duly filed
their return on the writs and produced the docu-
ments in their possession. After hearing, the CA
ruled that there was no more need to issue the
temporary protection orders since the writ
of amparo had already been issued, and dismissed
the petition against President Amoyo on the
ground that he was immune from suit during his
incumbency as President. Agnes appealed the CA
ruling to the Court. The appeal was lodged after
President Amoyo’s term had ended.
(a) Was the CA correct in saying that the
writ of amparo rendered unnecessary the is-
suance of the temporary protection order?
(2.5%)

Yes.
The Writ of amparo is an extraordinary and inde-
pendent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding and requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs to the petitioner. It serves both
preventive and curative reliefs in addressing extrajudi-
cial abduction and torture. Temporary protection orders
are merely intended to assist the Court before it can
arrive at a judicious determination of the amparo peti-
tion. A temporary protection order, being an interim
354 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

relief, can only be granted before nal adjudication on

the amparo case is made. The privilege of the writ of
amparo, once granted, already entails the protection of
the aggrieved party. Thus, since the Writ of amparo was
already granted and issued, there is no more need to
issue a temporary protection order. (Yano v. Sanchez,
G.R. No. 186640, Februaryll, 2010; Rodriguez v. Maca-
pagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 191805 & 193160, November
15, 2011)

(b) Will the President’s immunity from

suit continue even after his term has ended,
considering that the events covered by the
Petition took place during his term? (2.5%)
No. The presidential immunity from suit exists
only in concurrence with the President’s incumbency. A
non-sitting President cannot claim immunity even if the
acts complained of were committed while he was still a
sitting President. The reason for this is that if the im-
munity is not granted while he is in ofce, he might be
spending all his time in attending to litigations. After
his term, he can already attend to them. (Estrada v.
Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, April 3, 2001;
Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 191805 &
193160, November 15, 2011)

III
What and whose vote is required for the fol-
lowing acts: (2% each)

(a) the repeal of a tax exemption law;

A majority of all the members of Congress. (Article
VI, Section 28, 4)
 2018 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 355
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

[Acceptable Answer: A simple majority vote of all of the mem-

bers of the Congress considering the principle to the effect that tax
exemptions are to be strictly construed.]

(b) a declaration of the existence of a

state of war;

Two-thirds of all members of Congress, voting sepa-

rately. (Article Vl, Section 23, 1)

(c) the amendment of a constitutional

provision through a constituent assembly;
The approval of the constitutional amendment can
be effected with a majority of the votes cast in a plebi-
scite. (Article XVII, Section 1, 1) The approval of the
proposal to amend would be valid upon a vote of three-
fourths of all the Members of the Congress. (Article
XVII, Section 4)

(d) the resolution of a tie in a presiden-

tial election; and
A majority of all the members of both Houses of
Congress, voting separately. (Article VII, Section 4)

(e) the extension of the period for the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of ha-
beas corpus?

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a

majority of all its Members in regular or special session.
(Article VII, Section 18)
356 BAR Q & A
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IV
The Province of Amaya is one of the smallest
provinces in the Philippines with only one legisla-
tive district composed of four municipalities: Uno,
Dos, Tres, and Cuatro.
Andres, a resident and registered voter of
Cuatro municipality, ran and was elected as
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of
Amaya in the 2010 and 2013 local elections.
While Andres was serving his second term as
SP member, a law was enacted re-apportioning
the four towns of Amaya into two legislative dis-
tricts: Uno and Dos comprising the First District,
and Tres and Cuatro comprising the Second Dis-
trict.
In the2016 local elections, Andres ran and
was elected as member of the SP of Amaya repre-
senting the Second District.
Andres seeks your legal advice regarding his
intention to run as a member of the SP of Amaya
for the Second District in the next local elections
in 2019. What will you advise Andres? (2.5%)
He is not eligible. This involves a question of the
application of the three-term limit rule upon local elec-
tive officials in renamed and/or reapportioned districts.
A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve
for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent
of the framers of the Constitution was to limit the term
to three consecutive elections to the same position. (Na-
val v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014).
 2018 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 357
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

V
State whether or not the following acts are
constitutional: (2% each)
(a) A law prescribing as qualifications
for appointment to any court lower than the
Supreme Court, Philippine citizenship,
whether natural-born or naturalized, 35 years
of age on the date of appointment, and at
least eight years as a member of the Philip-
pine Bar;
The law prescribing as a qualication for appoint-
ment to any lower court mere Philippine citizenship,
whether natural-born or naturalized, would be unconsti-
tutional with respect to appointments to collegiate
courts (CA, CTA, Sandiganbayan) because all appoint-
ees to these courts must be natural-born citizens. (Con-
stitution, Article VIII, Section 7)

(b) A law requiring all candidates for na-

tional or local elective offices to be college
degree holders;

The law requiring all candidates for national or lo-

cal elective offices to be college degree holders should be
considered as unconstitutional with respect to national
elective offices because it is not one of the qualications
specifically required for these offices. The qualifications
for these positions under the Constitution are exclusive
in character and the Congress would be incompetent to
prescribe this requirement as an additional qualification
for candidates for national elective office. This addi-
tional requirement Would, however, be valid with re-
858 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

spect to candidates for local elective posts. (Social Jus-

tice Society o. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410)

of
(c) The designation by the President
an acting Associate Commissioner of the Civil
Service Commission;
Such designation is unconstitutional because the
Constitution provides that no person shall be appointed
or designated in any of the constitutional commissions
in a temporary or acting capacity. (Articles IX-B, Sec-
tion 1(2), IX-C, Section 1(2) and IX-D, Section 1(2))

(d) The appointment by the President as

Deputy Ombudsman of a lawyer who has been
engaged in the practice of law for five years;
and
The appointment can be upheld because only the
Ombudsman is required under the Constitution to have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
prior to his appointment. (Article XI, Section 8)

(e) The nomination by a national party-

list of a person who is not one of its bona fide
members.

The nomination is invalid because nominees of na-

tional parties must be bona fide members of such par-
ties (Atong Paglaum v. Commission on Elections, 694
SCRA 477)

VI
Ang Araw, a multi-sectoral party-list organi-
zation duly registered as such with the Commis-
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

sion on Elections (Comelec), was proclaimed as

one of the winning party-list groups in the last
national elections. Its first nominee, Alejandro,
assumed office as the party-list representative.
About one year after Alejandro assumed of-
fice, the Interim Central Committee of Ang Araw
expelled Alejandro from the party for disloyalty
and replaced him with Andoy, its second nominee.
Alejandro questioned before the Comelec his ex-
pulsion and replacement by Andoy.
The Comelec considered A1ejandro’s petition
as an intra-party dispute which it could resolve as
an incident of its power to register political par-
ties; it proceeded to uphold the expulsion.
Is the Comelec’s ruling correct? (5%)

No, the Commission on Elections is not correct. It

should dismiss Alejandro’s petition for lack of jurisdic-
tion.
The petition questioning Alejandro’s expulsion and
the succession of the second nominee as party-list repre-
sentative is a disqualication case because it relates to
the question of unseating Alejandro, who is already a
Member of the House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution en-
dows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on
the qualication of members of Congress. In the case of
party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdic-
tion over a disqualication case upon proclamation of
the Winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of ofce as member of the House of Repre-
sentatives. In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ang
Araw as a winning party-list group; Alejandro took his
360 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

oath and he assumed office in the House of Representa-

tives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC,
that has jurisdiction over this disqualication case. (See
Lico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, Sep-
tember 29, 2015)

VII
The 2016 mayoralty race in the City of Arda-
nia included Arnaldo and Anacleto as contenders.
Arnaldo filed a petition with the Comelec to
cancel Anacleto’s Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for misrepresenting himself as a Filipino citizen.
Arnaldo presented as evidence a copy of Ana-
cleto’s Spanish passport and a certification from
the Bureau of Immigration (Bl) showing that Ana-
cleto used the same passport several times to
travel to and from Manila and Madrid or Barce-
lona.
In his Comment, Anacleto claimed that, a year
prior to filing his CoC, he had complied with all
the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003) to reac-
quire his Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance and executing a sworn renunciation
of his Spanish citizenship. He defended the use of
his Spanish passport subsequent to taking his
oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a practical
necessity since he had yet to obtain his Philippine
passport despite reacquiring his Philippine citi-
zenship. Even after he secured his Philippine
passport, he said he had to wait for the issuance
of a Schengen visa to allow him to travel to Spain
to visit his wife and minor children.
 2018 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 361
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(a) Based on the allegations of the par-

ties, is there sufficient ground to cancel Ana-
cleto’s CoC? (2.5%)

The sole act of using a foreign passport does not di-

vest Anacleto of his Filipino citizenship which he ac-
quired by repatriation. However, by representing him-
self as a Spanish citizen, Anacleto voluntarily and effec-
tively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the
instant Anacleto represented himself as a Spanish citi-
zen by using his Spanish passport. He is thus disquali-
ed for being a dual citizen, and his CoC should be can-
celled. (Macquiling v Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April
16, 2013)

(b) In case Anacleto’s CoC is properly

cancelled, who should serve as mayor of Ar-
dania City: Arnaldo, who obtained the second
highest number votes, or Andrea, the duly-
elected Vice Mayor of the City? (2.5%)

The rule on succession would not apply if the per-

manent vacancy was caused by one whose certicate of
candidacy was void ab initio. Specically with respect to
dual citizens, their certicates of candidacy are void ab
initio because they possess “a substantive [disqualifying
circumstance] [existing] prior to the ling of their
certificate of candidacy.” Legally, they should not even
be considered candidates. The votes cast for them
should be considered stray and should not be counted.
In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab
initio certicates of candidacy, the person legally enti-
tled to the vacant position would be the candidate who
garnered the next highest number of votes among those
362 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

eligible; in this case, it was Arnaldo. (Chua v Comelec,

G.R. N6. 216607, April 5, 2016)

VIII
Two petitions for the cancellation of Certi-
cate of Candidacy (CoC)/Denial of Due Course
were filed with the Comelec against two candi-
dates running as municipal mayors of different
towns.
The first petition was against Anselmo. Years
ago, Anselmo was charged and convicted of the
crime of rape by final judgment, and was sen-
tenced to suffer the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua which carried the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. While Ansel-
mo was in prison, the President commuted his
sentence and he was discharged from prison.
The second petition was against Ambrosio.
Ambrosi0’s residency was questioned because he
was allegedly a “green card holder,” i.e., a perma-
nent resident of the US, as evidenced by a certifi-
cation to this effect from the US Embassy.
Acting on the recommendations of its Law
Department, the Comelec en banc motu proprio
issued two resolutions granting the petitions
against Anselmo and Ambrosio.
Both Anselmo and Ambrosio filed separate
petitions with the Supreme Court assailing the
resolutions cancelling their respective CoCs. Both
claimed that the Comelec en banc acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction because the petitions should
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

have first been heard and resolved by one of the

Comelec’s Divisions.
Are Anselmo and Ambrosio correct? (5%)
Anselmo is incorrect.
While it may be true that Section 3, Article IX-C of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution requires cases led
with the Commission on Elections to be rst “heard and
decided in division,” and that only motions for reconsid-
eration of said decisions shall be decided by the Com-
mission en bane, said constitutional provision, requiring
a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc may take action, is conned only to cases where
the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It
nds no application in matters concerning the COME-
LEC’s exercise of administrative functions.
VVhile the denial of due course to and/or cancella-
tion of one’s COC generally necessitates the exercise of
the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions commenced
through a petition based on either Sections 1220 or 7821
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or Section 4022 of
the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered con-
clusive on account of nal and executory judgments — as
when a candidate’s disqualication to run for public
ofce is based on a nal conviction — such exercise falls
within the COMELEC’s administrative functions, as in
this case. The Comelec merely performed its duty to
enforce and administer election laws in canceling peti-
tioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute dis-
qualication, the fact of which had already been estab-
lished by his nal conviction. In this regard, the
COMELEC en banc was exercising its administrative
functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for
reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3,
364 BAR Q & A
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Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being re-

quired only in quasi-judicial proceedings. (Jalosjos vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205033, June 18,
2013)
On the other hand, Ambrosio is correct that the pe-
tition for the cancellation of his CoC should have been
rst heard and resolved by the Comelec Division. Can-
cellation proceedings involve the COMELEC’s quasi-
judicial functions. The Constitution mandates the
COMELEC, in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers, to hear and decide cases rst by division
and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC
en banc. (Bautista v Comelec, G.R. Nos. 154796-97, Oc-
tober 23, 2003)

IX
In Agripina migrated to Canada and ac-
1990,
quired Canadian citizenship.
In 2008, Agripina retired and returned to the
Philippines to permanently reside in her home-
town of Angeles, Pampanga. A month after return-
ing to the Philippines, Agripina took her oath of
allegiance and executed a sworn renunciation of
her Canadian citizenship in accordance with R.A.
No. 9225.
In 2009, Agripina filed her certificate of can-
didacy for Congress for the 2010 elections. Agrip-
ina’s political rivals lost no time in causing the
filing of various actions to question her candi-
dacy. They questioned her eligibility to run as
member of Congress. Since Agripina had to take
an oath under R.A. No. 9225, it meant that she
 2018 POLITICAL LAw AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 365
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

needed to perform an act to perfect her Philip-

pine citizenship.
Hence, they claimed that Agripina could not
be considered a natural-born citizen. Agripina
raised the defense that, having complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, she had reac-
quired, and was deemed never to have lost, her
Philippine citizenship.
Is Agripina disqualified to run for Congress
for failing to meet the citizenship requirement?
(2.5%)

Agripina is eligible to run as member of Congress.

Repatriation results in the recovery of a person’s origi-
nal nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a Filipino citizen. If she were originally a
natural-born citizen before she lost her Philippine citi-
zenship, she would be restored to her former status as a
natural-born Filipino. (Bengson III vs. HRET, 409 Phil.
633; see also Parreno vs. Commission on Audit, 551 Phil.
368, and Tabasa vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016])
RA 9225 makes a distinction between those natu-
ral-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before
and after the effectivity of RA No. 9225. For those who
were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be
deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship
which was lost pursuant to CA 63. In the case of those
who became foreign citizens after RA 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they take the oath
of allegiance under the new law.
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Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a

Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of RA 9225, she
belongs to the rst category of natural-born Filipinos
who lost their Philippine citizenship by naturalization
in a foreign country, under the rst paragraph of Section
3. As the new law allows dual citizenship, she Was able
to reacquire her Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance (David vs. Agbay, G.R. No.
199113).

Ascertain the constitutionality of the follow-

ing acts: (2.5% each)

(a) An investigation conducted by the

Ombudsman against a Commissioner of the
Commission on Audit for serious misconduct.

The act is constitutional. Although a Commissioner

of any of the Constitutional Commissions is removable
only through impeachment, this rule does not preclude
the Ombudsman from conducting an investigation into
the alleged serious misconduct committed by impeach-
able officials for the purpose of ling a veried com-
plaint for impeachment. (Section 22, RA 6770; Carpi0-
Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10,
2015)

(b) A law prohibiting any court, other

than the Supreme Court, from issuing a writ
of injunction against an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman.
The law is unconstitutional. The power to issue in-
junctive writs is part of judicial power. The rules gov-
 2018 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 367
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

erning the exercise of this power are within the powers

of the Supreme Court to promulgate. The law therefore
is an encroachment into the Court’s rule-making power.
(Carpio-Morales v CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November
10, 2015)

(c) A law prohibiting any appeal from

the decision or final order of the Ombudsman
in an administrative proceeding, except
through a petition for review on certiorari
filed before the Supreme Court.
The law is unconstitutional. In Fabian v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998), the Court in-
validated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 insofar as it pro-
vided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the
decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not
only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
without its advice and concurrence in violation of Sec-
tion 30, Article VI of the Constitution, it was also incon-
sistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which provides that a petition for review on certiorari
shall apply only to a review of “judgments or nal orders
of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court
of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts
authorized by law.” In the absence of concurrence by the
Supreme Court, such a law would be unconstitutional.

XI
Under Section 6 of Article V (on Criminal Ju-
risdiction) of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA), the custody of a United States (US) per-
sonnel who becomes subject to criminal prosecu-
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POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

tion before a Philippine court shall be with the US

military authorities, if the latter so requests. The
custody shall begin from the commission of the
offense until the completion of all judicial pro-
ceedings. However, when requested, the US mili-
tary authorities shall make the US personnel
available to Philippine authorities for any inves-
tigative or judicial proceeding relating to the of-
fense with which the person has been charged. In
the event that the Philippine judicial proceedings
are not completed within one year, the US shall
be relieved of any obligation under Section 6.
The constitutionality of Section 6, Article V of
the VFA is challenged on two grounds: (1) it nulli-
fies the exclusive power of the Supreme Court to
adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Phil-
ippines; and (2) it violates the equal protection
clause to the extent that it allows the transfer of
the custody of an accused to a foreign power as
providing a different rule of procedure for that
accused.
Rule on the challenge. (5%)
The challenge is without merit.
The rule in international law is that foreign armed
forces allowed to enter one’s territory are immune from
local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. As a
result, the situation involved is not one in which the
power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules of procedure
is curtailed or violated. Rather, it is one in which, as is
normally encountered around the world, the laws (in-
cluding rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or
apply except to the extent agreed upon, to subjects of
another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial
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BAR QUESTIONS AND Sooonsnsn ANSWERS

immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed

forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agree-
ments recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some
aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to
long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of
State, diplomats and members of the armed forces con-
tingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another
State’s territory. On the contrary, the Constitution
states that the Philippines adopts the generally ac-
cepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2)
Neither is the equal protection clause violated be-
cause there is a substantial basis for a different treat-
ment of foreign military armed forces allowed to enter
our territory and all other accused. (Nicolas vs. Romulo,
G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009)

XII
Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, pro-
vides that the Sandiganbayan may adopt internal
rules governing the allotment of cases among its
divisions, the rotation of justices among them,
and other matters relating to the internal opera-
tions of the court.
Section 6 of Article IX-A of the Constitution
allows each of the Constitutional Commissions
“en banc [to] promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of
its offices. Such rules however shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights.”
370 BAR Q & A
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Section 16(3) of Article VI of the Constitution

states that “Each House may determine the rules
of its proceedings.” Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution further provides that “The Senate or
the House of Representatives or any of its respec-
tive committees may conduct inquiries... in accor-
dance with its duly published rules of procedure.”
Finally, Section 3(8) of Article XI of the Con-
stitution declares that “The Congress shall prom-
ulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purposes of this section.”
Are the rules promulgated pursuant to these
provisions subject to review and disapproval by
the Supreme Court? (5%)
Section 5[5] of Article VIII of the Constitution
clearly provides that the “Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.” Accordingly,
it is clear that the Supreme Court may review and re-
verse the rules of procedure of the Sandiganbayan and
the Constitutional Commissions.
With respect to the rules of procedure of Congress
in its proceedings, legislative inquiries and on im-
peachment, while these rules may be generally consid-
ered as political questions, when questioned before the
courts in a proper case, they would nevertheless be sub-
ject to the power of judicial review under the second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which authorizes it to review and annul all acts of any
branch or instrumentality of the government which may
be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

XIII
PO1 Adrian Andal is known to have taken
bribes from apprehended motorists who have vio-
lated traffic rules. The National Bureau of Inves-
tigation conducted an entrapment operation
where P01 Adrian was caught red-handed de-
manding and taking PhP500.00 from a motorist
who supposedly beat a red light.
After he was apprehended, PO1 Adrian was
required to submit a sample of his urine. The drug
test showed that he was positive for dangerous
drugs. Hence, PO1 Adrian was charged with viola-
tion of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
PO1 Adrian argues against the admissibility
of the urine test results and seeks its exclusion.
He claims that the mandatory drug test under
R.A. No. 9165 is a violation of the accused’s right
to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
Are PO1 Adrian’s contentions correct? (2.5%)
PO1 Adrian is correct that his rights to privacy and
against self-incrimination have been violated. The re-
sults of the “conrmatory” urine test should therefore be
rejected as evidence against him.
It should be noted that RA 9165 allows the conduct
of urine tests only for persons arrested for acts prohib-
ited under said law, such as, among others, the manu-
facturing, sale, use or possession of illegal drugs, and
not for any unlawful act, like extortion, for which PO1
Adrian was arrested. (De la Cruz vs. People, G.R. No.
200748, July 23, 2014)
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XIV
Amoroso was- charged with treason before a
military court martial. He was acquitted.
He was later charged with the same offense
before a Regional Trial Court. He asks that the
information be quashed on the ground of double
jeopardy.
The prosecution objects, contending that for
purposes of double jeopardy, the military court
martial cannot be considered as a “competent
court.”
Should the Regional Trial Court grant Amor-
oso’s motion to quash on the ground of double
jeopardy? (2.5%)
Yes, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
A defendant, having been acquitted of a crime by a
court martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under
lawful authority cannot be subsequently tried for the
same offense in a civil court.
It appearing that the offense charged in the Court
Martial and in the Regional Trial Court is the same,
that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case
and that both courts derived their powers from one sov-
ereignty, the acquittal by the military court should be a
bar to Amoroso’s further prosecution for the same of-
fense in the Regional Trial Court. (Crisologo vs. People,
G.R. No. L-6277, February 26, 1954)
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XV

Annika sued the Republic of the Philippines,

represented by the Director of the Bureau of
Plant Industry, and asked for the revocation of a
deed of donation executed by her in favor of said
Bureau. She alleged that, contrary to the terms of
the donation, the donee failed to install lighting
facilities and a water system on the property do-
nated, and to build an office building and parking
lot thereon, which should have been constructed
and made ready for occupancy on or before the
date fixed in the deed of donation.
The Republic invoked state immunity and
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that it had not consented to be sued. Should the
Republic’s motion be granted? (2.5%)
The motion should be denied.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injus-
tice on a citizen. Here, the alleged failure to abide by
the conditions under which a donation was given should
not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the
consent likewise being presumed when the State en-
tered into a contract. Under the circumstances, the
fundamental postulate of non-suability of the state can-
not stand in the Way. (Santiago vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-
48214, December 19, 1978)

XVI
Five foreign nationals arrived at the NAIA
from Hong Kong. After retrieving their checked-in
374 BAR Q & A
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luggage, they placed all their bags in one push-

cart and proceeded to Express Lane 5. They were
instructed to place their luggage on the exam-
iner’s table for inspection.
The examiner found brown-colored boxes,
similar in size to powdered milk boxes, under-
neath the clothes inside the foreigners’ bags. The
examiner discovered white crystalline substances
inside the boxes that he inspected and proceeded
to bundle all of the boxes by putting masking tape
around them. He thereafter handed the boxes
over to Bureau of Customs agents. The agents
called out the names of the foreigners one by one
and ordered them to sign their names on the
masking tape placed on the boxes recovered from
their respective bags. The contents of the boxes
were thereafter subjected to tests which con-
firmed that the substance was shabu.
Can the shabu found inside the boxes be ad-
mitted in evidence against the five foreigners for
the charge of illegal possession of drugs in viola-
tion of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002? (2.5%)
N0, those boxes containing the shabu are inadmis-
sible in evidence against them.
The signatures of the accused on the boxes consti-
tute tacit admissions of the crime charged and are tan-
tamount to uncounselled extra-judicial confessions
which are not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section
12[1] and [3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are,
therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission
wrung from them in violation of their constitutional
rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all
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accused were foreign nationals does not preclude appli-

cation of the exclusionary rule because the constitu-
tional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are
given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
(People vs. Wong Chuen Ming, G.R. Nos. 112801-11,
April 12, 1996)

XVII
The police served a warrant of arrest on Aris-
ton who was suspected of raping and killing a
female high school student. While on the way to
the police station, one of the police officers who
served the warrant asked Ariston in the local dia-
lect if he really raped and killed the student, and
Ariston nodded and said, “Opo.” Upon arriving at
the police station, Ariston saw the City Mayor,
whom he approached and asked if they could talk
privately. The Mayor led Ariston to his office and,
while there in conversation with the Mayor, Aris-
ton broke down and admitted that he raped and
killed the student. The Mayor thereafter opened
the door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness Arist0n’s confession. In
the presence of the Mayor, the police and the me-
dia, and in response to questions asked by some
members of the media, Ariston sorrowfully con-
fessed his guilt and sought forgiveness for his ac-
tions.
Which of these extrajudicial confessions, if
any, would you consider as admissible in evidence
against Ariston? (5%)
Ariston was already under custodial investigation
when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the
376 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

police failed to inform him of his constitutional rights

when he was investigated and interrogated. His confes-
sion to the police is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
However, his confession before the mayor is admis-
sible. VVhile it may be true that a mayor has “opera-
tional supervision and control” over the local police and
may arguably be deemed a law enforcement ofcer for
purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III
of the Constitution, Ariston’s confession to the mayor, as
described in the problem, was not made in response to
any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did
not appear as having questioned Ariston at all. No po-
lice authority ordered Ariston to talk to the mayor. It
was he himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntar-
ily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor
did not know that he was going to confess his guilt to
him. VVhen he talked with the mayor as a condant and
not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled con-
fession to the Mayor did not violate his constitutional
rights.
His confession to the media can likewise be prop-
erly admitted. The confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the police or any
other investigating ofcer. Statements spontaneously
made by suspects to news reporters during televised
interviews are deemed voluntary and are admissible in
evidence. (People vs. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3,
1997)

XVIII
Two police teams monitored the payment of
ransom in a kidnapping case.
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

The bag containing the ransom money was

placed inside an unlocked trunk of a car which
was parked at the Angola Commercial Center in
Mandaluyong City.
The first police team, stationed in an area
near where the car was parked, witnessed the
retrieval by the kidnappers of the bag from the
unlocked trunk. The kidnappers thereafter
boarded their car and proceeded toward the di-
rection of Amorsolo St. in Makati City where the
second police team was waiting.
Upon confirmation by radio report from the
first police team that the kidnappers were head-
ing towards their direction, the second police
team proceeded to conduct surveillance on the
car of the kidnappers, eventually saw it enter
Ayala Commercial Center in Makati City, and the
police team finally blocked it when it slowed
down. The members of the second police team
approached the vehicle and proceeded to arrest
the kidnappers.
Is the warrantless arrest of the kidnappers by
the second police team lawful? (5%)
The warrantless arrest is lawful.
There are two requirements before a Warrantless
arrest can be effected under Section 5(b), Rule 113,
Rules of Court: (1) an offense has just been committed,
and (2) the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be ar-
rested has committed it.
Both requirements are present in the instant case.
The rst police team present in the Angola Commercial
378 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Center was able to witness the pay-off which effectively

consummated the crime of kidnapping. Its team mem-
bers all saw the kidnappers take the money from the car
trunk. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other
police ofcers comprising the second police team sta-
tioned in Amorsolo St. where the kidnappers were ex-
pected to pass.
It is sufcient for the arresting team that they were
monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long
enough for them to be informed as to who the kidnap-
pers were. This is equivalent to personal knowledge
based on probable cause. (People vs. Uyboco, G.R. No.
178039, January 19, 2011)

XIX

President Alfredo died during his third year

in office. In accordance with the Constitution,
Vice President Anastasia succeeded him. Presi-
dent Anastasia then nominated the late President
Alfredo’s Executive Secretary, Anna Maria, as her
replacement as Vice President. The nomination
was confirmed by a majority of all the Members of
the House of Representatives and the Senate, vot-
ing separately.
(a) Is Anna Maria’s assumption as Vice
President valid? (2.5%)
No, Anna Maria’s assumption is unconstitutional
because only a member of the Senate or House of Repre-
sentatives may be nominated by a successor-President
as Vice President. (Article VII, Section 9)
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BAR QUESTIONS AND Succssrso ANSWERS

(b) Can Anastasia run as President in

the next election? (2.5%)
Yes, Anastacia can still run as President in the next
election since she has served for less than four years.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution provides that
“no person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be quali-
ed for election to the same ofce at any time.”

XX

Andreas and Aristotle are foreign nationals

working with the Asian Development Bank (ADS)
in its headquarters in Manila. Both were charged
with criminal acts before the local trial courts.
Andreas was caught importing illegal drugs
into the country as part of his “personal effects”
and was thus charged with violation of Compre-
hensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Before the
criminal proceedings could commence, the Presi-
dent had him deported as an undesirable alien.
Aristotle was charged with grave oral defamation
for uttering defamatory words against a colleague
at work. In his defense, Aristotle claimed diplo-
matic immunity. He presented as proof a commu-
nication from the Department of Foreign Affairs
stating that, pursuant to the Agreement between
the Philippine Government and the ADS, the
bank’s officers and staff are immune from legal
processes with respect to acts performed by them
in their official capacity.
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(a) Can the President’s act of deporting

an undesirable alien be subject to judicial re-
view? (2.5%)

The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act

done by or under the authority of the sovereign power.
It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
continued presence in the country is found to be injuri-
ous to the public good and the domestic tranquility of
the people. (Rosas vs. Montor, G.R. No. 204105, October
14, 2015). An act of State is one done by the sovereign
power of a country, or by its delegate, within the limits
of the power vested in him. An act of State cannot be
questioned or made the subject of legal proceedings in a
court of law (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4“ ed., 44). With
particular reference to Political Law, an act of State is
an act done by the political departments of the govern-
ment and not subject to judicial review.

(b) Is Aristotle’s claim of diplomatic im-

munity proper? (2.5%)
The claim of diplomatic immunity is improper.
Courts cannot blindly adhere to and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that Aristotle is covered
by immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain
person is covered by immunity is only preliminary and
has no binding effect on courts. Besides, slandering a
person cannot possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commis-
sion of a crime, such as defamation, under the guise of
official duty. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplo-
matic Relations, a diplomatic agent enjoys immunity
from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except
in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

outside his ofcial functions in the receiving state. The

commission of a crime is not part of official duty. (Liang
vs. People, G.R. N0. 125865, January 28, 2000).
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2019
PART I

A.1.

Define the following terms:

(a) Jus cogens (2%)

Jus cogens means the “compelling law.”

“A jus cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical
position among all other customary norms and princi-
ples.” As a result, jus cogens norms are deemed “per-
emptory and non-derogable.” (Bayan Muna v. Romulo,
GR. No. 159618, February 1, 2011)
Under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, it is “a peremptory norm of general
international law accepted and recognized by the inter-
national community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modied only by a subsequent norm of general interna-
tional law having the same character.”

(b) Principle of double criminality (2%)

Under the double or dual criminality principle, the

act for which the extradition is sought must be punish-
able in both the requesting and the requested state.
(Cruz and Cruz, International Law, 2020 Edition, page
370; Government of Hongkong Special Administrative
Region v. Munoz, G.R. N0. 207342, November 7, 2017)
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 383
BAR QUESTIONS AND Succssrro ANSWERS

(c) Act of State doctrine (2%)

An act of state is an act done by the sovereign

power of a country, or by its delegate, within the limits
of the power vested in him. An act of State cannot be
questioned or made the subject of legal proceedings in a
court of law. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4“ Edition, page
44) It is an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. (Rosas u. Montor, G.R. No. 204105,
October 14, 2015)
With particular reference to Political Law, an act of
State is an act done by the political departments of the
government and not subject to judicial review. (Cruz
and Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2014 Edition, page
47)

(d) Precautionary principle (2%)

Under the so-called precautionary principle, in or-

der to protect the environment, the precautionary ap-
proach shall be widely applied by States according to
their capabilities. VVhere there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientic certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation. (The
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, based on Principle 15, The Rio Dec-
laration on Environment and Development, 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
cited in International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), G.R. No. 209271, December 8, 2015)
384 BAR Q & A
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A.2.

Under the United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), what are the rights of
the Philippines within the following areas:

(a) Contiguous zone (2%)

Under Article 33 of the UNCLOS III, the contigu-

ous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured. In “a zone contiguous to its territorial
sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal State
may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent in-
fringement of its customs, scal, immigration or sani-
tary laws and regulations within its territory or territo-
rial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and
regulations committed within its territory or territorial
sea.”

(b) Exclusive economic zone (2%)

The exclusive economic zone of a coastal State shall

not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is meas-
ured. (UNCLOS, Article 5'7)
UNCLOS III provides that in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and
of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration
of the zone, such as the production of energy from the
Water, currents and Winds; (b) jurisdiction as provided
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 385
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with

regard to: (i) the establishment and use of articial is-
lands, installations and structures; (ii) marine scientic
research; (iii) the protection and preservation of the
marine environment; (c) other rights and duties pro-
vided for in this Convention. 2. (Article 56 [1]).
In exercising its rights and performing its duties
under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone,
the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and
duties of other States and shall act in a manner com-
patible with the provisions of this Convention. (Article
56 l2l)

A.3.

The Humanitarian Services Society (HSS), an

international non-government organization, as-
sisted the displaced families of Tribe X who had to
ee their home country in order to escape the
systematic persecution conducted against them
by their country’s ruling regime based on their
cultural and religious beliefs. Fearing for their
lives, some of these displaced families, with the
help of HSS, were able to sail out into the sea on a
boat with 15 passengers. An affiliate of HSS in the
Philippines intervened on behalf of these dis-
placed families, claiming that they are refugees
under international law and hence, should not be
expelled from our territory.
May the displaced families of Tribe X be con-
sidered as “refugees” under international law?
Explain. (3%)
386 BAR Q & A
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Yes, their consideration under interna-

as refugees
tional law would be consistent with the provisions of the
1951 Convention Relating to the Statute of Refugees,
Article 1 (A), paragraph 2 of which denes a refugee as
one who, owing to a well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of, among others, race or religion, such
as the displaced families of Tribe X, is outside the coun-
try of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or one who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual resi-
dence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

A.4.

Mrs. W supplied the Philippine National Po-

lice (PNP) with uniforms every year. Last month,
she and two (2) other officers of the PNP con-
spired to execute a “ghost purchase” covered by
five (5) checks amounting to P200,000.00 each, or a
total of P1,000,000.00. An investigating committee
within the PNP, which was constituted to look
into it, invited Mrs. W, among others, for an in-
quiry regarding the anomalous transaction. Mrs.
W accepted the invitation but during the commit-
tee hearing, she stated that she will not answer
any question unless she be provided with the as-
sistance of a counsel. The PNP officials denied her
request; hence, she no longer participated in the
investigation.
(a) What is a custodial investigation?
Under the 1987 Constitution, what are the
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

rights of a person during custodial investiga-

tion? (3%)
A custodial investigation has been understood to
refer to any questioning by law enforcement ofcers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any signicant way.
(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436) Custodial investiga-
tion commences when a person is taken into custody
and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a
crime under investigation and the police ofcers begin
to ask questions on the suspect’s participation therein
and which tend to elicit an admission. (People v. Caba-
nada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017)
Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution provides
for the rights of a person under custodial investigation.
Thus —
(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the ser-
vices of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimi-
dation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inad-
missible in evidence against him.
388 BAR Q & A
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(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil

sanctions for violations of this section as Well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families.

(b) Was the PNP’s denial of Mrs. W’s re-

quest violative of her right to counsel in the
proceedings conducted by the PNP? Explain.
It is submitted that the PNP’s denial of Mrs. W’s
request that she be provided with the assistance of
counsel is not violative of her right to counsel, which is
available only during so-called custodial investigations.
It is established that mere administrative investi-
gations are not considered as covered by Section 12,
which is limited to criminal investigations. (Remolona v.
Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 599 l2001];
Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187689,
September 7, 2010, 630 SCRA 202)

A.5.

At about 5:30 A.M. of September 15, 2019, Po-

lice Senior Inspector Officer A of the Manila Po-
lice District Station received a text message from
an unidentified civilian informer that one Mr. Z
would be meeting up later that morning with two
(2) potential sellers of drugs at a nearby restau-
rant. As such, Officer A decided to hang around
the said place immediately.
At about 9:15 A.M., two (2) male passengers,
named X and Y, who were each carrying a travel-
ling bag, alighted from a bus in front of the res-
taurant. A transport barker, serving as a lookout
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 389
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

for Officer A, signaled to the latter that X and Y

were “suspicious-looking.” As the two were about
to enter the restaurant, Officer A stopped them
and asked about the contents of their bags. Dis-
satisfied with their response that the bags con-
tained only clothes, Officer A proceeded to search
the bags and found packs of shabu therein. Thus,
X and Y were arrested, and the drugs were seized
from them. According to Officer A, a warrantless
search was validly made pursuant to the stop and
frisk rule; hence, the consequent seizure of the
drugs was likewise valid.

(a) What is the stop and frisk rule? (2.5%)

The stop and frisk rule, which is acknowledged as
among the exceptions to the rules against warrantless
searches and seizures, is generally recognized as “a pro-
tective seizure and search for Weapons” or a “limited
protective Search of outer clothing for weapons.” (Terry
v. Ohio, 392 US 1)

VVhile probable cause is not required to conduct a

“Stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere suspi-
cion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police ofcer’s
experience and Surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person may be stopped and frisked. (Ma-
lacat v. Court 0fAppeals, 347 Phil. 462 [1997], cited in
People v. Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018)
[Notez Under this rule, a police ofcer who observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his ex-
perience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identies him-
self as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
390 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his

reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled [to] the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. (Terry v.
Ohio, 392 US 1)]

(b) Was the stop and frisk rule validly

invoked by Officer A? If not, what is the effect
on the drugs seized as evidence? Explain.
(2.5%)

lt is submitted that Ofcer A could not have validly

conducted a valid stop and frisk search.
It bears emphasis that he approached X and Y,
both of whom had just alighted from the bus and were
about to enter the restaurant, simply by reason of a
“signal” from the lookout, the barker, to the effect that
they were “suspicious-looking.” There is no showing that
Officer A actually found them to be such, or suspicious-
looking. It is clear that, insofar as Ofcer A was con-
cerned, there was no observable manifestation that
could have aroused his suspicion as to cause him to stop
and frisk X and Y. To reiterate, the latter were merely
entering a restaurant after they got off the bus when
they were stopped by Officer A. (People v. Aruta, G.R.
No. 120915, April 3, 1998)

A.6.

A committee of the Senate invited Mr. X and

Mr. Y, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Secre-
tary of Energy, respectively, as resource speakers
for an inquiry in aid of legislation. Mr. X refused
to attend, arguing that the Senate, not its commit-
tee, has the power to compel attendance. Mean-
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

while, Mr. Y attended the committee hearing but

upon being asked about discussions made during
a closed-door cabinet meeting, he refused to an-
swer invoking executive privilege. The committee
members insisted that Mr. Y answer the question
pursuant to the right of Congress to information
from the executive branch.
(a) Based on his argument, is Mr. X’s
non-appearance permissible? Explain. (2.5%)
No, X’s non-appearance is not permissible.
The power to conduct legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation, which entails or includes coercive authority
to compel the attendance of witnesses, or resource per-
sons, such as Mr. X, under pain of contempt (Arnault v.
Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950), can be exer-
cised by either chamber of the Congress, or by any of its
respective committees. (Constitution, Article VI, Section
21)

(b) Is Mr. Y’s refusal to answer based on

executive privilege valid? Explain. (2.5%)
No, Mr. Y may not be allowed to refuse to answer
on the ground of executive privilege.
VVhile information pertinent to closed-door cabinet
meetings can generally be recognized as privileged
(Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Govern-
ment, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998), it must be
remembered that executive privilege is available only to
the President, or to a delegate or subordinate, who may
be allowed to invoke it but only upon prior express au-
thorization of the President. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777, April 20, 2006)
392 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Moreover, while it has also been held that, al-

though executive privilege is properly invoked in rela-
tion to specic categories of information, not to catego-
ries of persons (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April
20, 2006; Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related
Matters of the NEDA, G.R. No. 175210, February 1,
2016), it must still be remembered that for a mere sub-
ordinate, such as Mr. Y, to be allowed to invoke it, he
must clearly assert it “by specifying the grounds for the
exemption. In case of denial of access to the informa-
tion, it is the government agency concerned that has the
burden of showing that the information sought to be
obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the
same is exempted from the coverage of the constitu-
tional guarantee.” (Sereno v. Committee on Trade and
Related Matters of the NEDA, G.R. No. 175210, Febru-
ary 1, 2016)
It is submitted that Mr. Y, who merely refused to
answer and merely invoked executive privilege did not
properly discharge this burden.
[Note: A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an
obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly as-
serted, and not merely implied. In light of this highly exceptional
nature of the privilege, the Court nds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course
authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her
behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
authority is “By order of the President,” which means that he per-
sonally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary
power, it must be wielded only by the highest ofcial in the executive
hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such power. (Senate u. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1)]
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

A.7.

The continuing threat to the security of the

State in various parts of the country prompted
the National Security Adviser of the President to
adopt a “Comprehensive National Security Strat-
egy (CN SS)” with the following components:

Component 1: During a state of

emergency, the President, in the exercise
of his power of general supervision, may
delegate to the heads of local government
units (LOUs), through an administrative
issuance, the power to call-out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for a
more effective and immediate response to
the ground situation; and
Component 2: In declaring Martial
Law, the President, in a preemptive ac-
tion and without waiting for the recom-
mendation of the Secretary of National
Defense and the AFP, may rely upon any
intelligence information he may have
gathered through other sources.
Disturbed by the strategy’s supposed infirmi-
ties, a concerned citizens’ organization raised the
constitutionality of the two (2) components of the
CNSS before the Supreme Court.

(a) Is component 1 of the CNSS constitu-

tional? Explain. (2.5%)
No, it is not constitutional.
394 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Under the Constitution, it is only the President

who may exercise military powers under Section 18 of
its Article VII. This may not be delegated by him, as in
this case, to heads of local government units. (Jamar M.
Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012)

[Note: There is one repository of executive powers, and that is

the President of the Republic. xxx. Corollarily, it is only the Presi-
dent, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers
as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well
as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7,
Article VII thereof. (Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M.
Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012)]

(b) Is component 2 of the CNSS constitu-

tional? Explain. (2.5%)
Yes, Component 2 of the CNSS is not unconstitu-
tional.
The only pertinent conditions prescribed under the
Constitution for his exercise of the power to declare
martial law are, among others, it must be on the ground
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it. (Article VII, Section 18)
Prior recommendations from the Secretary of Na-
tional Defense and the AFP are not among the condi-
tions prescribed under the Constitution for his exercise
of said power.
It has been held that since these extraordinary
military powers are conferred by the Constitution with
the President as Commander-in-Chief, it therefore nec-
essarily follows that the power and prerogative to de-
termine whether the situation warrants his declaration
of martial law also lies exclusively, or at least initially,
with him. Accordingly, it has been ruled that, so long as
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 395
BAR QuEsTioNs AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

there exists factual basis which leads him to believe

that there is probable cause as to the existence of any of
the grounds for his declaration of martial law, such de-
termination must be respected. (Lagman v. Medialdea,
G.R. N0. 231658, July 4, 2017)

A.8.

Mayor X and his City Administrator, Y, are

political buddies who assumed their respective
offices in 2010. Sometime in January 2012, Y pro-
posed to Mayor X the entry into a P5,000,000.00
loan agreement with ABC Foundation, a non-
stock and non-profit organization in which the
two had a long-standing personal involvement.
The loan agreement was duly executed in the
same year but was never authorized and ap-
proved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod. It was
further found that the same constituted a fraudu-
lent scheme to defraud the City Government.
Meanwhile, Mayor X won another term dur-
ing the May 2013 Elections and Y continued on as
his City Administrator. A year after, or in May
2014, administrative charges for grave miscon-
duct, serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service were filed
against them before the Office of the Ombudsman.
In defense, Mayor X argued that his subsequent
re-election in May 2013 absolved him from any
administrative liability for any alleged anomalous
activity during his first term in office. Y raised
the same defense of condonation, having been
retained by Mayor X as City Administrator for a
second term.
396 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

On December 10, 2015, the Ombudsman ren-

dered its ruling in the case, finding both Mayor X
and Y administratively liable. Citing the Supreme
Court’s Decision in Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. Nos. 217126-27), which was initially
promulgated on November 10, 2015, the Ombuds-
man rejected their defense of condonation. With
the motions for reconsideration of Mayor X and Y
having been denied by the Ombudsman on March
10, 2016, they elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals.

(a) Did the Ombudsman err in not giv-

ing credence to the defense of condonation as
raised by Mayor X? Explain. (2%)
It is submitted that the Ombudsman erred in re-
jecting Mayor X’s defense of condonation.
As held in the Carpio case, the abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in applica-
tion for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until re-
versed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philip-
pines.
Since the administrative case against Mayor X was
based on acts committed by him before the promulga-
tion of the Carpio decision, or prior to November 10,
2015, said administrative case should properly be con-
sidered as barred by reason of his re-election in 2013.
Said re-election, according to the doctrine, should be
considered as a condonation of whatever administrative
offenses he may have committed prior to the same.

[Notez Clearly then, the rule is that a public ofcial cannot be

removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 397
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

term, since his re-election to ofce operates as a condonation of the

ofcer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115 August
21, 1992)]

[Note: We sustain the insistence of the OMB. The ruling prom-

ulgated in Morales v. Court of Appeals on the abandonment of the
doctrine of condonation had, indeed, become nal only on April 12,
2016, and thus the abandonment should be reckoned from April 12,
2016. (Crebello v. Ofce of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 232325, April
10, 2019)]

[Note: To reiterate, the condonation doctrine is no longer an

available defense to a public official who is reelected on or after April
12, 2016. In other words, the reelection of a public ofcial on or after
April 12, 2016 would no longer absolve him or her from any adminis-
trative liability arising from a previous misconduct that he or she
had committed during a prior term. (Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos.
226935, 228238 & 228325, February 9, 2021)]
[Note: Based on these considerations, the Court deems it
proper to declare the Ombudsman’s Ofce Circular No. 17 dated
May 11, 2016 null and void, pursuant to the above-discussed ruling
in Madreo. As it stands, the condonation doctrine is still considered
as “good law” in all administrative cases involving public ofcials
whose reelections occurred before April 12, 2016, regardless of the
dates of ling of the administrative cases against them or the status
of said cases when the Carpio-Morales ruling attained nality.
(Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325, February
9, 2021)]

[Note: Contrary to Gaudan’s assertion, the fact that Degamo

was elected as a Provincial Board Member and not as Governor of
the Province in the May 2010 elections is of no consequence.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Mayor Vergara, the Court ex-

plained that a public ofcial need not be reelected to the same posi-
tion in the immediately succeeding election for the condonation
doctrine to be an available defense for him or her in an administra-
tive proceeding. Otherwise stated, “the doctrine can be applied to a
public ofcer who was elected to a different position, provided that it
is shown that the body politic electing the person to another ofce is
the same.” (Gaudan u. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325,
February 9, 2021)]
398 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(b) How about Y? Can he validly invoke

the condonation doctrine to absolve him of
the charge? Explain. (3%)
No, he cannot.
The condonation doctrine does not apply to appoint-
ive ofcials. It only applies to elective ofcials. (Civil
Service Commission 0. Sojor, 577 Phil. 52, 72 [2008],
cited in Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
217126-27, November 10, 2015)

A.9.

The unabated rise of criminality and the re-

ported identification of delinquent children loi-
tering in the wee hours of the night prompted
City Z to implement a curfew ordinance. Minors
unaccompanied or unsupervised on the streets by
their parents or guardians between 10:00 P.M. to
5:00 A.M. may be apprehended by law enforcers
subject to certain exclusive exceptions. These ex-
ceptions are: 1. minors running lawful errands,
such as buying of medicines, using of telecommu-
nications facilities for emergency purposes and
the like; 2. night school students; and 3. minors
working at night. Minors apprehended for viola-
tion of the curfew ordinance shall be required to
undergo counseling, accompanied by their par-
ents/guardians.
(a) Does the curfew ordinance violate
the primary right and duty of parents to rear
their children? Explain. (2.5%)
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 399
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

No, the Curfew Ordinances are but examples of le-

gal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children’s well-being.
They may be validly imposed by the State as parens
patriae, and be considered as its inherent right and duty
to aid parents in the moral development of their chil-
dren, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents
to fulll their parental obligations. Under the Constitu-
tion, the State can properly conclude that parents and
others, teachers for example, who have the primary
responsibility for children’s well-being, are entitled to
the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility. (SPARK v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442,
August 8, 2017)

(b) Does the curfew ordinance infringe

any of the minors’ fundamental rights? Ex-
plain. (2.5%)
The subject ordinances can be considered as unduly
impairing minors’ reasonable exercise of their rights of
association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression, among others.
Their freedom of association and right to peaceful
assembly can be considered as effectively curtailed be-
cause they are hindered from participating in legitimate
activities during certain hours of the day, like political
rallies or school meetings, as they may be apprehended
if they are caught out on the streets at the specied
hours, even if they would be just on their way to or re-
turning from said legitimate activities. This hindrance
necessarily includes a suppression of their religious
freedom as they would be, by reason of said curfew ordi-
nance, effectively be prevented from attending religious
400 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

activities during the specied hours. Needless to state,

all of these prohibitions constitute curtailments on their
freedom of expression. (SPARK v. Quezon City, G.R. No.
225442, August 8, 2017)

A.10.

An Information for Estafa was filed against

the accused, Mr. D. During the course of the trial,
Mr. D filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute the case for a reasonable length of time.
Opposing the motion, the prosecution argued that
its failure to present its witnesses was due to cir-
cumstances beyond its control. Eventually, the
trial court dismissed the case with finality on the
ground that Mr. D’s right to speedy trial was vio-
lated.
A month after, the same criminal case for
Estafa was re-filed against Mr. D, prompting him
to file a motion to dismiss invoking his right
against double jeopardy. The prosecution opposed
the motion, arguing that the first criminal case
for Estafa was dismissed with the express consent
of the accused as it was, in fact, upon his own mo-
tion. Moreover, it was already able to secure the
commitments of its witnesses to appear; hence, it
would be prejudicial for the State if the case were
to be dismissed without trial.
(a) For double jeopardy to attach, what
requisites must exist? (2%)
The rule is that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
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BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or ac-

quittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act. (Constitution, Article III,
Section 21)
Accordingly, double jeopardy attaches when the fol-
lowing elements concur: (1) the accused is charged un-
der a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has
jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and has
pleaded; and (4) he/she is convicted or acquitted, or the
case is dismissed without his/her consent. (David v.
Marquez, G.R. No. 209859, June 5, 2017)

(b) Rule on Mr. D’s present motion. (3%)

Mr. D’s motion to dismiss should be granted.

The second case for the same offense is barred by
double jeopardy.
It is established that a dismissal, even if with the
express consent of the accused, will give rise to double
jeopardy if the same is based on a violation of the right
of the accused to a speedy trial. (People v. Anano, 97
Phil. 28, Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February
1, 2012) Under said ground, the dismissal would be tan-
tamount to an acquittal. (Tan v. People, G.R. No.
173637, April 21, 2009)
402 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND Pusuc INTERNATIONAL LAW

PART II
B.11.

Atty. G ran for Governor of the Province of

Pampanga, while his close friend, Atty. M, ran for
Mayor of the Municipality of Guagua, Pampanga.
They both won convincingly. Eventually, the los-
ing candidates timely filed election protests. The
losing gubernatorial candidate, Mr. A, filed his
protest before the Regional Trial Court of Pam-
panga (RTC), Whereas the losing mayoralty can-
didate, Mr. B, filed his protest before the Munici-
pal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga (MTC).
(a) What are the term limits for the posi-
tions of Atty. G and Atty. M? (1%)
Being local elective officials, their terms limits are
basically governed by Section 8 of Article X of the Cons-
titution, which prescribes that the term of office of elec-
tive local ofcials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
ofcial shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Moreover, under Section 43 of the Local Govern-
ment Code, the term of office of all local elective officials
elected shall be three (3) years and no local elective offi-
cial shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 403
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

as an interruption in the continuity of service for the

full term for which the elective official concerned Was
elected.

(b) Does the RTC have jurisdiction over

the case filed by Mr. A? Explain. (2%)
No, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the
case led by Mr. A because gubernatorial election con-
tests are cognizable by the Commission on Elections,
which has exclusive original jurisdiction over all con-
tests relating to the elections, returns, and qualica-
tions of all elective regional, provincial, and city of-
cials. (Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 2 [2])

(c) Does the MTC have jurisdiction over

the case filed by Mr. B? Explain. (2%)
No, the MTC, which is considered as a court of lim-
ited jurisdiction, does not have jurisdiction over the case
led by Mr. A because mayoralty election contests are
cognizable by trial courts of general jurisdiction (Consti-
tution, Article IX-C, Section 2 [2])
It
is therefore the RTC which has jurisdiction over
the same.

B.12.

W, the incumbent Congressman of the Prov-

ince of Albay, decided to run for Governor. He
filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for Gover-
nor without resigning from his post and contin-
ued exercising his duties as Congressman, such as
attending plenary sessions and committee hear-
ings in the House of Representatives. One of W’s
404 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

fiercest critics, X, claimed that W should not be

dispensing the functions of a Congressman since
he is deemed ipso facto resigned as such upon his
filing of a CoC for Governor of Albay.
(a) Is X’s argument correct? Explain.
(2.5%)

No, his argument is not correct.

Pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elec-
tion Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A.
8486 insofar as it considered an elected ofcial as re-
signed only upon the start of the campaign period corres-
ponding to the positions for which they are running, an
elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his
office upon the ling of his certicate of candidacy for
the same or any other elected ofce or position. In ne,
an elected ofcial may run for another position without
forfeiting his seat. (Quinto v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010)

(b) Assuming that W is instead, an in-

cumbent Undersecretary of the Department
of National Defense, what is the effect of the
filing of his CoC for the position of Governor
of Albay to said post? Explain. (2.5%)
He shall be considered as ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certicate of candidacy
for the position of Governor.
Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Sec-
tion 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person hold-
ing a public appointive ofce or position, including ac-
tive members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 405
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

and officers and employees in government-owned or -

controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the ling of his certicate
of candidacy. (Quinta v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 189698, February 22, 2010)

B.13.

Who are the impeachable officers under the

1987 Constitution? Briey explain the process of
impeaching them thereunder. (5%)
Under the 1987 Constitution, the impeachable of-
cers are the President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitu-
tional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (Article XI,
Section 2)
The process prescribed in the Constitution for im-
peachment is indicated in Section 3 of Article XI, which
provides —
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeach-
ment.
(2) A veried complaint for impeachment may be
led by any Member of the House of Representa-
tives or by any citizen upon a resolution or en-
dorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten ses-
sion days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Commit-
tee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, to-
gether with the corresponding resolution. The reso-
 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

lution shall be calendared for consideration by the

House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members
of the House shall be necessary either to afrm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeach-
ment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be re-
corded.
(4) In case the veried complaint or resolution of
impeachment is led by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Sen-
ate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initi-
ated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try
and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting
for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
afrmation. When the President of the Philippines
is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not
extend further than removal from office and dis-
qualication to hold any office under the Republic
of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,
trial, and punishment, according to law.
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 407
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

B.14.

A proposal to change a provision of the 1987

Constitution has been put forth as follows:
Original Text: “The Philippines is a democ-
ratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority ema-
nates from them.”
Proposed Text: “The Philippines is a democ-
ratic and socialist State. Sovereignty resides in
the party and all government authority emanates
from it.”
(a) Is this an amendment or a revision?
Explain. (2.5%)
The proposed text constitutes a revision.
A revision broadly implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the constitution, like altering the prin-
ciple of separation of powers or the system of checks-
and-balances. (Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153,
October 25, 2006)
It is submitted that the proposals to convert the
Philippines into a socialist state and to make sover-
eignty reside in the party would serve to alter a basic
principle to the effect that sovereignty resides in the
people.

(b) Briey explain the process to revise

the 1987 Constitution. (2.5%)
408 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

The process of revising the Constitution would nec-

essarily entail two steps, to wit, the making of the pro-
posal and the ratication.
Under Section 1 of Article XVII of the Constitution,
a proposal to revise the Constitution may be made or
done by the Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its Members; or by a constitutional convention, which
under Section 3 thereof, may be established by the Con-
gress, which may call the same by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members, or by a majority vote of all its Mem-
bers, submit to the electorate the question of calling
such a convention.
Any proposal to revise or any revision of the Con-
stitution shall be valid when ratied by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the approval of such revision. (Constitution, Article
XVII, Section 4)

B.15.

R was elected as Municipal Councilor for

three (3) consecutive terms. Before the end of the
third term, Vice Mayor S died, rendering his post
vacant. Since R was the highest-ranking Munici-
pal Council or, he assumed the office of the Vice
Mayor. One of his constituents, T, assailed R’s
assumption of office, arguing that elections
should have been conducted to fill in the vacancy
following the death of Vice Mayor S.
(a) Is T’s contention correct? Explain.
(2.5%)
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 409
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

No, T’s contention is not correct, because there

would be no need for elections. Instead, the rules on
succession should be made to apply.
Accordingly, under Section 44 of the Local Govern-
ment Code, if a permanent vacancy occurs in the ofce
of Mayor, the vice-mayor concerned shall become the
Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of
the Mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking Sang-
gunian member or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest ranking Sanggunian member, shall
become the Mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be.
Subsequent vacancies in the said ofce shall be lled
automatically by the other Sanggunian members ac-
cording to their ranking as dened herein.
Therefore, it was proper for R to have assumed the
ofce of Vice Mayor. This would be consistent with the
aforecited rule on succession under the Local Govern-
ment Code.

that R validly assumed S’s

(b) Assuming
post, at the end of R’s term as Vice Mayor,
may he run, once more, for the position of
Municipal Councilor? Or is he proscribed to
do so under the Local Government Code? Ex-
plain. (2.5%)
R can run again for the position of Municipal Coun-
cilor.
This would be consistent with the rule that, when a
permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and
the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the
rules on succession under the Local Government Code,
as in this case, then his service for the unexpired por-
tion of the term of the replaced ofcial cannot be treated
410 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

as one full term as contemplated under the subject cons-

titutional and statutory provision that that service can-
not be counted in the application of any term limit
(Borja, Jr. Commission on Elections and Jose T.
v.
Capco, Jr., G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998, 295
SCRA 157 [1998])]. If the official runs again for the
same position he held prior to his assumption of the
higher ofce, then his succession to said position is by
operation of law and is considered an involuntary sever-
ance or interruption (Montebon u. Commission on Elec-
tions, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008, 551 SCRA 50
[2008l).

B.16.

Under the 1987 Constitution, to whom does

each duty/power/privilege/prohibition/disqualifi-
cation apply:
(a) The authority to keep the general ac-
counts of the Government and for such period
provided by law, preserve the vouchers and
other supporting documents pertaining
thereto. (1%)
The Commission on Audit. (Constitution, Article
IX-D, Section 2 [1])

(b) The power to allow small-scale utili-

zation of natural resources by Filipino citi-
zens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-
workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
(1%)
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 411
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

The Congress. (Constitution, Article XII, Section 2,

3“ paragraph)

(c) The authority to provide for the

standardization of compensation of govern-
ment officials and employees. (1%)
The Congress. (Constitution, Article IX-B, Section
5)

(d) The sole power to declare the exis-

tence of a state of war. (1%)

The Congress, in joint session assembled, upon a

vote of two-thirds of both Houses, voting separately.
(Constitution, Article VI, Section 23 [1])

(e) The power to ratify treaties and in-

ternational agreements. (1%)
The President. (Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570,
October 10, 2000; Pimentel v. Office of the Executive
Secretary, GR. N0. 158088, July 6, 2005)

B.17.

In 2014, Congress enacted an appropriation

law containing a provision that gives individual
legislators the discretion to determine, post-
enactment, how much funds would go to a specific
project or beneficiary which they themselves also
determine. Consequently, disbursements were
made in the interim pursuant thereto.
Eventually, Mr. Z filed a petition questioning
the constitutionality of the statutory provision on
412 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

the ground that it violates the separation of pow-

ers principle. On the other hand, certain Con-
gressmen argued that there was nothing wrong
with the provision because, after all, the power to
appropriate belongs to Congress.
(a) Rule on the arguments of the parties.
(2.5%)

Mr. Z’s petition must be upheld.

The questioned law constitutes a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, following the rule
that, once a bill has become a law, the Congress, or any
of its individual members, may not have any participa-
tion in its actual enforcement, which lies in the exclu-
sive domain of the Executive Department. (Belgica v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. 208566, Nov. 19, 2013)

(b) Assuming that the provision is de-

clared unconstitutional, should the disburse-
ments made pursuant thereto be returned, in
light of the doctrine of operative fact? Ex-
plain. (2.5%)
No, the disbursements need not be returned.
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 29287, July 1, 2014)

The doctrine of operative fact is applicable.

Under this doctrine, the law is recognized as un-
constitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional
law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undis-
turbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the
invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission
that the law is unconstitutional. The operative fact doc-
trine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 413
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

an exception to the general rule that an unconstitu-

tional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked
to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. In
short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modies only
the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconsti-
tutional law itself. (League of Cities of the Philippines v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, August 24, 2010)

B.18.

A was appointed by the President as a Com-

missioner of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) while Congress was not in session.
Pending confirmation of his appointment by the
Commission on Appointments, A started to per-
form his official functions in the COMELEC, such
as attending en banc sessions, hearing election
protests, signing Resolutions, issuing Orders, and
appearing before Congress during budget hear-
ings. Atty. B questioned before the Supreme Court
the exercise of official functions by A, stating that
his ad interim appointment is not a permanent
appointment but a temporary one pending con-
firmation by the Commission on Appointments,
and thus prohibited under Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution which states that “[i]n no case shall
any Member [of the COMELEC] be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”
(a) Is Atty. B’s contention correct? Ex-
plain. (2.5%)
No, B’s contention is not correct.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent ap-
pointment because it takes effect immediately and can
414 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

no longer be withdrawn by the President once the ap-

pointee has qualied into ofce. The fact that it is sub-
ject to conrmation by the Commission on Appoint-
ments does not alter its permanent character. The Cons-
titution itself makes an ad interim appointment perma-
nent in character by making it effective until disap-
proved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress. (Matibag v. Benipayo,
G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002; Pamantasan ng Lung-
sod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. L-65439, November 13, 1985, 140 SCRA 22)
Accordingly, A’s ad interim appointment as Com-
missioner of the Commission on Elections cannot or
should not be considered as a temporary or acting ap-
pointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution. (Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002)

(b) If
the Commission on Appointments
by-passed the confirmation of A, can he still
be reappointed by the President? Explain.
(2.5%)

Yes, the President can reappoint A.

There is nothing in the Constitution, or in any ex-
isting law for that matter, which prohibits such a reap-
pointment.
An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by in-
action of the Commission on Appointments does not
constitute a term of ofce. The period from the time the
ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is
neither a xed term nor an unexpired term. (Fetalino u.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191890, December 4,
2012)
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 415
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suocssnzn ANSWERS

Accordingly, A’s reappointment should not or can-

not be considered as covered by the general constitu-
tional prohibition against reappointments in the Consti-
tutional Commissions.

B.19.

Candidate X, a naturalized Filipino citizen,

ran for Congressman for the Lone District of
Batanes. After a close electoral contest, he won by
a slim margin of 500 votes. His sole opponent, Y,
filed an election protest before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), claiming that X should be
disqualified to run for said position because he is
not a natural-born citizen. While the case was
pending, X was proclaimed by the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Batanes as the duly elected
Congressman of the province.

(a) Distinguish between natural-born

and naturalized citizens under the 1987 Con-
stitution. (2%)
Under Article IV of the Constitution, natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship (Section 2) and
those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority (Section 2, in relation to Section 1 [3])
In turn, naturalized citizens are those who acquire
Philippine citizenship either through judicial naturali-
zation under the provisions of C.A. No. 473, as
amended, or on the basis of the Administrative Natu-
ralization Law (R.A. 9139). It should be noted that both
416 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

laws also provide for naturalization through derivative

mode.

[Note: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, any

woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons natu-
ralized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall
be considered citizens thereof. A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling
in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent,
shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born
minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his
minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines
when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine
citizen even after becoming of age. A child born outside of the Philip-
pines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of
majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the
country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of alle-
giance.]
[Note: Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9139, known as
the Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000, after the approval of
the petition for administrative naturalization in cancellation of
applicant’s alien certicate of registration, app1icant’s alien lawful
wife and minor children may le a petition for cancellation of their
alien certicates of registration with the Committee subject to the
payment of the ling fee(s)...]
[Note: R.A. No. 9225 provides — Section 4. Derivative Citizen-
ship The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
—

adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire

Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizenship of the Philippines.]

(b) Is X qualified to run for Congress?

Explain. (1%)
No, X, being a naturalized Filipino citizen, is not
qualied to run for Congress because, under the Consti-
tution, no person shall be a Member of the House of
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 417
BAR QUEsT1oNs AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines (Article VI, Section 6)

(c) Did X’s proclamation divest the

COMELEC of its jurisdiction to decide the
case and vest the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction to
hear the case? Explain. (2%)
No, the proclamation of X does not serve to divest
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over the case. It may
still decide the same despite said proclamation.
The rule is that the COMELEC will be divested of
said jurisdiction, and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal shall exercise sole jurisdiction over
the case, only after it is shown that X would have been
proclaimed as the Winning candidate, taken his proper
oath and assumed office. (Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
207264, October 22, 2013)
Although X may have been proclaimed, it is clear
that he is yet to take his proper oath and assume ofce.
The COMELEC therefore retains its jurisdiction over
his case.

B.20.

H, a naturalized American citizen who later

became a dual citizen under Republic Act No.
9225 (the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act), decided to run for Congress and thus filed a
certificate of candidacy (CoC). A citizen argued
that H is ineligible for the position because of his
status as a dual citizen. H responded that his act
of filing a CoC amounted to his renunciation of
418 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

foreign citizenship, rendering him eligible for the

position.

(a) Was H’s filing of sufficient to

a CoC
renounce foreign citizenship? Explain. (2.5%)
No, H’s ling of a CoC cannot be considered as suf-
ficient to renounce foreign citizenship.
Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225, on the basis of
which he became a dual citizen, those seeking elective
public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualica-
tions for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
ling of the certicate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizen-
ships before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath. It must be noted that, upon taking said second
oath, the citizen ceases to be a dual citizen. (Lopez v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008; Jacot v.
Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA
295; see Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)

(b) Assuming that H is a dual citizen be-

cause his parents are Filipino citizens and he
was born in California, USA, was the his filing
of a CoC sufficient to renounce his foreign
citizenship? Explain. (2.5%)
It is submitted that his ling of his CoC can be con-
sidered as sufcient for purposes of his renunciation of
his foreign or American citizenship.
As held in Mercado v. Manzano (G.R. No. 135083,
May 26, 1999), a dual citizen by reason of the concur-
rent application of the jus soli and jus sanguinis princi-
 2019 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 419
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

ples, as in the case of H, can be considered as solely a

natural-born Philippine citizen upon his ling of a cer-
ticate of candidacy for a position which requires natu-
ral-born citizenship as a qualication.
By declaring in his certicate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does
so Without mental reservation, he can, as far as the laws
of this country are concerned, be considered as having
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citi-
zen. (Valles v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
137000, August 9, 2000; Cordora v. Commission on Elec-
tions, G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009)
420 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

2020-2021
1. Can a charismatic and effective 30-year-
old former mayor of a chartered city in Metro
Manila legally run for President of the Republic
of the Philippines in the 2022 elections? Explain
briey.
No.

He is not qualied because he is only thirty years

old.

Under the Constitution, no person may be elected

President unless he is at least forty years of age on the
day of the election. (Article VII, Section 2)

2. A law is passed penalizing any criticism of

any sitting Member of the Supreme Court on any
media platform. The penalty is higher when the
criticism is made through social media.
Is this law constitutional? Explain briey.

No, it is not.
It constitutes impermissible prior restraint and is
therefore an undue and unconstitutional abridgement of
freedom of expression, which allows criticism by citizens
of public officers (US v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731), including
Members of the Supreme Court, provided that the same,
with respect to the latter, should be made respectfully
(People v. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64) and cannot cover sub
judice matters (People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265).
 2020-2021 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 421
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

3. A law is passed which provides that when

the Department of Public Works and Highways
expropriates property for the government infra-
structure projects, it will have the sole and exclu-
sive authority to determine the price to be paid as
compensation to the landowner, which amount
shall be no more than the assessed value of the
property used for real property taxation.
Is this provision of law valid? Explain briey.

No, it is not. The subject law is invalid.

It is established that the valuation of property or
determination of just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is
vested with the courts and not with administrative
agencies. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Escaro, G.R.
N0. 204526, February 10, 2021; see Republic v. Spouses
Mirandilla, G.R. No. 233516, January 13, 2021; Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Barili Agro Development
Corp., G.R. No. 231812 (Notice), April 28, 2021; Land
Bank of the Philippines v. St. Louis Realty C0rp., G.R.
Nos. 209498, 209503 & 217895 (Notice), May 14, 2021)
Accordingly, the subject law which vests “sole and
exclusive authority to determine the price to be paid as
compensation” upon the Department of Public Works
and Highways constitutes impermissible encroachment
on judicial prerogative and is, accordingly, unconstitu-
tional. (Export Processing Zone v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305;
National Power Corporation v. Ileto, GR. No. 169957,
July 11, 2012; National Power Corporation v. Sps. Za-
bala, G.R. No. 173520, January 30, 2013)
422 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

A provincial ordinance was passed setting

4.
a province-wide curfew for all minors. This was
challenged through a suit filed before the Re-
gional Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction
over the province.
The provincial legal officer sought the case’s
dismissal on the lone ground that the Supreme
Court has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to de-
termine the constitutionality of a treaty, law, or
ordinance.
Should the provincial legal officer’s prayer
for dismissal be granted? Explain briey.
No, it should not be granted.
Jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of
treaties, laws and ordinances is not exclusive to the
Supreme Court. Regional Trial Courts have as well ju-
risdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of those
measures. (Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corpora-
tion, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008)
This can be gleaned from and is acknowledged in
the provision in the Constitution which assigns appel-
late jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over decisions of
lower courts, including Regional Trial Courts, on,
among others, all cases in which the constitutionality of
those measures is in question. (Article VIII, Section 5
I21)

Accordingly, the provincial legal ofcer’s prayer in

the subject motion to dismiss should be denied.
 2020-2021 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 423
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

5. Both the House of Representatives and

the Senate passed a bill which: (a) increases the
number of Supreme Court Justices from 15 to 20;
(b) assigns the five most senior Justices, including
the Chief Justice, exclusively to a Special Division
that will tackle only constitutional cases; and (c)
removes from the Supreme Court En Banc the
power to hear and decide cases involving alleged
violations of the Constitution.
The Chief Presidential Legal Counsel advises
the President to veto the bill, arguing that the law
is unconstitutional because its contents should be
the subject of constitutional amendment rather
than of legislation.
Is the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel’s ar-
gument constitutionally sound? Explain briey.
Yes.

The bill actually seeks to alter xed and self-

executing provisions of the Constitution which may not
be changed or altered except by amendment of the Con-
stitution.
Any change that adds to, reduces, or deletes any of
such provisions of the Constitution can be done only
through amendment or revision of the same, and not
through simple legislation. (Constitution, Article XVII;
See Philippine Political Law, Cruz and Cruz, 2014 Edi-
tion, page 805; Lambino v. Commission on Elections,
505 SCRA 160)

This would be true with respect to the proposals in

the bill to increase the number of Supreme Court Jus-
tices which, under the Constitution, is xed at fteen
424 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Article VIII, Section 4 [1]), and to remove from the Su-

preme Court En Banc the power to hear and decide
cases involving alleged violations of the Constitution,
which is expressly assigned to it under the Constitution.
(Article VIII, Section 4 [2])
[Acceptable Additional Answer: It may be added that the pro-
posal in the bill for the assignment of the ve most senior Justices,
including the Chief Justice, exclusively to a Special Division that
will tackle only constitutional cases constitutes an unlawful en-
croachment into the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court, on
the basis of which it may exclusively determine its procedures and
processes. (Constitution, Article VIII, Sections 4 [2] and 5 [5])]

6. To contain the spread of a virus, and in

line with the World Health Organization’s decla-
ration of a pandemic, the President declared mar-
tial law throughout the entire Philippine archi-
pelago. As an additional justification, the Procla-
mation declaring martial law cited the possibility
that health protocols might not be followed.
A law student filed a petition before the Su-
preme Court questioning the sufficiency of the
constitutional and factual bases for the martial
law declaration.
Does the law student have standing to file
this action? Explain briey.
Yes.
Under the Constitution, any citizen may le an ap-
propriate proceeding questioning the sufficiency of the
factual basis for any proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
(Article VII, Section 18, 3“ paragraph; Lagman v. Me-
dialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
 2020-2021 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 425
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

7. The Executive Judge of a Regional Trial

Court prohibited the conduct of daily prayers for
Muslims inside any room of the Hall of Justice
even during break time.
Among Muslims, five daily prayers (salah) are
mandatory. In all these daily prayers, Muslims
need to face the qiblah. There is a noontime
prayer (Zhuhr) and an afternoon prayer (Asr). But
unlike the other three prayers, these two can be
recited silently, but still on a prayer mat and with
body movements.
There is a Supreme Court Resolution that al-
lows Catholic masses to be held during break time
inside the Halls of Justice. There was only one
dissent to this Resolution on the ground of strict
separation of Church and State in relation to acts
of worship.
The Executive Judge is a member of a Catho-
lic institution perceived to be conservative.
Did the Executive Judge violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution? Explain
briey.
Yes.
Under the Constitution, the free exercise of reli-
gious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. (Article III, Section
5)

The Executive Judge’s prohibition is clearly based

on an invalid classification.
426 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

There can be no substantial distinction, which is

among the requisites for a valid classication in the
context of the equal protection clause, between Catholics
and Muslims in their free exercise of their religious pro-
fession and worship.

The subject prohibition unduly discriminates

against Muslims who would not be allowed by reason
thereof to pray in their offices, and during their ofce
breaks. Moreover, the implementation of said prohibi-
tion against Muslims would necessarily result in the
giving of preferential treatment in favor of Catholics
whose constitutional right to pray in their ofces, and
during their office breaks is, as stated, allowed as a
measure of religious accommodation.
Accordingly, said prohibition should be considered
as an undue and therefore unconstitutional discrimina-
tion against Muslims. It is thus a breach of the equal
protection clause, in addition to being a violation of the
Supreme Court’s policy on religious accommodation as
pronounced in its Resolution cited in the question. (Re:
Letter of Tony Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March
7, 2017)

8. A news agency incorporated under Phil-

ippine laws won two international awards for its
stand on freedom of expression. One of its found-
ing directors even won the Nobel Peace Prize. For
championing free expression, it received a sub-
stantial investment offer from a British philan-
thropist.
The investment offer comes in the form of
funds which can cover at least 80% of the news
agency’s operations, both in print and online. In
 2020-2021 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 427
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

exchange, however, the British philanthropist

would acquire 51% of the news agency’s out-
standing common and voting stocks, as well as get
a seat for the philanthropist’s nominee in the
news agency’s governing board.
Are the conditions of the investment consti-
tutional? Explain briey.
No, they are not.
They are violative of the provision in the Constitu-
tion which requires all mass media establishments,
including the subject news agency, to be wholly-owned
and managed (or 100 per cent owned and managed) by
Philippine citizens, or by corporations, cooperatives or
associations wholly-owned and managed by such citi-
zens. (Article XVI, Section 11)

[Acceptable Additional Answer: It is to be additionally noted

that among the conditions of the investment offer is the conferment
of control over the news agency in favor of the British philanthropist
by reason of his acquisition of 51% of the news agency’s outstanding
common and voting stocks of the same. This is a clear indication of
the violation of the aforecited constitutional prohibition]

9. driver was getting into their car

As a car
inside the parking area of a mall in Makati, two
individuals suddenly came from behind them.
One pointed a gun to the car driver’s head while
the other grabbed the car keys in the driver’s
hand. The two then sped away with the car.
After recovering from the initial shock, the
driver took their smartphone and opened the app
“Find My Car”, “Find My Car” is an app that
tracks in real time the movement and location of
428 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

a car through a Global Positioning System (GPS)

device installed in the car.
The driver then went to the nearest police
station and showed the officers the current loca-
tion of the car as shown on their smartphone. The
car appeared to stop at a spot in Novaliches, Que-
zon City.
Six hours after the car had been stolen, a
combined team of elite police officers from the
Highway Patrol Group and the Criminal Investi-
gation Detection Group, by force and without a
warrant, searched a private home in Novaliches,
Quezon City. The private home was pinpointed by
the car’s GPS tracker as displayed on the driver’s
phone.
The private home is enclosed by a gate and is
equipped with security cameras.
In the private home’s garage, the police offi-
cers found the driver’s car, along with two other
cars which matched police records of previously
stolen motor vehicles. The officers seized and im-
pounded all three cars. Right then and there, they
also arrested the owner of the private home, who
was subsequently charged with carnapping.
Are the seized cars admissible in evidence?
Explain briey.
N0, they are not.
The warrantless search was invalid. The act of the
police ofcers barging into or, with force, entering the
private home where the cars were found based purely on
 2020-202l POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 429
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

the information obtained from the subject app but only

with respect to the owner’s car, and after six hours from
the commission of the alleged crime, cannot be consid-
ered as falling within the coverage of any of the permis-
sible warrantless searches, which includes searches
incidental to a lawful arrest. (See People v. Alberto II,
GR. No. 247906, February 10, 2021; see Pagigan v.
People, G.R. No. 252003, February 10, 2021; Liwanag v.
People, G.R. No. 249125, April 26, 2021)

The subject warrantless search preceded the war-

rantless arrest. This is not allowed. It is established
that, although a warrantless search and seizure may be
allowed as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest, the
latter must precede the search and seizure. The process
cannot be reversed. (People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA
432; People v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, April 3, 1998;
Dionisio v. People, G.R. No. 249880, February 17, 2021)
Moreover, it cannot be said that said warrantless
arrest was valid, not being either an in flagarante
delicto arrest or an arrest based on a hot pursuit. (Rules
of Court, Rule 113, Section 5) The information that was
relayed to the police officers by the owner of the car
based on the aforecited app cannot be considered under
the rules as probable cause for either type of war-
rantless arrests. This constitutes additional reason for
the invalidity of the subject warrantless search and
seizure, which, to reiterate, could or may have been
allowed under the circumstances only if there had been
a prior lawful warrantless arrest.

Accordingly, their seizure was unlawful.

They are therefore inadmissible in evidence, follow-
ing the rule in the Constitution to the effect that any
evidence obtained in violation of the rules against un-
430 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

reasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible

for any purpose in any proceeding. (Article III, Section 3
[2], in relation to Section 2)

[Note: The requirements for a valid in agrante delicto arrest

are: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicat-
ing that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempt-
ing to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting ofcer. (Rules of Court, Rule 113,
Section 5 (a); Bocuya v. People, G.R. No. 241801 (Notice), February
10, 2021)]

[Note: The requisites for a lawful warrantless arrest known as

hot pursuit are: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the
person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it. Personal knowledge
of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. (Rules of Court, Rule 113,
Section 5 (b); Dionisio v. People, G.R. No. 249880, February 17, 2021]

[Acceptable Additional Answer: Neither can the search and sei-

zure be justified on the basis of the plain view doctrine, which is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. It is clear in this case that the police officers
were, based on the information given to them by the owner of the
car, actually searching for the subject car. Hence, the inapplicability
of the plain view doctrine to justify this warrantless search and
seizure of the car subject of the app, as well as of the two other cars.
(Liwanag y Liwanag v. People, G.R. No. 249125 (Notice), April 26,
2021)]

[Note: Under this doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of

the police ofcer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It
applies when the following requisites concur: 1) the police ofcer in
search of the evidence has a prior justication for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area; 2) the discov-
ery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and 3) it is immedi-
ately apparent to the police officer that the item he observes may be
an evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
(Pagigan y Dela Pea v. People, G.R. No. 252003 (Notice), February
 2020-2021 POLITICAL LAw AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 431
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

10, 2021; Liwanag y Liwanag v. People, G.R. No. 249125 (Notice),

April 26, 2021)]
[Acceptable Additional Answer: It is submitted that, upon re-
ceipt of the information derived from the subject app as relayed to
the police officers by the owner of the stolen car, which can be con-
sidered as probable cause for a search warrant, the police officers
ought to or could have applied for such a warrant instead of proceed-
ing to effect a warrantless search and arrest. (See People v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)]

10. Disappointed that both Houses of Con-

gress are seriously debating a bill seeking to en-
able absolute divorce, a citizen filed a petition
asking the Supreme Court to order Congressional
deliberations to stop.
Should the petition prosper? Explain briey.

No, the petition should not prosper. It cannot be al-

lowed.
It is established that the ling of bills is within the
legislative power of Congress and is not subject to judi-
cial restraint. (In The Matter of Save the Supreme Court
Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement
v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) And
Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21,
2015; see also National Food Authority v. Masda Secu-
rity Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 163448, March 8, 2005, cited
in Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Luisita Industrial
Park Corporation, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011)
432 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

11.A Senator filed a petition for mandamus

to compel a newly elected President to sign, ap-
prove, and transmit to the Senate for its ratifica-
tion the treaty creating the International Crimi-
nal Court.
Should this petition prosper? Explain briey.
No.

The President may not be compelled to submit the

treaty to the Senate for its concurrence.
It is within the authority of the President to refuse
to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its
consent for its ratication, refuse to ratify it. The re-
fusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed
in its behalf is a decision which is within the compe-
tence of the President alone, which cannot be en-
croached upon by the courts via a writ of mandamus.
Courts have no jurisdiction over actions seeking to en-
join the President in the performance of his official du-
ties. The writ of mandamus prayed for by the petition-
ers cannot prosper or be granted as it is beyond the ju-
risdiction of courts to compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of the treaty to
the Senate. (Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
158088, July 16, 2008, 462 SCRA 622, cited in Pangil-
inan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 288875, 239483 & 240954,
March 16, 2021)
[Notez Ratication is generally held to be an executive act, un-
dertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the case
may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is pro-
claimed. (Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations, An Introduction
to Public International Law, 4th Ed., p. 486) xxx. In our jurisdiction,
the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly
believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to
 2020-2021 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 433
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratication.

(Cruz, Isagani, International Law, 1985 Ed., p. 175) (Bayan v.
Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449; Pimentel
v. Executive Secretary, 501 Phil. 303 (2005), cited in Pangilinan v.
Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

12. The United Nations General Assembly

unanimously passed a Resolution expressing the
commitment of its members to pass law and re-
lated policies that would provide incentives for
all citizens of the planet to change their lifestyles
so that the impending disasters brought about by
climate change can be avoided or mitigated.
As the principal legal adviser of the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, you are asked this query: Is
this General Assembly Resolution a valid source
of State obligation under international law? Ex-
plain briefly.
Yes, it can be considered as a valid source of State
obligation under international law.
Itis to be noted that the subject resolution unani-
mously approved by the United Nations General As-
sembly covers only a basic commitment to pass laws and
related policies, which may differ or vary in each state,
to avoid impending disasters that may be brought about
by climate change. This general commitment would be
consistent with the universally acknowledged right of
all persons and all states to have a balanced and health-
ful ecology.
This unanimously approved resolution expressing
this general commitment can be said to partake of the
nature of an international convention establishing a
rule, i.e., on the general avoidance of impending disas-
ters that may be brought about by climate change, and
434 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

also, by virtue of its unanimous approval, as a generally

accepted principle of international law. It is established
that such are among the recognized sources of State
obligation under international law. (Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, Article 38)
[Note: The general rule, though, is that the treaty, to be con-
sidered a direct source of international law, must be concluded by a
sizable number of states and thus reect the will or at least the
consensus of the family of nations. The treaty need not be entered
into at the outset by a majority of the states forming the interna-
tional community. Even if originally agreed upon only by a few
states, the treaty may become binding upon the whole world if it is
intended to lay down rules for observance by all and it is subse-
quently signed or acceded to by other states which thereby submit to
its provisions. (International Law, Cruz and Cruz, 2020 Edition,
page 3'7 )l

[Note: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

was adopted by 120 members of the United Nations (UN) on 17 July
1998. It entered into force on 1 July 2002, after 60 States became
party to the Statute through ratication or accession. The adoption
of the Rome Statute fullled the international community's long-
time dream of creating a permanent international tribunal to try
serious international crimes. The Rome Statute, which established
an international criminal court and formally declared genocide, war
crimes and other crimes against humanity as serious international
crimes, codied generally accepted principles of international law,
including customary international laws. The principles of law em-
bodied in the Rome Statute were already generally accepted princi-
ples of international law even prior to the adoption of the Statute.
Subsequently, the Rome Statute itself has been widely accepted and,
as of November 2010, it has been ratied by 114 states, 113 of which
are members of the UN.

There are at present 192 members of the UN. Since 113 mem-
ber states have already ratied the Rome Statute, more than a
majority of all the UN members have now adopted the Rome Statute
as part of their municipal laws. Thus, the Rome Statute itself is
generally accepted by the community of nations as constituting a
body of generally accepted principles of international law. The prin-
ciples of law found in the Rome Statute constitute generally accepted
 2020-2021 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 435
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

principles of international law enforceable in the Philippines under

the Philippine Constitution. The principles of law embodied in the
Rome Statute are binding on the Philippines even if the Statute has
yet to be ratied by the Philippine Senate. In short, the principles of
law enunciated in the Rome Statute are now part of Philippine do-
mestic law pursuant to Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. (J. Carpio, Dissenting Opinion in Bayan Muna v.
Romulo, 656 Phil. 246, 325-329 (2011) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En
Banc], cited in Pcmgilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 &
240954, March 16, 2021)]

[Notez In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court applied the generally

accepted principles of international law and adopted the Interna-
tional Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances in dening the phrase “enforced disappearances.”

In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious

practice of enforced disappearance had become a global phe-
nomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(Declaration). This Declaration, for the rst time, provided in
its third preambular clause a working description of enforced
disappearance, as follows:

Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a

persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the
sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted
against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by
ofcials of different branches or levels of Government, or
by organized groups or private individuals acting on be-
half of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or
acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned
or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their lib-
erty, which places such persons outside the protection of
the law.

Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN

General Assembly adopted the International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(Convention). The Convention was opened for signature in
Paris, France on February 6, 2007. Article 2 of the Convention
dened enforced disappearance as follows:
436 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

For the purposes of this Convention, “enforced dis-

appearance” is considered to be the arrest, detention, ab-
duction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the dep-
rivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or where-
abouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law.

The Convention is the rst universal human rights in-

strument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to en-
forced disappearance and that this right is non-derogable. It
provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappear-
ance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal po-
litical instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges
State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense
punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal
law. It also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared
persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the
fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress
and results of the investigation. Lastly, it classies enforced
disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of
limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of
the victim are established. (International Law, Cruz and Cruz,
2020 Edition, page 37)]

[Notez While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to

be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less impor-
tant than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the
latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights alto-
gether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly men-
tioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitu-
tion itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the rst and
 2020-2021 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 437
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when
all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come —— generations which stand to inherit nothing but
parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced
and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. (Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No.
101083 July 30, 1993]
[Acceptable Answer: No, it cannot be considered as a source of
State obligation under International Law because it is a mere reso-
lution of the United Nations General Assembly and cannot be said to
be among any of the acknowledged sources of international law,
which are international conventions, international custom, general
principles of international law and judicial decisions and the teach-
ings of the most highly qualied publicists. (Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Article 38)]
438 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

2022
1.A police officer saw Harvey urinating in
public. A local ordinance imposes a Php500.00 fine
for urinating in public. The police officer shouted
at Harvey: “That is against the law!” Harvey sar-
castically answered: “N0, this is against the wall!”
Then and there, the police officer arrested him
and brought him to the police station. At the po-
lice station, Harvey was frisked and was found in
possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver
loaded with five live ammunition. He was subse-
quently charged with Qualified Illegal Possession
of Firearms. When the prosecution offered in evi-
dence the unlicensed firearm and ammunition, the
defense objected on the ground that the pieces of
evidence are products of an illegal search and
seizure. The prosecution contended that the
pieces of evidence were lawfully seized after a
valid warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest.
Was the search and seizure valid? Explain
briey. (5 points)
Yes, the subject warrantless search and the seizure
of the unlicensed revolver were valid because they were
done after a prior lawful warrantless arrest.
Harvey was seen, or caught and arrested, by the
police officer in the act of violating a local ordinance
prohibiting and punishing urinating in public. This can
be considered as a valid in agrante delicto arrest for
said crime on the basis of Harvey’s overt act of “urinat-
ing in public” done in the presence or within the view of
 2022 PoLITIcAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 439
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

the arresting ofcer. (Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure; see Miguel v. People, G.R.
No. 227038, July 31, 2017; see Luz v. People, G.R. No.
197788, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 421, 429; Homar
v. People, G.R. No. 182534, September 2, 2015)

It is established that a search incidental to a lawful

arrest is valid. (People v. Belocura, G.R. No. 173474,
August 29, 2012; Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180,
November 23, 2007)

[Notez In Miguel v. People (G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017),

which signicantly also involves “urinating in public,” the accused
was arrested by police officers who “simply responded to a purported
report of a man showing off his private parts,” on the basis of which,
the “the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon him” as he “went
out to the street to urinate.” Thus —

“On the basis of the foregoing testimonies, the Court is

inclined to believe that at around past 12 o'clock in the early
morning of May 24, 2010, petitioner went out to the street to
urinate when the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon
him. The latter then approached and questioned petitioner,
and thereafter, went on to search his person, which purport-
edly yielded the marijuana seized from him. Verily, the prose-
cution’s claim that petitioner was showing off his private parts
was belied by the aforesaid testimonies. Clearly, these circum-
stances do not justify the conduct of an in agrante delicto
arrest, considering that there was no overt act constituting a
crime committed by petitioner in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. Neither do these circumstances
necessitate a ‘hot pursuit’ Warrantless arrest as the arresting
Bantay Bayan operatives do not have any personal knowl-
edge of facts that petitioner had just committed an offense.”

In other words, the police ofcers sought out the accused based
on the “purported report of a man showing off his private parts,” but
did not arrest him for “showing off his private parts” or for actually
urinating in public.
Accordingly, the Court ruled —
440 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

“More importantly, the Court simply nds highly im-

plausible the prosecution‘s claim that a valid warrantless ar-
rest was made on petitioner on account of the alleged public
display of his private parts because if it was indeed the case,
then the proper charge should have been led against him.
However, records are bereft of any showing that such charge
was led aside from the instant criminal charge for illegal pos-
session of dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening the view
that no prior arrest was made on petitioner which led to a
search incidental thereto. As stressed earlier, there must rst
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and that such
process cannot be reversed.”]

2. Pedro was the accused in a rape case.

During the trial, the private complainant testified
that on the night of the incident, she was walking
home when Pedro, who was her neighbor, sud-
denly grabbed her and brought her to his house.
There, Pedro forcibly had carnal knowledge of
her. After the prosecution rested its case, Pedro
testified that the sexual intercourse between him
and the private complainant was consensual.
Eventually, the trial court acquitted Pedro on
reasonable doubt and found that the element of
force was not established.
The People filed a Rule 65 petition for certi0-
rari with the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging that
the trial court’s decision was rendered with grave
abuse of discretion because the private complain-
ant's testimony clearly established that Pedro had
carnal knowledge of her through force and with-
out her consent. In his comment, Pedro sought to
dismiss the petition on the ground of violation of
his right against double jeopardy.
As the CA, how would you rule on the peti-
tion? Explain briey. (5 points)
 2022 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 441
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

The petition should be dismissed.

Double jeopardy has set in.
A judgment of acquittal is nal and is no longer re-
viewable. (People v. Terrado, G.R. No. 148226, July 14,
2008; Lejano u. People, G.R. No. 176389, January 18,
2011) A verdict of acquittal is immediately nal and a
reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in
the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for
the same offense. (People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
159261, February 21, 2007, cited in People v. Banig,
G.R. No. 177137, August 23, 2012)

The only instance when an accused can be barred

from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when
it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not al-
lowed the opportunity to make its case against the ac-
cused or where the trial was a sham. (Bangayan v. Ban-
gayan, G.R. No. 172777, October 19, 2011; People v.
Laguio, G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007)
It is evident that the prosecution’s Rule 65 petition
for certiorari is premised only on the allegation that the
trial court erred in its nding that “the element of force
was not established,” and actually only seeks “a reex-
amination of the merits” of the subject acquittal.
It is submitted that this cannot be considered as
grave abuse of discretion which can be allowed to pro-
vide for a review of said acquittal.

3. A city ordinance was passed providing for

the removal, at the owner’s expense, of: (i) all out-
door advertising materials displayed or exposed
442 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

to the public in designated regulated areas such

as residential zones, bridges, and along main city
streets; and (ii) billboards of substandard materi-
als, or which obstruct road signs and traffic sig-
nals. Failure to comply with said ordinance au-
thorizes the mayor, assisted by the police, to im-
plement the removal of the non-compliant mate-
rials. ABC Ad Agency, owner of the billboards re-
moved by the city, filed a complaint because, con-
sidering the nature of its business, the removal of
its billboards amounted to taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation.
Will the complaint prosper? Explain briey. (5
points)
No, the complaint will and should not prosper.
It should be dismissed.
The removal under the ordinance of the subject
billboards does not amount to taking of private property
under eminent domain which cannot be done or allowed
without just compensation.
The ordinance partakes of the nature of a properly
delegated and valid exercise of the police power, clearly
intended to promote the general welfare based on lawful
means which can be considered as reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of said purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. (Evasco v. Montanez, G.R.
No. 199172, February 21, 2018)
Accordingly, the removal of said billboards provided
for under the ordinance constitutes a valid taking under
the city’s police power.
 2022 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 443
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

It is established that a taking of private property

under the police power does not require the payment of
just compensation. (Constitutional Law, Cruz and Cruz,
2015 Edition, page 81; Southern Luzon Drug Corpora-
tion v. The Department of Social Welfare and Develop-
ment, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017, citing Manila
Memorial Park, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 175356, De-
cember 3, 2013)

4. [This item has two questions.] As a reac-

tion to China’s occupation of the Spratly Islands,
a rally was organized by various civil society ag-
grupations at a vacant private lot. Before the
event could even start, the police ordered the or-
ganizers not to proceed with the program because
of security reasons and the fact that the group did
not have a mayor’s permit. When the organizers
still proceeded with the rally, the police dispersed
the crowd and arrested the leaders of the group.
(a) Did the actions of the police constitute a
violation of the group’s constitutional right to
peacefully assemble? Explain briey.
Yes, the actions of the police constituted a violation
of the group’s constitutional right to peacefully assemble
considering that the rally was at a vacant private lot.
Accordingly, a mayor’s permit for the same was not nec-
essary. (B.P. Blg. 880, Section 4; Bayan v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 169838, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 226)

[Acceptable Additional Answer: Indeed, the use of public places

for public meetings or rallies can only be reasonably regulated, and
not absolutely prohibited. The clear and present danger rule should
be applied in allowing said regulations or prohibitions. (See Primi-
cias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 and Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553)]
444 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(b)Would your answer be the same if the

rally was held at a freedom park? Explain briey.
(5 points)

Yes, the actions of the police would similarly consti-

tute a violation of the group’s constitutional right to
peacefully assemble if the rally were held at a freedom
park.
Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 880 also provides that a
mayor’s permit is or would not be necessary if a rally
were to be held in a freedom park, which is required
under Section 15 of said law to be established or desig-
nated by every municipality or city.

5. The K-12 Law was passed with the objec-

tive to enhance the Philippine educational system
by strengthening its curriculum and adding two
years of high school. Parents of students in a sci-
ence high school sought to have the law declared
unconstitutional citing the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. As well, the parents
averred that the law should not apply to their
children because the latter belong to a distinct
class, being gifted and advanced for their age, with
the capability to learn better and faster compared
to other high school students.
Is the contention of the parents tenable? Ex-
plain briey. (5 points)
N0, the contention of the parents is not tenable.
The K-12 Law is not violative of the equal protec-
tion clause.
 2022 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 445
BAR QUEsTIoNs AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

The equal protection clause, which is directed prin-

cipally against undue favor and individual or class privi-
lege, is not intended to prohibit legislation which is lim-
ited to the object to which it is directed or by the terri-
tory in which it is to operate. It does not require abso-
lute equality, but merely that all persons be treated
alike under like conditions both as to privileges con-
ferred and liabilities imposed. The equal protection
clause of the Constitution does not forbid classication
for so long as such classication is based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to
the subject of the particular legislation. If classication
is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all mem-
bers of the class, and applies equally to present and
future conditions, the classication does not violate the
equal protection guarantee. (JMM Promotion and Man-
agement, Inc. v. Court ofAppeals, 329 Phil. 87 [1996],
cited in Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines u. Secretary 0/‘Education,
G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018)

Valid classications require real and substantial

differences to justify the variance of treatment between
the classes. The students of the science high school can-
not not offer any substantial basis for the recognition of
a valid classication between them and the rest of the
high school students in the Philippines. Otherwise
stated, the equal protection clause would, in fact, be
violated if the assailed law treated the science high
school students differently from the rest of the high
school students in the country. (Council of Teachers and
Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9,
2018)
446 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

6.President Hidalgo, who wanted the Phil-

ippines to be part of the International Criminal
Court once again, signed the Philippines’ ratifica-
tion of the Rome Statute. A copy of the treaty,
along with the ratification, was sent to the Senate
for its concurrence. Senator Dalisay filed a pro-
posed “Resolution” for the Senate to concur with
the Philippines’ ratication. The proposed “Reso-
lution” was read three times on three separate
days. Three days before the third reading, printed
copies of the proposed “Resolution” in its final
form were distributed to all the Senators. The
Senators then unanimously approved the “Resolu-
tion”, and the Senate expressed its concurrence
with the treaty’s ratification. A civil society group
filed a petition before the Supreme Court ques-
tioning the validity of the Senate’s concurrence
on the ground that the “Resolution” was void be-
cause only a “bill” becomes a law.
Rule on the petition. Explain briey. (5
points)
The petition should be dismissed.
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitu-
tion, treaties become valid and effective upon the Sen-
ate’s concurrence. Upon such concurrence, the treaty
becomes legally effective and binding by transformation.
It then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by
Congress. (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association
of the Philippines v. Duque III, et al., G.R. No. 173034,
October 9, 2007, cited in Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R.
Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)
 2022 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 447
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Considering that the Senate had duly concurred in

the subject treaty, the same can therefore be properly
considered as law.

[Acceptable Additional Answer: Concurring in a treaty or in-

ternational agreement is essentially legislative in character. (Bayan
v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, cited in Pangilinan U.
Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

[Note: Under the last sentence of Article VI, Section 23 (2) of

the Constitution, the resolution of the Congress withdrawing a law
conferring upon or delegating in favor of the President emergency
powers in times of war or other national emergency can also be
considered as a law, because it would have the effect of repealing
said prior emergency powers law.]

7. After Martial Law was declared over Min-

danao, police officers arrested Jose Maria without
any Warrant while shopping for groceries at a
supermarket in Mindanao. Jose Maria questioned
the validity of the arrest as he had no pending case
and was not committing any crime at the time of
his arrest. The police officers countered that the
declaration of Martial Law suspended the privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus, and as a result,
they could effect warrantless arrests.
Is the contention of the police officers cor-
rect? Explain briey. (5 points)

No, it is not.
Under Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution,
a state of martial law does not automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A separate or
concurrent proclamation by the President would be nec-
essary for such suspension.
448 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Accordingly, the police ofcers cannot justify their

warrantless arrests on this basis.

8. A law was passed exempting the Land

Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from the payment
of filing fees in collection cases on loans granted
by LBP to its borrowers. The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court issued
a Memorandum requiring all courts to continue to
collect filing fees in collection cases filed by LBP,
stating that only the Supreme Court can decide
on exemptions from payment of filing fees. LBP
assails the OCA Memorandum, arguing that the
exemption found in the law is within the ple-
nary power of Congress to enact legislation.
Moreover, the law was approved by the President.
Thus, LBP argues that the act of the OCA violates
the principle of separation of powers.
Is LBP correct? Explain briey. (5 points)
No, LBP is not correct.
It is the law, and not the Memorandum of the Of-
ce of the Court Administrator, which is violative of the
principle of separation of powers.
The J udiciary’s scal autonomy under Section 3 of
Article VIII of the Constitution entitles it to levy, assess
and collect fees. (Bengzon u. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524
April 15, 1992) Any law which provides for an exemp-
tion from said fees (as, for instance, in favor of govern-
ment-owned or controlled corporations and local gov-
ernment units) would be “constitutionally inrm for it
impairs the Court’s guaranteed scal autonomy and
erodes its independence.” (Re: Petition for Recognition of
 2022 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 449
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS) for Payment ofLegaZ Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-
01-0, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA 193, at 209, cited in
In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Pay-
ment ofAll Court and Sheriffs Fees, A.M. No. 12-2-03-0,
March 13, 2012; see also In Re: Exemption of the Na-
tional Power Corporation From Payment of Filing/
Docket Fees, A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010)

9. During a press conference, President

Acosta explained that the Executive Department
can temporarily take over the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business af-
fected with public interest to address the short-
age of hospital beds occasioned by the COVID-19
pandemic. She invokes Article XII, Section 17 of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which provides
that: “In times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms pre-
scribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.”
Is President Acosta correct? Explain briey.
(5 points)
No, she is not correct.
Although the President may proclaim a state of
emergency, as this is among her recognized ordinance
powers under the general provisions of the Administra-
tive Code, she cannot, without a prior law, exercise
emergency powers. Said powers can be exercised by her
only on the basis of a prior valid delegation of the same
in her favor under either Section 23 (2) of Article VI or
450 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Section 17 of Article XII of the Constitution. (David v.

Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

10. Lemuel was born in 1988 to a Filipino

mother and an American father, as shown in his
birth certificate. His parents, however, were not
married to each other. Subsequently, his father
petitioned for him, as a result of which Lemuel
received a certificate of American citizenship and
an American passport. In 2022, Lemuel filed a cer-
tificate of candidacy to run as Representative of
the lone district of Batanes. Ayla, a Filipino citi-
zen and resident of Batanes, filed a petition for
disqualification with the Commission on Elections
alleging that Lemuel is ineligible to run for public
office in the Philippines as Lemuel is an American
citizen.
Is Ayla correct? Explain briey. (5 points)

Ayla is not correct.

Lemuel, Whose mother is a Filipina, is a natural-
born Filipino citizen (Constitution, Article IV, Section 1
[2], in relation to Section 2)

He is eligible to run as Representative of the lone

district of Batanes.
A dual citizen, as in the case of Lemuel, by reason
of his having received, upon petition of his American
father, a certicate of American citizenship and an
American passport, and not having renounced his Phil-
ippine citizenship, can be considered as solely a natural-
born Philippine citizen upon his ling of a certicate of
candidacy for a position which requires natural-born
 2022 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 451
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

citizenship as a qualication. (Mercado v. Manzano,

GR. No. 135083, May 26, 1999)
By declaring in his certicate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does
so without mental reservation, he can, as far as the laws
of this country are concerned, be considered as having
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citi-
zen. (Valles v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
137000, August 9, 2000; Cordora v. Commission on Elec-
tions, G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009)

[Note:...the cited portions of the INA, which refers to auto-

matic citizenship of a child upon the application of his or her Ameri-
can citizen parent, even supports the conclusion that, if, indeed,
some positive acts were performed in the acquisition of petitioner‘s
US citizenship, the same could not have been performed by her but
rather, by her American parent. Notably, the records are bereft of
any evidence which would indicate to the slightest degree that peti-
tioner petitioned to acquire her US citizenship or that she went
through the pertinent naturalization process. x X x.
Black’s Law Dictionary denes naturalization as “the act of
adopting a foreigner and clothing him [or her] the privileges of a
native citizen.” In Garcia v. Recio, the Court dened naturalization
as a legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him [or her] with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. It implies the renun-
ciation of a former nationality and the fact of entrance into a similar
relation towards a new body politic. Therefore, naturalization is a
process through which a State confers an outsider, i.e., a non-
citizen/alien/foreigner, with rights enjoyed by its citizens. Based on
the denition of naturalization, an insider, i.e., a citizen, is disquali-
ed from undergoing naturalization proceedings. In this regard, the
Court recognizes that naturalization is superuous for persons who
are already citizens of a particular State and that it is absurd for a
State to issue a certicate of naturalization to its own citizens.
452 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw

Thus, the Court nds that petitioner, as shown by evidence,

never underwent such process. The CRBA document itself, which
was used by the COMELEC En Banc as basis to declare that peti-
tioner was a naturalized dual citizen, actually proves the opposite.
Interestingly, this CRBA was presented before, and was considered
by, the COMELEC, yet the latter chose to ignore the literal contents
of the same. (Gana-Carait v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
257453, August 9, 2022)]

[Notez Indeed, R.A. 9225 covers only natural-born Filipinos

who personally and voluntarily become naturalized foreign citizens,
thereby possessing simultaneously two or more citizenships and
allegiances. It is not concerned with dual citizenships acquired upon
birth or due to the circumstances of one’s birth, which are involun-
tary and a product of the concurrent application of different laws of
two or more states. Indeed, in Cordora, although Tambunting’s
American father performed the positive act of petitioning Tam-
bunting under American laws, the Court nevertheless held that he
did not acquire his foreign citizenship through naturalization and,
thus, R.A. 9225 does not apply to him. (Gana-Carait v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 257453, August 9, 2022)]

11. The Commission on Higher Education

(CHED) directed higher education institutions to
remove materials “that contain pervasive ideolo-
gies of Communist-Terrorist Groups” from their
libraries. According to the CHED, the materials
need to be removed because these would radical-
ize students against the government.
Is the CHED directive a violation of the in-
stitutions’ academic freedom? Explain briey. (5
points)
Yes, the CHED directive which provides for the
removal of all materials pertinent to communist-
terrorist groups can be considered as violative of aca-
demic freedom, which covers the fundamental compe-
tence of educational institutions to determine for them-
 2022 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 453
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

selves, among others, what may be taught, and how

they shall teach. (Miriam College Foundation v. Court of
Appeals, 348 SCRA 265, December 15, 2000; Garcia v.
the Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of The-
ology, 68 SCRA 277, November 28, 1975; Regino vs.
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, GR.
No. 156109, November 18, 2004)

12. The Congress passed a law prohibiting

the sale and distribution of alcoholic drinks
within 100 meters from religious and educational
institutions. A city enacted an ordinance increas-
ing the coverage of the prohibition to 150 meters
from any religious and educational institution.
Is the city ordinance valid? Explain briey. (5
points)
No, the ordinance is not valid because it amends or
expands (as it increases to 150 meters) the coverage of
the law, which limits and prohibits the sale and distri-
bution of alcoholic drinks to only within 100 meters from
religious and educational institutions. (Batangas CATV,
Inc. v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 138810, September 29,
2004; Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., the Sang-
guniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City, G.R. No.
111097, July 20, 1994)

For an ordinance to be a valid exercise of the city’s

police power under Section 16 of the Local Government
Code, known as the general welfare clause, it must not
only be within its corporate powers to enact and be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, but
must also conform to the following substantive require-
ments: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
454 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit

but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consis-
tent with public policy and (6) must not be unreason-
able. (Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052,
February 13, 2008)

13. Pursuant to a law ordering the fixing of

“just and reasonable standards, classifications,
regulations, practices, or services to be furnished,
observed and imposed by operators of public util-
ity vehicles,” the Land Transportation Franchise
and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) promulgated and
published a regulation that “no car beyond six
years shall be operated as a taxi.” Taxi operators
assailed the validity of the regulation contending
that procedural due process was violated because
position papers were not asked of them and no
notice was given to them prior to the issuance of
the regulation.
Were the taxi operators denied procedural
due process? Explain briey. (5 points)

No, they were not denied procedural due process.

Previous notice and hearing, including the submis-
sion of position papers, are not essential to the validity
of general administrative rules or regulation, unless the
law provides otherwise. (Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel
and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307, cited in Taxi Cab
Operators Association v. Board of Transportation, G.R.
No. L-59234, September 30, 1982; see Abella v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17,
2004, 442 SCRA 507; Dagan v. Philippine Racing Com-
mission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009)
 2022 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 455
BAR QUESTIONS AND Suootsnso ANSWERS

[Noter The penalty for failure on the part of the government to

consult could only be reected in the ballot box and would not nullify
government action. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No.
216930, October 9, 2018, citing Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007, 558 Phil. 338, 363)]
[Acceptable Answer: Yes, their right to procedural due process
was violated because they were not given a real opportunity to pre-
sent their views or position papers on the regulation.

Procedural due process means compliance with the procedures

or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with
the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of
those who are called upon to administer it. (Tatad v. Sandiganba-
yan, 242 Phil. 563, 575-576 [1988], cited in Alliance for the Family
Foundation, Philippines, Inc. v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24,
2016)

It is provided under the Administrative Code (Bk. VII, Ch. 2, §

9) that before a legislative rule is adopted, interested parties are
required to be given the opportunity to submit their views prior to its
adoption. (See Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v.
Department of Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 108524, November 10,
1994, 238 SCRA 63)]

A foreign commercial ship was spotted

14.
by the Philippine Coast Guard dumping garbage
and toxic Waste 20 nautical miles from Nasugbu,
Batangas, the nearest coastline of the Philippines.
The officers of the ship were arrested and charged
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas for
violation of environmental laws of the Philip-
pines. The officers of the ship filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground that Philippine
courts do not have territorial jurisdiction over the
case since the vessel was sailing outside the terri-
torial sea of the Philippines when the arrest was
made.
456 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Is the ground to dismiss correct? Explain

briey. (5 points)
N0, it is not correct.
It is provided under Article 33 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea that, in a zone con-
tiguous to its territorial sea, extending up to 24 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured, and described as the con-
tiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control
necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs,
scal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations
within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish in-
fringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea. (See Magallona v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011)
Accordingly, the environmental act or offense com-
mitted 20 nautical miles from the nearest coastline of
the Philippines, or within its contiguous zone, is well
within its territorial or protective jurisdiction.
15. [This item has two questions.] Philippine
Medical Center (PMC) is a government hospital
created by law to provide healthcare to the gen-
eral public, especially the less fortunate. To en-
able PMC to perform its mandate, the national
government provided the initial capital, land,
buildings, and equipment to PMC. PMC’s charter
also authorized it, acting through its Board of
Trustees: to acquire property; to enter into con-
tracts; to mortgage, encumber, lease, sell, convey,
or dispose of its properties; and to do other acts
necessary to accomplish its purposes and objec-
tives.
 2022 POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 457
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

Among the properties of PMC are five lands

and buildings located in Quezon City. The Quezon
City assessor issued notices of assessment for real
property taxes (RPT) against PMC’s properties
that are being leased to private concessionaires.
According to the city assessor, PMC’s properties
leased to private entities are subject to RPT be-
cause these properties are not being exclusively
used for charitable purposes. PMC, on the other
hand, claims that, as a government instrumental-
ity imbued with corporate powers, it is exempt
from RPT.
(a) Is PMC liable for the assessed RPT over
the leased properties? Explain briey.
Yes, it is liable for real property taxes.
Even if it were a government hospital basically es-
tablished as a charitable institution, those portions of
its real property that are leased to private entities are
not exempt from real property taxes as these are not
actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. (Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon
City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004)

(b) Supposing PMC is correct that it is not li-

able for RPT, may the city assessor assess the les-
sees for the RPT due on PMC’s leased properties?
Explain briey. (5 points)
Yes, the lessees may be so assessed by the city as-
sessor.

Section 234 (a) of RA 7160 exempts real property

owned by the Republic from real property taxes except
458 BAR Q & A
POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

when the benecial use thereof has been granted, for

consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. A gov-
ernment instrumentality, though vested with corporate
powers, are exempt from real property tax but the ex-
emption shall not extend to taxable private entities to
whom the benecial use of the government instrumen-
ta1ity’s properties has been vested. (See Philippine
Heart Center v. Local Government of Quezon City, G.R.
No. 225409, March 11, 2020, citing Lung Center of the
Philippines v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,
2004; Government Service Insurance System v. City
Treasurer and City Assessor of the City of Manila, 623
Phil. 964 [2009]; Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewer-
age System (MWSS) v. Local Government of Quezon,
G.R. No. 194388, November 7, 2018; see Light Rail
Transit Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 211299,
June 28, 2022)

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