Sy v Westmont bank

Facts:
Petitioners are doing business under the business name Moondrops General
Merchandising (Moondrops). They obtained a loan in the amount of P2,429,500,
payable on November 20, 1997, and another loan of P4 million payable on December
26, 1997 on the respondent Westmont Bank.
Petitioners defaulted in the payment; respondent sent a demand letter. Unheeded,
respondent filed a complaint. Petitioners’ answer states that their loan application was
disapproved. The bank manager offered to help them secure a loan through Amado
Chua. Petitioners insist that it was Chua that lent them the money.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent bank, stating that Ramon Sy should have
annulled the promissory notes. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioners are liable for the loans.

Held:
No, petitioners not liable for the loans. A simple loan is perfected upon the delivery of
the object of the contract. In the case given, petitioners were able to prove that it was
not the bank that issued the loan to them. Therefore, there is no perfected contract of
loan.

Garcia v Thio

Facts:
Respondent received a crossed check in the amount of $100,000 payable to the order
of Marilou Santiago from the petitioner. Respondent received another crossed check in
the amount of P500,000 from petitioner.
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to pay the principal amounts of the loans when
they fell due. In both loans, no promissory note was executed since petitioner and
respondent were friends. Respondent countered that she contracted the loans. She
argues that it was Santiago who borrowed the amounts.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. The CA reversed the decision, stating that no
contract of loan was perfected between petitioner and respondent.

Issue:
Whether respondent is the debtor of the loans.

Held:
Yes, respondent is liable as debtor to the petitioner. A simple loan is perfected upon the
delivery of the object of the contract. The debtor acquires ownership of such money or
loan proceeds. The court found that petitioner did not know Santiago, and respondent
planned a scheme where she will re-lend the money to Santiago at a higher interest rate
(original interest rate is 3%, respondent planned to lend the same at 5% interest).
Therefore, respondent is liable to petitioner.

People v Puig
Facts:
112 cases of qualified theft were charged against respondents Puig and Porras. The
trial court did not find any probable cause, as the element of taking without the consent
of the owners is not present. Petitioners filed a petitioner for review under Rule 45.

Issue:
Whether or not the there is probable cause for the filed cases.

Held:
Yes, article 310 of the RPC states that qualified theft is committed by a person that
committed grave abuse of confidence. The court ruled that tellers, cashiers,
bookkeepers and other employees of the bank who came into possession of monies
deposited therein enjoy the confidence reposed in them by the employer.
BPI-FB v Franco
Facts:
On August 15, 1989, Tevesteco opened a savings and current account with BPI-FB.
Soon thereafter, FMIC also opened a time deposit account with the same branch of BPI-
FB

On August 31, 1989, Franco opened three accounts, namely, a current, savings, and
time deposit, with BPI-FB. The total amount of P2,000,000.00 used to open these
accounts is traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco allegedly in consideration of
Franco’s introduction of Eladio Teves, to Jaime Sebastian, who was then BPI-FB
SFDM’s Branch Manager. In turn, the funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was part of
the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI-FB from FMIC’s time deposit account and credited
to Tevesteco’s current account pursuant to an Authority to Debit purportedly signed by
FMIC’s officers.

It appears, however, that the signatures of FMIC’s officers on the Authority to

Debit were forged. BPI-FB, debited Franco’s savings and current accounts for the
amounts remaining therein. In the meantime, two checks drawn by Franco against his
BPI-FB current account were dishonored and stamped with a notation “account under
garnishment.” Apparently, Franco’s current account was garnished by virtue of an Order
of the court.

Notably, the dishonored checks were issued by Franco and presented for payment at
BPI-FB prior to Franco’s receipt of notice that his accounts were under garnishment. It
was only on May 15, 1990, that Franco was impleaded in the Makati case. Immediately,
upon receipt of such copy, Franco filed a Motion to Discharge Attachment. On May 17,
1990, Franco pre-terminated his time deposit account.

BPI-FB deducted the amount of P63,189.00 from the remaining balance of the time
deposit account representing advance interest paid to him. Consequently, in light of
BPI-FB’s refusal to heed Franco’s demands to unfreeze his accounts and release his
deposits therein, Franco filed on June 4, 1990 with the Manila RTC the subject suit.
Issues:
Whether or not BPI-FB can freeze the accounts of respondent
Held:
There is no doubt that BPI-FB owns the deposited monies in the accounts of Franco,
but not as a legal consequence of its unauthorized transfer of FMIC’s deposits to
Tevesteco’s account. BPI-FB conveniently forgets that the deposit of money in banks is
governed by the Civil Code provisions on simple loan or mutuum. As there is a debtor-
creditor relationship between a bank and its depositor, BPI-FB ultimately acquired
ownership of Franco’s deposits, but such ownership is coupled with a corresponding
obligation to pay him an equal amount on demand. Although BPI-FB owns the deposits
in Franco’s accounts, it cannot prevent him from demanding payment of BPI-FB’s
obligation by drawing checks against his current account, or asking for the release of
the funds in his savings account. Thus, when Franco issued checks drawn against his
current account, he had every right as creditor to expect that those checks would be
honored by BPI-FB as debtor.

More importantly, BPI-FB does not have a unilateral right to freeze the accounts of
Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds therein were proceeds of the multi-
million peso scam Franco was allegedly involved in. To grant BPI-FB, or any bank for
that matter, the right to take whatever action it pleases on deposits which it supposes
are derived from shady transactions, would open the floodgates of public distrust in the
banking industry.

Ineluctably, BPI-FB, as the trustee in the fiduciary relationship, is duty bound to

know the signatures of its customers. Having failed to detect the forgery in the Authority
to Debit and in the process inadvertently facilitate the FMIC-Tevesteco transfer, BPI-FB
cannot now shift liability thereon to Franco and the other payees of checks issued by
Tevesteco, or prevent withdrawals from their respective accounts without the
appropriate court writ or a favorable final judgment.

Dela Paz v L&J development company

Facts:
Rolando lent P350, 000 to L&J, with a 6% monthly interest. When respondent failed to
pay after repeated demands, Petitioner filed a complaint for the collection of sum of
money with damages. Respondent answered that the failure to pay the amount was due
to fortuitous events. Respondent added that the 6% monthly interest is unconscionable.
Petitioner argued that it was the respondents that set the monthly interests.

The MeTC upheld the 6% monthly interests, since the respondents are estopped from
impugning it after paying. The RTC affirmed the MeTC Decision. The CA reversed the
decision, since the parties failed to stipulate in writing the imposition of interests.

Issue:
Whether or not the interest rates can be demanded by petitioner.

Held:
Yes, the rate is unconscionable and should not apply, since it was not reduced into
writing. Furthermore, the monthly interests should be invalidated and reduced only in
cases where the terms of the loan are open ended or applied for an indefinite period. In
the present case, no specified period as to the payment of the loan was agreed upon by
the parties. Petitioner is ordered to return the excess payment.

Nacar v Gallery Frames

Facts:
On January 24, 1997, Dario Nacar got dismissed by his employer, Gallery Frames. He
filed a complaint; the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was dismissed without just
cause. A computation for the separation pay and back wages were made it amounted to
Php 158,919.92. The respondent sought appeal to the NLRC, CA and Supreme Court,
but they were all dismissed, thus the judgment became final on April 17, 2002.
During the execution of the final judgment, the petitioner filed a motion for the re-
computation of the damages. The amount previously computed includes the separation
pay and back wages up to the time of his dismissal. The petitioner argued that the
damages should cover the period until the date of final judgment. A re-computation was
made and the damages was increased to 471,320.31. Respondent prayed for the
quashal of such motion on the ground that the judgment made by the SC is already final
and the amount should not be further altered.
Petitioner also filed another motion asking the court to order the respondent to pay the
appropriate legal interest of the damages from the date of final judgment until full
payment.
Issues:

Held:

Buenaventura v Metropolitan Band and Trust Company

Fact:
Petitioner executed 2 promissory notes in the amount of P1, 500, 000 each, with rates
of 17.532% per annum. Despite demands, petitioner failed to pay the amounts, and the
respondent filed a complaint thereafter. Petitioner answered that she received 3
postdated checks from her nephew Imperial for the purchase of her property, and she
rediscounted the subject checks with respondent. She argues that she is a guarantor
and cannot be compelled to pay unless appellee exhausted the properties of Imperial.
The RTC ruled in favor of MBTC.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner is liable to MBTC.

Held:
Yes, petitioner is liable. The court ruled that the intention of the parties should not be
deciphered from the unilateral assertions of one party. The language used in the
contract is the one binding to the parties. In the present case, it was not indicated in the
PNs that the petitioner is a guarantor. The court stated that the guarantor must be
expressly stated since it was a special promise to answer for the debt of the other. The
court ruled that petitioner was the principal debtor of the contract.

Ligutan v Security Bank & Trust company

Facts:
Petitioners obtained a loan from respondent, P120, 000 with interest rate of 15.189%
per annum and 5% penalty every month on the principal and interest in case of default.
Petitioners failed to pay; respondent filed a complaint for recovery of the amount.
In view of the failure of the petitioners to appear, the RTC resolved the action. The RTC
ruled in favor of the plaintiff bank (respondent)
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Petitioners prayed for the reduction of the 5% penalty. They added that they executed a
real estate mortgage to secure the indebtedness, novating the contract.

Issue:

Held:

Delos Santos v MBTC

Facts:
Petitioners took out loan from respondents in the amount of P12 million; proceeds is the
hotel that they will construct. Interest rates were fixed for the first year, subject to
escalation or de-escalation in certain events without advance notice to them. After
defaulting, the MBTC sought the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.
Prior to foreclosure, petitioners filed a complaint in the RTC, alleging that the bank have
no right to foreclose the mortgage because they were not in default.

Issue:
Whether or not MBTC has the right to foreclose the mortgage.
Whether or not the escalation clause is valid

Held:
Yes, MBTC has the right to the foreclosure. The court finds that the petitioners already
defaulted. Foreclosure of a mortgage is but a necessary consequence of the non-
payment of obligation. On the issue
BPI v Land investors and developers corp.

Facts:
Respondent maintained a savings and current accounts with petitioner FEBTC. FEBTC
merged with BPI. Respondent authorized 2 personnel Farinas and Dela Pena as
signatories. Dela Pena was the president of respondent.
In 2001, Dela Pena was convicted for estafa. Dela Pena succeeded in withdrawing
amounts from the bank. Respondent filed a complaint in the RTC. BPI filed a demurrer,
as it argued that there was no conspiracy between them and Dela Pena. RTC granted
and dismissed the case.
The CA ruled that petitioners are still liable, as it allowed the withdrawal of Dela Pena
with only 1 signatory.

Issue:
Whether or not BPI is liable.

Held: Yes, BPI is liable. The liability proceeds from the breach of contract, when it
allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of Dela Pena.