EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

CRUZ, J:

The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:

(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,

Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein,
"without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to
operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and
expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate
individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor
Code. 1

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an
offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the
four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered
any employment for a fee. " 2

Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial
court dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The prosecution is now before us on
certiorari. 3

The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under
Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not
applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and
placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations,
application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.

The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all
the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or mre persons as
an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the
requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in
consideration of a fee. The other acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve
even only one person and are not necessarily for profit.

Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only of
an offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of two or
more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For its part, the petitioner does
not explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where the recruitment
and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but not when it is done
through "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of)
workers.

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule
nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The
presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement
whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a
fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. "

The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment
and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b)
win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is
involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected
in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective
workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the
act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that
presumption.

This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for
example, regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds
or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed
such funds or property. In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the
same token be given the force of a disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of
engaging in recruitment and placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County 40 ND
N.W. 313, 314.)

It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision
for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been
available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential
decree. The trouble with presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes
were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator
heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of
power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the
greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot
read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign
against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers
seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard- earned savings or even
borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical
deception at the hands of theirown countrymen.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside
and the four informations against the private respondent reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.