NAME: AQMAL HAKIM BIN SHAHARUDDIN

MATRIC NO.: 2019392341

CLASS: N4AM1205A

PART B

QUESTION 2 (a)

Issue:

The issue is whether Dahlia is liable to be sued by MPZ Bookstore and Epal Sdn. Bhd. for
breach of contract.

Law:

In the Law of Contract, there are 8 essential and main elements of a valid contract which are,
Proposal or Offer, Acceptance, Consideration, Intention to Create Legal Relations, Certainty,
Formalities, Legal Capacity and Free Consent. But for this case of Dahlia and MPZ Bookstore
and Epal Sdn. Bhd, it relates with the element of Legal Capacity. Legal Capacity is also one
of the essential elements of a contract.

According to Section 10 (1) of the Contract Act 1950 states that all agreements are contracts
if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration
and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.

In Section 11 of CA expressed that everyone is competent to contract who is the age of

majority according to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind, and not
unqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject. It can therefore be concluded
that a person or parties reaching the age majority, a sound-measure person and a person
qualified by any law to enter the contract shall enter into the agreement.

Based on Section 2 of the Age of Majority Act 1971 states that a person under the age of 18
is a minor, and all contracts entered by a minor are void because the law needs to protect the
minor as seen in Tan Hee Juan v The Boon Keat (1934). However, there will be an exception
is made if the contract is entered by a minor in the case of marriage/divorce/dowry cases,
necessaries, scholarship, insurance, apprenticeship.

In this case, under Section 69 of the Contracts Act 1950, a minor is bound to the contract if
the contract is for her necessaries and a person supplies the necessaries to the minor. The
person supplying is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of the minor (of a reasonable
sum).

Necessaries can be defined as things which are essential to the existence and of reasonable
comfort for the infant. A minor is liable in a contract for necessaries. The Contract Act 1950
does not define the word “necessaries” but the concept has been mentioned in the case of
Government of Malaysia v Gurcharan Singh by holding that education was “necessaries” for
the minors. A minor will not be bound by a contact of goods supplied which are not of
necessaries for the minor. The plaintiff/claimant (supplier/seller) would need to prove that such
goods supplied are necessaries for the minor to make the contract valid and binding. Section
12 (1) of the Contracts Act 1950 states that a sound mind is defined as “at the time when a
person makes a contract, they are capable of understanding it, and of forming a rational
judgement as to the contract effect on their interest”.

Application:

In the case of Dahlia v MPZ Bookstore et. Epal Sdn Bhd, Dahlia is a 16-year-old student who
is considered a minor as she is under the age of 18, entering a contract to buy reference books
from MPZ Bookstore and purchasing an APhone XS from Epal Sdn Bhd costing to RM300,
for the ease for her to do school revision and attend online classes. However, the item supplied
by the plaintiff/claimant (supplier/seller) can be considered as “necessaries” in Dahlia’s
situation because she is a student who really needs use these items for his online learning
class. She entered the contract with the agreement to pay in a period of 3 months. moreover,
to date, payment has not been made by Dahlia to MPZ Bookstore and Epal Sdn Bhd and the
suppliers wish to sue Dahlia for the unpaid payment.

The person supplying is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of the minor (of a
reasonable sum). In this case, necessaries can be defined as things which are essential to
the existence and reasonable comfort of the infant. The reference books and APhone XS that
she entered the agreement to pay to MPZ Bookstore and Epal Sdn Bhd respectively are
therefore considered as “necessaries” as she needs to use them for online learning in the
process of her education. Assuming Dahlia is of sound mind when making the agreement, that
is; “at the time when a person makes a contract, they are capable of; understanding it, and of
forming a rational judgement as to the contract effect on their interest” as stated in Section 12
(1) of the Contracts Act 1950, Dahlia is therefore liable for breach of contract between Dahlia
and MPZ Bookstore and Epal Sdn Bhd respectively as she has not made any payments for
her necessaries after agreeing to the contract.

CONCLUSION:

As conclusion, even though Dahlia is a 16-year-old minor under the age of 18, the contract
are still valid because there will be an exception for Dahlia into this situation as she buy
necessaries item that he compulsory to use in her online distance class.

QUESTION 2 (b)

ISSUE

The issue is whether Jay is able to sue Dahlia for not fulfill her promised which to made the
RM 100 payment.

LAW:

An agreement alone does not make a contract as both parties need to provide consideration.
Each side must promise to give or do something for the other, then only after a promise is
made will the agreement be enforceable as a contact if one party has provided consideration
– normally in the form of a payment of money. The promise must give something in return for
the promise of the promisor in order to have a binding contract.
Section 2 (d) of the Contracts Act 1950 states that when at the desire of the promisor, the
promise or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing,
or promises to do or to abstain from doing something, such act or abstinence or promise is
called a consideration for the promise. In basic terms, it means something that is given in
return for something else.

There are three types of considerations which are Executory Consideration, Executed
Consideration and Past Consideration. Past consideration can briefly be described as act
comes first, promise comes later. As in the case of Kepong Prospecting v A.E Schmidt (1968),
Schmidt, a consulting engineer, has assisted another in obtaining a prospecting permit for
mining iron ore in the state of Johor. After the company was formed, an agreement was
entered between them under which the company agreed to pay him 1% of the value of ore
sold from the mining land. This was consideration of the services rendered by him for the
company prior to its formation.

However, the Company failed to pay to Schmidt and Schmidt claimed for that. The court held
that the service given by Schmidt before the promise was made is considered as a valid
consideration eventhough the services were already in the past. A past consideration is
considered a valid consideration.

The rules of consideration must be sufficient but need not be adequate (Thomas v Thomas
(1842)), must come from promisee or other person (Venkata Chinnaya v Verikatara’ma’ya
(1881¬)), has some value (Collin v Godefroy (1931)), and the consideration must not be illegal
and vague (Scammel & Nephew v. Ouston).

Generally, an agreement made without consideration is void in accordance to Section 26 of

the Contracts Act 1950. However, there are exceptions when an agreement is made without
consideration. Under Section 26 (b) of the Contracts Act 1950 states that it is a promise to
compensate wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the
promisor, or something which the promisor was legally compellable to do. A promise to
compensate person already done/voluntarily done something such as an agreement to
compensate for a past voluntary act. In addition, the promisee did the act voluntarily.

APPLICATION

In the case of Dahlia v Jay, Jay – a bystander – had helped Dahlia with her flat tyre and Dahlia
had verbally promised to pay RM100 to Jay for his assistance. In this case, Dahlia is the
promisee who promised to pay compensation to Jay (the promisor) for his aid. This promise
is considered to have been taken into consideration in the past. Past consideration can briefly
be described as act comes first, promise comes later as exemplified in the case of Kepong
Prospecting v A.E Schmidt (1968). A past consideration is considered a valid consideration.

However, the consideration made by Dahlia was sufficient, came from the promisee, had some
value, and was not illegal and vague. There are exceptions that even without a consideration,
the contract is still valid as stated under Section 26 (b) of the Contracts Act 1950; it is a promise
to compensate wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the
promisor, or something which the promisor was legally compellable to do, as seen in the case
of J.M Wotherspoon v Henry Agency House (1962). Dahlia promised to compensate Jay after
Jay voluntarily assisted Dahlia with her flat tyre – a past voluntary act – which therefore makes
the agreement valid.

CONCLUSION:

In conclusion, the agreement is valid because she itself made the promise to jay and Dahlia
is liable to pay Jay RM100 as compensation and Jay is entitled the RM100 for his voluntary
assistance in changing Dahlia’s flat tyre. The promise was the evidence of the agreement.