INTENTIONAL TORTS

Intent Garratt v. Dailey

Facts: A five-year old pulled the chair out from underneath the
plaintiff, who was injured when she tried to sit down.
Rule of law: A minor may be held liable for battery if they acted with
intent.
Holding: Case was remanded to clarify the amount of defendants
knowledge in order to see if he was “substantially certain”. Upon
review the defendant was found guilty. Holding is that Dailey is liable
for battery if it can be proven that Dailey knew with substantial
certainty when he moved the chair that Garratt was going to sit
down.

Wagner v. State

Facts: A woman in K-Mart was pulled to the ground by Mr. Giese, a

person with disabilities who was under the state’s supervision.
Rule of law: Under Utah law, the actor does not need to intend for
contact to be harmful or offensive as long as they deliberately make
the contact and as long as the contact is actually harmful or offensive.
But in other jurisdictions, they need to intend to harm the plaintiff
Holding: Because Mr. Giese intended to make contact with Mrs.
Wagner, he committed a battery.
In order for contact to constitute battery at civil law:
 Contact must have been deliberate
 Contact must have been harmful or offensive at law
Ranson v. Kitner

Facts: While hunting, Ranson shot what he thought was a wolf but
what turned out to be Kitner’s dog.
Rule of law: An actor need not intend to harm as long as they intend
contact
Holding: Because Ranson intended for the bullet to hit the dog, even
though it was a wolf, he is held liable. Good faith mistake is not a
defense to an intentional tort.
Mcguire v. Almy

Facts: The plaintiff was the nurse for the defendant, a person with
disabilities. Before taking the job, the plaintiff knew that the
defendant was capable of harming others. After hearing a crash in the
defendant’s room, the plaintiff entered to make sure the defendant
did not hurt himself. Thereafter, the defendant struck the plaintiff
over the head.
 Rule of law: Mentally disabled people are responsible for intentional
torts as long as plaintiff can prove their intent
Talmage v. Smith

Facts: A man threw a stick, intending to hit one boy, but ultimately
blinded a different boy.
Holding: Because he intended to hit another boy, he is held liable
under the doctrine of transferred intent

 Transferred intent doctrine transfers intent between 2 torts.

Intent to commit assault satisfies the intent for battery

Battery Battery
 A battery is an act that is intended to bring about harmful or
offensive contact and it causes such contact.
 The plaintiff need not apprehend the contact. Thus, a
defendant who strikes sleeping beauty is still liable for
battery.
 Actual damages aren’t required to sustain a battery. A plaintiff
can recover nominal damages (absent actual damages) and
also punitive damages (if the defendant acts with malice).

Cole v. Turner

Rule of law: Even the slightest touching of another in anger

constitutes battery
 Contrast with the Restatement’s approach, under which anger is
not required to establish a battery(sufficient but not required)
 In sum: the slightest touching of another out of anger
is sufficient, though not necessary for a battery.

Restatement (Second) of Torts

§13. Battery: Harmful Contact
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
a) He acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with
the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact
b) A harmful contact with the person of the other directly or
indirectly results

What is the meaning of the plaintiff’s person? Anything touching the

plaintiff in a substantial way is considered the plaintiff’s person
 Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel

Facts: Fisher was holding a plate in a buffet line when an employee at

the defendant’s hotel grabbed the plate from Fisher’s hand a made a
racist remark.

Rule of law: A party is liable for damages for humiliation for

intentional offensive touching of anything connected to another
individual. Actual physical contact with the body of another person is
not necessary to establish a battery.

Holding: The defendant’s employee battered Fisher when the

employee intentionally touched Fisher’s plate in an offensive manner,
even though the employee did not touch Fisher’s body.

Assault Assault
An assault is an act that creates a reasonable apprehension of
immediate harmful offensive contact.
- Does not require physical contact to occur
- WORDS ARE NOT ENOUGH
o But words with a conditional act or overt act are
- Must be immediacy of threat
o “give me your money or I’ll see you after school” is not
an assault.
- Must be aware of the threat
o Thus, a defendant who swung a hatchet over sleeping
beauty’s head is not liable for assault unless sleeping
beauty woke up in the midst of the defendant’s act.
- Fear ≠ apprehension

I de S et ux v. W de S

Facts: The defendant waived a hatchet over the plaintiff’s head but
missed.
Rule of law: Assault is an overt act intended to cause an
apprehension of harmful or offensive contact and actually causes
apprehension of such harmful or offensive contact
Holding: The defendant intended to cause and did cause the plaintiff
to apprehend harm when the defendant brandished the hatchet close
to her head. Therefore, the defendant is liable for assault.

Under the reasonableness requirement, courts generally will not

protect a plaintiff against exaggerated fears of contact unless the
defendant knows that the plaintiff has an unreasonable fear and uses
 that knowledge to cause the plaintiff apprehension.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill

Facts: A Western Union employee was behind a counter when he told

Hill that he would fix her clock if she let him love and pet her. He
reached out for her but did not touch her. Hill jumped back, even
though the Western Union employee could not have touched Hill
because of the height of the counter between them.
Rule of law: An assault is an intentional unlawful attempt to touch
another in a harmful, offensive, rude, or angry manner, such that it
creates a well-founded fear of such touching along with the ability of
the offending party to actually effectuate the attempt.
Holding: It was founded as assault because he was within reasonable
reach behind the counter

False False imprisonment is the direct restraint by one person of the

physical liberty of another without adequate legal justification
Imprisonment
Restatement (Second) of Torts
§35 False Imprisonment
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for false
imprisonment if:
a. He acts intending to confine the other or a third person
within boundaries fixed by the actor
b. His act directly or indirectly results in such a
confinement
c. The other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed
by it

Big Town Nursing Home, Inc. v. Newman

Facts: Newman was taken to Big Town Nursing Home. He tried to

leave several times. But the employees kept him there against his will,
prevented him from using the phone, and taped him to his bed. The
patient filed an action for damages for false imprisonment against the
nursing home. The trial court found that the patient was entitled to
damages.
Holding: The nursing home is liable for false imprisonment. False
imprisonment is the direct restraint of another’s physical liberty
without legal justification. Newman was locked in a restraint chair and
brought back against his will each time he escaped. Since the nursing
home unlawfully and directly restrained Newman’s physical liberty,
the nursing home is liable for damages for false imprisonment.
Parvi v. City of Kingston

Facts: Parvi sued the City of Kingston for false imprisonment because
the police had taken him to an abandoned golf course outside the city
limits to let him sober up. Although the officers said that Parvi was
responsive throughout the night, Parvi testified that he had no
recollection of anything that happened the night before. The trial
court then dismissed the case.
Rule of law: A defendant is liable if the plaintiff was aware of the
confinement at the time it occurred (plaintiff doesn’t have to
remember later)

Consciousness of confinement is a necessary element of false

imprisonment, but recollection of that consciousness is not. It is thus
possible to maintain a cause of action for false imprisonment despite
lacking any recollection of confinement.

Holding: Question for the jury depending on which piece of evidence

the jury credits

Hardy v. LaBelle

Facts: Hardy was approached by the assistant manager of the jewelry

store where she worked. He told Hardy he was giving her a tour,
brought her to the manager’s office, and closed the door behind him.
She was then accused of stealing a watch and asked to take a lie
detector test, which she agreed to. She then sued for false
imprisonment. She did not ask to leave. She was not told she could
not leave. No threat of force or otherwise was made to compel her to
stay. The jury found for the defendant and the court reasoned that
one of the elements of false imprisonment is restraint against one's
will, and plaintiff testified that she wanted to stay to clarify the
allegation, so there was sufficient evidence for the jury finding.
 Rule of law: A plaintiff cannot succeed in a suit for false imprisonment
when no threat of force was used to compel the person to stay
against their will. Mere moral pressure to remain in the area is not
enough

Holding: Hardy does not have a successful claim for false

imprisonment against LaBelle’s because she was not unlawfully
restrained against her will. False imprisonment requires restraint
against one’s own will and that such restraint be unlawful. Hardy was
not restrained against her will because she wanted to stay to clarify
the situation, she did not ask to leave, and she was not otherwise
compelled to stay. Therefore, since Hardy was not restrained against
her will, her claim for false imprisonment fails.

Enright v. Groves

Facts: Groves, a cop, asked Enright for her license after he saw her
dog off leash in violation of the city’s “dog leash” ordinance. Groves
then demanded to see Enright’s license. When she refused, he
arrested her. She sued for false imprisonment.
Rule of law: Click or tap here to enter text.
Holding: Because Groves arrested Enright for failing to produce a
license, which is not an arrestable offense, rather than for violating
the dog leash ordinance, Groves could not use force to arrest Enright.
As a result, Groves was liable for false imprisonment.

Whittaker v. Sanford (Halpert loves this case)

Facts: Whittaker and her four children boarded Sanford’s boat in Jaffa
to sail to the United States. When they arrived, Sanford refused to
furnish Whittaker a boat so that she could get to shore. She was kept
on board for nearly a month. She sued for false imprisonment.

Rule of law: Failure to provide transport constitutes false

imprisonment. Confining a person to a bounded area and failing to
provide them a means of escape is a sufficient method of
confinement or restraint

Holding: Even though Sanford did not use any physical force, he is
liable for false imprisonment because there was no way for Whittaker
to leave the boat except by the row boat he agreed to provide her

Intentional Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Infliction of The plaintiff must prove the following elements:
1) intentional or reckless
Emotional 2) extreme and outrageous
Distress 3) wrongful conduct must cause the distress
4) emotional distress must be severe
State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff (California)

Facts: Silizinoff collected trash from a store within the Association’s

territory. The Association threatened Silizinoff that if he didn’t give
them the money from that store, they would beat him, slash his tires,
and put him out of business. Silizinoff became ill, vomited several
times, and missed work for several days.

Rule of law: Indirect threats are enough to cause emotional distress

Holding: The Association is liable for Silizinoff’s mental and physical

injuries.
D established a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress by showing that P intentionally subjected him to mental
suffering due to serious threats to his physical well-being, even
though the threats may not have constituted a technical assault.
Slocum v. Food Fair Stores

Facts: Slocum asked an employee the price of an item and the

employee responded “if you want to know the price, you’ll have to
find out the best way you can…you stink to me.” Slocum, who
suffered from pre-existing heart problems, had a heart attack. She
sued the store to recover for damages from her emotional distress,
claiming the employee made the comment in a malicious or grossly
reckless manner.

Rule of law: A party is not liable for intentional infliction of emotional

distress for simple insults not intended to have real meaning or
serious effect that subsequently causes another emotional distress.

Holding: Food Fair is not liable for intentional infliction of emotional

distress. A party is not liable for insults not intended to have real
meaning or serious effect that subsequently causes another
emotional distress. In this instance the comments by the employee
were not so calculating that the employee knew with substantial
certainty that his comments might cause severe emotional distress to
Slocum. Thus, the decision is affirmed.
Harris v. Jones

Facts: Harris, an employee at GM, had a stutter. Jones, Harris’s

supervisor, and other employees often mocked Harris’s stutter. Harris
sued for IIED.
Rule of law: In order for a party to recover for intentional infliction of
emotional distress a party must suffer a severely disabling emotional
response to another’s conduct.
For intentional infliction of emotional distress:
1) the conduct must be intentional or reckless;
2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
3) the wrongful conduct must cause the distress;
4) the emotional distress must be severe.
Holding: Harris may not recover for intentional infliction of emotion
distress. In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress Harris must show that he suffered a severely disabling
emotional response to Jones’s conduct. While Harris was humiliated
and his nervous condition may have worsened from Jones’ conduct,
he did not have a severely disabling emotional response to Jones’
conduct. Thus, the severity of the emotional distress that Harris
suffered was inadequate as a matter of law for Harris to recover
damages. The ruling of the Court of Special Appeals is affirmed

Taylor v. Vallelunga

Facts: Taylor alleged that she was presented and witnessed

Vallelunga beat her father and thereby suffered severe emotional
distress.

Rule of law: A third party may not recover damages for IIED when the
defendant was unaware that the third party was present at the time
the defendant’s conduct occurred.

Holding: Vallelunga may not be held liable for intentional infliction. A

party is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress when one
acts with the purpose of causing severe emotional distress or with
knowledge to a substantial certainty that such distress will be
produced. Vallelunga did not know that Taylor was present and saw
him beating her father. There is no allegation that Vallelunga beat
Taylor’s father for the purpose of causing Taylor to suffer severe
emotional distress. Further, there is no allegation that Vallelunga
 knew with substantial certainty that Taylor would suffer severe
emotional distress from seeing him beat up her father. Therefore,
Vallelunga may not be held liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Trespass to Trespass to Land

An unauthorized and intentional entry onto the land of another.
Land
Dougherty v. Stepp

Facts: Dougherty entered onto Stepp’s land, claiming it was his land.
Because Dougherty caused no injury to the land, however, the trial
court held that there was no tresspass.

Rule: To maintain a suit for trespass a plaintiff need not

Holding: The trial court erred because every unauthorized entry onto
land is unlawful, and the law presumes damages from every unlawful
entry onto land.

Herrin v. Sutherland

Facts: While standing on a property near the plaintiff’s, the defendant

repeatedly shot birds that flew over the plaintiff’s land. But the
defendant never physically entered the plaintiff’s land.

Rule: Trespass to pass over, or cause an object to pass over, the land
of another, even if there’s no physical touching of the land, because
the air space that is near the ground is still part of that person’s
property

Holding: Because defendant fired a shotgun over the plaintiff’s land,

the plaintiff can state a claim for trespass for nominal damages at the
very least.

Rogers v. Bd. of Road Com’rs for Kent Cnty.

Facts: The Board of Road Commissioners obtained permission to

place a snow fence on Rogers’ lawn, agreeing to remove the anchor
posts at the end of each winter. The Board never removed the posts.
When plaintiff was mowing the lawn, he crashed into one of the posts
 and died as a result of his injuries.

Rule: A plaintiff may sue for trespass when the defendant (or a
structure the defendant erected) remains on the plaintiff’s land after
the plaintiff’s consent has expired.

Holding: Because the Board failed to remove the anchor post once
the plaintiff’s permission expired, the plaintiff stated a claim for
trespass.
Trespass to Trespass to Chattels
An intentional interference with the plaintiff’s right of possession that
Chattels causes damages.

Restatement of the Law of Torts s. 218: “One who without

consensual or other privilege to do so, uses or otherwise intentionally
intermeddles with a chattel which is in possession of another is liable
for a trespass to such a person if,
(a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel
(b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality or value, or
(c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a
substantial time, or
(d) bodily harm is thereby caused to the possessor or harm is
caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a
legally protected interest”
(“Intermeddling” is defined as “intentionally bringing about a physical
contact.”)

Glidden v. Szybiak

Facts: Glidden, who was four years old, found Szybiak’s dog Toby on
the porch of a candy store. Glidden climbed on Toby’s back and pulled
on his ears. Toby snapped and bit Glidden. Glidden sued to recover
for a dog bite. But under New Hampshire law, a person isn’t liable for
their dog’s bite if the dog bite occurred while the victim was “engaged
in a tresspass.”

Rule: To maintain a claim for trespass to chattels, a plaintiff must

establish that tresspass damaged the chattel either by (1) impairing
the chattel’s condition, quality, or value, (2) depriving the possessor
of the ability to use the chattel for a substantial period of time, or (3)
causing bodily harm to the possessor or something in which the
possessor has a legally protected interest.
 Holding: Court held that she was not engaged in any tort and she was
too young to be held liable. Toby, the dog/chattel, was not injured.
There can be no trespass to chattels because there is no claim Toby
suffered any damages. Because there was no claim that Toby was
injured by Glidden’s conduct, Toby could not be liable for trespass to
the dog
CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotion, Inc.

Facts: Cyber Promotion sent hundreds of thousands of spam emails to

CompuServe subscribers. After Cyber Promotion refused to stop using
CompuServe’s servers, CompuServe modified its software to screen
out Cyber Promotion’s messages. But Cyber Promotion modified its
messages to avoid the screening software. Eventually, Cyber
Promotion’s spam burdened CompuServe’s equipment and caused
CompuServe to lose customers.

Rule: Electronic signals generated and sent by computer are

sufficiently tangible to support a claim for trespass. More importantly,
a plaintiff may sue for trespass to chattels when the value or
condition of the chattel is intentionally impaired or when the trespass
causes harm to something in which the plaintiff has a legally
protected interest.

Holding: Because CyberPromotion’s spam burdened CompuServe’s

equipment, CyberPromotion’s spam diminished the value of
CompuServe’s equipment. As a result, CompuServe had a claim for
trespass to chattels. CompuServe also had a claim for trespass to
chattels because CyberPromotion’s spam harmed CompuServe’s
business reputation and goodwill with its customers.

Conversion Pearson v. Dodd

Facts: Former employees of Connecticut Senator Thomas Dodd went

into his office without his knowledge, made copies of documents, and
gave the copies to journalists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson
(defendants). The former employees replaced the original documents
in Dodd’s (plaintiff) office. The defendants then published articles
with information learned from the copied documents. Dodd brought
suit against the defendants for conversion, among other things. The
district court granted Dodd’s motion for summary judgment on the
conversion claim. The defendants appealed.

Restatement(Second) of the Law of Torts §221: defining

conversion as
“An intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel
which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control
it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full
value of the chattel”
 Rule: A conversion is an intentional exercise of control over a chattel
which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it
that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of
the chattel.

Holding: A conversion is an intentional exercise of control over a

chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to
control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the
full value of the chattel. Put another way, if the owner is still able to
control and maintain the usefulness of the chattel, then a conversion
likely has not occurred. While in some cases information contained in
documents may have value in addition to the value of their physical
possession—such as intellectual property or trade secrets—the
documents in this case do not. Dodd’s original documents were
returned to his office, allowing him to maintain the documents’ full
utility for his previously intended purposes. Accordingly, the
defendants are not guilty of conversion and the district court’s grant
of summary judgment on the conversion claim is reversed.

PRIVILEGES/DEFENSES
O’Brien v. Cunard
Consent
Facts: O’Brien was a passenger on the S.S. Cunard, which landed in
Boston. Before arriving in Boston, one of the ship’s doctors vaccinated
the passengers. O’Brien was one of those passengers. And she stood
in a line and watched about 200 passengers get vaccinated. When it
was her turn, she showed the surgeon her arm and received the
vaccination. After she had a negative reaction, she sued for assault.

Rule: When consent is not given expressly, it may nevertheless be

given impliedly based on a person’s behavior. In determining whether
a person impliedly consents, the analysis turns on that person’s overt
acts and the manifestations of her feelings.

Holding: Because O’Brien did nothing to indicate to the surgeon that

she did not want to be vaccinated, she impliedly consented to
receiving the vaccination in light of the surrounding circumstances.

Huckbart v. Cincinnati Bengals

Facts: Dale Huckbart was injured when a Clark struck him in the back
of his head during a football game. NFL rules prohibit that kind of
violence. But the trial court held that Huckbart essentially consented
to this kind of violence because it’s a violent game.
Rule: The fact that a player consents to play a game does not mean
that the player consents to every act that occurs in that game.
Holding: Because neither the rules nor the general customs of football
approve of the intentional punching or striking of others, Huckbart did
not consent to be struck in the back of the head simply because he
consented to other violent acts within the game of football.

Mohr v. Williams

Facts: Mohr consented to a surgery on her right ear to remove a

problem that Dr. Williams discovered. While Mohr was under
anesthesia, Dr. Williams discovered a condition in her left ear that
needed surgery, although it wasn’t life threatening. Dr. Williams
presented it to Mohr’s family doctor, who was in the operating room
and who did not appear to object. However, the reason the family
doctor was there was to calm Mohr’s fear of being put under
anesthesia.
Rule: When a person has surgery, they impliedly consent to additional
medical or surgical treatment that is lifesaving.
Holding: Because the condition in Mohr’s left ear wasn’t life-
threatening, the scope of Mohr’s consent only included the already-
agreed-to surgery on her right ear. Moreover, the family doctor
wasn’t authorized to consent to any changes in the originally
proposed surgery.

De May v. Roberts
Facts: Roberts was in labor when her physician, De May, entered the
room with Scattergood. Believing Scattergood was De May’s assistant,
Roberts allowed him to stay and even hold her hand during delivery.
When Roberts realized that Scattergood wasn’t a doctor, she sued.

Rule: A person’s consent is invalid when the person wouldn’t have

consented if they were aware of all the material facts at the time.

Holding: Because De May and Scattergood did not disclose

Scattergood’s true identity when they entered the delivery room,
Roberts’s consent was invalid.
Katko v. Briney

Facts: A husband and wife trespassed into an abandoned uninhibited

house where they found items to add to their collection of antiques.
The owners of the house knew of trespassing and housebreaking
events over the years with loss of some household items so they
boarded up the house and made a 20-gauge spring shotgun trap in
one of the bedrooms. The husband and wife decided to return a
second time. Upon entering that room, the husband was shot in the
leg and lost his leg, resulting in permanent deformity. The spring gun
could not be seen from outside the bedroom, and there was no
warning or indication of its presence. The trespassers filed for
damages resulting in the injury, which was awarded by the trial court.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the Iowa.

Rule: A person, in protecting his property, may not use force

calculated to cause death or serious bodily injury, except where there
is also a threat to personal safety that justifies self-defense.

Holding: A person, in protecting his property, may not use force

calculated to cause death or serious bodily injury, except where there
is also a threat to personal safety that is sufficient to justify
self-defense. Personal rights are given a higher value under the law
than property rights. The use of spring guns or similar devices to
protect property against a trespasser or petty thief is not justified. This
court has previously found a property owner liable for injuries
sustained by a trespasser as a result of a spring gun trap, finding the
defense of property from trespass to be insufficient justification for
the use of a deadly weapon. A possessor of land cannot do indirectly
and by a mechanical device that which, were he present, he could not
do in person.
Bonkowski v. Arlan’s Department Store

Facts: Plaintiff had just left the Defendant department store with her
husband after making some purchases. A private policeman who was
on duty approached them as they were walking to their car and said
that someone had told him that she had placed jewelry in her purse
without paying for it. She denied taking anything but he requested
that she show him the contents of her purse. She emptied her purse
and showed receipts and the Defendant was satisfied by the presence
of receipts that she had not stolen anything. Plaintiff later sued
Defendant and the store for false arrest and slander.

Rule: If the defendant reasonably believed the plaintiff had unlawfully

taken goods held for sale in the defendants store, then he enjoyed a
privilege to detain her for a reasonable investigation of the facts

Holding: A merchant has the right to detain an individual who he

believes has stolen merchandise from his store for a reasonable
investigation.

Surocco v. Geary

Facts: On December 24, 1849, a large fire was raging through San
Francisco. The mayor, Geary (defendant), blew up Surocco’s (plaintiff)
house to create a break and prevent the fire from spreading. If
Surocco’s home had not been destroyed, the fire would certainly have
engulfed it. Prior to Surocco’s home being destroyed, Surocco was in
the process of removing his personal property from inside. Surocco
could have successfully removed almost all of his personal property if
Geary had not ordered the building destroyed. Surocco sued Geary to
recover damages.

Rule: A person who destroys property in good faith, and under

apparent necessity, in an emergency in order to save other buildings
cannot be held personally liable by the owner of the destroyed
property.
Holding: A person who tears down or destroys the house of another,
in good faith, and under apparent necessity, during the time of a
conflagration, for the purpose of saving the buildings adjacent and
stopping its progress, cannot be held personally liable in an action by
the owner of the property destroyed. The private rights of the
individual must yield to the considerations and the interests of
society.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co.

Facts: R.C. Vincent and others (Vincent) (plaintiffs) owned a dock in

Duluth. On November 27, 1905, Lake Erie Transportation Co. (Erie)
(defendant) anchored its boat to Vincent’s dock to unload the cargo. A
violent storm hit that prevented boats from leaving the harbor for two
days. During that time, Erie deliberately kept its boat anchored to
Vincent’s dock to prevent it from drifting away. It is undisputed that
doing so was a reasonable exercise of ordinary care given the severity
of the storm. However, strong winds repeatedly knocked the boat up
against Vincent’s dock, causing damage. Vincent sued Erie to recover
damages, and the jury awarded Vincent $500. Erie appealed, arguing
that it cannot be held liable for the damage to the dock because it
acted with due care under the circumstances.

Rule: An individual who damages the property of another as a result

of private necessity is liable for the damage to that individual's
property.

Holding: Erie acted prudently and out of a private necessity to protect

its boat, but it is nevertheless liable for the damage to Vincent’s dock.
The general rules that govern private property rights may be
“suspended by forces beyond human control.” In such cases, a party
will not be liable for property damage that results from an “act of
God.” Nevertheless, where a party acts deliberately to protect her
property, even if her actions are entirely reasonable under the
circumstances, she will be liable to another property owner for
damages that result.

Sindle v. New York City Transit Authority

Facts: Plaintiff boarded school bus, which while on its afternoon route
experienced vandalism from students. Driver told students he was
taking them to police department. En route, plaintiff either jumped or
fell from bus, and was injured. Plaintiff sued to recover damages for
negligence and false imprisonment, but proceeded only on theory of
false imprisonment. At close of plaintiff's case, court denied
defendants' motion to amend answers to plead defensive justification.
Court also excluded all evidence bearing on justification. Judgment
entered for plaintiff, and defendants appealed.

Rule: A person entrusted with the care or supervision of a child may

use a reasonably necessary amount of force to maintain discipline or
promote the welfare of the child.
 Holding: A person who is entrusted with the care and supervision of a
child is justified in using a reasonably necessary amount of force in
order to maintain discipline or promote the welfare of the child.
Specifically, a school-bus driver is entrusted with the care and
supervision of the student passengers on his bus. A school-bus driver
is also entrusted with taking care and custody of public property,
specifically the school bus. A school-bus driver thus has a duty to take
reasonable measures for the safety and protection of both the
passengers and the property. The reasonableness of a school-bus
driver's actions must be assessed in light of all the circumstances. In
this case, considering all of the circumstances, Mooney may have
been justified in aiding the investigation and apprehension of those
student passengers who were inflicting damage to the bus. Thus, the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the motion to
amend the complaint and in excluding evidence related to the
justification defense. Accordingly, the appellate court's judgment is
reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. On retrial,
attention should also be paid to the proper amount of damages. A
person trying to escape false imprisonment still must exercise
reasonable care for his own safety, and jumping out of a moving
vehicle without a compelling reason to do so is negligence per se.
Therefore, if the fact finder concludes that Sindle was falsely
imprisoned but acted unreasonably when he tried to jump from the
moving bus, Sindle will not be able to recover for his bodily injuries.

FLORIDA STATUTES
§ 810.02 Burglary.— (1)(a) For offenses committed on or before July 1, 2001,
“burglary” means entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or
a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless
the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is
licensed or invited to enter or remain.
 (b) For offenses committed after July 1, 2001, “burglary” means:
1. Entering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the
intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the
time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to
enter; or
2. Notwithstanding a licensed or invited entry, remaining in a
dwelling, structure, or conveyance:
a. Surreptitiously, with the intent to commit an offense therein;
b. After permission to remain therein has been withdrawn, with
the intent to commit an offense therein; or
c. To commit or attempt to commit a forcible felony, as defined
in s. 776.08.

§ 812.015(3) Retail and (3)(a) A law enforcement officer, a merchant, a farmer, or a

farm theft; transit fare
transit agency’s employee or agent, who has probable cause to
evasion; mandatory fine;
alternative punishment; believe that a retail theft, farm theft, a transit fare evasion, or
detention and arrest; trespass, or unlawful use or attempted use of any antishoplifting or
exemption from liability
inventory control device countermeasure, has been committed by a
for false arrest; resisting
arrest; penalties.— person and, in the case of retail or farm theft, that the property can
be recovered by taking the offender into custody may, for the
purpose of attempting to effect such recovery or for prosecution,
take the offender into custody and detain the offender in a
reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time. In the case of a
farmer, taking into custody shall be effectuated only on property
owned or leased by the farmer. In the event the merchant,
merchant’s employee, farmer, or a transit agency’s employee or
agent takes the person into custody, a law enforcement officer shall
be called to the scene immediately after the person has been taken
into custody.
(b) The activation of an antishoplifting or inventory control device
as a result of a person exiting an establishment or a protected area
within an establishment shall constitute reasonable cause for the
detention of the person so exiting by the owner or operator of the
establishment or by an agent or employee of the owner or operator,
provided sufficient notice has been posted to advise the patrons that
such a device is being utilized. Each such detention shall be made
only in a reasonable manner and only for a reasonable period of time
sufficient for any inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the
activation of the device.
(c) The taking into custody and detention by a law enforcement
officer, merchant, merchant’s employee, farmer, or a transit
agency’s employee or agent, if done in compliance with all the
requirements of this subsection, shall not render such law
enforcement officer, merchant, merchant’s employee, farmer, or a
transit agency’s employee or agent, criminally or civilly liable for
false arrest, false imprisonment, or unlawful detention.