State
State
159556)
pmurphy@murphyrosen.com
2 DANIEL N. CSILLAG (State Bar No. 266773)
dcsillag@murphyrosen.com
3 STELLA CHANG (State Bar No. 335851)
schang@murphyrosen.com
4 MURPHY ROSEN LLP
100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1300
5 Santa Monica, California 90401-1142
Telephone: (310) 899-3300
6 Facsimile: (310) 399-7201
9
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
11
24
25
26
27
28
2 Complainant Angelina Jolie (“Jolie”) hereby submits this Separate Statement in support of her
3 Motion to Compel Further Responses from William B. Pitt (“Pitt”) to Request for Production,
4 Set One.
7 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with the FBI from September 14, 2016 to December 31,
11 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
12 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
15 in this action.
16 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
17 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
18 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
20 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
23 This case is about Pitt’s failed attempt to purchase Jolie’s interest in Chateau
24 Miraval. The two had an agreement in place where Pitt would purchase Jolie’s interest in
25 Miraval, but in June 2021, that agreement fell apart. Pitt alleges that Jolie walked away
26 from the deal in anger over a supposed adverse ruling in their child custody case. As Pitt
27 details in his Second Amended Complaint, Jolie supposedly sold her interest in Miraval to a
28 third party as a vindictive measure specifically designed to inflict harm on him, so much so
2 that it was Pitt who is responsible for the collapse of the deal when he demanded an NDA
3 covering not only Miraval’s business, but Pitt’s personal misconduct irrespective of any
5 demanded this personal NDA to cover up, among other things, his abuse of Jolie and their
6 children, and his dishonesty with authorities who investigated Pitt’s violent actions towards
7 his family.
8 To defend herself, Jolie must gather the evidence necessary to demonstrate why Pitt
9 demanded an NDA as a condition of buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval, why his demand
10 was controlling and deeply hurtful to Jolie, and why that demand ultimately served to blow
11 up the sale. As detailed in Jolie’s Cross-Complaint, on September 14, 2016, Pitt physically
12 and emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 Los Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter. RFP No. 1
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 seeks Pitt’s communications with the FBI during its investigation at the end of 2016.
15 Pitt objects to RFP No. 1 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not relevant
16 to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the
17 discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence
18 is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its
19 case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is
20 sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.”
21 Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B.
22 v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if it might
24 The relevance of these documents is obvious. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell
25 apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to
26 use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of J olie and her
27 family and his subsequent efforts to escape the consequences of his actions. Pitt disputes
28 this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a
2 In fact, Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC,
3 calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie
4 disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, will present evidence establishing that the
5 deal cratered because Pitt had something to hide—his abuse of Jolie and their children and
6 his related coverup—and he felt he needed Jolie’s contractual commitment to keep that
7 conduct out of the public’s eye. Pitt’s direct communications with the FBI about its
8 investigation will undoubtedly assist Jolie in evaluating and proving her case by revealing
9 precisely what Pitt told the FBI about the abusive conduct it was investigating. These
11 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 1 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by the
12 right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even dangerous
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and their
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law. Pitt
15 cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing their
16 partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
17 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
18 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
19 to bury it.
20 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
21 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
22 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
23 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
24 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
25 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
26 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
27 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
2 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
3 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
4 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
5 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
6 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
8 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
10 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
11 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
12 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
15 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
16 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
18 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
19 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
20 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
21 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
22 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
23 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most
24 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with the FBI is for Pitt to produce
25 them. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to
27
28
2 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with GRANT regarding the FBI’s investigation into what
6 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
7 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
8 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
9 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
10 in this action.
11 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
12 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
15 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
18 This case is about Pitt’s failed attempt to purchase Jolie’s interest in Chateau
19 Miraval. The two had an agreement in place where Pitt would purchase Jolie’s interest in
20 Miraval, but, in June 2021, that agreement fell apart. Pitt alleges that Jolie walked away
21 from the deal in anger over a supposed adverse ruling in their child custody case. As Pitt
22 details in his Second Amended Complaint, Jolie supposedly sold her interest in Miraval to a
23 third party as a vindictive measure specifically designed to inflict harm on him, so much so
24 that Pitt seeks punitive damages from Jolie in this case. Jolie, on the other hand, contends
25 that it was Pitt who is responsible for the collapse of the deal when he demanded an NDA
26 covering not only Miraval’s business, but Pitt’s personal misconduct irrespective of any
28 demanded this personal NDA to cover up, among other things, his abuse of Jolie and their
2 his family.
3 To defend herself, Jolie must gather the evidence necessary to demonstrate why Pitt
4 demanded an NDA as a condition of buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval, why his demand
5 was controlling and deeply hurtful to Jolie, and why that demand ultimately served to blow
6 up the sale. As detailed in Jolie’s Cross-Complaint, on September 14, 2016, Pitt physically
7 and emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to
8 Los Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter. RFP No. 2
10 and Mondo Bongo’s manager—about the FBI’s investigation. Pitt has specifically
12 searched.
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 Pitt objects to RFP No. 2 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not relevant
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the
15 discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence
16 is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its
17 case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is
18 sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.”
19 Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B.
20 v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if it might
22 The relevance of these documents is obvious. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell
23 apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to
24 use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of J olie and her
25 family and his subsequent efforts to escape the consequences of his actions. Pitt disputes
26 this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a
27 nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue
28 in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of
2 present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury —his abuse of Jolie
3 and their children. Pitt’s communications with Grant about the FBI’s investigation will
4 undoubtedly assist Jolie in evaluating and proving her case by revealing Pitt’s
5 contemporaneous communications with his trusted advisor about the abusive conduct the
6 FBI was investigating. The documents are discoverable and should be produced.
7 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 2 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by the
8 right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even dangerous
9 assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and their
10 children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law. Pitt
11 cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing their
12 partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
15 to bury it.
16 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
17 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
18 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
19 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
20 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
21 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
22 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
23 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
25 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
26 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
27 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
28 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
2 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
4 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
6 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
7 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
8 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
9 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
10 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
11 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
12 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
14 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
15 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
16 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
17 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
18 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
19 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
20 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Grant is for Pitt to produce them.
21 They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to this case.
28 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
2 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
3 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
4 in this action.
5 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
6 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
7 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
9 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
12 This case is about Pitt’s failed attempt to purchase Jolie’s interest in Chateau
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 Miraval. The two had an agreement in place where Pitt would purchase Jolie’s interest in
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 Miraval, but, in June 2021, that agreement fell apart. Pitt alleges that Jolie walked away
15 from the deal in anger over a supposed adverse ruling in their child custody case. As Pitt
16 details in his Second Amended Complaint, Jolie supposedly sold her interest in Miraval to a
17 third party as a vindictive measure specifically designed to inflict harm on him, so much so
18 that Pitt seeks punitive damages from Jolie in this case. Jolie, on the other hand, contends
19 that it was Pitt who is responsible for the collapse of the deal when he demanded an NDA
20 covering not only Miraval’s business, but Pitt’s personal misconduct irrespective of any
22 demanded this personal NDA to cover up, among other things, his abuse of Jolie and their
23 children, and his dishonesty with authorities who investigated Pitt’s violent actions towards
24 his family.
25 To defend herself, Jolie must gather the evidence necessary to demonstrate why Pitt
26 demanded an NDA as a condition of buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval, why his demand
27 was controlling and deeply hurtful to Jolie, and why that demand ultimately served to blow
28 up the sale. As detailed in Jolie’s Cross-Complaint, on September 14, 2016, Pitt physically
2 Los Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter. RFP No. 3
3 seeks Pitt’s communications with Jon Liebman about the FBI’s investigation into P itt. Mr.
5 management and production company, and one of Pitt’s trusted advisors. Pitt has
7 must be searched.
8 Pitt objects to RFP No. 3 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not relevant
9 to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the
10 discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence
11 is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its
12 case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.”
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B.
15 v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if it might
17 The relevance of these documents is obvious. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell
18 apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to
19 use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of J olie and her
20 family and his subsequent efforts to escape the consequences of his actions. Pitt disputes
21 this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a
22 nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue
23 in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of
24 the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will
25 present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie
26 and their children. Pitt’s communications with Liebman about the FBI’s investigation will
27 undoubtedly assist Jolie in evaluating and proving her case by revealing Pitt’s
28 contemporaneous communications with his trusted advisor about the abusive conduct the
2 In fact, Liebman had direct communications with the Department of Children and
3 Family Services (“DCFS”) as part of its investigation into Pitt’s abuse of Jolie and their
4 children. Jolie understand Liebman also had at least some direct communications with the
5 FBI, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and perhaps other agencies as well. Given Liebman’s
6 direct role in the investigation, he certainly had direct communications with Pitt about these
7 investigations, which are highly relevant to Jolie’s defenses and cross-claims. These
9 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 3 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by the
10 right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even dangerous
11 assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and their
12 children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law. Pitt
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing their
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
15 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
16 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
17 to bury it.
18 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
19 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
20 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
21 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
22 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
23 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
24 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
25 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
27 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
28 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
2 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
3 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
4 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
6 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
8 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
9 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
10 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
11 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
12 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
16 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
17 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
18 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
19 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
20 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
21 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
22 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Liebman is for Pitt to produce
23 them. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to
28
3 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
4 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
5 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
6 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
7 in this action.
8 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
9 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
10 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
12 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
15 This case is about Pitt’s failed attempt to purchase Jolie’s interest in Chateau
16 Miraval. The two had an agreement in place where Pitt would purchase Jolie’s interest in
17 Miraval, but, in June 2021, that agreement fell apart. Pitt alleges that Jolie walked away
18 from the deal in anger over a supposed adverse ruling in their child custody case. As Pitt
19 details in his Second Amended Complaint, Jolie supposedly sold her interest in Miraval to a
20 third party as a vindictive measure specifically designed to inflict harm on him, so much so
21 that Pitt seeks punitive damages from Jolie in this case. Jolie, on the other hand, contends
22 that it was Pitt who is responsible for the collapse of the deal when he demanded an NDA
23 covering not only Miraval’s business, but Pitt’s personal misconduct irrespective of any
25 demanded this personal NDA to cover up, among other things, his abuse of Jolie and their
26 children, and his dishonesty with authorities who investigated Pitt’s violent actions towards
27 his family.
28
2 demanded an NDA as a condition of buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval, why his demand
3 was controlling and deeply hurtful to Jolie, and why that demand ultimately served to blow
4 up the sale. As detailed in Jolie’s Cross-Complaint, on September 14, 2016, Pitt physically
5 and emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to
6 Los Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter. RFP No. 4
7 seeks Pitt’s communications with Cynthia Pett-Dante 1 about the FBI’s investigation. Pett-
8 Dante is the co-owner and managing partner of Brillstein Entertainment Partners, a talent
10 Pitt objects to RFP No. 4 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not relevant
11 to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the
12 discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is
15 sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.”
16 Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B.
17 v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if it might
19 The relevance of these documents is obvious. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell
20 apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to
21 use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of J olie and her
22 family and his subsequent efforts to escape the consequences of his actions. Pitt disputes
23 this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a
24 nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue
25 in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of
26 the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will
27
28 1
The requests use the spelling “Donte,” but the actual spelling is “Dante.” Pitt has
not objected based on the inadvertent misspelling of her name.
-15- PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
JOLIE’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MTC FURTHER RESPONSES FROM PITT
1 present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury —his abuse of Jolie
2 and their children. Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about the FBI’s investigation
3 will undoubtedly assist Jolie in evaluating and proving her case by revealing Pitt’s
4 contemporaneous communications with his trusted advisor about the abusive conduct the
5 FBI was investigating. The documents are discoverable and should be produced.
6 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 4 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by the
7 right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even dangerous
8 assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and their
9 children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law. Pitt
10 cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing their
11 partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
12 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 to bury it.
15 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
16 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
17 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
18 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
19 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
20 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
21 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
22 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
24 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
25 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
26 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
27 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
28 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
3 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
5 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
6 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
7 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
8 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
9 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
10 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
11 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
13 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
15 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
16 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
17 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
18 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most
19 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante is for Pitt to produce
20 them. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to
23 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with PERRIN regarding the FBI’s investigation into what
27 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
28 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
2 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
3 in this action.
4 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
5 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
6 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
8 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
11 This case is about Pitt’s failed attempt to purchase Jolie’s interest in Chateau
12 Miraval. The two had an agreement in place where Pitt would purchase Jolie’s interest in
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 Miraval, but, in June 2021, that agreement fell apart. Pitt alleges that Jolie walked away
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 from the deal in anger over a supposed adverse ruling in their child custody case. As Pitt
15 details in his Second Amended Complaint, Jolie supposedly sold her interest in Miraval to a
16 third party as a vindictive measure specifically designed to inflict harm on him, so much so
17 that Pitt seeks punitive damages from Jolie in this case. Jolie, on the other hand, contends
18 that it was Pitt who is responsible for the collapse of the deal when he demanded an NDA
19 covering not only Miraval’s business, but Pitt’s personal misconduct irrespective of any
21 demanded this personal NDA to cover up, among other things, his abuse of Jolie and their
22 children, and his dishonesty with authorities who investigated Pitt’s violent actions towards
23 his family.
24 To defend herself, Jolie must gather the evidence necessary to demonstrate why Pitt
25 demanded an NDA as a condition of buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval, why his demand
26 was controlling and deeply hurtful to Jolie, and why that demand ultimately served to blow
27 up the sale. As detailed in Jolie’s Cross-Complaint, on September 14, 2016, Pitt physically
28 and emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to
4 Pitt objects to RFP No. 5 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not relevant
5 to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the
6 discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence
7 is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its
8 case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is
9 sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.”
10 Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B.
11 v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if it might
13 The relevance of these documents is obvious. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to
15 use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of J olie and her
16 family and his subsequent efforts to escape the consequences of his actions. Pitt disputes
17 this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a
18 nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue
19 in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of
20 the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will
21 present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie
22 and their children. Pitt’s communications with Perrin, his business partner in the Miraval
23 joint venture, about the FBI’s investigation will undoubtedly assist Jolie in evaluating and
24 proving her case by revealing Pitt’s contemporaneous communications with his partner and
25 the potential impact on Miraval. The documents are discoverable and should be produced.
26 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 5 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by the
28
2 one who assaults his partner and their children has a right of privacy in that conduct is
3 wholly unsupported by any case law. Pitt cannot be correct, for domestic abu sers are
4 prosecuted routinely for physically abusing their partners and children. The right of
5 privacy does not insulate such conduct from prosecution. And it does not insulate that
6 same conduct from discovery in this civil case where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at
8 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
9 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
10 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
11 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
12 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
15 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
17 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
18 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
19 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
20 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
21 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
22 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
24 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
26 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
27 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
28 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
2 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
3 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
4 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
6 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
7 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
8 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
9 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
10 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
11 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
12 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Perrin is for Pitt to produce them.
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to this case.
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
20 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
21 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
22 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
23 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
24 in this action.
25 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
26 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
27 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
4 This case is about Pitt’s failed attempt to purchase Jolie’s interest in Chateau
5 Miraval. The two had an agreement in place where Pitt would purchase Jolie’s interest in
6 Miraval, but, in June 2021, that agreement fell apart. Pitt alleges that Jolie walked away
7 from the deal in anger over a supposed adverse ruling in their child custody case. As Pitt
8 details in his Second Amended Complaint, Jolie supposedly sold her interest in Miraval to a
9 third party as a vindictive measure specifically designed to inflict harm on him, so much so
10 that Pitt seeks punitive damages from Jolie in this case. Jolie, on the other hand, contends
11 that it was Pitt who is responsible for the collapse of the deal when he demanded an NDA
12 covering not only Miraval’s business, but Pitt’s personal misconduct irrespective of any
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
14 demanded this personal NDA to cover up, among other things, his abuse of Jolie and their
15 children, and his dishonesty with authorities who investigated Pitt’s violent actions towards
16 his family.
17 To defend herself, Jolie must gather the evidence necessary to demonstrate why Pitt
18 demanded an NDA as a condition of buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval, why his demand
19 was controlling and deeply hurtful to Jolie, and why that demand ultimately served to blow
20 up the sale. As detailed in Jolie’s Cross-Complaint, on September 14, 2016, Pitt physically
21 and emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to
22 Los Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter. RFP No. 6
23 seeks Pitt’s communications with Richard Malchar about the FBI’s investigation into Pitt.
25 Services Inc., and appears to have also assisted Pitt with personal matters.
26 Pitt objects to RFP No. 6 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not relevant
27 to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the
28 discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence
2 case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is
3 sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.”
4 Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B.
5 v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if it might
7 The relevance of these documents is obvious. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell
8 apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to
9 use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of J olie and her
10 family and his subsequent efforts to escape the consequences of his actions. Pitt disputes
11 this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a
12 nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will
15 present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie
16 and their children. Pitt’s communications with Malchar about the FBI’s investigation will
17 undoubtedly assist Jolie in evaluating and proving her case by revealing Pitt’s
18 contemporaneous communications with his trusted attendant about the abusive conduct the
20 In fact, Malchar had direct communications with DCFS as part of its investigation
21 into Pitt’s abuse of Jolie and their children. Jolie understands Malchar may also have had
22 direct communications with other agencies investigating Pitt as well. Given Malchar’s
23 direct role in the investigation, he certainly had direct communications with Pitt or Pitt’s
24 other agents about these investigations, which are highly relevant to Jolie’s defenses and
26 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 6 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by the
27 right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even dangerous
28 assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and their
2 cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing their
3 partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
4 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
5 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
6 to bury it.
7 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
8 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
9 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
10 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
11 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
12 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
16 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
17 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
18 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
19 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
20 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
21 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
23 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
25 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
26 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
27 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
28 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
2 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
3 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instanc e, if any,
5 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
6 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
7 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
8 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
9 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
10 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
11 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Malchar is for Pitt to produce
12 them. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
15 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with any public relations company from September 14,
16 2016 to February 16, 2022 regarding the FBI’s investigation into what transpired on the
17 FLIGHT.
20 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
21 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
22 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
23 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
24 in this action.
25 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
26 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
27 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
4 This case is about Pitt’s failed attempt to purchase Jolie’s interest in Chateau
5 Miraval. The two had an agreement in place where Pitt would purchase Jolie’s interest in
6 Miraval, but, in June 2021, that agreement fell apart. Pitt alleges that Jolie walked away
7 from the deal in anger over a supposed adverse ruling in their child custody case. As Pitt
8 details in his Second Amended Complaint, Jolie supposedly sold her interest in Miraval to a
9 third party as a vindictive measure specifically designed to inflict harm on him, so much so
10 that Pitt seeks punitive damages from Jolie in this case. Jolie, on the other hand, contends
11 that it was Pitt who is responsible for the collapse of the deal when he demanded an NDA
12 covering not only Miraval’s business, but Pitt’s personal misconduct irrespective of any
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
14 demanded this personal NDA to cover up, among other things, his abuse of Jolie and their
15 children, and his dishonesty with authorities who investigated Pitt’s violent actions towards
16 his family.
17 To defend herself, Jolie must gather the evidence necessary to demonstrate why Pitt
18 demanded an NDA as a condition of buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval, why his demand
19 was controlling and deeply hurtful to Jolie, and why that demand ultimately served to blow
20 up the sale. As detailed in Jolie’s Cross-Complaint, on September 14, 2016, Pitt physically
21 and emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to
22 Los Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter. RFP No. 7
23 seeks Pitt’s communications with any public relations company about the FBI’s
25 Pitt objects to RFP No. 7 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not relevant
26 to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the
27 discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence
28 is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its
2 sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.”
3 Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B.
4 v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if it might
6 Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA.
7 Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of
8 covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family and his subsequent efforts to escape the
9 consequences of his actions. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart
10 over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later).
11 Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a
12 “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with a
15 public relations company about the FBI’s investigation will undoubtedly assist Jolie in
16 evaluating and proving her case by revealing what Pitt was telling the media about the
17 FBI’s investigation. Jolie expects that Pitt’s communications will reveal that he was not
18 truthful with public relations companies who worked with Pitt to manage the FBI’s
19 investigation vis-à-vis the public. This untruthfulness is important for Jolie to be able to
20 show at trial because it will underscore how important it was for Pitt to get the NDA from
21 her as part of the Miraval sale. Without it, Pitt would be exposed not just on the fact of his
22 abuse itself, but also for his dishonesty and attempt to cover up his conduct through a public
24 However, upon further review, Jolie is willing to limit the time period for this
26 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 7 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by the
27 right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even dangerous
28 assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and their
2 cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing their
3 partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
4 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
5 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
6 to bury it.
7 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
8 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
9 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
10 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
11 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
12 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
16 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
17 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
18 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
19 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
20 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
21 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
23 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
25 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
26 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
27 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
28 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
2 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
3 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instanc e, if any,
5 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
6 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
7 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
8 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
9 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
10 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
11 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with public relations companies he
12 worked with is for Pitt to produce them. They are documents within his possession,
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 custody, or control and are relevant to this case. The Court should order him to produce
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 them.
16 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with the USAO from September 14, 2016 to December
20 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
21 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
22 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
23 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
24 in this action.
25 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
26 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
27 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
5 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
6 Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter, and the agent in
7 charge ultimately prepared a statement of probable cause to charge Pitt with a federal
8 offense for referral to the United States Attorneys’ Office (“USAO”) for prosecution. RFP
9 No. 8 seeks Pitt’s communications with the USAO during its investigation into whether to
11 Pitt objects to RFP No. 8 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not relevant
12 to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its
15 case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is
16 sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.”
17 Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B.
18 v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if it might
20 Pitt’s communications with the USAO are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims
21 that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the
22 case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior
23 abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart
24 over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later).
26 “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to
27 present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that
28 Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with the
2 evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses to trial. Jolie
4 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 8 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by the
5 right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even dangerous
6 assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and their
7 children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law. Pitt
8 cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing their
9 partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
10 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
11 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
12 to bury it.
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
15 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
16 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
17 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
18 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
19 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
20 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
22 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
23 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
24 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
25 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
26 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
27 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
3 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
4 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
5 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
6 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
7 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
8 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
9 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
11 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
12 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
15 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
16 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
17 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with the USAO is for Pitt to produce
18 them. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to
25 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
26 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
27 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
28 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
2 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
3 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt also
4 objects to the use of the term “decision-making,” which is vague, ambiguous, and undefined.
5 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide
7 Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
11 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
12 Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter, and the agent in
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 charge ultimately prepared a statement of probable cause to charge Pitt with a federal
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 offense for referral to the United States Attorneys’ Office (“USAO”) for prosecution. RFP
15 No. 9 seeks Pitt’s communications with Cross-Defendant Warren Grant about the USAO’s
16 investigation into whether to file charges against Pitt. Grant is Pitt’s business manager and
17 Mondo Bongo’s manager, and Pitt has specifically acknowledged that Grant is a custodian
19 Pitt objects to RFP No. 9 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not relevant
20 to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the
21 discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence
22 is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its
23 case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is
24 sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.”
25 Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B.
26 v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if it might
28
2 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
3 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
4 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
5 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
6 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue in
7 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
8 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
9 evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their
10 children. Pitt’s communications with Grant about the USAO’s investigation and evaluation
11 of charges that could be brought against Pitt may contain powerful and candid admissions
12 that will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
14 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 9 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by the
15 right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even dangerous
16 assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and their
17 children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law. Pitt
18 cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing their
19 partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
20 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
21 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
22 to bury it.
23 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
24 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
25 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
26 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
27 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
28 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
2 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
4 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
5 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
6 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
7 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
8 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
9 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
11 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
13 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
15 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
16 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
17 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
18 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
19 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
21 Pitt also objects that the phrase “decision-making” is vague and ambiguous. But as
22 has been widely reported—and as Pitt himself likes to tout—the USAO ultimately declined
23 to bring charges against Pitt for his abuse of Jolie and their children on the plane . The
24 decision to charge or not to charge is the “decision-making” referenced in the request and
26 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
27 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
28 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
2 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
3 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most
4 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Grant is for Pitt to produce them.
5 They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to this case.
12 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
15 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
16 in this action.
17 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
18 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt also
19 objects to the use of the term “decision-making,” which is vague, ambiguous, and undefined.
20 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide
22 Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
26 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
27 Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter, and the agent in
28 charge ultimately prepared a statement of probable cause to charge Pitt with a federal
2 No. 10 seeks Pitt’s communications with Mr. Liebman who, as discussed above, was Pitt’s
3 confidante and talent agent, about the USAO’ investigation into whether to file charges
4 against Pitt. Pitt has specifically acknowledged that Liebman is a custodian of Pitt’s
6 Pitt objects to RFP No. 10 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
7 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
8 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
9 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
10 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
11 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
12 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
15 Pitt’s communications with Liebman about the USAO’s investigation into Pitt are
16 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
17 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
18 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
19 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
20 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue in
21 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
22 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
23 evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their
24 children. Pitt’s communications with Liebman about the USAO’s investigation and
25 evaluation of charges that could be brought against Pitt may contain powerful and candid
26 admissions that will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and
27 affirmative defenses to trial. And as discussed above, Liebman had direct communications
28 with DCFS about its investigation, and likely had direct communications with the FBI and
2 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 10 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
3 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even
4 dangerous assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and
5 their children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law.
6 Pitt cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing
7 their partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
8 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
9 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
10 to bury it.
11 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
12 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
15 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
16 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
17 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
18 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
20 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
21 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
22 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
23 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
24 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
25 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
27 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
2 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
3 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
4 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
5 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
6 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
7 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
9 Pitt also objects that the phrase “decision-making” is vague and ambiguous. But as
10 has been widely reported—and as Pitt himself likes to tout—the USAO ultimately declined
11 to bring charges against Pitt for his abuse of Jolie and their children on the plane . The
12 decision to charge or not to charge is the “decision-making” referenced in the request and
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
14 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
15 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
16 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
17 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
18 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
19 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
20 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Liebman is for Pitt to produce
21 them. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to
28 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
2 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
3 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
4 in this action.
5 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
6 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt also
7 objects to the use of the term “decision-making,” which is vague, ambiguous, and undefined.
8 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide
10 Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
14 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
15 Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter, and the agent in
16 charge ultimately prepared a statement of probable cause to charge Pitt with a federal
17 offense for referral to the United States Attorneys’ Office (“USAO”) for prosecution. RFP
18 No. 11 seeks Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante who, as discussed above, was the co-
19 owner of the talent agency that represented Pitt, about the USAO’ investigation into
21 Pitt objects to RFP No. 11 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
22 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
23 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
24 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
25 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
26 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
27 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
28 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
2 Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about the USAO’s investigation into Pitt are
3 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
4 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
5 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
6 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
7 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue in
8 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
9 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
10 evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their
11 children. Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about the USAO’s investigation and
12 evaluation of charges that could be brought against Pitt may contain powerful and candid
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 admissions that will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 affirmative defenses to trial. And as discussed above, Pett-Dante’s partner, Mr. Liebman,
15 had direct communications with DCFS about its investigation, and likely had direct
16 communications with the FBI and USAO as well. Jolie has reason to believe Pitt also had
19 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 11 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
20 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even
21 dangerous assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and
22 their children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law.
23 Pitt cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing
24 their partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
25 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
26 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
27 to bury it.
28
2 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
3 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
4 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
5 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
6 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
7 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
8 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
10 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
11 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
12 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
15 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
17 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
19 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
20 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
21 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
22 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
23 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
24 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
25 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
27 Pitt also objects that the phrase “decision-making” is vague and ambiguous. But as
28 has been widely reported—and as Pitt himself likes to tout—the USAO ultimately declined
2 decision to charge or not to charge is the “decision-making” referenced in the request and
4 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
5 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
6 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
7 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
8 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
9 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
10 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante is for Pitt to produce
11 them. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to
18 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
19 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
20 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
21 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
22 in this action.
23 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
24 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt also
25 objects to the use of the term “decision-making,” which is vague, ambiguous, and undefined.
26 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide
28 Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
4 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
5 Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter, and the agent in
6 charge ultimately prepared a statement of probable cause to charge Pitt with a federal
7 offense for referral to the United States Attorneys’ Office (“USAO”) for prosecution. RFP
8 No. 12 seeks Pitt’s communications with Cross-Defendant Marc Perrin who, as discussed
9 above, is Pitt’s business partner in the Miraval joint venture Miraval Provence. Pitt has
11 must be searched.
12 Pitt objects to RFP No. 12 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
15 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
16 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
17 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
18 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
19 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
21 Pitt’s communications with Perrin about the USAO’s investigation into Pitt are
22 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
23 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
24 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
25 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
26 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue in
27 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
28 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
2 children. Pitt’s communications with Perrin about the USAO’s investigation and
3 evaluation of charges that could be brought against Pitt may contain powerful and candid
4 admissions that will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and
5 affirmative defenses to trial. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the co-owner of a multi-
6 million dollar business venture would not discuss potential criminal charges against him
8 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 12 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
9 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even
10 dangerous assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and
11 their children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law.
12 Pitt cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 their partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
15 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
16 to bury it.
17 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
18 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
19 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
20 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
21 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
22 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
23 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
24 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
26 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
27 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
28 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
2 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
3 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
5 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
7 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
8 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
9 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
10 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
11 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
12 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
15 Pitt also objects that the phrase “decision-making” is vague and ambiguous. But as
16 has been widely reported—and as Pitt himself likes to tout—the USAO ultimately declined
17 to bring charges against Pitt for his abuse of Jolie and their children on the plane . The
18 decision to charge or not to charge is the “decision-making” referenced in the request and
20 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
21 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
22 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
23 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
24 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
25 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
26 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Perrin is for Pitt to produce them.
27 They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to this case.
6 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
7 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
8 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
9 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
10 in this action.
11 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
12 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt also
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 objects to the use of the term “decision-making,” which is vague, ambiguous, and undefined.
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide
16 Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
20 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
21 Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter, and the agent in
22 charge ultimately prepared a statement of found probable cause to charge Pitt with a federal
23 offense for referral to the United States Attorneys’ Office (“USAO”) for prosecution. RFP
24 No. 13 seeks Pitt’s communications with Mr. Malchar who, as discussed above, was Pitt’s
25 private security guard and personal attendant, about the USAO’s investigation into whether to
27 Pitt objects to RFP No. 13 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
28 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
2 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
3 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
4 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
5 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
6 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
8 Pitt’s communications with Malchar about the USAO’s investigation into Pitt are
9 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
10 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
11 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
12 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue in
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
15 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
16 evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their
17 children. Pitt’s communications with Malchar about the USAO’s investigation and
18 evaluation of charges that could be brought against Pitt may contain powerful and candid
19 admissions that will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and
20 affirmative defenses to trial. And as discussed above, Malchar had direct communications
21 with DCFS about its investigation, and likely had direct communications with the FBI and
23 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 13 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
24 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even
25 dangerous assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and
26 their children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law.
27 Pitt cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing
28 their partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
2 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
3 to bury it.
4 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
5 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
6 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
7 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
8 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
9 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
10 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
11 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
13 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
15 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
16 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
17 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
18 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
20 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
22 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
23 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
24 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
25 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
26 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
27 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
28 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
2 Pitt also objects that the phrase “decision-making” is vague and ambiguous. But as
3 has been widely reported—and as Pitt himself likes to tout—the USAO ultimately declined
4 to bring charges against Pitt for his abuse of Jolie and their children on the plane . The
5 decision to charge or not to charge is the “decision-making” referenced in the request and
7 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
8 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
9 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
10 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
11 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
12 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Malchar is for Pitt to produce
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 them. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and are relevant to
17 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with any public relations company from September 14,
18 2016 to February 16, 2022 regarding the USAO’s investigation into and decision-making or
22 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
23 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
24 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
25 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
26 in this action.
27 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
28 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt also
2 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide
4 Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
8 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
9 Angeles. The FBI immediately opened an investigation into the matter, and the agent in
10 charge ultimately prepared a statement of probable cause to charge Pitt with a federal
11 offense for referral to the United States Attorneys’ Office (“USAO”) for prosecution. RFP No.
12 14 seeks Pitt’s communications with public relations companies about the USAO’s
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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14 Pitt objects to RFP No. 14 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
15 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
16 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
17 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
18 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
19 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
20 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
21 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
23 Pitt’s communications with PR companies about the USAO’s investigation into Pitt
24 are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s
25 demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his p urchase of
26 her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes
27 this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a
28 nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue
2 the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will
3 present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury —his abuse of Jolie
4 and their children. Pitt’s communications with a public relations company about the
5 USAO’s investigation will undoubtedly assist Jolie in evaluating and proving her case by
6 revealing what Pitt was telling the media about that investigation. Jolie expects Pitt’s
7 communications to reveal that he was not truthful with public relations companies who
8 worked with Pitt to manage the USAO’s investigation vis-à-vis the public. This
9 untruthfulness is important for Jolie to be able to show at trial because it will underscore
10 how important it was for Pitt to get the NDA from her as part of the Miraval sale. Without
11 it, Pitt would be exposed not just on the fact of his abuse itself, but also for his dishonesty
12 and attempt to cover up his conduct through a public relations campaign built upon
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 falsehoods.
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14 However, upon further review, Jolie is willing to limit the time period covered by
15 this request to communications from September 14, 2016 to December 31, 2018.
16 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 14 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
17 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. This is a meritless and even
18 dangerous assertion. As an initial matter, the notion that one who assaults his partner and
19 their children has a right of privacy in that conduct is wholly unsupported by any case law.
20 Pitt cannot be correct, for domestic abusers are prosecuted routinely for physically abusing
21 their partners and children. The right of privacy does not insulate such conduct from
22 prosecution. And it does not insulate that same conduct from discovery in this civil case
23 where Pitt placed that conduct squarely at issue by demanding a draconian NDA designed
24 to bury it.
25 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
26 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
27 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
28 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
2 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
3 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
4 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
6 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
7 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
8 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
9 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
10 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
11 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
13 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
15 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
16 Studies confirm that women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
17 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
18 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
19 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie not only has the right to collect documentary
20 evidence to prove her case, but these studies counsel that such documentary evidence is
21 essential to establishing domestic violence. The right of privacy in this instance, if any,
23 Pitt also objects that the phrase “decision-making” is vague and ambiguous. But as
24 has been widely reported—and as Pitt himself likes to tout—the USAO ultimately declined
25 to bring charges against Pitt for his abuse of Jolie and their children on the plane . The
26 decision to charge or not to charge is the “decision-making” referenced in the request and
28
2 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
3 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
4 communications with others. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law.
5 Merely because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from
6 someone else does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce the m. Indeed, the most
7 direct way for Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with public relations companies is for
8 Pitt to produce them. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control and
9 are relevant to this case. The Court should order him to produce them.
14 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
15 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
16 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
17 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
18 in this action.
19 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
20 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
21 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
23 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
27 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
28 Angeles. DCFS immediately opened an investigation into the matter. As part of that
2 alcohol testing. RFP No. 15 seeks Pitt’s communications with DCFS during the course of
4 Pitt objects to RFP No. 15 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
5 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
6 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
7 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
8 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
9 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
10 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
11 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
13 Pitt’s communications with DCFS about his abuse of Jolie and their children are
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
15 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
16 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
17 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
18 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue in
19 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
20 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
21 evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their
22 children. Pitt’s communications with DCFS regarding these issues are powerful evidence
23 of what Pitt was hoping to bury with the NDA and will strongly support Jolie’s Cross-
25 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 15 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
26 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
28 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
2 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
3 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
4 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
5 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
6 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
8 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
9 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
10 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
11 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
12 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
15 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her
17 Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evide nce.
18 As discussed above, women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
19 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
20 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
21 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary evidence to prove her
22 points. Pitt’s communications with DCFS will likely contain candid admissions from Pitt
23 about the conduct he admitted to engaging in, and that evidence will greatly assist Jolie in
25 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to Jolie,
26 either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First, this
27 is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
28 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
2 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
3 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with the DCFS is for Pitt to produce them. Pitt’s
4 communications are not publicly available. They are documents within his possession,
5 custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this case, and Pitt has a duty to produce
6 them.
12 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
15 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
16 in this action.
17 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
18 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
19 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
21 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
25 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
26 Angeles. DCFS immediately opened an investigation into the matter. As part of that
27 investigation, DCFS required the implementation of a safety plan and for Pitt to undergo
28 alcohol testing. RFP No. 16 seeks Pitt’s communications with Grant who, as discussed
2 investigation and subsequent remediation efforts. Pitt has specifically acknowledged that
4 Pitt objects to RFP No. 16 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
5 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
6 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
7 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
8 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
9 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
10 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
11 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
13 Pitt’s communications with Grant about the DCFS’s investigation into Pitt are
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
15 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
16 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
17 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
18 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue in
19 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
20 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
21 evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their
22 children. Pitt’s communications with Grant about the DCFS’s investigation and remedial
23 efforts it required of Pitt may contain powerful and candid admissions that will assist Jolie
24 in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses to trial.
26 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 16 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
27 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
2 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
3 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
4 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
5 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
6 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
7 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
9 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
10 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
11 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
12 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
15 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
16 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
17 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
18 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
19 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
21 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
23 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
24 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
25 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
26 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
27 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
28 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
2 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
9 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
10 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
11 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
12 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 in this action.
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SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
15 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
16 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
18 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
22 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
23 Angeles. DCFS immediately opened an investigation into the matter. As part of that
24 investigation, DCFS required the implementation of a safety plan and for Pitt to undergo
25 alcohol testing. RFP No. 17 seeks Pitt’s communications with Liebman who, as discussed
26 above, was Pitt’s agent and confidante, about DCFS’s investigation and subsequent
2 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
3 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
4 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
5 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
6 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
7 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
8 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
10 Pitt’s communications with Liebman about the DCFS’s investigation into Pitt are
11 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
12 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
15 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue in
16 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
17 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
18 evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their
19 children. Pitt’s communications with Liebman about the DCFS’s investigation and
20 remedial efforts it required of Pitt may contain powerful and candid admissions that will
21 assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses
22 to trial. In fact, Liebman himself had direct communications with DCFS, further
23 underscoring the relevance of his communications with Pitt about the DCFS investigation.
25 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 17 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
26 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
28 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
2 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
3 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
4 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
5 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
6 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
8 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
9 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
10 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
11 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
12 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
15 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
16 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
17 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
18 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
20 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
22 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
23 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
24 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
25 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
26 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
27 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
28 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Liebman is for Pitt to produce them. They are
8 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
9 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
10 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
11 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
12 in this action.
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
15 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
17 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
21 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
22 Angeles. DCFS immediately opened an investigation into the matter. As part of that
23 investigation, DCFS required the implementation of a safety plan and for Pitt to undergo
24 alcohol testing. RFP No. 18 seeks Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante who, as
25 discussed above, is one of the partners of the talent agency that helped manage Pitt, about
27 Pitt objects to RFP No. 18 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
28 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
2 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
3 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
4 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
5 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
6 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (“evidence is discoverable “if
8 Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about the DCFS’s investigation into Pitt are
9 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
10 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
11 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
12 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue in
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
15 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
16 evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their
17 children. Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about the DCFS’s investigation and
18 remedial efforts it required of Pitt may contain powerful and candid admissions that will
19 assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses
21 communications with DCFS. Given the nature of their relationships, Jolie expects there are
22 communications between some combination of Liebman, Pitt, and Pett-Dante about the
24 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 18 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
25 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
27 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
28 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
2 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
3 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
4 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
5 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
7 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
8 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
9 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
10 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
11 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
12 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
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14 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
15 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
16 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
17 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
19 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
21 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
22 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
23 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
24 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
25 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
26 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
27 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante is for Pitt to produce them. They are
28 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
7 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
8 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
9 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
10 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
11 in this action.
12 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
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14 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
16 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
20 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
21 Angeles. DCFS immediately opened an investigation into the matter. As part of that
22 investigation, DCFS required the implementation of a safety plan and for Pitt to undergo
23 alcohol testing. RFP No. 19 seeks Pitt’s communications with Perrin about DCFS’s
25 Pitt objects to RFP No. 19 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
26 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
27 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
28 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
2 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
3 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
4 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
6 Pitt’s communications with Perrin about the DCFS’s investigation into Pitt are
7 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
8 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
9 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
10 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
11 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue in
12 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their
15 children. Pitt’s communications with Perrin about the DCFS’s investigation and remedial
16 efforts it required of Pitt may contain powerful and candid admissions that will assist Jolie
17 in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses to trial.
18 And as discussed above, Perrin is Pitt’s partner in the Miraval joint venture and friend.
19 Under these circumstances, there are likely to be communications between them about the
21 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 19 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
22 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
24 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
25 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
26 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
27 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
28 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
2 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
4 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
5 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
6 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
7 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
8 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
9 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
10 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
11 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
12 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
16 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
18 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
19 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
20 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
21 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
22 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
23 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
24 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Perrin is for Pitt to produce them. They are
25 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
27
28
6 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
7 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
8 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
9 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
10 in this action.
11 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
12 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
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13 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
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15 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
19 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
20 Angeles. DCFS immediately opened an investigation into the matter. As part of that
21 investigation, DCFS required the implementation of a safety plan and for Pitt to undergo
22 alcohol testing. RFP No. 20 seeks Pitt’s communications with Malchar about DCFS’s
23 investigation and subsequent remediation efforts. As discussed above, Malchar provi ded
25 Pitt objects to RFP No. 20 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
26 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
27 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
28 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
2 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
3 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
4 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
6 Pitt’s communications with Malchar about the DCFS’s investigation into Pitt are
7 highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand
8 for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her
9 interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this
10 theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity
11 by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue in
12 paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their
15 children. Pitt’s communications with Malchar about the DCFS’s may contain powerful and
16 candid admissions that will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-
17 claim and affirmative defenses to trial. And as discussed above, Malchar had direct
19 Malchar and Pitt about DCFS. Jolie is entitled to receive this evidence.
20 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 20 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
21 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
23 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
24 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
25 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
26 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
27 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
28 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
3 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
4 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
5 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
6 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
7 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
8 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
9 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
10 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
11 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
12 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
15 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
17 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
18 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
19 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
20 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
21 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
22 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
23 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Malchar is for Pitt to produce them. They are
24 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
27 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with any public relations company from September 14,
28 2016 to February 16, 2022 regarding DCFS’s investigation into what transpired on the FLIGHT.
3 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
4 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
5 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
6 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
7 in this action.
8 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
9 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
10 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
12 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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16 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
17 Angeles. DCFS immediately opened an investigation into the matter. As part of that
18 investigation, DCFS required the implementation of a safety plan and for Pitt to undergo
19 alcohol testing. RFP No. 21 seeks Pitt’s communications with any public relations
21 Pitt objects to RFP No. 21 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
22 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
23 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
24 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
25 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
26 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
27 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
28 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
2 Pitt’s communications with PR companies about the DCFS’s investigation into Pitt
3 are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s
4 demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his p urchase of
5 her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes
6 this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a
7 nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the NDA at issue
8 in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of
10 Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of
11 the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children.
12 Pitt’s communications with a public relations company about the DCFS’s investig ation will
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 undoubtedly assist Jolie in evaluating and proving her case by revealing what Pitt was
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14 telling the media about that investigation. Jolie expects that Pitt’s communications will
15 reveal that he was not truthful with public relations companies who worked with Pitt to
16 manage the DCFS’s investigation vis-à-vis the public. This untruthfulness is important for
17 Jolie to be able to show at trial because it will underscore how important it was for Pitt to
18 get the NDA from her as part of the Miraval sale. Without it, Pitt would be exposed not
19 just on the fact of his abuse itself, but also for his dishonesty and attempt to cover up his
21 Upon further review, however, Jolie is willing to limit the time period covered by
22 this request to communications from September 14, 2016 through December 31, 2018.
23 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 21 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
24 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
26 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
27 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
28 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
2 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
3 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
4 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
6 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
7 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
8 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
9 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
10 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
11 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
12 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
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14 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
15 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
16 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
18 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
20 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
21 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
22 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
23 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
24 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
25 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
26 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with PR companies is for Pitt to produce them. They
27 are documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
2 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with DCFS regarding random drug and alcohol testing.
5 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
6 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
7 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
8 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
9 in this action.
10 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “random drug and alcohol testing,” which is
11 vague, ambiguous, and undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
12 documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
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16 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
18 concluding that investigation, DCFS required Pitt to undergo random drug and alcohol
19 testing. RFP No. 22 seeks Pitt’s communications with DCFS specifically concerning this
21 Pitt objects to RFP No. 22 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
22 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
23 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
24 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
25 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
26 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
27 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
28 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
2 Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA.
3 Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of
4 covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that
5 the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal
6 three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the
7 SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie
8 disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying
9 misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s
10 communications with DCFS may contain powerful and candid admissions, especially
11 considering that he agreed to undergo drug and alcohol testing as a result of DCFS’s
12 investigation. DCFS required Pitt to undergo this testing for a reason. Pitt’s direct
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 communications with DCFS on these points may contain important admissions to support
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15 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 22 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
16 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. But Pitt does not have a privacy
17 interest government action taken against him in response to his abuse of his wife and their
18 children. The DCFS both investigated Pitt’s conduct and required him to undergo remedial
19 measures to address it, and Pitt’s supposed right to privacy was no bar to DCFS’s
21 A “court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely
22 assertion of privacy.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046
23 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be
24 specifically identified and carefully comparted with competing our countervailing privacy
25 and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
26 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party
27 asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective
28 invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing
2 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
3 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
4 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
5 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
6 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
7 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
8 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
9 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
10 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
11 defenses with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the
12 victims of domestic violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
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14 and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
16 Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to Jolie, either
17 publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First, this is
18 blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
19 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
20 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
21 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
22 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with the DCFS about the drug and alcohol testing
23 DCFS required of him is for Pitt to produce the documents. Pitt’s communications are not
24 publicly available. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control, the
25 documents are relevant to this case, and Pitt has a duty to produce them.
26 Finally, Pitt objects to RFP No. 22 on the ground that the term “random drug and
27 alcohol testing” is undefined and therefor vague and ambiguous. This objection is
28 meritless. The phrase “random drug and alcohol testing” means exactly what it says.
2 employment. It is a simple and readily understood phrase. Moreover, Pitt knows exactly
3 what he agreed to with DCFS, so the notion that Pitt is somehow confused by these words
4 is disingenuous at best.
7 alcohol testing.
10 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
11 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
12 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
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14 in this action.
15 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “random drug and alcohol testing,” which is
16 vague, ambiguous, and undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
17 documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy
18 under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
21 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
22 Angeles. The Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) immediately opened
23 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, DCFS required Pitt to
24 undergo random drug and alcohol testing. RFP No. 23 seeks Pitt’s communications with
25 Grant about this random drug and alcohol testing. Pitt has specifically acknowledged that
27 Pitt objects to RFP No. 23 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
28 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
2 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
3 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
4 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
5 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
6 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
8 Pitt’s communications with Grant about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt undergo
9 random drug and alcohol testing are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the
10 Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is
11 that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse
12 of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
15 “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to
16 present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that
17 Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with Grant
18 about why Pitt had to undergo this testing may contain powerful and candid admissions that
19 will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative
21 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 23 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
22 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
24 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
25 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
26 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
27 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
28 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
2 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
4 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
5 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
6 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
7 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
8 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
9 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
10 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
11 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
12 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
16 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
18 Pitt objects to RFP No. 23 on the ground that the term “random drug and alcohol
19 testing” is undefined and therefor vague and ambiguous. This objection is meritless. The
20 phrase “random drug and alcohol testing” means exactly what it says. Millions of
22 simple and readily understood phrase. Moreover, Pitt knows exactly what he agreed to
23 with DCFS, so the notion that Pitt is somehow confused by these words is dising enuous at
24 best.
25 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
26 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
27 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
28 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
2 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
3 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Grant is for Pitt to produce them. They are
4 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
8 alcohol testing.
11 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
12 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
15 in this action.
16 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “random drug and alcohol testing,” which is
17 vague, ambiguous, and undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
18 documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy
19 under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
22 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
23 Angeles. The Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) immediately opened
24 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, DCFS required Pitt to
25 undergo random drug and alcohol testing. RFP No. 24 seeks Pitt’s communications with
26 Liebman about this random drug and alcohol testing. Pitt has specifically acknow ledged
28
2 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
3 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
4 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
5 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
6 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
7 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
8 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
10 Pitt’s communications with Liebman about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt
11 undergo random drug and alcohol testing are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that
12 the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a
15 custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He
17 “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to
18 present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that
19 Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with
20 Liebman about why Pitt had to undergo this testing may contain powerful and candid
21 admissions that will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and
23 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 24 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
24 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
26 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
27 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
28 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
2 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
3 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
4 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
6 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
7 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
8 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
9 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
10 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
11 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
12 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
15 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
16 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
18 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
20 Pitt objects to RFP No. 24 on the ground that the term “random drug and alcohol
21 testing” is undefined and therefor vague and ambiguous. This objection is meritless. The
22 phrase “random drug and alcohol testing” means exactly what it says. Millions of
24 simple and readily understood phrase. Moreover, Pitt knows exactly what he agreed to
25 with DCFS, so the notion that Pitt is somehow confused by these words is dising enuous at
26 best.
27 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
28 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
2 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
3 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a thir d party
4 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
5 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Liebman is for Pitt to produce them. They are
6 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
10 alcohol testing.
13 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
15 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
16 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
17 in this action.
18 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “random drug and alcohol testing,” which is
19 vague, ambiguous, and undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
20 documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy
21 under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
24 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
25 Angeles. The Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) immediately opened
26 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, DCFS required Pitt to
27 undergo random drug and alcohol testing. RFP No. 25 seeks Pitt’s communications with
2 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
3 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
4 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
5 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
6 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
7 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
8 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
10 Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt
11 undergo random drug and alcohol testing are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that
12 the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a
15 custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He
17 “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to
18 present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that
19 Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with Pett-
20 Dante about why Pitt had to undergo this testing may contain powerful and candid
21 admissions that will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and
23 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 25 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
24 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
26 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
27 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
28 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
2 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
3 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
4 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
6 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
7 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
8 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
9 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
10 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
11 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
12 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
15 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
16 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
18 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
20 Pitt objects to RFP No. 25 on the ground that the term “random drug and alcohol
21 testing” is undefined and therefor vague and ambiguous. This objection is meritless. The
22 phrase “random drug and alcohol testing” means exactly what it says. Millions of
24 simple and readily understood phrase. Moreover, Pitt knows exactly what he agreed to
25 with DCFS, so the notion that Pitt is somehow confused by these words is dising enuous at
26 best.
27 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
28 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
2 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
3 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a thir d party
4 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
5 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante is for Pitt to produce them. They are
6 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
10 alcohol testing.
13 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
15 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
16 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
17 in this action.
18 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “random drug and alcohol testing,” which is
19 vague, ambiguous, and undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
20 documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy
21 under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
24 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
25 Angeles. The Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) immediately opened
26 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, DCFS required Pitt to
27 undergo random drug and alcohol testing. RFP No. 26 seeks Pitt’s communications with
2 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
3 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
4 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
5 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
6 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
7 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
8 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
10 Pitt’s communications with Perrin about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt undergo
11 random drug and alcohol testing are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the
12 Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a
15 custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He
17 “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to
18 present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that
19 Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with Perrin
20 about why Pitt had to undergo this testing—especially as the owner of a winery—may
21 contain powerful and candid admissions that will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and
22 bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses to trial. Jolie is entitled to receive this
23 evidence.
24 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 26 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
25 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
27 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
28 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
2 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
3 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
4 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
5 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
7 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
8 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
9 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
10 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
11 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
12 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
15 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
16 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
17 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
19 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
21 Pitt objects to RFP No. 26 on the ground that the term “random drug and alcohol
22 testing” is undefined and therefor vague and ambiguous. This objection is meritless. The
23 phrase “random drug and alcohol testing” means exactly what it says. Millions of
25 simple and readily understood phrase. Moreover, Pitt knows exactly what he agreed to
26 with DCFS, so the notion that Pitt is somehow confused by these words is dising enuous at
27 best.
28
2 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
3 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
4 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
5 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
6 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
7 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Perrin is for Pitt to produce them. They are
8 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
12 alcohol testing.
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
15 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
16 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
17 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
18 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
19 in this action.
20 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “random drug and alcohol testing,” which is
21 vague, ambiguous, and undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
22 documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy
23 under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
26 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
27 Angeles. The Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) immediately opened
28 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, DCFS required Pitt to
3 Pitt objects to RFP No. 27 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
4 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
5 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
6 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
7 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
8 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
9 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
10 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
12 Pitt’s communications with Malchar about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt undergo
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 random drug and alcohol testing are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the cas e is
15 that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse
16 of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a
17 custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He
19 “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to
20 present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that
21 Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with
22 Malchar about why Pitt had to undergo this testing may contain powerful and candid
23 admissions that will assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and
25 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 27 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
26 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
28 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
2 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
3 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
4 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
5 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
6 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
8 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
9 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
10 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
11 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
12 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
15 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
16 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
17 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
18 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
20 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
22 Pitt objects to RFP No. 27 on the ground that the term “random drug and alcohol
23 testing” is undefined and therefor vague and ambiguous. This objection is meritless. The
24 phrase “random drug and alcohol testing” means exactly what it says. Millions of
26 simple and readily understood phrase. Moreover, Pitt knows exactly what he agreed to
27 with DCFS, so the notion that Pitt is somehow confused by these words is dising enuous at
28 best.
2 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
3 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
4 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
5 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
6 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
7 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Malchar is for Pitt to produce them. They are
8 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
11 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with any public relations company from September 14,
12 2016 to February 16, 2022 regarding DCFS’s random drug and alcohol testing.
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
15 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
16 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
17 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
18 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
19 in this action.
20 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “random drug and alcohol testing,” which is
21 vague, ambiguous, and undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
22 documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy
23 under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
26 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
27 Angeles. The Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) immediately opened
28 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, DCFS required Pitt to
3 Pitt objects to RFP No. 28 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
4 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
5 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
6 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
7 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
8 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
9 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
10 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
12 Pitt’s communications with PR companies about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 undergo random drug and alcohol testing are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is
15 that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse
16 of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a
17 custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He
19 “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to
20 present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that
21 Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with a
22 public relations company about the DCFS’s investigation will undoubtedly assist Jolie in
23 evaluating and proving her case by revealing what Pitt was telling the media about that
24 investigation. Jolie expects that Pitt’s communications will reveal that he was not truthful
25 with public relations companies who worked with Pitt to manage the DCFS’s investigation
26 vis-à-vis the public. This untruthfulness is important for Jolie to be able to show at trial
27 because it will underscore how important it was for Pitt to get the NDA from her as part of
28 the Miraval sale. Without it, Pitt would be exposed not just on the fact of his abuse itself,
3 Upon further review, however, Jolie is willing to limit the time period covered by
4 this request to communications from September 14, 2016, through December 31, 2018.
5 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 28 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
6 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
8 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
9 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
10 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
11 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
12 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
16 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
17 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
18 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
19 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
20 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
21 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
22 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
23 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
24 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
25 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
26 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
28 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
2 Pitt objects to RFP No. 28 on the ground that the term “random drug and alcohol
3 testing” is undefined and therefor vague and ambiguous. This objection is meritless. The
4 phrase “random drug and alcohol testing” means exactly what it says. Millions of
6 simple and readily understood phrase. Moreover, Pitt knows exactly what he agreed to
7 with DCFS, so the notion that Pitt is somehow confused by these words is dising enuous at
8 best.
9 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
10 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
11 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
12 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
15 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with PR companies is for Pitt to produce them. They
16 are documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
22 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
23 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
24 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
25 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
26 in this action.
27 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
28 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
2 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
3 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right
4 of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
7 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
8 Angeles. DCFS immediately opened an investigation into the matter. As part of that
9 investigation, Pitt agreed to a safety plan for the children. RFP No. 29 seeks Pitt’s
12 Pitt objects to RFP No. 29 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
15 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
16 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
17 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
18 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
19 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
21 Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA.
22 Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of
23 covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that
24 the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal
25 three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the
26 SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie
27 disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying
28 misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s
2 considering that Pitt agreed to the safety plan during DCFS’s investigation. DCFS required
3 the safety plan for a reason. Pitt’s direct communications with DCFS on these points may
5 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 29 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
6 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
8 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
9 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
10 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
11 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
12 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
16 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
17 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
18 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
19 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
20 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
21 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
22 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
23 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and public
24 policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses
25 with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the victims of
26 domestic violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa
28 Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
2 remedy Pitt voluntarily agreed to is powerful evidence of the conduct Pitt was hoping to
4 Pitt’s boilerplate objection that the request seeks documents protected by the
5 physician/patient privilege fares no better. The request on its face seeks communications
6 with DCFS—not with any person covered by the person covered by the physician/patient
7 privilege.
8 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
9 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
10 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
11 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
12 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with the DCFS about the drug and alcohol testing
15 DCFS required of him is for Pitt to produce the documents. Pitt’s communications are not
16 publicly available. They are documents within his possession, custody, or control, the
17 documents are relevant to this case, and Pitt has a duty to produce them.
22 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
23 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
24 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
25 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
26 in this action.
27 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
28 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
2 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
3 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right
4 of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
7 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
8 Angeles. The Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) immediately opened
9 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, Pitt agreed to a safety plan.
10 RFP No. 30 seeks Pitt’s communications with Grant about this safety plan.
11 Pitt objects to RFP No. 30 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
12 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
15 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
16 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
17 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
18 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
20 Pitt’s communications with Grant about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt stipulate
21 to a safety plan are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart
22 over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his
23 purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family.
24 Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was
25 rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the
26 NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie
27 backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the
28 jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his
2 to this safety plan may contain powerful and candid admissions that will assist Jolie in
3 evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses to trial. Jolie
5 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 30 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
6 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
8 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
9 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
10 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
11 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
12 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
16 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
17 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
18 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
19 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
20 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
21 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
22 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
23 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
24 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
25 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
26 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
28 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
2 Pitt’s boilerplate objection that the request seeks documents protected by the
3 physician/patient privilege fares no better. The request on its face seeks communications
4 with Grant—not with any person covered by the person covered by the physician/patient
5 privilege.
6 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
7 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
8 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
9 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
10 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
11 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
12 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Grant is for Pitt to produce them. They are
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
19 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
20 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
21 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
22 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
23 in this action.
24 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
25 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
26 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
27 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
28 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right
4 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
5 Angeles. The Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) immediately opened
6 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, Pitt agreed to a safety plan.
7 RFP No. 31 seeks Pitt’s communications with Liebman about this safety plan.
8 Pitt objects to RFP No. 31 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
9 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
10 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
11 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
12 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
15 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
17 Pitt’s communications with Liebman about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt
18 stipulate to a safety plan are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal
19 fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped
20 to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her
21 family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling
22 (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically
23 places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason
24 for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory
25 to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to
26 bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with Liebman about
27 why Pitt agreed to this safety plan may contain powerful and candid admissions that will
28 assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses
3 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 31 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
4 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
6 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
7 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
8 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
9 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
10 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
11 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
12 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
14 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
15 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
16 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
17 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
18 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
19 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
20 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
21 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
22 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
23 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
24 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
26 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
28
2 physician/patient privilege fares no better. The request on its face seeks communications
3 with Liebman—not with any person covered by the person covered by the physician/patient
4 privilege.
5 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
6 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
7 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
8 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
9 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
10 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
11 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Liebman is for Pitt to produce them. They are
12 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
18 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
19 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
20 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
21 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
22 in this action.
23 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
24 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
25 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
26 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
27 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right
28 of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
3 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
4 Angeles. The Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) immediately opened
5 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, Pitt agreed to a safety plan.
6 RFP No. 32 seeks Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about this safety plan.
7 Pitt objects to RFP No. 32 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
8 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
9 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
10 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
11 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
12 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
16 Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt
17 stipulate to a safety plan are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal
18 fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped
19 to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her
20 family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling
21 (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically
22 places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason
23 for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory
24 to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to
25 bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about
26 why Pitt agreed to this safety plan may contain powerful and candid admissions that will
27 assist Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses
28 to trial. This is especially true given that Pett-Dante’s business partner, Liebman, had direct
2 evidence.
3 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 32 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
4 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
6 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
7 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
8 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
9 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
10 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
11 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
12 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
14 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
15 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
16 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
17 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
18 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
19 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
20 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
21 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
22 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
23 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
24 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
26 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
28
2 physician/patient privilege fares no better. The request on its face seeks communications
4 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
5 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
6 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
7 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
8 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
9 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
10 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante is for Pitt to produce them. They are
11 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
17 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
18 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
19 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
20 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
21 in this action.
22 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
23 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
24 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
25 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
26 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right
27 of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
28
3 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
4 Angeles. The Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) immediately opened
5 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, Pitt agreed to a safety plan.
6 RFP No. 33 seeks Pitt’s communications with Perrin about this safety plan.
7 Pitt objects to RFP No. 33 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
8 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
9 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
10 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
11 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
12 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
16 Pitt’s communications with Perrin about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt stipulate
17 to a safety plan are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart
18 over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his
19 purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family.
20 Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was
21 rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically places the
22 NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie
23 backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory to the
24 jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his
25 abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with Perrin about why Pitt agreed
26 to this safety plan may contain powerful and candid admissions that will assist Jolie in
27 evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses to trial. Jolie
2 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
4 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
5 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
6 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
7 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
8 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
9 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
10 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
12 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
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14 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
15 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
16 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
17 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
18 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
19 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
20 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
21 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
22 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
24 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
26 Pitt’s boilerplate objection that the request seeks documents protected by the
27 physician/patient privilege fares no better. The request on its face seeks communications
28 with Perrin—not with any person covered by the person covered by the physician/patient
2 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
3 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
4 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
5 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
6 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
7 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
8 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Perrin is for Pitt to produce them. They are
9 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
15 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
16 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
17 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
18 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
19 in this action.
20 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
21 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
22 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
23 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
24 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right
25 of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
28 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
2 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, Pitt agreed to a safety plan.
3 RFP No. 34 seeks Pitt’s communications with Malchar about this safety plan.
4 Pitt objects to RFP No. 34 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
5 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
6 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
7 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
8 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
9 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
10 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
11 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
13 Pitt’s communications with Malchar about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 stipulate to a safety plan are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal
15 fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is that Pit t hoped
16 to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her
17 family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling
18 (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically
19 places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason
20 for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory
21 to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to
22 bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with Malchar about why
23 Pitt agreed to this safety plan may contain powerful and candid admissions that will assist
24 Jolie in evaluating her defense and bringing her cross-claim and affirmative defenses to
25 trial. This is especially true given that Malchar had direct communications with DCFS
27 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 34 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
28 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
2 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
3 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
4 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
5 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
6 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
7 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
8 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
10 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
11 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
12 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
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13 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
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14 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
15 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
16 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
17 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
18 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
19 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
20 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
22 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
24 Pitt’s boilerplate objection that the request seeks documents protected by the
25 physician/patient privilege fares no better. The request on its face seeks communications
26 with Malchar—not with any person covered by the person covered by the physician/patient
27 privilege.
28
2 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
3 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
4 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
5 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
6 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
7 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Malchar is for Pitt to produce them. They are
8 documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
11 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with any public relations company from September 14,
15 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
16 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
17 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
18 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
19 in this action.
20 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
21 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
22 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
23 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
24 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right
25 of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
28 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
2 an investigation into the matter. As part of that investigation, Pitt agreed to a safety plan.
3 RFP No. 35 seeks Pitt’s communications with PR companies about this safety plan.
4 Pitt objects to RFP No. 35 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
5 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
6 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
7 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
8 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
9 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
10 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
11 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
13 Pitt’s communications with PR companies about the DCFS’s requirement that Pitt
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
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14 stipulate to a safety plan are highly relevant to this case. Jolie claims that the Miraval deal
15 fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA. Her theory of the case is tha t Pitt hoped
16 to use his purchase of her interest as a means of covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her
17 family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that the deal fell apart over a custody ruling
18 (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal three weeks later). He specifically
19 places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason
20 for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie disagrees, and to present her theory
21 to the jury, Jolie will present evidence of the underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to
22 bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s communications with a public relations
23 company about the DCFS’s investigation will undoubtedly assist Jolie in evaluating and
24 proving her case by revealing what Pitt was telling the media about that investigation. Jolie
25 expects that Pitt’s communications will reveal that he was not truthful with public relations
26 companies who worked with Pitt to manage the DCFS’s investigation vis -à-vis the public.
27 This untruthfulness is important for Jolie to be able to show at trial because it will
28 underscore how important it was for Pitt to get the NDA from her as part of the Miraval
2 his dishonesty and attempt to cover up his conduct through a public relations campaign
4 Upon further review, however, Jolie is willing to limit the time period covered by
5 this request to communications from September 14, 2016 to December 31, 2018.
6 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 35 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
7 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
9 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
10 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
11 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
12 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
15 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
17 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
18 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
19 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
20 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
21 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
22 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
23 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
24 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
25 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
26 defenses with admissible evidence. Women who claim to be the victims of domestic
27 violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
3 Pitt’s boilerplate objection that the request seeks documents protected by the
4 physician/patient privilege fares no better. The request on its face seeks communications
5 with PR companies—not with any person covered by the person covered by the
6 physician/patient privilege.
7 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
8 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
9 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
10 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
11 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
12 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with PR companies is for Pitt to produce them. They
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SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 are documents within his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this
18 voluntarily agreed to engage from September 14, 2016 through December 31, 2018.
21 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
22 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
23 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
24 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
25 in this action.
26 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “therapy,” which is vague, ambiguous, and
27 undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
28 disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy under the Constitution of the
3 On September 14, 2016, Pitt physically and emotionally abused Jolie and their
4 children on an airplane travelling from France to Los Angeles. DCFS and the FBI
5 immediately opened parallel investigations into the matter. As part of concluding these
6 investigations, Pitt voluntarily agreed to participate in certain related therapy. RFP No. 36
7 seeks Pitt’s communications with cross-defendant Warrant Grant about this during the time
8 period immediately following his abuse of Jolie and their children on the plane.
9 Pitt objects to RFP No. 36 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
10 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
11 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
12 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
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14 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
15 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
16 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
18 Grant is a key witness in this case. Not only is he Pitt’s business manager and
19 confidante, but he sent several emails to Jolie’s business manager when Pitt and Jolie
20 purchased Miraval in 2008 confirming that Pitt did not want any agreements between them
21 governing how the property would be disposed of in the even the couple broke up. After
22 Jolie divorced Pitt, Grant was heavily involved in Pitt’s attempts to buy Jolie’s interest in
23 Miraval. As a trusted advisor, Grant likely also had communications with Pitt about how to
24 handle the aftermath of his abuse of Jolie and their children. Those communications will
25 likely contain candid admissions about Pitt’s actions. With those communications in hand,
26 Jolie will be able to establish why, in 2021, Pitt demanded an NDA as a condition to
27 purchasing Jolie’s interest in Miraval. These communications are discoverable and likely
2 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. But Pitt does not have a privacy
3 interest in his communications with Grant about this topic. A “court should not play the
5 Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed
8 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
9 starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
10 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
11 must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior
13 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
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14 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of his communications
15 with Grant would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy
16 here, and any such interest has been waived by his disclosure to third parties . In contrast,
17 Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible evidence
18 regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a personal NDA
19 as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out of their deal
20 when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she
21 files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and public policy based
22 defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible
23 evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence
24 are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
26 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
28
2 commonly understood term and it need not be defined to be understood by Pitt’s highly
4 Finally, Pitt claims that the request seeks information protected by the
5 physician/patient privilege. But this request is not seeking any such communications. Jolie
6 has always applauded his efforts to heal and has no interest in such communications. She
7 seeks, instead, only Pitt’s communications with Grant, who is not a physician, but is instead
11 voluntarily agreed to engage from September 14, 2016 through December 31, 2018.
14 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
15 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
16 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
17 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
18 in this action.
19 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “therapy,” which is vague, ambiguous, and
20 undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
21 disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy under the Constitution of the
24 On September 14, 2016, Pitt physically and emotionally abused Jolie and their
25 children on an airplane travelling from France to Los Angeles. DCFS and the FBI
26 immediately opened parallel investigations into the matter. As part of concluding these
27 investigations, Pitt voluntarily agreed to participate in certain related therapy. RFP No. 37
28 seeks Pitt’s communications with Liebman about this during the time period immediately
2 Pitt objects to RFP No. 37 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
3 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
4 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
5 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
6 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
7 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
8 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
9 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
11 Liebman is a key witness in this case. He is Pitt’s talent agent who communicated
12 directly with DCFS and possibly other government agencies investigating Pitt’s abuse of
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13 Jolie and their children. As a trusted advisor, Liebman likely also had communications
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 with Pitt about how to handle the aftermath of his abuse of Jolie and their children. Those
15 communications will likely contain candid admissions about Pitt’s actions. With those
16 communications in hand, Jolie will be able to establish why, in 2021, Pitt demanded an
19 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 37 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
20 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. But Pitt does not have a privacy
21 interest in his communications with Liebman on this topic. A “court should not play the
23 Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed
24 privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
26 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
27 starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
28 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
3 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
4 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of his communications
5 with Liebman would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of
6 privacy here, and any such interest has been waived by his disclosure to third parties . In
7 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
8 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
9 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
10 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
11 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and public
12 policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses
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13 with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the victims of
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14 domestic violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa
16 Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
18 Pitt also objects that the word “therapy” is vague and ambiguous. Therapy is a
19 commonly understood term and it need not be defined to be understood by Pitt’s highly
21 Finally, Pitt claims that the request seeks information protected by the
22 physician/patient privilege. But this request is not seeking any such communications. She
23 has always applauded his efforts to heal and has no interest in such communications. She
24 seeks, instead, only Pitt’s communications with Liebman, who is not a physician, but is
28 YOU voluntarily agreed to engage from September 14, 2016 through December 31, 2018.
3 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
4 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
5 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
6 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
7 in this action.
8 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “therapy,” which is vague, ambiguous, and
9 undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
10 disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy under the Constitution of the
13 On September 14, 2016, Pitt physically and emotionally abused Jolie and their
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 children on an airplane travelling from France to Los Angeles. DCFS and the FBI
15 immediately opened parallel investigations into the matter. As part of concluding these
16 investigations, Pitt voluntarily agreed to participate in certain related therapy. RFP No. 38
17 seeks Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about this during the time period immediately
19 Pitt objects to RFP No. 38 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
20 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
21 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
22 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
23 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
24 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
25 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
26 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
28
2 partner, Liebman, communicated directly with DCFS and possibly other government
3 agencies investigating Pitt’s abuse of Jolie and their children. Pett-Dante is also one of
4 Pitt’s trusted advisors and likely also had communications with Pitt about how to handle the
5 aftermath of his abuse of Jolie and their children—relevant here, communications about
7 admissions about Pitt’s actions. With those communications in hand, Jolie will be able to
8 establish why, in 2021, Pitt demanded an NDA as a condition to purchasing Jolie’s interest
9 in Miraval. These communications are discoverable and will likely to lead to the discovery
10 of admissible evidence.
11 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 38 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
12 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. But Pitt does not have a privacy
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13 interest in his communications with Pett-Dante about voluntary therapy. A “court should
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14 not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely assertion of privacy.”
15 Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the
16 claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
18 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
19 starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
20 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
21 must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior
23 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
24 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of his communications
25 with Pett-Dante would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of
26 privacy here, and any such interest has been waived by his disclosure to third parties . In
27 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
28 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
2 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
3 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionabilit y, and public
4 policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses
5 with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the victims of
6 domestic violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa
8 Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
10 Pitt also objects that the word “therapy” is vague and ambiguous. Therapy is a
11 commonly understood term and it need not be defined to be understood by Pitt’s highly
13 Finally, Pitt claims that the request seeks information protected by the
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 physician/patient privilege. But this request is not seeking any such communications. Jolie
15 has always applauded his efforts to heal and has no interest in such communications. She
16 seeks, instead, only Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante, who is not a physician, but is
17 instead the owner of the talent agency that represents and manages Pitt.
20 voluntarily agreed to engage from September 14, 2016 through December 31, 2018.
23 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
24 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
25 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
26 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
27 in this action.
28
2 undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
3 disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy under the Constitution of the
6 On September 14, 2016, Pitt physically and emotionally abused Jolie and their
7 children on an airplane travelling from France to Los Angeles. DCFS and the FBI
8 immediately opened parallel investigations into the matter. As part of concluding these
9 investigations, Pitt voluntarily agreed to participate in certain related therapy. RFP No. 39
10 seeks Pitt’s communications with Perrin about this during the time period immediately
12 Pitt objects to RFP No. 39 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
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14 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
15 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
16 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
17 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
18 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
19 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
21 Perrin co-owns with Pitt the Miraval joint venture, Miraval Provence. As Pitt’s
22 business partner, Pitt likely communicated with Perrin about DCFS and possibly other
23 government agencies investigating Pitt’s abuse of Jolie and their children. Perrin is als o
24 one of Pitt’s friends and likely also had communications with Pitt about how to handle the
25 aftermath of his abuse of Jolie and their children. Those communications will likely
26 contain candid admissions about Pitt’s actions. With those communications in hand, Jolie
27 will be able to establish why, in 2021, Pitt demanded an NDA as a condition to purchasing
28 Jolie’s interest in Miraval. These communications are discoverable and will likely to lead
2 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 39 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
3 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. But Pitt does not have a privacy
4 interest in his communications with Perrin about this issue. A “court should not play the
6 Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed
7 privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
9 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
10 starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
11 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
12 must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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14 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
15 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of his communications
16 with Perrin would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of p rivacy
17 here, and any such interest has been waived by his disclosure to third parties . In contrast,
18 Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible evidence
19 regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a personal NDA
20 as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out of their deal
21 when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she
22 files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and public policy based
23 defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible
24 evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence
25 are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman,
27 Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary
2 commonly understood term and it need not be defined to be understood by Pitt’s highly
4 Finally, Pitt claims that the request seeks information protected by the
5 physician/patient privilege. But this request is not seeking any such communications. Jolie
6 has always applauded his efforts to heal and has no interest in such communications. She
7 seeks, instead, only Pitt’s communications with Perrin, who is not a physician, but is
8 instead the co-owner of Miraval Provence and a fellow cross defendant in this case.
11 voluntarily agreed to engage from September 14, 2016 through December 31, 2018.
14 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
15 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
16 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
17 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
18 in this action.
19 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “therapy,” which is vague, ambiguous, and
20 undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
21 disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy under the Constitution of the
24 On September 14, 2016, Pitt physically and emotionally abused Jolie and their
25 children on an airplane travelling from France to Los Angeles. DCFS and the FBI
26 immediately opened parallel investigations into the matter. As part of concluding these
27 investigations, Pitt voluntarily agreed to participate in certain related therapy. RFP No. 40
28 seeks Pitt’s communications with Malchar about this during the time period immediately
2 Pitt objects to RFP No. 40 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
3 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
4 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
5 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
6 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
7 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
8 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
9 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
11 Malchar is Pitt’s talent agent and communicated directly with DCFS and possibly
12 other government agencies investigating Pitt’s abuse of Jolie and their children. As Pitt’s
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 private security and personal attendant, Malchar likely also had communications wit h Pitt
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 about how to handle the aftermath of his abuse of Jolie and their children. Those
15 communications will likely contain candid admissions about Pitt’s actions. With those
16 communications in hand, Jolie will be able to establish why, in 2021, Pitt demanded an
19 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 40 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
20 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. But Pitt does not have a privacy
21 interest in his communications with Malchar about voluntary therapy. A “court shou ld not
23 Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the
24 claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
26 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
27 starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
28 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
3 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
4 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of his communications
5 with Malchar would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of
6 privacy here, and any such interest has been waived by his disclosure to third parties . In
7 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
8 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
9 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
10 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
11 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and public
12 policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the victims of
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 domestic violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa
16 Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
18 Pitt also objects that the word “therapy” is vague and ambiguous. Therapy is a
19 commonly understood term and it need not be defined to be understood by Pitt’s highly
21 Finally, Pitt claims that the request seeks information protected by the
22 physician/patient privilege. But this request is not seeking any such communications. Jolie
23 has always applauded his efforts to heal and has no interest in such communications. She
24 seeks, instead, only Pitt’s communications with Malchar, who is not a physician, but is
27 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with any public relations company from September 14,
28 2016 to February 16, 2022 regarding any therapy in which YOU voluntarily agreed to engage
4 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
5 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
6 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
7 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
8 in this action.
9 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “therapy,” which is vague, ambiguous, and
10 undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
11 disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy under the Constitution of the
14 On September 14, 2016, Pitt physically and emotionally abused Jolie and their
15 children on an airplane travelling from France to Los Angeles. DCFS and the FBI
16 immediately opened parallel investigations into the matter. As part of concluding these
17 investigations, Pitt voluntarily agreed to participate in certain related therapy. RFP No. 41
18 seeks Pitt’s communications with public relations companies about this during the time
19 period immediately following his abuse of Jolie and their children on the plane.
20 Pitt objects to RFP No. 41 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
21 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
22 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
23 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
24 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
25 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
26 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
27 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
2 topic, those communications will assist Jolie in evaluating and proving her case by
3 revealing what Pitt was telling the media about it. Jolie expects that Pitt’s communications
4 will reveal that he was not truthful with public relations companies who worked with Pitt to
5 manage the DCFS’s investigation vis-à-vis the public. This untruthfulness is important for
6 Jolie to be able to show at trial because it will underscore how important it was for Pitt to
7 get the NDA from her as part of the Miraval sale. Without it, Pitt would be expos ed not
8 just on the fact of his abuse itself, but also for his dishonesty and attempt to cover up his
10 Upon further review, however, Jolie is willing to limit the time period covered by
11 this request to communications from September 14, 2016 to December 31, 2018.
12 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 41 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. But Pitt does not have a privacy
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 interest in his communications with PR companies about this topic. A “court should not
16 Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the
17 claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
19 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
20 starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
21 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
22 must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior
24 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
25 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of his communications
26 with PR companies would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of
27 privacy here, and any privacy interest has been waived. In contrast, Jolie has a specific and
2 buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out of their deal when Jolie refused.
3 Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her answer,
4 including unclean hands, unconscionability, and public policy based defenses. Jolie must
5 be able to prove the facts underpinning these defenses with admissible evidence. As
6 discussed above, women who claim to be the victims of domestic violence are rarely
7 believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:
8 Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167
9 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect documentary evidence to prove her
10 points.
11 Pitt also objects that the word “therapy” is vague and ambiguous. Therapy is a
12 commonly understood term and it need not be defined to be understood by Pitt’s highly
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
14 Finally, Pitt claims that the request seeks information protected by the
15 physician/patient privilege. But this request is not seeking any such communications. Jolie
16 has always applauded his efforts to heal and has no interest in such communications. She
20 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with the LAPD from September 14, 2016 to September
24 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
25 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
26 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
27 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
28 in this action.
2 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
3 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
5 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
9 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
10 Angeles. Because the flight landed at the Los Angeles International Airport, the Los
11 Angeles Police Department was initially involved in responding to the anonymous report
13 Pitt objects to RFP No. 42 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
15 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
16 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
17 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
18 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
19 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
20 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
22 Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA.
23 Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of
24 covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that
25 the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal
26 three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the
27 SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie
28 disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will have to present evidence of the
2 communications with the LAPD may contain powerful and candid admissions about what
3 happened on the flight. Those communications will serve as evidence to support Jolie’s
5 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 42 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
6 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
8 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
9 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
10 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
11 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
12 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
16 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
17 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
18 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
19 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
20 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
21 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
22 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
23 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
24 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
25 defenses with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the
26 victims of domestic violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein
27 & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and
28 Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
2 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
3 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
4 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
5 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
6 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
7 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
8 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with the LAPD is for Pitt to produce them. Pitt’s
9 communications with the LAPD are not publicly available. They are documents within his
10 possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this case, and Pitt has a duty
11 to produce them.
17 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
18 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
19 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
20 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
21 in this action.
22 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
23 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
24 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
26 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
28
3 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
4 Angeles. Because the flight landed at the Los Angeles International Airport, the Lo s
5 Angeles Police Department was initially involved in responding to the anonymous report
7 Pitt objects to RFP No. 43 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
8 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
9 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
10 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
11 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
12 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
16 Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA.
17 Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of
18 covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that
19 the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal
20 three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the
21 SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie
22 disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will have to present evidence of the
23 underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s
24 communications with Grant may contain powerful and candid admissions about what
25 happened on the flight. Those communications will serve as evidence to support Jolie’s
27 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 43 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
28 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
2 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
3 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
4 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
5 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
6 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
7 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
8 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
10 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
11 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
12 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
15 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
16 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
17 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
18 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
19 defenses with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the
20 victims of domestic violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein
21 & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and
22 Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
24 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
25 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
26 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
27 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
28 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
2 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Grant is for Pitt to produce them. Pitt’s
3 communications with Grant are not publicly available. They are documents within his
4 possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this case, and Pitt has a duty
5 to produce them.
11 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
12 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
15 in this action.
16 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
17 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
18 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
20 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
24 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
25 Angeles. Because the flight landed at the Los Angeles International Airport, the Lo s
26 Angeles Police Department was initially involved in responding to the anonymous report
28
2 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
3 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
4 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
5 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
6 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
7 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
8 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
10 Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA.
11 Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of
12 covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the
15 SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie
16 disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will have to present evidence of the
17 underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s
18 communications with Liebman may contain powerful and candid admissions about what
19 happened on the flight. Those communications will serve as evidence to support Jolie’s
21 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 44 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
22 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
24 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
25 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
26 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
27 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
28 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
2 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
4 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
5 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
6 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
7 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
8 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
9 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
10 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
11 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
12 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 defenses with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 victims of domestic violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein
15 & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and
16 Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
18 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
19 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
20 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
21 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
22 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
23 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
24 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Liebman is for Pitt to produce them. Pitt’s
25 communications with Liebman are not publicly available. They are documents within his
26 possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this case, and Pitt has a duty
27 to produce them.
28
6 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
7 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
8 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
9 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
10 in this action.
11 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
12 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
15 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
19 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
20 Angeles. Because the flight landed at the Los Angeles International Airport, the Lo s
21 Angeles Police Department was initially involved in responding to the anonymous report
23 Pitt objects to RFP No. 45 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
24 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
25 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
26 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
27 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
28 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
2 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
4 Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA.
5 Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of
6 covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that
7 the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal
8 three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the
9 SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie
10 disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will have to present evidence of the
11 underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s
12 communications with Pett-Dante may contain powerful and candid admissions about what
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13 happened on the flight. Those communications will serve as evidence to support Jolie’s
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15 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 45 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
16 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
18 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
19 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
20 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
21 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
22 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
23 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
24 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
26 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
27 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
28 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
2 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
3 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
4 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
5 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
6 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
7 defenses with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the
8 victims of domestic violence are rarely believed on their word alone. See Deborah Epstein
9 & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and
10 Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
12 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
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13 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
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14 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
15 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
16 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
17 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
18 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante is for Pitt to produce them. Pitt’s
19 communications with Pett-Dante are not publicly available. They are documents within his
20 possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this case, and Pitt has a duty
21 to produce them.
27 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
28 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
2 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
3 in this action.
4 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
5 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California. Pitt further
6 objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and provide information
8 equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is more
12 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
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13 Angeles. Because the flight landed at the Los Angeles International Airport, the Lo s
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14 Angeles Police Department was initially involved in responding to the anonymous report
16 Pitt objects to RFP No. 46 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
17 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
18 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
19 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
20 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
21 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
22 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
23 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
25 Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA.
26 Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of
27 covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that
28 the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal
2 SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie
3 disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will have to present evidence of the
4 underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s
5 communications with Malchar may contain powerful and candid admissions about what
6 happened on the flight. Those communications will serve as evidence to support Jolie’s
8 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 46 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
9 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
11 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
12 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
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14 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
15 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
16 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
17 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
19 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
20 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
21 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
22 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
23 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
24 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
25 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
26 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
27 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
28 defenses with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the
2 & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and
3 Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
5 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
6 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
7 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
8 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
9 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
10 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
11 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with Malchar is for Pitt to produce them. Pitt’s
12 communications with Malchar are not publicly available. They are documents within his
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13 possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this case, and Pitt has a duty
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14 to produce them.
16 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with any public relations company regarding the LAPD’s
20 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
21 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
22 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
23 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
24 in this action. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks documents protected from
25 disclosure by the right of privacy under the Constitution of the State of California.
26 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
27 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
28 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
4 emotionally abused Jolie and their children on an airplane travelling from France to Los
5 Angeles. Because the flight landed at the Los Angeles International Airport, the Lo s
6 Angeles Police Department was initially involved in responding to the anonymous report
8 Pitt objects to RFP No. 47 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
9 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
10 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
11 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
12 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
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13 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
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14 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
15 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
17 Jolie claims that the Miraval deal fell apart over Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA.
18 Her theory of the case is that Pitt hoped to use his purchase of her interest as a means of
19 covering up his prior abuse of Jolie and her family. Pitt disputes this theory and alleges that
20 the deal fell apart over a custody ruling (that was rendered a nullity by the Court of Appeal
21 three weeks later). Pitt specifically places the NDA at issue in paragraphs 83 to 92 of the
22 SAC, calling it a “pretextual” reason for Jolie backing out of the deal. (SAC at ¶ 88.) Jolie
23 disagrees, and to present her theory to the jury, Jolie will have to present evidence of the
24 underlying misconduct that Pitt hoped to bury—his abuse of Jolie and their children. Pitt’s
25 communications with a public relations company about the FBI’s investigation will
26 undoubtedly assist Jolie in evaluating and proving her case by revealing what Pitt was
27 telling the media about the FBI’s investigation. Jolie expects that Pitt’s communications
28 will reveal that he was not truthful with public relations companies who worked with Pitt to
2 Jolie to be able to show at trial because it will underscore how important it was for Pitt to
3 get the NDA from her as part of the Miraval sale. Without it, Pitt would be exposed not
4 just on the fact of his abuse itself, but also for his dishonesty and attempt to cover up his
6 However, upon further review, Jolie is willing to limit the time period covered by
7 this request to communications from September 14, 2016, to December 31, 2018.
8 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 47 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
9 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
11 Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the claimed privacy
12 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
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14 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
15 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
16 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
17 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
19 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
20 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
21 would invade. And there is none. Pitt does not have an expectation of privacy here. In
22 contrast, Jolie has a specific and important countervailing interest in obtaining admissible
23 evidence regarding a hotly contested factual dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a
24 personal NDA as a condition to buying Jolie’s interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out
25 of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie intends to assert numerous affirmative
26 defenses when she files her answer, including unclean hands, unconscionability, and
27 public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to prove the facts underpinning these
28 defenses with admissible evidence. As discussed above, women who claim to be the
2 & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and
3 Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399 (2019). Thus, Jolie must collect
5 Finally, Pitt claims that the requests seek information that is equally available to
6 Jolie, either publicly or from third parties, rendering the requests unduly burdensome. First,
7 this is blatantly untrue. As between Jolie and Pitt, only Pitt has access to his own
8 communications. Moreover, this is not a valid objection under California law. Merely
9 because a party theoretically has the ability to obtain these documents from a third party
10 does not eliminate the party’s obligation to produce them. Indeed, the most direct way for
11 Jolie to obtain Pitt’s communications with PR companies is for Pitt to produce them. Pitt’s
12 communications with PR companies are not publicly available. They are documents within
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13 his possession, custody, or control, the documents are relevant to this case, and Pitt has a
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20 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
21 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
22 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
23 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
24 in this action.
25 Pitt also objects to the use of the term “personal overuse or abuse of alcohol,” which is
26 vague, ambiguous, and undefined. Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
27 documents protected from disclosure by the physician/patient privilege, the right of privacy
28 under the Constitution of the State of California, and/or any other applicable laws.
2 . This request seeks documents to help establish the connection between Pitt’s
3 alcohol use and his demand for an NDA to cover up all of the related details. Publicly,
4 Pitt’s sources repeatedly and vociferously denied that alcohol played any role in Pitt’s
5 relationship with Jolie and their children. His private, non-privileged discussions are
6 potentially powerful evidence to help establish whether his use of alcohol did in fact play a
7 role in that relationship—as Jole contends and which supports why he needed an NDA—or
8 it will help establish that Pitt’s use of alcohol was completely unconnected to any wrongful
9 conduct, thereby supporting Pitt’s theory of the case. Either way the evidence is relevant
10 and discoverable.
11 Pitt objects to RFP No. 48 on the ground that it seeks documents that are not
12 relevant to this case. “Any doubts about relevance are generally resolved in favor of
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13 allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98
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14 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might reasonably assist a party in
15 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the
16 test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible
17 evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See
18 also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206 (2006) (evidence is discoverable “if
20 For Jolie to explain to the jury why the NDA was a dealbreaker for her —and why it
21 was essential for Pitt—she must be able to show what Pitt hoped to hide with the NDA.
22 While the NDA was certainly intended to cover up his abuse of Jolie and their children, it
23 was also designed to help bury the role alcohol played in his relationships with his family.
24 His non-privileged communications on this topic with others are thus highly relevant and
25 discoverable.
26 Pitt also objects to RFP No. 48 on the ground that it seeks documents protected by
27 the right of privacy under the California Constitution. A “court should not play the trump
2 right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully comparted with
3 competing our countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a balancing test.” Hill v.
4 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a starting point, courts must
5 first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and
6 seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
7 countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th
9 In his objections and during the subsequent lengthy meet-and-confer process, Pitt
10 did not specifically identify any privacy interest that production of the requested documents
12 communications concerning this issue. In contrast, Jolie has a specific and important
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14 dispute in this case: why Pitt demanded a personal NDA as a condition to buyin g Jolie’s
15 interest in Miraval and why Pitt backed out of their deal when Jolie refused. Further, Jolie
16 intends to assert numerous affirmative defenses when she files her answer, including
17 unclean hands, unconscionability, and public-policy based defenses. Jolie must be able to
19 Pitt also objects that the phrase “personal overuse or abuse of alcohol” is vague and
20 ambiguous. But Pitt does not explain the ambiguity and it is not ambiguous. This phrase is
21 constructed with commonly used words and is readily understandable to an ordinary person.
23 Finally, Pitt claims that the request seeks information that is protected by the
24 physician-patient privilege. To the extent Pitt has such communications on this topic with a
25 physician, Jolie has no interest in those documents and they can obviously be withheld. But
26 to the extent Pitt had communications not covered by that privilege, Pitt must produce
27 them.
28
3 Authority in Support Thereof Re: Testimony Regarding Domestic Violence that Jolie filed
7 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
8 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
9 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
10 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
11 in this action.
12 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
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13 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
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14 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
15 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
16 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the right of privacy under the
19 In February 2021, Jolie agreed to sell Pitt her half-interest in Chateau Miraval. In March
20 2021, Pitt “stepped back” from the agreement, then demanded an NDA from Jolie that would
21 cover Pitt’s personal conduct. The reason for Pitt’s demand is simple: On March 12, 2021, as
22 part of the couple’s ongoing child custody dispute, Jolie filed under seal two “Offers of Proof”
23 detailing the evidence of Pitt’s domestic violence against Jolie and their children. When Jolie
24 filed the evidence in the custody suit, she was careful to file it under seal so that no member of
25 the public could see it. But Jolie’s sealed filing, which included emails, summaries of the
26 family’s expected testimony, and other evidence, caused Pitt to fear that the information could
27 eventually become public. For the previous five years and to protect their children’s health and
28 privacy, Jolie had never revealed to the public any details of Pitt’s abuse and related efforts to
2 preserve the family’s privacy, and he attempted to leverage his buyout of Jolie’s interest in
4 Pitt objects to this request on relevance grounds. “Any doubts about relevance are
5 generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158
6 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might
7 reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a
8 settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might
9 reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53
10 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206
12 evidence”).
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13 Pitt’s communications with his business manager, Warrant Grant, about the Offers of
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14 Proof will be extremely important, contemporaneous evidence that will help Jolie establish the
15 link between the NDA Pitt demanded and the abuse Pitt was hoping to bury. This evidence
16 goes to the heart of the case, especially if Pitt has communications with Grant where he spells
17 out that link, which would directly contradict his allegations in this case. Those
18 communications are obviously relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
19 Pitt also objects on the ground that the requested documents are publicly available or
20 equally available to Jolie. But Jolie does not have access to Pitt’s or Grant’s communications.
21 The documents are not publicly available and the Court should overrule this boilerplate
22 objection.
23 Finally, Pitt objects that the request will invade his right to privacy. A “court should
24 not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely assertion of privacy.”
25 Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the
26 claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
28 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
2 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
3 must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior
5 Pitt does not have a privacy interest in his communications with his business
6 manager about allegations of abuse filed by Pitt’s ex-wife in court. Pitt did not identify
7 such an interest during the meet-and-confer process. On the other hand, and as discussed
8 above, Jolie has a compelling interest in obtaining these communications to show the
9 factfinder the link between the Offer of Proof she filed, Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA,
10 and why the deal to purchase her interest in Miraval ultimately fell apart. These documents
11 will also help establish Jolie’s state of mind, defend against Pitt’s request for punitive
12 damages on the ground that Jolie was acting maliciously when she sold to a third party, and
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13 help Jolie establish the factual predicates for her affirmative defenses, including unclean
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17 and Authority in Support Thereof Re: Testimony Regarding Domestic Violence that Jolie filed
21 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
22 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
23 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
24 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
25 in this action.
26 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
27 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
28 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
2 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the right of privacy under the
5 In February 2021, Jolie agreed to sell Pitt her half-interest in Chateau Miraval. In March
6 2021, Pitt “stepped back” from the agreement, then demanded an NDA from Jolie that would
7 cover Pitt’s personal conduct. The reason for Pitt’s demand is simple: On March 12, 2021, as
8 part of the couple’s ongoing child custody dispute, Jolie filed under seal two “Offers of Proof”
9 detailing the evidence of Pitt’s domestic violence against Jolie and their children. When Jolie
10 filed the evidence in the custody suit, she was careful to file it under seal so that no member of
11 the public could see it. But Jolie’s sealed filing, which included emails, summaries of the
12 family’s expected testimony, and other evidence, caused Pitt to fear that the information could
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13 eventually become public. For the previous five years and to protect their children’s health and
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14 privacy, Jolie had never revealed to the public any details of Pitt’s abuse and related efforts to
15 cover it up. Nevertheless, Pitt was no longer willing to rely on Jolie’s voluntary efforts to
16 preserve the family’s privacy, and he attempted to leverage his buyout of Jolie’s interest in
18 Pitt objects to this request on relevance grounds. “Any doubts about relevance are
19 generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158
20 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might
21 reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a
22 settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might
23 reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53
24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206
26 evidence”).
27 Pitt’s communications with his agent, Liebman, about the Offers of Proof will be
28 extremely important, contemporaneous evidence that will help Jolie establish the link between
2 of the case, especially if Pitt has communications with Liebman where he spells out that link,
3 which would directly contradict his allegations in this case. Those communications are
5 Pitt also objects on the ground that the requested documents are publicly available or
6 equally available to Jolie. But Jolie does not have access to Pitt’s or Liebman’s
7 communications. The documents are not publicly available and the Court should overrule this
8 boilerplate objection.
9 Finally, Pitt objects that the request will invade his right to privacy. A “court should
10 not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely assertion of privacy.”
11 Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the
12 claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
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14 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
15 starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
16 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
17 must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior
19 Pitt does not have a privacy interest in his communications with his Liebman about
20 allegations of abuse filed by Pitt’s ex-wife in court. Pitt did not identify such an interest
21 during the meet-and-confer process. On the other hand, and as discussed above, Jolie has a
22 compelling interest in obtaining these communications to show the factfinder the link
23 between the Offer of Proof she filed, Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA, and why the deal
24 to purchase her interest in Miraval ultimately fell apart. These documents will also help
25 establish Jolie’s state of mind, defend against Pitt’s request for punitive damages on the
26 ground that Jolie was acting maliciously when she sold to a third party, and help Jolie
27 establish the factual predicates for her affirmative defenses, including unclean hands,
3 Proof and Authority in Support Thereof Re: Testimony Regarding Domestic Violence that Jolie
4 filed under seal in the DIVORCE CASE on or about March 12, 2021.
7 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
8 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
9 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
10 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
11 in this action.
12 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
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13 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
15 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
16 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the right of privacy under the
19 In February 2021, Jolie agreed to sell Pitt her half-interest in Chateau Miraval. In March
20 2021, Pitt “stepped back” from the agreement, then demanded an NDA from Jolie that would
21 cover Pitt’s personal conduct. The reason for Pitt’s demand is simple: On March 12, 2021, as
22 part of the couple’s ongoing child custody dispute, Jolie filed under seal two “Offers of Proof”
23 detailing the evidence of Pitt’s domestic violence against Jolie and their children. When Jolie
24 filed the evidence in the custody suit, she was careful to file it under seal so that no member of
25 the public could see it. But Jolie’s sealed filing, which included emails, summaries of the
26 family’s expected testimony, and other evidence, caused Pitt to fear that the information could
27 eventually become public. For the previous five years and to protect their children’s health and
28 privacy, Jolie had never revealed to the public any details of Pitt’s abuse and related efforts to
2 preserve the family’s privacy, and he attempted to leverage his buyout of Jolie’s interest in
4 Pitt objects to this request on relevance grounds. “Any doubts about relevance are
5 generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158
6 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might
7 reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a
8 settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might
9 reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53
10 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206
12 evidence”).
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
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13 Pitt’s communications with Pett-Dante about the Offers of Proof will be extremely
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 important, contemporaneous evidence that will help Jolie establish the link between the NDA
15 Pitt demanded and the abuse Pitt was hoping to bury. This evidence goes to the heart of the
16 case, especially if Pitt has communications with Pett-Dante where he spells out that link, which
17 would directly contradict his allegations in this case. Those communications are obviously
19 Pitt also objects on the ground that the requested documents are publicly available or
20 equally available to Jolie. But Jolie does not have access to Pitt’s or Pett-Dante’s
21 communications. The documents are not publicly available and the Court should overrule this
22 boilerplate objection.
23 Finally, Pitt objects that the request will invade his right to privacy. A “court should
24 not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely assertion of privacy.”
25 Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the
26 claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
28 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
2 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
3 must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior
5 Pitt does not have a privacy interest in his communications with Pett-Dante about
6 allegations of abuse filed by Pitt’s ex-wife in court. Pitt did not identify such an interest
7 during the meet-and-confer process. On the other hand, and as discussed above, Jolie has a
8 compelling interest in obtaining these communications to show the factfinder the link
9 between the Offer of Proof she filed, Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA, and why the deal
10 to purchase her interest in Miraval ultimately fell apart. These documents will also help
11 establish Jolie’s state of mind, defend against Pitt’s request for punitive damages on the
12 ground that Jolie was acting maliciously when she sold to a third party, and help Jolie
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 establish the factual predicates for her affirmative defenses, including unclean hands,
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
17 Authority in Support Thereof Re: Testimony Regarding Domestic Violence that Jolie filed
21 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
22 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
23 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
24 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
25 in this action.
26 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
27 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
28 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
2 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the right of privacy under the
5 In February 2021, Jolie agreed to sell Pitt her half-interest in Chateau Miraval. In March
6 2021, Pitt “stepped back” from the agreement, then demanded an NDA from Jolie that would
7 cover Pitt’s personal conduct. The reason for Pitt’s demand is simple: On March 12, 2021, as
8 part of the couple’s ongoing child custody dispute, Jolie filed under seal two “Offers of Proof”
9 detailing the evidence of Pitt’s domestic violence against Jolie and their children. When Jolie
10 filed the evidence in the custody suit, she was careful to file it under seal so that no member of
11 the public could see it. But Jolie’s sealed filing, which included emails, summaries of the
12 family’s expected testimony, and other evidence, caused Pitt to fear that the information could
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 eventually become public. For the previous five years and to protect their children’s health and
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 privacy, Jolie had never revealed to the public any details of Pitt’s abuse and related efforts to
15 cover it up. Nevertheless, Pitt was no longer willing to rely on Jolie’s voluntary efforts to
16 preserve the family’s privacy, and he attempted to leverage his buyout of Jolie’s interest in
18 Pitt objects to this request on relevance grounds. “Any doubts about relevance are
19 generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158
20 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might
21 reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a
22 settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might
23 reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53
24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206
26 evidence”).
27 Pitt’s communications with Perrin about the Offers of Proof will be extremely important,
28 contemporaneous evidence that will help Jolie establish the link between the NDA Pitt
2 especially if Pitt has communications with Perrin where he spells out that link, which would
3 directly contradict his allegations in this case. Indeed, discovery in this case has already
4 confirmed that both Pitt and Perrin sought the expanded NDA covering Pitt’s personal conduct
5 specifically in response to the Offer of Proof’s filing. Their communications are obviously
7 Pitt also objects on the ground that the requested documents are publicly available or
8 equally available to Jolie. But Jolie does not have access to Pitt’s or Perrin’s communications.
9 The documents are not publicly available and the Court should overrule this boilerplate
10 objection.
11 Finally, Pitt objects that the request will invade his right to privacy. A “court should
12 not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely assertion of privacy.”
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
16 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
17 starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
18 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
19 must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior
21 Pitt does not have a privacy interest in his communications with Perrin about
22 allegations of abuse filed by Pitt’s ex-wife in court. Pitt did not identify such an interest
23 during the meet-and-confer process. On the other hand, and as discussed above, Jolie has a
24 compelling interest in obtaining these communications to show the factfinder the link
25 between the Offer of Proof she filed, Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA, and why the deal
26 to purchase her interest in Miraval ultimately fell apart. These documents will also help
27 establish Jolie’s state of mind, defend against Pitt’s request for punitive damages on the
28 ground that Jolie was acting maliciously when she sold to a third party, and help Jolie
5 and Authority in Support Thereof Re: Testimony Regarding Domestic Violence that Jolie filed
9 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
10 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
11 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
12 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 in this action.
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 Pitt further objects to this Request to the extent it would require Pitt to search for and
15 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
16 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
17 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
18 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the right of privacy under the
21 In February 2021, Jolie agreed to sell Pitt her half-interest in Chateau Miraval. In March
22 2021, Pitt “stepped back” from the agreement, then demanded an NDA from Jolie that would
23 cover Pitt’s personal conduct. The reason for Pitt’s demand is simple: On March 12, 2021, as
24 part of the couple’s ongoing child custody dispute, Jolie filed under seal two “Offers of Proof”
25 detailing the evidence of Pitt’s domestic violence against Jolie and their children. When Jolie
26 filed the evidence in the custody suit, she was careful to file it under seal so that no member of
27 the public could see it. But Jolie’s sealed filing, which included emails, summaries of the
28 family’s expected testimony, and other evidence, caused Pitt to fear that the information could
2 privacy, Jolie had never revealed to the public any details of Pitt’s abuse and related efforts to
3 cover it up. Nevertheless, Pitt was no longer willing to rely on Jolie’s voluntary efforts to
4 preserve the family’s privacy, and he attempted to leverage his buyout of Jolie’s interest in
6 Pitt objects to this request on relevance grounds. “Any doubts about relevance are
7 generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158
8 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might
9 reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a
10 settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might
11 reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53
12 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
14 evidence”).
15 Pitt’s communications with Malchar about the Offers of Proof will be extremely
16 important, contemporaneous evidence that will help Jolie establish the link between the NDA
17 Pitt demanded and the abuse Pitt was hoping to bury. This evidence goes to the heart of the
18 case, especially if Pitt has communications with Malchar where he spells out that link, which
19 would directly contradict his allegations in this case. Those communications are obviously
21 Pitt also objects on the ground that the requested documents are publicly available or
22 equally available to Jolie. But Jolie does not have access to Pitt’s or Malchar’s
23 communications. The documents are not publicly available and the Court should overrule this
24 boilerplate objection.
25 Finally, Pitt objects that the request will invade his right to privacy. A “court should
26 not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely assertion of privacy.”
27 Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the
28 claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
2 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
3 starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
4 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
5 must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior
7 Pitt does not have a privacy interest in his communications with Malchar about
8 allegations of abuse filed by Pitt’s ex-wife in court. Pitt did not identify such an interest
9 during the meet-and-confer process. On the other hand, and as discussed above, Jolie has a
10 compelling interest in obtaining these communications to show the factfinder the link
11 between the Offer of Proof she filed, Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA, and why the deal
12 to purchase her interest in Miraval ultimately fell apart. These docum ents will also help
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 establish Jolie’s state of mind, defend against Pitt’s request for punitive damages on the
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 ground that Jolie was acting maliciously when she sold to a third party, and help Jolie
15 establish the factual predicates for her affirmative defenses, including unclean hands,
18 YOUR COMMUNICATIONS with anyone else (excluding the Court in the DIVORCE
19 CASE) concerning Petitioner’s Offer of Proof and Authority in Support Thereof Re: Testimony
20 Regarding Domestic Violence that Jolie filed under seal in the DIVORCE CASE on or about
24 which are incorporated herein, Pitt specifically objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
25 overly broad, unduly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, not reasonably
26 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is unduly oppressive and
27 harassing because the information it seeks is wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses
28 in this action.
2 provide information that is publicly available, is equally available to or already in the possession
3 of Jolie, or is equally obtainable from third parties or from some source other than Pitt that is
4 more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Pitt further objects to this Request to the
5 extent it seeks documents protected from disclosure by the right of privacy under the
8 In February 2021, Jolie agreed to sell Pitt her half-interest in Chateau Miraval. In March
9 2021, Pitt “stepped back” from the agreement, then demanded an NDA from Jolie that would
10 cover Pitt’s personal conduct. The reason for Pitt’s demand is simple: On March 12, 2021, as
11 part of the couple’s ongoing child custody dispute, Jolie filed under seal two “Offers of Proof”
12 detailing the evidence of Pitt’s domestic violence against Jolie and their children. When Jolie
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 filed the evidence in the custody suit, she was careful to file it under seal so that no member of
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 the public could see it. But Jolie’s sealed filing, which included emails, summaries of the
15 family’s expected testimony, and other evidence, caused Pitt to fear that the information could
16 eventually become public. For the previous five years and to protect their children’s health and
17 privacy, Jolie had never revealed to the public any details of Pitt’s abuse and related efforts to
18 cover it up. Nevertheless, Pitt was no longer willing to rely on Jolie’s voluntary efforts to
19 preserve the family’s privacy, and he attempted to leverage his buyout of Jolie’s interest in
21 Pitt objects to this request on relevance grounds. “Any doubts about relevance are
22 generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158
23 Cal.App.4th 60, 98 (2007). Evidence is relevant for discovery purposes “if it might
24 reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a
25 settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might
26 reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.” Glenfed Dev. Corp v. Superior Court, 53
27 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117 (1997). See also John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1206
2 Pitt’s communications with others about the Offers of Proof will be extremely important,
3 contemporaneous evidence that will help Jolie establish the link between the NDA Pitt
4 demanded and the abuse Pitt was hoping to bury. This evidence goes to the heart of the case,
5 especially if Pitt has communications with others where he spells out that link, which would
6 directly contradict his allegations in this case. Those communications are obviously relevant or
8 Pitt also objects on the ground that the requested documents are publicly available or
9 equally available to Jolie. But Jolie does not have access to Pitt’s communications. The
10 documents are not publicly available and the Court should overrule this boilerplate objection.
11 Finally, Pitt objects that the request will invade his right to privacy. A “court should
12 not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely assertion of privacy.”
TELEPHONE 310-899-3300; FACSIMILE 310-399-7201
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13 Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1046 (1989). When assessing the
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
14 claimed privacy right, the “privacy interests [must] be specifically identified and carefully
16 balancing test.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 37-38 (1994). As a
17 starting point, courts must first “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
18 establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing
19 must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies.” Williams v. Superior
21 Pitt does not have a privacy interest in his communications with others about
22 allegations of abuse filed by Pitt’s ex-wife in court. Pitt did not identify such an interest
23 during the meet-and-confer process. On the other hand, and as discussed above, Jolie has a
24 compelling interest in obtaining these communications to show the factfinder the link
25 between the Offer of Proof she filed, Pitt’s demand for a personal NDA, and why the deal
26 to purchase her interest in Miraval ultimately fell apart. These documents will also help
27 establish Jolie’s state of mind, defend against Pitt’s request for punitive damages on the
28 ground that Jolie was acting maliciously when she sold to a third party, and help Jolie
3 Respectfully submitted,
6 By:
Paul D. Murphy
7 Daniel N. Csillag
Stella Chang
8 Attorneys for Defendant and
Cross-Complainant Angelina Jolie
9
10
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12
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100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1300
13
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addresses listed above or on the attached service list. I did not receive within a reasonable time
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SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was
14 unsuccessful.
15 [State] I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
the above is true and correct.
16
Executed on April 4, 2024, at Santa Monica, California.
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______________________________
19 Christina M. Garibay
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13 khummel@cravath.com
MURPHY ROSEN LLP
SANTA MONICA, CA 90401-1142
jcclarke@cravath.com
14 jmooney@cravath.com
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