Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 10, Number 2—Spring 1996—Pages 169–177

Retrospectives
The Origins of the Representative Agent

James E. Hartley

This feature addresses the history of economic words and ideas. The hope is
to deepen the workaday dialogue of economists, while perhaps also casting new
light on ongoing questions. If you have suggestions for future topics or authors,
please write to Joseph Persky, c/o Journal of Economic Perspectives, Department of
Economics (M/C 144), The University of Illinois at Chicago, Box 4348, Chicago,
Illinois 60680.

Marshall's Representative Firm

Representative agents were born in Marshall's Principles of Economics. However,

his use of the representative agent is very different and more limited than its current
use. Despite its relatively limited use, Marshall's representative agent was vigorously
assaulted, most notably in a 1928 essay by Lionel Robbins. This criticism hit its mark.
Decades later, one commentator wrote (Wolfe, 1954, in Wood, 1982, p. 284), "It
is now more than twenty-five years since Professor Robbins's famous article on the
representative firm finally drove that concept from the pages of economic
text-books."
Marshall limited the application of the concept to the idea of a representative
firm. He considered applying this construct to consumer theory —what we would
call today a "representative agent"—but decided against it. As Marshall once noted
(in Pigou, 1956, p. 437): "I think the notion of 'representative firm' is capable of
extension to labour; and I have had some idea of introducing that into my

• James E. Hartley is Assistant Professor of Economics, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley,
Massachusetts.
170 Journal of Economic Perspectives

discussion of standard rates of wages. But I don't feel sure I shall: and I almost
think I can say what I want to more simply in another way."
The representative firm makes its appearance in Marshall's Principles ofEconom-
ics (1920 [1961]) in the discussion of the conditions of supply.1 Marshall defines
the representative firm in the following manner (p. 317):

We shall have to analyse carefully the normal cost of producing a commodity,

relatively to a given aggregate volume of production; and for this purpose we
shall have to study the expenses of a representative producer for that aggregate
volume. On the one hand we shall not want to select some new producer just
struggling into business, who works under many disadvantages, and has to be
content for a time with little or no profits, but who is satisfied with the fact
that he is establishing a connection and taking the first steps towards building
up a successful business; nor on the other hand shall we want to take a firm
which by especially long-sustained ability and good fortune has got together
a vast business, and huge well-ordered workshops that give it a superiority over
almost all its rivals. But our representative firm must be one which had a fairly
long life, and fair success, which is managed with normal ability, and which
has normal access to the economies, external and internal, which belong to
that aggregate volume of production; account being taken of the class of
goods produced, the conditions of marketing them and the economic envi-
ronment generally.

To clarify Marshall's notion of the representative firm, let us explicitly note

what it is not. It is not some statistical construct; it is not, for example, created
by dividing total supply by the number of firms in the industry. It is not a giant
super-firm that is assumed to produce all of the aggregate output. It is not a
particular real firm; Marshall writes (1920 [1961], p. 805), "We have to
consider the conditions of the representative firm rather than a given individ-
ual firm."
It is useful to step back and consider why Marshall found it necessary to invent
the concept of the representative firm in the first place. Marshall wanted to con-
struct an industry supply curve, which would show how much supply would be
forthcoming at any given price. He recognized that the supply of a good depends
on the costs of producing the good. However, he was troubled by the existence of
firms of vastly different size within any given industry. Due to internal economies
of scale, these differently sized firms could bring the same good to market at vastly
different costs. So which of these costs determined the unique selling price of the
commodity?

1
The phrase "representative firm" was first used in the second edition of Principles, published in 1891,
though there were intimations of the concept in the first edition (1890). All page references here are
from the variorum edition, published in 1961, using the text of the eighth edition, published in 1920.
 James E. Hartley 171

Modern economic analysis tends to assume that the supply price is determined
by the marginal, or least profitable, firm. Any firm that cannot bring a product to
market at or below this cost will not produce. Marshall, however, recognized that
there will be firms who are just starting out that will be content to produce with
negative profits for a while in the hope of establishing a position in the industry
and thereby making positive profits later on. Similarly, Marshall believed that there
would be older firms who were well established and making positive economic
profits. Thus, the industry supply price would be lower than the costs of newer firms
that are hoping to rise, but higher than the costs of older firms that may be stable
or declining. The representative firm was invented to fill this gap. Marshall defined
it as the firm whose costs of bringing its product to market are exactly the same as
the industry supply price.
Marshall created the representative firm to abstract from the idiosyncrasies of
individual firms and the vagaries of industry supply. His fundamental purpose was
to avoid needing to assume all firms were alike. He wanted to be able to describe
a single industry equilibrium with a single market price without having to assume
that all firms were producing in exactly the same manner.
The representative firm was created for this very specific purpose, and only for
this purpose. Marshall makes no attempt, here or elsewhere, to use the represen-
tative firm to derive other results.
There is a telling clue to Marshall's thinking about the limitations of the rep-
resentative firm in his Industry and Trade (Marshall, 1920). Appendix N in this work
is subtitled "The recent increase in the size of the representative industrial estab-
lishment in America" (p. 846). This would seem to be the perfect place to examine
Marshall's use of the representative firm. However, after the subtitle, the represen-
tative firm is not mentioned in this appendix. Instead, the appendix discusses a
broad range of national data from the years 1850 to 1910. Discussed are such ag-
gregates as the number of business firms in operation, the amount of capital and
labor employed in the nation, the aggregate level of wages and sales, and so on. In
this appendix, Marshall had at his disposal all the data he needed to construct a
statistical profile of a representative institution, along with a subtitle promising a
description of the representative firm—and yet he refrained from constructing one.
Marshall uses the representative firm solely as an abstract notion designed to
avoid problems arising from the diversity of firm size. He does not view the repre-
sentative firm as a tangible entity with a life of its own. Marshall's representative
firm is a very limited notion indeed.

The Critique and Abandonment of the Representative Firm

To most economists today, Marshall's use of the representative firm would

seem innocuous enough. But as noted in the introduction, this notion of the rep-
resentative firm quickly elicited a great deal of criticism.
172 Journal of Economic Perspectives

The first main criticism of Marshall's representative firm was that the notion
was rather ephemeral. As Robbins (1928, in Wood, 1982, p. 23) put it:

The Marshallian conception of a Representative Firm has always been a some-

what unsubstantial notion. Conceived as an afterthought . . . it lurks in the
obscurer corners of Book V [of Principles] like some pale visitant from the
world of the unborn waiting in vain for the comforts of complete tangibility.
Mr. Keynes [1924] has remarked that, "this is the quarter in which in my
opinion the Marshall analysis is least complete and satisfactory and where
there remains most to do."

The second prong of the attack on the representative firm was that the use of
this construct gained nothing. Robbins (1928, in Wood, 1982, p. 28) notes, "There
is no more need for us to assume a representative firm or representative producer,
than there is for us to assume a representative piece of land, a representative machine,
or a representative worker." Sraffa (1926) made this line of argument most forcefully.
Recall that Marshall created the representative firm to explain how an industry with
diverse firms could generate a single market price. Sraffa, in a precursor of the mo-
nopolistic competition literature, argued that the equilibrium would not in general
have a uniform price; different producers would charge different prices for similar
goods, and thus there was no need for the assumption of a representative producer.
In Sraffa's view, Marshall's aim of establishing a unique industry supply curve was
simply misguided. There is no need to presume that all firms in a given industry will
have the same price to establish the existence of an equilibrium.
Third, other critics argued that the representative firm becomes even less clear
in a situation of industry growth. Marshall (1920 [1961], pp. 316, 459–60) argued
that as industry grew, the representative firm grew proportionally; this assumption
allows the supply curve to stay relevant when market demand is increasing. Young
(1928) noted a fatal flaw in this reasoning. One feature of economic growth is the
furtherance of the division of labor. Just as pins were formerly made by only one
individual and later by multiple individuals, products that were formerly made by
one firm will later be made by multiple firms, each producing only a part of the
former product. Young (p. 538) explained that this division of labor is problematic
for the idea of the representative firm:

With the extension of the division of labor among industries the representa-
tive firm, like the industry of which it is a part, loses its identity. Its internal
economies dissolve into the internal and external economies of the more
highly specialized undertakings which are its successors, and are supple-
mented by new economies.

Thus, Young showed that Marshall's representative firm was unable to take account
of any type of economic expansion other than the simple enlargement of the ex-
isting manufacturing process.
 Retrospectives: The Origins of the Representative Agent 173

In fact, it turns out that even if all firms are identical to one another, Marshall's
representative firm may not grow with the industry. Robbins (1928, in Wood, 1982)
notes that an increase in production can arise from an increase in the production
of all existing firms, in which case the representative firm grows with the industry,
or from an increase in the number of firms, in which case the representative firm
does not grow with the industry. Both outcomes are equally plausible. Thus, during
economic growth, "the representative firm may cease to be representative and its
cost curve cease to be significant" (p. 31).
Perhaps the most devastating criticism of Marshall's representative firm was
that it led to confusion about the nature of the average firm. Since the represen-
tative firm is such an ephemeral construct, it is very easy to lose track of what exactly
it entails. As Robbins (1928, in Wood, 1982, p. 33) put it, 'The whole conception,
it may be suggested, is open to the general criticism that it cloaks the essential
heterogeneity of productive factors—in particular the heterogeneity of managerial
ability—just at that point at which it is most desirable to exhibit it most vividly."
The problems in this vein began with Marshall himself. Recall that the reason
Marshall concocted the representative firm was to be able to write down a single
supply curve for an industry with diverse firms. Implicit in this argument is the
assumption that the supply curve will be that of the representative firm. But why
will the supply curve of the representative firm, rather than that of some other firm,
correspond to that of the industry? Marshall (1920 [1961], pp. 377–378) explains
it thus:

Anyone proposing to start a new business in any trade . . . if himself a man

of normal capacity for that class of work, . . . may look forward ere long to
his business being a representative one, in the sense in which we have used
this term, with its fair share of the economies of production on a large scale.
If the net earnings of such a representative business seem likely to be greater
than he could get by similar investments in other trades to which he has access,
he will choose this trade. Thus that investment of capital in a trade, on which
the price of the commodity produced by it depends in the long run, is gov-
erned by estimates on the one hand of the outgoings required to build up
and to work a representative firm, and on the other of the incomings, spread
over a long period of time, to be got by such a price.

Marshall is here arguing that the expected profits from running a representative
firm determine the level of capital investment in the industry and thus the market
price. If a manager sees the representative firm making positive economic profits,
he will enter the industry, raising the quantity supplied of the good and thereby
lowering the market price. Thus, the arbitrage of managerial ability ensures that
the market price coincides with the costs of the representative firm.
This line of reasoning neglects the fact that managers have varying abilities.
Both the inferior and superior managers must work somewhere. As Davenport
(1908, p. 377) notes:
174 Journal of Economic Perspectives

This evidently takes the representative firm to be something like an average

firm; it is here said that any average man who concludes that in the trade in
question he would turn out to be an average man, will go into the trade if he
notices that the average man in that trade is doing better than average men
outside. True, as a doctrine of opportunity cost; but it does not need the
assumption of average men to be true. Any inferior or superior man will act
in precisely the way outlined, if he believes that men of his grade are finding
the trade in question more remunerative than other trades to which he has
access. And there is nothing in any case to indicate that the cost of this average
man will coincide with the price of the product, or to indicate that the cost
of the marginal man will not so coincide.

There is thus nothing about Marshall's analysis that explains why the market
price will coincide with the costs of the representative firm. It is only by implicitly
assuming that all managers are of average ability that he can argue that arbitrage
of managerial ability will drive the market price to coincide with that of the rep-
resentative firm. Davenport is simply noting that there is nothing in Marshall's
analysis to drive the conclusion that the supply price will be that of the average (or
representative) firm rather than the inferior (or marginal) firm. Instead, it is equally
plausible that the arbitrage of inferior managerial ability will drive the supply price
to the costs of the inferior firm. By thinking about market equilibrium in terms of
the average firm, Marshall seems to have forgotten about essential heterogeneities
in managerial ability.2
These criticisms of Marshall's representative firm were fatal. Marshall's use of
the representative firm did have its defenders, notably Pigou (1928), Robertson
(1927) and in Robertson, Sraffa and Shove (1930). However, as Wolfe's (1954)
comment shows, these defenders were ultimately unsuccessful.

Modern Lessons

Earlier this century, even Marshall's extremely light reliance on the repre-
sentative firm provoked sharp criticisms. But in more recent times, the repre-
sentative agent has made a remarkable comeback. In fact, it has become one of
the most pervasive assumptions in economics. Yet many of the criticisms of Mar-
shall's representative economic agent apply with equal force to its modern coun-
terparts. Let us take up each of the lines of criticism in turn. For a more extensive
discussion of the problems with modern representative agent models, see
Kirman (1992).

2
The same problem arose in the works of Marshall's followers, in particular those of Henderson (1922)
and Robertson (1927). Robbins (1928, in Wood, 1982, pp. 34–35) deflated these arguments succinctly:
"Mr. Henderson should reflect that if all entrepreneurs were at least of average managerial ability, they
would at once cease to be average."
 James E. Hartley 175

The notion of a representative agent is no more corporeal today than it was

when Marshall first used it. What exactly is a representative agent? Does "represen-
tative" simply mean "average," or does it mean something else? In a group of firms
or agents with, say, 100 characteristics, how many of these characteristics must be
well reflected by a representative agent? And so on.
Consider two examples. Suppose that the marginal propensity to consume is
0.9 for 90 percent of the population and 0.5 for the rest. What should be the
marginal propensity to consume for a representative agent? Should it be 0.9, to
reflect 90 percent of the population? Should it be the average weighted by popu-
lation—in this case, 0.86? Should it be the average weighted by spending of the two
population groups? Do any of these ideas capture what we mean by a "represen-
tative" agent?
The questions become even harder when we consider more complicated ex-
amples. Imagine a world where 90 percent of the population is risk averse and 10
percent is risk neutral. 3 Imagine further that in this world, 90 percent of the bonds
are risk-free government bonds, while the remaining 10 percent of bonds are risky
corporate bonds. For simplicity, assume all bonds have the same expected yield and
all people hold the same number of bonds. In this world, the risk premium on
corporate bonds will be exactly zero. After all, as long as there is a positive risk
premium, the risky bonds would be unambiguously more desirable to the risk-
neutral investors. They will keep buying risky bonds and driving down the return,
until they own all the risky bonds and (in the conditions of this example) the risk
premium is eliminated.
Imagine that we now construct a representative agent model to study risk pre-
mia as was done in Mehra and Prescott (1985). What value should we use for the
risk-aversion parameter? Is the representative agent risk averse? If we say no, then
our representative agent does not represent the 90 percent of the population that
is risk averse. If we say yes, and build a representative agent model with a risk-averse
agent, then that model will predict a positive risk premium on corporate bonds.
Our model will be unable to understand why no risk premium is observed in actual
data.4
The problem here is general. No representative agent can model this hetero-
geneity. With a heterogeneous population and multiple types of agents and bonds,

3
Mayer (1993) examines a similar idea. That paper shows that indexed bonds do not provide an estimate
of inflationary expectations in a world of heterogeneous agents.
4
Relaxing the assumptions will eliminate the extreme case of no measured risk premium in the aggre-
gate, but does not eliminate the basic problem. We can, for example, allow for a continuous distribution
of risk averseness in the population. In such a case, the risk premia on the risky bonds will be exactly
the risk premia demanded by the marginal purchaser, not some sort of average purchaser in the general
population. Thus, unless we define the representative agent as the marginal purchaser, the measured
risk premia will be different than predicted. Defining the representative agent as the marginal purchaser,
however, means that the agent is quite ephemeral; any change in the distribution of the riskiness of
bonds, for example, will result in a change in the representative agent; the coefficient of risk aversion
would be endogenously determined by the market distribution of bond risk.
176 Journal of Economic Perspectives

there will always be difficulty in measuring risk premia. It is extremely hard to give
a consistent and empirically usable definition of what a representative individual is
like. If we create an agent that is some sort of statistical average, the model using
it will not necessarily explain aggregate data. If we try to define the representative
agent as the marginal purchaser, it becomes a will-o'-the-wisp whose taste parame-
ters are endogenously determined by market characteristics.
The second criticism leveled at Marshall's representative firm assumption was
that it was unnecessary. Even if that criticism was justified against Marshall's use of
the concept, it would have little to say about whether the assumption of a repre-
sentative agent or firm is necessary in other uses.
However, it remains true that representative agent models still have difficulties
dealing with problems of growth. Most economists would agree that we do not live
in a perfectly linear, constant-returns-to-scale economy. As Hahn (1973, p. 12) has
remarked, "For it now seems to me clear that there are logical difficulties in ac-
counting for the existence of agents called firms at all unless we allow there to be
increasing returns of some sort." However, if nonlinearities are important, the rep-
resentative agent framework is completely unable to account for growth. When
representative agents are used in macroeconomic models, one of two equally un-
palatable assumptions is commonly made. Either everything is assumed to be linear
or the number of agents is fixed exogenously. Neither assumption is acceptable to
most economists, but the representative agent framework forces one of these as-
sumptions to be made in any framework with economic growth.
The most devastating criticism of Marshall's limited use of the representative
firm also applies to its modern counterparts. Representative agent models conceal
heterogeneity whether it is important or not. Economists who would never auto-
matically assume that the important characteristics of all policy regimes are ho-
mogenous routinely assume that heterogeneity among agents is unimportant. How-
ever, one should no more automatically assume heterogeneity is irrelevant than
automatically assume regime changes are irrelevant.

• I would like to thank Shivani Bhasin, Kevin Hoover, Thomas Mayer, Fred Moseley and
Michael Robinson for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Special thanks to the
editors of this journal, Timothy Taylor and Carl Shapiro, for their extensive and exceptionally
useful comments.
 Retrospectives: The Origins of the Representative Agent 177

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