/ The Manual Wargaming Process:

Does our Current Methodology Give

Us The Optimum Solution ?

A Monograph
by
Major Walter E. Kretchilc
InfanQ'

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
AY 91-92
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11IE MANUAL WARGAMING PROCESS: DOES OUR CURRENT
~ODOLOGY GIVE US THE OPTIMUM SOLUTION?

KRETCHIK

Ln,'jlllM G ~"_'iANI1A IIUN NAM'\JJ~ANI) AOUAUSIU •• ,urUIIMINli ORGANl1A TlUN

~OOL F ADVANCED MILITARY SrUDIES 111'0111 HUMIIII
ATTN: ATZL-SWV
miT LEAVENWORTH. KANSAS 66027-6900
am (913) 684-3437
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 SCHOOL OF RDVaNCED MILITQRY STUDIES

MONOGRRPH RPPROVRL

Malor Walter E. Kretchik

Title of Manograph: The Manual Waraarninq

Process: Does Our Current

Methodoloqv Give U s The

Ontimum Solut iun?

Rpproved by:

Monograph Director
COL Dennis W. Tighe MS

Director, School of
CO James R. McDonough, M d Qdvanced M i 1 itary
Studies

Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D. Degree Program

Rccepted this Afk day of .becea& 1941

 Table of Contents

Page

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
11 . GameTheory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

I11 . Historical Evolution of Wargarning . . . . . . . . . . . 12

IV . Current Rnalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
V . Conclusion and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Rppendixes:

R
8
.. Selected European Decision Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
U.S. Rrmy Wargaming Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
C. U.S. Rrmy Wargarne Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
D. Wargaming Recording Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
E. .S. Rrmy Decision Matrix . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . 52
U
F . Weighting of Intelligence Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . 53
G. Soviet Nomogram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
 RBSTRRCT

THE MRNURL WRRGRMING PROCESS: DOES OUR CURRENT METHOD

GIVE US THE OPTIMUM SOLUTION? by MRJ Walter E. Kretchik, US&, 68
pages.

This monograph analyzes the manual wargaming portion of the

U.S. Army's decision-making cycle in order to determine if the
process deduces the optimum course of action. The monograpn
begins by examining game theory, which is the theoretical basis
for wargaming. This examination establishes that game theory
provides two theoretical models for decision-making, one based
upon enemy capabilities and the other m enemy intentions. The
analysis continues by examining the historical development of
wargaming and its incorporation as a decision-making tool. Using
theory-based criteria, the monograph reviews current Fimerican,
' German, British, and Soviet war gaming methods at the division
level. The three criteria analyze how well a methodology pro-
vides a rational opponent, considers friendly and enemy inten-
tions, and uses rational control or rules.

The monograph concludes that the current U. S. wargarnlng

method does not give us the optimum solution, largely because it
is difficult to discover enemy intentions before a decision is
made by the friendly commander. If a friendly commander knew
what the enemy's intentions were, he would choose the appropriate
course of action to counter it. However, since the commander can
only base his decision on enemy capabilities--or what his enerfly
can (vice will) do--his course of action choice becomes merely a
"best guess." The monograph then suggests remedies to bring us
closer to an opt imurn course of act ion.
 I. Introduction

The increasingly complex demands made by modern farces and

by modern warfare ... have led to an explosion in the
amount of data processed by any given command system t;!
carry out the mission. Rs the quantity of data rose, the
difficulty of interpreting it in preparat ion fur decision-
making grew .... Martin Van Creveld
Command In War

Decision-making is a process rather than just a goal.1

Specifically, military tactical decision-making is a dynamic,

continuous cycle. In addit ion, decisions about current and

future operations often occur simultaneously.2

The United States Rrmy endorses a standardized, tactical

decision-making process that serves as a methodology for guiding

tactical commanders and their staffs in the application of Air-

Land Battle doctrine. FIrmy Field Manual 101-5, Staff Orqan~za-

tion and O~erations, is the primary doctrinal source that

describes that decision-making process.

Within the military decision-making process is a procedural

step called the "Estimate of the Situation," which includes steps

to analyze and compare a commander's courses of action. The

decision-maker develops a course of action using the criteria cf

feasiblity, suitability, and acceptability. C1 feasible course of

action is "doable"; it offers a reasonable expectation o f suc-

cess. A suitable course of action should result in the desired

effect. Finally, an acceptable course of action means the

expected results are worth the estimated cost of executing the

course of action. FIfter a course of action is developed, it is

analyzed using wargaming. 3

 Wargaming is t h e p r o c e s s of s y s t e m a t i c a l l y t h i n k i n g aaout

t h e c h a i n o f e v e n t s t h a t o c c u r a s a u n i t e x e c u t e s a c o u r s e of

action. Wargaming tries t o v i s u a l i z e t h e flow of a b a t t l e .

By u s i n g f r i e n d l y s t r e n g t h s and d i s p o s i t i o n s , enerny a s s e t s ,
p o s s i b l e f r i e n d l y and enemy c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n , and a set
p i e c e of ground, wargaming a t t e m p t s t o f o r e s e e t h e a c t i o n ,
react ion, and c o u n t e r a c t i o n dynamics of a b a t t l e . 4

Thus, t h e wargarner f i r s t d e t e r m i n e s f r i e n d l y act:ons. These

are simply any f e a s i b l e f r i e n d l y moves a g a i n s t a n enerny. This

s t e p l e a d s t o t h e next p a r t o f t h e sequence, o r .the enerny r e a c -

tion. The r e a c t i o n p r o c e d u r e c o n s i d e r s a l l r n v e s t h e enemy might

make t o c o u n t e r t h e f r i e n d l y move. The wargarner a s k s h i m s e l f ,

" I f I d o t h i s , what c a n and w i l l t h e enemy do?" By answering

t h a t q u e s t i o n , t h e wargamer t h e n must move i n t o t h e c o u n t e r a c t i c ; n

s t e p t o d e t e r m i n e answers t o t h e q u e s t ion, " I f he d o e s t h i s , ahat

s h o u l d and c a n I do?"5

The t a c t i c a l commander1 5 v i s u a l i z a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n of

c o u r s e s of a c t i o n through wargaming is i m p o r t a n t . To win on t h e

b a t t l e f i e l d t h e commander must f i r s t t h r o u g h l y u n d e r s t a n d a l i t h e

o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e t o him i n d e f e a t i n g t h e enemy.6 Then h e must

c h o o s e a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n from t h o s e o p t i o n s t h a t w i l l a l l o w him

t o b e s t accomplish h i s mission.7

Because I am n o t s u r e t h a t o u r wargaming p r o c e s s a c h i e v e s

t h a t end, t h i s monograph w i l l t r y t o answer t h e q u e s t i o n : Does

t h e c u r r e n t United S t a t e s Rrmy manual wargaming p r o c e s s d e t e r m i n e

t h e optimum c o u r s e of a c t i o n f o r t h e t a c t i c a l commander? I wiil

a t t e m p t t o s o l v e t h a t problem by f i r s t examining t h e t h e o r e t i c a l

b a s i s f o r wargaming; t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n s h o u l d h e l p me d e t e r m i n e
criteria for analyzing the current wargaming methodology. Next,

my investigation of the historical evolution of wargarning should

illustrate how and why wargaming became an accepted part o f the

decision-making process. Finally, i will analyze the current

United States Rrmy tactical decision-making process, using my

criteria, to evaluate how well we perform the wargaming process.

I will limit my inquiry to the division level due to space

limitations.

By conducting these analyses I hope to determine whether Sr

not our wargame process is consistent with theory. if nut, I

hope to determine if this inconsistency gives us a less than

optimum solution. Simultaneously with my analysis of the U.S.

prucess, I will also analyze the current division level, Rrmy

decision-making processes of Germany, Britain, and the Soviet

Union. I will attempt to discover any advantages or disadvan-

tages of their wargaming processes which might improve U.S. Rrmy

wargaming.

Several assumptions are necessary in order to answer the

research question. First, wargarning will continue to be an inte-

gral part of the tactical decision-making process since cornmand-

ers must have a methodology to decide which course of action is

best. FI second assumption is that manual wargarning--as apposed

to automated methods--will continue to be the pwcess of choice

at the division level. Perhaps the Ftrmy will someday field a

useful, automated wargarning system. Ft 1989 Rrmy Research Insti-

tute (l2RI) experiment, which compared manual versus automated

wargaming results, determined that automated means had no

significant advantages over manual processes.8

11. GAME THEORY

War gaming is a derivation of a mathematical theory known as

gaming. While this section is but a brief overview of game

theory, it is necessary to examine this theory to grasp how war

gaming originated as a decision-making tool.

Game theory is a branch of mathematics developed to deal

with conflict of interest situations in the social sciences. its

origins go back to the mid-1928'~~to articles written by Emile

Bore1 and John von Neumann. Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern

later established the field of gaming in 1953, when they pub-

lished Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. This book, hailed

as a major scientific achievement, is still the primary work in

the field. 9

Game theory is not about games as most people think of them.

Game theorists define a game as any social situation involving

two or more players in which the interests of the players are

interdependent.10 Recording to the noted game theorist, Frank

Zagare, "While poker and parchesi are games, so are wage bargain-

ing, . . . arms races, and war. "11

The crux of the von Neumann/Morgenstern theory of games is

that one player can select an optimum strategy from a number of

possibilities without knowing the strategies of the other player.

17 "payoff," or the benefits accrued from a particular strategy,

m y be positive, negative, or zero. Thus, given any interaction

with your opponent, yon always win, lose, or draw. This concept,

known as a "zero-sum" game, means your gains equal your

opponent's losses and vice versa; if neither side gains or Inses,

the game ends in a draw. 12

Interactive gaming, according to von Neurnann and Morgen-

stern, needs three basic components: a rational actor, rational

control, and strategies that consider the opponent' s actions as

well as friendly ones. 13 These components will later form the

basis of my criteria for evaluating the U.S. wargaming process.

12 rational actor is someone who looks out for his awn interests

and pursues a strategy (course of action) to achieve those inter-

ests.14 In pursuing this strategy, the rational actor apposes

any move by an opponent which might prevent him from acccmplish-

ing his goal. Similarly, his rational opponent also anticipates

where he might be blocked from his

-
goal and acts to prevent this.

The rational actor concept is basic to the von Neu-

mann/Morgenstern theory of gaming. The game cannot exist if

either player is irrational. Von Neumann notes that an irra-

tional opponent is not governed entirely by reason in reaching

his decisions. An irrational opponent does not know what he

wants, fails to define his goals, and does not seek the attain-

ment of those objecti~es.15 Thus, there cannot be a game, if one

player is not cooperating.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern define rational control as

rules or principles to which actions or procedures must conform

or intend to conforrn.16 While many wargaming rules can he used

for decision-making, they tend to fall into one of two

categories: rigid or free-form.17

Rigid games specify all rules before game start. Rigid

games include chess, poker, and other similar interactive games.

Because a finite number of moves exist for any situation, rnathe-

matical analysis determines which moves provide an optimum solu-

tion under given circumstances. In chess, for example, because a

player can only move one piece per turn, his future moves can be

mathematically forecasted using probability theory.18

Free-form games, on the other hand, are loosely defined and

imaginative. They are "diplomatic" in nature; that is, consensus

frequently determines results. Gn example of a free-form game is

the child's garne of tag. The players execute the garne differ-

ently each time by varying the rules to suit the conditions.

Free-form games, according to von Neumann and Morgenstern,

closely mirror the realities

-. . of our interactive world because

these games are how actors analyze complex situations, select

strateqies, and then make and implement decisions.19

The process of considering both friendly and opposing

actions is the last required component for a game. These actions

fall into either of two categories: capabilities or intentions.2B

Capabilities are strategies that either you or an opponent

m m take. By considering an opponent's capabilities, an actor

must consider all likely (theoretically, all possible) options

available to himself and an opponent because he is uncertain as

to which option his opponent will choose. For instance, both

players can attack, defend, withdraw, or do nothing. p i

Intent ions, meanwhi la, are strategies that have already been

selected for execution. The decision to commit to a strategy

creates indicators that might cue an actor that his opponent has
made a decision to execute a strategy. The actor then formulates

a counter-strategy to stop his opponent's intended action. 22

Von Neumann and Morgenstern developed two theoretical models

dealing with the process of determining strategies based upon

1) whether or not an opponent is capable of doing something (the

minorant or maxi-min gartie), or 2 ) intends to take some kind of

action (the majorant or mini-man game).23 Roth theoretical mod-

els try to select a minimal-risk option from available choices,

given the time available to collect information regarding an

opponent's intentions. If an actor knows little about an appo-

nent's intentions and must make a decision with available infur-

mat ion, von Neumann and Morgenst ern recommend the maxi-min model.

If an actor has the time to deduce an opponent's intentions, then

von Neurnann and Morgenstern suggest the mini-man model.24 Why we

use these particular decision models will be explained later in

this section.

In 1'351, Colonel Oliver Haywood, USRF, wrote a RRND paper

entitled Military Doctrine of Decision and the von Neumann Theory

of Games. Haywood' s paper applied von Neurnann/Morgenstern' s game

theory to military decision-making and became the basis for how

w e perform wargaming today. Haywood deduced that a friendly

military commander equated to a rational actor because they both

establish objectives, pursue courses of action to achieve those

objectives, and block an opposing commander's attempts to keep

them from their goal. Haywnod assumed, as game theory assumes,

that a rational e m opponent behaves in a similar manner.

Therefore, Haywood concluded that any decision-making process

must consider a rational enemy opponent.25

Moreover, Haywood believed that "The Estimate of the Situa-

tion,' an analytical method for military problem-solving, was

identical to game theory's rational control concept. Saywood

noted that the estimate process made commanders conform to an

analytical method for decision-making. By conforming to an

accepted decision-making process, military commanders were, in

effect, following established norms. Thus, Haywood concluded

that the estimate process equates to von Neumann/Morgensternls

rational control criterion because it establishes rules.26

Furthermore, Haywood believed that a commander seeking a

decision wants a course of action (von Neumann/Morgenstern's

"strategy") that has more advantages than disadvantages with

respect to the enemy's ability to oppose it. In the example in

Figure 1, Haywood used the von NeumanrdMorgenstern maxi-min model

to develop a sample matrix based upon enemy ca~abilities:

ENEMY COURSES OF FlCTION

FRIENDLY
EL I I1 I11 MINIMUM
1 failure excel lent excellent I failure
1
2 good fair fair I @
I
3 excellent defeat superior I defeat

In this situation, the friendly commander created a matrix

baed upon limited available information regarding his opponent;

specifically he only knew his enemy's capabilities, but not his

intentions. The friendly commander, in this case, developed

three possible friendly and enemy courses of action (CORs);natu-

rally, he could have developed more or fewer CORs. He then esti-

mated the effect of enemy capabilities on the probability of suc-

cess of each of his possible COAs. Haywood identified possible

payoffs-or degrees of predicted friendly success, given each

enemy CDFI--as superior, excellent, good, fair, failure, and

defeat. 27

The friendly commander1s problem is to choose the COR that

has the best chance of success. He expects that his rational

enemy w i l l try to do the same. Since he does not know what the

enemy intends to do, and vice versa, the friendly commander can

only make a decision based upon enemy capabilities. Given only

enemy capabilities, the friendly commander cannot determine which

of his CDFIs has the best chance of success, because he lacks suf-

ficient information about his enemy to do so. Being conserva-

tive, the friendly commander scans his matrix looking for his

worst case result for each enemy COR. However, the friendly cum-

~ n d e rdoes not want to be overly cautious, so he picks the best

of the worst cases, thus "maximizing his minimums" (maxi-min).28

Von Neumann and Morgenstern viewed the maxi-min model as a

less than optimum solution for selecting CORs. They believed

that a friendly actor making decisions that are dependent upon an

opponent's capabilities must make the first COR decision. His

opponent could then gain an advantage by developing a counter-

move. Haywood agreed with this belief, noting that,

Decisions based upon enemy capabilities require us to view

the situation from our perspective only. We then
assume ... we are deciding first, for we do not know which
 enemy course of action our opponent might select.
Selecting . . . first gives us a significant disadvantage.Z9
Haywood, however, describes a second type of decision-making

process, one where the commander visualizes the situa$ion from

the enemy's point of view, determines enerny intent ions, and

develops an optimum Con to counter it. As another example,

Haywood developed the sample table, shown in Figure 2.

ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

FRIENDLY
C X I II I11

1 failure excellent excel lent

2 good fair fair

3 excellent defeat superior

..................................
Max OF 9-( 6-3 superior
COLUMN

This mini-man game considers reduced commander uncertainty

but is still conservative. Here the friendly commander assumes

the enemy commander made his decision first, because he has a

caters of that decision. For example, the friendly commander

received reports that the enemy moved his command posts forward,

massed his artillery units, and cleared passage lanes forward

through his own minefields. These indicators of enemy activity

have led the friendly commander to assume that the enemy intends

to attack; however he is not absolutely certain as to what the

enemy will do. He knows the enemy commander has three

probable--and closely related--CDRs, but does not know w h ~ c hone

the enemy selected. Because he has indicators of what the enemy

will do--as opposed to what he can do, the friendly commander

optimistically selects, for each enemy CUR, a COR that will give

him his best "payoff. " The maximum value of each column is the

best outcome the friendly commander can imagine achieving against

that particular enemy COR.

Thus, the friendly commander, by choosing a CDR after the

enemy has supposedly selected his, is in a position to choose the

optimum CDR. If the enemy commander selects COR I, for example,

then the friendly commander selects COR 3, which is the best or

optimum outcome against the opposing COR. On the other hand,

because he is uncertain as to what the enemy do, the

friendly commander balances optimism with conservatism by choos-

ing the "worst of the best" cases.30 The worst outcome the

friendly commander, a conservative, can foresee is the minimum

value of the maximums found in the fourth row. 31 I n this case,

the friendly commander can choose either COA 1 or 2.

Decisions based upon intentions rather than capabilities

give the decision-maker an advantage over an opponent. As Hay-

wood puts it,

Making decisions on the basis of enemy intentions indicates

an outcome more optimum than one based on an estimate
of enemy capabilities. The advantage of deciding second is
significant. 32

In summary, my review of game theory identified three

required components of a game: rational actor, rational control,

and the recognit ion of friendly and erterny act ions (capabilities

and intentions). However, with respect to the last criterion,

selecting an optimum COR to thwart enemy actions depends more

upon knowing enemy intentions than knowing just capabilities.

Therefore, my third criterion now becomes recognition of friendly

a d enemy intentions, vice actions, because recognizing intent

should provide the optimum solution. Ry using these components

as criteria, I plan to analyze current wargarning methods to

arrive at an answer to my research question.

111. HISTORICRL EVOLUTION OF WRRGRMING

Before analyzing whether or not the U.S. Rrmy's wargarning

mthod gives the optimum solution, a review of the historical

evolution of wargaming from the 1820's to the present can illus-

trate why wargaming has become such an important part of the

decision-making process.

Prior to the 1820's, decision-making was primarily a corn-

mander' s responsibility, and did not have much staff input.

Because officers varied greatly in professional ability, military

decisions were left to a few skilled individuals. Some command-

ers, such as Napoleon, used toy soldiers upon maps to visualize

how battles might be fought. The Prussians, however, conceived

the idea of developing professional staff officers who could

assist commanders in tactical planning. Thus, the wargarne

evolved from the need to train better staff officers.33

The Prussians first produced a set of wargaming rules in

1824. The wargame focused on maneuvering units on a map. It

soon became a tool to help not only staffs, but also commanders

practice and sharpen their tactical skills by visualizing

battles from start to finish.34

By 1828, a young lieutenant named Helmuth von Moltke became

an a v i d f a n of wargaming. Molke promoted t h e importance of w a r -

gaming after h e became t h e c h i e f o f s t a f f i n 1837.35 Wargaming

c o n t i n u e d as a tactics t r a i n e r u n t i l t h e 1 8 6 0 ' ~when

~ t h e Prus-

s i a n s began u s i n g t h e game as a n a i d t o decision-making. Prus-

s i a n commanders s t u d i e d t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s , a r r a y e d and moved

forces on maps, and t h e n v i s u a l i z e d t h e e x e c u t i o n o f v a r i u u s CORs

i n t h e i r heads. The commanders t h e n s e l e c t e d t h e b e s t COR f o r

e x e c u t i o n based upon t h e wargame r e s u l t s . 3 6

The Germans impressed t h e world i n 1870 w i t h t h e i r s w i f t

v i c t o r y o v e r t h e French. A s a r e s u l t , many n a t i o n s s t u d i e d Ger-

man s u c c e s s e s and a d o p t e d German s t a f f p r o c e d u r e s , i n c l u d i n g war

gaming. Wargaming soon became a f a v o r i t e decision-making t o o l

f o r many European armies between 1871 and 1914. The U.S. Rrmy

also borrowed t h e German decision-making p r o c e s s , but f a i l e d t o

d e s c r i b e how t o u s e a s t r u c t u r e d framework t o a n a l y z e CORs u n t i l

1910.37

~ u s s a a ncommanders also used wargarning f o r decision-making.

R Russian wargame played i n F ~ p r i l1914 v i s u a l i z e d a Russian inva-

s i o n of E a s t P r u s s i a . T h i s wargame r e s u l t e d i n two Russian

armies being s e p a r a t e d by terrain--and subsequently defeated i n

detail. The l e s s o n , however, was i g n o r e d because t h e two Russian

commanders argued w i t h t h e umpire o v e r how f a s t t h e German oppo-

nent c o u l d countermarch. The umpire c a p i t u l a t e d and slowed t h e

German countermarch, which allowed t h e R u s s i a n commanders t o mass

on t h e German p l a y e r and d e s t r o y h i s army. Later t h a t y e a r , t h e

same two Russian armies, s e p a r a t e d by t e r r a i n , s u f f e r e d d e f e a t i n

d e t a i l a t t h e b a t t l e s o f Tannenberg and t h e Masurian Lakes.38

 Wargaming declined in popularity after World War One, pri-

marily due to the excessive manpower required to perform a war-

game. Specifically, wargames had grown from simply being a deci-

sion-making process on a map into major field exercises with hun-

dreds of controllers and additional staff participants.39 During

this interwar period, however, the U.S. Army developed Field Man-

ual (FM) 101-5 to help staffs conduct a logical investigation of

battlefield information in order to arrive at the best COR for

the situation. 40 This manna1 focused on developing COAs, but did

not mention how the staff should analyze then.

Despite the lowered level of interest elsewhere, wargaming

continued to be p'opular in Germany. In the 1930's Adolf Hitler

incorporated a wargaming process into his decision-making.41

Hitler demanded that German attacks be agonizingly wargamed to

determine friendly CORs, enemy reactions, and resulting German

variations to the basic plan. In 1939, the Germans wargamed

their planned 1940 attack into France; by so doing, they redis-

covered an important march axis through the Flrdennes.42 During

k r l d War Two the Germans continued to wargame major operat ions

such as "Sea Lion," the planned invasion of England. 9itler's

generals believed in the wargaming process so .much that they

talked Hitler out of invading England after the wargarne continu-

ally produced disasterous results. 43

Since the end of World War Two, the German wargaming system

has undergone many refinements, not only by Germany, but also by

other nations as well. In Europe and the United States,

decision-making using wargaming shifted from just being a rnap

exercise to including a formal analytical process. Using this

logical process became both the norm and a necessity because

rapid technological change and improved weapons lethality meant

less time to make decisions.44

In the 1950's, new decision-making techniques that employed

game theory were developed to cope with the exponentially

increasing flow of information. 45 Game theory, as discussed in

the previous section, provided the structure for making wargaming

a formal process within the decision-making cycle. in 1954, U.S.

Flrmy FM 101-5 made it clear that commanders needed to visualize

enemy Cons, and then reach decisions about how they would defeat

those enemy CDRs by using maps and military symbols as aids.46

From the 1960's until today, numerous nations refined their

decision-making processes by including wargaming. During this

time, however, U. S. Rrmy wargaming procedures differed from the

European methodology.

While the European methods of wargaming remained primarily a

commander's assessment of the situation, the U. S. Rrmy process

became a command and staff action.47 For example, in 1968 the

U.S. Flrmy defined wargaming in FM 101-5 to be a method for the

commander and his staff to visualize friendly and enemy CDRs as

the troops moved from current dispositions to the objective.48

Later on, the 1972 FM 101-5 took a prescriptive approach. War-

gaming would now be performed around a situation map, with the

staff recommending three feasible friendly CDns for the commander

to consider.49 No mention was made as to how many enemy COas

should be considered.
 The 1984 FM 101-5 eliminates some prescribed requirements

and--as did the 1972 version--cites wargaming as a method for

analyzing CORs. However, the 1984 version fails to describe how

to conduct wargarning. The Command and General Staff College

(CGSC) attempted to fill this void by publishing Student Text

(ST) 100-9 in 1989 and 1991. These =-doctrinal CGSC products

discuss the wargaming process, specify the rules of wargarning,

and delineate how a COA should be analyzed to produce the best

solution under the given conditiom.50

In summary, wargarning began as a training device to teach

tactics to Prussian officers; however, it eventually transitioned

into a firmly ingrained decision-making aid. The reason for this

rise in importance is because wargaming helped commanders to not

only visualize possible battlefield events, but also better aria-

-the advantages and disadvantages of friendly CORs versus

enemy CORs. While European wargaming remains primarily a com-

mander's function, the U.S. Rrmyys method is both a commander and

a staff procedure. Whether or not either method is more advanta-

geous than the other will be examined in the next section.

Finally, while FM 101-5 is not specific as to how one goes about

wargaming CORs, CGSC ST 100-9 does describe this process in

detail.

IV. CURRENT RNFIiYSIS

The purpose of this section is to analyze, using the pre-

viously identified criteria, the tactical wargaming processes of

the U.S. Rrmy, Germany, Britain, and the Soviet Union. After a

short review of the U.S. Rrmy decision-making process (detailed

descriptions of the German, British, and Soviet division-level

decision-making steps are in Rppendix R), I will analyze each of

the wargaming methods to provide a foundation for understanding

the U.S. wargaming process. These analyses will determine an

answer to my research question by 1) ascertaining how effectively

the U.S. Rrmy wargaming process analyzes CURS, and 2) whether we

can learn anything from the way other countries wargame.

The U. S. Rrmv Tactical 'Decision-makins Process

The decision-making process begins with receipt of a new

mission, either from higher headquarters or one deduced by ana-

lyzing the current operation. Rrmy FM 101-5 and CGSC ST 100-9

stipulate four steps:

o Mission analysis. This is a command and staff action to

gather facts, make assumptions, analyze the higher headquarters1

mission and intent, and focus the staff for planning the mission.

This step ends when the staff briefs the commander about the cur-

rent situation. The commander then approves a G3-derived

restated mission, which incorporates the essential tasks from the

higher headquarters' mission and intent; and then issues planning

guidance for developing COffi to accomplish the mission.51

o Course of action development. The staff now focuses on

any information necessary for the commander to make decisions

about COAe. The staff analyzes the current situation by

computing relative friendlyleneny force ratios, arraying initial

forces on a map, developing a scheme of maneuver that meets the

commander's guidance (or if it cannot, the staff reports why it

cannot), and preparing CDFI sketches and statements to help the

commander visualize each COR. The staff develops as many varied,

feasible CORs as t i m allows, giving the commander as many

options as possible from which to choose. The staff also consid-

ers whether or not the CORs are suitable and acceptable.52 This

step ends with the staff recommending CORs to the commander, who

decides which COffi to analyze in the next step.

o Course of action analysis. The staff uses wargaming to

analyze the CORs chosen by the commander. It analyzes each COR

separately and then compares them using criteria established

before the COAs were developed to determine the best option,

given the current conditions. The "best" COR is the one that has

the highest probability of success against the enemy COR of

greatest concern to the friendly commander.53 This step ends

with the staff briefing the results of each of the wargames to

the commander, followed by the staff recommending a COR for the

commander's approval.

o Decision/execution. The commander decides upon a COR,

followed by the staff preparing the order or plan to implement

the selected COR. 54

Given this overview of decision-making, the reader should

now understand how a U.S. division commander makes his COR deci-

sions. This understanding is necessary for comprehending the

wargaming process and the role it plays today in the overall U.S.

decision-making process.

The Waraamina Process

R brief examination of step three of the decision-making

process, to see how CORs are analyzed, seems in order. R more

detailed explanation of each step is found in Rppendix B.

CGSC ST 100-9 describes six wargaming steps for analyzing a

course of action. These are:

o Gather the tools. "Tools" are aids for conducting war-

gaming. They consist of friendly situation information, the

areas of operation and interest, the current enemy situational

templates, and a map showing current friendly unit locations.

o List all friendly forces. Rll available assets and units

that are available for the mission are compiled for use in the

wargame.

o List the assumptions. Rny information that is not known

to be a fact--such as enemy strength--but is necessary for COR

execution is incorporated into planning assumptions.

o List critical events and decision points. Critical events

are tasks that are essential for mission accomplishment.5J5 Rn

example is a passage of lines. 17 decision point identifies in

time and space where a commander must make decisions. Decision

points help to synchronize friendly assets to have the maximum

effect upon the enemy. 56

o Select a wargame method. ST 100-9 recommends three tech-

niques: the avenue-in-depth, the belt, and the box. These meth-

ods organize the battlefield for analysis. The avenue-in-depth

and belt techniques, while examining avenues of approach in Great

detail, are slow. The box technique focuses on only a specific

area (such as a river crossing site), but is faster than the

other two techniques. Each wargame method is more fully

explained in Rppendix C.
 o Select a technique to record and display the results. ST

100-3 recommends two methods to record wargaming results: the

narrative and sketch note techniques. A detailed example of each

technique is in nppendix D.

o Wargame the battle and assess results. The staff identi-

fies tasks to subordinate units and visualizes a subordinate com-

mander's use of forces to accomplish his tasks. The staff goes

through the action-reaction-counteraction sequence--visualizing

friendly actions necessary to accomplish a task, determining how

the enemy might react to each action, and then creating counter-

actions to check the enemy moves. The wargame continues until

the entire friendly COR is analyzed. The staff then restarts the

sequence using the same friendly-but now a different enemy--Con.

Wargaming continues until all friendly and enemy CORs are ana-

ly zed. 57

ST 100-9 notes that the wargame process should result in

several findings. For example, the wargame process discovers

branches to the plan. Branches are options for changing friendly

dispositions, orientations, or directions of movement; and for

accepting or declining battle. In other words, they give com-

manders flexibility.58 Wargaming also helps identify additional

tasks to maneuver units and estimates how long an operatian might

continue. This information assists in Combat Service Support

(CSS) planning, helps the G2 plan intelligence collection

requirements, and identifies COR advantages and disadvantages.59

Finally, wargaming can help determine the risk associated with

various actions during the action-reaction-counteraction

sequence. Rlthough risk is only a "best guess," the staff should

continually assess the likelihood that a COR w i l l not accomplish

either the mission or a critical portion of a mission.60

Rs soon as the wargame process ends, the staff uses pre-

viously developed criteria to compare CORs to determine the one

having the highest probability of success.61 Criteria are fac-

tors that pertain to the mission, enemy, terrain, troops avail-

able and time. They also consider such factors as commander's

guidance, critical events, and principles of war. 62 Certain

staff officers construct a decision matrix--using their

criteria-to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each

WR from their particular viewpoint. Rn example of such a deci-

sion matrix is in appendix E.

-. .

Each of those staff officers, led by the 63, then presents

his information to the others for consideration. The staff as a

group reaches a consensus on a recommended COA. If the staff

cannot, agree, the chief of staff listens to the facts and decides

which COR to recommend to the commander.63

Rrmed with this overview of U.S. Rrmy decision-making and

wargaming, I can now better analyze the wargaming process using

my three criteria.

o RRTIONRL OPPONENT. I mentioned previously that a deci-

sion-making game must have a rational opponent, one who will

pursue a WFI that w i l l achieve his best interests. kcordingly,

ST 188-9 requires the wargamer to visualize the battle, starting

with initial unit locations and following a logical sequence of

friendly and enemy actions within the method (box, belt, avenue)
selected for organizing the area of operations. Furthermore, ST

100-9 specifically mentions that visualizing the battle means

examining battlefield flow from the friendly perspective and

estimating how the enemy might employ his forces within his caoa-
bilities.64 In this approach, the wargamer must think and act as

though he were an enemy commander.

However, ST 100-9 does not say what expertise is required to

"fight" as an enemy commander. Moreover, a wargarner may or may

not be familiar enough with the enemy to adequately determine an

opponent's reaction to a friendly action. A wargarner's lack of

enemy expertise could skew the wargame results by under or over-

estimating enemy capabilities and assets. R key question that

arises is: Can we have a wargamer who can realistically estimate

and play enemy capabilities? One possible solution is ST 100-9's

optional technique called "adversarial" wargaming, where the 62

plays the opposing commander. 65 In this method, the

G2--hopefully the "expert" on the enemy--must think and act as an

enemy would under the given circumstances. However, this is not

as simple as one might think, since the 62 might, in a contin-

gency situation, be an expert on another enemy. Rleo, the doc-

trine for all potential enemies is not always available fur

study. In Desert Storm, as the 3d Army 02 put it, " [Enemy3 tem-

plate production was a major team effort."&

So what can we expect from the G2? Most G2s are trained in

a process called thinking "red". This process, delineated in FM

34-3, Intelfinence Flnalvsis, means seeing the battle from the

enemy's viewpoint.67 The 02 prepares himself for the wargame by

a s k i n g such q u e s t i o n s a s what is t h e enemy's d o c t r i n e ? what a r e

h i s t a c t i c s ? and how is he equipped?68 The 62 u s e s t h i s check-

list t o d e v e l o p a d a t a base and p e r s o n a l mental framework t o bet-

t e r assume t h e r o l e of a c r e d i b l e enemy commander.

While any commander o r s t a f f o f f i c e r c a n c o n s i d e r enemy

c a p a b i l i t i e s d u r i n g wargarning, t h e G2 u s u a l l y h a s t h e must t r a i n -

i n g t o perforrn t h i s f u n c t i o n . Using t h e G2 a s a n " a d v e r s a r y "

p r o v i d e s a more balanced wargame because h e c a n b e s t r e p l i c a t e

enemy a s s e t s and c a p a b i l i t i e s .

My a n a l y s e s o f German, B r i t i s h , and S o v i e t wargarning show

t h a t t h e i r commanders a l l c o n s i d e r a r a t i o n a l opponent i n a way

similar t o t h e G.S. Rrmy. However, t h e r e is much less s t a f f

involvement. The German and B r i t i s h commanders u s e t h e i r 02s

o n l y t o p r o v i d e d o c t r i n a l enemy i n f o r m a t i o n ; t h e 62s d o not war-

game i d e a s w i t h t h e commander. The S o v i e t commander u s e s h i s

c h i e f nf s t a f f i n l i e u o f a 62. However, t h e S o v i e t c h i e f of

staff, l i k e t h e German and R r i t i s h G 2 s , does not p a r t i c i p a t e i n

wargatning. 63

The German, B r i t i s h , and S o v i e t commanders examine t h e b a t -

t l e f i e l d from both a f r i e n d l y and enemy view, and t h e y c o n s i d e r

which enerny COR is b e s t from t h e enemy's perspective. Each com-

mander assumes t h a t h i s opponent w i l l u s e h i s assets w i t h i n h i s

c a p a b i l i t i e s t o a c h i e v e h i s purpose. European commanders t h e n

v i s u a l i z e moving t h e i r f o r c e s u s i n g maps o r o t h e r a i d s , d e t e r m i n e

p o s s i b l e enerny r e a c t i o n s , and f i g u r e o u t f r i e n d l y countermoves. 70

While European commanders c o n s i d e r enerny i n t e n t i o n s , t h e l a c k of

a "smart a d v e r s a r y " c a n skew t h e wargarning r e s u l t s .

 In summary, ST 100-9 notes that wargarning relies heavily on

tactical judgment-and experience.71 Perhaps the best we can

expect is that experience with one threat will carry over to

another, and that the personnel asked to replicate a rational

. .
opponent will have the time to fill in any knowledge gaps. Thus,

while our wargaming method considers a "thinking" opponent, it

appears as if our ability to meet this criterion depends on the

amount of available expertise.

The Eumpeart commanders consider the enemy in much the same

way as the U. S. Rrmy does. The difference, however, is that, as

mentioned earlier, the commander analyzes COFIs by himself. By

not using an "adversary" during CUR analysis, European commanders

may unwittingly insert bias into their wargaming conclusions.

If, however, they use a qualified intelligence expert to repli-

cate an enemy commander during adversarial wargaming, they might

have a fairer analysis, which could produce a more optimum solu-

tion.

o RECOGNITION OF FRIENDLY FIND ENEMY INTENTIONS. Intentions,

as mentioned previously, are Cons that have alreadx been selected

for execution. For example, the ST 100-9 wargaming process com-

pares friendly CORs (capabilities) against enemy COFIs (capabili-

ties). The commander then choses the CDFI he wants to execute.

By committing to a specific CDFI, he now intends to pursue the COR

to meet his objectives. Thus, as in game theory, friendly inten-

tions result from a commander selecting a CDFI and deciding to

execute it. 7Z

ST 100-9 then asks the wargamer to visualize the battle,

given what the enemy-m do. The battlefield visualization

process begins with the staff initially comparing friendly and

enemy combat ratios. ST 100-9 v i e w the comparison process as

necessary for drawing some conclusions about friendly and enemy

capabilities as they pertain to the tactical situation, but

offers nothing about ways to determine enemy intent ions. 73

Friendly and enemy capabilities are the COAs a unit can

undertake. ST 100-9 recommends having the division-level com-

mander and staff conduct a detailed study of available friendly

and enemy personnel and weapons systems to determine capabi 1 i -

ties. Ey current doctrine divisions maneuver battalions; there-

fore, the commander or staff considers all combat assets within

both friendly and enemy battalion-sized units that are available

far the upcoming mission in order to determine capabilities.74

Within the friendly division, the staff uses its reporting

system to gather the detailed information necessary to determine

friendly capabilities. The types of reports differ from unit to

unit, depending upon local tactical field standard operating

,
procedure (FSOP) but they usually include the commander's sit ua-

tion report, as well as personnel and logistics reports.75

Enemy capabilities, however, are determined by the G 2

through the Intelligence Weparation of the Battlefield (IPBB)

process. FM 34-3 describes enemy capabilities as COFls that the

enerny might take--att ack, defend, reinforce, or retrograde. In

effect, capabilities describe "what the enemy can do, when and

where the enemy can do it, and in what strength the enemy can do

it. "76
 ST 100-9 specifically notes that calculating friendly and
enemy capabilities is not precise because many factors are

unknown about bath opposing forces. For example, while the pro-

cess of comparing force ratios does account for quantifying per-

sonnel and weapons systems, it is difficult to be absolutely sure

at any given moment how many people or how much equipment is

available for use by either side. Additionally, human factors

such as morale and leadership cannot be quantified with any

degree of accuracy. Thus, while ST 10a-9 accounts for enemy and

friendly capabilities, it is only an estimate for the staff to

use in planning. The friendly and enemy capabilities data are

then used in the wargaming process.77

In van Neumann/Morgenstern game theory, and as discussed by

Colonel Haywood, the optimum solution is to base decisions upon

enemy intentions because one gains an advantage by knowing which

COR the enemy commander has chosen. How, then, does the friendly

commander discover enemy intentions before he decides upon a

friendly CUR? Doing so depends upon "tactical judgment, experi-

ence, . . . time available, . . . enemv indicators tmy emphasisl,

Cfriendlyl commander fatigue, and the commander's personality and

ability. "78

Most division commanders probably have reasonable compe-

tency, good judgment, and get enough rest to make logical deci-

sions about enemy intentions. I base this assumption upon per-

sonal ubservation of five Battle Command Training Program War

Fi g h t w exercises. 79 It appears, however, that a commander's

experience and enemy indicators are more important prerequisites

for discerning enemy intent ions.

RLPHFITECH, a behavioral sclence research corporation,

observes that experienced commanders make faster decisions

Secause they ask the right questions.to fill in enemy information

gaps. The commander's questions focus the division intelligence

collection effort on those priority enerny indicators necessary

for command decisions. Inexperienced commanders have trouble

cnnveying what is important; therefore, intelligence collection

becomes diluted as the staff tries to find out everything.&?

Moreover, the GE has the problem o f discerning enemy

"truth," even if he receives fncused commander intelligence

priorities. Intelligence analysts get confusing indicators of

enemy decisions due to enemy deception, random enemy activity, or

the ever-present "fog of war." F M 34-3 recommends that, when

confronted with conflicting indicators, analysts must determine

enerny intent by weighting some enemy indicators more than oth-

ers, since some are more "indicative" of intent than others.81

?he process for weighting indicators is in FIppendix F.

Rs with commanders, intelligence analysts vary in their

experience levels. FIn experienced intelligence analyst tends to

quickly assess a situation and pick out key activities that

indicate what the enemy intends t o do. Rn inexperienced analyst

waits longer to confirm an enemy indicator, and steals time from

the commander by doing so.

However, no analyst can ever be absolutely certain.that he

is right. Consequently, the analyst's degree of uncertainty

contributes to the commander's risk. F M 34-3 mentions that

uncertainty plays a key role in the evaluation of the enemy and

the amount of risk accepted. 82

Since neither the commander nor his G2 are absolutely cer-

tain of what the enemy intends to do, it appears wargamlng

depends upon how much risk a commander is willing to accept. ST

100-9 plays it safe by telling the friendly commander to base his

COFI analysis upon enemy capabilities, and then wargarne all pos-

sible enemy options--as time allows. Thus, the friendly com-

mander must choose his COR before he knows enemy intentions. By

basing his decision upon enemy capabilities, the friendly com-

mander commits himself to a strategy before he knows which COFI

the enemy is executing. This committal by the friendly force

triggers indicators which the enemy commander can now use to

select &h optimum COG. On the other hand, if the friendly com-

mander bases his decision upon enemy indicators, he in effect

"knows" what the enemy intends to do, and thus can better counter

an enemy move.

When a commander focuses his intelligence assets and has

experienced intelligence personnel, he should discover enough

enemy indicators to wargame a COR that w i l l defeat the enemy's

intent. On the other hand, a commander might fail to focus his

intelligence priorities, might have poor intelligence sources, or

may simply run out of time. In those cases it appears the best

he can do is to prioritize enemy COFIs based upon enemy capabili-

ties, wargame as many options as time allows, and execute the

best option under the circumstances once the battle begins.

German, British, and Soviet commanders, meanwhile, also begin

their analysis of enemy CDRs by looking at capabilities. Some

differences in these three processes, however, are worth noting.

The German commander uses enemy capabilities to formulate

his plan while continuing to try to discern enemy intentions

through indicators of enemy activity. He carefully arrays known

enemy and friendly force locations on a map and calculates

friendly-to-enemy force ratios within his area of operations.83

Once the German commander calculates friendly-to-enemy force

ratios, he mentally est imates friendly and enemy combat effec-

tiveness, or the ability of his and the enemy's forces to accom-

plish their missions. This process, performed solely by the

commander, relies heavily on his experience and judgment. How-

ever, the German army is confident that its commanders

- have the

expertise, based upon years of training and experience, to per-

form a credible effectiveness assessment. Once the combat effec-

tiveness assessment is complete, the German commander compares

the results with enemy indicators. He then uses his judgment to

deduce what he believes are enemy intentions.84

Once the German commander deduces the estimated enemy

intent, he then selects the best friendly COR that he

believes--based upon his experience and judgment--fits the cur-

rent situation. Because the enemy intent is only an estimation,

the German commander must accept risk. His staff continues, how-

ever, to develop other options (similar to U. S. Army branches) in

case the commander is wrong. Once the commander makes the deci-

sion, however, the staff formulates and issues the operations

order. 85
 The British commander's estimate of the situation is almost

identical to the German method, except his analysis is very

methodical. The British commander determines friendly and enemy

capabilities by analyzing "factors"--terrain, time available for

a friendly decision, weather, comparison of forces, logistics,

and morale. The British commander and his 62 focus their efforts

on comparing each of the above factors against the purpose or

"airn" that the friendly commander wants to achieve. Once the

commander understands friendly and enemy capabilities, and the

effect of the factors upon his accomplishing the aim, he moves

into the next step--determining enemy options.86

In determining enemy options, the British commander now

assesses each possible enemy COA by mentally

-~
visualizing what the

enemy commander, given his capabilities, might do. This process

is very similar to the U.S. Army method, except the commander

does it without staff assistance. The British commander then

tries to deduce the enemy commander's most dangerous C m , which

is the one that impacts most upon friendly mission accomplish-

ment. Deducing the enemy's "most dangerous" option is a product

of the commander's experience and his judgment in using the

information at hand.87

Once the British commander determines the most dangerous

enemy option, he personally examines those COAs that attain the

"airn". He mental ly weighs the advantages and disadvantages of

each COR against the enemy's most dangerous COA, and selects the

best opt ion available under the circumstances. The commander's

weighing of advantages and disadvantages is based upon his

personally chosen criteria. For example, he might favor a plan

that is simple, fast, and makes the best use of terrain. Once

the British commander selects the most advantageous option, he

briefs his staff as to why he selected it. The staff then pro-

duces and issues the operatiom order.88

The discussion of Soviet tactical decision-making proce-

dures within this paper addresses only known doctrinal methods

and capabilities. Recent political turmoil within the Soviet

Union makes it difficult, at best, to assess what capabilities

the Soviet Rrmy has either lost or retained. Thus, while this

paper addresses Soviet decision-making in the present tense, it

is possible that Soviet methods might be under revision.

The Soviet commander first considers his mission, instruc-

tions from his senior commander, and factors such as available

decision-making tirfle,the current friendly and enemy situation,

and the capabilities of his subordinate commanders. The initial

analysis of the current situation enables the Soviet commander to

begin a detailed--yet rapid--analysis of available COns using

mathematical norms and scientific principles.89

Soviet commanders probably have the same experience and

judgment capabilities of any commander we have looked at so far.

However, the Soviet decision-making process differs from the pre-

vious processes by giving the commander charts and tables, called

"nomograms," to perform mechanical calculations that commanders

in the United States, Germany, and Britain d& mentally or analyt-

ically. Nomograms, which are based upon World War Two statis-

tics, are designed to rapidly calculate the capabilities of

friendly and enemy units. The commander' s calculat ions include

determining the proper number of artillery pieces, tanks, people,

and aircraft necessary for the appropriate correlation of

forces--or what he needs to accomplish his mission.90 Fln example

of a nomogram is in Rppendix G.

The Soviet commander then weighs his capabilities against

the enemy's capabilities, and chooses the best option for accon-

plishing his mission. The Soviet commander's criteria for weigh-

ing options, similar to his Western counterparts, are based upon

experience and judgment. S l after he chooses the final option,

his staff issues the order.

Soviet commanders, unlike their western counterparts, are

less concerned with determining enemy intentions because they

believe they have enough mass to overpower an opposing force.

The Soviets view being able to discern enemy intentions as

the ideal; however, time, deception, and other factors impact

greatly upon deducing enemy intent. The Soviets use their robust

reconnaissance and intelligence system t o accurately template

enemy assets and deduce enemy capabilities; they then use mass to

offset this lack of battlefield certainty regarding enemy inten-

tions. 92 In effect, mass subst itutee for finesse.

To sum up, U.S. Flrmy wargaming does not meet this criterion

because U.S. division commanders make decisions based upon enemy

capabilities rather than intentions. However, none of the other

countries meet the criterion either, for the same reason. The

problem lies with an inability to discern enemy intentions.

Time and the level of acceptable risk seem to impact most

upon COR analysis. Rlthouqh commanders need time to read and

confirm enemy indicators, they may not have enough time. There-

fore, since sufficient time is not always available, a commander

must accept risk by wargaming enemy capabilities, vice inten-

tions, to reach a decision.

Moreover, success in deducing enemy intentions is highly

dependent upon an experienced commander who clearly defines his

priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and conveys them to his

subordinates. If the commander fails to focus his intelligence

collection assets, then it seems that the best one can do is to

1) base decisions upon enemy capabilities and 2) have options

available to counter any enemy move.

- European commanders all base their decisions upon enemy

The

capabilities. Consequently, their processes do not offer ways to

improve our ability to deduce enemy intentions. However, the

commander-driven wargaming process might be useful for reducing

time to make decisions when using friendly and enemy capabili-

ties. Moreover, Soviet-style nomograms might help staffs do rou-

tine calculations faster before COR analysis begins, thereby

allowing more time to be spent on wargarning.

o RFITIONFlL CONTROL. ST 100-9 identifies five wargaming

rules the wargamer must observe.93 The manual does not define

the term "wargamer," but ST 100-9 notes that staff members

analyze CORs, thereby implying that staff members are

wargamers.94 Rules, then, apply to staff members who "wargame".

The rules discussed below appear to be von Neumann/Morgenstern's

rigid form, in that they are "specified in advance. "95

 The first rule requires the wargamer to list advantages and

disadvantages as they become obvious during the wargaming pro-

cess. ST 100-9 fails to explain what "obvious" means, or to

offer any method for recognizing what is an obvious advantage or

disadvantage.

army Research Institute (ARI) believes that the ability to

recognize obvious advantages and disadvantages comes from recog-

nition patterns established from years of practice in viewing

events. Recognition patterns make it obvious as to what can be

accomplished, what dangers exist, what critical cues must be

monitored, and what expectations should be formed. 96 Thus, the

ability to understand and recognize obvious advantages and disad-

vantages comes from experience and judgment.

The second rule asks the wargamer to remain unbiased, keep

an open mind, and avoid influences by other staff officers or his

own prejudices. This appears to be unrealistic. FILPHRTECH finds

that decision-makers weigh any evidence which supports prior

beliefs more heavily than evidence which contradicts them.97

I3LPHRTECH also finds that e~perienced decision-makers reduce bias

by seeking information to disconfirm their beliefs. Less exper-

ienced decision-makers, however, seek information to confirm

their beliefs, which increases bias in their decision-making pro-

cess. 98

Experience and beliefs affect wargarner bias. 12s FIR1

describes it, people "are poor decision-makers at best."99 People

are influenced by their past experiences, pre-conceptions of

reality, and personal preference. Rules number one and two,

34
however, rely greatly upon experience and judgment. There-

fore, rules one and two seem to contradict each other.

Rule number three asks the wargamer to assess the feasibil-

ity of the COR to see if it meets mission requirements.100 The

wargamer is then asked to reject any COR that is not feasible. 17

feasible COR is one that is "doable1'--eitheryou can or cannot do

it. R COR that "meets mission requirements' means it is suit-

able, or results in the desired effect. An acceptable CDR means

the expected results are worth the estimated costs. If the CDR
under consideration is not feasible, the wargamer throws it out.

However, if the COR is neither suitable nor acceptable, what does

the wargamer do? The rule does not cover this situation.

The wargamer needs criteria regarding mission requirements

to decide what is suitable and acceptable. Mission requirements

criteria come from the commander's intent, any command guidance,

and other instructions from a higher headquarters.101 The staff

determines these criteria during the mission analysis portion of

the decision-making cycle. Thus, if the wargamer understands the

mission criteria, then he should know how to judge the suitabil-

ity or acceptability of the COR. However, if the wargamer fails

to understand the mission criteria, he will have difficulty

assessing mission suitability and acceptability.

The fourth rule requires the wargamer to avoid comparing one

COR with another during the wargaming of the individual CDRs.

Rccordingly, the wargaming process assists in avoiding premature

comparisons of CORs by designating a cocflparison phase, which

occurs after CDQs have been analyzed in isolation.102 The staff

then compares feasible CORs to identify the one with tne best

chance of success.103 This rule appears to be enforceable, pro-

vided that the wargamers have enough discipline to avoid early

W R comparison.

The last rule requires the wargamer to avoid drawing prema-

ture conclusions and then presenting facts to support those con-

clusions. Unfortunately, ST 100-9 offers no help in suggesting

ways to elude this problem. Premature conclusions occur if a

situation seems sirni lar to past situations. 104 However, an

experienced wargamer will realize that each tactical situation is

different and that he must analyze each situation independently

of past experience. R less experienced wargamer makes a rapid

decision based upon past experience, fails to analyze a11 the

facts, and arrives at a premature conclusion. Because this rule

requires experience and judgment, it is susceptible to the same

failings as rules one and two.

The German, British, and Soviet decision-making processes do

not address specific rules for wargaming. European commanders

mentally visualize the execution of each possible COR using the

decision-making steps in Rnnex A. However, some of their deci-

sion-making procedures might be considered rules.

The German commander, for example, is required to follow

three sequential steps in determining his comparison of forces.

These steps are: compare friendly and enemy combat effectiveness,

examine possible changes in relative strengths, and compare

friendly CORs against their chances of success. I can find no

specific guidance on how these steps are accomplished, or what
criteria constitute a "chance of success;" however, an interview

with a German officer confirmed the steps are done in sequence

and the commander's judgment determines the criteria for suc-

cess. 105

The British commander must rigidly follow the sequential

decision-making process described in Annex CI. This process is

supposed to help the commander follow a logical, methodical

thought process to accomplish his "aim". 106

Finally, the Soviet commander must use nomograms. 107 The

commander mentally visualizes the current situation, then selects

the nomograms which fit. However, selecting nomograms to fit a

situation is somewhat similar to free gaming, since the situation

constantly changes as to which nomograms are necessary to deter-

mine a tacticai answer. However, because the data which produce

nomograms do not change, nomograms themselves are not only rigid

but probably antiquated.108 The process of choosing nomograms to

meet the requirements of a situation is very similar to a U. S.

Rrmy "playbook." A playbook consists of pre-determined branches

to a plan, that are detailed enough to execute, if necessary. 109

Thus, a Soviet commander, by choosing which "norms" fit the situ-

ation, takes a "playbook" approach toward analyzing the situation

he faces.

In summary, U.S. Rrmy wargaming rules do not meet this

criterion because they are vague and conflicting. The rules

attempt to establish some general conformity, which is good; how-

ever, wargarners must rely heavily upon experience and judgment to

comply with them. Wargamers must not only define unclear and
conflicting rules but, by being human, the wargamers are subject

to personal biases and are subject to making premature conclu-

sions as well. More specific rules and clearly defined wargaming

terms might help. Reducing wargamer bias and premature conclu-

sions is difficult at best; however, ST 100-9 could be more spe-

cific on how a wargamer avoids these problems.

European rules are prescriptive guidance for following cer-

tain procedures during decision-making. However, since there are

no specific rules associated with the mental wargaming process, I

cannot make an assessment whether or not the European methods are

better than ours.

V. CONCLUSIONS FIND IMPLICRTIONS

'

I began my research by asking, "Does the current manual war-

gaming process, as practiced by the U.S. Rrmy, determine the

optimum course of action for the tactical commander?" My inves-

tigation shows it does not--and probably cannot because of uncer-

tainty. My overail findings are that while wargaming considers a

rational opponent, it does not analyze CDAs by considering enemy

intentions, nor is rational control precise enough to preclude

human bias and premature judgment. Furthermore, analyses of the

current German, British, and Soviet processes demonstrate that

their processes are probably no better than the U.S. Army's pro-

cess. Besides my overall conclusion, some others are also worth

mentioning.

First, wargaming relies upon experienced wargamers who

understand the doctrine of a rational enemy. Therefore, lack of

expertise about the enemy might bias the wargame results.

However, the 62 should be the staff subject matter expert

on enemy doctrine; therefore, he must be able to provide the best

possible information about the enemy.

Second, and closely related to the previous conclusion, the

use of adversarial wargaming helps reduce the bias in wargaming

results by incorporating the best possible representative of the

enemy, the 62.

Third, garae theory views recognition of enemy intentions as

the optimum way to choose a friendly COO. However, in the "real

world," getting the optimum solution is difficult because com-

manders are under such limitations as time, uncertainty, a pos-

sible unwillingness to take risk, and because they have diffi-

culty formulating useful PIR. While the intelligence community

dues its best to help with these problems, divisions currently do

not have the assets to produce the "near-real time" intelligence

the commanders need to make decisions.110

Fourth, we can learn from the German, British, and Soviet

processes. The first lesson is that their processes require more

commander involvement, which seems to reduce the time needed to

analyze COAs. Accordingly, ST 100-9 recommends an option to

shorten the decision-making process by involving the commander

more when time is critical.111 The second point is that the

Soviets are particularly effective at simplifying staff

calculations through the use of nomograms. While nomograms do

not speed up wargaming, per se, they might assist in rapidly per-

forming mission analysis so that more time is available for COA

analysis.
 My final conclusion is that U.S. army wargaming rules do not

provide an effective structure for analysis; they are vague and

conflicting. The rules rely too much upon experience; as such,

they are subject to misinterpretation and bias.

Having reached some conclusions about wargaming, I can now

deduce some corresponding implications. First, the 62 will need

extensive training to replicate a rational opponent through

adversarial wargaming. This concept should be taught in U.S.

Army schools and units rflust practice it in the field. Second, we

must do a better job training officers on the development of PIR.

Because they focus the intelligence effort, PIR rflust be more than

just a "check the block" requirement during training exercises.

Third, the intelligence community will need to develop methods to

provide commanders with near-real time imagery to help commanders

deduce enemy intentions and reduce risk by answering the PIRs.

These first three implications would seem to be my most important

ones. Fourth, the U.S. Army school system should emphasize the

concept af more commander involvement in wargasing in order to

reduce COFl analysis time. Fifth, we must look at the practical-

ity of time-saving templates to ease the staff burden of comput-

ing the data the commander needs for decisions. Finally, FM

101-5 needs to be rewritten to include the detailed wargarning

process found in ST 100-9. Until FM 101-5 is revised, however,

ST 100-9--which is not doctrine--will need to be revised to

include the applicable changes recommended in this paper.

Helmuth von Moltke ("The Elder") said that, "You will

usually find that the enemy has three courses open to him, and of
these he will adopt the fourth."lle Thus, no matter what the

commander does, he cannot escape uncertainty completely. While

our wargaming process has its problems, it does provide a method

for helping the commander cope with this "fog of war." However,

it can and should be improved, since the ability of a commander

to visualize and analyze friendly COQs against enemy C O k just

might be the deciding factor on the battlefield.

appendix a: Selected European Rrmy Decision Models
Reference: TRRDOC Report The Command and Control Svstew of the
German Rrmv. 1977, pps. 1, 2; and interviews with German CGSC
students.

1. German Army. The German army uses a five-step estimate of the

situation. The commander may move between steps in no particular
order.

o Analysis of the mission. The commander and staff iden-

tify important tasks from the higher commander, any conditions or
limitations placed upon possible friendly courses of action, and
perform an analysis of the current situation.

o Estimate of the Friendly and Enemy Situation. The esti-

mate of the friendly situation includes determining friendly com-
bat power and estimating friendly effectiveness. Combat power is
determined by staff estimates, normally personnel and material
strengths, equipment readiness, supply stat us, and current st at us
of command and control means (in-place comrflunications and
liaison). The German commander also considers troop morale,
level of training, and the physical condition of his troops. The
62 and the commander develop and analyze enemy courses of action
based upon possible enemy capabilities and the current enemy
situation. The German commander mentally visualizes what the
enemy commander is capable of doing, then compares capabilities
to known enemy locations on his situation map. The German com-
mander continually updates and analyzes the enemy situation
throughout the process.

o Evaluation of Environmental Conditions. This step is sim-

ply terrain analysis, which may be combined with the step above.
Terrain is evaluated as favorable, conditionally favorable, or
unfavorable in relation to both friendly and enemy forces and
their equipment, weather, and previous use of chemical or nuclear
munit ions.

o Formulation of Own Courses of Action. The German com-

mander first compares his friendly force analysis against the
enemy force. He determines, in his judgment, which force is more
capable than the other. He then performs a projection as to what
possible enemy or friendly strength changes might occur that
could affect his mission. The German commander determines which
courses of action are feasible by mentally wargaming each pos-
sible course of action against each enemy course of action. He
discards non-feasible courses of action.

o Comparison of Each Course of Flction. The commander

evaluates each friendly course of action as to advantages vice
disadvantages using criteria he considers important 1 . use of
time or deception). He then uses his judgment to select the best
one, and his staff prepares the execution order.
appendix R: Selected European Rrmy Decision Models (continued).
Reference: Ornanizational Handbook of the British Rrmv, 1990,
pps. 2 to 7 and interviews with British CGSC students and British
and Canadian students at the Canadian Staff College 1990-91.

2. British Rrmy. The British estimate is called an "Rpprecia-

tion". There are five steps. The commander- r finish one sten
before he moves to the next.

o Step One. The British commander and staff analyze the

current situation, guidance, and mission from higher headquar-
ters, and any assumptions which impact upon the plan.

o Step Two. The commander specifies his "aim", or what is

to be attained. The aim is the crux of the appreciation; it must
be right or the entire process might be skewed. There is only
one airn. The commander deduces his aim by considering the cur-
rent situation, to include friendly and enemy forces, their loca-
tions, training stat us, equipment readiness, and the enemy' s most
probable threat ( i.e., ground attack, terrorism, to name a few).
The aim is never qualified by limitations; it must be attainable
given the means at hand.

o Step Three. The commander considers all relevant fac-

tors--t ime and space, weather, comparison of forces, ground (ter-
rain), logistics, morale, and others as the commander's experi-
ence dictate. He then weighs each factor against the aim to
ensure that his airn is feasible, suitable, and acceptable (same
as U.S. criteria). He then considers all enemy courses of
action developed by his 62 that might affect selection of any
friendly course of action. The commander considers enemy options
from his view point and how the enemy options might impact on his
attaining his aim. He then "worst cases" the situation and iden-
tif ies the enemy' s most dangerous or immediate threat.

o Step Four. The commander considers all feasible courses

of action that attain his aim in relation to the most immediate
enemy threat. The commander mentally wargames each course of
action against the most dangerous enemy option to visualize his
plan and develop countermoves (branches). Each friendly course
of action is considered separately, with the commander determin-
ing the advantages and disadvantages of each using his own crite-
ria i . e best use of ground, surprise, speed) in regards to
attaining the airn.

o Step Five. The commander decides which friendly course

of action, in his judgment, attains the aim. He briefs his staff
as to why he chose the course of action that he did and issues
guidance; the staff then prepares the order.
Appendix A. Selected European Clrmy Decision Models (continued).
Reference: Fundamentals of Tactical Command and Control, 1'377,
p. 188.

3. Soviet Army. The Soviet commander follows the process as

diagramed below.

Enemy
.
Lnior
commander's
connpt
- O mtrmp .

htermtdiuu
miwon

- Economic condition of
c o m b 1 o p n t t o l u u-a
and . a i o p d l o c J makw
up of populatton

Tactical Ipditical work. I

Concept of m i u i o ~of _,
+. cmrdtnation
ltwp combat opera. I
combat
0pmLi0N
rubuniu of
braneha of procedure -LioN auppon, ,
land o r w i a c i o o
. ,.
trmp lof command I
~ m ~ c ~ n_!t r o ~
I I I
+
9.lection and formula. Note: m e extent t o which the
Uon of b a t dceuion comm.nder d r t u h m e u u m
option for politcal work. t y p a of combat
combat o p t r a t i o n auppon.
8nd or#miution of command
and control depend. on the
avdlabilit~of time and
Appendix B. United States Army Wargaming Process
Reference: United States Flrmy Command and General Staff College
Student Text 100-9, Techniaues and Procedures For Tactical Deci-
sionmakinq, 1'391, pps. 4-1 to 4-10.

o Gather the tools. The commander decides, based upon the

G2's current situation estimate, which enemy course of action he
wants to wargame first. The staff then posts the map with the
area of operations, which came from higher headquarters. The
staff next posts the area of interest, as determined by the 62
from his Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The
62 posts the current enemy situational template, also derived in
the G2 IPB process, on the map. 63 personnel then post current
friendly unit locations on the same map as the enemy template.

o List all friendly forces. The staff compiles all avail-

able forces, assets, and priorities of support such as air
sorties and nuclear/chernical packages. The list prevents over-
looking a resource during wargaming.

o List the assumptions. In wargaming, assumptions help to

shape a course of action. Not everything is known as the course
of action is formulated; therefore, wargamers develop logical
assumptions concerning enemy activities, enemy strengths, and
other factors beyond friendly control. Fln assumption is consid-
ered valid, for wargaming purposes, if it answers the questions:
1) Is the assumption necessary to solve the problem?, and
2) Would the result change if the assumption were not made?

o List known critical events and decision points. The 63

identifies critical events and decision points based upon the
current situation and/or commander's guidance. Critical events
are specified or implied tasks, the completion of which are
=sent ial for mission accomplishment. Examples of critical
events are passages of lines, river crossings, and deep oper-
ations. Decision points identify events in time and space that
require a command decision to ensure synchronization. The war-
game process may identify additional crltical events and decisive
points.

o Select a wargame method. This means choosing from several

recommendations in ST 100-9 or using one of your own. Wargame
methods organize the battlefield so it can be analyzed by the
wargarae process. ST 100-9 recommends three techniques: the ave-
nuts-in-depth, the belt, and the box. The avenue-in-depth and
belt techniques, while detailed, are also time consuming. The
box method analyzes a small, critical area of the
battlefield--such as a river crossing site--and is faster. Each
technique may be used separately or in combination. A detailed
explanation of these techniques is found in Appendix C.

o Select a wargase technique to record an0 display the

results. Recording the results of wargaming is a key factor in
synchronizing the battlefield. Wargaming results help determine
Rppendix B: United States Flrmy Wargaming Process (continued)

task organizat.ion changes, the maneuver sub-paragraph of the

operations order, and a course of action sketch, which becomes
the operations overlay. There are two recommended methods for
recording the wargame: the narrative and sketch note techniques.
The narrative technique describes the operation from start to
finish in "story" form. The sketch note technique uses brief
notes concerning critical locations and tasks. These notes might
be recorded on maps, a wargame worksheet, or on a synchronization
matrix. Examples are found in Rppendix D.

o Wargame the battle and assess results. The crux of the

wargame process is the last step where the staff, led by the G3,
wargames the battle. The wargame process begins with the staff
identifying tasks to subordinate commanders one level down (bri-
gade), and assets two levels down (battalion). The staff men-
tally visualizes how a subordinate commander might use his allo-
cated forces. The staff simultaneously considers the subordi-
nate's use of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service
support (CSS) assets to accomplish assigned tasks. For example,
the division plans on tasking 1st Brigade to attack to secure an
objective. The staff mentally visualizes how the brigade com-
mander might array his combat, CS, and CSS assets to cross the
line of departure (LD). The staff next arrays unit symbols
depicting all the 1st Brigade assets on the wargaming map. This
process repeats itself for each of the division major subordinate
commands and division troops. The sequence of action-reaction-
counteraction now begins.

The division staff uses this sequence for any type of oper-
ation, but, as an example, I will use an attack. The staff
Segins by first visualizing the brigades and their subord~nate
battalions in their initial positions and then moving the repre-
sentative unit symbols on the map to the LD. The staff focuses
on those actions the subordinate units must take to accomplish
movement to the ID. The staff simultaneously considers all ele-
ments of the offensive framework (deep, close, rear, flank secu-
rity, and reserves to weight the main effort) and records all
actions taken by division and subordinate units across the
battlefield operating systems (command and control, maneuver,
fire support, intelligence and electronic warfare, mobility-
countermobility-survivability, combat service support, and air
defense) using a recording technique. Once each action is deter-
mined for moving to the LD, the second part of the sequence
begins--t he enemy react ion.

The enemy reaction considers ail possible enemy farces the

62 identifies that cculd counterattack the division. :t is
important to use all enemy assets available so the friendly
course of action can he adequately tested. The staff records
enemy actions on the same document as the friendly actions. Tinis
leads into the third part of the sequence--the counteract icn.
Rppendix B: United S t a t e s Rrmy Wargaming P r o c e s s (continues)

The s t a f f now examines what a c t i o n s t h e d i v i s i o n h e a o q u a r t -

ers t a k e s i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e enemy r e a c t i o n . Some examples c:f
c o u n t e r a c t i o n s might be s h i f t i n g o f p r i o r i t y o f f i r e s from ewe
b r i g a d e t o a n o t h e r o r jamminq enemy command and c o n t r o l n e t s .
The 63 a l l o c a t e s assets t o e x e c u t e t h e c a u n t e r a c t i o n and lists
them i n t h e same f a s h i o n a s i n t h e a c t i o n and r e a c t i o n sequence.
The a n a l y s i s of moving t o t h e LD is now complete. Tne a n a l y s i s
c o n t i n u e s i n t h e same manner u n t i l t h e d i v i s i o n r e a c h e s i t s
o b j e c t i v e . The p r o c e s s t h e n ~ e s t a r t sw i t h a d i f f e r e n t enemy
s i t u a t i o n a l t e m p l a t e b u t w i t h t h e same f r i e n d l y c o u r s e c%f a c t i o n .
War gaming c o n t i n u e s u n t i l a l i f r i e n d l y and enemy c o u r s e s o f
a c t i o n are analyzed.
Appendix C. U.S. Army Wargame Methods.
Reference: United States Army Command and General Staff College
Student Text 100-9, Techniques and Procedures For Tactical Deci­
sionmaking, 1991, pps. 4-Z, 4-3.

Step 5. Select a w... game mathod. A number of

locIlniq.... con be used 10 organiza the If. . to be
analyzed. Three possibfe method. at. the avenue,"",­
deplh lachniquea. the bait I_nique. anc:l the llox
IOC/Inique. These are exp/8in8d below:
1; Avenue-in-depth technique. This. technique
focuses on one avenue at • time starting with the
main effort. It is • good technique to use foroffensive
COUtS8. of _ or in the del..... where cansliling
ItITSin exisls.
2. Belt technique. This technique divides the
battSefieId into 81... that run the width of the sector.
it anaIyzu lhe subcomponent battl.. sequentially
acroU· the width of the sector. This is the preferred
method u it ensures simultaneous consideration of
Btl forces that couki affect a particular event. The
act shape of the belt is based on anaIysi. of tne bat·
e.­
Uefield. Any bait may _ mote thon one critical
_I-
In the offense. the p'anner considers the assault
or pene....Uon phose. the exploitation ph.... and. fi·
naJly. the pursuit phase. In the defense. he examines
in sequence the batUe in the covering force are•. In
the main battle are. (MBA), and. finally. in the 'ear
....... This technique is most effective when the ter­
rain il _on into _-defined crOll comparunonts. II
---- -
is also good to ... W the operation is phased: in·
c1udes amphibious assauJts. river crossing.. airmobile
anc:l airbome operations: or Wthe enemy is in cIaarty
defined belts or echelons. BellS con be drawn adja·
cent to or ..on overlapping one onelllerlor complete
v_tion 01 the battle.
When timo il short. a modified belt t_nique
may be used. The modified I_nique. in lloth the of·
fen.. and defense, divides the banlefield into not
more than three sequentiat. but not necessarily adja­
cent or overlapping. belts that run the width of the
sector and focus on actions throughout the depth of
thear.. of operation••
~ • _minimum. the behs should include initial
contacteilller along the line 01 departure (LDI, line of

coun_
cont8Ct (LC), or in the covering force area; initial
penetration or initial contaei along the FEBA: anc:l
pillage of the re.lrve or commitment of •

3. Box technique. The box technique is •

microanalysis of • few critical areas. such as an
engagement area, a river-erossing site, or • hank
avenue of approach into the sector. The ptanner
isoIal.1 the area anc:l tocusel \he battle in lhat I""sin

_I:
..... This taehnique i. kiss timo consuming. An initial
_ption is mode lIIat the friendly units can handle
most of the situations on the battlehld and the
planner can focus on the most essential tasks. This
lachnique is useful Wlhe tasic i. e.g .. attack
or counte,ittack of a major enemy unit. This
techniQue is used when time .. extremely limited such
I I in a hasty attICk.
You may use these technique. separately or in
_ or you may use your own malhod.

48
appendix D. U.S. Rrmy Wargame Recording Techniques.
Reference: U n i t e d S t a t e s army Command and General S t a f f ColI ene
----- =-
S t u d e n t Text 100-9, T e c h n i q u e s and P r o c e d u r e s Fop Tact:=al Decl-
sionmakinq, 1331, pps. 4-4 t o 4-6.

NARRATIVE WAR GAME

CORPS DEFENSE
cnmcu MNT: corps ~ o u n ~ n l ~ ~ l rI- B ~ X
& th. follow-cn tank division approaches me FLOT, me MBA unit$ will both have foupM s g n i f i t fiqhts but
dl be wul dlswsed along me FEBA The mreat mll probaw commlt the M k d ~ w along n me avenue m u
h u proauced the most sqnlficant results. We feel mat mls wll be donp me avenue tun to me norm of tne
divia*n.sep mecn M e wundary. The MBA dinslon may have suLc.ent ComDat wwer to defeat Inns tan. ow.
lion if me aismotton eftons
~7 ~ .~~
of .ma
~ .coros
. .--. deao
- ~ onerasons
.-... . . .Enmoaan --- haws aeen
--. sc,eeesstul.
.-.-----
~ ~.m
.. . l~.
e we.no-.-.mar
~ .~
mi will b e ~ m ecase. we I&mat me lhreat is mon likelv lo Denerrate our defenses
~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~~- vic Obi BLUE. The coros
~ ~ ~~ ~

swnteranack force. Dlv (4,will plan a counteranack to ieslr& anv force makina a sionific&t oenetrarion $0
lhii wet. As mis is the aiea where we feel me threat will more l h a i likelv come.-we a k well ~ i e ~ a r e ford 11bv
me n e d placement of me counterand force. The MBA d.vls~onWII s u b m me counteranack oy holatng me
shwlde~sof thm wnatranon. The penenallon mll be m a d so mat me dw (.) anacks me awtnem llank vn le
ma MBA dlv Nunu ~.ms. merratnn.
~ -. ~
At. Vle
~ ..c..
m l u a a n. at
.~ ~ .ma
t.. h.oneratoon
~ . corns
--.-- wl
...~defend dam -
- .ins
- FEBA
wih me h i B ~ dini the nollh, the coros counteranack force. div I.).in me center. and the seo mecn bde in the
~~~ ~

swm. Priority of engineer suppan to'me MBA div to prep&si6ons to hold me shoulders~b1 s mnetratlon.
then to ensure mobility of lhe counteranack force. Avn bde be prepared to suppon counteranack mlo Ob)
BLUE. ADA priority to proteclinp me move of the counteranack force. IEW assets confirm the commitment 01
ttn I h m t into Obj BLUE, idenbty any followon forces.
Flppendix D. U. S. Army Wargarae Recoraing Tschniques (cont inneo) .

WABOWBWORRBHEET
Cap D*law
CRITICAL WENT, Can(.# P- B*tUcB.lt 1
Rppendix D. U.S. Rrmy Wargarae Recording T e c h n i q u e s i c u n t i z u e d )

SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX-Dlvhfon Offense \

Rppendix E. U.S. flrmy Decision Matrix.
Reference: United States Rrmy Command and General Staff College
Student Tent 100-9, Techniaues and Procedures For iactlcai Deci-
sionmakinq, 1991, p. 4-11.
Pppendix F. Weighting of Intelligence indicators.
Reference: United States Rrmy Field Manual 34-3, Intel 1 i qence
Flnaivsis, 1390, pps. 6-10 to 6-13.

WlOHTING INDICATORS

Welghtlng Indicators heiPe reaoive m b l g u l t y . I n combat, lntelllgenca

analysts usually are Contronted w i t h c o n t l l c t l n g indlcetors. Enmy forces
may p o r t r a y patterns aseoclated w i t h attack. defense. and dalay
s l m l t a n s o u s l y . C o n t l l c t l n g Indicators r e s u l t t r a -

0 D.1 lberetm decept ion.

O 8.6 mxaoutlon.

* tnoorery indsolslon.

0 I n c m l a t e or inaocurete intormatlon.

O l n b l g u l t y of the Indlcator l t e e l t .

Wen contronted w i t h mblguoue or c o n t l l c t l n g indlcatore. analysts

rmlgh e m Indlcatore more h a w l l y than othsra t o determlna the enmny'e
actual i n t e n t . This i s not a pr0bI.m o t s l m l e ~ t h a n r t l c e . The anmy's
actual ccurse 01 action may not have the most lndlcatore. hsiyats
develop a mthodology tor I d e n t i t y i n g thoma Indicators which are most
h i g h l y c h e r a c t a r l s t l c o f a course o t actlon. There are several teohnlques
which. individually or I n comblnetlon, aeslst I n t h l s procees.

O r i g i n o t thm Indlcator

One technlqua o t determlnlng the anmy's Intent I s t o conelder the

o r l g l n o t the Indlcator: t h a t 11, the reason why the a n w torce presents
a PartlCUIer pattarn or t i p - o t t . I n broet. a l l lndlcatore s t m from
a l t h a r m l l l t a r y loglc, doctrinal tralnlng. organtzatlonal constraints.
bUreaUCretlC conatralnta. or tha pereonellty o t the anmy c m n d a r .

M I l I t a r v Loale. M I I l t a r y l o g l c Impllee. and m i l i t a r y axpert. egr.8. that

solutlone t o N n y m i i i t a r y p r o b l e m are obvloue. For exmple. e l l modern
armlee m p l o y a r t i l l e r y torward t o r attack and echelonad in-dapth t o r
datenam. V l o l e t l o n o t m l l l t a r y l o g l c usually lmpltes the loss o f c a b a t
p w r or support a t e a o r l t l c a l p o l n t during an operation.

W c t r i n a l Tralnlng. A netlon's t a c t l c e l doctrine Includes m l l I t a r y Ioglc

end rmch more. Moat dootrlna baglns where m l l l t a r y logic and. Mllltary
exeerts e a t t m s dieagrse on the Ideal e o i u t l o n t o ls p e c i t i o m l l l t a r y
Vroblm. For Uxm~Pla. US and Soviet doctrine agrea on deploying a r t i l l e r y
forward i n the attack. while they dlaagrss on using a r t i l l e r y i n a d i r a o t
t l r a r o l a . Just as t a r r a i n and n a t h e r ara physical constraints on tha
a n n y ' e adoption of lcourse o t action. enmy d o c t r i n a end t r e t n i n g are
m n t a l constraints. Sovlet mphasls on detailad, r e p e t i t i v e t r a i n i n g I s
designed t o inbreed a s o r t o t r e t l e x a c t i o n w+~icnenhances the value o t
dootrlnal indlcatore. Though lndlvldual c m n d e r a display more or less
Appendix F. Weighting O f Intelligence Indicators (continued).

Inuglnatlon and c r a e t l v l t y I n I t s appllcatlon. Indlcators baaad on

doctrine and t r a l n l n g arm generally r a l l a b i a .

Oraanizatlonal Constraints. Organizational s t r u c t u r e represents a spmclal

case c f doctrine. The ideal c-ition of r d i v l a l o n (aiza.
organizatlon. wapona. and crganlc support) 1s dabatable. The m l l l t e r y
exparts have rmaolvad t h i s isaue I n radically d i f f e r e n t ways.
Organization Influensas includa a nation's a t r a t a g l c c m i t r m n r s . *COnomlC
resourcms. gaogrephy, threat p a r c ~ p t l o n s . h i s t o r i c a l axperiencg,
elliancea. personnal and e q u i p n n t resoureas. and a n y r i a d of other
factors. Th. t a c t l c a l or0anlzation r e s u l t i n g iron, thee. factors Causes
l d a n t l f l a b l e patterns t o dmveiop when mployed. A US d i v o a ~ o ngenerally
has thrae subordinat* maneuver headouartars C0ntrast.d ~~- - ~ w
~ - i t~
h feur
-~
~ in a
Soviet d i v i s i o n . and differensas i n the composition and s t r u c t u r r of tha
d l v l s i o n base iwoama d i s t i n c t patterns concerning US and Soviet
opsr a t ions.

Bureaucratic Constraints. I d e n t l t y i n g bureaucratic constraints as a

source o f indlcatore shows t h a t m l l l t a r y u n i t s are Iarga organizations and
m a t a s t a b i l s h routlnaa and SOPS t o tunction a f f l c l a n t l y . This Impoaaa
patterns i n planning. execution. l o p l s t l c a support. and other r c t i v l t l e a .
Though there are general s i m i l a r i t i a s I n routlnas and procedur*s of
c a p a r a b l e u n i t s . there are l i k e l y t o be s i g n i f i c a n t v a r l a t l o n e which can
be I d a n t i t i a d and axploltad l o c e l l y .

Parsonalitv o f the C m n d a r . The enmy c m n d e r I s the f i n a l eourca o t

indicators. Each C m M a r has s uniqus h i s t o r y of person8i t r a i n i n g ,
experlance. auccaas. f a i l u r e . and idlosyncresles. Many are creatures o f
habit, prone t o rapeat what has worked I n the past: othara are c r e a t i v e
and innovative. A l l are captives of t h e i r axperience t o e m degree. It
I s the c m n d a r who m s t apply and mix m l l l t a r y logic, doctrina, and
organlzatlon t o accom~llshthe mission. The c m n d a r ' s paraonailty i s
one m i o r sourca o t deviation from establishad d o c t r i n a l norm. Tha
importance o f personality I s racognized I n t h a t blographlc i n t e i l lgenca i s
a major caponent o f s t r a t e g i c lntelliganca. US t a c t i c a l 08 doctrina
classlf1as personality as a aubcatagory under miacallanaous factors.

i n gsneral. Indicators ara wighad. w i t h tha r o t a of t h s c m n d a r

belng conaldarad a variable. I n th. case of a strong. Innovativa, or
eccantrlc c m n d a r (Patton or R m O , personality i s nore important than
doctrina or tralnlng; while tha pnreonality of a m t h o d l c a l . t r a d l t l o n a i
O m n d e r ranks last.

Another tachnlque I s t o w l g h tha Indicators which r e t l s c t or are

basad on the p r i n c i p l e o f maas. M l l l t a r y u n i t e n o r m l l y conduct dscaptlon
operations w i t h the a m torcm c o n s t r a i n t s I n which they accomplish t h e i r
actual mission. T h . en* c m n d m r o f t e n conducte decaption w i t h tho
least outlay o t scarce rmsourcas. Indlcetors baaed on a major c o n f l r m d
c m i t m n t of e&et resources are nore l i k e l y t o r e f l a s t the true
slturtlon. I n a nuclear e n v l r o m n t . massing I s not required t o achlava a
tavorabie canbat p w r r a t i o ; thus. mass l a not a r e l i a b l e Indicator.
Flppendix F. Weighting of Intelligence Indicators (continued).

.- -- -- - --
Analysts l d a n t l t y tha enmy's c a p s b l l l t y t o concantrats f l r a s of p o t a n t l a l
nuolasr d s l l v a r y s y s t w .

Othsr Indlcators

Tha l a s t tachnlqua I s t o wmlght t h o u Indloatora h l c h arm most

d l t f i o u l t t o taka.

Ouantlty Probabla Rmlatlonahle. Ouantlty the probable r o l a t l o n a h i p

b s h s n the prassnca o t a p a c i t l c indicators and tha anmy's adoption o t a
p a r t i c u l a r coursa o t action. I f the #new comnndar lntanda t o adopt a
PartlCuIar COUram 01 action. what i s tha p r o b a b i l l t y t h a t a s p a c l t l c
Indlcator l a pr-a-nt? The anawar i s aubjectlva. but i t i s baaad on the
analyst's knowladga of and axpariancm w i t h the snmy, the analyat'a
protassional j u d m n t . and t o s a dsgrss. the n u t h m t l c a l p r o b a b i l i t y o f
s p s c l t l c indicators associated w i t h anmy couraas of action.

Analyze tha T i m Sequence o t Events. I t takas tlnw tor an anmy forcs to

prmpars. move. and axacuta an oparation. T i m , mass. and space
r n l s t i o n s h l p s I r a a nuior tool I n exposing deception. Slnca dacsptlon I s
o f t e n conducted w i t h thm l u s t outlay o t c a b a t reaourcsa. cloae analysis
01 l n t o r n u t l o n t r a d i t t o r a n t sources which r-port on tha s m location.
a t the a m tlm, or concarnlng the s m anmy u n i t m y rsvsal s i g n l t l c a n t
dlsorapanclss.

Asaaas ths Enmy's Combat Etfoctivenesa. Such assas-nts ara bassd on an

m a l y a l s o t both tangible and intangible tactora. Tangible factora
include psrsonnnl and aquipmnt atrsngth. Intanglbla factors lncluda
morale, t r a i n i n g , p o l l t l c a l r a l l a b l l l t y , and othar factors. Whila combat
stfmctlvsnssa bears d i r a c t l y on a u n i t ' s c a p a b l l i t l a a and probabla couraaa
01 action. there ir no s c i a n t i t l c m t h o d of dstarmlning It. It requires
tha a n a l y s t ' s aubjactlva judpmnt of the Impact o t both the t m g i b l e and
Intangible tactors.

WA8GAMING FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES

COnsldar tha snmy 62's parcaption of tha f r l a n d l y force. Though

anmy c a p a b l l i t l a a e x i s t lndepandantly o t t h e i r a s s e s w n t o f f r i e n d l y
torces. the anmy's Choica o t a l t e r n a t l v a couraae of action doam not.
Datarmina the anew's perception of t r i a n d l y c a p a b i l i t i e s through analysis
o t the COIIectIOn CaPabilities. known c o l l e c t i o n a c t i v l t i o r . and
inadvmrtsnt diacloauroa by f r i e n d l y torcaa which might have been u m n i t o r w
by anmy IntalIiganCa. Dotailmd analysis of p o t a n t l a l dlsclosura anablaa
tho analyst t o p a r t i a l l y raconstruct the enmy 02's w r k l n g SITMAP.

Mentally wargun advantages and dlasdvantagss o t i d a n t i t l a d anmy

c a p a b l l l t l e a f r a tha enmy cormunder's p o i n t of v l w . This 18 a valuablo
a n a l y t i c a l technique, but p o t a n t i a l l y dangarous i f It b s c a a
mirror-Imaging.

Avoid preconceptions. The analyst m a t r a m b m r t h a t ths o b j a c t i v e l a

not t o prova a p r i o r judpmnt. Exparlanca suggssts t h a t praconcsptiona
arm ths analvat's principal n w s i a . Evan i f the tachniquns racomnndmd
Appendix F. Weighting of Inteliigence Indicators icontinuea).

aWva are crmatlvaly w l o y e d , there I 8 a danger t h a t tha analyst who has

reachsd and axprssaed a praliminary j u d m n t unconsciously bagtna t o seat
and n i g h evldence whlch c o n t i r m the l n l t l a l estlnuta and dlvnlsaea or
~ a s a e aOver inconsistent or c o n t l l c t i n g i n t o r m t i o n . The analyst should
not ba concernad about the anrurr. as long as i t I s the r i g h t s n m r . The
analyst resarvsa j u d w n t , n u l n t a l n s o b j e c t i v i t y , remains awara o t
uncertalntiaa. t o l e r a t a s diaaant. and constantly t e s t s working theory
against available evidence. where p r a c t i c a l , the analyet conaidera
aatabllahlng a - d a v l l ' a advocata- a y a t m t o test. challenge. and thlnk the
unthlnkabla.
 Flppendix G. S o v i e t Nomogram.
Reference: Fundamentals of T a c t i c a l Cornrnand and C o n t r o i , 1977,
p.210

Figure 25. Graph for Determining the Required T i e , the Extent of the
Move, or the Troops*Marching Rate.
 ENDNOTES

1. 0.1. Gibbs, Dictionarv of Gaminn. klodellinn. and Simulation,

(Beverly Hills, 13781, 37. Gibbs defines decision-mak~ng as
"taking" decisions, but the intent is the same.

2. Command and General Staff College, Student Text 180-9. Tech-

ninues and Procedures For Tactical Decisionma~inq, (Fort Leaven-
worth, KS, 19911, 1-1.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 0-1 National Defense Dcc-
trine, Washington, D.C., initial draft, 1 Nov 1389, 1-18, and
CGSC ST 100-9, Tactical Decisionmakinq, p. 4-1.

4. Ibid, 4-1.

5. Ibid, 4-1.-6. U.S. Rrmy, Field Manual 100-5, D~eratinns,

(Washington D. C., 1986), 22.

7. CGSC ST 100-3, 4-1.

8. John 3. Fallesen, Rex R. Michel, and Charles F. Carter JR.,

Rnalvsis of Tactical Courses of Rction Usino Structured Proce-
dures and Automated Aids, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Research
Institute, E19893), p. 5.

9. Frank C. Zagare, Game Theorv. Concepts and Applicat ions,

(Beverly Hills, 1984), 7.

10. Ibid, 9.

11. Ibid, 7.

12. Ibid, 7.

13. Ibid, 7-8.

14. Ibid, 8.

15 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theorv of Games and

Economic Behavior, (Princeton, 19531 12-20.

16. Gibbs, 103.

17. Martin Shubik, The Uses and Methods of Gaminq, (New York,
19751, 18.

18. Ibid, 10. Shubik.believes that chess and card games are
rigid because the rules are specified in advance. As such the
best game m v e for any given game turn is predictable due to the
limited number of possible choices.

19. V o n Neumann and Morgenstern, 12-16.

20. Zagare, 11-15.

21. Ibid, 11.

22. Ibid, 14-15.

23. Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 75-80.

24. Ibid, 76.

25. Colonel Oliver Haywood, JR. USRF, Military Doctrine of Deci-

sion and the Van Neumann Theory of Games, (Santa Monica: RRND
Corporation, C19511), pps. 2-6.

26. Ibid, 6-10.

27. ibid, 2Q.

28. Haywood, 26.

29. Ibid, 23.

30. Rlexander H. Cornel 1, The Decision-maker' s Handbook,

(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hali, Inc., 13881, p. 33. 1 designed
the following table to better explain how decision-makers
evaluate information to reach a decision.

Rb.oluto ab.olut-
UKortainty Certainty
Enemy C a p a 8 i l l t i . r - E n ~ y
Intmtiom

(-1 1 1
1
P
1
P
1
P P
1
P
IP I
P
I I I I*>

p . P P p
Ultra ~I.(~co utr.
Consorvat tw Point . Opt i m i . t I e
mini-llin Maxi-nin' Miniur -8‘1-a*

For the payoff model above, absolute uncertainty and certainty

are opposite poles. In decision-making theory, the absolutes are
seldom used. Rn ultra-conservative decision has minuscule pay-
offs and is deemed inappropriate, while the ultra-optimistic
decision fails to consider losses and is overly audacious. Thus,
decision-makers tend to balance between being too conservative
and too bold. Which side of the balance point one uses depenas
upon available information regarding an opponent. For example:
if all one can discern are enemy capabilities, then most deci-
sion-makers choose the best of the worst cases by using the maxi-
min model, or somewhere between ultra-conservative and the bal-
ance point. The subsequent payoff is not as good when compared
to a decision using intent~ons, but it is safer due to limited
enemy information. In this case, moving further to the right not
only increases risk but also a theoretically more positive pay-
off. On the other hand, a decision-maker who deduces enemy
intentions chooses the mini-max model, accepts a reduced but
larger payoff--but is still conservative in that he retains
assets to deal with some uncertainty. If he is more optimistic,
the decision-maker can move further to the right and increase his
payoff (while increasing risk), or move further to the left,
decreasing simultaneously both his payoff and his risk. Of
course a decision-maker can ignore the models completely and be
ultra-conservative, ultra-optimistic, or anything in between
regardless of how much enemy information he has. Choosing to
ignore the models depends upon the decision-maker's experience
and judgment, and how much risk he is willing to accept.

31. Haywood, 30.

32. Ibid, 24-26.

33. Staff of Strategy and Tactics, Mar Game Design, (New 'fork,
1977), 2.

34. Ibid, 2.

35. Ibid, 4.

36. Ibid, 5.

37. Rex R. Michel, Historical Develo~rnent of the Estimate of the

Situation, (Leavenworth: Army Research Inst it ute, October ?990),
3.

38. Staff of Strategy and Tactics, 5.

39. Ibid, 5.

40. Michel, 7.

41. Staff of Strategy and Tactics, 5.

42. Ibid, 6.

43. Staff of Strategy and Tactics, 9.

44. Martin Van Creveld, Command In War, (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-

versity Press, 1985), pps 2-5.

45. Ibid, 3.

46. Michel, 7.

47. Ibid, 10.

48. Ibid, 8.
49. Ibid, 10.

50. ST 100-9 mentions being a b l e t o "read t h e b a t t l e f i e l d " on

page 2-1, and s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e " b e s t " c o u r s e of a c t i o n on page
4-1. The d i s c u s s i o n on t h e s e oages i n d i c a t e s t h a t commanders
make d e c i s i o n s based upon c u r r e n t c o n d i t i o n s t n a t a r e known o r
assumed.

51. CGSC ST 100-9, 2-1 t o 2-6.

52. Ibid, 3-1 t o 3-6.

53. Ibid, 4-1.

54. Ibid, 5-1 t o 5-2.

55. Ibid, 4-1.

56. Ibid, 4-1 t o 4-2.

57. Ibid, 4-8.

58. Ibid, 4-8.

59. Ibid, 4-10.

60. Ibid, 4-10.

61. I b i d , 4-10.

62. Ibid, 4-11.

63. Ibid, 4-11.

64. I b i d , 4-7.

65. Ibid, 4-7.

66. BG(P) John F. Stewart, Desert Storm, The M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i -

nence Storv, (Headquarters, 3d U.S. Army, R p r i l 1991), 13.

67. Department of t h e Rrrny, F i e l d manual 34-3 I n t e l l i u e n c e Flna-

m,Washington D.C., March 1990, p. 5-6.

68. Ibid, 5-9.

69. D. FI. Ivanov, V. P. Savel' yev, and P. V. Shernanskiy, Fundarnen-

tals o f T a c t i c a l Command and Control, t r a n s . U.S. R i r Force
(Washington: Department of t h e R i r Force, 1977), p. 163.

70. My information f o r t h i s f o o t n o t e a p p e a r s i n a numoer of

sources. My primary German s o u r c e is a T r a i n i n g and Doctrine
Command Report on The German Command and Control System, 1577. i
used v a r i o u s i n t e r v i e w s with German CGSC s t u d e n t s a s well a s :oy
over seven years of USRREUR service working frequently with Ger-
man units. During 1986 I was a company commander attached to a
German armored battalion where I watched this process in action
over a one-week period. My British notes come from interviews
with British CGSC students, a British student I met in 1931 on a
visit to the Canadian Staff College, and the 1386 version of the
Camberley Staff College rnanual Tactics. The Soviet method curnes
from a USRF translation of Fundamentals of Tactical Command and
Control, 1977.

71. CGSC ST 100-9, 4-1,

72. Ibid, 3-2.

73. Ibid, 3-2.

74. Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-1Q0 Division flzer-

ations, Washington, D. C., June 1990, p. 1-1.

75. I used these reports in my three years experience as a pri-

mary staff officer in a heavy division. F1s a Battle Command
Training Program Observer/Controller I observed ten different
U.S. Rrmy divisions use the same methods for collecting data.

76. U.S. Rrmy Field Manual 34-3, 6-1 to 6-2.

77. CGSC ST 100-9, 4-1.

78. Daniel Serfaty, Toward FI Theorv of Tactical Decisionmakinq

Expertise, (Burlington: RLPHRTECH, Inc., October I%@), chapters
4-2 and 4-3.

79. 1 personally observed five division commanders go tnrouan

the decision-making process during BCTP War Fighter Exercises
between September 1989 and May 1990.

80. Daniel Serfaty, Tactical Decisionmakina Expertise, (Burling-

ton: RLPHRTECH, inc., Rugust 19901, p. 24.

81. U. S. Army FM 34-3, 6-10 to 6-12.

82. Ibid, 5-4.

m. Headquarters, US Rrmy Training and Doctrine Command. &P

odic Report. Rrticles of Special Interest: The Command and Con-
trol Svstem of the German Rrmv. Fort Monroe, VFI, 14 July 1977,
p. 2.

84. Author interview with a German officer during CGSC War

Fighter 1991. I cannot give his name due to the CGSC non-
attribution policy.

85. Rccording to my German source, this is normal because war

gaming "takes too lono".
86. Camberley Staff College. Tactics. Camberley, England, i386,
pps. 1-1 to 1-7.

87. Interview with a field grade British officer during a Cana-

dian Staff College exercise. I cannot use his name due to CGSC
non-attribution policy.

88. Camberley Staff College, 1-6.

89. D.R. Ivanov, V. P. 5ave11yev, and P. V. Sherflanskiy, p.

185-186.

90, Ibid, 210.

31. Ibid, 207 to 2@9.

92. Ibid, 40-46.

33. CGSC ST 100-9, 4-1.

34. Ibid, 4-1.

95. Shubik, 9-10.

96. Gary F). Klein and Dunald MacGregor, Knowledse Elicitation of

Reconnition-Primed Decision Makinq, (Fort Leavenworth: nrmy
Research Institute, July 1388), p. 19.

97. Serfaty, Theorv of Tactical Decisionmakinq, p. 24.

98. Ibid, 24.

99. Klein and MacGregor, p. 13.

1 0 CGSC ST 100-9, 4-1.

101. Ibid, 2-1 to 2-6 and 4-11.

102. Ibid, 4-1.

103. Ibid, 4-10.

104. Serfaty, Toward a Tactical Decisionrnakinq Theorv, 25.

105. This is similar to the U.S. process where the commander

determines what is important and bases his decision on his crite-
ria.

106. Camberley Staff College, 1-6.

107. Ivanov, Savel' yev, and Shemanskiy, 207.

108. Shubik, 9-18.

109. This playbook works well within the U.S. division. See LYG
Charles Otstott, B G W ) Craig FI. Hagan, and Major Nelvin E. Rich-
mond, "Battle Rhythm," Militarv Review (June 1330): 14-26.

110. Brown, iii. B O W ) Brown specifically states that "Ctlhe

FIrmy needs to develop an imagery architecture to provide near-
real time photography to commanders".

111. CGSC ST 100-9, 6-1.

112. Robert Debs Heinl, JR., Dictiunarv of Military and Naval

[luotations, (FLnnapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1385), p. 60.
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 INTERVIEWS

British Officer at Command and General Staff College. Interview

by author, 1 November, 1991, at residence, Leavenworth, Kan-
sas. Name not given under non-attribution policy.

British Officer at Canadian Staff College. Interview by author,

5-8 February, 1991, during Exercise STFlLWRRT WARRIOR, Yor-
den, Canada. Name not provided under non-attribution pol-
icy.

Canadian Officer at Canadian Command and Staff College. Inter-

view by author, 5-0 February, 1991, during Exercise STRLWRRT
WRRRIOR, Borden, Canada. Name not provided under non-
attribution policy.

Two German officers at Command and General Staff College,

1990-91, Personal interview by author, 14-18 May 1991, Fort
Leavenworth, KS. Students names not be published under non-
attribution policy.