THE JOY OF PAIN

THE JOY
of
PAIN
SCHADENFREUDE AND THE DARK SIDE
OF HUMAN NATURE

Richard H. Smith
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Smith, Richard H.
The joy of pain : schadenfreude and the dark side of human nature / Richard H. Smith.
pages cm
ISBN 978–0–19–973454–2
1. Envy. 2. Failure (Psychology) 3. Humiliation. I. Title.
BF575.E65S65 2013
152.4—dc23 2012044930

135798642
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
 CONTENTS

Acknowledgments
Introduction

CHAPTER 1
THE HIGHS OF SUPERIORITY

CHAPTER 2
LOOKING UP BY LOOKING DOWN

CHAPTER 3
OTHERS MUST FAIL

CHAPTER 4
SELF AND OTHER

CHAPTER 5
DESERVED MISFORTUNES ARE SWEET

CHAPTER 6
JUSTICE GETS PERSONAL

CHAPTER 7
HUMILITAINMENT

CHAPTER 8
THERE’S SOMETHING ABOUT ENVY

CHAPTER 9
ENVY TRANSMUTED
 CHAPTER 10
DARK PLEASURES UNLEASHED

CHAPTER 11
HOW WOULD LINCOLN FEEL?

Conclusion
Notes
Index
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Lori Handelman was my first editor at Oxford University Press. Do you

know someone whose judgment is so keen that you hang on her every
word? You know that whatever your own understanding might be, it is
necessarily incomplete until you have consulted her. Lori is in this category.
Lori gave the first draft of the book an initial thumbs up, and she began the
tough task of helping me turn a sow’s ear into something of better quality.
Chance favored me a second time when Abby Gross took over the project.
Upon these two rocks of Handelman and Gross, I could start a publishing
company. I was very far from solving the problems with the first draft, but
Abby rolled up her editorial sleeves and went to work on guiding it toward
the copy editing stage. Like Lori, her wisdom is extraordinary. As with
Lori, I was incapable of a confident judgment on any issue until I got her
opinion. If this final product misses the mark in any way, it is because I was
unable to act on Abby’s suggestions. I should add that the whole operation
at Oxford was superb. The group of folks, together with Abby, who thought
through the cover of the book did an exceptional job. I had imagined any
number of designs for the cover, but none was close to what the Oxford
team created. It was perfect, really. Suzanne Walker, Karen Kwak, Coleen
Hatrick, and Pam Hanley expertly guided the final draft through to its
completion as book in hand.
This book is partly a story of empirical work, done by myself and a
group of other psychologists, including Norman Feather, Shlomo Hareli,
Wilco van Dijk, Jaap Ouwerkerk, Masato Sawada, Hidehiko Takahashi,
Zlatan Krizan, Omesh Johar, Colin Leach, Russell Spears, Niels van de
Ven, Seger Breugelmans, Jill Sundie, Terry Turner, Mina Cikara, and Susan
Fiske—as well as some of my current and former students, Ron Garonzik,
David Combs, Caitlin Powell, Ryan Schurtz, Charles Hoogland, Mark
Jackson, Matt Webster, Nancy Brigham, and Chelsea Cooper. Much of this
work I summarize in this book, and I am indebted to these scholars for all
their efforts to make conceptual and empirical headway in understanding
schadenfreude.
Many friends and colleagues have contributed directly to my thinking or
have simply given me the support of their friendship, which indirectly made
this book possible. John Thibaut and Chet Insko at the University of North
Carolina, where I did my graduate work, and Ed Diener at the University of
Illinois, where I enjoyed a postdoc, were my first academic mentors. They
each made me a much better researcher and thinker. The first study on
schadenfreude that I was part of was done at Boston University, my first
academic home. Much thanks to Ed Krupat, Len Saxe, Fabio Idrobo, Jean
Berko Gleason, Henry Marcucella, Hilda Perlitsh, Mary Perry, and Joanne
Hebden for their constant goodwill during the four years I was in the
department—and to the late Phil Kubzansky, a marvelous human being of
many parts who gave me so much good advice, including these words from
A. E. Housman: “Get you the sons your fathers got, and God will save the
Queen.” What a mensch he was.
I am lucky currently to work at a place, the Psychology Department at
the University of Kentucky, that provides a friendly, respectful, and
intellectually vibrant environment conducive to getting good work done. A
special thanks to Bob Lorch, Betty Lorch, Jonathan Golding, Ron Taylor,
Art Beaman, Phil Berger, Monica Kern, Larry Gottlob, Charley Carlson,
Ruth Baer, Rich Milich, Tom Zentall, Mike Bardo, Phil Kraemer, Mary Sue
Johnson, Jenny Casey, Erin Norton, Melanie Kelley, Jeremy Popkin,
Richard Greissman, Steve Voss, and Mark Peffley.
A number of people read and gave me feedback on one or more chapters.
Mark Alicke, Phil Berger, Zlatan Krizan, Rich Milich, Jeremy Popkin, Peter
Glick, and Stephen Thielke read early versions of Chapters 9 or 10, and
their comments greatly improved each. Mark Alicke, Phil Berger, and
Stephen Thielke also read Chapters 5 and 6, and, here again, their
comments were very, very helpful. Stephen was a constant source of astute
observations about schadenfreude and other social emotions. Phil supplied
me with many pertinent newspaper clippings and magazine articles. Claire
Renzetti read Chapter 7 and gave me useful sociological references. Heidi
Breiger provided me with a judge’s perspective on assessing emotional
reactions to criminal behavior. Jerry Parrott clarified much of my thinking
about envy. Late in the process, Charley Carlson read the penultimate draft
of the entire book. This was an enormous help in fine-tuning points. Before
submitting the last draft of the book, Jon Martin, Sarah Braun, Alex
Bianchi, and Allie Martin, the undergraduates in my lab at the time, read
parts or all of the book. They also made very helpful suggestions and
caught many writing glitches. A former honors student, Edward Brown,
read the entire book and gave me especially useful comments.
My sisters, Gillian Murrell and Helen Smith, read the first draft of the
book. Their comments were extremely helpful in my being able to take a
sober assessment of where things were—what was working and what was
not. I very much appreciated their enthusiasm for what I was trying to
accomplish. My brother-in-law, Arch Johnson, who has a lot of horse sense,
was always ready as a sounding board. And my sensible and fair-minded
niece, Julia Smith, read early versions of Chapters 5, 6, and 10. Her
comments greatly assisted my efforts to clarify these sections.
There are a few people I want to single out for extra thanks. My good
friend, Mark Alicke, has had my back ever since we were in graduate
school together, when he accepted my citing the Bard rather than the latest
social psychological research. He has followed this project from its
inception, sometimes reading chapters, but always, and with inimitable
humor, giving me frank, constructive suggestions for how to get it done.
Thanks, Mark.
My brother, Eric Smith, read several drafts and helped at all stages, from
pleading with me to write the book in the first place to volunteering to do
the figures. I am not the only person who has benefited from his willingness
to help others, professionally and personally, in hugely substantial ways.
I am blessed with a family who has remained loving, patient, and
optimistic as I worked to complete the book. My younger daughter,
Caroline Smith, who shares my proclivity for punning, rather than groaning
at them, simply came up with reciprocal puns of her own. This pun-
upmanship was a sure energy boost when my vigor lagged. My older
daughter, Rosanna Smith, despite her many other activities, did the
drawings for the book. Working with her on ideas for these drawings was
by far the most fun part of this project. My wife, Sung Hee Kim,
painstakingly read the book at least five times at critical junctures. So
gladly forbearing, she also created guilt-free conditions in our home to
make it easier to complete it. More than anyone, by a country mile, she is
the reason this thing got done. Finally, I thank my parents. I owe my love of
reading and of scholarly pursuits to both. My mother, Hilary Smith, spent
many years as an editorial assistant in the English Department at Duke
University, and, during that time, helped edit the collected letters of Thomas
and Jane Carlyle. She is still quick with an adapted line of poetry for any
occasion. With rings on her fingers and bells on her toes, she shall have
music wherever she goes. My late father, Peter Smith, who was a professor
of chemistry at Duke for several decades and the son of a flower and seed
shop owner in Manchester, England, knew and valued his Shakespeare, and
this rubbed off on me as well. “Lay on, Macduff, and damn’d be him that
first cries, ‘Hold! enough!’”
 INTRODUCTION

Homer Simpson’s neighbor, Ned Flanders, announces during a backyard

barbecue that he will quit his sales job to start a business called the
“Leftorium,” catering to left-handed people. Ned and Homer break the
wishbone from a turkey carcass, and Homer gets the bigger piece and the
right to make a wish. “Read it and weep!!” he exclaims, imagining a scene
of the business failing. It turns out that it does start poorly, as Homer
discovers when he passes by the store some weeks later. It is “deeeserted,”
he happily reports to the family at dinner. Lisa Simpson, ever the erudite
daughter, labels and defines the emotion he is feeling.
LISA SIMPSON: Dad, do you know what schadenfreude is?
HOMER SIMPSON: No, I do not know what schadenfreude is. Please tell me because I’m dying
to know.
LISA: It’s a German word for shameful joy, taking pleasure in the suffering of others. 1

There is no English word for what Homer’s feeling, but as Lisa tells him,
there is one in German: schadenfreude. It comes from the joining of two
words, “schaden” meaning “harm” and “freude” meaning “joy,” and it
indeed refers to the pleasure derived from another person’s misfortune.2
This book is about schadenfreude, an emotion that most of us can feel
despite its shameful associations.

GAIN FROM OTHERS’ MISFORTUNE

Although most of us feel uncomfortable admitting it, we often feel
schadenfreude because we can gain from another person’s misfortune. What
does Homer gain from the failure of Ned Flanders’s business? Actually,
quite a lot. Homer envies Ned. Although Ned is a good neighbor, he still
has it better than Homer in just about every way, from his well-equipped
recreation room with foreign beers on tap to his superior family bliss. The
envy Homer feels runs deep and takes its typical inferiority-tinged and
hostile form. When Ned fails, Homer feels less inferior. Ned’s failure also
satisfies Homer’s hostile feelings. These are heady psychological dividends
and should make Homer feel pretty good as a result. What better
tranquilizer for Homer’s inadequacy and ill will than Ned’s failure?

Perhaps you have heard this joke: two campers come across a grizzly
bear while hiking in the forest. One immediately drops to the ground, takes
off his hiking boots, and starts putting on his running shoes. The other says,
“What are you doing? You can’t outrun a bear!” His friend replies, “I don’t
have to outrun the bear, I only have to outrun you!” While this example is
cartoonish, similar but lower-stakes scenarios like this one play out in
relationships every day. In Chapters 1 and 2, I examine the link between
schadenfreude and personal gain and show that a large part of our
emotional life results from how we compare with others. We gain from
another person’s misfortune when this “downward comparison” boosts our
rank and self-worth. We shall see that this is no small benefit.
The benefits to Homer from Ned’s failing are largely intangible, but
schadenfreude also results from tangible things. As I will stress in Chapter
3, much of life involves competition. One side must lose for the other to
win. This is captured well in Apollo 13, the film based on the near-fatal
NASA lunar mission. In this film version of events, Jim Lovell is unhappy
because fellow astronaut Alan Shepard and the others on Shepard’s crew
have the latest coveted opportunity to travel to the moon. But Shepard
develops an ear problem, and his crew is replaced by Lovell’s. This is
painful for Shepard, but Lovell’s reaction is exuberant when he rushes
home to give the news to his family. Lovell shows no hint of sympathy for
Shepard as he tells his wife what has happened.3
As viewers of Apollo 13, we are watching from Lovell’s perspective and,
with him, we experience the good news. We see that when an outcome is so
desired, its value for ourselves eclipses other factors. The extra detail that
our gain comes at another person’s expense recedes in relevance and does
little to reduce the pleasure involved. Notice, however, that Lovell would
have had no reason to delight in Shepard’s ear infection had it not furthered
his own goals. He was not happy “in” Shepard’s misfortune, but rather
“because of” it. Does this mean his joy was not schadenfreude at all? In this
book, I take a broad definition of schadenfreude. The distinction between
types of gain is easily blurred in our experience. For example, Lovell may
well have envied Shepard. As I will explore later in the book, Homer
Simpson is an exaggerated version of all of us. Envy can produce deep
satisfaction in another’s misfortune, especially in competitive situations,
and there may be few pure cases of gain uncontaminated by such features.
Plus, would we see Lovell showing his joy outside the family? Taking any
pleasure from another’s misfortune simply because we are gaining from it
seems illicit and shameful. This gives it the clear stamp of schadenfreude.
If schadenfreude arises to the extent that we gain from another person’s
misfortune, then any natural tendencies we have to favor our own self-
interests should further this pleasure. In Chapter 4, I address how human
nature pulls us in at least two directions, one toward narrow self-interest
and the other toward concern for others. Our capacity to feel schadenfreude
highlights the self-interested, darker side of human nature. Without ignoring
our compassionate instincts, I consider some of the evidence for our self-
interested side and suggest that this evidence indeed reveals our capacity for
schadenfreude.

PLEASURE FROM DESERVED MISFORTUNES

How about deservingness? Sometimes misfortunes suffered by others
satisfy our sense of justice. In Chapters 5 and 6, I shift to this important
reason why we can feel schadenfreude. Examples are everywhere. Take the
case of Baptist minister and clinical psychologist, George Rekers. He made
headlines in May of 2010 for using a Web site, Rentboy.com, to hire a 20-
year-old male to accompany him on a short trip to Europe.4 On the surface,
this doesn’t sound like news, but Rekers quickly became the focus of jokes
on the internet and on late-night TV.5 Rekers, as The New York Times
columnist Frank Rich argued, is “the Zelig of homophobia, having played a
significant role in many of the ugliest assaults on gay people and their civil
rights over the last three decades.”6 His hiring of the Rentboy.com
employee was viewed as a case of pure hypocrisy when the hired man
claimed that he had given Rekers intimate massages during the trip. As Joe
Coscarelli noted in his blog for The Village Voice soon after the event made
news: “Please excuse most of the forward-thinking, tolerant world for being
a bit excited and snide about the news. … ”7
As shameful as schadenfreude can be, the more a misfortune seems
deserved, the more likely schadenfreude is out in the open, free of shame.
This is true especially if the standards for judging deservingness are clear
cut—for instance, if someone has committed crimes—or has behaved so
hypocritically, as with George Rekers. The pleasure is collective and free-
flowing.
I will emphasize that the desire for justice is a strong human motive, so
strong that we are biased in our perceptions of deservingness. We are
particularly biased in our reactions to being personally wronged. Our
pleasure in a wrongdoer’s misfortune is sweet indeed if we are lucky
enough to have this hoped-for event occur. Here, the desire for justice
merges with a desire for revenge against someone we dislike, even hate.

THE AGE OF SCHADENFREUDE?

Are we living in the age of schadenfreude? Just glance at the checkout lanes
in the grocery store: some of the best-selling magazines will have break-
ups, scandals, and other personal tragedies emblazoned on their colorful
covers. The reality TV industry flourishes by developing programs that pit
people against each other in difficult situations; ratings and advertising
spending speak for themselves. Of course, the internet multiplies these
trends many times over, which is why we speak of information going
“viral.” I was not surprised to find out what happens if you insert the word
“schadenfreude” in the search tool Google NGram Viewer. Figure I.1 shows
the percentage of times that schadenfreude is used among all words in
books published in English from 1800 to 2008. Starting in the late 1980s, its
use begins to increase and then rockets upward by the mid-1990s. An
analysis of the use of the word in The New York Times nicely mirrors this
pattern: in 1980, there were no instances; in 1985, only one; three in 1990;
seven in 1995; twenty-eight in 2000; and sixty-two in 2008.8 Perhaps this
upsurge in usage comes as trends in media also shift toward a focus on
people suffering all variety of misfortunes.
In Chapter 7, I examine two distinctive examples of reality TV,
American Idol and To Catch a Predator. Both shows, in memorable ways,
pioneered the pleasures of humiliation as entertainment—or
“humilitainment,” a term coined by media researchers Brad Waite and
Sarah Booker.9 Why are these shows so popular? We shall see that
humilitainment, when heightened by the way a show is edited and
structured, often arises within narratives of deservingness. These shows
provide a steady diet of pleasing downward comparisons for viewers.

Figure I.1. Google NGram for usage of “schadenfreude” in thousands of books published from
1800 to 2008.
 A BALM AND CURE FOR ENVY
I give envy its due in the next three chapters. Although envy is a painful
emotion and schadenfreude is a pleasing one, the two emotions often travel
in tandem. As Homer experiences it and as Lisa helps him understand, I
detail in Chapter 8 how misfortunes befalling those whom we envy
transform pain into a special joy. This is why definitions of envy often
include the readiness to feel pleasure if the envied person suffers.
Much can be said about envy and its link with schadenfreude. Because
envy is such a repugnant emotion, most of us are in fact more like Homer
than Lisa. We are so threatened by the feeling that we suppress awareness
of it. Even if we are aware of it, we rarely want to admit to it. In Chapter 9,
I show that this often causes envy to transmute into other emotions, ones
more palatable to ourselves and to others. In this altered form,
schadenfreude resulting from an envied person’s misfortune can seem
justified, sometimes even decent. Moreover, envy is usually hostile at its
roots. Hostility may breed dissatisfaction with passive forms of
schadenfreude. When we feel envy, strong envy especially, we not only
hope for misfortunes to befall those whom we envy; we may sometimes
find ways to bring the misfortune about.

ENVY, SCHADENFREUDE, AND HUMAN DEPRAVITY

In Chapter 10, I take envy’s transmutational nature into especially dark
territory. I examine the special case of anti-Semitism and the Nazis’
pleasure in the brutal treatment of the Jews. I claim that this extreme
example of schadenfreude is partly explained by unconscious envy
transmuted into resentment. When this happens, the envious person can
rationalize and justify extreme forms of schadenfreude, as well as
aggression. This is the outer range of schadenfreude, where crimes occur
that go “beyond denunciation.”10

ARE THERE ANTIDOTES?

As natural as schadenfreude is, should we encourage it? Who would argue
this way, especially if we see that it can trend toward hurtful actions? I
won’t try to claim that we can snuff out this feeling, but I will suggest in
Chapter 11 at least one way that we might moderate its likelihood. I will
elaborate on our psychological tendency to prefer personality explanations
when explaining other people’s behavior. This “fundamental attribution
error” enhances schadenfreude over empathy when we see people suffer
misfortunes. People will seem to deserve their misfortunes because their
internal qualities will appear to cause them. If we can curb this tendency,
then empathy might trump schadenfreude—as we will see was true for
Abraham Lincoln.
Let me be doubly clear from the start. By focusing on schadenfreude in
this book I do not mean to suggest that human beings lack a strong capacity
for empathy when others suffer. Of course we do. Some recent evolutionary
thinking suggests that human nature disposes us more toward
compassionate responses than hostile ones. We see this in titles of recent
books. The primatologist Frans de Waal labels this shift in how we view
human nature as The Age of Empathy. The emotion researcher Dacher
Keltner uses the phrase Born to Be Good to capture this shift in zeitgeist.
And, just as we have instinct for revenge, we also have an instinct for
forgiveness, as psychologist Michael McCullough argues in Beyond
Revenge: The Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct.11 We see the embracing
of the good in human nature in the speedy ascent of positive psychology
and its focus on healthy human functioning rather than mental illness.
Important studies on understanding happiness by psychologists Ed Diener,
Robert Emmons, and Martin Seligman are examples.12 One theme of the
positive psychology movement is that compassion leads more to personal
happiness than does self-focused gratifications. Nonetheless, our capacity to
feel schadenfreude resonates with our less compassionate side.
In sum, we will see that schadenfreude arises because there are varied
ways that we can gain from other people’s misfortunes. The primacy of our
own self-interests in competitive situations and our keen preference for
superiority over inferiority ensure a place for schadenfreude in our
repertoire of feelings. We have a passion for justice, and it happens that
many misfortunes seem deserved. Schadenfreude is intimately linked with
deservingness, particularly when the suffering person has wronged us, and I
will also examine the basis for this important link. An envied person’s fall
brings a special pleasure, and I will explore the many reasons for this
frequent cause of schadenfreude as well. More than we realize,
schadenfreude is a natural human emotion, and it pervades our experience.
It is worth taking a very close look at why it is so prevalent because it will
tell us a lot about human nature—and should help redirect us toward, in
Lincoln’s words, “the better angels of our nature.”13
 CHAPTER 1

THE HIGHS OF SUPERIORITY

To feel one’s well-being stronger when the misfortune of other people is put under our own well-being like
a background to set it into brighter light, is founded in nature according to the laws of the imagination,
namely that of contrast.
—IMMANUEL KANT1

For a few days I brought along Saul Bellow’s novel Herzog so I could feel a little better than everyone else
in line.
—DON J. SNYDER, THE CLIFF WALK2

I’m Chevy Chase … and you’re not.

—CHEVY CHASE, “WEEKEND UPDATE” FROM SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE3

When my eldest daughter was four years old, she attended a day care center close to
where I worked. One day, I came into the center to pick her up and saw her drawing
with a piece of chalk on a low-slung chalkboard. She saw me and immediately begged
me to help her sketch some people. I did, but, coincidentally, one of her friends had
been drawing right next to her. Just as my daughter began to draw again, the girl’s mom
showed up. The first thing her mom saw were my drawings next to her own daughter’s
age-appropriate stick figures. Never have I seen a look of shock and confusion appear
so forcefully on a person’s face.
“Did she do that … did she do that??!!!!”
“No, no, I drew them.”
Her expression swiftly changed to embarrassed relief.
 I often think of this incident when considering the effects of how we compare with
others on our everyday emotions.4 Identified as she was with her daughter, the gulf in
apparent performance between her daughter and mine jolted her. The sudden
knowledge that my daughter was blessed with so much greater talent than hers was
painful. And if you think about it, revealing my contribution was a kind of bad news
for me and good news for her. The diminishment in my daughter’s talents brought her
relief and, I sensed, a touch of schadenfreude.
Comparisons with others, the conclusions we make about ourselves based on them,
and the resulting emotions pervade much of our lives. As much as inferiority makes us
feel bad, superiority makes us feel good. The simple truth is that misfortunes happening
to others are one path to the joys of superiority and help explain many instances of
schadenfreude.
This sometimes disquieting fact is more easily digested when we see it at arm’s
length, in the context of entertainment. There are many examples from Frasier, the
long-running sitcom that starred Kelsey Grammer as a neurotic, endearingly snobbish
psychiatrist, Dr. Frasier Crane. In one episode, “The Perfect Guy,” Frasier is intensely
envious because the radio station where he has his own call-in show has hired a new
health expert, Dr. Clint Webber—who is extraordinarily talented and handsome. Along
with an irritating, modest charm, Clint effortlessly outshines Frasier and gets the lustful
attention of all the women. To convince people that he is not envious, Frasier throws a
party for Clint. The event evolves into yet another showcase for Clint’s staggering set
of talents. When Frasier tries to impress a Chinese woman with his (woefully
rudimentary) Mandarin Chinese, he compliments her by trying to say that she looks
“absolutely beautiful,” but his pronunciation translates this to “lovely as a chicken
beak”—as she is quick to point out. Clint has partially overheard the conversation and
interjects, “Who is as lovely as chicken beak?” He then proceeds to have a smooth
conversation with the woman in perfect Mandarin.
Frasier, thoroughly defeated, concedes to his brother Niles that Clint must be
entirely free of defects. But later, he finds himself alone in the kitchen with Clint, who
thanks Frasier for arranging the party in his honor. In the background, a hired pianist is
playing “Isn’t It Romantic” on Frasier’s grand piano, and Clint says how much he loves
the song. Anticipating yet another domain in which Clint is superior to top off the
evening, Frasier exits the kitchen as Clint begins to sing—way off-key! Frasier
immediately recognizes this unexpected good fortune and turns with keen anticipation
back into the kitchen. Clint apologizes for singing too loudly, but Frasier, now grinning
broadly, says, “No, no, not at all. I can’t tell you how much I’m enjoying hearing it.”
Clint admits to being a bit of ham when he has a glass of wine in him and asks if he
might “serenade” the guests. Frasier seizes this opportunity, leading Clint to the piano.
As Clint prepares to sing, Frasier rushes over to Niles to tell him the good news: “Oh
Niles, Niles, I’ve done it. I have found his Achilles’ heel. … I just heard him singing,
the man’s completely tone deaf. He’s about to launch into a rendition of ‘Isn’t It
Romantic’ that will simply peel the enamel from your teeth!”
 Niles objects to the plan: “Are you sure you want to let him do that? … You have
your victory, you’re a wonderful singer. Isn’t it enough to know that? Do you really
need to see him humiliate himself?”
Frasier pauses for a moment, then says, “Yes.”
Humiliation is precisely what Frasier wants. He has had it with feeling inferior to
Clint and is thrilled to discover his rival’s “Achilles’ heel.” Frasier gleefully anticipates
the added pleasure of seeing Clint expose this flaw to all the guests. When Clint starts
singing, Frasier is triumphant, delighted with the results. The guests try to be polite, but
they are almost made ill by the horrid performance. And Frasier says with an ironic,
rebuking air, “Please, everybody—nobody’s perfect.”5
It is funny and entertaining, but it is also just a sitcom. Even if, in identifying with
Frasier, we half recognize his feelings in ourselves, we can also keep this recognition at
a comfortable distance. And yet is Frasier more like ourselves than we want to admit?

HOW GOOD AM I? COMPARED TO WHOM?

Social comparisons not only help tell us whether we are succeeding or failing, but they
also help explain the cause of our success or failure. If we “fail” because most people
are performing better than we are, we infer low ability; if we “succeed” because most
people do worse than we do, we infer high ability. Social comparisons deliver a double
influence by defining whether a performance is a success or a failure and by suggesting
that the cause probably results from high or low ability. No wonder misfortunes
happening to others can be pleasing. They increase our relative fortunes and upgrade
our self-evaluations.
It is worth stressing how much social comparisons can contribute to defining our
talents and abilities. How do you know whether you are a fast runner? Is it enough to
time how fast you can run a lap? No. You must compare this time with the times of
other people who are similar to you in age, gender, and practice level. If you run faster,
then you can say you are a fast runner.
Many have tried to capture the powerful role of social comparisons in human
experience. Sometimes it comes through in a quip inspired by a lifetime of experiences,
such as, “I’ve been rich and I’ve been poor. Believe me, honey, rich is better,”
attributed to the American singer and actress Sophie Tucker.6 Or, it comes from a
transforming event, such as when entertainer Walter O’Keefe was replaced by young
Frank Sinatra at a New York nightclub in 1943. O’Keefe summed it up this way:
“When I came to this place, I was the star. … Then a steamroller came along and
knocked me flat.”7 Stand-up comedian Brian Regan once fantasized about what it
would be like to be one of the few people in the world to have walked on the moon;
then, in social situations involving “me-monsters” who like to dominate conversations
by bragging about their accomplishments, he could break in and say, “I walked on the
moon.”8 No one could beat this comparison.
 A slew of utopian novels, such Walden Two by B. F. Skinner and Facial Justice by
L. P. Hartley, reveal how people’s common use of social comparisons challenges
societal efforts to maximize happiness. But I doubt anyone has been as effective in
showing the importance of social comparisons in everyday life as 18th-century
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his classic work, A Discourse on Inequality,9
Rousseau imagines what life might have been like early in human history and
speculates that people may have lived in a relatively solitary state. If this were so, the
implications for our sense of self and our emotional life would have been huge. Natural
differences among people in intelligence and strength, often the stuff of social
comparison, would have carried little weight in this “state of nature.” As long as people
were smart and strong enough to procure food and shelter, they would have needed no
greater talents—nor would they have felt lacking. Rousseau suggests that with greater
contact among people in our more recent history, an increase in social comparisons
resulted, yielding likely effects. Rousseau writes:
People become accustomed to judging different objects and to making comparisons; gradually they acquire
ideas of merit and of beauty, which in turn produce feelings of preference. … Each began to look at the
others and to want to be looked at himself; and public esteem came to be prized. He who sang or danced the
best; he who was the most handsome, the strongest, the most adroit or the most eloquent became the most
highly regarded, and this was the first step toward inequality.10

Feelings about ourselves would also change. In a solitary state, we would feel good
about ourselves if we had food in our bellies, a roof over our heads, and the absence of
physical injury. Not so when living among others. Now, a kind of self-pride or “amour
propre” takes over, inspired by a newfound desire to be superior to others and to be
recognized as such. Rousseau highlights the feelings that dominate when self-feelings
are powered by relative differences—shame and envy if we are inferior and vanity and
scorn if we are superior.11

SOCIAL COMPARISON AND SELF-ESTEEM: WHAT IS THE

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE?
Psychologists, beginning with the pioneering work of Leon Festinger in the 1950s that
linked social comparison with a basic drive to evaluate ourselves, have found many
ways to give empirical weight to claims about the importance of social comparison in
self-evaluations.12 Susan Fiske, in her recent book, Envy Up, Scorn Down: How Status
Divides Us, provides an excellent distillation of this research done by her and many
others.13 I am most fond of a study done in the late 1960s by Stan Morse and Ken
Gergen.14 The design was simple, but the implications of the findings are far reaching.
Participants who were students at the University of Michigan showed up in response to
an ad for a job. The job promised good pay, so the stakes were higher than for a typical
experiment. On arriving, they were placed in a room and asked to fill out a
questionnaire as part of the application. After the students had completed half of the
questionnaire, which contained an indirect measure of self-esteem, the experimenters
arranged for another apparent applicant to enter the room and also begin completing the
application. The appearance and behavior of this person were adjusted to create two
conditions. In the Mr. Clean condition, this person was impressively dressed, well-
groomed, and self-confident. He carried with him a college philosophy text and began
completing the application with efficient ease. In a contrasting, Mr. Dirty condition,
this person was shabbily dressed, smelly, and seemed a little dazed. While working on
his application, he would occasionally stop and scratch his head, as if he needed help.
Participants then completed the final part of the application, which contained
another embedded self-esteem measure. By subtracting the participants’ self-esteem
scores before and after the second applicant entered the room, Morse and Gergen were
able to test a number of possible predictions. One possibility was that comparing with
“Mr. Clean” would decrease self-esteem, but comparing with “Mr. Dirty” would not
increase it. This would suggest that an “upward” comparison typically affects self-
esteem, but a “downward” comparison does not. Superiority in others makes us feel
bad, but we may be indifferent to inferiority in others. A second possibility was that
Mr. Dirty would increase self-esteem, but Mr. Clean would not decrease it. This would
suggest that a downward comparison can affect self-esteem, but an upward one may
not. We are indifferent to superiority in others, but inferiority in others gives us a boost.
A final possibility—the one that actually occurred—was that both conditions would
affect self-esteem. Applicants felt worse about themselves when the other applicant
was superior and better about themselves when the other applicant was inferior.
Superiority in others often decreases our self-esteem, but their inferiority provides a
boost, especially in competitive circumstances—as many other subsequent studies have
shown since this one by Morse and Gergen.
The results were revealing in other interesting ways. A staff person rated how
similar the participants were to the accomplice in terms of demeanor, grooming, and
overall appearance and confidence. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, most of the movement
in self-esteem occurred for those participants who resembled Mr. Dirty—that is, those
who appeared to have “inferior” characteristics themselves. They must have felt the
contrast with the superior applicant most acutely, as their reports of self-esteem, when
compared to Mr. Clean, took a big hit. But they also benefited most if they were lucky
enough to be in the Mr. Dirty condition—comparing themselves to someone at least
equally inferior appeared to give them a much-needed boost. Interestingly, participants
rated as having superior characteristics were little affected by either accomplice. If
anything, comparison with the superior applicant made them feel better. Perhaps the
comparison confirmed their own feelings of superiority.
Figure 1.1. The association of resembling Mr. Clean or Mr. Dirty with self-esteem. Participants resembling Mr.
Dirty had lower self-esteem after comparing themselves with Mr. Clean and higher self-esteem after comparing
themselves with Mr. Dirty. In contrast, participants resembling Mr. Clean had no change in self-esteem after
comparing themselves with Mr. Dirty and slightly greater self-esteem after comparing themselves with Mr. Clean.

INFERIORITY IN OTHERS AND SCHADENFREUDE

It is hard to overstate the far-reaching advantages of superiority, as well as the obvious
disadvantages of inferiority. The implications for understanding many instances of
schadenfreude are important as well. Most of us are motivated to feel good about
ourselves; we look for ways to maintain a positive sense of self.15 One reliable way to
do this is to discover that we are better than others on valued attributes. When our self-
esteem is shaky, comparing ourselves with someone inferior can help us feel better.
A series of studies by Dutch social psychologists Wilco van Dijk, Jaap Ouwerkerk,
Yoka Wesseling, and Guido van Koningsbruggen gives strong support for this way of
thinking.16 In one study, participants read an interview with a high-achieving student
who was later found to have done a poor job on her thesis. Before reading the
interview, as part of what appeared to be a separate study, they also filled out a standard
self-esteem scale. Participants’ feelings about themselves were very much related to
how much pleasure they later felt after learning about the student’s failure (items such
as “I couldn’t resist a little smile” or “I enjoyed what happened”): the worse they felt
about themselves, the more pleasing was this student’s failure. The explanation for
these findings was reinforced by a closer analysis using a different measure.
Immediately after reading about the high-achieving student, participants indicated
whether reading about the student made them feel worse about themselves by
comparison. The analysis showed that the tendency for participants with low self-
esteem to feel pleased over the student’s poorly done thesis was linked precisely with
also feeling that they compared poorly with this student. In other words, when the
participants with low self-esteem felt schadenfreude, they had also felt the earlier sting
of comparing poorly with the student.
A second study added further evidence. The procedure was exactly the same, except
that half of the participants, immediately after reading the interview with the high-
achieving student but before learning about her academic misfortune, were given a
prompt to think “self-affirming” thoughts about their important values. The other half
did not get this opportunity. Only this latter group showed the same pattern of reaction
as in the first study. Participants in the first group, because self-affirming thoughts may
have prevented the unpleasant effects of the social comparison, were less inclined to
find the student’s academic misfortune pleasing.
There is nothing like a little success to blunt the influence of low self-esteem. I
noted earlier that Frank Sinatra had the kind of talent to flatten the hopes of other
singers. But even Sinatra went through a rough period in his career, and his self-esteem
was at a low ebb by the end of the 1940s. Then he got the role of Maggio in the 1953
film From Here to Eternity and won the Oscar for best supporting actor. His
psychiatrist, Dr. Ralph Greenson, watched on television as Sinatra received it, and said
to his wife, “That’s it, then. I won’t be seeing him anymore!” And he never did.
Winning the Oscar was hugely self-affirming and was the start of a lasting comeback.
A third study by the Dutch researchers (van Dijk et al.) added yet another wrinkle.
The starting point of the first two studies was existing variations in self-esteem. This
time, the researchers “created” variations in self-esteem by giving false performance
feedback to participants and then examined how they responded to others’ misfortune.
Each participant performed a task described as highly linked with intellectual ability
and was told that he or she scored among the worst 10 percent of the population (a
control group received no feedback). Then the participant read a national magazine
article that described a student who had tried to impress people at a party by renting an
expensive car. But, after arriving and while trying to park the car, the student drove it
into a nearby canal, causing severe damage to the car. Sure enough, participants
receiving the negative feedback on intellectual ability found the misfortune more
enjoyable than did those in the control condition who did not receive such feedback.17
As the 17th-century writer François de la Rochefoucauld expressed in a maxim, “If we
had no faults of our own, we would not take so much pleasure in noticing those of
others.”18
Thanks to the ingenuity of these researchers, we have a store of evidence
demonstrating that people who stand to gain psychologically from another person’s
misfortune indeed get a boost to self-esteem from comparing themselves with someone
suffering a setback. People with low self-esteem and those who have experienced threat
to self-esteem seem especially likely to benefit. Schadenfreude provides one way of
spotting this process.

THE EVOLUTIONARY ROOTS OF SOCIAL COMPARISON

Evolutionary psychology highlights the important role of social comparisons in
everyday life and also helps explain why inferiority in others should be pleasing. A
simple fact crucial to understanding how evolution works is that people differ in ways
that consistently matter in terms of survival and reproduction. Differences that provide
advantages for survival contribute to natural selection. Much of life comes down to a
competitive striving for superiority on culturally prized dimensions: to gain the status
and many-splendored spoils following from such status. Superiority, literally, makes the
difference. Attributes that underlie greater dominance or prestige compared to rivals
allow us to rise in the pecking order and accrue benefits as a result. For these reasons
alone, human beings should be highly attuned to variations in rank on any attributes
that grant them advantages. And, given the huge adaptive implications of rank and
status, inferiority should feel bad and superiority should feel good.19
How much we attend to social comparisons is nowhere more obvious than in the
mating game. This makes sense in evolutionary terms because reproductive advantage
is the bottom line. Survival means that our genetic material survives us (in our
offspring), not so much that we survive individually. Thus, we must mate—and mating
with those who give our offspring adaptive superiority is the name of this competitive
game.20
Interestingly, couples are usually matched in terms of physical attractiveness. Why
is it so? As much as we may desire to mate with the most attractive person around, we
are competing against others with the same goal. Any overture we make must be
reciprocated if the relationship is to proceed, and overreaching on this valued
dimension usually doesn’t work. It leads to rejection.
In a graduate course I teach, I use a classroom demonstration to dramatize this
point.21 The 15 or so students in the class are randomly given folded index cards that
have their physical attractiveness “mate value” indicated inside (ranging from 1 to 15).
They open up the cards and place them on their foreheads such that only others are
aware of the value on the card. Ignoring their sex, they are told to pair up with someone
with the highest mate value they can find. The pairing is initiated by offering to shake a
potential mate’s hand. If the offer is accepted, then the pair is complete. Rejected offers
require that the person keep making offers until an offer is accepted.
As things progress, a small number of unhappy people wander about until, finally,
even they find a mate. Then everyone guesses their own mate value and writes it down
before seeing the actual value. They also rate their satisfaction with their pairing. Using
a computer, I quickly enter actual and perceived values and ratings of mate satisfaction.
Simply correlating these values is instructive. First, actual values are highly correlated.
People pair up with those of similar value. Second, actual and perceived mate values
are also highly correlated. It only takes a rejection or two to realize that one is not high
on the attractiveness totem pole. Finally, mate values, both perceived and actual, are
highly correlated with satisfaction. Attractive pairs are pleased; unattractive pairs are
not. The demonstration is artificial, of course, but it dramatizes the consequences of
ranking in one important area of life. People easily sense their mate value from how
they are treated by others, and their feelings of satisfaction parallel actual and perceived
mate values.
 For our primitive ancestors living in closely knit tribes, it would have been
important to be superior relative to other group members because it would have
enhanced competitive advantage. Economist Robert Frank notes an interesting benefit
to relativistic thinking. He argues that the rule of thumb, “do the best you can,” leads to
a quandary. When can you conclude that you have done enough? Frank suggests that
the relativistic rule “do better than your nearest competitor” solves this problem in an
efficient way.22 The adaptive goal is to be better than your competitor, not to keep on
achieving ad infinitum. Having a natural focus on social comparisons should lead to
efficient actions: stop striving when you have a clear relative advantage; this is the
signal to get off the treadmill. The process of evolution is likely to disfavor those who
are fully at ease having low status because those with low status have less access to
resources and are less preferred by potential mates.23 No wonder there is mounting
evidence that lower status is related to an array of ill effects on health and longevity.24
Most people are unhappy with low status, and this is adaptive to a degree—a signal to
do something about it. Similarly, most people are happy with high status. This is also
adaptive—a signal of having achieved the benefits of high status. This happy feeling is
something to anticipate and seek, as well as to relish.
One route to high status and its pleasures is through the reduction in status of others,
especially those of higher status. As the pioneering evolutionary psychologist David
Buss suggests, the anticipated pleasure of seeing higher status people fail serves an
adaptive goal as well: to bring about these misfortunes, the relative gain that results,
and the experience of this pleasure.25
The adaptive benefits of a keen sensitivity to relative differences are supported by
observing a parallel tendency in primates, who share great genetic similarity to humans.
Researchers at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center at Emory University
trained a group of capuchin monkeys in what they called a “no-fair” game.26 The
monkeys were trained in pairs to hand a small rock to a researcher in exchange for a
food reward, either a slice of cucumber or a grape, their much preferred food. When
both received cucumber slices, both seemed satisfied. But when one received a
cucumber slice and the other received a grape, the monkey receiving the cucumber
became upset. The relative quality of rewards appeared as important as their presence
versus their absence. As the lead researcher Sarah Brosnan noted, these disadvantaged
monkeys “would literally take the cucumber from me and then drop it on the ground or
throw it on the ground, or when I offered it to them they would simply turn around and
refuse to accept it.”27 These monkeys’ reactions seemed to mirror what we see in
ourselves when we are unfairly treated, relatively speaking: if we can’t have the best,
don’t bother us with second best.
Even canines appear to show a concern over unequal treatment. The celebrated 18th-
century scholar Samuel Johnson suggested that some people are superficial in their
thinking and, in this sense, that they are like dogs and “have not the power of
comparing.” They snatch the piece next to them, taking “a small bit of meat as readily
as a large” even when they are side by side.28 A study on dog behavior indicates that
Johnson may have underestimated canine abilities. A group of researchers at the
University of Vienna examined domestic canines’ behavior. Paired dogs were given
either a high-quality reward (sausage) or a low-quality reward (brown bread) if they
placed a paw in the experimenter’s hand. Consistent with Johnson’s claims, the dogs
seemed indifferent to the reward quality, even when they received the brown bread
rather than the sausage. However, one procedural variation created a different reaction.
When one dog received either of these rewards and the other got nothing, this seemed
to make the disadvantaged dog much slower at offering his paws and more likely to
disobey the command entirely. The disadvantaged dogs became more agitated and
appeared to avoid the gaze of their advantaged partners. The researchers inferred from
these findings that the dogs were having a negative “emotional” reaction to the unequal
distribution—at least if being disadvantaged meant getting nothing. One piece was as
good as the next, but “nothing” was upsetting when the other dog got something.29 If
dogs appear bothered by disadvantage, we can easily infer that most humans will be at
least as concerned.
There are important cultural variations in how much social comparisons affect
people’s emotions.30 But if I meet people who doubt how powerful social comparisons
can be, I often put aside the research evidence and evolutionary theory and ask them if
they have kids. If they do, I ask what would happen if they treated one child more
favorably than another. Their faces usually animate with instant memories of family
clashes caused by making this mistake. They remember the fireworks, the wails of
unfairness, and the leftover resentments. They typically need no more convincing, but,
primed in this way, I complete the point by telling them of the challenges my wife and I
had in giving out popcorn to our two daughters when they were very young. Popcorn
and movies were a compulsory pairing, and, from the beginning of this tradition, our
daughters often quarreled over who received more popcorn. The only way to avoid an
argument was to take delicate care in making sure the mound of popped kernels in each
matching bowl was exactly equal. Nevertheless, one often would claim the other was
getting more and was “always” favored. Sometimes we tried to snatch a teaching
moment out of the sibling conflict: “Does it really matter who gets more? And why not
ask for the bowl with the smaller amount? Be happy that your sister is getting more,”
and so on. As readers might expect, our teaching moments were usually no match for
what our daughters perceived as favoritism. Now that they are grown, we laugh about
these times. But the raw distress over disadvantage they showed when they were young
is good evidence for the natural concerns people have over social comparisons.
In my introductory social psychology course, I take a different tack to show the
importance of social comparisons. As social psychologist Mark Alicke demonstrates in
many experiments, people are usually self-serving in their beliefs about how they
compare with others. This “better-than-average effect” is very easily demonstated.31
One classroom activity that works spectacularly well begins by asking two questions,
answered anonymously by each student, on a single sheet of paper:

1. How good is your sense of humor?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

much worse much better

than the average than the average
college student college student

2. How good is your math ability?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

much worse much better

than the average than the average
college student college student

After collecting the responses, I ask a few volunteers to do a quick tally of the
responses. Figure 1.2 shows roughly what emerged when I conducted the exercise in a
class of more than 100 students. For sense of humor, the distribution describes a near
impossibility. Just about everyone in the class is reporting themselves above average.
Most students see themselves as way above average. When it comes to sense of humor,
this is easy to do. A highly subjective judgment lends itself to bias, and we seize the
opportunity to see ourselves in a flattering way. The second distribution for perceived
math ability shows the bias as well, but it is not nearly as extreme. Math ability is more
objectively determined than sense of humor, and our judgments on such domains are
more likely to be anchored by actual standing. And yet, even so, most people manage
to see themselves as above average here as well.
Figure 1.2. Biased perceptions of relative standing. Students rated their sense of humor (top panel) and their math
ability (bottom panel) compared to the average college student. Most rated themselves at or above the midpoint
(number 4 on the scale).

Why are these perceptions so skewed? I think it is mainly because most of us like
the idea of being superior to others, and we search for ways to come to this view
whenever we can. The late comedian George Carlin captured the craving: “Have you
ever noticed that anybody driving slower than you is an idiot, and anyone going faster
than you is a maniac?”32 Such illusions help us maintain a sufficiently robust self-
esteem.33 If superiority was superfluous for self-judgments, then there would be no
need for biased construal. But we don’t throw objectivity completely out the window.34
On traits and abilities that are less subjective, we are more responsive to the realities of
our actual relative standing, even though we may still give ourselves the benefit of the
doubt.

SOCIAL COMPARISONS AND SCHADENFREUDE IN FICTION:

THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE
The more we recognize how profoundly social comparisons permeate everyday
judgments about ourselves—whether we are talented or mediocre, whether we are
successful or unsuccessful, whether we are noticed or ignored by others—the clearer it
becomes why another person’s misfortune might be pleasing. Not surprisingly, great
novelists who understand the human condition bear out this pattern. In Stephen Crane’s
Civil War novel, The Red Badge of Courage, the main character, Henry Fleming,
eagerly joins the Union Army near the start of the war.35 But his excitement soon turns
to dread when he confronts the possibility of dying. Naively, he had felt superior to his
school friends who had not joined the army. All it took was to see the first dead soldier
to reverse this perception. His friends were now the lucky ones. He also worries that he
will run when he gets his first taste of battle, and this causes him to compare his
worries with those of the other soldiers “to measure himself by his comrades.”36
Fleming’s fears get the better of him in his first battle: he speeds “toward the rear in
great leaps”37 and soon feels ashamed and inferior because of his cowardly behavior.
Of course, upward comparisons are hard for Fleming to ignore. He notices a proud
group of soldiers marching toward the battle front, which makes him feel even more
inadequate, as well as envious. He slips into another group of soldiers who have just
come from a battle but soon feels acute shame because so many of these men, unlike
himself, have wounds or “red badges of courage.” Happily for Fleming, he also meets
other soldiers whose difficulties help him regain self-worth—sometimes leading to
schadenfreude. Fleming notices a struggling friend, and this makes him feel “more
strong and stout.”38 During the first battle, when he acted so cowardly, he takes some
comfort in learning that many other soldiers also fled. Later, he notices a group of
fearful, retreating troops and likens them to “soft, ungainly animals.”39 He takes
pleasure in the flattering comparison and concludes that “perhaps, he was not so bad
after all.”40 By the end of the novel, Fleming finds redemption in showing that he can
act bravely in battle, but not before his sense of self is rehabilitated through pleasing
comparisons with other soldiers.41 It is extraordinary how much social comparisons
regulate Fleming’s emotional life, their influence on schadenfreude being just one
example.

SOCIAL COMPARISONS AND SCHADENFREUDE IN BIOGRAPHY:

NATHAN McCALL’S MAKES ME WANNA HOLLER
It is easy to find biographical examples conveying a similar pervasive role for social
comparison in people’s everyday emotions, with schadenfreude inevitably punctuating
the emotional landscape as a result. Born and raised in working-class Portsmouth,
Virginia, journalist Nathan McCall illuminated the troubled terrain of racial comparison
in his memoir, Makes Me Wanna Holler: A Young Black Man in America.42 Although
McCall grew up in a largely stable family and did well in school, by the time he was 15
he was carrying a gun and engaging in a range of criminal behavior from gang rape to
armed robbery. He narrowly avoided a murder charge when a man he shot managed to
pull through and survive, but, by his late teens, he was arrested for robbing a
McDonald’s. McCall finds himself in prison, which, despite its challenges, helps him
turn himself around. By the time he left prison, he had completed a degree in
journalism. After several disappointments, he landed a job as a reporter for The
Atlanta-Journal Constitution, and, eventually, The Washington Post.
 The memoir takes the reader through a territory unfamiliar to most people. Few of
us know what it is like to commit armed robbery or to engage in gang rape, and the
people who commit such acts are rarely in the position to write about them with
McCall’s effectiveness. His honesty is blistering, but for the reader interested in human
psychology, the dividends are rich.
McCall is hyper-aware of social comparisons, especially those that involve race.
Much of his downward spiral toward cruel behavior and crime can be traced to feelings
of inferiority linked to his black identity. As a child of about seven or eight, he would
watch TV and be “enchanted” by white people. He would think how much more fun
white people seemed to have. In various ways, he got the message that white people
were superior to blacks, such as when his mother would tell him to “Stop showing your
color. Stop acting like a nigger!”43 Or his grandmother would compare his bad
behavior with the good behavior of the kids from an affluent Jewish family for whom
she did domestic work. These white boys were “nice” and did everything she told them
to do—why didn’t he act like them also?44 Once, he tried to straighten his hair with
some of his grandfather’s pomade, but it didn’t last. Within minutes, his hair went from
“straight, to curly, and back to nappy.”45 He received a whack on the back of his head
from his mother when she discovered what he had done and endured the scalding
effects of washing out the pomade. Worst of all, he suffered the pride-wounding
recognition that his hair would never be as straight as the privileged and superior white
people around him.
Painful longings and confused frustrations ruled his life. Envy and resentment
plagued him. McCall summed up this time in his life this way:
I’m certain that that period marked my realization of something it seemed white folks had been trying to get
across to me for most of my young life—that there were two distinct worlds in America, and a different set
of rules for each: The white one was full of possibilities of life. The dark one was just that—dark and
limited.46

The accumulating toll of these experiences had corrosive effects on his psyche, and
McCall suffered bitterly from consuming, explosive anger. He could hardly see straight
well enough to make good decisions, which partly explained why he turned to various
unhealthy and ultimately criminal behaviors.
One way he coped was by finding ways to see himself, and black folks in general, as
superior to whites. During his time in prison, he learned how to play chess, conscious
that white inmates considered themselves better at chess because it involved thinking.
Thus, McCall approached any game against a white inmate as a war rather than a game.
He focused every fiber of his being and every ounce of his concentration on winning.
And he usually did win.
The win and the trophy (I still have it) were especially sweet because I beat an egotistical white inmate in
the finals. I fasted for two days in preparation for that match and beat that white boy like he stole
something.47
 Later, as a reporter, he would constantly examine the behavior of his white
colleagues and note when it seemed better or worse than the behavior of black folks.
He was depressed by their superiority and was elevated by their inferiority. He attended
a party at which “constipated-looking white folks” discuss politics and tell “corny
jokes.48 While working at The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, he concluded that many of
the white reporters were terrible at choosing clothing, having selected uncoordinated
colors and patterns. He notes that they “couldn’t dress as sharp as the brothers and they
felt insecure about it.”49 He enjoyed their ineptitude.
McCall also found satisfaction when the owners of the Journal-Constitution hired
Bill Kovach, a former Washington bureau chief of The New York Times, to run the
paper and upgrade its quality. Kovach brought in his own team and shook the place up.
Many reporters were comfortable with the old ways and resented a “Yankee” coming in
and changing things. It was as though they still hadn’t accepted the outcome of the
Civil War. McCall could understand why his colleagues reacted this way and, to a
degree, felt a kinship with them. He sensed that many Southerners suffered an
inferiority complex that ran deep. Whites from the North had “worked a mojo number
on their minds”50 that continued across many generations. Maybe there was a parallel
in the ways black people had coped with the degrading legacy of slavery. Kovach’s
actions, by suggesting that these white reporters couldn’t run a newspaper in a
competent way, aggravated past wounds. McCall imagined that the stereotype of the
“hick” Southerner was humiliating in ways not so very different from stereotypes of
intellectual inferiority that black people had suffered. But this understanding did not
take the edge off McCall’s schadenfreude.
Watching some of those good ol’ boys huddling conspiratorially in their clusters, grumbling all the time
about “them damned Yankees coming in and taking over,” you would have thought they were planning to
fight the fucking Civil War all over again. Some got mad and quit. Kovach fired others. It was interesting
seeing white people warring against each other like that. I enjoyed watching the carnage.51

McCall’s sentiments are raw, but they are not mysterious. They come as no surprise
in the light of the laboratory evidence that van Dijk and his colleagues provide. The
pleasure that McCall experienced when he perceived inferiority in whites was fine-
tuned by the insults to his racial dignity suffered as a child and the continued challenge
of confronting racial stereotypes of black inferiority.
McCall enjoyed the highs of superiority. But notice that a big part of his enjoyment
came from focusing on another person’s inferiority as much as on his own superiority.
Perceptions of superiority and inferiority are interlinked, but our attention can be
directed at either pole. As we’ll learn in Chapter 2, this second direction of focus,
downward comparisons, provides many opportunities for schadenfreude. Indeed, they
explain why many events hit an ingrained funny bone.
 CHAPTER 2

LOOKING UP BY LOOKING DOWN

“Ain’t no reason to cry, George,” Dub said. “We’re a lot better off than the grasshoppers.”
— W. T. “DUB” SCROGGINS1

Let us be thankful for the fools. But for them the rest of us could not succeed.
— MARK TWAIN2

It’s not enough that I fly first class … my friends must also fly coach.
— NEW YORKER CARTOON3

Writer Susan Cheever describes dinner parties at which people would

embarrass themselves with each extra drink. Women would apply their
lipstick left of center, and men would crash to the floor among broken
dishes. It was, “One tequila, two tequila, three tequila, floor,” as George
Carlin might have added.4 Unfortunately for Cheever, this is all in the past.
Parties where slurred speech, pratfalls, and shattered crockery can be
enjoyed have almost vanished from the social scene in recent years.
According to Cheever, people still drink, but they don’t get drunk, which
means that they behave better and no longer make spectacles of themselves.
Social disapproval of overdrinking has even overcome alcohol addiction.
Cheever laments the change, because “there is a kind of drunkenfreude to
watching others embarrass themselves.”5
Cheever is an alcoholic, which is why she also avoids drinking at these
parties. She knows the ruinous effects of alcoholism. She has authored a
book about Bill Wilson, who founded Alcoholics Anonymous, and has
written both about the alcoholism suffered by her well-known father, John
Cheever, and her own struggles with this addiction. This intimacy with
alcoholism moves her to empathize with people who embarrass themselves
while drunk, but she also delights in it.6
 She plays the role of hopeful observer. She longs for replays of the
drunken behavior, but refuses the director’s chair. Like most people, she is
ambivalent enough about taking pleasure in misfortunes in which she plays
no role; engineering a misfortune is even more taboo. She takes her
downward comparison pick-me-ups as they come, anticipating them,
hoping for them, taking the classic passive route to schadenfreude rather
than an active one. Yet she reveals a certain mischievousness in her heritage
when she recalls something her father would do. When he was sober, he
would “mix killer martinis” in order to enjoy their effects on his guests.7
There are many paths to pleasing downward comparisons. Strategies
range from joining groups whose members provide a comparison boost,
focusing attention on people who are down and out, exaggerating the
inferior qualities in other people who are otherwise superior, dismissing the
value of other people’s superior qualities to taking actions to bring about
others’ inferiority—such as making killer martinis. There are unlimited
permutations.

DOWNWARD COMPARISON PROSPECTS IN THE MEDIA

One handy maneuver is simply to look at almost any form of media because
so many news outlets home in on scandals and other misfortunes happening
to others. So does the ever-expanding genre of reality television that I
explore in Chapter 7. Humiliation, or the public bringing “down” of others,
is the frequent lure for viewers. And today, with the internet and its various
means of providing information, embarrassing behavior becomes instantly
available for broad and repeated viewings. What produces hits is often what
also provides a gratifying downward comparison.8 Many readers will
recognize this quote:
I personally believe that U.S. Americans are unable to do so because, uh, some … people
out there in our nation don’t have maps and, uh, I believe that our, uh, education like such as
in South Africa and, uh, the Iraq, everywhere like such as, and, I believe that they should,
our education over here in the U.S. should help the U.S., uh, or, uh, should help South Africa
and should help the Iraq and the Asian countries, so we will be able to build up our future,
for our children.9

This was the response by Caitlin Upton, a contestant from South Carolina in
the 2007 Miss Teen USA pageant, to the question: “Recent polls have
shown a fifth of Americans can’t locate the U.S. on a world map. Why do
you think this is?” It is not easy to answer any question under a competitive,
public glare, and most of us can remember suffering a brain spasm when
put on the spot. Later, when interviewed on NBC’s Today Show, she
explained herself much better.10 She was a good sport about it, even doing
self-parodies.11 But her word salad of an answer was so marvelously
convoluted, so replete with unforgettable phrases (“like such as” and “the
Iraq”) that media outlets replayed it mercilessly, with mocking commentary.
This merited multiple viewings and a YouTube link worth forwarding it to
others for their sure enjoyment. In fact, it was an instant YouTube sensation,
ultimately the second most viewed video of 2007.12 It won the “stupidest
statement of the year award”13 and was on top or near the top of many lists
of memorable quotes of the year.14 It was second in the “Yale Book of
Quotations,” just behind “Don’t tase me, bro,” the plea that a college
student used to avoid being tossed out of a college auditorium where
Senator John Kerry was giving a speech.15 It continues to be a favorite
downward comparison stimulant, a dependable schadenfreude kick.16
 DOWNWARD COMPARISONS AND THEIR SOMETIMES
PLEASING OUTER RANGE
Pleasing downward comparisons can have darker origins. Take the spate of
cases in 2005–2006 of brutal assaults on homeless men. Sometimes labeled
“sport killings,” these acts are typically committed by middle-class teens.
One assault, featured on the CBS news show 60 Minutes, received special
attention because it resulted in an unfortunate man’s death. The four teens
who confessed to the crime came across the man in a wooded area where
they had intended to smoke pot. They beat him in three stages for over three
hours, off and on, despite his pleas to stop and his cries for help. It was an
abhorrent, drawn-out series of actions, beginning with sticks and ending
with a two-by-four with a nail at its end. Ed Bradley, the late CBS
correspondent for the segment, interviewed the boys after they had been
caught, convicted, and sentenced for the crime. The main theme in his
questioning was to understand why they did what they did. The oldest
member of the group, 18 at the time of the fatal beating, explained, simply,
“I guess for fun.” He was ashamed of what he and his friends had done and,
in a way, seemed just as puzzled as Bradley. He claimed the man’s pleas for
help were the main thing he could not “keep out of [his] head … 24/7.”17
 Why was it fun? The judge in the case suggested that the helplessness of
these men provided someone lower on the pecking order to pick on. Brian
Levin, a criminologist and an expert on hate crimes, offered a similar
explanation. It would be a mistake to see offenses of this sort as committed
by inveterate, hate-filled people. Rather, they are examples of young males
looking for cheap thrills. They select targets who are inferior to themselves
and who cannot fight back. The vulnerable, inferior status of these homeless
men is a psychological boost for the perpetrators, who need to feel
superiority. There is “fun” in this process.
But, still, why would these kids need a target in the first place? In this
case, the teens were unaware of the DVD series, Bumfights, in which
homeless people get paid with chump change and alcohol to engage in
humiliating behaviors.18 In other cases of teens attacking homeless people,
this series is cited as causing copycat behavior. The judge in the 60 Minutes
case saw one recurring theme. Many of the boys felt that they had been
mistreated by others in the past. Perhaps these homeless men presented an
opportunity for a kind of payback.
Is it a stretch to interpret these cases as opportunities, at least in part, for
pleasing downward comparisons? It is hard to say for sure, but some details
of these and other similar cases fit the profile. Psychologist Tom Wills has
outlined a theory that explains why comparisons with those less fortunate
can enhance a person’s subjective sense of well-being.19 Normally, we feel
uncomfortable observing someone’s suffering. However, Wills argues that
our preferences change when we have suffered, our self-esteem has taken a
hit, or we are chronically low in self-esteem. Under these conditions,
comparing with someone just as unfortunate or—even better—with
someone who is less fortunate has restorative power. Opportunities for
downward comparisons can be passive or active. In the former case, we
might seek out opportunities that naturally occur all around us, such as
stories in the tabloid press or gossip among friends and acquaintances.20 In
the latter case, we actively derogate others or deliberately cause harm to
someone, thus creating downward comparison opportunities.21 According
to Wills, downward comparisons tend to be directed at people of lower
status, or “safe” targets, who are acceptable to derogate because particular
cultural norms seem to give the behavior a free pass.22
 The beating of the homeless by these teens largely fits Wills’s analysis.
If the judge who adjudicated the case is right, the boys may indeed have
been mistreated by others in the past. In response to their own abuse, and as
a means of feeling better about themselves, they may well have sought
opportunities to feel superior to others. The homeless were convenient
targets. They are at the farthest and most jagged margins of society.
I hesitate to take this analysis too far. At best, downward comparison can
explain only part of behavior as extreme as these beatings. That these
actions happened in groups may be an another important factor in how the
events played out. Extreme antisocial behaviors are more likely to occur in
groups in which people become deindividuated and thus feel less
responsible for their behaviors and less aware of their motivations.23 Also,
maybe these teens were bored and the simple entertainment value of their
behavior contributes to explaining it. But these additional factors seem
insufficient for understanding the core motive for these actions; in such
cases, downward comparison explanations help provide a plausible reason
for actions that can otherwise seem so puzzling. The pleasing enhancement
to the self, albeit at the expense of these luckless men, may have been a
seductive psychological boost.
Bradley found the teen’s explanation of “it was fun” unsatisfactory. We
probably resist such explanations because they not only reflect poorly on
the boys, but also on human nature, and, therefore, on all of us. Wills also
emphasizes that his theory assumes that we are ambivalent about finding
gratifications from downward comparisons. Doing this produces mixed
feelings, and, certainly, no one is admired for doing so.24 When a
downward comparison explanation fits, we resist it. Wills, however, argues
that few people, especially when psychologically primed by their own
failure or low status, refuse the opening for self-enhancement through
favorable comparison. And we know from the empirical work by Wilco van
Dijk and colleagues described in Chapter 1 that schadenfreude is more
likely if the misfortune happening to another person bolsters our self-
esteem—especially when it is in need of a boost. Add the ingredients of
group psychology and an especially safe, dehumanized target and
downward comparisons, even ones that are engineered, may be a tempting
option.
 THE SUPERIORITY THEORY OF HUMOR
In a sense, schadenfreude implies something funny. The misfortune causes
us to smile and sometimes laugh in ways that we would if we heard a good
joke—told at another person’s or group’s expense. In fact, some
explanations for humor offer a link between downward social comparisons
and schadenfreude. Perhaps the longest standing theory of humor has social
comparison at its core. Superiority theory assumes that when people laugh,
it results from their awareness of superiority over another person. This
approach goes back as far as Plato and Aristotle, but the 17th-century
philosopher Thomas Hobbes is credited with its full expression. In The
Leviathan, he wrote that “sudden glory”
[i]s the passion which maketh those grimaces called laughter; and is caused either by some
sudden act of their own that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing
in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident
most to them that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep
themselves in their own favour by observing the imperfections of other men.25

Laughter, in Hobbes’s analysis, often stems from a sudden sense of

superiority. And, consistent with Wills’s ideas, the pleasure in sudden
superiority is more likely to occur in those who are “conscious of the fewest
abilities in themselves.”26 Indeed, the superiority theory of humor dovetails
nicely with the idea of downward comparison. Wills also stresses the
connection by noting that humor often entails a negative event happening to
another person, causing a pleasurable response in an audience. A downward
comparison takes on this incongruent pairing of a negative with a positive
in that the negative event is happening to someone else.27
A downward comparison view on humor assumes that it involves self-
enhancement by comparing oneself favorably to another. It also takes threat
to self-esteem into account. Wills observes that many examples of humor
concern topics about which the audience feels “insecure,” such as sexual
inadequacies, uneasy relationships with one’s boss, ethnic inferiority, and
the like. Humor, in social comparison terms, relieves insecurities by
providing a flattering social comparison in these and other aspects of life.28
As I noted, humor often arises at another person’s or group’s expense.
But at whose expense more specifically? As with downward comparisons,
the preference is a safe target. Audiences laugh at jokes that focus on people
of lower status, often ethnic, racial, or religious groups usually disliked by
the audience. Many comedians more or less make downward comparisons
their stock in trade. Insult comics, in the tradition of Groucho Marx (“I
never forget a face, but in your case, I’ll be glad to make an exception”29)
and Don Rickles (“Oh my God, look at you. Anyone else hurt in the
accident?”30), add extreme elements. There is little evidence that we
fundamentally object to this approach, even in these extreme forms. We
love it. What comedian can waste an opportunity to go for the comic
jugular when given examples of anyone displaying a human frailty? Most
of the jokes in the opening monologues of late-night talk shows highlight
the foolish behaviors of others. Such behaviors are free gifts for a
comedian. When people become objects of downward comparison humor
because of the exotic nature of their failings, contemporary comedians such
as Jon Stewart will show gratitude for the comic material—and wish it a
long half-life. Stewart rejoiced in reaction to an extraordinary gaff
committed by a politician during a political debate in November 2011: “Are
you not entertained? There is so much meat on that bone, and it is all breast
meat.”31
A more recent variant of the superiority theory of humor is advanced by
psychologist Charles Gruner. He likens the experience of laughter to
winning.32 Gruner uses “winning” in the broadest sense: “getting what we
want.” This can mean winning an argument, reaching a goal, or defeating
something in nature, such as finally digging up a stubborn tree root. What is
funny, in Gruner’s view, turns on who wins what, and who loses what.
Often, when we find something funny, we are winning because of someone
else’s stupidity, clumsiness, or moral or cultural defect.33
Gruner’s ideas are consistent with evolutionary psychology. Our
ancestors’ struggles for survival in the competitive conditions of scarcity
and competition for mates would have bred emotional reactions to rewards
(victory) and loss (defeat). In sports, where norms do not forbid expressing
joy in victory, we often see self-assertive, aggressive laughter. One can see
examples of the “thrill of victory” in competition events that are captured
and preserved in the media. Remember U.S. swimmer Michael Phelps
reacting to his 2008 Olympic relay victory? How about Tiger Woods fist
pumping after making the clutch putt that catapulted him into a
commanding position deep into the fourth round of the 2008 U.S. Open?
Gruner claims that the feeling of winning strikes a chord that harkens back
to our evolutionary past, where a competitive triumph surely aided
survival.34 Open pleasure, especially when the outcome is sudden and the
result of struggle, is a natural reaction to winning. Is it any surprise that
hyperbole such as, “Tragedy is when I cut my finger. Comedy is when you
fall into an open sewer and die,” made by comedian Mel Brooks, can seem
more than simply eccentric?35

The superiority theory of humor is also supported by research showing

how people use social comparisons at the intergroup level to boost self-
esteem. Humor that entails disparaging an outgroup is one way of
enhancing one’s own group and, indirectly, one’s own self-esteem. Indeed,
studies confirm that we are more likely to laugh at jokes that disparage
outgroups rather than ingroups; this makes us feel better about ourselves.36
The superiority theory of humor is not an all-encompassing explanation
for when and why people find things funny.37 Other explanations focus on
incongruity (a conflict between what is expected and what actually occurs)
or release (a relief from strain or stress). But, as Wills argues, a downward
comparison perspective implies that such factors are secondary processes
and “merely technical devices, serving to obscure the process of presenting
another person’s misfortune for the enjoyment of the audience.”38 They
serve, in part, to circumvent the hesitancy that people feel about making
downward comparisons. Similarly, Gruner is undaunted by other
approaches to humor and claims that he can see superiority as explaining
any example of humor. As someone who often studies the dark side of
social comparison, I am less concerned about the debate on the broad
origins of humor. What is relevant in explaining schadenfreude is that
superiority resulting from downward comparisons is present in many cases
of humor. It may well be a sufficient condition for humor, if not a necessary
one.

THE CODE OF THE WOOSTERS: LIGHT HUMOR IN

DOWNWARD COMPARISONS
The unmatched comic writer P. G. Wodehouse set most of his stories in
pre–World War I Edwardian England. He populated these stories with
upper-class characters who mostly lived lives of leisure and who frequented
big country mansions with servants in tow. But the apparent narrowness of
the setting and times did not prevent Wodehouse from producing some of
the most inspired comic writing in the English language. J. K. Rowling,
creator of the Harry Potter books, always places a Wodehouse volume by
her bed.39 A considerable part of Wodehouse’s humor involved lighthearted
schadenfreude. A good example is The Code of the Woosters, which the late
writer Christopher Hitchens put high on his list of favorite books.40 Like
many Wodehouse novels, the plot of The Code of the Woosters is
complicated and the narrator, Bertie Wooster, through no major fault of his
own, finds himself in all kinds of troubles for which there seem no
solutions. Bertie lives a pampered life and has a lazy intellect, but he is a
lovable character even so. And, fortunately for Bertie, his uncommonly
gifted and skilled valet, Jeeves, finds inspired ways to save the day. The
satisfying moments, when those who have tormented Bertie are finally cut
down to size, are rich in downward comparison–inspired schadenfreude, for
Bertie as well as for readers.
Early in The Code of the Woosters, we meet Spode, a beefy, threatening
character who is intent on physically assaulting both Bertie and one of
Bertie’s friends. But Jeeves uses his network of fellow valets to discover an
embarrassing secret about Spode.41 This knowledge gives Bertie the power
to reduce this bully to a meek, obsequious lapdog, such that the “red light
died out of his eyes.”42 Here is how Bertie analyzes the pleasure he gets
from the power he has to humble Spode:
I felt like a new man. And I’ll tell you why.

Everyone, I suppose, has experienced the sensation of comfort and relief which comes when
you are being given the runaround by forces beyond your control and suddenly discover
someone on whom you can work off the pent-up feelings. The merchant prince, when things
are going wrong, takes it out on the junior clerk. The junior clerk goes and ticks off the
office boy. The office boy kicks the cat. The cat steps down the street to find a smaller cat,
which in its turn, the interview concluded, starts scouring the countryside for a mouse.

It was so with me now.43

Bertie can be forgiven for actively exhibiting joy from a downward

comparison because Spode is a true menace and he is shown to deserve
humbling (I will discuss a lot more about the important role of
deservingness in schadenfreude in later chapters). The novel is alive with
other instances of downward comparison, but they are mostly of the
standard, passive variety. In another sequence, Jeeves tells Bertie that a
police officer, Constable Oates, who has also been unreasonably hostile to
Bertie, has been hit on the head. Bertie replies:
“Blood?”

“Yes, sir. The officer had met with an accident.”

My momentary pique vanished, and in its place there came a stern joy. Life at Totleigh
Towers had hardened me, blunting the gentler emotions, and I derived nothing but
gratification from the news that Constable Oates had been meeting with accidents.44

The novel ends with the subplots coming together and neatly resolving
themselves in a manner not unlike a Shakespearian comedy. Bertie is happy
because he is no longer threatened by people like Spode, Constable Oates,
and others, and this also eases what has been a string of assaults to his self-
esteem and general well-being. He is also gratified because his actions have
helped two couples end their love squabbles and because he has found ways
of benefiting his aunt and uncle. His aunt avoids losing a coveted servant,
and his uncle obtains a much-desired cow creamer. With Jeeves, he reflects
on the complex troubles he has suffered and Jeeves’s brilliant solutions for
these troubles. They are in their room in the country house where most of
the action has taken place, and they hear a sneeze coming from outside.
Earlier, Bertie had been wrongly accused of plotting to steal a prized object
from the home (the cow creamer). Constable Oates was ordered to stand
guard outside Bertie’s window, to prevent him from escaping until morning,
when he would be taken to court. But Bertie has been exonerated, and no
one has told Oates that his watch is unnecessary. Rain has begun “with
some violence.” Bertie reacts:
I sighed contentedly. It needed but this to complete my day. The thought of Constable Oates
prowling in the rain like the troops of Midian, when he could have been snug in bed toasting
his pink toes on the hot-water bottle, gave me a curiously mellowing sense of happiness.

“This is the end of a perfect day, Jeeves. … ”45

Using fresh images, incandescent language, and plots impossible to

predict and yet so fitting as they unfold, Wodehouse puts a wondrously
comic mirror up to nature. A generous portion of his themes relies on the
schadenfreude felt by his characters, as well as by his readers, but this
hardly leaves a mean-spirited taste. There is no real cruelty in his “stern
joy”—no beating of the homeless. If Bertie gets pleasure over someone’s
humiliation, it feels right under the circumstances. Also, it’s simply the way
of the world to feel this emotion, especially if life has been placing you at a
disadvantage and you need a ration of downward comparison.
In the next chapter, I continue to focus on how downward comparisons
can create schadenfreude, but I add another ingredient: group identity. This
is no trivial factor. There is something about “us” and “them” that quickly
shifts to “us” versus “them.” When we are strongly connected to a group,
misfortunes happening to the members of rival groups can be thrilling.
Examples from sports and politics will provide sufficient proof of this.
 CHAPTER 3

OTHERS MUST FAIL

When a nimble Burman tripped me on the football field and the referee (another Burman)
looked the other way, the crowd yelled with hideous laughter. … The young Buddhist
priests were the worst of all.
—GEORGE ORWELL1

The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other guy die for his.
—U.S. GENERAL GEORGE S. PATTON2

It’s not enough that we succeed. Cats must also fail.

—SAID BY A CANINE IN A NEW YORKER CARTOON3

If you have ever checkmated someone in chess, you know the experience of
winning a zero-sum game, in which one person’s gain or loss translates
exactly into another person’s loss or gain. A clear memory I have from high
school is taking my queen and flicking over my friend’s king as I said,
“checkmate,” with understated yet pointed emphasis. Perhaps a small thing,
but my friend had beaten me in an earlier match and had gloated over the
win. This was low-stakes competition among high school kids, but no less
intense for this fact. “Gentleman, start your egos,” as comedian Billy
Crystal once quipped.4 I can still see the proud smile on his face when he
had agreed to the rematch. As a result, beating him was a keener joy.
Although part of why beating him was so satisfying was his gloating, the
zero-sum nature of the game told another part of the story. The pleasure I
felt was from my winning and his losing. Both enabled satisfying gain for
me.5
 Athletic contests are also zero-sum, and emotions are keyed on the
outcome. As a parent of two girls, now grown, I spent years engaged in
youth sports, sometimes coaching, but usually as a spectator watching the
games. I often stepped back to watch myself and the parents of other kids
on our team reacting to the ebb and flow of games. Errors by the other side
would often receive as many cheers as the successes of our own team,
especially as the teams’ age group increased. Sometimes, the pleasure over
the other side’s mistakes more than matched the pleasure of a good play by
our own kids. If you think about it, this is hardly a nice thing. When a child
commits a turnover in a basketball game, for example, it is a misfortune for
the child—maybe a mortifying one. Why should we feel comfortable
clapping and cheering? The context of sports seems to make it kosher.

WHEN MEMBERSHIP IN GROUPS AFFECTS SELF-

ESTEEM
The triumphs or defeats of our children produce personal gain or loss.
Watch the faces of parents when their children perform, especially during
unguarded moments, and there is little doubt that our identification with our
children is usually total. The best example I can think of occurred during
the 2012 Summer Olympic Games. The parents of American gymnast Aly
Raisman were in tense synchrony with their daughter as she performed her
difficult routine on the uneven bars. The NBC “parent cam” captured their
shifting and swaying, and this video quickly spread across the internet. It
summed up something that all parents experience.6 The phrase popularized
by ABC Sports, “the thrill of victory and the agony of defeat,” applies to
our children’s performances as much as to our own. And so events that help
them succeed, even if they involve another child’s failure, can mix pleasure
with sympathy.
Spectators feel powerful emotions, even when no family members are
playing. The successes and failures of the groups to which we belong affect
us perhaps as much as do our individual ups and downs.7 The attachments
we have to groups are quickly cemented and often arbitrary, yet
consequential despite these arbitrary origins. The first experiments to hint at
this uncanny process were performed by the Polish-born social psychologist
Henri Tajfel in the 1960s.8 Tajfel was as an international student at the
Sorbonne at the outbreak of World War II, and he was called into service by
the French. He survived imprisonment in Nazi prisoner of war camps only
because his Jewish identity remained hidden. Most of his friends and
relatives were not so lucky, and the terrible difference in their fates, based
simply on ethnicity, spurred him to do his now classic research.
In his early experiments, Tajfel recruited British school boys at the
University of Bristol as participants. The boys estimated the number of dots
flashed on a screen and were then categorized into groups of either
“overestimators” or “underestimators.” These categorizations were actually
random, so neither group could logically assume any superiority over the
other. But when these boys were given the opportunity to either favor their
“ingroup” or discriminate against the “outgroup” in distributing rewards,
they usually did so.
These findings are easy to replicate using even more arbitrary
categorization procedures, such as randomly assigning participants to
merely group “A” or group “B.” We now understand this phenomenon as
the “minimal group paradigm,” and it suggests that human beings have an
inbuilt tendency to categorize themselves and others into ingroups or
outgroups. Why do we do this? One reason is that it helps us achieve a
useful clarity and certainty about our self-concept. Knowing that one is an
”overestimator” not an “underestimator” clarifies who one is, and this in
itself is useful. It also provides an opportunity to enhance our self-esteem
because we mostly conclude that our own groups are superior to others.9
When it comes to evaluating the groups we belong to, actual objectivity is
elusive, and we like it this way.

THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF THE TRUE FAN

Sports fans know that the wins and losses of their favorite teams affect them
in the emotional gut, even when cheering from the sofa. This may seem
strange to those who have little interest in sports. But Tajfel’s findings, and
the decades of research he has inspired, offer a window into the workings of
fandom. A savvy and entertaining confirmation of Tajfel’s ideas is Warren
St. John’s book, Rammer Jammer Yellow Hammer.10 St. John, a native of
Tuscaloosa, Alabama, took a six-month sabbatical from his job as a reporter
for The New York Times to tackle one core question: why in the heck did he
care so much about Alabama football?
Enrolled at Columbia University in the early 1980s, St. John and his
fellow students were experiencing the longest losing streak in modern
college football history. But for St. John, the only team that really mattered
was the football team of the University of Alabama, the Crimson Tide. Few
other Columbia freshmen understood the significance of the poster of Paul
“Bear” Bryant, Alabama’s legendary coach, displayed proudly in St. John’s
dorm room. But at home in Alabama, the zeal of the Crimson Tide fans was
unsurpassed. And St. John shared this zeal.
St. John collected most of the material for his book by spending the 1999
fall season attending every Alabama game and immersing himself in the
tailgating culture of a group of Alabama fans. He bought a barely functional
RV, dubbed the “Hawg,” to attend away games and to provide credibility
among the group of fans who also drove their RVs to these games. The RV
folks were suspicious of St. John at first, but they could soon tell that wins
and losses mattered to him as much as they did to them. He was giddy when
Alabama won and numb when it lost. As much as anything, this let him
gain the trust of these über-fans.
More than 40 years earlier and across the Atlantic Ocean, Tajfel’s
experiments had suggested that our allegiances to groups have almost
astonishingly unplanned origins. St. John’s story also offers good evidence.
In Tuscaloosa in the 1940s, his then 18-year-old father, Warren St. John Sr.,
was struggling with the decision of which university to attend. His first
preference was Georgia Tech, but his parents were about to divorce because
of his father’s chronic drinking problem. St. John’s father decided to stay
near his parents and attend the University of Alabama. He started his own
family nearby. And so, for this tangled set of reasons, his son, Warren,
would attach his devotion to the Crimson Tide and would be singing the
fight song “Rammer Jammer Yellow Hammer,” rather than “(I’m a)
Ramblin’ Wreck from Georgia Tech.”11
I grew up in Durham, North Carolina, the home of Duke University,
because my parents chose to move there for their own set of haphazard
reasons. This meant that the Duke Blue Devils became my Crimson Tide; it
was as if a mischievous spirit dropped a magic potion on my boyish eyelids
while I slept, as in Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream. I awoke to
see a Duke Blue Devil mascot, and I have rooted for Duke ever since.
It may seem that our emotions follow from a narrow focus on our own
team’s winning or losing. But the logic of Tajfel’s research suggests that it
takes two groups to tango. The British boys in Tajfel’s studies favored their
own group, but they also discriminated against the outgroup. The thrill of
winning means that we have won and a competitor has lost. Interestingly,
this can mean that winning away from home feels better than winning at
home. This accentuates that the rival is now a “loser.” St. John noted this
when describing how he felt while leaving Florida’s stadium, the “Swamp,”
after Alabama had beaten Florida. Whereas the visiting Alabama fans
seemed drawn together by the high of the victory, the losing Florida fans
seemed to separate from each other, like wounded animals needing
isolation. Away from the noise of the stadium, they could remove the now
ridiculous-looking paint that they had applied fastidiously to their faces
before the game. For a moment, St. John felt pity for these miserable
creatures. But only for a moment, because when he received a hateful look
from one of them, he belted out the Alabama victory cry, “Rammer,
Jammer, Yellow Hammer,” with wild, unself-conscious abandon.
How much of the satisfaction of winning comes from the defeat of the
other team? One way to consider this is to focus on situations in which a
rival team loses, but not at the hands of one’s own team. After Alabama’s
loss to Louisiana Tech, St. John was relieved to hear the results of another
game, this one between Florida and Tennessee. Since Alabama fans dislike
both teams, there will be some consolation that at least one of them will
have to lose.12
 Any type of misfortune befalling rival teams, such as injury or scandal,
is red meat for people highly invested in their own team. In July 2006, J. J.
Redick, the two-time National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
basketball player of the year for Duke University, was arrested for driving
under the influence (DUI) of alcohol. This was an embarrassment both for
Redick and for Duke. Redick had just graduated and was waiting to learn
how he would do in the professional draft. The DUI charge would hurt his
chances to do well, which would mean a reduced starting salary. The
university was also having a tough time, as it was still reeling from the
suspension of its lacrosse team for alleged sexual crimes by team members
(the charges were ultimately dropped).13 Redick’s misstep was unwelcome
news for Duke fans, but how was it received in Lexington, Kentucky, where
I now live, home of the University of Kentucky? When I came to work the
following day, one of my colleagues stopped by my office early and asked,
“Did you hear about Redick?” He pulled a face of fake compassion and
wiped away imaginary tears. When I checked my e-mail, there was a
message from another colleague wanting to know if I had heard the “bad”
news. Exultation powered every typed word.
Why the schadenfreude? Alabama fans may dislike Florida, but I doubt
it reaches the scorn for which most University of Kentucky basketball fans
have for Duke University. Like Duke, Kentucky is a perennially strong
team and usually in the running for the national championship (Kentucky
won the national championship most recently in 2012; Duke won in 2011),
making it a natural rival. There’s another reason. In 1992, Kentucky lost in
overtime to Duke in the Eastern Regional Finals. The game was won in the
last couple of seconds, when Duke player Christian Laettner performed a
turnaround jump shot after having received an improbably accurate full
court pass from Grant Hill. This shot had snatched away what had appeared
to be a sure victory for Kentucky and a place in the coveted “Final Four,”
the grouping of four teams that compete in the last phase of the National
Championship tournament. To the deep irritation of the Kentucky faithful, a
clip of this shot replays every spring during each phase of the national
tournament (dubbed “March Madness”), and most Kentucky fans have
developed a helpless distaste for Duke ever since. And so, as a rare Duke
fan in Lexington, I am a target of teasing—or worse—when anything
unfortunate happens to the Duke basketball program.
 Kentucky rarely plays against Duke. When it does, and when Kentucky
wins (as it did in the 1998 Eastern Regionals), the joy is many-fold greater
for Kentucky fans than simply learning about an isolated case of Duke’s
losing. But any Duke loss, misfortune, or scandal will do in a pinch. And, in
these cases, the joy is clearly in the loss.
The particulars of the Duke-Kentucky rivalry may be unique, but its
underlying dynamics are universal. A study using Dutch participants
provided empirical evidence for what one sees in everyday life.14 The
researchers assessed Dutch soccer fans’ reactions to an article describing
the loss of the German national team, the Dutch team’s main rival.
Beforehand, the researchers also measured the extent of the fans’ interest in
soccer. Indeed, most fans found the loss suffered by Germany pleasing, but
the loss generated greater pleasure for those most interested in soccer.
These were the fans who had the most to gain emotionally from the rival’s
loss. In another phase of the study, just before describing their emotional
reactions to Germany’s losing, some of the fans were primed to think about
losses that the Dutch team had suffered in the past. This intensified the
pleasure over Germany’s loss all the more. These fans had even more to
gain, psychologically, from learning about their rival’s loss. To fans
suddenly concerned with their team’s inferiority, a rival’s loss was welcome
news.

WHAT ARE THE LIMITS TO SCHADENFREUDE IN

SPORTS?
It is extraordinary that the randomness of our team associations fails to
render them trivial in their effects on us.15 But what are the boundaries to
what will produce schadenfreude? Cultural norms, if not people’s capacity
for empathy, dictate that claps and cheers stop if an opposing player gets
injured. Natural expressions of true concern sweep over every face. Yet
there is a distinction between the immediate emotional reaction at the
moment of seeing a player injured and the quick realization of the meaning
of the injury for one’s own team. Compared to a turnover or missed shot, an
injury to an important player on the opposing team leads to a greater
competitive gain. In addition to feeling bad for the player, is it reasonable to
expect the average person to feel no pleasure over this benefit as well?
 St. John certainly admits to the impulse. He describes one game against
Louisiana Tech in which, toward the end of the game, quarterback Tim
Rattay was leading Tech to what appeared to be a go-ahead score. Rattay
had been shredding the Alabama defense with accurate passes, and the Tech
offense seemed unstoppable.
A minute forty left. This time Alabama rushes five linemen. Rattay pumps his arm as the
pocket collapses on top of him. As he stumbles backward, his cleats bite the turf awkwardly,
violently torquing his right ankle. A hulking two-hundred-forty-pound mass of red in the
form of linebacker Darius Gilbert smothers Rattay at the thirty-five. He gets up limping.
Tech calls time.

I have an unsporting feeling: I’m happy he’s limping.16

But Rattay is able to stay in the game, and he continues to move the team
forward and very close to a score. Rattay takes the snap again and, before
he can set up to pass, finds himself in the grasp of two Alabama linemen.
One has him by his tender ankle and the other by his upper body, creating a
twisting effect. He is driven to the ground headfirst as his ankle is wrenched
a second time. He is badly injured, hobbles off the field, and collapses on
the sideline bench. How does St. John feel about this? It is good news. As
St. John summarizes the result,
He has thrown for 368 yards and three touchdowns, and now he’s finished.

Hallelujah and amen.17

Are St. John’s sentiments atypical? I doubt it. Some susceptibility to feel
this way is part of what it means to be a true fan. When Tom Brady, the
New England Patriots’ quarterback, tore his anterior cruciate ligament at the
beginning of the 2008 season, few fans outside the New England area
seemed to show much sympathy. Some New York Jets’ fans were
admonished for voicing open joy. But one Philadelphia blogger, Andrew
Perloff, came to their vigorous defense. He argued that it would be absurd
not to celebrate if a rival quarterback got injured.18 Perloff may be an
outlier, but in the world of spectator sports, emotions run high and frank
expressions of schadenfreude are more common than in other areas of
life.19 In sports, people are freer to voice their darker feelings—the same
feelings that in most other contexts would be shameful.
 Research shows that the average fan is quite capable of being pleased
over injuries to players on opposing teams.20 Charles Hoogland, Ryan
Schurtz, and their fellow researchers at the University of Kentucky asked
students to respond anonymously to an article describing either a mild
(wrist sprain) or a severe injury (knee tear) to a star player for Duke
University’s basketball team (later, they were told that the event was
fictitious). They also completed a measure assessing how identified they
were with Kentucky basketball. The results were illuminating. Students
who cared little about basketball felt no schadenfreude but considerable
sympathy for the player. Naturally, sympathy was greater when the injury
was severe. The highly identified fans experienced these events very
differently: they tended to be pleased over both injuries. The severe injury
produced less schadenfreude than the mild, but even the severe injury
produced a significant amount of pleasure. Most students who reported
feeling pleased also indicated that they felt this way because injury would
help the Kentucky team and hurt the Duke team. This was the main reason,
along with a basic dislike of Duke. With a few extreme exceptions, the
pleasure these fans felt was mild, especially when the injury was severe—
but that many felt any pleasure at all suggests how “negative” events
happening to others are interpreted in the eye of the beholder. Being a
highly identified fan flipped the normal meaning of the event: a “bad” thing
happening to the rival player was, to a degree, “good.”21
Other research shows that there may be an evolutionary “wired-in” basis
for such reactions to a rival group’s suffering. In their Princeton University
social neuroscience lab, psychologists Mina Cikara, Matthew Botvinick,
and Susan Fiske obtained brain scans of either diehard Boston Red Sox or
New York Yankee fans as they watched simulated baseball plays. These
plays featured their own team and their rival playing against each other,
against a neutral team, or two neutral teams playing against each other.
After each play, the participants reported their levels of pleasure, anger, and
pain. Own-team winning, beating the rival, and seeing the rival fail against
a neutral team all produced more pleasure than did seeing two neutral teams
compete against each other. Losing to any team and seeing the rival succeed
produced more anger and pain. The brain scans concurred with self-reports.
Activation of brain regions associated with pleasure (the ventral striatum—
putamen, nucleus accumbens) was also linked with baseball plays in which
participants reported being pleased. Activation associated with pain
(anterior cingulate cortex and insula) was linked with plays in which
participants reported feeling pain. Thus, how the participants’ own group
was doing compared to the rival outgroup showed close connections with
reward and pain systems in the brain. A rival’s failure is a good and
pleasing thing, whether our own group is doing the vanquishing or another,
neutral group is doing it. It gives a pleasing boost to our ingroup identity,
which is an important ingredient in our overall self-feelings. As Cikara and
her colleagues argue, because these brain systems respond to basic,
rudimentary reward and pain situations, they probably developed very early
in our evolutionary history. But they may have further evolved to help us
respond adaptively to the beneficial or threatening aspects of intergroup
contact.22
There was another interesting finding in these researchers’ study
suggesting the intense motivations that can underlie schadenfreude. Their
participants were contacted a few weeks after giving their reactions in the
scanner. They completed a Web survey designed to assess their willingness
to harm rival fans or nonrival fans by heckling, insulting, threatening, and
hitting. Participants expressed a greater willingness to do these things to
rivals than to nonrivals.
There does seem to be something about intergroup dynamics that brings
out competitive instincts. When groups are rivals in sports, competition is a
given, but the psychology of intergroup relations suggests many reasons
why the competitive mindset will be amplified. Social psychologists Chet
Insko, Tim Wildschut, Taya Cohen, and others have done many
experiments that compare interactions between two individuals with
interactions between two groups. Groups end up being more competitive
than individuals.23 This “individual-group discontinuity effect” is
remarkably robust and easily replicated. Why? First, it is easier to serve the
interests of our group than our own narrow interests without seeming
greedy. Second, we are apt to see it as our duty as a loyal group member to
favor our group. Far from feeling greedy, we take pride in serving our
group’s interests. Third, we are much more likely to attribute competitive
motives, as well as a host of other negative traits, to outgroups than to
individuals; outgroups are more difficult to trust and thus require our
vigilance. Finally, any aggressive actions we do take seem to be a collective
group action rather than our own individual action, and this diffuses our
responsibility for the nastiness that may result. No wonder intergroup
relations can be so overloaded with conflict.
If you follow golf, you have probably noticed the difference in both
players’ and spectators’ reactions to Ryder Cup matches compared to
regular tournaments. The Ryder Cup is a biennial, three-day event that pits
the United States against Europe in a series of competitions between players
from each team. As sports go, golf is subdued. Player and spectator norms
dictate proper decorum and sportsmanship. The bouncy, Gangnam Style
dance that Korean golfer James Hahn displayed after sinking a long birdie
putt during the final round of the Phoenix Open in February of 2013 was
memorable in part because it was so unprecedented.24 In regular
tournaments, spectators display approval at every good shot made and
collective groans at every shot missed. On the back of tickets for one major
tournament, the Masters, a sentence reads: “Applauding mistakes is no part
of the game of golf and we hope that visitors to the Masters will henceforth
observe the etiquette and retain their reputation as among the most
knowledgeable and courteous of golfing spectators.”25 Players themselves
may be elated if a competitor chokes, but we wouldn’t know this from their
inscrutable demeanors. However, these norms do not apply quite so
consistently for the Ryder Cup matches, especially in recent years.
The 1999 Ryder Cup involved an improbable comeback victory for the
United States team.26 As the drama unfolded, the emotions of both players
and spectators intensified and erupted openly. The competition came down
to a final pairing between American Justin Leonard and Spaniard José
María Olazábal. There were two holes to go (the 17th and 18th), and all
Leonard had to do to ensure victory for the U.S. team was to win one of the
holes or tie both. On the 17th hole, both golfers made the green on their
second shots. Leonard’s ball was more than 40 feet away, a very difficult
putt. Olazábal’s was just over 20 feet away: tough but makeable. Leonard
putted first and holed it! Even though Olazábal had yet to putt (and,
importantly, making it would have extended the match), American players,
some fans, and even wives rushed onto the green in celebration. The green
was cleared for Olazábal to putt, but he missed. There was celebration over
this too! So much for the gentleman’s game of golf when play is
intergroup.27
 SCHADENFREUDE AND THE BLOOD SPORT OF
POLITICS
There are other arenas in life where partisan instincts carry the day—such
as in politics. As in sports, any misfortune befalling an opposing party
candidate, from sexual scandal to verbal gaffe, improves the chances of
one’s own candidate or party winning. In the heat of political campaigns,
particularly as election night approaches, most events are interpreted
through their implications for victory or defeat, even if a misfortune creates
general negative effects for everyone. For example, dispiriting economic
news might seem to have no positive outcomes for anyone, and yet for a
challenger trying to defeat an incumbent, an economic downturn might be
good news indeed—because the blame goes to the incumbent. The prospect
of winning is the outcome that matters most and so the “bad news” creates
schadenfreude.28
The partisan interests driving the emotions of those invested in politics
can sometimes be difficult to uncover, however. The political costs of
appearing to lack empathy over bad news are great—much more so than in
sports. Regardless of who is losing politically, both sides are required to put
on a long face, their actual feelings notwithstanding. Yet the suspected
inconsistency between actual and presented feelings is probably why
politicians and their allies often accuse their opponents of experiencing
unseemly joy when negative events bring good political news.29 For
example, early in the presidential campaign of 2012, President Barack
Obama claimed that Republicans greeted with great enthusiasm the bad
news of rising gas prices. They were “licking their chops” over the political
opportunity, even though this hurt the average consumer. He added, “Only
in politics do people root for bad news.”30 There is little doubt that political
motivations can promote schadenfreude, often camouflaged by mock
concern. A juicy scandal suffered by a political adversary is an unfailing
trigger. But is it actually true that schadenfreude also occurs when the
misfortune is general in its negative impact, affecting more than the specific
outcomes of a political adversary? I collaborated on a series of studies led
by social psychologist David Combs in which we examined this question.31
We assessed participants’ political party affiliations and the intensity of
their affiliation. Approximately two months later, just before the 2004 U.S.
presidential election and again just before the 2006 midterm elections, we
gauged their reactions to news articles entailing misfortunes of two types.
Some were partly comic in nature and embarrassing to either the
Republican or Democratic Party (e.g., President George W. Bush falling off
his bicycle and Senator John Kerry dressed in a comical outfit during a tour
at NASA). Others were objectively hurtful to others regardless of political
party, yet had implications for the outcome of an upcoming election (a
downturn in the economic news and troop deaths in Iraq). We expected that
party affiliation would predict the amount of schadenfreude felt by the
participants.
This is exactly what happened. For the comic misfortunes, the results
were straightforward. Democrats found the article about President Bush
much more humorous than did Republicans and vice versa for the article
about Senator Kerry. Echoing the findings for sports, this pattern was
stronger for those highly identified with their party and thus more
concerned about the outcome of the election. Essentially, the “same” event
was seen as either very funny or not depending on the political vantage
point.
But more interesting were the results from the questions about the two
“objectively negative” misfortunes. Democrats found both the economic
downturn and the troop deaths more pleasing than did Republicans. Once
again, this was all the more true for those highly identified with their party
and invested in the outcome of the election. Overall, these feelings of
pleasure were not extreme. And yet it was true that these objectively
negative misfortunes were pleasing to some degree. Because the pleasure
increased with strength of identification, it is likely that this pleasure was
linked to resulting political gain. I should note that Democrats felt
considerable ambivalence about both the economic downturn and the troop
deaths. They seemed to welcome the potential political windfall that might
follow from each event, yet they still wrestled with the fact that the news
was generally bad for almost everyone. By contrast, Republicans reported
less overall negative affect as the result of these events. This might be
because Republicans were trying to downplay the seriousness of the
problem so that they would have less reason to feel troubled by bad things
brought about by their party.
In our initial studies, we did not find that Republicans also experienced
schadenfreude over an objectively negative event. This was a quirk of the
period when we ran these studies, a period when scandals were the province
of Republicans, not Democrats. Bad news on the economic or military front
almost always had negative implications for Republicans, whose party was
in power. However, we had no reason to believe that political
schadenfreude was only something Democrats would feel. In another study,
we took the liberty of constructing an article that portrayed a negative event
that could be pinned on either Democrats or Republicans. The time period
for this study was the tail end of the 2008 primary campaign, after both the
Democratic candidate, the then Senator Barack Obama, and the Republican
candidate, Senator John McCain, had earned their respective party
nominations. The article claimed that during the previous year the candidate
had pushed through legislation that directly led to higher mortgage
foreclosures that devastated the fortunes of many homeowners. The article
stressed these broad, negative effects. As in the previous studies, we
assessed party affiliation and party identification. Again, the pattern of
findings was strikingly dependent on which candidate was associated with
the misfortune and the participants’ party affiliation and degree of
identification with their party.
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, Republicans were more pleased than
Democrats when Obama was the cause of the misfortune. The pattern
reversed when McCain had pushed the bad legislation through. Those
strongly identified with their party showed the pattern all the more. Just as
in the competitive realm of sports, when it comes to political fortune,
people naturally focus on their own party’s success, regardless of how
others’ outcomes might be affected. As comedian Stephen Colbert put it
during the summer of the 2012 presidential campaign between incumbent
President Barack Obama and his challenger, Mitt Romney, “I’ve got some
good news and some bad news. The good news is there’s plenty of bad
news, which is great news for Mitt Romney.”32
Figure 3.1. The role of party affiliation of observer and party of the sufferer on schadenfreude.
Schadenfreude in response to a “misfortune” happening to either McCain or Obama depended on
party affiliation of observer.

The influence of group identification on schadenfreude is powerful, but

it fits with our inherent social nature. Humans have always lived in groups,
and our individual survival has probably been linked with the advantages of
being part of a strong group. Group identification is therefore quite
automatic and can lead to ingroup favoritism and outgroup antipathy—and
schadenfreude when a rival outgroup suffers. Schadenfreude seems the
signature emotion in the competitive rough and tumble of sports and
politics, where group allegiances are so intense.
Sometimes sports and politics travel together. Historian Peter Gay grew
up in the pre-war Berlin of the 1930s. In his memoir My German Question,
he describes what it was like to cope with persecutions that he and his
family suffered as Jews until they made their escape on a ship to Cuba in
1939.33 He found refuge from the increasingly vile treatment of the Nazis
by immersing himself in sports. He developed passionate attachments to
teams and was keenly happy when they did well and miserable when they
lost. Also, since he and his father hated the Nazis, they both began
identifying with America rather than Germany. By the 1936 Berlin
Olympics, they supported “the Americans passionately.”34 They attended
most of the events, and their hatred of the Nazis and their love for
Americans led to great swings in emotions depending on the outcome of the
various games. Gay remembered one event most keenly, the women’s 4 ×
100-meter relay, in which the highly favored German team lost because
they dropped the relay baton:
 As long as I live I shall hear my father’s voice as he leaped to his feet … “Die Mädchen
haben den Stab verloren!,” he shouted, “The girls have dropped the baton!” As Helen
Stevens loped to the tape to give the Americans yet another gold medal, the unbeatable
models of Nazi womanhood put their arms around each other and cried their German hearts
out. … Schadenfreude can be one of the greatest joys in life.35

Gay is understandably unapologetic about his and his father’s

schadenfreude, and, as I will explore in Chapters 5 and 6, the deservingness
of a misfortune can go a long way in disconnecting schadenfreude from
shame. I am wholly in sync with his experience. I get goosebumps thinking
about Jesse Owens defeating the German sprinters as Hitler watched from
his stadium seat. Aryan superiority indeed!
Unfortunately, what we see in sports and politics can bring about another
sort of chill. The emotions often produced by intergroup relations may also
encourage extreme forms of conflict, such as ethnic and religious strife and
wars between nations. In this sense, schadenfreude, as natural as it is to
feel, may be a kind of gateway drug, closing the door on compassion and
encouraging darker emotions and actions. Later, in Chapter 10, I venture
into this territory.
 CHAPTER 4

SELF AND OTHER

We know how little it matters to us whether some man, a man taken at large and in the
abstract, prove a failure or succeed in life,—he may be hanged for aught we care,—but we
know the utter momentousness and terribleness of the alternative when the man is the one
whose name we ourselves bear. I must not be a failure, is the very loudest of the voices that
clamor in each of our breasts: let fail who may, I at least must succeed.
— WILLIAM JAMES1

In all Distresses of our Friends

We first consult our private Ends,
While Nature kindly bent to ease us,
Points out some Circumstance to please us.
— JONATHAN SWIFT2

And afterwards I was very glad that the coolie had been killed; it put me legally in the right
and it gave me a sufficient pretext for shooting the elephant.
— GEORGE ORWELL3

Suppose you are a woman secretly in love with a man, and you are
competing for his love with a good friend of yours. The problem for you is
that your friend has many remarkable qualities that make her appealing to
this man. But you find out that she has just been fired from the newspaper
where she works for plagiarizing someone else’s work. How would you
feel? Almost certainly you would express public concern for your friend:
“Too bad about Betty losing her job. I feel terrible for her.”
This is what you are “supposed” to feel, and expressing concern puts you
in a flattering light. After all, she is a good friend, and the misfortunes of
friends should cause us to feel bad. Part of you undoubtedly does feel bad
for her, but you might also add, “Surprising about what Betty did. I guess
it’s hard to blame the newspaper. She probably needs therapy.”
These mild digs at your friend’s character and mental health would be a
telltale sign that another part of you feels pleased. There might be a touch of
the crocodile, crying while eating its victim. Her downfall transforms her
from an attractive rival into someone tarnished. Perhaps the critical detail is
exactly that Betty is now tarnished, a decidedly promising development for
you on the romantic front. You might emphasize in your mind the aspect of
your feelings that registers concern for her. Perhaps you will convince
yourself that compassion is what you are only feeling. But in a corner of
your being, you may be jumping for joy. The prospect of obtaining your
heart’s desire may just be the stronger source of your emotions.

Clearly, feeling pleasure because of a friend’s troubles leads us into

disturbing psychological and moral terrain. We are loath to admit that the
primary wellspring of our emotions can be raw and narrow self-interest,
especially if a friend’s well-being is involved. To feel even a momentary
secret joy sullies the way we view ourselves. Perhaps we may succeed in
falsely convincing the people around us, as well as ourselves, that our
motives and the emotions that rest on them are largely selfless. But, in so
doing, we may be “strangers to ourselves,” as Nietzsche wrote.4 In the
mating game, as in many other competitive arenas of life, self-serving
feelings can often go strongly with the grain and overrule our altruistic
impulses. The weather vane predicting our stronger emotions in these cases
points to the question, “What is in it for me?”
 BORN TO BE GOOD OR BAD
In an early episode of The Simpsons, Sideshow Bob frames Krusty the
Clown for a convenience store robbery and takes over Krusty’s show.
Sideshow, who fancies himself as far more talented and cultured than
Krusty, has been frustrated by playing the minor, sidekick role in what he
thinks of as Krusty’s crassly produced show. He likes that Krusty is behind
bars and enjoys running the show his own way, reading aloud classic
literature, making references to Susan Sontag, and singing songs by Cole
Porter. After one of his shows, as he walks with a group of toadying staff
members, he claims to be feeling sorry for Krusty. He bites his finger and
sobs, but after he enters his dressing room and closes the door, his public
sobs are transformed into a private, devilish cackle. He has what he wants,
full control and the starring role of the show, and he is happy that this came
through Krusty’s downfall.
Schadenfreude should at least flavor our emotions to the extent that we
gain from another person’s misfortune, even if empathy arises as well. But
Sideshow is a caricature of someone motivated only by self-interest and
narrow personal gain; his reaction is pleasure unblended with pity. More
typically, our natural tendencies tug us in at least two directions: one toward
narrow self-interest and schadenfreude, the other toward the interests of
others and empathy. Neither direction fully captures human nature.
In the history of psychology, it would be hard to think of someone who
had a more razor-sharp and even-handed understanding of human
motivation than Harvard psychologist and philosopher William James.
Although his landmark work, The Principles of Psychology, was published
in 1890, contemporary scholars continue to return to his inspired
characterizations of how the human mind works. Here is how James
captures the two competing sides of human nature:
In many respects man is the most ruthlessly ferocious of beasts. As with all gregarious
animals, “two souls,” as Faust says, “dwell with-in his breast,” the one of sociability and
helpfulness, the other of jealousy and antagonism to his mates. Though in a general way he
cannot live without them, yet, as regards to certain individuals, it often falls out that he
cannot live with them either.5

As contemporary Harvard psychologist Howard Gardner argues, we are

neither born to be “good” nor born to be “bad”; we are born to be “good or
bad.”6 It is a false dichotomy.
 Again, if another person suffers a misfortune that leads to our gain, our
feelings usually will be mixed, as the studies on political schadenfreude
described in Chapter 3 show. And our natural feelings of empathy are likely
to be reinforced by cultural norms prescribing this empathy and censuring
displays of pleasure over others’ suffering. Any secret joys we feel when
our rivals lose probably would make most of us feel a little guilty and
ashamed.
In the complex interplay between self-interest and other-interest, do
emotions connected to self-interest have an edge? Does self-interest have
the louder voice—especially in the competitive circumstances that mark
many situations in life?7 Probably. Competition would not lend itself to
schadenfreude if it did not matter who won—“let fail who may, I at least
must succeed,” as William James put it so well.8 The 18th-century Irish
satirist, Jonathan Swift, made a similar point with these lines:
Who would not at a crowded Show
Stand high himself, keep others low?
I love my Friend as well as you
But would not have him stop my View.
Then let him have the higher Post:
I ask but for an Inch at most.9

Most of the time, are we not keenly seeking our own victory? Who among
us enters into a competition hoping that the other side wins? When we say
“good luck” to an opponent, is it not a contradiction in terms? Competition
typically makes our own interests primary. Napoleon advised, “Never
interrupt an enemy when he is making a mistake.”10 We may not admit to
feeling any happiness over the rival’s misfortunes, and it may come blended
with empathy and guilt, but at least a trace of the feeling should arise.
Perhaps President Barack Obama shared Napoleon’s intuitions during a
memorable exchange with Governor Mitt Romney toward the end of the
second presidential debate in October 2012. Obama had just finished
answering a question about the attack that had occurred the previous month
on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya. This had caused the death of the
U.S. ambassador and three other Americans. It was a terrible loss, and it
had hit Obama and many in the State Department especially hard because
of personal connections with the ambassador. But it had also revealed
embarrassing security lapses in the administration’s Libya policy, which
Romney and other Republicans had been quick to highlight. One theme in
their criticisms was that the Obama administration had failed to recognize
early enough that the attack had been carried out by terrorists. Romney was
expected to score points on this—which he did try to do in response to
Obama’s answer. Romney focused on Obama’s claim, made moments
earlier, that on the day after the attack he [Obama] had said that it was “an
act of terror.” He looked at Obama as if to ask whether this was indeed the
president’s claim. Obama nodded and said, “That’s what I said.”
This was a highly charged moment. Romney had thrown down the
gauntlet, and Obama responded in kind. Romney appeared absolutely sure
that Obama had not made the statement, and he said accusingly, “You said
in the Rose Garden the day after the attack, it was an act of terror.”
Romney then paused, seeming to think that he had the advantage. He
raised his eyebrows, gave Obama a look of confident disbelief, and
reasserted his position: “It was not a spontaneous demonstration. Is that
what you’re saying?”
In fact, it was Obama who had the advantage, and Obama knew it.
Having calmly completed a sip from a glass of water while Romney was
making his assertions, he responded to Romney’s allegation by saying,
“Please proceed. Please proceed, Governor.”
Obama was challenging Romney to keep moving into a trap. The look in
his eyes was so intense that the effect was almost physical—and I think
there was a whisper of a smile on his face. As comedian Jon Stewart later
sized up the moment, when your opponent tells you to proceed, that’s “your
first clue” that you are in trouble. This is when the door that the Road
Runner is offering Wile E. Coyote is “merely paint on a rock.”11 Romney
stammered through a few sentences but now seemed to realize that Obama
had the upper hand. Indeed, the debate moderator, Candy Crowley, soon
confirmed Obama’s Rose Garden statement. Obama put an exclamation
point on the exchange by saying, “Can you say that a little louder, Candy?”
The debate audience erupted in spontaneous laughter and applause. It
was a humiliating moment for Romney, and Obama, no doubt, enjoyed
every second of it. Certainly, most Democrats did.12 It may have been a
turning point in the campaign.
 THE THEME OF SELF-INTEREST IN HUMAN NATURE
The dual themes of self-interest and other-interest are reflected in any
complete analysis of human nature and have been a source of lively debate
among thinkers for millennia.13 But our capacity to feel schadenfreude
clearly highlights our self-interested side. And so I think that it is worth
dwelling briefly here on this theme. There are innumerable scholarly
examples to choose from highlighting the role of self-interest in human
actions. In Western philosophy, the British philosopher Thomas Hobbes,
mentioned in Chapter 2, argued that a constant desire for power is the prime
motivation of human beings.14 Of course, in psychology, we can turn to
Freud, who argued we are essentially self-interested and motivated by
pleasure and the desire for sex.15
Many well-known maxims capture the idea in succinct ways, such as this
one from François de la Rochefoucauld, the 17th-century French writer who
I also quoted in Chapter 1: “Few are agreeable in conversation, because
each thinks more of what he intends to say than of what others are saying,
and listens no more when he himself has a chance to speak.”16 Uncovering
people’s self-interested ways was a common theme for de la
Rochefoucauld, as was schadenfreude. Both ideas come through in this
axiom: “We all have enough strength to endure the misfortunes of others.”17
In contemporary popular culture, the ideas proposed by Dale Carnegie
are a good example of this theme of self-interest. Carnegie’s name is
synonymous with simple, common-sense advice on how to get ahead in life.
In his long-time best-seller, How to Win Friends and Influence People, his
main thesis, at which he pounds away in various forms, is that we are
primarily motivated to satisfy our own interests, not the interests of others.
Carnegie claims that “a person’s toothache means more to that person than
a famine in China that kills a million people.”18 He also emphasizes that it
is our pride and vanity that cause us to crave appreciation and a sense of our
own importance. Therefore, he counsels, don’t think you will be able to
influence others unless you understand that their desires and perspectives
are what largely motivates them—not your own. His advice is to couch
your attempts at influence in terms of the interests of those you are trying to
influence, and praise them in any way that is authentic and credible.
Carnegie claims that we show a remarkable capacity to rationalize our
behavior so that our actions and motives seem noble. No matter the depths
of our bad behavior, most of us can produce a positive spin on our motives.
He gives the example of Al Capone, the notorious Chicago gangster, who
was responsible for multiple murders and strong-arm tactics. Did Capone
see himself as a criminal? No. He saw himself as “an unappreciated and
misunderstood public benefactor”19 who was simply providing a service to
people by giving them access to alcohol during Prohibition. Our self-
interest, according to Carnegie, explains why most people are exceedingly
prickly when criticized. Far from producing positive changes in behavior,
criticism is more likely to inspire defensiveness and retaliatory ill will
because it “wounds a person’s precious pride, hurts his sense of
importance.”20 “Let us remember,” Carnegie advises, “we are not dealing
with creatures of logic. We are dealing with creatures of emotion, creatures
bristling with prejudices and motivated by pride and vanity.”21
 Carnegie’s ideas may portray a crude, unbalanced view of human nature,
but they have become guiding principles for generations of people wanting
to improve their social skills and get ahead in their careers.22 It seems easy
to detect when someone has taken a Dale Carnegie course because he will
learn your name, compliment you, and seem to focus on your interests
rather than his own. Some are unable to pull off these strategies without
coming across as ingratiating and inauthentic. Possession of a native
understanding of people may be a necessary ability for Carnegie’s advice to
work effectively, yet there is merit to his ideas. Many people are so tilted
toward their own concerns that they fail to realize that others are similarly
focused. But once they take the point of view of those they are trying to
influence, they usually become much better at influencing them. Because
most people do crave appreciation, they will enjoy any genuine praise that
comes their way. Also, they will be most responsive to influence attempts
that fit their own interests.23 When we realize that our own interests are not
necessarily the interests of those we are trying to influence, we have taken a
huge step toward being more effective in our influence attempts.
Carnegie developed his ideas in the 1920s and ’30s, but they never seem
to go out of style.24 Many people, from presidents, coaches, actors, and
actresses to scores of successful businesspeople, have taken Dale Carnegie
courses and applied his methods to achieve their goals.25 And Carnegie is
far from alone in emphasizing the self-interested side of human nature. A
recent example, also in the domain of understanding persuasion and social
influence, is the social science approach developed by social psychologist
Robert Cialdini, who is perhaps the most respected contemporary expert on
these topics. His terrific book, Influence: Science and Practice, now in its
fifth edition, blends insights from his field experiences with the
implications drawn from many laboratory studies done by him and others.
He distills this blend into a set of core insights that explain successful
persuasion and social influence. Is the principle of self-interest (“the desire
to maximize benefits and minimize costs”) one of the explanations that he
highlights?26 No—but hardly because he believes it is unimportant. Quite
the opposite. He views the principle of self-interest as so fundamental and
self-evident that it does not merit a major focus. It is a “motivational
given.”27

SELF-INTEREST WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN

Sometimes, extreme circumstances reveal how self-interest plays a role in
our behavior. In November 1959, near a small farming town in Kansas, two
small-time ex-cons brutally murdered wealthy farmer Herbert Clutter, his
wife, and two children. To detail the crime in his pioneering nonfiction
book, In Cold Blood, Truman Capote traveled to this town and spent
months interviewing residents. He talked with those close to the Clutter
family, the law enforcement officers who managed to solve the crime, and,
eventually, the murderers themselves, after they were captured and until
they were executed.28 One resident revealed his conflicted reactions to the
murders. This was Bob Johnson, Mr. Clutter’s life insurance agent. In the
months previous to the murders, Mr. Johnson had spent long hours trying to
sell a policy to Mr. Clutter, a man very careful with his money. On the very
afternoon of the murders, Mr. Johnson had finally convinced Mr. Clutter to
buy a policy. It was a $40,000 plan, doubled in the event of accidental
death. When Mr. Johnson got word of the murders, he still had Mr. Clutter’s
signed check to initiate the policy, uncashed in his wallet. His rueful
account of his initial reaction on hearing the news suggested more concern
about how much money he and his company were going to lose rather than
sorrow for the Clutters. He realized that he was the only person still alive
who knew about the check. If he destroyed it, no one else would know.
Even though Mr. Clutter was a friend, his own wallet was in the forefront of
his mind. This concern seemed his first, perhaps primitive, reaction. He did
not destroy the check though. By his accounting, his conscience led him to
do the right thing, and, after discussing the matter with his manager in
Wichita, the company honored the policy. But the tension between self-
interest, cleanly entailed by acute monetary concerns, versus the desire to
do right by Mr. Clutter was unmistakable.
Another telling incident is described in a World War II memoir, The
Doctor and the Damned, by French physician and Resistance member
Albert Haas. He infiltrated the Nazi High Command of occupied France but
was discovered by the Nazis and sent to a series of concentration camps.
Because of the awful, barbarous conditions and the enveloping
hopelessness among prisoners, these camps did not tend to bring out the
most noble, selfless instincts in people. One day, a group of prisoners
assaulted one of the guards, and the German officers retaliated by
announcing that one in every ten prisoners would be shot. They lined the
prisoners up in rows. A guard counted off every ten prisoners and shot the
tenth one in succession. Haas was terrified and hoped desperately that he
would be lucky to escape selection. As the counting got closer to his
position in line, Haas calculated that he would be the next one to die. He
noticed that the man just to his left was in weakened physical condition and
probably very close to death. Haas eased himself over and pushed the man
into his previous place. Within seconds, the German guard placed a gun to
the unfortunate man’s head and shot him dead. As Haas described it, his
“action was so immediate” that he “didn’t have time to think it through until
after it was done.”29 The memory of this event was fixed in Haas’s mind for
the rest of his life. Despite the rational thinking girding his decision,
feelings of guilt endured. Although Haas’s memoir also describes stirring
acts of compassion and self-sacrifice, the fearful conditions typically made
it difficult for men to see beyond their own survival needs. As Brecht
famously wrote, “Food is the first thing—morals follow on.”30
I have collected anonymous accounts of schadenfreude from many
people, and the role of self-interest in guiding reactions to others’ suffering
is a common theme. I am struck by how easily people can come up with
powerful experiences—and also how frank they can be about the details—
even if these details are unflattering. Many accounts involve competition in
its infinite variety. Some echo the conflict experienced by Mr. Johnson
when deciding what to do about Mr. Clutter’s check, and a few even
resonate with Dr. Haas’s account. One respondent described a situation in
which he had performed poorly at work. He feared a bad evaluation from
his supervisor, the person most knowledgeable about his poor performance.
Then he heard that the supervisor had taken seriously ill and might have to
resign, might even die. On hearing the news, he felt an immediate “yes!”
reaction, even though the supervisor was a good person. His honest
admission was that a secret joy was his first reaction because this illness
might prevent the bad evaluation. Of course, he quickly caught himself and
felt a pang of guilt and a surge of sympathy, but his initial reaction sprung
from what he stood to gain from the illness.
Because self-interest so often drives our emotional reactions to events,
even when these events also entail a misfortune for others, we can feel
pleased if we gain from the misfortune.

OUT OF THE MOUTH OF BABES

The unguarded behavior of children can be another window into the self-
interested side of human nature. When I was about ten years old, my
parents invited a family over for a birthday piñata party. This family had
three kids ranging in age from three to eight. They were well behaved until
it was time to hit the piñata. First, each wanted to be the first to hit it, and
second, each wanted to hit it more than his or her share. My siblings and I
backed off and watched them fight over the stick and whack away at the
piñata. This was unsettling enough to witness, but nothing compared to
what happened when the piñata burst and shot its candy over the ground.
All three of these hellions hurled themselves onto the ground and grabbed
for the candy. It was a scene worthy of William Golding’s Lord of the Flies.
The eldest of the lot, stout and advantaged in size, soon got the lion’s share.
I still remember the look on his face as he elbowed aside his smaller
siblings. It was unself-conscious and almost brutish, and it revealed how
little he cared, in the moment, about their yelps and cries. He wanted more
and more, and he was going to get it. Finally, their parents intervened,
looking embarrassed.
Most people have seen similar displays in kids. This may be one reason
why cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker characterized childhood in this
way:
In childhood we see the struggle for self-esteem at its least disguised. The child is
unashamed about what he needs and wants most. His whole organism shouts the claims of
his natural narcissism. … We like to speak casually about “sibling rivalry,” as though it were
 some kind of byproduct of growing up, a bit of competitiveness and selfishness of children
who have been spoiled, who haven’t yet grown into a generous social nature. But it is too
all-absorbing and relentless to be an aberration, it expresses the heart of the creature: the
desire to stand out, to be the one in creation. When you combine natural narcissism with the
basic need for self-esteem, you create a creature who had to feel himself an object of
primary value: first in the universe, representing in himself all of life.31

When our younger daughter was four years old, my wife attended a
function requiring her to be away and late for dinner. A severe thunderstorm
developed by early evening. The sky was purple-black at first, then came
the torrents of rain. It was scary. We were characters in The War of the
Worlds, and the Martians had begun their invasion. My wife called to say
she would be delayed because of the storm. My daughter overheard the
conversation, and this worried me. Now, the terror of the storm would be
compounded by her concern over her mom. And, indeed, the wide-eyed
fright in her face seemed to confirm my worry. But, to my surprise she cried
out, “What about me?” This really took me aback. After I had a moment to
think about it, however, I realized her reaction made a lot of sense. In her
young mind, her biggest fear was the implications of her mom not being
there for her. What would this mean? Her older sister was also present, and
we gave each other bemused looks. Four years her senior, she was more
nuanced in her reactions—and could see the humor in it, even as the storm
thundered outside. The incident is legend in our family. When we joke
about someone’s self-centered behavior, we often blurt out, “What about
me?”
In Chapters 1 and 2, I stressed the importance of social comparisons in
contributing to our feelings about ourselves and therefore the potential
positive effects of downward comparisons—even if they come in the form
of misfortunes happening to others. Social comparisons can also reveal the
self-interested side of human nature. Becker argues this point as well:
[T]he child cannot allow himself to be second-best or devalued, much less left out. “You
gave him the biggest piece of candy!” “You gave him more juice!” “Here’s a little more,
then.” “Now she’s got more juice than me!” “You let her light the fire in the fireplace and
not me.” “Okay, you light a piece of paper.” “But this piece of paper is smaller than the one
she lit.” And so on and on. … Sibling rivalry is a critical problem that reflects the basic
human condition: it is not that children are vicious, selfish, or domineering. It is that they so
openly express man’s tragic destiny: he must desperately justify himself as an object of
primary value in the universe. … 32
 HAPPY AND SAD FOR YOU, RELATIVELY SPEAKING
Psychologist Heidi Eyre and I did an experiment that captures some sense
of how our reactions to events happening to others are anchored by our own
relative experiences.33 Female undergraduate participants in our study
thought that the purpose of the study was to evaluate ways students get
feedback on exams. Another student participant would take an IQ test and
then be given feedback about her performance using different methods
(e.g., oral vs. written). Participants would observe this feedback and
evaluate its effectiveness. The actual purpose of the study (revealed when
the experiment was over) was to assess how the participants’ own relative
performance on the test would influence their emotional reaction to the
other student’s performance. To achieve this, we also asked participants to
take the test, for the ostensible purpose of their being in a better position to
appreciate the experience of the other student. And, as part of their
evaluation of the feedback given to the other student, they completed a
questionnaire tapping their own emotional reactions (such as “happy for”
and “sad for”). In addition, we randomly determined whether the participant
and the other student appeared to have done well or poorly on the IQ test
(again, at the end of the experiment, the actual nature of what was
happening was revealed). We did not measure schadenfreude in this study.
But it was clear from examining these emotional reactions that participants’
sympathy for the other student when she failed, for example, was in part
anchored by their own relative performance. Participants’ feelings did not
simply follow from the objective fact that the other student had “failed.” If
she failed, participants were less sad for her when they themselves had
failed than when they had succeeded. If she succeeded, they were also less
happy for her when they themselves had failed than when they had also
succeeded.
In sum, participants’ reactions to the success and failure of the other
student were partly dictated by their own relative performance and not only
by the simple fact of the other student’s success or failure. It was easy to
feel sad for someone else’s failure from the vantage point of one’s own
relative success. It was hard to feel happy for someone’s success from the
vantage point of one’s own relative failure.
 THE BALANCE OF SELF-INTEREST AND EMPATHY: A
COMPLEX DUALITY
It is important to recognize that even participants who failed usually
reported some sympathy for the other failed students—and some happiness
for those students who succeeded. That is, they had mixed feelings. None of
my suggestions about the self-interested aspect of human nature, let me
emphasize once again, aims at cheapening other empathic motivations. I
like the way that 18th-century Scottish thinker Adam Smith made a similar
point:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature,
which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasures of seeing it. … That we often derive
sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to
prove it. … The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not
altogether without it.34

It is easy to marshal telling examples of empathy in human beings, and

many researchers continue to explore this aspect of human nature.35 Our
dependence on others at all stages of life alone suggests that empathy is
itself a product of our evolutionary heritage. Overly self-interested people
are likely to be rejected by group members. At the very least, human
motivation reflects a complex interplay between concern for self and
concern for others.36 But in trying to comprehend schadenfreude, the self-
interested side of human nature provides a window into understanding why
the misfortunes of others can give us pleasure rather than provoke feelings
of empathy.
In Chapter 1, I referred to the research on primates done at the Yerkes
National Primate Research Center.37 When both monkeys were given
cucumbers, both seemed satisfied. But when one received a cucumber and
the other received a grape, the monkey receiving the cucumber became
distressed. These monkeys seemed to show concern over unequal treatment.
What I did not mention is that these monkeys appeared unconcerned when
getting more than their share. Gaining an “unfair” advantage over other
monkeys did not seem to cause them distress. Researcher Sarah Brosnan
notes: “The capuchins’ sense of inequity seems to be very one-sided. It’s all
about whether or not ‘I’ got treated unfairly.”38 Not surprisingly, although
humans beings are capable of feeling stressed from both unfair advantage
and unfair disadvantage, unfair advantage is generally less troubling than
unfair disadvantage.39
Psychologists Roy Baumeister and Brad Bushman, in their widely used
textbook Social Psychology and Human Nature, characterize this duality of
self- and other-interest in an interesting way.40 They emphasize the view
that self-interested impulses are especially likely to be rooted in our
evolutionary heritage because traits furthering individual survival and
reproduction should be favored. This is why Aristotle could suggest that
luck is when “a missile hits the next man and misses you.”41 It is hard to
imagine living beings surviving without a strong impulse to serve
themselves. Baumeister and Bushman also stress that human beings
respond to the demands of culture, which typically urges that we adjust our
own narrow interests to fit the needs of the group. Even if we want the
larger share of the popcorn, we learn to share it equally. This was certainly
true as my wife and I watched our daughters mature. As I described in
Chapter 1, when they were very young, the disadvantaged one did the
protesting and the advantaged one was less perturbed. As they got older,
they broadened their concerns, insisted on equality all around, and indeed
felt good and took increasing pride in generosity and self-sacrifice. But,
even now, if we were to sit down and watch a holiday movie, they would
feel puzzled, even a little wounded, if I were to make the mistake of
violating the rule equality in distributing popcorn.
Baumeister and Bushman note that many of the rules that we learn, such
as turn-taking and respect for the property of others, are based on moral
principles that inhibit self-interested behavior. Especially when we are
among people we know well, moral emotions such as guilt and shame help
in this process. We feel guilty if we satisfy only our own needs and
disregard the interests of those in our own group or family, and we feel
ashamed when our selfish actions are made public. But our self-interested
concerns surface easily. It often requires deliberate, planful efforts on our
part to act in culturally appropriate ways. Baumeister and Bushman put it
nicely:
Generally, nature says go, culture says stop. … The self is filled with selfish impulses and
with the means to restrain them, and many inner conflicts come down to that basic
antagonism. That conflict, between selfish impulses and self-control, is probably the most
basic conflict in the human psyche.42
 We can recognize this tension in Mr. Johnson’s mind as he struggled
with what to do with Mr. Clutter’s check, in Dr. Haas’s mind as he
instinctively changed places with his sick fellow prisoner, and in children’s
minds when they react to how desired things are divvied out to themselves
and others.
Any factor that amplifies the benefits of others’ misfortunes for
ourselves, such as competition, should promote an “anesthesia of the
heart,”43 to use philosopher Henri Bergson’s phrase, and thus intensify our
schadenfreude. This is one reason we see so much schadenfreude in the
realms of sports and politics. As the studies I reviewed in Chapter 3 show,
misfortunes happening to rival teams and rival political parties produce
quick pleasure, especially for people highly identified with their own team
or party. This is because when our group identity is important to us, a rival
group’s loss is good for our own group and thus good for us. In these
studies, the perception of self-gain was highly associated with
schadenfreude. In fact, without this perception, unless our participants had
reasons to dislike the rival, there was very little schadenfreude reported.
Self-interest, through the impact of group identification in these cases,
inverted the emotional landscape. For the highly identified fan or political
devotee, “bad things” happening to others (if they were rivals) were
experienced as good for the group and therefore for the self. In sports, this
was true even if the misfortune was a severe injury. In politics, this was true
even if the misfortune entailed the death of soldiers. Although
schadenfreude was typically low in intensity, especially in the case of
reactions to troop deaths, and was mixed with concern, misfortunes
happening to others created a boost in pleasure to the extent that these
events led to self-gain.
In the next chapter, I shift to another important reason why we often feel
schadenfreude, and this has to do with justice. We care deeply about justice
and fairness. Our emotional reactions to both good and bad events
happening to others are guided in part by whether these events seem
deserved or undeserved, fair or unfair. Misfortunes are bad things, but when
we believe that they are deserved, schadenfreude is almost sure to follow.
 CHAPTER 5

DESERVED MISFORTUNES ARE SWEET

When someone who delights in annoying and vexing peace-loving folk receives at last a
right good beating, it is certainly an ill, but everyone approves of it and considers it as
good in itself, even if nothing further results from it.
—IMMANUEL KANT1

Every decent man will kvell when that sadist goes to jail.
—LEO ROSTEN2

Being an old farm boy myself, chickens coming home to roost never did make me sad; they
always made me glad.
—MALCOLM X3

It is hard to imagine the film industry without the revenge plot. There are
inexhaustible variations on the theme, but the basic pattern is simple,
predictable—and preferred by viewers. The villain treats the hero badly, and
the arc of the story completes itself with the hero taking satisfying revenge.
No one is more pleased when justice is served than the eager audience. The
villain gets no sympathy. We cheer the outcome. It is highly pleasing to see
bad people get what they deserve.
The regular merging in films of justice-inspired revenge with its
resulting pleasure suggests a natural link between justice and
schadenfreude.4 No manner of bloody end can cause us to blanch. I make
this claim confidently because of a two-year stint working as an assistant
manager at a movie theater during the late 1970s. The catbird seat in the
projectionist booth was a good place for observing audience behavior. We
showed many films that made audiences cheer when the villain got what
was coming to him, but the one I remember best was the Brian De Palma
film, The Fury. The villain in this film is an intelligence operative, Ben
Childress, played by John Cassavetes, who pitilessly experiments with the
lives of two teenagers who happen to have telekinetic powers that could be
useful for intelligence purposes. When his actions lead to the death of one
of the teens, the other teen turns her telekinetic powers on Childress. Driven
by her anger and hatred, she levitates him a few feet off the ground and
spins him around with increasing speed until he explodes. The theater
audiences were untroubled by the grotesque scene. Some whooped and
hollered. They hated this man, played so effectively by Cassavetes. Not
only did they want him dead, but they also wanted him minced and
pulverized. He deserved it. A ghastly end—but pleasing even so.5
There seems little question that seeing a just misfortune befalling another
causes us to feel pleased, with schadenfreude being part of the feeling.
Philosopher John Portmann, who has written more on schadenfreude than
any other scholar, argues it is an emotional corollary of justice.6 It follows
seamlessly from a sense that the misfortune is deserved. And experiments
by social psychologists Norman Feather, Wilco van Dijk, and others
confirm what one would expect: participants in experiments report more
schadenfreude over deserved than undeserved misfortunes.7

WHAT IS A DESERVED MISFORTUNE?

Typically, we use shared standards to resolve whether a misfortune is
deserved. For example, we think people who are responsible for their
misfortunes also deserve their suffering, and schadenfreude is a common
response.8 Brazen swindler Bernie Madoff will go down in history for his
Ponzi scheme, breathtaking in scale. Investors appeared to earn returns that
were actually generated by later investors. Many high-profile individuals,
charities, and nonprofit institutions lost staggering amounts of money, with
the tally of the crime reaching $60 billion.9 In June 2009, when Madoff
received his sentence of 150 years, cheers and applause filled the courtroom
packed with many of his victims.10 Even Madoff appeared to finally grasp
the enormity of his wrongdoing. After receiving this maximum sentence, he
turned to address his victims: “I live in a tormented state knowing the pain
and suffering I have created.”11
Another shared standard for deservingness, often related to
responsibility, has to do with balance and fit. We believe that bad people
deserve a bad fate, just as good people deserve a good fate. We believe that
extremely bad behavior deserves extreme punishment, just as extremely
good behavior deserves great reward. And so villains such as the character
played by Cassavetes in The Fury deserve their demise because of their
villainous natures and wicked behaviors. They receive their “just desserts.”
This is pleasing to observe because it agrees with our ideas of how fate
should play out. Part of this pleasure is aesthetic. The righting of the
balance achieved when bad behavior leads to a bad outcome produces a
kind of poetic justice.12
Reactions to Madoff’s punishment fit this standard as well. He did
indeed create extreme suffering and betrayed the trust of many in the
process—shamelessly, it seemed—until he was caught.13 His victims, when
given the chance to describe their personal losses before the sentencing,
pulled no punches. One victim, Michael Schwartz, whose family used their
now lost savings to care for a mentally disabled brother, said, “I only hope
that his prison sentence is long enough so that his jail cell will become his
coffin.”14 The judge concurred, labeling Madoff’s crimes as
“extraordinarily evil,” which is why for each of the crimes to which Madoff
confessed, the maximum sentence was imposed. “It felt good,” said
Dominic Ambrosino, one of Madoff’s many victims, who was outside the
courthouse in the crowd when the news of the verdict spread.15
One of the most unfortunate tales from the Madoff scandal involved
Nobel Peace Prize recipient and Auschwitz survivor Elie Wiesel. Because
of Madoff’s scheme, Wiesel lost $15 million of funds for his Foundation for
Humanity. This was virtually all of the Foundation’s endowment. Wiesel
was in no forgiving mood. “Psychopath—it’s too nice a word for him,”16
Wiesel said and then went further to recommend a five-year period in a
prison cell containing a screen depicting the faces of each of Madoff’s
victims—presented morning, noon, and night.17
Nor was there a trace of sympathy for Madoff when he landed in prison.
In fact, some even expressed disappointment that he was sentenced only to
a minimum security facility populated largely by other white-collar
criminals. The maximum punishment allowed by law seemed hardly
enough. Most people took what pleasure they could from the event,
nonetheless. This was especially evident on the internet, where most
comments were exultant and often crude. A post on one site contained a
photo of Madoff’s prison bed and included comments such as the
following:18
 Isn’t there a bed of nails we could put in there?

There’ll be a lot of outrage when people see that he gets a pillow for his head.

I hope those beds are filled with bedbugs.

Madoff’s swindle was epoch-making. He betrayed the trust of friends,

charities, and, evidently, even his family. He so deserved his punishment by
any standard one could point to that no one seemed sorry for him. Rather,
just about everyone was openly happy to see this money man with the
counterfeit Midas touch reduced to prison inmate.
Schadenfreude clearly thrives when justice is served. As a basis for
schadenfreude, deservingness has the advantage of seeming to be unrelated
to self-interest because the standards for determining justice appear
objective rather than personal and thus potentially biased.19 It is less an
“outlaw” emotion, less a shameful feeling. John Portmann describes the
example of the influential Roman Catholic theologian Bernard Haring, who
declared that schadenfreude is an evil, sinful emotion to feel. And yet
Haring qualifies this characterization by noting,
Schadenfreude is evil, it is a terrible sin—unless you feel it when the lawful enemies of God
are brought low, and then it’s a virtue. Why? Because you can then go to the lawful enemies
of God and you can say “see, God is making you suffer because you’re on a bad path.”20

I am unaware of any examples in the Gospels of Christ approving of

schadenfreude. However, Haring’s sentiments echo those of other religious
thinkers, such as 13th-century Catholic priest St. Thomas Aquinas21 and
18th-century Christian preacher Jonathan Edwards. The title of one of
Edwards’s sermons was “Why the Suffering of the Wicked will not be
Cause of Grief to the Righteous, but the Contrary.”22 Evil schadenfreude
may be, but not when the lawful enemies of God get what they deserve. If
sanctified justice is served, then schadenfreude is—well—justified.

THE SINGULAR PLEASURE OF THE FALL OF A

HYPOCRITE
Some types of deservingness produce an especially satisfying
schadenfreude. I suspect that few things can top the fall of the hypocrite.
The archetype of this general category is Jimmy Swaggart, who stands out
among a congested group of unforgettable cases. Swaggart, a talented,
charismatic entertainer, helped create a particular brand of Christian
proselytizing: the TV evangelist. His program, The Jimmy Swaggart
Telecast, at its peak, was broadcast on hundreds of stations around the
globe. Swaggart continues to this day to entertain and attract a large
following. He is a remarkable person, a self-made American original.
However, he got himself in trouble in the late 1980s. Swaggart not only
preached about the consequences of sin, but he also went about exposing
the sins of others. Most notably, he accused another well-known evangelist,
Jim Bakker, of sexual misconduct. But Swaggart soon lost his high moral
footing. A church member, whom Swaggart also accused of sexual
misbehavior, hired a private detective to monitor Swaggart’s activities. The
detective produced photographs showing Swaggart’s regular visits to a
prostitute. When the leadership of his church, the Assemblies of God,
learned of this behavior, they suspended him for three months. In a public
confession—a now iconic event in popular culture—Swaggart came before
his congregation and television audience to admit his sin and ask for
forgiveness.23
For many, the image of Swaggart, his face twisted in pain and tears
streaming down his cheeks was, and still is, a source of unabashed hilarity.
His behavior was full-strength hypocrisy, and his humiliation seemed
wholly deserved. Indeed, most media accounts and letters to major papers
focused on the hypocrisy of Swaggart’s behavior and heaped on the disgust,
ridicule, and glee.24 Making matters worse for Swaggart, and further
preserving the likelihood that his confession would persist in cultural
memory, was that he returned to the pulpit far from entirely repentant. Thus,
the Assemblies of God defrocked him. A few years later, he was caught
with yet another prostitute. He didn’t bother with contrition this time. He
told his congregation, “The Lord told me it’s flat none of your business.”25
Confession is one thing; repentance is quite another.26
 When it comes to hypocrisy and its gratifying exposure, preachers stand
out. Many in this line of work seem so quick to point out others’ moral
failings despite being vulnerable to moral lapses themselves.27 In the
Introduction, I noted the case of George Rekers. His anti-gay initiatives
were undone when he was caught hiring a young man from Rentboy.com to
accompany him on a trip to Europe. What took Rekers’s hypocrisy to its
spectacular level—and what made the schadenfreude seem so deserved—
was that he went out of his way to further policies that harmed gay people
for their homosexual behavior—for more than three decades. As much as
one might feel sorry for Rekers as he combated the white-hot media
attention that he received, his prior punishing ways put him at a
disadvantage for deflecting schadenfreude. Syndicated columnist Leonard
Pitts, Jr. wrote, “as perversely entertaining as it is to watch someone work
out his private psychodrama in the public space … there is a moral crime
here.”28 Rekers condemned and punished people for behaviors he evidently
engaged in himself.
Another well-publicized example is Reverend Ted Haggard, who
resigned from his mega-church in Colorado Springs after admitting to
having homosexual relations with a professional masseur named Mike
Jones.29 Haggard’s behavior was patently hypocritical because he had
condemned homosexuality so frequently and vigorously. In a documentary,
Jesus Camp, he proclaimed with conviction that “we don’t have to debate
about what we should think about homosexual activity. It’s written in the
Bible.”30 Among his authored books, one had the title From This Day
Forward: Making Your Vows Last a Lifetime.31 Jones, for his part, wanted
to reveal their relationship because he learned that Haggard (who went by
the name of “Art” when he visited Jones) supported a Colorado ballot
amendment that would ban same-sex marriage in that state. When Jones
realized how much Haggard’s influence might lead to passage of the
amendment, he grew increasingly angry:
I remember screaming at his picture on the computer. “You son of a bitch! How dare you!”
Art and every straight-acting couple in America could get married and divorced as many
times as they liked, yet two men or two women cannot get married even once, much less
enjoy the legal benefit of marriage. … I was becoming angrier by the minute.32 … You
goddamn hypocrite!33

Haggard at first denied the allegations of sexual contact,34 but evidence

against this denial mounted quickly, as did the cascading waves of
schadenfreude. His behavior was satirized in various forms from late-night
comedy to a book-length treatment on sex scandals (The Brotherhood of the
Disappearing Pants: A Field Guide to Conservative Sex Scandals).35 One
response from a pleased blogger summed up the tenor of most reactions: “I
love the smell of hypocrisy in the morning.”36
As for Mike Jones, he claimed to get no pleasure out of exposing
Haggard’s hypocrisy. Friends even commented that he should have been
more lively when interviewed about his relationship with Haggard. But
Jones wrote that he “was not happy about anything that had happened.”37
Perhaps he worried that being “lighthearted” would make his motives
suspect. In any event, he recognized the glaring inconsistency between
Haggard’s public denouncements and his private behavior. Wrote Jones,
“You must not speak out against something that you do in secret. You must
practice what you preach. Let us not forget that the ultimate word in this
story is hypocrisy.”38
Preachers are easy targets. Their job requires that they encourage moral
behavior in others—even though they are surely flawed themselves, just
like their congregations. And, just like the rest of us, for that matter. It is an
occupational hazard made worse by a greater need to keep up appearances
and maintain at least a higher standing of moral behavior than those around
them. But their professional activities may expose them to many powerful
temptations as they counsel their flock. Sometimes, to quote Oscar Wilde,
“The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it.”39 Swaggart and
Haggard both have redeeming qualities, obscured by the exposure of their
hypocrisy. I, for one, enjoy Swaggart’s preaching and his gospel singing. I
am quite taken by the life story of someone who is, as one biographer of
Swaggart, Ann Rowe Seaman, put it, so “full of sauce”40 and so uniquely
“poor and gifted and determined.”41 I admire how Haggard and his wife
have handled life since his fall from grace. Haggard has been forgiving in
his comments about Rekers (e.g., “we are all sinners”),42 but even he noted
that his own actions were not as hypocritical as Rekers’s.43 As I stressed in
Chapters 1 and 2, the social science evidence makes clear the self-esteem
benefits of seeing oneself as superior to others. When is it not open season
for a downward comparison?
Take someone like Bill Bennett, the well-known and accomplished
conservative thinker and author of books such as Moral Compass: Stories
for a Life’s Journey and The Book of Virtues. Bennett has a reputation in
some circles for wagging the moral finger at others for their misbehavior.44
In 2003, a story circulated that he had been gambling at casinos for years,
losing as much as $8 million. Bennett had his defenders.45 His books on
virtues are effective tools for instilling moral values in kids. But many
writers seized on this story, notably Michael Kinsley of Slate Magazine,
who awarded Bennett a “Pulitzer Prize for schadenfreude.” Kinsley guessed
that many sinners had long fantasized that Bennett was a secret member of
their club. And so he wrote that “[a]s the joyous word spread, … cynics
everywhere thought, for just a moment: Maybe there is a God after all.”46
Preachers and others who make a living telling others how to live get top
billing in the roll call of fallen hypocrites. But hypocrisy plays no real
favorites. Politicians often feel the need to both aggrandize themselves and
criticize their opponents in order to get elected. Thus, in scandals and the
media attention that surrounds them, they come in at least a close second.
Like preachers, who need to impress congregants, politicians have to
position themselves to voters and constituents as beyond reproach.
 WHY IS IT SUCH FUN TO WATCH HYPOCRITES
SUFFER?
Yes, witnessing the suffering of hypocrites is felicitous fun. What is behind
this distinctive pleasure? Hypocritical behavior reveals a breakdown
between words and deeds, usually having to do with moral behavior.
Hypocrites claim virtue but practice sin. According to one gospel account,
hypocrisy among the religious leaders even made Jesus angry:
Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For ye make clean the outside of the cup
and of the platter, but within they are full of extortion and excess. … Woe unto you, scribes
and Pharisees, hypocrites! For ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear
beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men’s bones, and of all uncleanness.47

Throughout history and across cultures, people find inconsistent

behavior unappealing. “The person whose beliefs, words, and deeds don’t
match is seen as confused, two-faced, even mentally ill,” notes social
psychologist Robert Cialdini in his book Influence: Science and Practice,
also referenced in Chapter 4.48 Cialdini speculates that being inconsistent
may even be worse than being wrong. It smacks of deception and is a
violation of trust.
It is more than contempt from the sidelines that leads us to condemn
hypocrites. Hypocrites often set themselves up as morally superior, forcing
imperfect people around them to ponder their relative moral inferiority.
Thus, even before their hypocritical behavior comes to light, hypocrites can
be an irritating, disagreeable presence. Their “holier than thou” manner is
annoying.49 For example, Stanford University social psychologist Benoit
Monin has found that the presence of a vegetarian can make an omnivore
self-conscious. He showed that meat-eaters can feel morally inferior around
vegetarians, who they anticipate will show them moral reproach.50
Vegetarians need not say a word; their very existence, from a meat-eater’s
point of view, is a moral irritant. And so imagine the pleasure felt by a
meat-eater when catching an avowed vegetarian snacking on a rack of ribs.
Discovery of this deceptive, hypocritical behavior is a buoyant event. We
are not as inferior as we were led to believe; now, we can assume the
contrasting position of moral superiority. Naturally, this turnaround feels
good.
 There is another reason why misfortunes befalling hypocrites should be
so satisfying. Often, these misfortunes amount to their being caught doing
the very thing that they point the finger at others for doing. The precise
matching of their moral rebukes and the behavior that lands them in trouble
heightens the suitable feel of their downfall. Such reversals have extra
special aesthetic appeal.51 Justice rises up to meet poetry. This helps make
the exposure of hypocrisy feel like such a satisfying tale.
I collaborated on an experiment with social psychologist Caitlin Powell
in which we showed how pleasing it is to see hypocrites get caught for the
precise thing they have criticized others for doing.52 Our undergraduate
participants read what appeared to be an article containing an interview
with a fellow student. Half the time, the student interviewed mentioned
being an avid member of a campus organization aimed at curtailing as well
as punishing plagiarism. The student said in the interview, “It really gets me
mad when I see people cheating or plagiarizing. That’s just lazy. Our
actions have helped in the punishment of three recent cases of cheating.”
For other participants, the student was simply mentioned as being a member
of a university club. In a second, follow-up article, the same student was
charged with one of two possible moral lapses: he had been caught and
suspended either for plagiarizing or for stealing. We also gave our
participants questionnaires after each article to gauge what they thought and
felt about the student, his misconduct, and his subsequent punishment. As
we expected, the student was seen as more hypocritical when he had been a
member of the organization focused on academic misconduct and was
subsequently caught plagiarizing compared to when he had just been a
member of the club. In this case, our participants also thought his
punishment more deserved and more pleasing.
What was more interesting was a comparison of reactions to the two
kinds of misbehaviors, depending on whether the student had been a
member of the organization focused on academic misconduct or the club.
When the student had been a member of the club, his misfortune was
viewed as equally deserved and experienced as equally pleasing, regardless
of whether he was caught stealing or plagiarizing. After all, both behaviors
were morally wrong. How about when the student had been a member of
the organization that aimed to combat plagiarism? (See Figure 5.1.)
Participants now felt much more pleased when the student got caught for
the precise behavior he criticized others for doing, that is, when he was
caught plagiarizing. And this is the important part: they felt this way even
though the misbehaviors were equally immoral. Why? Knowledge that the
student had criticized others for plagiarizing transformed how participants
felt about the student getting caught. The matching of misconduct and prior
statements enhanced the perception of hypocrisy and the deservingness of
the misfortune.

Figure 5.1. The effect of prior moralizing about cheating on the intensity of schadenfreude.
Prior moralizing about cheating resulted in markedly greater schadenfreude in response to a person
caught cheating compared to stealing.

There is little doubt about it. Deserved misfortunes are a joy to witness,
whether due to hypocrisy, as was the case in this experiment, or to other
factors that make misfortunes seem deserved. We can understand why John
Portmann, after his wide-ranging scholarly examination of the nature of
schadenfreude, concluded that deservingness is the main explanation for
why we can take pleasure in the misfortunes of others. Indeed, much more
can be said about this frequent cause of schadenfreude, and the next chapter
will take up some of these points.
 CHAPTER 6

JUSTICE GETS PERSONAL

O what a brilliant day it is for vengeance!

—AESCHYLUS1

When I heard on the news they finally got him, I was filled with joy.
—SAUNDRA WOOLEN, MOTHER OF AN ARMY SERGEANT KILLED IN THE PENTAGON
ON 9/11, ON HEARING THE NEWS OF OSAMA bIN LADEN’S DEATH2

I am not a vengeful man, but I do enjoy a touch of retribution now and then.
— NEW YORKER CARTOON CAPTION BY ED KOREN3

One appeal of witnessing deserved misfortunes is that any joy we feel can
seem free of malice. As I highlighted in the previous chapter, this is
especially true when our judgments of deservingness follow from clear,
culturally shared standards. Our thinking then has the stamp of impartiality,
and we gain the license to feel righteous pleasure.4 But it is important to
recognize that there is a strong motivational component to judgments of
deservingness that can heighten this pleasure, sometimes in a subjective,
biased way. This is a process well worth exploring.

BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD

One way that this subjectivity happens is because we are often motivated to
construe the world as a just place. We need to believe in a “just world” in
which people generally get what they deserve and deserve what they get.5
Believing in a just world allows us to go about our lives as if events are
guided by predictable, orderly forces. The alternative belief, that the world
operates in a random fashion in which deservingness is absent, undermines
the value of planful actions. The chaos it implies causes anxiety. These are
existential conclusions that most of us resist.
 This motive to believe in a just world, originally proposed by
psychologist Melvin Lerner, seems innocent enough, but research by Lerner
and others shows that it can lead to the ironic effect of blaming innocent
people when they suffer. Lerner and his colleague Carolyn Simmons did a
series of now-classic studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s that supports
this idea. In their first study,6 observers witnessed another person who
appeared to be receiving electric shocks. The reason for these shocks was
designed to seem unfair, and, indeed, knowledge that this innocent person
was receiving these shocks produced compassion in the observers. When
given the opportunity in one condition, they chose to rescue and
compensate the person. But an additional condition gave observers the
expectation that this person would continue to receive the shocks.
Surprisingly, observers tended to derogate the character of the victim.
Lerner and Simmons suggested that reactions in both conditions could be
explained by concerns over justice. If people need to believe that the world
is a just place in which people get what they deserve, then they will
construe all events as confirming this belief. In the first condition, the easy
recognition that the victim was undeserving of the shock led to compassion.
In the second condition, the disturbing sense that an innocent victim would
continue to receive undeserved shock led to a more rationalized view that
she must deserve it. Lerner and Simmons argued that the just world motive
provides a substantial filter through which we interpret and react to both
good and bad things happening to others.

BLAMING THE VICTIM AND ENJOYING IT TOO

The idea that people need to believe in a just world might explain reactions
to events that are otherwise perplexing. Consider the memorable case in the
late 1980s of a young woman who was raped at knife-point after she had
been kidnapped from a Fort Lauderdale restaurant parking lot. The
perpetrator was captured and put on trial, but the jurors acquitted him. The
jury foreman commented, “We all feel she asked for it [by] the way she was
dressed.”7 The victim had been wearing a white lace miniskirt, a tank top,
and no underwear. This may have been a provocative, attention-getting
ensemble, but did she deserve her assault? It seems the jurors thought as
much. Otherwise, how could they have found the perpetrator innocent? A
need to believe in a just world may offer one clue.
 In his 1980 book, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion,
Lerner explained how he came up with this idea. His first thoughts about
the just world motive were prompted by noticing schadenfreude in others.
Early in his career, when he worked among doctors and nurses who cared
for psychiatric patients, he saw many instances of these professionals joking
about their patients behind their backs, sometimes to their faces. These
reactions jarred him because, generally, these patients were unlucky souls
and had little control over their psychological problems. But he did not
view his colleagues as callous. Rather, he concluded that their reactions
were coping responses to the unpleasant reality they confronted in these
patients. Eventually, he developed the notion of a need to believe in a just
world as a prime motive for such reactions. If these patients largely seemed
to “deserve” their troubles, one could feel comfortable joking about them.8
Lerner’s core idea is far-reaching in its implications. Believing in a
world with no semblance of justice may indeed lead to an unsettling
existential uncertainty. Perhaps even the most world-weary and cynical
individual may believe, superstitiously, in a kind of karma. On the outside
chance that there is some cosmic principle that will even the balance and
correct injustice, they avoid dismissing the fates entirely. A bad deed will
be punished—somehow, in some way, at some time.
The possibility that people have a need to believe in a just world
connects concerns over justice more strongly with schadenfreude for at
least two reasons. For one, when there are good, “objective” reasons to
blame people for their misfortunes, we will be all the more eager to do so.
After all, these valid reasons will go along with the motivational grain. And
so, when people appear responsible for their misfortunes (e.g., the driver
has an accident while texting or the investment banker goes broke because
of risky loan practices), we will zero in on their role in the outcome all the
more. We will seize on this information, even embellish it. The objective
details of deservingness nicely satisfy the just world motive. The second
reason is that the range of unfortunate events that can be construed as “just”
increases. This is because our perceptions of causality are likely to be
distorted by a need to perceive a just basis for the misfortune when none
exists in the first place—which may be why victims are at risk for receiving
blame.
That just world motivations might bias our judgments of deservingness
raises the general problem of human biases and how they might distort
judgments in ways that create schadenfreude. Research by social
psychologist Mark Alicke demonstrates that we tend to see others as having
more control over bad outcomes than they actually have. As a consequence,
this perception of “culpable control” means that others will be seen as more
blameworthy—which should enhance pleased reactions to their suffering.
Generally, we show what Alicke labels an outcome bias. Especially when
we want to evaluate someone negatively, we work backward from negative
events and perceive more intentionality and foresight than is warranted by
the facts.9 Schadenfreude itself may encourage this process: if we find
people’s suffering amusing, we may conclude that they must be
blameworthy.

JUSTICE AND SELF-INTEREST

I noted in Chapter 5 that many were pleased when Bernie Madoff was
punished for his Ponzi scheme—but his victims were the ones who cheered
the loudest. Likewise, of the many happy at news of Osama Bin Laden’s
death, relatives of those who died from the terrorist attack master-minded
by Bin Laden were most gratified. Saundra Woolen, whose son died in the
attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, said, “I wish they could
have gotten him alive and given him a slow death. … Either way, he’s gone
and I’m glad.”10 People responsible for treating us poorly will seem to
deserve their suffering more surely than those who have offended others.
And their suffering will create especially satisfying schadenfreude. We will
delight in it.
In the Aesop fable, the ant felt good to see the grasshopper suffer from
hunger. After all, the grasshopper had danced, sung, and taunted the ant
during the summer while the ant had worked and stored food for the winter.
 We easily develop grievances against people and come to dislike them,
sometimes hate them, because they have mistreated us. These can seem
petty sentiments, and so they often remain private. But they nonetheless set
us up for feeling schadenfreude if these people suffer. And we probably feel
that even their severe suffering is deserved. I am persuaded on this point by
the example of Sir Kenneth Dover, the late distinguished scholar of Greek
life, literature, and language.11 Dover was a prolific scholar who wrote
pioneering books on the Greek Classical Age. His writings overturned
many assumptions about this period in history. Remarkably, despite his
impressive scholarly record earned at Oxford and St. Andrews universities,
he may be best known for a few admissions made in a memoir that he wrote
at the end of his career.12 The book includes frank observations about many
aspects of his life.13 The admissions attracting the most attention concerned
his intense dislike of another colleague at Oxford, Trevor Aston. This man’s
exasperatingly manipulative personality, drunken behavior, and chronic
threats of suicide caused Dover, who was then the administrator charged
with dealing with Aston’s behavior, to contemplate ways of furthering these
suicidal intentions. Dover wrote: “My problem was one which I feel
compelled to define with brutal candour: How to kill him without getting
into trouble.”14 Dover had found Aston such a maddening burden that he
considered that through an “act of omission” on his own part Aston might
act on his suicide threats.15 Only the legal implications seemed to cause
Dover to balk at following through on such plans. When Aston did take his
own life, Dover described his own reaction the following morning: “I can’t
say for sure that the sun was shining, but I certainly felt it was. I said to
myself, slowly, ‘Day One of the Year One of the Post-Astonian Era.’”16
Was Dover lacking in normal human compassion, or was he simply
being refreshingly candid in confessing to emotions that others were
privately feeling as well?17 Some, such as James Howard-Johnston, a
lecturer in Byzantine studies at Oxford, thought the former, arguing that
Dover was “cold, clinical and ahuman.”18 Others, such as Brian Harrison, a
history fellow and tutor, disagreed: “I’m 100 percent behind Kenneth. It’s
astonishing he bore it all those years.”19 Dover was sensitive to this
question, and, in his memoir, he related that on hearing the news of Aston’s
death, two of his colleagues confessed to nothing but relief.20 He noted that
all the proper things were said at Aston’s funeral and at his memorial
service, but he also believed the general sentiment was probably not far
different from his own.
Should readers have been shocked by what Dover wrote about himself? I
am inclined to agree with Stephen Halliwell, a professor of Greek at St.
Andrews University, who wrote the Guardian obituary on Dover. He
suggested that Dover was unfairly criticized for honestly exploring his life.
Dover embraced the task of giving a frank and full accounting of his
emotions and desires; that some parts of life seemed unbecoming obscured
the broader story of a remarkably accomplished and admirable person.21
Putting aside Dover’s lethal thoughts, it seems natural to find pleasure when
misfortunes happened to people we despise,22 especially if the reason why
we despise them is because they have badly treated us. These misfortunes
are likely to “feel” just—and pleasing.
A few years ago, a friend of mine told me about the firing of a manager
at a big company. For a time, they had worked at the same company. My
friend, as well as many of his co-workers, felt that this man treated them
poorly. He had been unkind to many of them, often humiliating and
bullying them. But finally, he went too far, and the company president
decided to fire him. My friend was decidedly excited about the news—as
were many others. My friend said to me, “I finally get it. You know that
emotion you study, what is it ‘farfegnugen’?23 Well, guess what, I’m feeling
it.” He went on to describe the details with unashamed excitement and
delight. He had a smile on his face as wide as the Cheshire Cat in Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland. It took really disliking (if not hating) someone
for him to recognize his own capacity for schadenfreude.
In Chapter 4, I noted the memoir written by Albert Haas, the French
physician who had survived the German extermination camps.24 One of the
last camps suffered a typhus epidemic. Haas found consolation in the
“apolitical nature of the lice that spread the disease.”25 Although many of
the SS guards who caught it were healthy enough to recover, some did not.
Haas and his friends were “especially pleased when one of the
sharpshooters stationed in the watchtower died of the disease.”26
The life of Malcolm X also provides examples in which the experience
of mistreatment from others can cause pleasure if they suffer. As a Muslim
minister in the Nation of Islam, Malcolm X used his remarkable rhetorical
skills and unique charisma to unsettle the status quo of the 1950s and early
1960s. Perhaps more than anything, he held whites accountable for their
abominable treatment of African Americans. One way he achieved this was
by suggesting that most slaves would have been happy if their masters
suffered. In a speech at Michigan State University in 1962, he contrasted
the “house Negro” with the “field Negro.” The house Negro, because he
lived comparatively better than the field Negro (although he wore the
master’s secondhand clothes and ate leftovers), identified with the master.
The identification was so strong that when the master got sick, he would
say, “What’s the matter boss, we sick?” But the “house Negro” was the
minority. The “field Negroes” made up far greater numbers. How did they
feel when the master got sick? Well, as Malcolm X put it: “[T]hey prayed
that he’d die. If the house caught on fire, they’d pray for the wind to come
along and fan the breeze.”27 The implied schadenfreude hit its mark and
may have unsettled many listeners. Is there much doubt that misfortunes
happening to these slave masters would have seemed well deserved to those
suffering slavery in the fields? The resulting schadenfreude must have been
keen.

REVENGE AND ITS DELIGHTS

When justice is personal, the righting of the wrong can merge most clearly
with the powerful motive of revenge and its resulting gratifications. The
pleasure derived from revenge is complicated, however, by factors creating
ambivalence over this pleasure, at least in the context of present-day
Western culture. An example is the experience of Simon Wiesenthal,
survivor of multiple Nazi concentration camps, who made it his life’s work
after World War II to track down and capture Nazis war criminals.28 His
most celebrated case was the capture of Adolf Eichmann, now infamously
remembered as one of the main planners of the Holocaust. Eichmann had
been hiding in Argentina until a group of Israeli agents snared him as he
was coming home from work in a Buenos Aires suburb, thanks in part to
Wiesenthal’s information gathering. Wiesenthal was associated with other
triumphs as well, including exposing the man who had been responsible for
arresting Anne Frank and her family. Even though he had exceptional just
cause for hunting these men down, he was careful to avoid characterizing
his motive as vengeful. Wiesenthal’s motto, often repeated, was “Justice,
not vengeance.”29
Wiesenthal denied being motivated by revenge. Rather, he wanted to
ensure that people didn’t forget the horrors of the Holocaust.30 He had good
reason for this concern. Not long after the war, much of the world largely
lost interest in pursuing Nazis. As the Cold War struggle took center stage
and became the priority for powerful governments, it became better to use
ex-Nazis for various purposes, such as scientific and espionage work, than
to investigate whether they had committed war crimes.31 There was also the
problem of some people refusing to believe what had happened. Wiesenthal
faced a postwar generation that could conclude that The Diary of Anne
Frank was a fabrication and the death camps were propaganda. Hunting
down Nazis, then, was a way for Wiesenthal to restore and permanently
settle the record by bringing those responsible to justice. He may have
prudently avoided letting it seem as if his motives were personal, to stay
clear of seeming biased, even though he once conceded that he had wanted
revenge, “perhaps … for a short time in the very beginning.”32
Psychologically, however, it is strange to separate justice from revenge.
We feel the urge to take revenge when someone has wronged us.33 We want
the person who has wronged us to suffer “just” as we were made to suffer.
This is the main point of revenge. We feel that the harm was unfair and
unjust. Although though the grievance may sometimes be subjectively
derived through self-serving thinking, the experience of it is saturated with
a sense of injustice even so. Also, regardless of this potential for self-
serving construals, the urge to take revenge, because of its close link with
justice, is made up of a mix of related emotions, including anger, hate,
indignation, and outrage, all focused on the wrongdoer.
Of course, some instances of personal revenge are uncluttered by
ambivalence. Once again, I am reminded of the memoir by French
physician Albert Haas, who managed to survive the circles of hell that was
the system of German death camps. His last camp was Gusen I (the name
itself gives one chills). When word came that the Americans would soon
arrive to liberate the camp, the order was given to destroy the whole camp
with explosives. This was to hide evidence and prevent testimonies. But a
resistance group in the camp had been planning an uprising using stolen
weapons and was ready when the SS officers made their move. Despite
their weakened state, the prisoners had strength in numbers. Haas was
barely lucid from a worsening fever, but with a “gun in his hands” he
“found the strength.”34 He joined the fight. Near the camp gates, he
confronted a frightened SS man who raised his arms, begged not to be shot,
and said, “I didn’t do anything!”35 This was too much for Haas, for, as he
candidly described his own reaction, the SS man’s “blanket denial of any
guilt violently liberated all of the anger I had been storing for so long. I
emptied my gun into him.”36
Evolutionary psychologists conclude that vengeful urges are instinctual.
Acting vengefully in response to harm would have served as a powerful,
adaptive deterrence against future harm.37 Legal scholars like Jeffrie
Murphy agree. Murphy suggests in his book, Getting Even: Forgiveness
and its Limits, that vengeful feelings and the actions that they inspire should
have helped our ancestors defend both themselves and the moral order.38 He
argues that a moral person must have both an intellectual and emotional
reaction to a wrong. It is probably the emotional commitment to insisting on
one’s rights that leads to corrective action. If we feel no outrage over
injustice, we will fail to redress a wrong.39
Murphy also reflects on why revenge has such a bad reputation—and so
can seem decoupled from justice. He notes that in both literature and films,
revenge is so often portrayed in extreme and pathological ways. He gives
the example of the early 19th-century novella Michael Kohlhaas.40 In it, a
man, angered by mistreatment from an official and by the death of his wife
from a beating, goes wild. Before he is through, he sets fire to part of two
towns in efforts to find out where the official is hiding, thereby harming
many innocent people. Murphy points out that this man’s response is
“insanely over the top, and if all revenge was like that then nothing could be
said for it.”41
Examples of excessive vengeance in films come easily to mind, such as
the ending of The Fury, mentioned in Chapter 5. How about Commando,
one of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s early films with a revenge theme?
Schwarzenegger’s daughter in the film is kidnapped by a group of lowlife
criminals, and, in the process of rescuing her, he leaves a path of surplus
mayhem and death. In a hyperbolic moment, he skewers a man with an
exhaust pipe and says, “let off some steam.”42 The inflated features of these
stories are probably part of their appeal. Would they be remembered if the
avenging heroes had been less over the top and more proportional in their
reactions? Revenge need not be out of proportion. But the trouble is that
personal revenge is more likely to be disproportionate to the initial harm.
The poet W. H. Auden summed it up in a definition he gave for justice:
Justice: permission to peck
a wee bit harder
than we have been pecked.43

And so, as the reaction to being wronged loses a sense of proportionality

and seems more rationalized than rational, it is difficult to conclude that
“justice” is being served.
Nonetheless, that the nature of the vengeful motivations can have a
rationalized component does not alter the subjective feel of the related
emotions. Misfortunes suffered by others, when perceived to be deserved,
are pleasing to behold—especially from the vantage point of the person
who feels wronged.
When we look behind extreme acts of violence, vengeful motives are a
frequent cause.44 A desire for revenge can be so powerful that it supplants
any other concerns, even self-preservation. There is unlikely to be a more
powerful human passion than vengeance. The satisfaction of taking revenge
is often correspondingly sweet. In a well-known passage, Geronimo
describes the moment when he and his fellow Apache warriors exulted over
their defeat of the Mexican soldiers who had killed many beloved relatives.
Still covered with the blood of my enemies, still holding my conquering weapon, still hot
with the joy of battle, victory, and vengeance, I was surrounded by the Apache braves and
made war chief of all the Apaches. Then I gave orders for scalping the slain. I could not call
back my loved ones, I could not bring back the dead Apaches, but I could rejoice in this
revenge.45

Geronimo and his people had suffered greatly, and so we interpret his
actions as revenge, not sadism. But it is likely that in cultures in which
revenge is frowned on, enacting it may bring a mixture of both joy and
regret. For example, in Western culture today, as much as we enjoy themes
of revenge in movies and novels, we are admonished against actually taking
revenge ourselves. Legal systems assert their dominion over punishment,
making it illegal to take the law into one’s own hands. In Judeo-Christian
traditions, God reserves the right to take revenge.46 Phrases from the Bible,
such as “Vengeance is mine; I will repay, says the Lord,” are lodged in our
thinking.47
An experiment by Kevin Carlsmith, Tim Wilson, and Dan Gilbert
supports this view about our attitudes toward revenge.48 Undergraduate
participants, in groups of four, thought that they were playing a multiround
computer game with each other. Players were given some initial money that
they could decide to invest in the group or keep for themselves. The
instructions made it clear that investing in the group (cooperating) would
ultimately lead to the greatest overall amount of money, which would be
distributed equally at the end of the game. To stimulate investing, a 40
percent dividend was promised to the group total, to be distributed at the
end of the game. But there was also a temptation to “free ride.” If a single
player decided not to invest in the group, he or she would earn the most
money, and the other players earn less. What was best for the group was for
all participants to invest their money—but there was also a temptation to
act selfishly by keeping one’s money and also receiving a quarter of the
final distribution (which was also made larger by investments from others).
The experimenters programmed the apparent behavior of the others so that
it appeared that one participant ended the game with a series of selfish
choices, even though this participant had urged the other players to
cooperate at first. There was a “punisher” condition in which participants
were allowed to financially penalize any or all of the other players (literally,
“payback”) and then report how they felt. There was also a “forecaster”
condition in which participants completed the game and were asked how
they would feel if they punished this free-rider.
The researchers found that forecasters predicted that retaliation would be
more satisfying than what was actually reported by punishers. This effect
seemed to be explained in part by a measure of how much participants
ruminated over their actions. The measure came 10 minutes after the end of
the game, suggesting that punishers continued to brood over the experience
more than did others. Thus, it appears that people often overestimate how
satisfying revenge will be because they are unaware that their vengeful
actions can cause them “to continue to think about (rather than forget) those
whom they have punished.”49 And so, does revenge work? Because of
rumination, there may be at least one downside. If we go by these
researchers’ results, after people have taken revenge, rumination may cause
increased regret over their vengeful behavior.50
Social psychologist Sung Hee Kim argues that one function of revenge is
to restore self-esteem, diminished by the fact that another person has so
little respect for us that they are willing to harm us. Revenge restores the
balance.51 But by stooping to the wrongdoer’s level, one’s moral superiority
can seem diminished, at least in most modern cultures. And so, unless the
initial harm is extreme or the harmdoer is especially despicable, internalized
norms against taking revenge, guided by culture, may sap the pleasure out
of the vengeful act. No wonder countless Hollywood films show heroes
who hold back from vengeful behavior until so goaded that few viewers
will think less of them. We want our heroes to take revenge, but we want
them to do so from an unimpeachable moral high ground.
The research by Carlsmith and his colleagues nicely highlights our
complex attitudes toward revenge. It also helps us appreciate another
important point about how schadenfreude arises. The strong impress of
cultural norms against revenge means that indirect revenge, the act of
bearing witness, might in fact bring greater pleasure to an individual than
direct revenge. There is a lot to be said, in terms of psychological gain, for
this indirect, “passive” form of outcome. Although one might temper the
outward expression of joy, there is no danger of being browbeaten over
having acted in an uncivilized way. At the same time, the misfortune should
go a long way toward appeasing vengeful feelings. The experiment by
Carlsmith and his colleagues partially supports this idea as well. In an
additional condition, participants witnessed the punishment rather than
enacting it. This produced significantly greater positive feelings than the
“punisher” condition, comparable to another “forecaster” condition in
which participants predicted reactions to witnessing the punishment.
Participants in the “witness” condition also ruminated less. Yes, witnessing
the suffering of someone who has wronged us has a lot going for it over
inflicting the suffering ourselves. It is schadenfreude, guilt-free (and avoids
counter revenge too!).
As I have already noted, some scholars claim that we feel schadenfreude
only when we witness another person’s suffering, not when we bring it
about ourselves.52 Schadenfreude is passive, not active. I think this
demarcation is too neat. A friend of mine grew up in Eastern Kentucky near
the area famous for the feud between the Hatfields and the McCoys. His
grandfather was a Golden Gloves winner as a teen and, even in his late
eighties, is still ornery and ready for a fight. He was just 16 when Pearl
Harbor was attacked, but he lied about his age and enlisted on the spot.
Unluckily, he was one of the many American soldiers captured by the
Japanese in the Philippines when U.S. forces were overrun and defeated
there at the start of the war. He suffered through the Bataan Death March,
so rivetingly chronicled in the book Ghost Soldiers by Hampton Sides.53
During the march, a buddy was decapitated by a Japanese soldier simply
because he was too big and tall, so it seemed. My friend’s grandfather also
endured years of appalling hardship in a POW camp until he and the other
surviving soldiers were rescued toward the war’s end. My friend told me
that his grandfather avoided talking about this experience, but there was one
incident that he didn’t seem to mind telling. He and the other men suffered
backbreaking labor in rock quarries. They were overseen by guards who
treated them cruelly and who were indifferent when a man died from the
labor. The soldiers hated these guards and would find ways to have them
suffer “accidental” deaths themselves. Once, his grandfather was carrying a
large rock and found himself looking over a ledge where a guard was
standing below. He took aim and let the rock fall. It found its target and
crushed the guard’s head, killing him instantly. He would tell the story with
the glee and satisfaction of justice served. It was an invigorating memory of
an event now over 60 years past. I confess that when my friend told it to
me, I smiled a little as I imagined the incident too.
 Were my friend and I the only ones feeling schadenfreude, not his
grandfather, because he dropped the rock, and we did not? The distinction is
far from hard and fast. In any event, I found it difficult to fault my friend’s
grandfather for taking pleasure in the guard’s death. It was not sadistic—he
was not someone who ordinarily found joy in hurting others, nor did he
seek such pleasures.54 The conditions were extraordinary. Going by the
calculus of fairness created by the war, “justice” was served. In my mind’s
eye, as my friend recreated the event for me, and as I saw the big grin on his
face, I seemed to live vicariously his grandfather’s happy satisfaction. I also
felt a whiff of something similar when Albert Haas described how he dealt
with the SS man, noted earlier in this chapter. There seems no question that
misfortunes happening to others who have severely wronged us appeal to
our deep-rooted sense of justice.
In Hamlet, Shakespeare’s timeless revenge drama, Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern are to be the instruments of Hamlet’s death because they carry
sealed instructions for the King of England to have him killed. But Hamlet
intercepts the document, changes the instructions, and directs that the
English King have them killed instead. He feels little compunction because
these two school friends are toadies to his treacherous uncle and are to be
trusted like “adders fang’d.” He anticipates being pleased over the outcome,
“For ’tis the sport to have the engineer hoist with his own petard.”55
Certainly, we expect the playgoer to sense the sport in it too.
 CHAPTER 7

HUMILITAINMENT

I feel the producers really exploited my lack of talent at this time. I looked like an idiot up
there. I want to be good, not something that people will laugh at.
—WILLIAM HUNG1

It has always been a mystery to me how men can feel themselves honored by the
humiliation of their fellow beings.
—MAHATMA GANDHI2

The boys who pull out grasshoppers’ legs and butterflies’ wings, and disembowel every
frog they catch, have no thought at all about the matter.
—WILLIAM JAMES3

In the fall of 2003, William Hung was an obscure college student at the
University of California at Berkeley. Nothing about him foretold the
celebrity status he would achieve by mid-January 2004 as the last auditioner
for the third season of the hugely popular reality TV program American
Idol. He wasn’t much of a singer. He performed his audition song, “She
Bangs,” with an awkwardness that was the furthest contrast to the sexy
original rendition by Ricky Martin. He had a nerdy, toothy look evoking
Mickey Rooney’s regrettable portrayal of a Chinese houseboy in Breakfast
at Tiffany’s—complete with an accent left over from having spent the first
11 years of his life in Hong Kong.4,5 Hung turned out to have an endearing,
good-natured authenticity to him that transcended the entertainment aims of
the show, leading to a wacky run of post-series celebrity fame. But he was
no American Idol.
 Although Hung had no shot at winning the competition, the producers of
the show must have suspected, must have known, that they had in their
hands the kind of comically bad performance that many viewers of the
show would enjoy. Thousands auditioned for the final 12 spots in the Idol
competition. During the preliminary weeks, when the highlights of these
auditions are broadcast, the producers could choose to air only the cream of
this very large crop. But part of the formula for the success of Idol has been
that bad performances and the judges’ sometimes withering critiques are
highlighted as frequently as the talented contestants and the high praise that
they receive. With Hung, the best of the worst was saved for last. His
humiliation, anticipated with teaser clips, was a ratings bonanza.

THE APPEAL OF HUMILIATING THE NAIVE AND

UNTALENTED
Since its first season in 2002, American Idol has been one of the most
highly viewed shows on television. There are many reasons for its
popularity. Without the opportunity to see talented performers emerge from
obscurity and mature over the weeks and to enjoy the guest appearances
from music legends, it would lack the cocktail of ingredients that has made
it so popular. But without the balance of viewing the humiliating as well as
the uplifting, the extraordinary appeal of the show would diminish.
 Humiliation might be one of the worst things to experience.6 It renders a
person’s public self in tatters, defective and inferior. People in such
situations are like marks who are socially dead and who, as sociologist
Erving Goffman wrote, “are sorted but not segregated, and continue to walk
among the living.”7
How could it be pleasing to witness such social pain? One explanation
may be in the social comparison implications for the viewer. As I
underlined in Chapters 1 and 2, any downward comparison, which is partly
what another person’s humiliation implies, can mix pleasure with sympathy.
Certainly, for most people, watching William Hung performing so poorly
on the screen created no danger of experiencing a deflating “upward
comparison” with someone superior to them. On any visible dimension of
comparison, even the most ordinary viewers would have felt no threat to
their own relative judgment of themselves. On the contrary, most people
could conclude that they were better looking, more talented, more self-
aware—more cool—than Hung. Some non-Asians might have found
satisfaction in having certain stereotypes of Asians supported, especially if
they had felt their own self-worth threatened by this successful minority
group. Over time, Hung showed many admirable qualities. His authenticity
was beguiling. But, at his audition, just about anyone could have felt
superior by contemplating the absurd idea that someone of Hung’s
appearance and talents could imagine advancing to the next level of
competition, much less winning.
Why aren’t the pleasures of feeling superior supplanted by the pain of
witnessing humiliation? While Hung performed, viewers saw sequences of
the judges’ mockery. One judge, Randy Jackson, placed a handkerchief
over his face to hide his reaction. Paula Abdul, usually soft-hearted, was
unable to suppress her outward amusement; she laughed uncontrollably.
The third judge, Simon Cowell, characteristically felt no need to hide his
ridicule and soon stopped the performance before Hung had finished the
song. “You can’t sing, you can’t dance, so what do you want me to say?”8
Painful for Hung, clearly, but not for many viewers. In fact, the judges’
mockery was a large part of the fun. Their reactions seemed irrepressible—
a natural response to the performance. Here were three experts clearly
enjoying themselves—approving similar pleasure in viewers.
Other features of Idol also help promote amusement over empathy.
Auditioners perform voluntarily. No one forces them to audition. If
someone has the naive boldness to think he could be the next American
Idol, why should he receive our pity if his performance is embarrassing and
receives ridicule? And when contestants become hostile in response to
pretty accurate feedback, as many do, they deserve their humiliation all the
more. As I underscored in Chapters 5 and 6, the deservingness of a
misfortune is a sure path to creating schadenfreude. The modest and lovable
manner of William Hung was atypical of poor performers selected to be
aired. Hung’s response to Simon Cowell’s critique was, “Um, I already
gave my best, and I have no regrets at all.”9 This response, so humble and
uncoached, was surely one reason why Hung was eventually embraced by
viewers and why he enjoyed more than his 15 minutes of fame. Indeed, he
benefited financially from his anti-Idol persona. More typical was the
behavior of another contestant from the preliminary rounds, Alexis Cohen,
who delivered a barrage of vulgar expletives and gestures in response to
Simon Cowell’s critique of her performance. Cameras followed her
progress out of the audition room and building as she continued her crude
outbursts. At some level, this was also “fun” to watch. It added to the
perception of her “inferiority” and upheld the deservingness of her
humiliation.
American Idol is just one example of a prominent theme in reality TV in
which humiliation is the marquee ingredient. According to analysis by
media scholar Amber Watts, there has been an increase in the number of
programs (such as Survivor, Big Brother, America’s Next Top Model, Jersey
Shore) that use real-life formats to exploit the many ways that people can be
humiliated as a lure for pleasing viewers.10 They are on tap 24/7, as is
obvious to anyone who watches a small sample of television fare. A content
analysis conducted by other media scholars, Sara Booker and Brad Waite,
revealed that the most popular reality TV shows contained more
humiliation than scripted dramas did. They coined the term
“humilitainment” to label the trend.11
When it comes to exploiting the entertainment value of humiliation,
American Idol is actually tame. It has counternarratives of success
attributed to hard work and sometimes goosebumps-raising performances.
Moreover, some auditioners seem eager to trade public humiliation for
short-lived fame. Other programs use especially intense humiliation as their
main hook.
 I caught a memorable episode of the short-lived show called Howie Do
It.12Hosted by comedian Howie Mandel, it was a kind of amplified Candid
Camera, as its core element was to show people humiliating themselves in
an array of extreme situations. The show’s Web site unashamedly
summarized the goals of the show:
During each episode, the unsuspecting “marks” will think they are the stars of a new game
show or reality show, or that they are auditioning for a big Hollywood movie or television
role. What they don’t realize is, they ARE the stars, but in the most unexpected and
entertaining way, in front of millions of people on TV.13

One segment of the episode involved a young man taking part in a

campy Japanese-style game show. The game required that he shock a fellow
teammate at doubling levels each time he, himself, missed a general
knowledge question. His teammate was actually hired by the show and was
instructed to pretend to feel the shocks. The producers rigged things so that
at the third missed question, the teammate screamed in pain as the electrical
current hissed, smoked, and crackled. He then appeared to lose
consciousness and stop breathing. Quick CPR by two paramedics got him
breathing again but not before the young man concluded for a brief moment
that he had killed his teammate.
Viewers see this replayed on a large screen to a live audience who know
what was actually going on and laugh along. Mandel provided a running
commentary designed to heighten the laughs. Adding to the humiliation,
“contestants” wore skintight suits resembling long underwear and silly red
caps. Of course, the young man was extremely upset to think that he had
almost killed his teammate, but the studio audience howled with laughter
and clapped their approval.
The young man was soon told that his teammate was actually just fine
and that he had been part of a big joke. This knowledge hardly soothed him.
This “mark” was not easily cooled. He yelled, “You cruel sons of
bitches!!!!” How did Mandel respond to this outburst? He looked at the
viewing audience and admitted, “We’re cruel, but we’re funny.”14 We can
admire Mandel’s honesty, but, to paraphrase George Orwell as he recalled
the humiliations he suffered as a boy in a British boarding school—such,
such are the joys.15
 HUMILITAINMENT FINDS A HOME ON THE SEAMY
SIDE: TO CATCH A PREDATOR
Perhaps the most extreme example of popular programs using intense
humiliation as their main draw is To Catch a Predator. It ceased to produce
new episodes in 2008 but lives on as of this writing in reruns and specials,
such as Predator Raw. Each episode involves a sting operation designed to
catch a series of men who appear intent on having sexual relations with a
minor, leading up to an ignominious turnaround in every case when each
man is told that his recorded exposure will be aired on national TV. This
show, its value in alerting the public to the problem of online predators
notwithstanding, may just be the consummate example of how far television
can go to use humiliation as the key attraction. Its features provide insights
into why this type of show can also supply opportunities for schadenfreude.
It is worth a full look.
 The producers of Predator work with a private watchdog organization to
pull off these stings. Staff members create fake, underage decoys who post
their identities on chat lines. Early in the chats, the decoys use photos to
suggest that they are underage and make false statements that their ages
range from 12 to 15. The decoys refrain from initiating sexual content, but
once this line has been crossed by a man, they vigorously begin exploring
sexual themes in any direction that can seem credible. The decoy will
encourage a meeting. If the man agrees to meet, a site is selected, usually a
suburban house, arranged by a phone call with the decoy. These men turn
out to be easy marks. “The result? Fish in a barrel, every time,” as Jesse
Wegman of the Huffington Post summed it up.16
The site for the meeting has been rigged inside and out with as many as
17 hidden cameras and microphones. A young-looking actress, made to
look like the girl or boy the man is expecting to meet, greets the man and
invites him into a patio area or inside the house, typically the kitchen. After
a brief conversation that ends with the decoy stepping out of the room for a
moment, the man is surprised by the host of the show, Chris Hansen—who
enters usually through the door that the decoy has just exited. Often,
Hansen begins his conversation in an ironic way, as if his surprise presence
is part of an expected flow of events. “What’s going on?” he might say. Or,
if the man has brought some food and drink for the anticipated meeting,
Hansen might say, “Going to have some fun?” Hansen asks the man to take
a seat, a request that is usually obeyed instantly, and then he begins
questioning the man’s reasons for being in the house. Viewers already know
some basic details of the online conversation, and when the man almost
invariably lies about his intentions, viewers follow along as Hansen
confronts the lies. Hansen typically holds a copy of what appears to be the
full transcript of the online chat the man has had with the decoy. He will
read passages from the transcript that seem to contradict the man’s claims
while viewers watch the man hesitating and squirming as he tries to
reconcile the transcript statements with his current claims. Once Hansen
seems satisfied the conversation has run its course, he announces who he is
and why he’s there, using variants of this phrase:
“I have to tell you that I am Chris Hansen with Dateline NBC and we are doing a story about
computer predators/adults who try to meet teens online for sex.”17
 As Hansen reveals his identity, two Dateline employees with large,
shoulder-held TV cameras and others holding long boom mikes emerge
through entryways and angle for close views of how these men react. Of
course, these men have already grasped that things are not going according
to plan. Most realize that they are in big trouble. Some even recognize
Hansen from earlier episodes of the show. But it is when Hansen makes his
announcement and the cameras appear that the full enormity of what is
coming down usually hits them. Some men immediately try to exit the
room, covering their faces with their hands or by pulling up their shirts.
Some collapse to the floor. When a man makes it outside, he finds himself
surrounded by a group of police officers with guns raised, shrieking
commands, who usually shove the man to the ground, handcuff him from
the back, and then lead him away to certain arrest and arraignment. These
men—instant pariahs—are surely near the bottom of fortune’s wheel. With
their reputations obliterated, they have, to borrow from Shakespeare, lost
the immortal part of themselves, and what remains is bestial.18
While it aired new episodes, the show was a dependable sweeps-week
draw for NBC. The reruns, some in more elaborated and less edited
formats, continue to attract audiences. Chris Hansen has become an icon
and a go-to expert on online predatory behavior—even testifying before
Congress on the issue. The show is so well known that some of its repeated
features have become part of popular culture, most notably the point in each
exchange when the men realize they are to be humiliated on national TV,
their lives wrecked in the most public of ways. The phrase, “I am Chris
Hansen” is now recognized to the point of frequent parody, appearing in
some form in shows ranging from The Simpsons to 30 Rock.19

WHY IS PREDATOR SO ENTERTAINING?

As Steven Winn of Slate Magazine put it so aptly, the show has a “queasily
transfixing” appeal.20 There are a number of reasons why. Clearly, some
viewers enjoy learning about the dirty secrets of others. On the grand stage
of the 21st-century public square, the show is gossip writ large. There is
certainly a pornographic element in the details of the online chats between
the men and the decoys.21 Little is left to the imagination. And because this
material is presented in the context of what appears to be a highly deserved
sting, many viewers can obscure their awareness of any voyeuristic and
pornographic gratifications by being distracted by righteous disgust. Again,
as I stressed in Chapters 5 and 6, deserved misfortunes create a direct route
to schadenfreude. But, as with the appeal of watching William Hung and
the other less talented American Idol contestants, we also know that a big
part of the comic pleasure likely results from the satisfaction of downward
comparisons, spiked with humiliation. And Predator seems to take this
satisfaction to another level. How else could Jimmy Kimmel say this when
introducing Chris Hansen as a guest for his late night TV show?
Our next guest is host of the funniest comedy on television. It’s called To Catch a Predator.
… If you’ve never seen it, it’s like Punk’d for pedophiles. It’s a great show. … Please say
hello to Chris Hansen.22

Predator may help us feel better about ourselves, but this is through
another person’s extreme humiliation. How is it that the producers of
Predator are able to get away with humiliating someone so mercilessly on
national TV, let alone serving up almost wall-to-wall opportunities for raw
voyeuristic and pornographic fulfillment? How is it that they can trust that
most people will find it agreeable to see these men brought down so low
and exposed in such a vulgar, grubby glare—without being troubled by
guilt?

THE LOWEST OF THE LOW

The title of the show tells us a lot. Viewers watch with the operating
assumption that the men who appear are “predators”—classified into a
squalid category of humanity from the start. There are few labels held with
deeper disgust, fear, and contempt than a “sexual predator” or “pedophile,”
even though the actual category of behavior is broad and ranges in degree
and in cure.23 Taking sexual advantage of a child ranks at or near the top of
most cultures’ lists of immoral behaviors. It is not only repugnant, but it
also suggests an unalterable defect, a moral leprosy, a placing of the person
outside the circle of humanity. Even among criminals, molesting a child is
usually regarded with a singular disgust and probably boosts the self-esteem
of the average inmate—“Yes, I killed a man, but I’m no pedophile.”24 Sex
offenders are at special risk for physical assault in prison as a result. Unlike
even felons convicted of violent crimes, those convicted of child
molestation are put on criminal registries and Web sites. Letters are sent out
to neighbors when they move into a neighborhood, and they are often
unable to live within 1,000 feet of schools.
Predator does nothing to alter these perceptions. Douglas McCollam, an
attorney and contributing writer for Columbia Journalism Review, argues
that the label “predator” alone creates immediate images in many viewers’
minds of a “drooling, trench-coated sex fiend hanging out at the local
playground with a bag full of candy.”25 Because of high-profile examples of
child abductions, such as the Polly Klaas case, people’s fears are easily
roused.26 These understandable worries grant the show considerable
leeway. There seems little need to treat such people with the basic respect
owed to human beings. Not only do they deserve humiliation, but they must
be caught and then humiliated as a way of deterring this vile behavior. This
must help explain why viewers find the humiliation of these men so
pleasing—and entertaining. After all, these men, these predators, showed
up with the clear intent to have sexual contact with young girls or boys.
Where is the defense for this? Humiliation is a just start of their
punishment, a fitting prelude to a jail sentence.
Gone are the days of public hangings, stocks, and pillories. Modern
sensibilities lead us to resist the idea that we could deliberately take
pleasure in seeing others humiliated—as least as official policy.27 Yet these
sensibilities seem to remain inert in the case of people who molest children.
This means that the producers of Predator have an effective firewall against
easy criticism when the show humiliates these men, clearing all involved
from guilty feelings for participating in this process. The crystalline sense
of deservingness creates a clear path to schadenfreude free of moral clutter.
It is hard to overstate the contempt most people have for those who
molest children. It is so deep and reflexive that showing any sympathy for
these men risks contaminating the defender with a nasty stench. I feel this
risk keenly. I have read many commentaries on Predator, and no writer fails
to include a phrase emphasizing disgust over the category of behavior
linked with these men, lest even implied criticism of those involved with
the show be misconstrued. McCollam raises credible concerns about the
ethics of the show, but even he notes, “Let’s concede up front that this is an
unsympathetic bunch of would-be perverts.”28 Truly, “predators” are a
reviled category of humanity—the idea of viewing them in less than
damning terms has potentially tainting effects on one who would do so.
 AN EASY STACKING OF THE DECK
Even if viewers are inclined to doubt the full deservingness of the
humiliations, the show does little to further these inclinations. Although it
may seem that the evidence against these men is being provided in a fair
and objective fashion, in fact, viewers get only an edited version of the
online chat and of the interaction between Hansen and the men. The
average episode contains about 10 interactions. Some of the chats extended
for days; others for less than an hour. At best, viewers learn only a few
exchanged lines of dialogue, and many of those selected are sexually
charged. Dateline claims that the men always initiate the sexual material
and suggest the initial meeting, but the development of this stage is rarely
laid out in full. There is little room for fine distinctions here, and viewers
have to trust the producers in these and other matters. And there is little in
how the program evolves that disrupts this structure and causes one to
distrust the narrative themes. The chat conversations, when they are
described, are often typed on the screen as if they are happening live. These
recreations may exaggerate the implications of the written content and
heighten their effects on viewers. The material selected is usually so
disgusting (and “titillating”) and incriminating on the face of it that
anything else that might have been said that might allow viewers to see the
men in a more positive light seems beside the point. Furthermore, Hansen
always has a big ace up his sleeve: No matter what the apparent extenuating
circumstances might be, no matter what excuses the men might have, the
plain fact is that they showed up at a place expecting to have some sort of
sexual contact with an underage person. There seems no cause to be
distracted by trivial details that suggest a more nuanced view of the
“predator’s” intentions, responsibility, and blameworthiness.
Hansen has a huge advantage over these men as he steps into the room.
Hansen knows what their apparent intentions are, as do viewers, and these
men do not know that he knows (and they surely do not know that a national
audience will also know). Hansen uses this advantage to make these men
look foolish, ridiculous, or worse—dialing up the humiliation and the
schadenfreude.
There are many deft touches enhanced by the editing process that add to
the potential for schadenfreude. One case involved a prominent doctor who
carried himself in a refined way compared with most of the other men. The
sting in this case was situated in the backyard patio of a house in a suburban
neighborhood. The decoy appeared to have made a pitcher of crushed ice
lemonade, and she suggested that he pour her a drink while she went to
change clothes. As he slanted the pitcher, the ice held for a moment and
then avalanched down, overloading the glass and splattering. The man tried
to maintain his cool. This small comic moment at the doctor’s expense
added entertainment value to the bigger drama that began when the doctor
looked around for a towel, only to spot Dateline’s camera crew. He
immediately turned, put on his sunglasses in a feckless instinctive move to
hide his identity, and raced out of the patio. When he got to the driveway of
the house, three police officers swarmed, guns drawn in his direction,
directing him to the ground. He was pushed to the cement pavement and
handcuffed behind his back.29
It was an extraordinary sequence with few unrecorded moments. In
addition to the police officers, other people also came into view. One man
held a large TV camera over his shoulder and moved within a few feet to
the doctor’s right. A second man moved in from the right. Why these extra
cameras? After all, there were fixed, hidden cameras already covering every
square inch of space (as the editing shows). Might not these added cameras
cause viewers to start wondering whether law enforcement is getting too
cozy with the entertainment goals of Dateline? However, if the point of the
show and secret of its appeal are to humiliate for entertainment purposes,
the host of cameras amplifies the sense of excruciating humiliation. With
the next edited shot, there was a close-up of the doctor’s reactions (some
moments after he had been allowed to get back on his feet). This shot
showed him protesting, “I wasn’t doing anything … oh man, I wasn’t doing
anything!” From about two feet away, there was a shot of his face as he
seems to be half crying. Then, there was a series of edited moments taking
viewers through the process of the doctor being questioned by police.
Hansen’s voice provided steady commentary, at once clinically detached
(“The police ask routine, personal questions but the doctor appears
distracted”), sometimes expressing disbelief (“It’s hard to believe that
someone of his stature would show up to meet a girl who said she was 13”),
always with an air of moral superiority free of qualms about the tactics
being used.30
Hansen appears well insulated from doubts about the appropriateness of
the tactics employed by the show. In an informative 2007 book he wrote
about Predator, he described many of his interactions with these men. He
stated that it was important not to go “overboard” but granted the
“prosecutorial” tone that he sometimes used. Although there were “some
sad cases that come knocking on our door,”31 he emphasized the
manipulative features of the men’s actions, the offensive aspects of their
chats, the fact that they made the initial contact, the intent of their actions,
and the overall threat they pose for society. With these and other arguments
in mind, he admitted that none of the many exchanges inspired in him any
strong sympathy.32

THE GRATIFICATIONS OF HIGH STATUS AND

REVENGE
Social science research on why people watch reality TV generally fits with
why certain content appears in programs such as American Idol and
Predator. Media researchers Steven Reiss and James Wiltz argue that
people will watch TV, or any stimulus, to satisfy basic motives and desires.
In one study, Reiss and Wiltz examined the free-time activities of a large
group of people. Participants indicated how much they enjoyed different
types of travel, sports, and music, as well as various popular reality TV
programs. They also completed a personality measure tapping 16 basic
desires and their associated joys when these desires are fulfilled. Two
motives were most clearly associated with reality TV viewing. The
strongest of these two was status, or, as Reiss and Wiltz define it, a “desire
for prestige” with the associated joy of “self-importance.” The next
strongest was vengeance, a “desire to get even” with the associated joy of
“vindication.” The greater the number of reality TV shows viewed and
liked, the more important these two desires.33
Both American Idol and Predator invite viewers to feel good about their
relative status and hence their sense of importance. With Idol, William
Hung was given screen time more because of his inferiority rather than his
talent. With Predator, the men profiled are already near the lowest of the
low, but the show is structured to bring them down further still. As Dan
Snierson and Josh Wolk of Entertainment Weekly commented bluntly, “Do
we watch reality television for precious insight into the human condition?
Please. We watch for those awkward scenes that make us feel a smidge
better about our own little unfilmed lives.”34
What about vengeance? In both programs, and more so with Predator,
participants “deserve” their humiliations. With Idol, these humiliated
contestants are considered fools to think they could win. No one is forcing
them to audition. With Predator, what else do these perverted men deserve
but crushing humiliation—and, of course, jail time? They receive what they
deserve.
In some ways, shows like Predator really do harken back to times when
humiliation was a more general punishment of choice for many cultures.35
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter is a work of fiction, but it
captures the spirit of the Puritans who believed that punishment should be
humiliating.36 Until the 19th century, stocks and pillories served as a public
punishment instead of imprisonment. The convicted were sentenced to
stand in public sites, such as village greens, that people frequented. It was
common for people to make fun of victims and throw all manner of things
at them, from rotten food to dead animals. The pillory was a favorite
because the victim’s face was immobilized, along with his or her hands.
Sometimes the ears were nailed to the wood to prevent the face from
moving. For many onlookers, it must have been a feasting time for
schadenfreude.37
Are some segments of television programming today serving a similar
role? Predator educates viewers about a potential societal threat, but
compelling entertainment seems to drive many of the choices that the
producers make. The gratifications of humiliation and resulting guilt-free
schadenfreude are a potent draw. Deserved humiliation and anticipated
schadenfreude seem to be the formula for the show’s success, and the
decisions appear made to swell the gratifying effects of this pairing.
The producers of Predator (as well as American Idol and so many other
reality TV shows) know there is a line that they must avoid crossing. They
may test the limits of humiliation, but they surely wish to avoid the chance
that schadenfreude is replaced by outrage over the treatment of these men, a
decline in viewing, and the withdrawal of advertising dollars. The
continued reruns of Predator suggest that this line has not been crossed,
even though no new shows have been produced since the 2008 episode in
which a Texas man committed suicide rather than face arrest and public
humiliation. Hansen has achieved cool celebrity status and is respected
enough to testify before Congress on the problems of online sexual
predators, despite using humiliation as a catapult to these achievements.
This suggests that it is these men who have been effectively demonized
rather than the show itself.
I admit, however, that watching Hansen orchestrate the humiliations on
Predator is disturbing—even as I will also admit that he and his production
team have created a show that captivates irresistibly. I find myself at once
entertained, spellbound, and more than a little sullied. I am reminded of the
ratings-hungry reporter, Richard “Dick” Thornburg, in the Die Hard films.
He’s the one who gets punched in the nose by Detective John McClane’s
wife, Holly, in the first movie and tasered toward the end of the second. The
reporter, played perfectly by the actor William Atherton, is a caricature of
the type, and yet he seems hardly exaggerated. In the first movie, when part
of an office building explodes, Thornburg witnesses the explosion but
doesn’t know yet whether his camera man had his camera running:
THORNBURG: My God, tell me you got that.
CAMERAMAN: I got it, I got it!!
THORNBURG: Eat your heart out, Channel Five!38

For Thornburg, it is all about getting the sensational story. He claims that
he is a crusader for the public’s “right to know,” but he will do just about
anything to get the salacious scoop. If this means humiliating people on TV,
so be it. Ironically, after Holly hits him on the nose, he gets a restraining
order against her—because “that woman assaulted me and she humiliated
me in public.”39 This was a brilliant touch.
The cut-throat demand for high TV ratings in the increasingly complex,
competitive world of TV programming probably creates strong pressure to
go for the entertainment jugular rather than for sensation-free edification.
The gratifications of witnessing seemingly deserved humiliation—and the
resulting schadenfreude—must be hard to resist exploiting under these
intensely competitive conditions. At the same time, should we encourage
programs such as Predator? The exposing of a societal problem and its
prevention are the ostensible goals of the show, although Hansen also
admits his desire to produce absorbing television. It is not at all clear that
the show uncovers a behavior that is as much a problem as the episodes
suggest.40 Many experts claim that most sexual abuse of children occurs in
the family or among people who know each other.41 How likely is it that the
majority of men who show up at the sites would have done so without the
ambitious tactics of the decoys? How much do we learn about the nature of
online sexual deviancy from this show? Does Predator create a false
impression of the problem, stirring unwarranted fears, creating events rather
than reporting on them, and inappropriately demonizing some individuals
rather than helping the public understand the general problem of deviant
sexual behavior?
Most of all, should a civilized society sanction the humiliation of people
—regardless of what they appear to have done? Should we encourage
shows that rely so much on the gratifications of this form of guilt-free
schadenfreude? Make no mistake about it: Hansen inflicts extreme
humiliation on these men. Although it is easy to conclude that they deserve
it, there is huge collateral damage done to the families of these men,
innocent people who must deal with the shame and embarrassment of the
aftermath long after Predator moves on. Whether Hansen and the show’s
producers (and viewers) should feel sympathy for these men is a complex
moral question. Is Predator a bold, groundbreaking work of investigative
television or, to use Jesse Wegman’s words again, a “theater of cheap
morality, wrapped in an orgy of self-righteousness”?42 You be the judge.
 CHAPTER 8

THERE’S SOMETHING ABOUT ENVY

The man who is delighted by others’ misfortunes is identical with the man who envies
others’ prosperity. For anyone who is pained by the occurrence or existence of a given
thing must be pleased by that thing’s non-existence or destruction.
—ARISTOTLE1

Envy … is hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he is sad at the good fortune of
another person and is glad when any evil happens to him.
—BARUCH SPINOZA2

Homer: Oh, come on, Lisa. I’m just glad to see him fall flat on his butt! He’s usually all
happy and comfortable, and surrounded by loved ones, and it makes me feel … what’s the
opposite of that shameful joy thing of yours?
Lisa: Sour grapes.
Homer: Boy, those Germans have a word for everything!
—THE SIMPSONS3

Koreans have a phrase, “When my cousin buys a rice paddy, my stomach

twists.” This captures well the pain of envy and helps explain why a
misfortune that brings an envied person down can yield emotional pay dirt
in the form of schadenfreude. Envy is the familiar blend of painful
discontent, ill will, and resentment that can result from noticing another
person enjoying something that you desire but seem unable to obtain. But
when a misfortune befalls the envied person, the negative comparison drops
away, bringing relief and joy. Contemplating it “untwists” the stomach. The
misfortune may even provide hope for the future by hobbling the
competition.
 Envy is a universal human emotion. It is natural to feel envy when we
lose out to someone else and must continue to gaze on the envied person
now enjoying the desired thing.4 As I underscored in Chapters 1 and 2,
social comparisons matter, and envy is a special testimony to this fact. It
matters when a person you love chooses someone else who is better looking
and more talented than you. It matters when you aspire to compose great
music but fail—in contrast to a friend who receives high praise for his
recent composition. Most people can identify with the character of Salieri in
the film Amadeus. Salieri, although accomplished in his own right, is
rendered mediocre by Mozart’s effortless genius. Perhaps there is no better
capturing of envy than the scene in the film where F. Murray Abraham (as
Salieri) looks up in pain while sight-reading the miraculous notes on the
originals of Mozart’s sheet music.5
Social psychologist and neuroscientist Susan Fiske, whose book, Envy
Up, Scorn Down: How Status Divides Us, I referred to in Chapter 1,
summarizes the neuroscientific evidence on envy and suggests a consistent
pattern of brain activation when people feel envy.6 People responding to
envied targets show brain activation in the amygdala, an area of the brain
associated with reactions to something emotionally important to us, whether
good or bad.7 The amygdala appears necessary for the instant evaluation of
another person who is superior to us in an important way. Another part of
the brain linked with envy is the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Fiske
suggests that the ACC is important for envy as a “discrepancy detector.”8 In
a sense, we cannot feel envy unless we detect a difference between
ourselves and another (superior) person. A third part of the brain associated
with envy is the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), an area that activates
when we try to understand what another person is thinking and feeling.9
This seems especially important to do when confronted with an envied
person who may control things we desire and whose presence matters to us
more than does the presence of people with lower status.10 In sum, as one
would expect with a blended emotion such as envy, brain activation is
complex. But there seems to be a signature pattern of brain activation in
envy that reflects our recognition that someone has something important
that we do not have and that requires our keen attention if we are to do
something about it.
Throughout this book, I have highlighted the personal benefits that result
from downward comparisons. I have argued that just about any misfortune
befalling another person, from a social comparison perspective, is a
potential boost to self-esteem. Where such misfortunes reside, opportunity
knocks. If any misfortune suffered by another person has the potential to
yield benefit, a misfortune befalling an envied person is a windfall.11 Since
envy thrives best in competitive circumstances, the gain from the
misfortune will often be direct and palpable. Also, if we envy someone, by
definition, the dimension of comparison is important to us, thus adding
greater value to what the misfortune brings. An extra bonus is that the
misfortune eliminates the painful feeling of envy—no small thing. It is
transformational: inferiority and its unpleasantness become superiority and
its joys. A painful upward comparison, in an instant, becomes a pleasing
downward comparison. What a turnaround! The late American novelist and
curmudgeon Gore Vidal famously confessed, “Every time a friend
succeeds, I die a little.”12 If this can be true, then the reverse can also be
true: “Every time a friend fails, I am more alive.”
Mark Twain, in his autobiography Life on the Mississippi, describes a
boyhood event in Hannibal, Missouri, that illustrates the joys of seeing an
envied person fall. In his retelling, Twain notes that every boy in Hannibal,
Twain heading the list, wanted to be a riverboat pilot and wanted it badly.
One boy had the job that they craved. He also knew more than they did
about everything that mattered, and he pulled it off with the kind of style
that had the girls riveted. Twain’s and his friends’ hostile envy was about as
intense as one sees it—and great was the schadenfreude when the boy
suffered a misfortune on his riverboat. Twain described the feeling: “When
his boat blew up at last, it diffused a tranquil contentment among us such as
we had not known for months.”13
Novelist Walker Percy also captures the easy path from envy to
schadenfreude in his eccentric self-help book, Lost in the Cosmos:14
Your neighbor comes out to get his paper. You look at him sympathetically. You know he
has been having severe chest pains and is facing coronary bypass surgery. But he is not
acting like a cardiac patient this morning. Over he jogs in his sweat pants, all smiles. He has
triple good news. His chest ailment turns out to be hiatal hernia, not serious. He’s got a
promotion and is moving to Greenwich [CT], where he can keep his boat in the water rather
than on a trailer.

“Great, Charlie! I’m really happy for you.”

Are you happy for him?15

No, Percy argues. For the “envious self,” this kind of news is hardly
cheering. He asks the question, “how much good news about Charlie can
you tolerate without compensatory catastrophes …?”16 It is as if something
unfortunate happening to Charlie is the only possible cure for the envy and
unease that his good news is actually causing in you. What are the chances
that your own fortunes will change? Also, is there a morally acceptable or
doable way to bring Charlie down? Percy bets that if you find out later that
the promotion failed to come through, this would not be bad news at all—
although you may try to deny, suppress, or hide the joy the news brings.

WHAT IS THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE LINKING ENVY

WITH SCHADENFREUDE?
Cognitive psychologist Terry Turner and I were part of a group of
researchers who collaborated on an experiment testing a connection
between envy and schadenfreude.17 We first evoked envy in our
undergraduate participants by showing them a videotaped interview with a
student who had plans to attend medical school. We hired an actor to play
the role of either a superior (enviable) student or an average (unenviable)
student (eventually, we let the participants in on our deception). As he
discussed his academic and extracurricular activities, we added scenes in
which he was engaging in these activities. In the envy version, we showed
him working away on his organic chemistry homework, peering through a
microscope in a cutting-edge biology lab, and walking across Harvard Yard
on his way to a summer class that should help him get into Harvard Medical
School. We also included a scene showing him entering an expensive condo
that his father had bought for him while he was in school, driving a BMW,
and cooking a meal with an attractive girlfriend. In the average version, we
showed him struggling with his homework and washing test tubes in a
biology lab. We also showed him entering an unappealing high-rise dorm,
riding crowded public transportation, and eating pizza with an average-
looking female acquaintance. Toward the end of each version, we paused
the tape for a minute and asked participants to complete a mood
questionnaire. Some of the items measured envy. Then, an epilogue
appeared on the screen to update the participants about what had happened
to the student since the interview. This was where we inserted a misfortune.
The epilogue noted that the student had been arrested for stealing
amphetamines from the lab where he worked and thus had been forced to
delay plans for medical school. A second questionnaire contained items
tapping pleased reactions (such as “happy over what happened to the
student since the interview”), camouflaged by other items designed to
distract the participants from our actual focus.
As we expected, participants felt more schadenfreude when the enviable
student suffered than when the average student suffered. Even more telling,
any envy reported after the initial pause in the video “explained” much of
this effect. Participants who actually reported feeling envy while watching
the first part of the interview were most likely to find the later misfortune
pleasing. Also, participants who reported higher scores on a personality
measure of envy completed before viewing the interview (i.e., “envious
types”) were more likely to find the misfortune pleasing.
 Research using brain-scan technology also supports the links between
envy and pleasure—if the envied person suffers.18 A Japanese team of
researchers monitored the brain activity of people as they imagined
themselves in scenarios in which another person was of either higher or
lower status. Imagining envy activated the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
an area of the brain also associated with experiencing physical pain. The
participants were then asked to picture this other person suffering various
forms of misfortune, from financial trouble to physical illness. This
produced greater brain activity in a different brain region, the striatum, a
pleasure or reward center. This pattern of activation was particularly true
for those participants who had reported the most envy at first. The lead
researcher, Hidehiko Takahashi, summed up the results using the Japanese
phrase translated as: “The misfortunes of others are the taste of honey.”19 A
Korean might add: Especially if the stomach has been twisting because of
envy.

ENVY AND HOSTILITY

Envy is a blend of ingredients, each of which helps explain why it should be
so closely connected to schadenfreude. Twain’s account highlighted the
envied boy’s superiority, and envy indeed contains feelings of inferiority.
But without accompanying hostility, the schadenfreude produced by the
boat exploding would hardly have been so gratifying. People do not feel
warmly toward those whom they envy. In fact, hostility may just be the
feature of envy that distinguishes it from other unpleasant reactions to
another person’s superiority, such as discontent alone.20 One can readily see
this in Twain’s account. The envy that he and his friends felt is far from
benign. The hostility in their envy clearly contributed to why the explosion
caused such contentment.21
There is something distinctive about envious hostility. People feeling
envy are willing to take a loss themselves, as long as it also means that the
envied person will suffer to the same or greater relative degree.22 This can
seem self-defeating, unless one realizes that, to the envious, the pleasure of
gaining in an absolute sense is often insufficient compensation for the pain
produced by witnessing the envied person’s relative advantage.
It is no surprise that envy is usually a hostile emotion. Envy is triggered
by noticing a desired attribute enjoyed by another person, but it is largely a
frustrated desire.23 Imagine the experience of noticing and wanting another
person’s advantage, all the while knowing that one could easily obtain the
advantage eventually. Perhaps there would be a brief feeling of discontent,
but this would go away quickly when the path to acquiring the advantage
was clear. This is a type of envy, but it is benign in nature.24 The experience
would also be quite different if the prospect of obtaining the advantage were
naught. The comparison itself may seem irrelevant. We envy people who
are similar to ourselves, except that they have something that we dearly
want but lack. The similarity allows us to imagine the possibility of our
having the longed for thing, even if we know that our desires are likely to
be frustrated. When we envy in a hostile way, we have the tantalizing sense
of what it might be like to obtain what we want—we can almost taste it—
but we feel unable to realize this desire. The frustration of any keen desire,
the blocking of an important goal, is a dependable recipe for anger and
hostility—and will often trigger schadenfreude if the person causing the
frustration suffers.

THE TABLOIDS AND THEIR APPEAL

The editors of popular tabloid magazines such as The National Enquirer
would appreciate the observations of Edmund Burke, the 18th-century
philosopher and statesman. He suggested that theatergoers anticipating a
tragic performance on the stage would quickly lose interest and empty
themselves from the theater if they heard that a criminal was just about to
be executed outside in a nearby square.25 Burke believed that people have
“a degree of delight, and that no small one, in the real misfortunes and pains
of others.”26 Moreover, in his view, real misfortune probably trumps the
“imitative arts” every time.
Some have taken this way of thinking even further. In their recent
biography of Mao Tse-tung, Mao: The Unknown Story, Jung Chang and Jon
Halliday make a persuasive case that Mao was someone who took a special
joy “in upheaval and destruction.”27 But Mao also believed that he was not
alone in this preference. For instance, he claimed that most people would
choose war over perpetual harmony:
Long-lasting peace is unendurable to human beings, and tidal waves of disturbance have to
be created in this state of peace. … When we look at history, we adore the times of [war]
when dramas happened one after another … which make reading about them great fun.
When we get to the periods of peace and prosperity, we are bored.28

Still others, such as Walker Percy, referred to earlier, have also claimed
that people have a pleasure-linked fascination with disasters and calamity,
at least when these things are happening to other people. The appeal of the
tabloid press and the heavy coverage of crime, accidents, and natural
disasters in the media testify to the validity of such claims.
In addition to its reliance on real misfortunes, another consistent feature
of the tabloid press is its focus on troubles happening to celebrities. A study
of The National Enquirer that I conducted with psychologist Katie Boucher
confirmed this feature.29 We examined approximately 10 weeks of the
magazine. For each story, we rated the status of the person who was the
main focus of the story and how much the story detailed a misfortune
happening to that person (e.g., divorce, scandal, weight gain, health
problem, etc.). As the status of the person in the story increased, so did the
likelihood that the story would also focus on misfortune. Although the rich
and famous fascinate us, most of us feel infinitely less successful than they
and probably a little envious. The chance to read about celebrities’ setbacks
can be irresistible—which explains much of the success of these tabloid
magazines.
 MARTHA STEWART’S MISFORTUNES
Let’s examine the case of Martha Stewart,30 whose indictment and ultimate
conviction for insider trading was made to order for the tabloids. Stewart is
a remarkable American success story.31 But, as Michael Kinsley noted in an
article for Slate, her period of troubles represent “a landmark in the history
of schadenfreude.”32 Following an early career as a model and then as a
successful stockbroker, she began using her long-time interests in cooking,
decorating, and gardening to develop a series of hugely successful business
ventures. After releasing her first book, Entertaining, which was a New
York Times best seller, she published an almost yearly series of other books
on topics ranging from pies, hors d’oeuvres, and weddings to pulling off a
good Christmas celebration. Along the way, she wrote many magazine
articles and newspaper columns and was a frequent guest on national
television programs. By the time of her indictment for insider trading in
2002, she had created a media empire, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia.
It included her own magazine, Martha Stewart Living, a daily television
program, a catalogue business (Martha by Mail), and a floral business
(marthastewartflowers.com), among other ventures. When the company
went public on the New York Stock Exchange, she became a billionaire by
the end of the first day.
Before her indictment, as the information about her alleged stock
dealings emerged, Martha Stewart allowed Jeffrey Toobin, legal analyst for
The New Yorker, to interview her at her Connecticut home. He sensed that
the ridicule that she was receiving (such as the mock magazine cover,
Martha Stewart Living Behind Bars, ubiquitous on the internet) was
probably taking its toll on her, and perhaps this seemed an opportunity to
right the balance. His observations about this interview were telling.
Stewart positioned herself as just about perfect, free of flaws. When
Toobin was served Hunan chicken for lunch, Stewart emphasized that it was
done in the best way possible. She gave Toobin the recipe so that he could
replicate it later. The kitchen was a marvel, with every kind of copper pot
and cooking utensil. From Toobin’s description, everything about her home,
about what she served him, about the way she talked and acted, seemed
aimed at perfection. Martha Stewart was bound to inspire envy in many
people.33
 One senses a point of diminishing returns for Stewart as she revealed
more about her marvelous lifestyle to Toobin, and comments Stewart made
suggest that she was aware of the social price that could come with
advantage. Toobin noticed that the utensils for lunch were thin silver
chopsticks. Stewart explained that the Chinese associate thinner chopsticks
with higher status, which was why she “got the thinnest I could find. That’s
why people hate me.”34 She also seemed well aware of the schadenfreude
that her troubles were creating for her and even used the word to capture the
tabloid tenor of most reactions in the media. However, she expressed
puzzlement over this because she saw her main business as helping women
become better homemakers, and “to be maligned for that is kind of
weird.”35
Stewart must have suffered emotionally from the negative treatment she
received from much of the media. Toobin noted that the unattractive photos
of her in many publications irritated her. She was peeved that Newsweek
suggested that people would have treated her better if she had been nicer to
them during her rise to fame and fortune. Her response in each case added
to the sense that she thought pretty highly of herself. About the photos, she
said, “I’m a pretty photogenic person, I mean, and they manage to find the
doozies.” About Newsweek’s claim, she said, “I’ve never not been nice to
anybody.”36
Stewart’s unrelenting pursuit of flawless living, however close it may be
to realization, created a big target for envy. I am reminded of an often-cited
experiment done in the mid-sixties by Elliot Aronson and colleagues, not
long after the Kennedy administration’s bungling of the U.S. invasion of
Cuba.37 These social psychologists had been struck by the rise in Kennedy’s
popularity following this botched attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro. Why
would a blunder enhance the president’s appeal? They reasoned that before
this incident, the handsome, talented, and charismatic Kennedy had cut so
impressive a figure that people might have found it hard to identify with
him and thus harder to like him. Perhaps this mistake “humanized” him and
made him more likeable. In the experiment, participants listened to an audio
tape that showed another student either performing very well or poorly on a
College Bowl quiz team. Following the performance, in some cases,
participants then heard the student clumsily spill a cup of coffee. Ordinarily,
one might think that clumsy behavior would reduce the appeal of both the
superior and the average performing student. But, consistent with the
researchers’ intuitions, the superior performing student actually became
more attractive and likeable after he made the spill. If there were any
negative effects from the pratfall, the average performer was perceived as
less appealing.
There is an obvious lesson in this for Stewart. As much as people might
admire competence in other people, when it comes to actually liking them,
too much competence becomes a handicap. We might select the highly able
person to be our neurosurgeon or lawyer, but we avoid their company for
lunch. A touch of weakness and vulnerability goes a long way toward
taking the edge off the negative effects of superiority. A little less of “I’m
Chevy Chase, and you’re not” tempers the evil eye of envy.38
I remember watching a Tonight Show episode around the time of the first
season of Survivor, the TV show that helped ignite the ascent of reality TV.
The basic premise of the show is that members of a group are placed in a
remote location and are voted off until a single “survivor” remains. Jay
Leno, the host of the Tonight Show, chose about five people from his
audience and placed them on a traffic “island” somewhere in Burbank. In a
parody of the Survivor show, every 10 minutes or so, the audience voted off
one from the group. Before they headed off for the island, however, Leno
introduced the group to the studio audience by letting each say a few things
about him- or herself. I recall being a little put off by the first person. He
introduced himself as student at Stanford University and then went on to list
a number of impressive things he was doing with his life. My initial,
uncharitable thought was that I hoped he was the first to go. And I was not
surprised when he was indeed the first one booted off. The other contestants
were just average folks and certainly were more humble. I detected an
emphatic quality in the audience’s first decision—and a burst of laughter-
spiked schadenfreude accompanied the verdict.
Jay Leno would appreciate as much as anyone why his audience
laughed. In a 2012 interview for Parade Magazine, he was asked whether
the digital age influenced his approach to comedy. His view was that humor
really does not change much across generations. If one looks at the
trappings, there may appear to be shifts in content, but the underlying
process remains the same. Leno summed it up well: “[T]he fat rich man
stepping out of the Cadillac and into the mud puddle” will always be
funny.39
Leno’s use of an expensive car in his example is a good one because cars
are often the source of envy. According to consumer psychologist Jill
Sundie, the flaunting of luxury items has been a common theme in most
cultures from Egyptian pharaohs and their golden thrones to present-day
Lamborghini owners.40 In one study, she and her colleagues asked student
participants to respond to one of two articles about another student. The
student in the article noted that he owned either a $65,000 Mercedes or a
$16,080 Ford Focus. Next, participants were shown a photo ostensibly
taken of the car, along with a verbal description of how it had broken down
at a shopping center, stranding the owner and some friends. The car had its
hood up in the photo. Students reading about the Mercedes were much more
likely to admit feeling happy when learning of the car’s mechanical failure
than were those who read about the Ford, especially if they also reported
envy. As one would expect when envy is involved, it was the hostility
linked with their envy that was most closely related to their pleasure.
 An analogue to this study occurred in May 2012, and a video of it
produced many approving hits.41 A bright yellow, $250,000 Lamborghini
spun out of control when the driver oversteered while making a turn in a
Chicago neighborhood. No one was hurt, but the car ended up sandwiched
between two other cars. Passengers in another car recorded it all. The video
shows these passengers making invidious comments about the Lamborghini
before the accident and their keen delight after it happened. They even
turned around to take a closer look. The video collected 3.8 million views in
about 24 hours based on YouTube statistics. The unfortunate driver took
quite a ribbing. Echoing SpiderMan, one viewer wrote, “With great
horsepower comes great responsibility.”42 Many were dripping with
envious ill will, with comments such as “stupid rich person trying to show
off.”43

ENVY IMPOSES ITS WILL

Would hostile envy directed at highly competent people be dulled if they
are likeable? One would think so. Naturally, the suffering of a liked person
produces less schadenfreude than the suffering of a disliked person, as
studies led by Israeli psychologist Shlomo Hareli confirm.44 And yet envy
may not be so easily defeated. In our study that I described earlier, where
we showed envy leading to schadenfreude, we were careful to make the
interviewed students likeable, and equally so, in both the high- (superior
student) and low-envy (average student) conditions. Nonetheless, in the
high-envy condition compared with the low-envy condition, greater
schadenfreude followed the misfortune.
I have collected many accounts of people’s experiences of envy. It is not
unusual for the target of the envy to be described as friendly and nice, in
addition to having desirable talents or possessions. But the effect of these
likeable qualities on the envying person can sometimes worsen the
frustration of not having what is desired. Typically, people feeling envy find
reasons to dislike the target of their envy so as to rationalize their invidious
ill will. The envied person might be unfairly seen as “arrogant” or
“obnoxious,” for example. Likeable qualities in the envied person short
circuit the easy route to rationalizing one’s ill will—these qualities make it
difficult to find plausible reasons to justify it. But because the frustrating
disadvantage cannot be willed away, the envy does not necessarily cease.
One participant wrote: “I envied and hated Sarah because she was smarter
and more beautiful than me, and what made it worse, she was also a nice
person. I had no good reason to hate her.” Likability, therefore, may be no
sure antidote for defusing another person’s envy. Even though the nice
envied person suffers less hostility from others than the obnoxious envied
person, niceness does not solve the fundamental problem that envied people
represent—they are advantaged and superior. No wonder Jonathan Swift,
who had imagined both small Lilliputians and large Brobdingnagians in
Gulliver’s Travels, could write about the possible hostile consequences of
an envy-causing contrast with a fellow writer in this way:
In Pope I cannot read a line,
But with a sigh I wish it mine;
When he can in one couplet fix
More sense than I can do in six;
It gives me such a jealous fit,
I cry, “Pox take him and his wit!”45

Toobin had many good things to say about Martha Stewart. Although she
lives a life of privilege, she was not born into wealth. She lives her well-
earned life of luxury with gusto and a good measure of authenticity. As he
put it, “[the] Martha Stewart persona is no act.”46 And she has plenty of
friends who can testify to her good character and good deeds. Toobin noted
that she generally declined to criticize her tormentors; she had no complaint
with the late-night comedians.47
But envy has a logic all its own. Homer Simpson’s envy of his neighbor
Ned Flanders is a case in point. In the episode of The Simpsons, “Dead
Putting Society,” Ned invites Homer to tour his recreation room. It has all
the bells and whistles, including a bar with exotic, foreign beers on tap.
Ned’s son skips into the room, kisses him on the cheek, and thanks him for
the help his father gave him on his science project. “Kids can be a trial,
sometimes,” Ned says, as if this was the worst of his son’s behavior. Then,
Ned’s attractive wife appears with a tray of tasty-looking sandwiches for
them to enjoy. Homer soon brims over with envious ill will toward Ned,
despite the fact that Ned gives him no just cause for it. Homer accuses the
bewildered Ned of deliberately flaunting his advantages, and he leaves after
hurling a flurry of insults.
 Homer hates Ned but without being able to articulate a credible reason
for doing so. That evening, Homer unloads his envy-caused hostility on
Ned as he lies in bed with his wife Marge. She is puzzled because, despite
her probing questions, Homer is unable to come up with a legitimate reason
for his hostility. The exchange ends in this way:48
MARGE: Was he angry?
HOMER: No.
MARGE: Was he rude?
HOMER: Okay, okay, it wasn’t how he said it either. But the message was loud and clear: Our
family stinks!49

Ned Flanders is a painful irritant to Homer simply because he is a

frequent presence and because he is superior. Homer lacks the self-
awareness to label his pain as envy, but he is able to appreciate why having
Ned as a neighbor can be more of a curse than a blessing. This is why
Homer finds it so delightful when Ned’s business does so poorly. Likewise,
Martha Stewart, who is so attractive, so very cultured, so astonishingly
accomplished—and rich—is just about perfect. Too much so. The average
person probably needed relief from the impossible standard that she
represents and the envy her success creates, as the schadenfreude over her
legal troubles showed.
 CHAPTER 9

ENVY TRANSMUTED

I do know envy! Yes, Salieri envies.

Deeply, in anguish envies—O ye Heavens!
Where, where is justice, when the sacred gift,
When deathless genius come not to reward
Perfervid love and utter denial,
And toils and strivings and beseeching prayers,
But puts a halo round a lack-wit’s skull,
A frivolous idler’s brow? … O Mozart, Mozart!
—PUSHKIN1

And this man

Is now become a god, and Cassius is
A wretched creature and must bend his body
If Caesar carelessly but nod on him.
—SHAKESPEARE2

Hatred is active displeasure, envy passive. We need not wonder that

envy turns so soon to hatred.
—JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE3

There is much more to be said about envy and its link with schadenfreude. I
have given little attention to one feature of the emotion that has huge
implications for how it works within the psyche of the average person
suffering it. This concerns what most scholars assume is the largely
suppressed or subterranean way that envy operates in everyday life.
Generally, we deny feeling it. We keep our distance from the emotion,
especially in how we present ourselves to others and often even in our
private, internal owning up to it.4 My aim in this chapter is to show that this
feature of envy actually makes schadenfreude much more likely if the
envied person suffers, and it facilitates actions that bring about a
misfortune.5
 WHY DO WE DENY FEELING ENVY?
Admitting envy, even in our private thoughts, is to concede inferiority, as I
stressed in the previous chapter. Most of us work hard to maintain the
opposite view. Even if the evidence of our inferiority is obvious, we are
quick to repair the narcissistic wound. We are well equipped and well
practiced with defenses against such assaults to our self-image. When one
defense fails, another seems to erect itself, and then another. As I
emphasized in Chapter 2, this is why most of us can believe that we are
better than average despite this being a mathematical impossibility—
everyone cannot be better than average. When we weigh our strengths and
weaknesses, we are usually guided by the preferred image of a superior self.
This is the self who, despite demonstrable failings in the actual world, can
still view itself as an important if not heroic figure, battling slights and
injustices. This self, a kind of god unto itself, plays out fantasy roles of
victory and revenge over those who seem to thwart its interests. This self is
rarely inclined to envy, or so we convince ourselves. Admitting to envy
would be demeaning and unbecoming. Other people may be plagued by this
petty emotion, but we are not.6
Most of us also resist acknowledging our envy because of its hostile and
thus repellent nature. It is unlikely that we feel at ease knowing we dislike,
perhaps hate, people and might even enjoy seeing them hurt simply because
they have advantages over us. What have they actually done to deserve such
hostility? This is hostility directed toward a blameless target; this is an
unjustified, even pathetic thing to feel. It smacks of meanness and spite, a
conspicuous defect in moral fiber and another threat to the high opinion we
like to have of ourselves.7
Adding to this private resistance to admitting our envy is the concern for
our public image. Recognizing the inferiority revealed by our envy is
painful enough in our private thoughts, but confessing it to others piles on
the pain of humiliation. Few people have the patience to listen to the petty
whining of the envious. They have contempt for the nasty ill will
underlying the envy as well. Understandably, most cultures develop strong
norms against feeling envy or expressing it, or, more surely, acting on the
feeling. Therefore, expressing envy almost certainly receives censure from
others. The hostile nature of envy, together with the embarrassment of
inferiority, means that when people reveal their envy, they will probably
feel further diminished and ashamed.8
Is there a religion that approves of envy? Not likely. Judeo-Christian
traditions warn against it. Consider the familiar 10th commandment from
the Old Testament of the Hebrew Bible:
Thou shall not covet thy neighbor’s house, thou shall not covet thy neighbor’s wife, nor his
manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy
neighbor’s.9

Some of its details sound almost quaint, but the point is broad and
anyone can comprehend the core command: don’t envy what another has.
Even feeling it is a crime of thought.
Anyone with a passing familiarity with the Bible knows that the theme
of envy is part of its narrative fabric. This helps explain why the text can
read like a pot boiler.10 Envy is likely the main reason that Cain killed his
brother Abel. Both Cain and Abel brought offerings to the Lord. The Lord
frowned on Cain’s “fruit of the ground” and accepted with warmth and
respect Abel’s “firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof.” And so, Cain
“rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him” causing the Lord to send
Cain away, cursed, to wander in the Land of Nod, to never again have the
luxuries of tilling rich soil.11 In this fashion, envy caused the first murder,
leaving us with an early and clear moral lesson: don’t envy. If your brother
has it better than you, address your own failings—the solution is not to
respond by killing him.
Christian conceptions of envy, sometimes personified in Satan, link envy
to evil, as in John Milton’s magnificent poetic creation:
Satan—so call him now; his former name
Is heard no more in Heaven. He, of the first,
If not the first Archangel, great in power,
In favour, and pre-eminence, yet fraught
With envy against the Son of God, that day
Honoured by his great Father, and proclaimed
Messiah, King Anointed, could not bear,
Through pride, that sight, and thought himself impaired.
Deep malice thence conceiving and disdain,
Soon as midnight brought on the dusky hour
Friendliest to sleep and silence, he resolved
With all his legions to dislodge, and leave
 Unworshiped, unobeyed, the Throne supreme.12

Satan, although powerful in his own right, is overloaded with envy of

Jesus, who has God’s greater favor. Weakened by this, his pride wounded
and his malice aroused, he plots revenge and releases evil into the world. Is
there a more alarming vision of what envy, unleashed, can do? It is hard to
read this and think about envy in a benign, cheerful way.
Christian traditions also include envy in the cast of the deadly sins.
Although the pain of envy is its own kind of punishment, the consequences
of the sin of envy are singularly unpleasant. In Dante’s vision of Purgatory,
the envious have their eyes sewn shut with wire.13 This seems fitting, for
the root of the word envy derives from in- “upon” + videre “to see.”14
People feeling envy look at advantaged others with malice, casting an “evil
eye” upon them—and look with pleasure when misfortune strikes. Envy
may also be a sin that catalyzes others. Christian philosopher George
Aquaro makes the case for envy being the core emotion driving most sinful
behaviors, the one that creates the necessity for other commandments.15
Without envy, Cain may not have murdered Abel. Alas, because the
commandment to avoid envy may be impossible to follow, we must also
have “thou shalt not kill.”
 It doesn’t take a scholar of religions to see that envy is likely to be a
troublesome problem for any faith, and so religious beliefs must provide a
palliative for those less fortunate. According to the Bible, Jesus said,
“Again I say to you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a
needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.”16 It is the
meek rather than the wicked, powerful, and arrogant who will inherit the
earth. This is good news for the disadvantaged person because it gives
moral worth to inferiority and promises rewards for it in the long run. And
yet the gnawing, immediate fact of disadvantage is hard to ignore in the
moment. Inequality—and the envy that can result, regardless of
commandments against the feeling—probably eats away at the foundations
of a particular religion’s explanation and justification for such inequalities.
Envy signals a destabilizing discontent with one’s lot that can place
religious beliefs under suspicion and on shaky ground. The supreme being
and creator of all things is implicated when envious discontent arises in
response to his or her handiwork. Envy may initiate a questioning of the
wisdom of the plan itself.17

LAYERS OF SELF-DECEPTION
The effect of envy’s link with an inferior self and with a repellent reputation
is that envy produces multiple levels of self-deception and public posturing.
Again, most certainly, people will avoid confessing their envy. Scholars,
such as anthropologist George Foster, give examples of how envy is
detected in its opposite, so much do the envious try to hide their true
feelings. “Against whom is that eulogy directed?” is the line Foster cites
from a novel by Migel de Unamuno to capture this jolting idea.18 People
can concede their envy in private, of course. They can come clean both in
private and in public. But envy is frequently, as social and political theorist
Jon Elster writes, “suppressed, preempted, or transmuted into some other
emotion”19 because there are “strong psychic pressures to get rid of the
feeling.”20 This means that many people are feeling envy, perhaps acting
out of envy, but are unaware of it—even though others may label them as
envious and motivated by the emotion.21

ENVY, INJUSTICE, AND SCHADENFREUDE

There is another important element to throw into the blend: envy often
comes mixed with a sense of injustice. When we feel envy, we are also
likely to think that the advantage enjoyed by the envied person is
undeserved, or at least that our own disadvantage is undeserved.22 We
resent the envied person’s advantage. Why is this? The pioneering social
psychologist Fritz Heider saw envy as emerging from a strong tendency
toward the “equalization” of lots.23 We believe that others who are similar
to ourselves in background characteristics ought also to have similar
rewards. Otherwise, a core sense of balance and rightness seems violated.
Because envy is most likely to arise between people similar to each other24
—except for what triggers the envy—the advantage will seem to violate this
sense of what ought to be. Thus, envy often comes flavored with
resentment.
In a similar vein, Freud claimed that the very origins of justice feelings
come from the child’s envy over inequality. Claims of unfairness might
serve as a way of appearing to legitimately cry foul over unequal treatment.
An element of our reactions to inequality, even as adults, may therefore
have roots in how we reacted to inequality when we were children.
According to Freud, the preoccupations of our younger self leave a strong
residue. In this sense, the child is father to the man because we never quite
rid ourselves of this early childish insistence on equality.25
I suspect another factor contributing to a sense of injustice in envy is that
so many of the things creating envy are beyond the average person’s ability
to change.26 One can only do so much to adjust one’s physical beauty,
intelligence, athletic ability, and musical talent—the list of attributes goes
on and on. Even things such as wealth and family background are often
insurmountable differences that separate people permanently at the starting
gate of life. Such inequalities are undeniably important contributors to
success in life, both in work and in attracting romantic partners. Hence, they
are raw ingredients for envy. To this extent, people feeling envy cannot be
blamed for their inferiority and therefore do not “deserve” it. Neither, to this
extent, do envied people “deserve” their advantage. Even so—and this is an
important point—these differences are not considered an unfair basis for
meting out rewards, at least in most cultures. On the contrary, they are
sources of merit. If Anna is less gifted at math than Susan, she will have no
cause to cry foul if Susan is the one selected for the quiz bowl. If Mary
attracts Paul’s attention because of her physical beauty, plain Jane cannot
take Mary to court over this advantage, “unfair” though it may be. From the
subjective view of people feeling envy, these advantages can seem unfair,
but this unfairness must be suffered without redress. If the emotion driving
the sense of injustice is envy, most cultures insist on the grievance
remaining a private one. These lines from Edward Fitzgerald’s translation
of The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám capture the frustration that fate can
bring:
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: not all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.27

Envy can imprison us in a paradox because we feel both a sense of

injustice and a sense of shame. In Heider’s words, “Envy is fraught with
conflict, conflict over the fact that these feelings should not be entertained
though at the same time one may have just cause for them.”28 Envy, by this
logic, is a hostile feeling that seems justified and yet damnable. It comes
with an aggressive urge having a subjectively righteous character, and yet,
acting on this hostility in a way that reveals one’s envy is a repugnant move.
A private part of oneself wishes to assert one’s rights, because, as I outlined
in Chapters 5 and 6, a desire for justice is a powerful motive. Furthermore,
to a degree, a self-assertive impulse seems adaptive for succeeding in life.
But cultural norms against envy create hesitation. In fact, you’re damned if
you do and damned if you don’t.
Evolutionary psychologists Sarah Hill and David Buss give another
reason to think that envy joins itself with resentment. From an evolutionary
psychology perspective, envy serves an important adaptive function. It
alerts us to conditions in which we rank lower than others in domains
important for survival and reproductive success. The unpleasant nature of
envy does not diminish its adaptive value but rather enhances it. In the
competitive arenas of life, envy should lead to actions that increase
resources compared to rivals and that upgrade social status and the benefits
that follow from higher social status. Envy, by this logic, is both an alarm
and a call to action. Hill and Buss suggest that envy may have evolved as a
way of construing oneself as more deserving of scarce resources compared
to rivals. They also argue that it is adaptive to find even the deserved
advantages of other people as undeserved, at least to a degree; for example,
by finding reasons to view the envied person as morally corrupt. The anger,
hostility, and resentment created by perceiving the envied person’s
advantage as undeserved will make it more likely that people feeling envy
will compete vigorously for the valuable resource. The process of natural
selection is, as Hill and Buss phrased the point, “inherently competitive,
selecting for individual phenotypes—and the genes that code for them—
based on their ability to outperform existing alternate forms in domains that
affect fitness.”29 The fusing of resentment with envy is an adaptive blend.
Max Scheler, guided in part by ideas originated by fellow German
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, wrote about a chronic state of mind that he
argued originated in envy and other, related painful states of frustration.
Like Nietzsche, he borrowed the term ressentiment to give the phenomenon
a label. One way this state can emerge, he argued, is when prolonged
experiences of envy produce a sense of impotence so debilitating that one
begins to suppress the emotion, despite its potency. This, in turn, produces a
grudging, rancorous, embittered attitude toward life. In this psychologically
poisoned state, envied things become reduced in value. This is no fun, but
at least we need no longer accuse ourselves of envy. The things we once
desired no longer seem worth having. However, because ressentiment is
born of repressed envy and the actual valuing of these things, it is a
conflicted, unhealthy brew. And, among other toxic effects, it creates
particularly ugly emotions when advantaged people suffer. In the end,
aggression, even cruelty, may result—as I will explore in the next chapter.
Although these ideas inspired by Nietzsche and Scheler are hard to test
empirically, a series of studies done with Dutch participants by social
psychologists Colin Leach and Russell Spears provides some support.
These researchers’ main goal was to show that feelings of inferiority would
prime people to take out their frustration and anger on successful others,
which would emerge as schadenfreude if successful others fail. In one
study, undergraduate participants were told that their own university had
done poorly in their league on a quiz competition called “IQ.” Their
feelings of inferiority and shame were measured immediately afterward.
Then they learned about the winner of another league and reported how this
success made them feel. Finally, they found out that this successful
university had lost to the winner of their own league, and they again
reported their feelings over this outcome. Indeed, these students were likely
to find the loss of this other university pleasing. The students’ pleasure was
related to their prior feelings of inferiority and shame, as well as to the
anger they felt over the other group’s initial success. Specifically, students
who felt inferior and ashamed over their own group’s failure tended to be
the ones who also felt angry over the other group’s success. And this anger
was closely linked to schadenfreude when this group suffered a defeat.
Leach and Spears evoke Nietzsche’s notion of the “vengefulness of the
impotent” to capture this process.30
Another empirical contribution comes from work by Zlatan Krizan and
Omesh Johar, who have examined the role of vulnerable narcissism in envy
and schadenfreude.31 Vulnerable narcissists have a complex jumble of
features. Like all narcissists, they are usually self-absorbed and
interpersonally tone-deaf. They are also apt to fancy themselves superior to
others and to expect that the world concurs with this assessment. As a
result, they typically feel entitled to special treatment and are taken aback if
they don’t receive it. But vulnerable narcissists, compared to “grandiose”
narcissists, are less confident about their superiority and less confident in
how others see them. Their narcissism may mask a core low self-esteem,
and their behavior tends to reflect defensive efforts to convince themselves
of their own superiority. Vulnerable narcissists should be especially
susceptible to envy and schadenfreude because of their low self-esteem.
Studying how narcissism might combine with envy to cause
schadenfreude is a particular challenge. Narcissists are especially unlikely
to reveal their envy because, as social worker and psychotherapist
Hotchkiss notes in her book, Why Is It Always About You?: The Seven
Deadly Sins of Narcissism “to admit envy would be to acknowledge
inferiority, which no good narcissist would ever do.”32 But Krizan and
Johar employed a clever procedure that minimized the likelihood that
participants would know that the study’s focus was on envy and
schadenfreude. Undergraduate participants thought they were simply giving
their reactions to the format of news stories. They expected to see two
related stories, one on a computer screen and the second on paper, and then
give their reactions to the different formatting. They also completed a
personality measure of vulnerable narcissism, but this was done in a mass
screening at the beginning of the semester. There was little chance that
participants would detect the researchers’ interest in narcissism or envy.
The first article contained an interview with another student who was either
of high status and enviable or of low status and unlikely to be envied. Then,
participants were taken to a different room and given a memory test (to
distract them from the true purpose of the study). Finally, they were given
the second story, which detailed how the same student from the first story
had been found guilty of plagiarism and received a one-year academic
probation.
As in other studies mentioned earlier, participants found the student’s
downfall more pleasing when it happened to the high-status person than the
low-status person. And envy, reported just after the first article, was a big
factor in explaining why. Moreover, vulnerable narcissists were even more
likely to feel envy, and this envy resulted in more intense feelings of
schadenfreude at the envied individual’s misfortune. These results provide
convincing evidence that our private self-views, when they are threatened
by another person’s superiority, set us up for feeling envy—and
schadenfreude if the envied person suffers. And some of us, if we possess a
shaky self-esteem joined with narcissism, are even more likely to follow
this pattern.

SALIERI’S PRIVATE GRIEVANCE AND THE REVENGE

THAT FOLLOWS
The film Amadeus, as I noted earlier, contains a good example of this
tension between the sense of injustice, which is often part of envy, and the
social censure also linked to the emotion.33 Salieri, the respected court
composer, envies the young and miraculously talented Mozart. But he
avoids fully admitting to envy, construing Mozart’s talent as an injustice
committed by God. Salieri views Mozart as immature, indecent, and
undeserving of his musical gifts. He resents Mozart’s talents and is outraged
at the injustice that he, Salieri, has only the capacity to appreciate Mozart’s
talent, rather than to duplicate it. He is a frustrated prisoner of mediocre
abilities. Can he cry out against this injustice? No, because differences in
ability are not considered an injustice by the standards of his culture.
Ability and talent are sources of merit. Therefore, Salieri blames God,
whom he deems to be responsible for awarding ability and talent among
people. He knows that he will get no sympathy from others, however, if he
makes any open efforts to right this wrong. Furthermore, he would not want
others to think that he is envious because this would add public shame to
his frustrations.

Salieri, mediocre by his own and others’ verdicts, suffers many

humiliations as Mozart outperforms him at every opportunity, usually in
front of others, who laugh along with Mozart. In one scene, Mozart is
performing impromptu at a lavish costume party and imitates the style of
well-known composers. Salieri, disguised and incognito behind a mask, is
in the crowd and calls out for Mozart to do “Salieri.” Mozart proceeds to
mock Salieri to the howling delight of the rest of the crowd. Salieri’s
mortification shows through his mask when Mozart takes on the look of a
Neanderthal and with slow deliberateness plods his way through a Salieri
melody. He literally apes Salieri.
The now-vengeful Salieri vows to undermine Mozart’s career and plan
his death. The success of both efforts brings him intense schadenfreude. He
decides to feign a liking for Mozart and becomes his apparent friend and
supporter. His actual feelings are hostile and vengeful, fed by a sense of
injustice that we, the viewers, can easily recognize as envy. He encourages
Mozart to include a section of ballet in his opera, The Marriage of Figaro,
despite his knowing that the Emperor Joseph II will object when he views
its initial performance. He watches Joseph’s reaction as he views a rehearsal
and anticipates with pleasure Joseph’s disapproval. This fails to happen
because Joseph enjoys the piece, and Salieri’s hopes are dashed. But later,
when the full production debuts, he receives a “miracle.” Although Salieri
realizes that the opera is path-breaking in quality, he also knows that
Joseph’s attention span is short. In the final number, Joseph yawns once, a
signal that the opera will only have a few performances. This failure is a
triumph for Salieri, and he smiles the smile of satisfying schadenfreude.
Later, when Mozart’s magnificent Don Giovanni also suffers a short run,
Salieri once again silently exults.
Eventually, he pivots toward murder. “Before I leave this earth I will
laugh at you,” he vows in secret, his whole being now fully poisoned by
envy and a desire for revenge. Mozart is already physically weakened by
overwork, made necessary by financial woes. Concealed by a mask, Salieri
visits Mozart and offers him extra work composing an opera, hoping that
this will direct Mozart to an early grave through physical exhaustion and
illness. Mozart accepts the offer, and, as he works, Salieri watches for
hopeful, happy signs of Mozart’s weakening physical condition. He is
pleased to see Mozart almost delirious as he conducts an inaugural
production of The Magic Flute. He is elated when Mozart collapses at the
keyboard. He supervises bringing Mozart home and arranges a way to keep
Mozart working by offering to record the notes as Mozart composes. He is
gratified to see Mozart’s strength fade while he works to meet the deadline
for the commission. Mozart does indeed die of exhaustion and illness—
again, much to Salieri’s pleasure.
The experience of Salieri may be unusual in certain respects. He is
actually more aware of his envy than others who might reach a vengeful
state propelled by fully repressed envy.34 Also, his anger is egged on by
intentional humiliation from Mozart. Such deliberate humiliations enacted
by the envied person may be rare in everyday experiences of envy;
nonetheless, the film dramatizes the point that envy can lead to an extreme
endpoint created by powerful tensions stirred up within the envying person.
Invidious comparisons register in our emotional solar plexus. Usually,
altering the pecking order is unrealistic—a reason why the emotion is so
painful. The disadvantage remains a stubborn fixture, creating a persistent
need to cope with inferiority, repugnant feelings of hostility—and
frustrating resentment over being unfairly treated. This is mainly why the
emotion can transmute itself into a private grievance no longer having the
label of envy.35 Once transmuted, events can more easily trend toward a
justified pleasure if the envied person suffers and even justify vengeful
actions that bring about the suffering, also resulting in pleasure.
This way of thinking about envy crosses over from the commonplace to
something sinister. Common envy is often disturbing enough in its
consequences, but the example of Salieri suggests that it can slope toward
something uglier—toward a schadenfreude laced with malice and
aggressive intent.
It is important to keep the hostile, potentially violent endpoint in mind. It
is the difference between laughing over the seemingly benign joke and the
willingness to stand happily by while another person suffers—or worse, to
be responsible for perpetrating the harm. Generally, social norms keep
hostile actions at bay. But because envy can be such an ugly, yet also a
righteous feeling, and because owning up to it threatens the self-esteem of
the envying person, its transmutation into a more palatable emotion, such as
pure indignation and resentment, is a frequent outcome. Again, once
transmuted and relabeled, the envying person need no longer wait in
frustrated anticipation for a misfortune. Transmuted, this passivity can take
a holiday, even a permanent vacation. A more certain virtuousness replaces
shame and provides a license for something more active. Now, the envying
person might take action to bring the misfortune about.
The progression from finding a bad thing amusing to wishing that it
happens, and from anticipating it to engineering the deed, is difficult to
unpack given the complicated motives that drive the change. Envy, I think,
motivates in ways that deceive both the self and others, creating its own
opportunities, manufacturing its own clever justifications, energized by the
pain of the emotion and masked by its relabeling. This is the evil eye of
envy, so feared in most cultures. The envied person is now the voodoo doll,
vulnerable to attack. And so, Salieri is more easily able to take action
against Mozart because he largely sees his decision as revenge against
injustice.
In Richard Russo’s novel Bridge of Sighs,36 the narrator, currently in his
60s, looks back with improved understanding and describes a boyhood
event in which he caused the injury of a friend, Bobby, whom he both liked
and envied. On Saturday mornings during one summer, they would go with
the narrator’s dad when he delivered milk in his truck. They would play at
“surfing” in the back of a truck, a game that meant balancing on milk crates
as the truck navigated through the streets. The trick was to stay balanced on
the crate even as the truck took turns. Bobby was better at the game, as he
was at most things, and this created mixed feelings and desires in the
narrator. Although he liked Bobby, even loved him in a way, this did not
prevent envy and its attending hostile leanings from taking hold. I think
Russo captures perfectly how envy-triggered aggression can happen, and it
is well worth quoting in full:
[A]s the summer wore on I became troubled by the knowledge that part of me was waiting
for, indeed looking forward to, my friend getting hurt. It had, of course, nothing to do with
him and everything to do with my own cowardice and jealousy. The jealous part had to do, I
think, with my understanding that Bobby’s bravery meant he was having more fun,
something that my own cowardly bailing out had robbed me of. Each week I told myself I’d
be braver, that this Saturday I wouldn’t reach out and hold on for safety. I’d surrender
control and be flung about, laughing and full of joyous abandon. But every outing was the
same as the last, and when the moment came, I grabbed on. Gradually, since wishing for
courage didn’t work, I began wishing for something else entirely. I never wanted Bobby to
be seriously injured, of course. That would have meant the end of everything. But I did wish
that just once he’d be hurt bad enough to cry, which would lessen the gulf I perceived
between him and me.

And so our milk-truck surfing ended the only way it could. I didn’t actually see Bobby break
his wrist when he was flung against the side of the truck. I heard the bone snap, though.
What saved me from suffering the same fate was my cowardice. I’d seen the curve coming
and at the last second reached out and grabbed one of the tied-off milk crates. Bobby, taken
by surprise, went flying.37

For a few minutes after the event occurred, they sat quietly beside each
other in the back of the truck while the narrator’s father drove them home.
Bobby broke the silence and said, “You didn’t call the turn.”38 These words
clarified the initial ambiguity of what had happened and why it had
happened. His failure to warn of the curve was by hidden inclination,
needing a sober accusation to let the motive break the surface. He wanted
the accident to happen because of his envy, and, when it happened, part of
him was happy over it. This was the essential truth of the matter, made clear
once the narrator matured.
There is a sense that schadenfreude, when linked with envy, often exists
in a kind of fantasy world of frustrated anticipation and privately articulated
hopes for misfortune. During moments allowing for reflection, the wished-
for misfortune, perhaps in fine detail, takes shape. Primed by mere
imagination, the real thing, if it ever happens, is an extraordinary bolt out of
the blue. When we have taken no role in the misfortune, if luck grants us
this outcome, it is a thing of beauty. We can be free of any guilt that might
arise.
As pleasing as a misfortune might be to witness when the envied suffer,
the sad rub (for the rest of us) is that people who are envied tend not to
suffer. They have it better. We are the ones who suffer. Whatever our
dreams may be, they are living them.39 But as envy goes underground,
feelings of injustice and outrage can overtake envy in its manifest form,
providing a foundation for unimpeachable, justified action—in the form of
a kind of revenge and its dark thrills.
This is not a process to trifle with. In the next chapter, I take this
transmutation of envy into righteous revenge to its furthest extreme and ask
whether it might help explain the extreme, brutish treatment of the Jews by
the Nazis.
 CHAPTER 10

DARK PLEASURES UNLEASHED

There were many Jews who did not show the necessary restraint and who stood out more
and more in public life, so that they actually invited certain comparisons because of their
numbers and the position they controlled in contrast to the German people.
—HERMANN GÖRING1

One does not have to speculate about this link between envy and anti-Semitism in the Nazi
mind; it can be confirmed and documented empirically by reading Hitler’s many envious
comments about Jews.
—JAMES GILLIGAN2

[T]he Jew is a money-getter; and in getting his money he is a very serious obstruction to
less capable neighbors who are on the same quest. I think that that is the trouble.
—MARK TWAIN3

Perhaps most instances of schadenfreude are harmless, on a par with the

pleasures of light gossip. Even when the feeling is linked with envy, there’s
little need to wag the finger. Envy and schadenfreude are also such natural
emotions that alarm about their mingled frequency is unrealistic. And yet
we must be mindful that envy can motivate, without full awareness, the
engineering of misfortune—and its anticipated pleasures. This takes us into
troubling moral territory. In this chapter, I chart a dark example of this, a
kind of outer moral limit: the Nazi persecution and murder of the Jews.
How was it that so many Germans were able to engage in the systematic,
pitiless, often pleasing to observe mistreatment and ultimate killing of over
six million Jews? Of course, the answer to the question is complex and
multilayered, and the scholarship on this question is correspondingly vast.4
Addressing the question can seem to raise even more questions, taking one
further away from understanding. Almost any attempt to explain the horrors
of the Holocaust can seem inadequate to the task, oversimplified, and futile
—like looking into a hideous kaleidoscope that changes and mutates with
each viewing. With these far from trivial caveats in mind, in this chapter, I
explore the role that envy may have played in these horrors.

Envy of the Jews—how could this be? The innumerable instances of

prejudice and harm occurring before the period of the Holocaust in
Germany, when it reached a heretofore unimaginable crest in the Nazi
atrocities, suggest a group to be pitied rather than envied. Only a group held
in vicious contempt could cause such brutish treatment. How could Jews be
the spur for strong envy if they are also linked with negative stereotypes
suggesting inferiority, another common theme in their history? Coinciding
with these stereotypes were the contrasting beliefs of Aryan racial
superiority that the Nazis promulgated. To explain these seeming
contradictions, let’s first take a close look at the evolution of anti-Semitism
in the obsessed spearhead of the Holocaust, Adolf Hitler. Did Hitler envy
the Jews and, if so, did this envy contribute to his hatred—and pleasure at
their systematic persecution and elimination?

ADOLF HITLER AND THE EVOLUTION OF A LETHAL

ANTI-SEMITE
Mein Kampf, the autobiographical screed and political manifesto Hitler
wrote in the early 1920s, is a good place to start when looking for clues
about the role of envy in Hitler’s hatred of the Jews.5 Some of the details of
his account undoubtedly misrepresent how his ideas actually evolved, but
the book still provides a revealing vantage point for understanding his
thinking.
On its face, Hitler’s narrative is not about his envy. He tries to convince
readers that he came to believe that the Jews were a depraved race of people
and that his lasting feelings were a blend of disgust and intense contempt—
seemingly devoid of envy. Hitler claimed to be drawn toward this anti-
Semitism against his will. His inner struggle (his “kampf”) was long and
disturbing, and, as he stated, “only after months of battle between my
reason and my sentiments did my reason begin to emerge victorious.”6
Initially, he had been horrified by accounts of religious persecution of Jews
in prior centuries. Even when he first moved to Vienna, he rejected the
“sharp” tone of the Viennese anti-Semitic press. He thought it “unworthy of
the cultural tradition of a great nation” and he “was oppressed by the
memory of certain occurrences in the Middle Ages.”7 In fact, he noted that
envy may have partly explained these reactions in others.8 Other people
might have been motivated out of envy but surely not himself—or so he
would want us to conclude. Did he protest too much and so reveal the
opposite?
His early descriptions of his learning about Jews provide illuminating
evidence of his envy. What is it about Jews that would make one envy
them? For starters, one would have to notice them, and, interestingly, as a
young man in Linz, Hitler claimed to be barely aware of their presence. The
small number of Jews in Linz were so “Europeanized” and “human” that he
“even took them for Germans.”9 However, after moving to Vienna, he did
start noticing Jews. He began seeing Jews everywhere, and this disturbed
him. And it was not only that they seemed to be everywhere; Hitler also
perceived their having a powerful influence. From these twin perceptions,
his envy may have been pricked.
In his book Envy: The Seven Deadly Sins, Joseph Epstein suggests the
strong links between envy and Nazi anti-Semitism, and, as an example, he
gives a characterization of the Vienna close to Hitler’s day:
 Consider these rough statistics from Vienna of 1936, a city that was 90 percent Catholic and
9 percent Jewish: Jews accounted for 60 percent of the city’s lawyers, more than half its
physicians, more than 90 percent of its advertising executives, and 123 of its 174 newspaper
editors. And this is not to mention the prominent places Jews held in banking, retailing, and
intellectual and artistic life.10

Wouldn’t these kinds of statistics in Vienna and other cities in Austria

and Germany make hollow the claims of Jewish inferiority and Aryan
superiority? These facts would have likely had invidious effects on anyone
craving beliefs in Aryan superiority. Indeed, Hitler became preoccupied
with the pervasive influence Jews appeared to have despite their small
number.
I now began to examine carefully the names of all the creators of unclean products in public
artistic life. … The fact that nine tenths of all literary filth, artistic trash, and theatrical idiocy
can be set to the account of a people, constituting hardly one hundredth all the country’s
inhabitants, could simply not be talked away; it was the plain truth.11

As he perceived their disproportional influence, he also transformed his

view of Jews from one based on religious distinctions to one of race and,
furthermore, a race having vile and pernicious characteristics. He
encountered Jews in their distinctive caftans and side locks and began
sensing something foreign rather than native. He would wonder: “Is this a
German?” He still claimed to be troubled by the anti-Semitic pamphlets and
their atrocious accusations. They seemed so unscientific and shameful, and
he feared that he would be committing an injustice to believe them. But the
Jews’ essential and degenerate separateness took complete hold on his
perceptions:
Wherever I went, I began to see Jews, and the more I saw, the more sharply they became
distinguished in my eyes from the rest of humanity.12

Having separated Jews from other people, Germans most importantly, he

bristled at the notion that Jews could label themselves the “Chosen People.”
He recognized their powerful influence, a fact incompatible with inferiority
and likely to spur envy. However, he focused on those perceived attributes
of Jews that inspired his contempt and would have clouded recognition of
his envy. Jews were parasitic, immoral Zionists. Any outward condemning
of Zionism by a Jew was a back-stabbing smoke screen for a favoring of
Jewish rather than German interests. All their activities, whether “in the
press, art, literature, and the theatre” exuded an outward and inward
repulsiveness; they were “germ-carriers of the worse sort.”13 And there was
no aspect of cultural life without the degenerate influence of Jews.14
The transformation into a committed anti-Semite completed itself when
Hitler linked Jews with political causes having Marxist elements. Here as
well, he perceived their disproportionate influence. But, once again, he
seemed to blunt the invidious effects implicit in this perception by focusing
on the seditious threat these Jews posed to Germany. This threat was
especially true in the press, which he saw as dominated by disloyal,
treacherous Jews. Here is a characteristic sample of Hitler’s thinking:
I gradually became aware that the Social Democratic press was directed predominantly by
Jews … there was not one paper with Jews working on it which could have been regarded as
truly national, according to my education and way of thinking.

… I took all the Social Democratic pamphlets I could lay my hands on and sought the names
of their authors: Jews. I noted the names of the leaders: by far the greatest part were likewise
members of the “chosen people,” whether they were representatives of the Reichsrat or
trade-union secretaries, the heads of organizations or street agitators. It was always the same
gruesome picture. The names of the Austerlitzses, Davids, Adlers, Ellenbogens, etc. will
remain forever graven in my memory. One thing had grown clear to me: The party with
whose petty representatives I had been carrying on the most violent struggle for months was,
as to leadership, almost exclusively in the hands of a foreign people; for, to my deep and
joyful satisfaction, I had at last come to the conclusion that the Jew was no German.15

Hitler detailed his futile attempts to persuade the Jewish members of the
party of the “madness of their doctrine.”16 But he eventually concluded that
they had no interest in whether their beliefs were good for the future of
Germany. And just when he thought he had them persuaded, they would
turn around and spout the “same old nonsense as though nothing at all had
happened, and, if indignantly challenged, affected amazement.”17 Hitler
was intensely frustrated by these interactions with Jews, marveling at the
“agility” of their persuasive language and the “virtuosity” of their deceit.18
There was a clear, invidious residue produced by his being outwitted, but
the plain result was that he hated Jews with a ferocious passion.
Decades later, when Albert Speer, Hitler’s top architect, was asked why
Hitler was anti-Semitic, he gave three reasons. One was Hitler’s
pathological desire to destroy. Another was that he blamed the Jews for
Germany’s defeat in World War I, thus denying him the opportunity to
achieve his dream of becoming an architect. But a third reason, probably
related to his frustrated dreams as well as to a desire to destroy, was that he
“secretly admired and envied the Jews.”19
Speer knew Hitler about as well as anyone, and I think that Speer was
right on the mark. It is likely that a part of Hitler’s “struggle” was with his
envy. Initially, he had claimed to be appalled by the way Jews had been
treated in previous centuries and was concerned that hating Jews would be
an injustice. He had seen envy as an explanation for the anti-Semitic
pamphlets, and so he could see this motive in others. But it may be that as
his own envy grew, his subsequent “struggle” was to find a way to hate the
Jews without attributing his motives to the ugly, humiliating emotion of
envy. He may have envied and hated the Jews earlier than he claimed, as his
friend during his late teens, August Kubizek, believed. Once they walked
past a synagogue in Linz, and Hitler said to him, “This shouldn’t be here.”20
Even Kubizek admitted, however, that Hitler’s experiences in Vienna
“might have deepened” his anti-Semitism.21 Arguably, envy found a way to
transmute itself into disgust, and then into righteous, justified, “deserved”
hatred. As clever as these so-called chosen people might be, they were
morally corrupt and traitorous in their motives. Perhaps at some earlier
point, the idea of the Jews as the chosen people would have accentuated
only the invidious implications of their disproportionate influence for
Hitler.22 However, now, he seized on it as evidence for Jewish arrogance,
adding further justification for his disgust and hatred.
Historian John Toland, in his biography of Hitler, notes a revealing
statement made by Hitler in 1941 to Walther Hewel, an early member of the
Nazi Party and one of Hitler’s few friends. It was a few weeks before the
invasion of the Soviet Union and during a period in which Hitler set in
motion preparations for the liquidation of the Jews. By Hewel’s account,
Hitler likened himself to a medical scientist who had “found the bacillus”
and had therefore discovered a way to deal with the problem of the Jews.
And in words suggesting the invidious roots of his hatred, he said, “one
thing I have proven is that a state can live without Jews: that economy, art,
culture, etc., can exist even better without Jews, which is the worst blow I
could give the Jews.”23 This statement fits with the envious mind set,
although Hitler would not have acknowledged it, of course. By the time he
wrote his memoirs, he had long convinced himself that by achieving the
annihilation of the Jews he would be an avenger for God, so justified did he
believe his hatred.24 Hitler probably envied the Jews, but this seemed fully
hidden from his awareness.

SCAPEGOATING THE ENVIED JEWS

Does Hitler’s path to hating the Jews generalize in some respects to other
Germans who also hated the Jews? Could envy help explain not only the
Holocaust, but anti-Semitism going back centuries? Many respected
thinkers have argued so, from Mark Twain to Friedrich Nietzsche.25 More
recently, Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin, in their analysis of anti-
Semitism, Why the Jews? The Reasons for Antisemitism, make the more
general point this way:
In nearly every society in which the Jews have lived for the past two thousand years, they
have been better educated, more sober, more charitable with one another, committed far
fewer violent crimes, and have had a more stable family life than their non-Jewish
neighbors. These characteristics of Jewish life have been independent of Jews’ affluence or
poverty. … Of course, it is impossible to measure precisely to what extent the higher quality
of Jews’ lives has been a major cause of antisemitism. Few antisemites list the Jews’ good
qualities as reasons for attacking them. But it is human nature for individuals and groups
perceived as living better lives, however that may be understood, to elicit jealousy and
resentment.26

Prager and Telushkin’s analysis is especially useful because they suggest

that it is not just the obvious markers of wealth, power, and influence that
may have created envy. The more subtle but evident cultural strengths
usually present in Jewish communities could also be a trigger.27
Social psychologist Peter Glick has addressed the question of envy and
Nazi anti-Semitism within the Stereotype Content Model, an innovative
theory of prejudice proposed by him and fellow psychologists Susan Fiske
and Amy Cuddy.28 Traditional theories cast prejudice as a generic negative
feeling toward another group. Glick, Fiske, and Cuddy argue that this way
of thinking about prejudice is too general, and, for example, overlooks that
groups vary in terms of their perceived status or competence. Prejudice
against poor Hispanics is very different from prejudice against successful
Jews (or, Asians, etc.). Both feelings can be “negative,” but only one is
likely to also contain envy—namely, toward groups enjoying
stereotypically high status and competence. Traditional views of prejudice
also tend to neglect another important dimension in which other groups
differ: whether or not they are perceived as a threat. This is the “warmth”
dimension of the Stereotype Content Model. Members of highly competent
groups might simply be admired (a high warm feeling) rather than envied (a
low warm feeling) if, for example, there is no concern that they will take
away jobs from one’s own group. These two fundamental dimensions
inherent in our perceptions of other groups (warmth and competence) are
crucial to take into account. They address two adaptive questions we should
ask about members of other groups: first, are they friends or foes? And,
second, are they weak or powerful? Will they like us, and will they hurt us
if they can? Not surprisingly, groups with stereotypically higher status (e.g.,
economic advantages) are perceived as more competent and, if they are
perceived to be in competition with us, are also seen as low in warmth and
therefore threatening. And this combination of high status and low warmth
in another group encourages in us feelings of envious prejudice, as
empirical work has confirmed.29
Glick stresses that the remarkable successes of Jews would have been of
little consequence, psychologically, for those inclined to dislike the Jews—
if it were not for Jews also being perceived as a competitive threat. The
Nazis, capitalizing especially on the willingness of people to believe bogus
anti-Semitic documents, such as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,
claimed that Jews represented a kind of conspiracy aimed at accruing power
and favoring only their own interests.30 As we have seen, a constant theme
in Hitler’s statements, as well as in propaganda spewed out by other Nazi
leaders, was that this sense of threat was reinforced by the belief that many
Jews were in leadership positions in the communist movement and its
spread. And as we have also seen pulse through Hitler’s own writings,
many Germans—and most Nazis—blamed Jews for Germany’s humiliation
in World War I and its economic problems following the war and believed
the Jews were in bed with the Communists.
In relating his theories of stereotyping and prejudice to anti-Semitism,
Glick applies the idea of scapegoating to this type of prejudice. In
scapegoating, we see ingroup members, particularly when feeling
threatened by, for example, economic circumstances, lash out against a
vulnerable outgroup, usually one that is perceived as inferior.31 But Glick
points out that this partially fits the history of anti-Semitism. True,
stereotypes about Jews had long included negative features suggesting the
kind of “inferiority” (e.g., dirty, greedy) so persistently claimed in Hitler’s
writings. Indeed, the Nazis did their best to promulgate these beliefs.32
However, other stereotypes of Jews imply a kind of power and superiority
(e.g., clever, cunning). Glick argues that viewing the Jews as “inferior” as
well as powerful created a particularly malicious form of scapegoating, an
intense, envy-tinged blaming of Jews for Germany’s economic woes.33
The wide assimilation of Jews into German culture might have worked
to reduce this sense of separateness. But Glick notes that this blending was
seen as false. The Nazis, entranced by ideas of race, saw group identity in
blood rather than in beliefs. What’s more, Jews’ efforts to fit in could be
taken as evidence of conspiratorial motives, as Hitler claimed. Again, as a
distinct racial group, Jews were considered both powerful and threatening.
Victims of their own success, they were held to be manipulative, powerful
threats. The reward for being so perceived was to suffer even more surely
from a particularly virulent, unrelenting form of envious prejudice.
The persistence of envious prejudice, particularly in the case of Nazi
Germany, can be explained by a number of factors. Like Epstein and other
scholars, Glick also emphasizes that Jews were overrepresented in many
important aspects of professional and cultural life and that the talents and
drive suggested by such success would have been hard to dismiss. The
Nazis exaggerated and distorted the prevalence of Jews in powerful
positions, claiming that these influential Jews represented a coordinated,
monolithic entity bent on domination, but there was just enough surface
evidence to justify the sense of power and threat. When economic
conditions are poor, it is not surprising that people, in their collective
frustration, will search for plausible causes for the hardships they are
suffering. Blaming these hardships on another group—one perceived to be
different, as well as competent, manipulative, and out for themselves—has
a certain plausibility to it. Moreover, Jews who were able to lend money in
tough economic times could be construed as making money off the misery
of Germans.34 Had economic and political conditions in Germany been
different, Glick suggests that Jews might have been tolerated, even seen as
useful. But stressful economic times call for explanations for why things are
going so poorly. Ideological movements, such as the National Socialism
endorsed by the Nazi Party, supplied plausible and well-packaged
propaganda that could be used to blame the Jews. Explanations fueled by
envious stereotypes took firm hold.
 Glick points out that if hatred toward Jews was simply a function of their
being a threatening outgroup, this alone would not explain the nature of the
hostility directed at them. If it was a straightforward function of threat, then
once the basic threat was dealt with, hostile action should cease. Hatred of
the Jews was a thing apart, however. The Nazis wanted to eliminate Jews
arguably because, in part, their very existence created painful envy. Envious
hostility predicts a willingness to suffer in other respects, as long as the
envied object can be neutralized or destroyed. The goal of elimination
trumps many other concerns.
Consider the Nazis’ treatment of Albert Einstein. Imagine if Einstein had
not been a Jew. He would have been feted as the best example of Aryan
superiority. But, inconveniently, he was a Jew and, as would be the pattern
expected by envy-inspired hatred, the Nazis undermined their full potential
by virtue of their treatment of the Jews. If the talents of Einstein and other
Jewish scientists had been harnessed by the Nazis, the German war effort
would likely have benefited greatly. Germany might have been the first to
develop an atomic bomb. Instead, Einstein and other brilliant scientists
were persecuted, forced to leave Germany, or delivered into the
incomprehensible horrors of the extermination camps.35 But again, people
feeling envy get little enjoyment over contemplating the achievements and
brilliance of those whom they envy, even when these achievements might
lead to some form of personal gain. And so, envy provides a way of
understanding why the Nazis would act in puzzling, counterproductive
ways.

THE PLEASURES OF PERSECUTION IN ONE’S MIDST

Stereotypes alone can generate envious, prejudicial reactions—and one
result is schadenfreude. A study done with Princeton University students by
Mina Cikara and Susan Fiske assessed people’s reactions to negative events
happening to members of one of four kinds of stereotyped groups.36 Each
group fit one of the four categories of the Stereotype Content Model. Cikara
and Fiske predicted that members of stereotypically envied groups (i.e., a
high competence/high threat type of group) would create more positive
reactions to the group member’s suffering than any of the other three
categories. A self-report measure and a physiological measure both
confirmed this prediction. Compared to the other three groups, the suffering
of envied groups generated less empathy and more smiling.
Can we extrapolate such findings to better understand the Nazis, whose
stereotypes of Jews were at the far extreme? As the Nazis rose to power,
humiliation, violence, and destruction against Jews increasingly became the
sanctioned norm and, ultimately, government policy. Keenly aware of the
wealth, property, possessions, and professional positions held by many
Jews, the Nazis focused on taking these things away, often violently.
Sometimes property was simply destroyed, as in the events of Kristallnacht,
in which many Jewish shops were damaged and synagogues were burned.
Most average Germans were probably shocked and disturbed by these
extreme actions. They did not have the stomach for it, especially since
scores of Jews were also killed in the process. Some, such as pastor Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, resisted the Nazis from the start. He noted, “If you board the
wrong train it is no use running along the corridor in the opposite
direction.”37 But it may be that these increasingly brutal actions occurred in
part because not enough people were expected to object, because many
actually turned a blind eye—and because some displayed their appreciation
and pleasure.
We can be confident that Hitler was pleased. Although Hitler disguised
his role in Kristallnacht as well as his enthusiasm for it, there is evidence
for both. Historian John Toland relates a credible account from Fritz Hesse,
one of Hitler’s press agents. It occurred on the very night of Kristallnacht,
during a dinner at which Hitler, the Propaganda Minister Goebbels, and
other Nazi leaders were present. Hesse was also there, and he overheard
Goebbels telling Hitler that the attack against the Jewish businesses and
synagogues was about to happen. Hitler’s happy reaction to this information
was unmistakable. Hesse remembered that “Hitler squealed with delight
and slapped his thigh in his enthusiasm.”38
Hitler also recognized that many Germans did not share in his
exuberance, and so he pulled back from these violent tactics. Instead, a
series of laws was passed and policies implemented that did the job in a
“legal” manner more fitting the sensibilities of the average German. These
actions may have pleased the mildly envious in a way that the violent
approach could not. In any event, many Germans benefited directly or
indirectly, whether it was the shopkeeper who was able to get rid of
competition or the student who was able to take the position in a
professional school that otherwise might have gone to a Jew.
There is ample evidence showing the common pleasure that some
Germans took in the suffering of Jews, such as gathering to watch Jews
scrubbing streets with toothbrushes or soldiers pulling the beards of old
Jewish men. There was schadenfreude aplenty.39 Historian Donald McKale
gives an example of how the Nazi leadership responded to the horrific
conditions created by herding many Jews, mostly in Poland, into ghettos. A
Nazi “leisure” organization, Kraft durch Freude (literally meaning
“Strength through Joy”!), supervised bus tours. German soldiers took these
tours through the ghettos and laughed at suffering Jews as if they were
visiting the “zoo to see animals.”40 Funerals were interrupted so that the
soldiers could pose for photographs with rabbis and the grieving family
members.
Of course, inferring the actual emotional amalgam associated with these
and other actions is difficult. Nonetheless, envy provides one credible
explanation for some of the behavior that emerged and the pleasure this
behavior often produced in witnesses—and in perpetrators.

FROM ENVY TO SCHADENFREUDE TO ACTION

I suggested in the previous chapter that once schadenfreude becomes the
normative response to the mistreatment of a group of people, worse
behaviors, even genocide, might enter the imagination of the envious
person. In this sense, as Russell Spears and Colin Leach note,
schadenfreude can be a kind of deliberate passivity which provides
encouragement for others willing to commit further and more extreme
mistreatment.41
Schadenfreude may motivate action in the observer too. When envy is at
the root of schadenfreude, I argue that the line between passive and active
becomes quite blurred. Enjoying misfortune evolves into longing for
misfortune and then the willingness to bring it about. Mina Cikara and
Susan Fiske did another study testing the Stereotype Content Model. This
one assessed actions associated with envious prejudice. They showed that
members of stereotypically envied groups might also suffer more harm
compared to the other three groups.42 Participants in the study were asked
to imagine that they were participating in a Fear Factor–type game show.
They were further told that they had the power to choose various ways that
other group members should receive punishment in the form of a painful
(but not lethal) shock. Members of stereotypically envied groups were most
often chosen.
I have stressed envy’s habit of transforming itself. For one thing, envy
begins to “feel” like resentment, and, if a misfortune occurs to the envied
person or group, it will “feel” deserved. Also, when schadenfreude is rooted
in envy, there arises yet another incentive toward action because the
envying person will not want to admit to his or her envious motive. Such an
admission would be to concede inferiority and unjustified hostility, which in
most people would cause shame. These are powerful reasons for people to
deny their envy. Who wants to admit inferiority, and who wants to admit
this as a reason to hate others? The shame in this blend is a terrifying threat
to one’s self-worth and, as so many scholars have pointed out, leads to all
sorts of less than conscious defensive strategies to avoid both the public
and private owning up to these feelings. The late social theorist Leslie
Farber put it well when he suggested that envy has a protean “talent for
disguise” that may fool others as well as “the envious one himself, whose
rational powers may lend almost unholy assistance to the need for self-
deception.”43 Thus, if the envied target is harmed, the deservingness of this
outcome is emphasized and justifications work backward, in part from the
action to the reason for the action. The target will be vilified, dehumanized,
and then seen deserving of this treatment. The invidious roots of this pattern
are usually well buried or camouflaged. Disgust rather than sympathy
prevails.44 As Mina Cikara, Susan Fiske, and others also suggest, the
addition of the intergroup element (“us” vs. “them”) probably enhances
these processes.45 Now, one is acting for the group and against the enemy.
Collective, group goals rather than personal “selfish” goals seem to be the
motivation for Germany and the Reich, rather than a personal grudge.
In Hitler’s case, as I argued earlier, once he could convince himself that
the Jews deserved his hate, without attributing to himself an envious
motive, he could vow to destroy them. And vow he did. In a speech to the
Reichstag in January 1939, he foretold the fate of the Jews. He claimed that,
during his long struggle, Jews laughed at his prophesies of gaining power
and enacting a “solution of the Jewish problem.” But he claimed that these
same Jews were “now choking” on this laughter. As if he believed he would
have the last laugh, he prophesied the “destruction of the Jewish Race in
Europe.”46

CIGARS AND COGNAC OVER PROBLEM SOLVED

On January 20, 1942, in the Berlin suburb of Wannsee, the SS led a meeting
of many leaders of the German bureaucracy whose cooperation would be
needed in enacting the full-scale, systematic genocide of the Jews. The
Wannsee Conference was chaired by Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Nazi
security agencies. Adolf Eichmann, who would later hold chief
responsibility for planning the killing operation, also attended, along with
various other SS officers and Nazi officials. The plans were not
unanticipated by the representatives; many already knew of mass killings
that had already been taking place as the German army advanced into
Eastern Europe. A written record survived from this meeting, only slightly
altered by euphemistic phrases to veil its full purpose. This record, along
with retrospective accounts obtained later from, for example, Israeli
interrogations of Eichmann, reveals the eager, accommodating attitude
attendees had for the plans.47 Given our understanding of schadenfreude, I
suspect there was more eagerness over it than we can know.48 But
investigation by Donald McKale indicates that, after the meeting, cigars and
cognac were shared merrily by Heydrich and other attendees. Eichmann,
himself, later recalled how satisfying it was to know that the “Popes of the
Third Reich” had put their seal of approval on the plan, thereby seeming to
rid everyone of doubts. He said, “At that moment, I sensed a kind of
Pontius Pilate feelings, for I felt free of guilt.”49
In his book on the Wannsee Conference, historian Mark Roseman also
infers that schadenfreude was part of how Heydrich and others Nazi leaders
felt about the meeting.50 It was probably true that almost all the attendees
supported the goal of exterminating the Jews, but there were a few sticking
points that might have created objections. One had to do with the many
Jews of mixed parentage or Jews who were married to non-Jews. Heydrich
probably expected that Wilhelm Stuckart of the Interior Ministry would
advocate greater protection of Jews in these categories. Not so. Just about
all of the officials voiced their desires to exterminate the Jews quickly and
completely. Eichmann’s recollections may reveal a desire to exaggerate the
enthusiasm of the attendees so as to lessen his own accountability—
nonetheless, this was his assessment:
[N]ot only did everyone willingly indicate agreement, but there was something else, entirely
unexpected, when they outdid and outbid each other, as regards the demand for a final
solution to the Jewish question. The biggest surprise, as far as I can remember, was not only
Bühler but above all Stuckart, who was always cautious and hesitant but who suddenly
behaved there with unaccustomed enthusiasm.51

Roseman notes that the “galvanized” Heydrich sent copies of the

protocol to the attendees.52 In an accompanying message, he wrote that
“happily the basic line” had now been “established as regards the practical
execution of the final solution of the Jewish question.”53 It was now
official. Genocide was the plan, and it was a cause for celebration.54
Schadenfreude in its most disturbing forms and guises was there to see,
whether envy was part of the formula for its presence or not. Interestingly,
the 2001 film Conspiracy, which attempted to recreate faithfully the actual
Wannsee Conference, has schadenfreude as a dominant theme throughout—
from the crude anti-Semitic jokes to the bursts of enthusiasm and rappings
on the table generated by each step in the direction of finalizing the plans
for the Jews’ annihilation. There are hints of the role of envy, masked, as
would be expected, by a transmuted righteous belief that the Jews deserved
this fate. At first, Stuckart (played brilliantly by actor Colin Firth), as the
historical record indicates, appears to have some resistance to the extreme
measures being proposed. He reminds everyone that he was the primary
author of the 1935 Nuremberg Laws establishing the legal definitions of
various categories of Jews that were the basis for codifying their
persecution. Indiscriminate deportation of Jews by the SS, in his view,
would create legal chaos. He overhears one of the SS officers saying to
another attendee that Stuckart must “love” the Jews. This triggers in him a
vigorous defense of his “credentials” as a hater of Jews, and a more
sophisticated one at that.
[F]rom your uniform I can infer that you’re shallow, ignorant, and naïve about the Jews.
Your line that the party rants on about is … is … how … how inferior they are some …
some … some species. … I keep saying how wrong that is. They are sublimely clever. And
they are intelligent as well. My indictments of that race are stronger and heavier because
they are real, not your uneducated ideology. … They are arrogant and self-obsessed and
calculating and they reject the Christ and I’ll not have them pollute German blood … he
doesn’t understand … deal with the reality of the Jew, and the world will applaud us. Treat
 them as … as imaginary fantasy evil, human fantasy, and the world will have justified
contempt for us. To kill them casually without regard for the law martyrs them … it will be
their victory … when you have my credentials, then we’ll talk about who loves the Jew and
who hates them.55

Stuckart, in this albeit imagined dialogue, breaks through the absurd

logic of those in the room who use their distorted beliefs of the inferiority
of the Jews to bolster their case for annihilation. He still wants them purged,
with a passion unsurpassed by anyone in the room, however. He manages to
justify this desire by embracing other negative stereotypes about Jews, as
Glick’s perspective on envious prejudice would predict. These attributes
seem enough for even Stuckart to discount the role envy may play in his
hatred toward these “sublimely clever” people.

SUFFERING SCHADENFREUDE FIRSTHAND

Through interviews and memoirs, survivors of the Holocaust leave no doubt
about the pleasure many Nazis and some Germans displayed over the
suffering of the Jews. It is more difficult to know the origins of this
pleasure. By reading these accounts and applying to them what we know
about human emotion and behavior, I think many clues can be uncovered.56
In one account, Soldiers and Slaves, Roger Cohen, columnist for The New
York Times, describes a series of events that played out toward the end of
World War II.57 Cohen follows the wretched experiences of a group of
about 350 men who were sent to the small East German town of Berga to
build an underground fuel-making factory. It was a preposterous plan that
had no realistic prospects of succeeding, but Germany was in desperate
need of gasoline for its war effort. Most of the men were American GIs who
had been captured by the Germans during the Battle of the Bulge, Hitler’s
last-gasp counteroffensive that took the advancing American forces by
surprise.58 Most were selected because they had Jewish-sounding names,
admitted to being Jews, or looked Jewish. None had the slightest notion that
they were now enmeshed in the Nazi plan to exterminate the Jews, even as
they were herded into cattle cars. Cohen relates their experiences, recalled
by the small proportion of men who managed to survive the circumstances
of their capture, their treatment as slave laborers, and the final death march
away from Berga as advancing American troops closed in on the region. He
parallels their experience with that of a Hungarian Jew named Mordecai
Hauer, who had also been sent to Berga after he and his family, along with
more than 500,000 largely unsuspecting Jewish citizens of Hungary, had
been efficiently rounded up by the Germans during the last phase of the
war.
There are a number of recurrent themes in the narrative. With some
exceptions, the German soldiers generally showed a clear hatred and
contempt for the prisoners. Any hint of insolence or disobedience was met
with instant, violent retaliation and further contempt. Humor and
schadenfreude—and sheer sadistic cruelty—were also common in the
camp. The guards’ responses to disobedience from the prisoner were often
to beat or execute one or more of them. The dead were usually suspended
from make-shift gallows as an example to the others, with the guards
taunting the dead with mocking humor.59 One survivor, Private William
Shapiro, struggling to comprehend the human depravity all around him,
recalled a time when a number of prisoners had suffered this fate. In
Cohen’s words:
Shapiro would cast a furtive glance at the gallows, anxious not to draw the attention of the
SS troopers whose cruelty was often on display. Growing up in the Bronx, he had been
shown photographs of a lynching in the South and had wondered at the smiling faces of the
white murderers. He had never seen a hanging.60

It is one thing to witness a lynching and to ponder its meaning, but when it
is accompanied by smiling faces,61 it creates disorientation:
Shapiro was at a loss. He had plunged into some netherworld where hangings were public
and terrified adolescents with yellow triangles on their sleeves were made to stand at
attention in the frigid air before being beaten with batons and rifle butts, but he could not say
what this hell was, how it had been constituted, why it existed.62

The experiences of Hauer, the Hungarian Jew, hint more directly at how
envy may have sometimes played a role in the vicious treatment of the Jews
and echoes many of the ways Germans had also treated Jews from Germany
and other countries. The Hungarian Jews thought they were protected from
the Nazis by an agreement made between the German and Hungarian
governments. As the war appeared to be coming to an end, most Jews did
not fear that this agreement would change. Eichmann himself showed up in
the early stages of the roundup to give a speech laced with lies that would
induce the Jews to be compliant, telling them that they were being taken to
camps for their own protection. However, as the situation deteriorated, the
more sober members of the community voiced “dire forecasts.” Hauer
intuited that many Hungarians resented and envied the Jews because of
their successes. He observed that many Hungarians:
[H]ated the Jews, hated them for saving money, for not drinking, for educating their
children, for moving up in the world. Now, with the Nazis in Hungary, every frustration
could be vented; all that the Jews had patiently amassed would be taken.63

Similar to what occurred in Germany and other countries, one

preoccupation of the round-ups involved inspecting possessions,64 notably
any valuable items. Hauer recalled his father saying that one Hungarian
official claimed that the Jews had “large amounts of gold and diamonds,”
and he wanted them for himself because “the Jews are leeches that suck the
blood of other people.”65 Cohen notes that Hauer felt “no amount of gold
would have satisfied this bigot from Budapest with his conviction that Jews
had plundered the wealth of Hungary.”66 It is hard to escape the view that
many Hungarians, like many Germans, envied the Jews and that the
disappearance of the Jews led to the benefit and satisfaction of many. Envy,
camouflaged by rationalized indignation and resentment, would help
explain why the Hungarians could do the things that they did to the Jews or
stand aside while the Nazis pursued their murderous goals. Hauer never
heard anyone say they envied the Jews, but it seemed in the air, no matter
how made over or masked.67
One of the puzzles raised by Cohen’s account is why the SS guards
continued to push the prisoners to their deaths and, further still, march them
away from the advancing American lines when it was clear that doing so
was foolish. It made their behavior more incriminating in the probable
event of their capture by the Allied forces.68 I have emphasized earlier that
a key point is that envy changes the nature of what one is “interested in.”
Envy inspires a hatred in which the most important goal is to bring the
envied person down, even if it is costly to the self in other ways. Arguably,
because of a mix of factors—envy being one—the Jews were hated in this
way. Here is Hauer’s recollection of what a newly arrived SS commander
said to the prisoners who were assembled for their march away from the
Berga camp:
 The enemy is nearing this town … but you won’t be left here. The war is not over yet. The
Fuhrer has promised us victory, and I believe him. He has a secret weapon, more terrible
than our enemies have ever known. This weapon will turn the tide in our favor! But even if
we should lose, there is nothing in it for you. You should know that I volunteered to serve in
the SS because I hate you dirty Jews. We have enough machine guns and ammunition to
execute a group ten times larger than you are.69

When the war was over and Hauer made the disheartening trip back to
his hometown in Hungary to search for survivors and evidence of prior life
preserved, he came to discover how much had been taken away. He went by
the house owned by a Dr. Grossman. It was one of the nicer homes in
Goncz, but Dr. Grossman, of course, no longer lived there, nor did any of
his family. They had all likely perished. In a cruel twist, the man who
opened the door was someone named Veres, a man reviled by Hauer and his
family. He had been an especially open anti-Semite and was proud of it. But
now, Veres was full of good cheer and claimed to be only watching over the
house until Grossman’s return. He also claimed to have tried to help
Hauer’s family when the Nazis overran the town. Hauer was invited to eat
with him and his wife to celebrate his surprise return home, but Hauer left
in disgust.
A few years later, Hauer ended up in the United States, where he would
carve out a good life for himself as a family man and as a teacher. But the
Auschwitz tattoo—A9092—would be forever on his arm. To a degree, he
was able to step back from the horrors he experienced and become almost
accepting. He could see, for example, the capacity for schadenfreude in
everyone, even himself. Cohen powerfully captures Hauer’s thoughts in this
way:
The dog was in every man, a beast that could be unleashed. That, at least, was Hauer’s
conclusion. Man was a divided being. In the right circumstances, with enough
encouragement, the dogs would rampage. He recalled how in the camps, on a bright day, he
might sit in the sun and feel happy for a moment as he crushed the lice that crawled all over
him. Killing them was some measure of revenge on a living thing actually weaker than him.
The pleasure was ephemeral. But in everyone there lurked some potential to find
contentment in another’s pain. In Germany, all constraint had been cast off, the beasts had
run wild.70

Hauer also found comfort, perhaps a little schadenfreude, in realizing

that Germans would have to live with the knowledge of what they had
done. This would be a heavy burden, and it was comforting to make such a
downward comparison. And Hauer was lucky, at least in the sense that he
survived. He, like the few lucky Americans soldiers who also survived,
picked up the pieces and had successful lives. GI William Shapiro returned
home, earned a medical degree, and had a long career as an obstetrician.
His sentence in the hell of the Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis ended
when, during the forced marched away from Berga, he and other fellow
soldiers were resting in a barn and heard the close advance of American
troops. Shapiro, emaciated and weakened, staggered out of the barn to see a
white star imprinted on a Sherman tank approaching his way. The SS
guards had scattered. An American jeep drove up, and Shapiro heard the
friendly words spoken by an American soldier, words that were in such
contrast to the barking commands he had heard from the guards: “Climb in,
soldier.” And with those three words, a better world welcomed him.71
 CHAPTER 11

HOW WOULD LINCOLN FEEL?

No one who actually knew the president ever quite understood Chevy Chase’s Saturday
Night Live impersonation of him as a genial dolt who stumbled over doorsteps. … Even the
slightest misstep was taken as more proof that this graceful and athletic man, who had
played on two national championship football teams at the University of Michigan and
turned down offers from the pros, was, in fact, a bumbler.
—JAMES A. BAKER III1

“He that is without sin among you, let him cast a stone at her.” And again he stooped
down, and wrote on the ground. And they which heard it, being convicted by their own
conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, even unto the last: And Jesus was
left alone, and the woman standing in the midst.
—JOHN 8:3–112

I am still a little afraid of missing something if I forget that, as my father snobbishly

suggested, and I snobbishly repeat, a sense of the fundamental decencies is parceled out
unequally at birth.
—NICK CARRAWAY, THE GREAT GATSBY3

One of my first bosses left a lasting impression on me. I helped him manage
a group of high school student employees at the movie theater I mentioned
in Chapter 5. Much of these kids’ banter was at each other’s expense.
Mistakes inspired ribbing, sometimes ridicule. This was mostly how they
entertained themselves between shows and after the concession rush. But
they did not behave this way around my boss. When he emerged from the
manager’s office to make his rounds, gather the cash, check the Coke syrup,
examine the ice chests, they would rein it in. It was not because they feared
him. They respected him, as did I.
The source of our respect was something indistinct at first. It was not his
physical presence. He was slight of build and had a pallor that caused him
to blend into the surroundings. But he made wise decisions under pressure.
Movie theaters usually run smoothly, but they are also only one broken
projector away from a frustrated public wanting its money back. And
sometimes boorish customers cause problems. To paraphrase Rudyard
Kipling, my boss kept his head when everyone about him was losing theirs,
even accepting blame for problems if this resolved the issue nicely.4 But
what really set him apart—and produced a kind of awe in me—was that I
never once saw him either criticize or make fun of another person. He liked
listening to jokes and saw the humor in people’s behavior, but he left
criticism to others and recoiled from unkind laughter.
It took a while for me to appreciate these things about him. I would
watch him closely, wondering if he would deviate from the pattern. He
never did. I soon found myself trying to copy him, so impressed was I with
his way of being. This proved impossible. My more judgmental nature
usually triumphed over my will. Even if I avoided making a critical remark
or suppressed a pleased reaction to someone’s small failure, the internal
judge in me failed to purge itself.
What enabled him to be this way? Partly, it was just the way he was. He
owned a greater capacity for empathy than the average person. But the more
I watched him, the more I realized that a big reason was that he understood
people better than we did. He had a highly developed understanding of what
caused people’s behavior, and this made him resistant to blaming people for
their failures. He had suffered his share of hard knocks. Only in his early
30s when I knew him, he was already losing his sight because of diabetes
that had struck him in early childhood. He would sometimes grab a candy
bar, throw some change in the cash drawer, and eat it quickly as he went
back to his office. Through the crack in the manager’s door, I had once seen
him injecting himself with insulin. He had only a high school education,
and I suspect that he missed an early opportunity to go college. For some
people, hardships make them resentful; in his case, these setbacks made him
alert to the circumstances that can hold people back. Many people make
quick negative judgments when seeing those around them fail (making it
easy to find humor in their failings). My boss’ instinct was to look for those
circumstances beyond their control that may have caused their failure. He
seemed temperamentally inclined to wonder what in their lives may have
constrained them to act as they did.
I reflect on my boss because, as I near the end of this book, it is worth
considering how we might curb our natural leaning to feel schadenfreude. I
hope it is clear from earlier chapters that schadenfreude often goes with the
grain of human nature rather than against it. But I think there is a lot we can
learn from my boss if we want to avoid making schadenfreude a habit. By
focusing on the situational factors that are often overlooked, the major
causes of other people’s misfortunes, we will feel empathy rather than
schadenfreude.

PERSONALITY IS THE DEFAULT EXPLANATION FOR

OTHERS’ ACTIONS
The consideration of situational factors is not so easily done, however—
there is at least one countervailing psychological bias that we need to
overcome, what social psychologists sometimes call the “fundamental
attribution error.” This bias refers to our dual tendencies to overattribute the
causes of other people’s behavior to their internal qualities along with
overlooking the possible role of situational causes. This bias goes precisely
in the opposite direction of what leads to empathy, producing schadenfreude
instead when others suffer.
I once saw a man get angry with a nurse in a hospital waiting room.
What a jerk, I thought. This was my quick, automatic reaction. But then I
caught myself. Some years earlier, I had also lost my patience with a nurse
in an emergency waiting room. My eldest daughter had hit her head while
playing on a slide and needed immediate medical attention. After an hour of
waiting, I had reached my limit with the triage system and had started
protesting insistently to a nurse. Soon, a doctor examined my daughter, and,
20 stitches later, we left the hospital. With the surfacing of this strong
memory, I questioned my initial reaction to the man’s behavior. I wondered
whether this man had a good reason for losing his cool, too.
We see a man get angry with a nurse and our quick inference is that he
must be a hostile person. This “explains” his behavior. He may be under
enormous emotional stress—but we usually settle for thinking “what a
jerk!” Unless we can put ourselves in the man’s shoes and discover the
situation from his perspective, this attributional bias will often prevail.5
This attributional bias has a direct bearing on how we react to the
misfortunes of others. If I perceive the misfortune of another to be the result
of that person’s internal disposition or moral failing, then I’ll probably think
he deserves what he gets and I may feel a rush of pleasure at his pain. If I
perceive his misfortune to be the result of the situation, then I may conclude
that he does not deserve it and I will feel empathy—not schadenfreude.
Let’s say I made the assumption that the man yelling at the nurse was
belligerent and selfish. In the moment, I had good reason to think so and I
might feel pleased if the nurse called a security guard. But what if, right
before I walked into the waiting room, the man had calmly asked the nurse
for an update on his wife’s condition, and the nurse had replied, “I need to
be honest with you. Your wife is not going to make it. I need to attend to
other patients.” Now we see the situation differently. The man’s behavior is
forgivable, even commendable. Anyone who witnessed the entire exchange
is unlikely to pigeonhole this man as a jerk.

A LESSON FROM STANLEY MILGRAM’S RESEARCH ON

OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY
Recognizing our strong tendency to make internal explanations for other
people’s behavior, and the accompanying tendency to ignore situational
causes, helps us avoid these tendencies when appropriate. But this
recognition is difficult to achieve. A good example to illustrate the point is
the classic research done on obedience to authority by social psychologist
Stanley Milgram. This research was conducted in the 1960s, but, even
today, it has the capacity to amaze. Most of the participants in Milgram’s
studies behaved in ways that seemed sadistic, and it is tempting to damn
them for it and to infer sadistic traits to explain how they acted. Indeed,
when I show a film made from these original studies, many students laugh
at the participants and set themselves above them—until they learn more
about the research. The procedure merits a close examination.
The participants were ordinary, mostly middle-aged men who responded
to an advertisement for paid participants in an experiment on learning on
the Yale University campus where Milgram was a professor. They showed
up, two at a time, or so it appeared, and were told that the experimenters
were interested in the effects of punishment on learning. One participant,
determined by drawing straws, was given the role of “teacher” and the other
the role of “learner.” In fact, the procedure was rigged so that the real
participant would always be the teacher. The other man was a stooge
pretending to be another participant. The “learner” was instructed to
memorize a list of word pairs with the expectation that the teacher would
call out the first word in each pair and ask him to complete the pair in
successive order. Each correct pairing would get a “good” and each
incorrect pairing would result in an increasingly intense shock delivered by
the teacher.
As the teacher watched, the learner was led to an adjacent room and
hooked up to what appeared to be electrodes. The teacher also received a
sample mild shock of 45 volts to show that the “shocks” would hurt, even at
a low level. The learner then revealed information that would have weighty
implication later on. He noted that a medical exam had detected a slight
heart condition and asked if the shocks were dangerous. The experimenter
responded confidently that they would be “painful” but cause “no tissue
damage.” All communication with the learner from this point was through
an intercom. Once in the control room, the teacher sat at a table facing an
apparatus used for delivering the shocks. This apparatus had a series of 30
switches representing successively higher volts of electricity. The 10th level
(150 volts) was labeled “Strong Shock”; the 17th level (255 volts) “Intense
Shock”; the 25th level (375 volts) “Danger, Severe Shock.” At the final
levels (435 and 450 volts), the control panel was marked “XXX,”
suggesting especially intense danger.6
At first, the learner did well (using a programmed sequence), but he soon
began making errors, requiring the teacher give him shocks by pressing
down the switches, each giving a harsh buzzing sound. At 75 volts the
learner responded with audible grunts, and at 120 volts, the learner shouted
that the shocks were painful. Groans of pain began at 135 volts, and, at 150
volts, the learner cried out, “Ugh!!! Experimenter! That’s all. Get me out of
here! I told you I had heart trouble. My heart’s starting to bother me now.
Get me out of here, please. My heart’s starting to bother me. I refuse to go
on. Let me out.”7 However, the experimenter calmly told the teacher to
continue, using a sequence of prods such as the “experiment requires that
you continue” and “you have no other choice, you must go on.” At 270
volts, the learner emitted an agonized scream as well as further emphatic
demands to stop the experiment. At 330 volts, the screams were intense and
prolonged, and the learner, sounding panicked, complained about his heart
and screamed once again to be let out. At the next voltage level, the
intercom went silent, implying the real possibility that the learner had
suffered a fatal heart attack.
What would you do if you were the “teacher” in this study? Milgram
addressed this question to three groups: psychiatrists, college students, and
middle-class adults, using a detailed summary of the procedure, complete
with a diagram of the control panel. All 110 respondents believed that they
would have disobeyed the experimenter at some point. Only four said they
would obey until the shocks reached 300 volts, the highest level that anyone
said they would go. The most common predicted level, for all groups, was
150 volts, and a typical explanation was “I can’t stand to see people suffer.
If the learner wanted to get out, I would free him so as not to make him
suffer pain.”8 Milgram worried these responses might reflect a degree of
vanity. He then asked respondents to predict how 100 other Americans
from diverse ages and occupations would respond. Figure 11.1 shows the
predictions made by the 39 psychiatrists, whose views were essentially the
same as the views of the other two groups. All who responded to the survey
felt that the end of the shock board was reserved for, as Milgram called it,
the “pathological fringe.”9 In fact, the group of psychiatrists predicted that
most people would not go beyond 150 volts, the point in the procedure
when the learner made his first demand to get out of the experiment.
I know of no more persuasive evidence for how easy it is to
underestimate the powerful influence of situational forces on behavior—
because all three of these groups were wildly inaccurate in their predictions.
The average percentage of actual participants (top line) behaved very
differently: 65 percent of participants in Milgram’s study not only went to
the highest shock level, but had to be asked by the experimenter to stop
giving the shocks. In summarizing the implications of the misaligned
predictions made by the three groups, Milgram presaged the idea of the
fundamental attribution error. He concluded that people assume that:10
Figure 11.1. Predicted vs. actual levels of obedience in the Milgram study.

Unless coerced by physical force or threat, the individual is preeminently the source of his
own behavior. A person acts in a particular way because he has decided to do so. Action
takes place in a physical-social setting, but this is merely the stage for its occurrence. The
behavior itself flows from an inner core of the person; within the core personal values are
weighted, gratifications assessed, and resulting decisions are translated into action. … Most
people start with the presuppositions of this sort. … They focus on the character of the
autonomous individual rather than on the situation in which he finds himself.11

Again, the implications for understanding schadenfreude are important.

Misfortunes often result from deliberate actions people have taken, making
them appear responsible and deserving of their suffering. But Milgram’s
findings suggest that we are unlikely to recognize the situational factors that
may have played a role in causing these actions. The situation “is merely
the stage”12 for their enactment. This means that internal qualities will seem
to explain these actions. They will fill in the causal gaps, usually making
the misfortunes seem more deserved—and amusing to this extent.

HOW MILGRAM’S RESULTS HELP UNDERSTAND

REACTIONS TO PREDATOR
Consider again To Catch a Predator, which I explored in Chapter 7, a
reality TV program that I argued uses humiliation as a main hook to appeal
to viewers. Each man who shows up with the apparent intentions of
engaging in sexual relations with a minor is doing something that the vast
majority of people assume that they themselves would not do. And so it is
natural to see the man’s behavior as an expression of a flawed, perverted
inner core. In fact, this assumption will seem catalyzed by the perceived
absence of countering situational factors. But might there be mitigating
factors? Some of these men might have been abused themselves, some may
have been more vigorously enticed than others, and some may have not
believed the decoy to be minor. Some may have been particularly
vulnerable to the clever, persuasive tactics used by the decoy. At the very
least, there is wide variation in how we might judge these men—branded
sexual predators—if we knew their stories. But the tendency to make the
fundamental attribution error generally, together with the manifest
abnormality and repulsiveness of the behavior, would discourage anyone
from looking for a more complete picture. As a packager of schadenfreude,
the show is not designed for situational analysis. It is improbable for these
men to be perceived as anything but wholly perverted creatures,
undeserving of our concern—even deserving of their humiliation, a
punishment that civilized society normally disallows. The show allows,
even encourages, viewers to delight in the downfall of these “predators.”
It is so easy, perhaps automatic, to infer dispositional, internal causes for
other people’s behavior—so much so that it can require focus and effort to
correct this initial, automatic inference even when situational factors
warrant it. A series of studies by Dan Gilbert and his colleagues shows this.
In one study, participants watched a video of a woman acting in a nervous
and anxious way while conversing with a man. Viewers could not hear the
conversation, but subtitles on the screen told them the topics being
discussed: embarrassing topics (e.g., sexual fantasies) in one condition and
mundane topics (e.g., hobbies) in another. As one would expect, subsequent
ratings of “dispositional anxiousness” were greater in the hobbies condition
than in the sexual fantasies condition. Highlighting this situational
constraint affected judgments, as viewers inferred that being asked to
discuss an embarrassing topic could make a person anxious. But if someone
was anxious when discussing hobbies, then “personality” was the stronger
cause of the anxious behavior. More interesting was what happened in two
additional conditions. Viewers watched one of the two videos, but this time
they were also asked to rehearse a set of word strings at the same time.
Ratings of dispositional anxiousness in both conditions resembled the rating
made in the ‘hobbies’ condition without the additional cognitive task.
Evidently, viewers having the additional, distracting task failed to take into
account the implications of the conversation topic on anxious behavior. The
woman acted in an anxious way, and therefore she was perceived as
dispositionally anxious.13
These and other experiments led to the conclusion that the causal
attributions for behavior we observe in others start by automatically
inferring a dispositional cause. The man gets angry with the nurse, he is a
hostile person; the man continues to shock the learner, he is a sadistic
person; the woman is behaving nervously, she is a nervous person, and so
on. There is a straight and easy path from behavior to inferring disposition
that requires little cognitive effort. We may then “correct” the dispositional
inference if we are made aware of situational factors that counter our initial
impression. The man is not a hostile person because his wife is severely
injured; the man is not sadistic because he is only doing what most people
would do in this situation; the woman is not an anxious person because she
is discussing an embarrassing topic. The problem is that correcting our first
impressions is much less automatic. And there are innumerable ways that
this correction will be prevented from ever happening. Furthermore, we
have a plentiful supply of seductive personality labels that are difficult to
avoid using (such as “jerk,” “sadist,” and “neurotic”) and fewer labels to
describe circumstances (such as “it was a tough situation”).14
Awareness of this attribution tendency provides at least an opportunity
for a more complex explanation for someone’s behavior, which might avert
the instant flow of guilt-free schadenfreude. There is a clear lesson to be
learned from our tendency to commit the fundamental attribution error: we
would do well to make a conscious effort to learn more about the
circumstances that might have caused a misfortune happening to another.
Situational factors will compete on an even playing field with dispositional
factors in our efforts to explain what happened. In the process, we might
find ourselves less likely to laugh or smile.

WISDOM FAVORS AVOIDING THE FUNDAMENTAL

ATTRIBUTION ERROR
It is certainly easy to find fun in the humiliation of people when we can
enjoy self-righteous superiority over them or when they appear to richly
deserve what they get. The strong tendency to make dispositional
attributions for other people’s actions is one reason this type of fun is so
common. But some people succeed better than others in resisting the
tendency. My boss was an example. I cannot think of a better way to sum it
up than to say that he had wisdom. Perhaps he also had a greater natural
empathy for others, but I think that life taught him to focus first on the
circumstances that can shape people’s behavior, especially if someone had
failed or suffered from his actions. When those around my boss were quick
to blame people for their failures, he bucked the instant consensus either by
his silence or by offering an alternative, less condemning explanation. Did
we ever catch him feeling schadenfreude? Of course. The emotion is part of
everyone’s DNA. But it was never malicious, and his wisdom moderated its
prevalence.
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE;
CHARITY FOR ALL
There was a touch of Abraham Lincoln in my boss. Lincoln is admired by
anyone who becomes familiar with the details of his life. Early in his
political career in the Illinois state legislature, he made the mistake of
making fun of a fellow legislator, James Shields, by publishing satirical
letters about him. Lincoln had used a pseudonym, but Shields found out,
felt his honor offended, and challenged Lincoln to a duel. Together with
friends on both sides, Lincoln found a way to convince Shields to call off
the duel, but not until it got close to happening. This experience taught
Lincoln important lessons. Ashamed by the incident, he avoided harsh
satire of others in print from then on. His stump speeches could be lively in
their pointed humor aimed at his opponents, but even this habit disappeared
over time.15 He was so talented in mimicry and so perceptive about the
human condition that these were hard habits to reverse completely, but
when he lapsed, he felt chagrined and apologized.16 He walked away from
fights, laughed off insults, and rejected opportunities to mock and
humiliate.17
Taking the perspective of others seemed to come naturally to Lincoln.
He learned how to handle people effectively through tact, which he once
defined as, “the ability to describe others as they see themselves.”18 Many
accounts of Lincoln’s life highlight the famous incident of his writing a
critical letter to General George Meade after the battle of Gettysburg.19
Lincoln had suffered many frustrations with his generals. There had been so
many missed opportunities due to incompetence or the lack of initiative in
these men, but the Union victory at Gettysburg could have been a fatal blow
to the Confederacy. After many clashes with terrible losses on both sides,
Meade had prevailed over the Confederate army under General Robert E.
Lee, causing Lee to retreat across the Potomac to regroup and to prevent
complete defeat. Retreat was slowed by flooding along the river, yet Meade
failed to take this opportunity to crush Lee’s army, despite explicit urgings
from Lincoln by telegraph and special messenger. Thus, Lee had the time to
build bridges that allowed his army’s escape. Meade’s failure to act
exasperated Lincoln, and he penned a letter expressing his feelings. This is
how part of it reads:
 My dear General … You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the
least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me,
pressingly pursue him, but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were
again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as
many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with
you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet
you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his
leisure, without attacking him. … I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the
misfortune involved in Lee’s escape. He was within our easy grasp, and to have closed upon
him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war
will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you
possibly do so south of the river, when you can take with you very few—no more than 2/3’s
of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect and I do not expect
that you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed
immeasurably because of it. … 20

Meade, sensitive to criticism, had already learned of Lincoln’s

frustration through other channels and had threatened to resign because he
felt the criticism undeserved. But Meade never read the letter. It was found
in Lincoln’s materials after his death. On this letter, Lincoln wrote, “To
Gen. Meade, never sent, or signed.” According to historians, Lincoln saw
no point in further upsetting General Meade, who had served the Union
cause mightily. As distressed as Lincoln was by Meade’s inaction, he was
able to suppress the impulse to send the letter.
Lincoln did not care for alcohol, especially whiskey, because he disliked
the effect it had on his thinking and on his self-control. But if others wanted
to drink, this was fine. In his early days, he frequented the company of
heavy drinkers and could enjoy their company even as he refused to drink.
Mostly notably, he did not condemn alcoholics, unlike many others who
did. In fact, he felt pity and compassion—because he recognized that
alcohol could often have special hold on even the best of people—this
“tyrant of spirits,” as he called it.21
 Lincoln’s sensitivity to the situational factors affecting other people’s
behavior was not at the expense of a sense of humor. Lincoln delighted in
jokes which, when he was present, were “plenty and blackberried,”22 even
bad puns. He was able to tell funny yarns about people so vividly that
people’s “sides were sore with laughing,” according to President Van
Buren.23 But he was rarely unkind in his joking.24 Lincoln used humor to
put people at ease. If he did laugh at people’s misfortunes, it was
amusement that recognized human frailties that he himself shared.25 Indeed,
much of Lincoln’s humor was directed at himself, especially at what he
considered his “ugly” face.26
And so, Lincoln, for all his remarkable talents for seeing the humor in
people’s behavior, matured into someone whose instincts leaned more
toward empathy than ridicule. Lincoln came to recognize the evils of
slavery, but he did not condemn Southerners for owning slaves. When
Southerners complained that slavery was a difficult system to eliminate, he
could appreciate this point. “I surely will not blame them,” he said, “for not
doing what I should not know how to do myself. If all earthly powers were
given me, I should not know what to do, as to the existing situation.”27
When he considered the matter carefully and imagined what kind of
Southerners that Northerners would be if they grew up in the South, he
thought, “They are just what we would be in their situation.”28 And yet, he
knew slavery was wrong, in part because he could imagine what being a
slave was like. To people who argued that slavery was “a very good thing,”
he noted that he had never come across someone eager to take advantage of
the opportunity “by being a slave himself.”29
Lincoln was a complex man, and I do not want to make a saint out of
him. My aim here is to suggest that, to the extent that he displayed traits
that we admire, he was also broad in his understanding of the causes of
other people’s behavior. His instincts, like those of my boss, led him to take
into account the situational constraints that can play a major role in
explaining people’s actions—which is at least one reason why he said
things such as, “I don’t like that man. I must get to know him better.”30 He
was also capable of seeing depravity in others when fitting, but in his
tendency to avoid the “fundamental attribution error,” he set a good
example for us all.
The additional lesson here is that we are less likely to have
schadenfreude dominate our reactions to another person’s misfortune if we
are able to focus on the situational factors causing the misfortune. Rather
than schadenfreude, the prevailing emotion should be empathy, as it was for
Lincoln, by all accounts. It is no accident that Lincoln was able to pen these
immortal lines from his second inaugural address: “With malice toward
none; with charity for all.”31
 CONCLUSION

The scandal? There was no need to be driven away by a little scandal. It would have been
painful, grotesque, but a scandal was after all a sort of service to the community.
—SAUL BELLOW, HERZOG1

[A]n apostle of peace will feel a certain vicious thrill run through him, and enjoy a
vicarious brutality, as he turns to the column in this newspaper at the top of which
“Shocking Atrocity” stands printed in large capitals.
—WILLIAM JAMES2

Until the late fall of 2009, Tiger Woods seemed to live a life approaching
perfection. After leaving Stanford University early to turn pro, he instantly
became the ascendant golfer on the professional tour. During the more than
a decade of dominance that followed, there were periods when he toyed
with the competition. He hit shots impossible for mere mortals, maintained
an astonishing level of focus, and carried himself with singular self-
assurance and poise. Unlike so many other golfers, he actually looked like
an athlete. “Tiger” was of a different breed of golfer, even a different breed
of man, and, at the age of 34, was within easy striking distance of eclipsing
the record of 18 major golf championships long held by “The Golden Bear,”
Jack Nicklaus. Woods became an international marketing phenomenon,
transcending the world of golf, and the income from many lucrative
endorsements propelled him into the near-billionaire class.3 Woods enjoyed
the kind of celebrity status that enabled him to double TV ratings with his
participation in a tournament.4 What was known about his well-guarded
personal life also added to the luster. He married a stunningly beautiful
Swedish woman who was a former fashion model. He had his own charity
organization, the Tiger Woods Foundation, dedicated to helping children
learn and achieve. His father, Earl Woods, had been able to say with
confidence that his son “will do more than any other man in history to
change the course of humanity.”5
But his fall from grace was quick and cataclysmic. On December 9,
2009, he was taken to a hospital for injuries suffered when he reportedly
crashed his Cadillac Escalade on his property in the early morning hours.6
The details of how and why this happened are unclear, but much evidence
suggested that there had been a domestic dispute caused by his wife’s
discovery of his apparently out-of-control infidelity. Within days, multiple
women claimed to have had affairs with Woods,7 and Woods himself, under
the pressure of burgeoning evidence, admitted to betraying his marriage
vows8 and voluntarily took a leave of absence from golf to get his personal
life in order. In a press conference, he apologized for selfishly hurting his
wife, family, friends, and fans.9
This was no ordinary fall, and the tabloid media leapt on this story. As a
milestone in the history of schadenfreude, the misfortunes of Tiger Woods
surely surpass the troubles of Martha Stewart. Indeed, the National
Enquirer was largely responsible for initially exposing Woods’s
infidelities,10 but it was deemed fair game for just about every respected
news outlet and internet venue.11 The general interest in this story was
broad and relentless, and schadenfreude was infused through many public
reactions. Soon came the jokes.12 “Tiger” was now the “Cheetah.”13 The
late-night talk show writers took full advantage, and the blogosphere
abandoned all constraint.14
Don Ohlmeyer, a longtime innovator in television sports and
entertainment generally, was working at the time as an ombudsman for
ESPN, the major sports network channel. His job was to provide
independent analysis of the business of producing sports television at
ESPN, and he found himself addressing how the network dealt with the
indiscretions of athletes, with Tiger Woods heading the list. It was clear that
viewers wanted to know everything about these indiscretions. Ohlmeyer
struggled to think through the difficult balancing act of maintaining high
journalistic standards while also feeding the monster that paid the bills. The
tabloids and talk shows fired up their engines to serve a public that delights
in the troubles of the rich, famous, and powerful, and then ESPN and other
“mainstream media tag along.”15 Ohlmeyer noted that the bottom line of
needing to serve the insatiable appetites of the public meant that ESPN had
to keep its headlights on the story, just like pretty much everyone else.
Coverage focusing on the misbehavior of Woods was what viewers wanted.
Many ESPN.com articles about Woods attracted an enormous increase in
viewer traffic compared to the average article. It seemed impossible to
withhold reporting the details of Woods’s story in light of this. Ohlmeyer,
whose experience and role as ombudsman give him considerable credibility,
concluded that “Schadenfreude … seems to be a contagion afflicting many
media outlets and their consumers.”16
One theme that I’ve carried through this book is that misfortunes
befalling others can bring us pleasure because, sometimes, we benefit from
these misfortunes—more than we are aware of or willing to admit. I argued
in Chapter 3 that this is true most obviously in competitive situations when
a rival suffers. We can easily infer that many other golfers on the
professional tour might have been secretly pleased by Woods’s troubles. It
is hard enough to win a professional tournament, especially a coveted
Major tournament, but the chances of winning were reduced to small odds
indeed when Woods was playing. Some golfers may have cursed the fates
to have their careers overlap with the reign of Tiger Woods. His fall from
grace provided an opening.
As natural as it may be to feel schadenfreude, I have also emphasized
that most of us are not quite sure that we ought to feel it, or at least disclose
feeling it. I can only suspect that other golfers felt happy over Woods’s
troubles. I am unaware of any golfer, at least in interviews for the national
press, who openly expressed schadenfreude. Most people are uncomfortable
with admitting schadenfreude, generally, but particularly if it seems inspired
by a selfish motive. It is verboten. Some on the pro tour acknowledged the
obvious: that their own rankings might rise in the wake of Woods’s
troubles. British golfer Lee Westwood noted that Woods’s situation made a
higher ranking for himself more within reach.17 At the time he made the
comment, he was ranked number 3 in the world, behind Woods at number 1
and Phil Mickelson at number 2.
I have underscored throughout this book that the way we compare with
others plays an important role in our self-esteem and in our emotional life.
Competition itself is a kind of social comparison process. If we had no
capacity to make social comparisons, then we would have no sense of what
rivalry means. It is largely through social comparisons that we understand
who has won and who has lost and through which we infer the levels of our
abilities and talents. Social comparisons are important building blocks for
self-assessments, self-evaluations, and the emotions enmeshed with these
judgments.
 Woods’s remarkable success on the golf course and the way he seemed
to realize perfection in almost every way a person can do so provided an
acute contrast for most people, even if they were not interested in golf.
Although some people might have been inspired by Woods, perhaps more
felt diminished. Those plagued by envy surely found some measure of joy
in his fall from grace. And, as inspiring as he might have been, many of us
would have preferred to be him rather than be in awe of him. For golfers in
particular, Woods probably changed the standards by which they judged
themselves. This also fits with the role of social comparisons in how we
judge our abilities and talents. Because of his physique alone, many on the
pro tour would look at themselves in the mirror and conclude that they
failed to measure up even before taking a swing. Often, it seemed as
though, when Woods was playing, all the other golfers were playing for
second. Ireland’s Padraig Harrington, reminiscing about Woods’s 15-stroke
victory in the 2000 U.S. Open, said, “I was there … I was playing in the
other tournament.”18 Ernie Els, paired with Woods in the final round and
with two U.S. Open championships to his own credit at that juncture, noted,
“It seems like we’re not playing in the same ballpark right now. … When
he’s on, you don’t have much of a chance.”19
The scandal around Woods’s affairs reduced that contrast between him
and other golfers. At the news conference where Woods, once such a
colossus, apologized, he was reduced to humbler dimensions. The stunning
personal and professional dimensions to this humbling undoubtedly
registered with golfers and other people across the board. Some may have
felt mostly pity and disappointment,20 but others are likely to have felt to
some degree boosted by the event.
As I have also stressed throughout this book, many instances of
schadenfreude can be explained by envy. We are most likely to envy people
who do better in areas important to us—those in the same line of work and
with similar aspirations. Envy is more intense and more hostile when it
represents a frustrated particular desire.
There is little doubt that envy of Tiger Woods could make some people
feel schadenfreude over his misfortune. For many pro golfers, of course,
Woods was no ordinary unflattering social comparison—he had all the
features that would create strong, potentially hostile envy. No doubt Woods
left a trail of frustrated, envious golfers in his wake as he racked up win
after win, usually in dominating fashion, sometimes humiliating his
competition—because they sometimes seemed to choke under pressure.
Becoming a pro golfer is no easy process; golf is an extremely difficult
game, and the competition to get on and to stay on tour is fierce.
Nonetheless, I imagine that most felt like they were playing Salieri to
Woods’s Mozart.
I highlighted in Chapters 9 and 10 that people will rarely admit to envy,
particularly the hostile kind. Because of his apparently sterling moral
qualities, it was especially unacceptable to express hostile envy of Woods; it
would have come across as mean and spiteful. Ironically, exactly because
other pro golfers would be most primed for schadenfreude—because of
their gain, because of a relief from a painful, envy-producing social
comparison—I suspect that they were unwilling to express it openly. This
was left to the tabloids, the late-night talk shows, the blogosphere, and other
venues.
Another important factor in understanding public reaction to Woods’s
fall had to do with whether it seemed deserved. Deserved misfortunes
produce more schadenfreude than undeserved misfortunes, another frequent
theme in this book. We are pleased when a person gets his just desserts,
even if it means that he’ll suffer intensely as a result. The fact that Woods
was solely responsible for his own downfall was a constant feature in many
voiced reactions. Interestingly, a year before his extramarital affairs were
revealed, Woods had taken a leave from the game because of a knee injury
and the surgery it required. This may have pleased some, at least privately,
for reasons we know well, but the general tenor of public reactions among
golfers and fans was outwardly sympathetic. This dramatically changed
following the revelations of infidelity, especially as the number and nature
of his affairs quickly came to light.21 His duplicity seemed extreme. After
the birth of his son, he had placed a photo on his Web site with his baby and
wife, suggesting perfect marital bliss. Woods had been extremely careful at
crafting an image of a perfect life while apparently having affair after affair.
The crafted image was clearly false. Did he begin to believe his father’s
prediction that he would “do more than any other man in history to change
the course of humanity”?22 When the information about the affairs surfaced,
most people thought that he deserved the negative consequences—and were
pleased.
It could have been worse for Woods. He was not someone to criticize
others for their misbehaviors. His fault was in raising himself high rather
than pointing out the failings of others. He was nonetheless faulted for
maintaining an illusion of spotless living and for letting down those who
believed in him. Other golfers spoke of Woods’s deserving the negative
publicity. The South African Ernie Els, who had been so completely
humbled by Woods when they had been paired with each other in the 2000
U.S. Open, criticized the timing of the press conference at which Woods
gave his apology. It overlapped with the start of a tournament in which
Woods was no longer participating, thus hurting the sponsors. “It’s selfish,”
said Ernie Els to Golfweek Magazine. “You can write that.”23 In Chapter 6,
I argued that the perception of the deservingness of a misfortune is more
acute when we have felt personally mistreated. Els, although highly
accomplished in his own right and admired on and off the links,24 may have
felt a measure of personal humiliation over his U.S. Open drubbing, but
there may have another reason. Although Woods rarely criticized other
golfers, there was at least one exception. In September 2009, Woods was
asked about how Els was responding to surgery to repair a torn anterior
cruciate ligament (ACL). Woods, who had just gone through the same
surgery, praised Els, but then noted: “Ernie is not a big worker physically
and that’s one of the things you have to do with an ACL injury. I feel pretty
good with what I’ve done and I think Ernie could have worked a little bit
harder.”25 Not only did he suggest Els was a bit lazy, he also contrasted
Els’s behavior with his own. For Els, the comparison must have hurt. In my
opinion, it would be asking too much of Els not to feel a touch of
schadenfreude when Woods’s troubles emerged. I should emphasize Els’s
sterling qualities. When he was accepting the trophy for winning the 2012
British Open, he took time to thank former South African President Nelson
Mandela (who had just turned 94) for what he had done for South Africa.26
This was a stirring moment.
The comments of Jesper Parnevik, another pro golfer, also stand out.
When Woods crashed his SUV, it was reported that Elin Nordegren,
Woods’s then-wife, used a golf club to break open a window so that she
could extricate him from the car. Parnevik suggested that Nordegren “use a
driver next time instead of a 3-iron.” Why? In 2000, Parnevik and his wife
had employed Nordegren as a nanny and had introduced her to Woods in
2001. Three years later, they were married. Parnevik, in some small way
responsible for their marriage, felt sorry for her. He took Woods’s betrayal
of Elin personally. He said, “We probably thought he was a better guy than
he is.”27

STEPPING BACK FOR A MOMENT

Exploring the reasons why we feel schadenfreude over misfortunes such as
what happened to Tiger Woods was the purpose of this book. However, as I
have noted in earlier chapters, my focus on schadenfreude is not meant to
overplay this reaction to another person’s suffering—as natural and
common a human emotion as I think it is.

Let’s start with Homer Simpson, who is clearly prone to feeling

schadenfreude when Ned Flanders fails. It is Homer’s pleasure at seeing
Ned’s “Leftorium” do poorly that prompts Lisa to define the emotion for
Homer. Toward the end of the episode, however, Homer has had his fill of
feeling good when his friend is suffering, and he suddenly feels terrible for
Ned who is about to lose all this property and savings “for a pig and
poke.”28 Homer begins to cry over Ned’s troubles and is weighed down
with guilt over his earlier wishing for Ned’s failure and over his pleasure
when this did indeed happen. He leaps into action to save the business. He
calls everyone he knows who is left-handed and urges them to go to the
store to buy something. Soon it seems that all of Springfield are making
their way to the store. In an ending echoing the final scene of Frank Capra’s
It’s a Wonderful Life, when the townspeople of Bedford Falls come to the
aid of George Bailey, the citizens of Springfield buy everything from can
openers to accountant ledgers, all designed for the left-handed. Homer and
Ned are now bosom buddies:
NED: Homer, affordable tract housing made us neighbors … you made us friends.
HOMER: To Ned Flanders, the richest left-handed man in town.29

The ended closes with Ned’s son leading everyone in the song “Put on a
Happy Face.” It is a heartening ending without a trace of envy or
schadenfreude. The inspired writers of this popular and long-lasting show
surely knew that schadenfreude should neither be the whole story nor be the
way to bring it to a close.
I ended Chapter 2 with the example of Bertie Wooster taking delicate
pleasure in the knowledge that Constable Oates had to stand guard in the
cold rain outside Bertie’s window. No one had thought to tell Oates that
Bertie was no longer a suspect in the theft of the cow creamer and no longer
needed to be guarded. The thought of this caused Bertie to sigh contentedly
and provided “a curiously mellow sense of happiness.” Even so, few
readers would accuse Bertie of being a sadist. Oates had treated Bertie
abominably and, in the comic spirit of the novel, he richly deserved a few
hours of discomfort. Until this point, Bertie had been imposed upon and
mistreated by friends and foes alike and had suffered humiliations and
physical injuries, all as he strove to satisfy the wishes of family and friends.
Furthermore, he only experienced full contentment when he also knew that
he had succeeded in actually helping them. He managed things so that his
Aunt Dahlia could keep her cherished cook, his uncle could get a prized
cow creamer, and a friend could acquire the permission to marry the girl of
his dreams. The title of the novel, The Code of the Woosters, refers to the
Woosters’ credo to “never let a pal down”—largely the reason why Bertie
gets enmeshed in these unpleasant situations. The end of a perfect day
contains but a dusting of schadenfreude, adding a little spice to the
knowledge that his friends and family have what they want.
 And yet schadenfreude may almost always have a perverse feel to it,
precisely because it is a feeling prompted by another’s suffering. Our
capacity to feel schadenfreude speaks to a side of human nature about
which most of us are uneasy. For good reason, if we dwell for a moment on
the appeal of humilitainment and on the insidious path from envy, to anti-
Semitism, and then to pleasure in genocide. This is why the title of this
book includes the word “dark.”
While writing this book, I requested daily Google alerts signaling any
story on the electronic media where the word schadenfreude was used. I
averaged around two to three or so examples per day, and it was rare to find
people admitting the feeling without an excuse. People would say, “I know
I shouldn’t have felt it but …” or “I have to admit that I couldn’t help
feeling …” Maybe this is one reason why there is no word for
schadenfreude in English. It is a feeling that recoils from giving itself a
label.30
But I agree with philosophers John Portmann and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev that
the emotion need not be demonized.31 I was struck by readers’ reactions to
a lighthearted column posted on the Chronicle of Higher Education Web
site by a professor of English writing under the pseudonym “Alice Fenton.”
The column entitled “The Pleasures of Seeing the Deserving Fail” began by
stating the delights of successful teaching, but then noted that, equally
pleasurable although “much less discussed, are a series of what might be
called negative victories.”32 Fenton described several variants, ranging from
the irksome student who drops out to the student who fails but thoroughly
deserves it. In other words, some students are simply hard to like.
She was wise not to give her real name. A passionate reaction quickly
arose from many readers. Of the 101 comments I scanned, over half (52)
were unambiguously critical and, of these, 32 were scathing.

• I want to take a shower after reading this piece. What’s bad is that it’s
filled with pettiness and schadenfreude.
• What a horrid little essay.
• … to take pleasure in the ignorance, messed-up life, or dwindling life
opportunities of a young person? That is a form of evil.
• She sounds like a bit of a sadist to me, taking pleasure in others’
shortfalls. Shame on you, Alice …!
 • Fenton’s approach is simple-minded and hateful.
• What a sad, spiteful harpy.
• This essay is the product of a warped mind.

Fenton’s honesty swiftly alienated her from over half of those

responding—despite other passages in the article that emphasized the many
joys she got from teaching, such as when the faltering student blossoms
after much effort on both sides. There was no sense that the cases of
schadenfreude were the prevalent part of her experience. Nor was she
arguing that the emotion should be nourished. Rather, she was being
unapologetically candid about the full range of emotions she felt as a
college teacher, a profession that seems increasingly undervalued. For her
troubles, many commenters, using rhetoric perhaps sharpened by the mostly
unsigned nature of the postings, concluded that she was either a disturbed,
hateful person or an embittered burn-out—and an incompetent teacher—or
a blend of all of the above.
She had her strong supporters. This was my favorite:

Oh, for the love of Pete. Why is everyone so snippy? I thought this was a funny essay at a
stressful time of term. I glory in the success of my students; I don’t gloat or wish their
failures, but I certainly recognize some of the scenarios “Alice” describes, and she’s not
asking us to let loose daily with our negative emotions, but simply allowing us a minute or
two to sheepishly admit to one another that we do sometimes have petty feelings, and that
it’s perfectly natural.33

Fenton herself was unprepared for the responses she received, especially
the hateful ones. After all, her experiences of schadenfreude were rare, and
she was careful to start her comments by emphasizing the reasons to
celebrate teaching. I saw no reason to disbelieve her. In fact, I thought that
her admission of occasional schadenfreude gave her greater overall
credibility. In another column in which she responded to the criticism,
Fenton summed up her own defense well:
To be human is to be unpleasant as well as pleasant. … Anger, dislike, weariness,
schadenfreude: Those are all, for me, parts of human experience. That does not mean those
emotions rule people, but it does mean they are there sometimes.34

Yes, schadenfreude is there—sometimes—and perhaps more in gray

hues rather than in darkest black. In fact, most instances of schadenfreude
may occur in quickly passing traces. These traces originate from the stories
we choose to read as we surf the internet or from the gossip we overhear. If
we are watching a golf match, schadenfreude will be part of the ebb and
flow of the event, depending on whether we want a particular golfer to do
well or poorly. Tiger Woods sends his ball into the water: schadenfreude—
if we don’t like him. A politician from an opposing party commits an
embarrassing gaffe as election night approaches: schadenfreude. We see
that a player for a rival basketball team that we detest gets injured: a mild
rush of schadenfreude because the team will suffer—but sympathy for the
player as well. A person whom we envy at work comes back from a
vacation with an extra roll of fat around her middle or the hairline of a rival
is receding surprisingly quickly: schadenfreude. Most of us, like Bertie
Wooster, are basically good-natured and rarely wish severe problems on
others, but we are not above taking pleasure in mild misfortunes when they
are deserved. It is the rare person who acts on these fantasies, however. We
rely on fate or acts of God. When the desired misfortunes fail to happen, we
simply feel secret disappointment. A recently coined word for this feeling is
glückschmerz—but that is another story.35
NOTES
 Introduction
1. From http://www.snpp.com/episodes/7F23.html, retrieved April 5,
2010. I take this example from Powell, C. A. J., Smith, R. H., & Schurtz, D.
R. (2008), Pleasure in an envied person’s gain, in R. H. Smith (Ed.), Envy:
Theory and research (pp. 148–164), New York: Oxford University Press.
 2. From http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/schadenfreude,
retrieved May 24, 2012.
 3. Howard, R. (Director) (1995), Apollo 13 [film], Los Angeles: Image
Entertainment. The film is an adaptation of real events. I do not claim actual
knowledge of Jim Lovell’s or Alan Shepard’s behavior and feelings.
 4. See http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2010-05-06/news/christian-
right-leader-george-rekers-takes-vacation-with-rent-boy/, retrieved May 16,
2010.
 5. See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/opinion/16rich.html,
retrieved May 16, 2010.
6. Ibid.
 7. See
http://blogs.miaminewtimes.com/riptide/2010/05/rekers_on_the_record.php
, retrieved May 16, 2010; http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2010-05-
06/news/christian-right-leader-george-rekers-takes-vacation-with-rent-
boy/1, retrieved May 28, 2010;
http://blogs.miaminewtimes.com/riptide/2010/05/george_rekers_is_a_homo
sexual_says_escort.php, retrieved May 28, 2010; and
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/archives/2010/05/more_on_geor
ge.php, retrieved May 28, 2010.
 8. See http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/the-age-of-
schadenfreude/, retrieved December 17, 2011.
 9. See
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/observer/2005/
march-05/reality-check.html, retrieved January 12, 2011.
 10. Steinbeck, J. (2008), The grapes of wrath, New York: Penguin. This
novel was first published in 1939, p. 349.
 11. de Waal, F. B. M. (2009), The age of empathy: Nature’s lessons for a
kinder society, New York: Harmony Books; Keltner, D. (2009), Born to be
good: The science of a meaningful life, New York: W. W. Norton;
McCullough, M. E. (2008), Beyond revenge: The evolution of the
forgiveness instinct, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
 12. Baer, R. A. (Ed.) (2005), Mindfulness-based treatment approaches:
Clinician’s guide to evidence base and applications, New York: Academic;
Diener, E., & Biswas-Diener, R. (2008), Happiness: Unlocking the
mysteries of psychological wealth, New York: Wiley-Blackwell; Emmons,
R. (2007), Thanks! How the new science of gratitude can make you happier,
New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt; Seligman, M. E. P. (2011), Flourish:
A visionary new understanding of happiness and well-being, New York:
Free Press.
 13. See
http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/1inaug.htm,
retrieved August 1, 2012.
 Chapter 1
1. Cited in Heider, F. (1958), The psychology of interpersonal relations,
New York: John Wiley & Sons, p. 285.
2. Snyder, D. J. (1997), The cliff walk, New York: Little, Brown.
 3. See http://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/, retrieved May 14,
2010.
 4. Brickman, P., & Bulman, R. (1977), Pleasure and pain in social
comparison, in J. M. Suls & R. L. Miller (Eds.), Social comparison
processes: Theoretical and empirical perspectives (pp. 149–186),
Washington, DC: Hemisphere; de Botton, A. (2004), Status anxiety, New
York: Pantheon; Festinger, L. (1954), A theory of social comparison
processes, Human Relations, 7, 117–140; Fiske, S. T. (2011), Envy up,
scorn down: How status divides us, New York: Russell Sage Foundation;
Frank, R. H. (1999), Luxury fever, New York: Free Press; Marmot, M.
(2004), The status syndrome, New York: Times Books; Mussweiler, T.
(2003), Comparison processes in social judgment: Mechanisms and
consequences, Psychological Review, 110, 472–489; Smith, R. H. (2000),
Assimilative and contrastive emotional reactions to upward and downward
social comparisons, in L. Wheeler & J. Suls (Eds.), Handbook of social
comparison: Theory and research (pp. 173–200), New York: Kluwer
Academic Publishers; Stapel, D., & Blanton, H. (Eds.) (2006), Social
comparison: Essential readings, Brighton, NY: Psychology Press; Tesser,
A. (1991), Emotion in social comparison and reflection processes, in J. M.
Suls & T. A. Wills (Eds.), Social comparison: Contemporary theory and
research (pp. 115–145), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum; Suls, J. M., & Wheeler, L.
(Eds.) (2000), Handbook of social comparison: Theory and research, New
York: Plenum Press.
 5. See http://www.frasieronline.co.uk/episodeguide/season5/ep17.htm;
and
http://www.kacl780.net/frasier/transcripts/season_5/episode_17/the_perfect
_guy.html, retrieved April 8, 2013.
 6. Quoted in Baumol, W. J., & Blinder, A. S. (2010), Economics:
Principles and policy, Mason, OH: Cengage Learning.
 7. Summers, A., & Swan, R. (2006), Sinatra: The life, New York:
Vintage Books, p. 81.
 8. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5QvSoRQrVJg, retrieved
June 15, 2010.
 9. Rousseau, J. (1984), A discourse on inequality, New York: Viking
Penguin (orginally published in 1754; trans. Maurice Cranston).
10. Ibid., p. 114.
11. Much of this analysis was taken from Smith (2000).
12. Festinger (1954).
13. Fiske (2011).
 14. Morse, S., & Gergen, K. J. (1970), Social comparison, self-
consistency, and the concept of the self, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 16, 148–156.
 15. Baumeister, R. F., & Bushman, B. (2008), Social psychology and
human nature (1st ed.), Belmont, CA: Wadsworth; Kernis, M. H. (Ed.)
(2006), Self-esteem issues and answers: A sourcebook of current
perspectives, New York: Psychology Press; Tesser, A. (1988), Toward a
self-evaluation maintenance model of social behavior, in L. Berkowitz
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. 21 (pp. 181–227),
New York: Academic Press.
 16. van Dijk, W., van Koningsbruggen, G. M., Ouwerkerk, J. W., &
Wesseling, Y. M. (2011), Self-esteem, self-affirmation, and schadenfreude,
Emotion, 11, 1445–1449.
 17. van Dijk, W., Ouwerkerk, J. W., Wesseling, Y. M., &
Koningsbruggen, G. M. (2011), Toward understanding pleasure at the
misfortunes of others: The impact of self-evaluation threat on
schadenfreude, Cognition and Emotion, 25, 360–368.
 18. See
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/François_de_La_Rochefoucauld,
retrieved May 3, 2012.
 19. Buss, D. (2012), Evolutionary psychology: The new science of the
mind (4th ed.), New York: Allyn & Bacon. Also see a similar analysis in
Smith (2000) and in Smith, R. H., & Kim, S. H. (2007), Comprehending
envy, Psychological Bulletin, 33(1), 46–64.
 20. Evolutionary perspectives also highlight that altruistic tendencies,
especially toward kin, should be adaptive. It’s not that the individual
survives, but that his or her offspring survives. Offspring carry the
individual’s genetic material, and so tendencies that enhance the survival of
kin should provide an evolutionary advantage.
 21. Described in Fletcher, G. J. O. (2002), The new science of intimate
relationships, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.
22. Frank (1999), pp. 135–136.
23. See Smith (2000) and Smith & Kim (2007).
24. de Botton (2004); Fiske (2011); Marmot (2004).
25. Buss (2012).
 26. Brosnan, S. F., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2003), Monkeys reject unequal
pay, Nature, 425, 297–299.
 27. See
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21773403/ns/technology_and_science-
science/, retrieved November 28, 2009.
 28. Boswell, J. (1904), Life of Johnson, Oxford: Oxford University
Press (originally published in 1781).
 29. Range, F., Horn, L., Viranyi, Z., & Hube, L. (2008), The absence of
reward induces inequity aversion in dogs, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, doi: 10.1073/pnas.0810957105, retrieved April 10,
2010.
 30. Lindhom, C. (2008), Culture and envy, in R. H. Smith (Ed.), Envy:
Theory and research (pp. 227–244), New York: Oxford University Press.
 31. Alicke, M. D., & Govorun, O. (2005), The better-than-average
effect, in M. D. Alicke, D. A. Dunning, & J. I. Krueger (Eds.), The self in
social judgment (pp. 85–106), New York: Psychology Press. This effect is
also referred to as the “Lake Wobegon effect” in reference to the imaginary
community in Garrison Keiller’s NPR show, The Prairie Home Companion,
“where all the women are strong, all the men are good-looking, and all the
children are above average.” See http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/,
retrieved May 5, 2012.
 32. See
http://www.digitaldreamdoor.com/pages/quotes/george_carlin.html,
retrieved September 1, 2012.
 33. Dunning, D. (2005), Self-insight: Roadblocks and detours on the
path to knowing thyself, New York: Psychology Press; Taylor, S. E., &
Brown, J. (1988), Illusion and well-being: A social psychological
perspective on mental health, Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193–210.
 34. Baumeister, R. F. (1989), The optimal margin of illusion, Journal of
Social and Clinical Psychology, 8, 176–189.
 35. I take many of the examples here about Crane’s novel from a more
extensive treatment in Smith (2000).
 36. Crane, S. (1952/1895), The red badge of courage, New York:
Signet, p. 21.
37. Ibid., p. 47.
38. Ibid., p. 92.
39. Ibid., p. 68.
40. Ibid.
 41. Although The Red Badge of Courage is fictional, it has the feel of
an absorbing documentary. Crane was in his early twenties when he wrote it
and had no experience in battle, but he was able to imagine the feelings a
soldier might have and why. Indeed, this may have been one of his main
goals in writing the book. During the period when he wrote it, he spent
many hours in the New York studio of a painter friend, Corwin Linson, who
saw him sift through many accounts of Civil War battles. See Linson, C. K.
(1958), My Stephen Crane, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
 42. McCall, N. (1995), Makes me wanna holler: A young black man in
America, New York: Vintage.
43. Ibid., p. 12.
44. Ibid., p. 13.
45. Ibid., p. 14.
46. Ibid., p. 17.
47. Ibid., p. 215.
48. Ibid., p. 263.
49. Ibid., p. 300.
50. Ibid., p. 351.
51. Ibid.
 Chapter 2
1. Jones, G. (1996), I lived to tell it all, New York: Bantam Doubleday,
p. 5.
 2. Quoted in Sandage, S. A. (2005), Born losers: A history of failure in
America, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 277–278.
 3. See http://www.condenaststore.com/-sp/A-businessman-on-a-plane-
thinks-it-s-not-enough-that-I-fly-first-class-New-Yorker-Cartoon-
Prints_i8545335_.htm Leo Cullum, retrieved March 30, 2013.
 4. See
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/g/george_carlin_2.html#
CjVhwQkdRa8G3eEB.99, retrieved April 22, 2012.
 5. See http://proof.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/drunkenfreude/,
retrieved December 5, 2009.
 6. Cheever also couched her “drunkenfreude” in the context of what she
was able to learn from their behavior. She met many partygoers whose fine
behavior left them unmemorable. It was the inebriated whose outrageous
behavior was most instructive. She learned more about what not to do by
watching those who embarrass themselves than she learned to do by
watching the well-behaved and sober.
 7. See http://proof.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/drunkenfreude/,
retrieved December 5, 2009.
 8. For an interesting empirical analogue, see Pyszczynski, T.,
Greenberg, J., & LaPrelle, J. (1985), Social comparison after success and
failure: Biased search for information consistent with a self-serving
conclusion, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 195–211;
Wills, T. A. (1981), Downward comparison principles in social psychology,
Psychological Bulletin, 90, 245–271.
 9. See http://kenlevine.blogspot.com/2007_12_01_archive.html,
retrieved March 21, 2011.
 10. See
http://www.nj.com/entertainment/celebrities/index.ssf/2007/08/beauty_quee
ns_map_quest.html, and http://www.theage.com.au/news/people/beauty-
queen-left-searching-for-answers/2007/08/29/1188067160206.html,
retrieved March 21, 2011.
 11. See
http://www.zimbio.com/Lauren+Caitlin+Upton/articles/IifvXCVcaBc/Caitli
n+Upton+Miss+Teen+South+Carolina+Learns, retrieved March 21, 2011.
 12. See http://www.nickburcher.com/2007/12/2007s-most-watched-
best-youtubeclips.html, retrieved March 21, 2011.
 13. See
http://www.stupidityawards.com/Stupidest_Statement_of_the_Year.html,
retrieved March 21, 2011.
 14. See http://www.urbanmoms.ca/juice/2007/12/top-ten-quotes-of-
2007.html, retrieved March 21, 2011; http://poplicks.com/2007/12/best-
quotes-of-2007.html, retrieved March 21, 2011; and
http://deathby1000papercuts.com/2007/12/the-27-most-outrageous-quotes-
of-2007/, retrieved March 21, 2011.
 15. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/gallery/121907_top10quotes?
pg=3, and http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1959512020071219?
loc=interstitialskip retrieved March 21, 2011.
 16. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lj3iNxZ8Dww, retrieved
March 21, 2011.
 17. See
http://www.cincihomeless.org/content/downloads/Bumfights.pdf., retrieved
December 5, 2009.
 18. See http://vyuz.com/022706_Bumfights.htm, retrieved December 5,
2009.
19. Wills (1981).
 20. Wert, S. R., & Salovey, P. (2004), A social comparison account of
gossip, Review of General Psychology, 8, 122–137.
21. Wills (1981), p. 246.
22. Ibid.
 23. Diener, E., Fraser, S. C., Beaman, A. L., & Kelem, R. T. (1976),
Effects of deindividuation variables on stealing among Halloween trick-or-
treaters, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 178–183;
Festinger, L., Pepitone, A., & Newcomb T. (1952), Some consequences of
deindividuation in a group, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 47,
382–389; Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (1998), Deindividuation and anti-
normative behavior: A meta-analysis, Psychological Bulletin, 123, 238–
259; Zimbardo, P. G. (2007), The Lucifer effect: Understanding how good
people turn evil, New York: Random House.
24. Wills (1981), p. 246.
 25. Hobbes, T. (1968), Leviathan, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 35
(originally published in 1651).
26. Ibid.
27. Wills (1981), p. 260.
28. Ibid.
 29. See http://www.guy-
sports.com/humor/comedians/comedian_groucho_marx.htm, retrieved May
17, 2012.
 30. See http://www.corsinet.com/braincandy/ins-fmen.html, retrieved
May 17, 2012.
 31. See http://www.thewrap.com/tv/column-post/jon-stewart-accept-it-
gop-mittromneys-your-man-video-32710, retrieved November 13, 2011;
another safe target is the self: there is no way to insult the audience if the
focus is on the joketeller himself.
 32. Gruner, C. R. (1997), The game of humor: A comprehensive theory
of why we laugh, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, p. 8; see also
Ferguson, M. A., & Ford, T. E. (2008), Disparagement humor: A theoretical
and empirical review of psychoanalytic, superiority, and social identity
theories, Humor: Interrnational Journal of Humor Research, 21, 283–312;
La Fave, L., Haddad, J., Maesen, W. A. (1996/1976), Superiority, enhanced
self-esteem, and perceived incongruity humor theory, in A. J. Chapman &
H. C. Foot (Eds.), Humor and laughter: Theory, research and applications
(pp. 63–91), New York: John Wiley & Sons; Zillman, D., & Cantor, J. R.
(1976), A disposition theory of humor and mirth, in A. J. Chapman & H. C.
Foot (Eds.), Humor and laughter: Theory, research and applications (pp.
93–116), London: Wiley.
 33. As with Hobbes, Gruner also emphasizes that the laughter
component of humor is related to suddenness of the victory.
 34. For a recent evolutionary analysis, see Martens, J. P., Tracy, J. L., &
Shariff, A. F. (2012), Status signals: Adaptive benefit of displaying and
observing the nonverbal expressions of pride and shame, Cognition and
Emotion, 26, 390–406.
 35. See
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/melbrooks161275.html#J3q3
MoD2rU1HwY8u.99, retrieved April 22, 2012.
36. For a review, see Ferguson, & Ford (2008).
 37. Martin, R. A. (2007), The psychology of humor: An integrative
approach, London: Elsevier.
38. Wills (1981), p. 260.
 39. See http://www.harrypotterspage.com/category/j-k-rowling/,
retrieved January 5, 2012. As Lev Goldman noted in a tribute to Wodehouse
in Time magazine: “His subject was the foibles of the pre-war English
aristocracy, which sounds limiting, but it was his subject the same way
marble was Michelangelo’s subject. He could do anything with it.” See
http://entertainment.time.com/2011/11/23/in-praise-of-p-g-wodehouse/,
retrieved January 5, 2012.
 40. See
http://www.booktv.org/Watch/8532/In+Depth+Christopher+Hitchens.aspx,
retrieved January 5, 2012.
41. He designs ladies’ underwear.
 42. Wodehouse, P. G. (1938), The code of the Woosters, New York:
Vintage Books, p. 166.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 182.
45. Ibid., pp. 220–221.
 Chapter 3
1. Orwell, G. (1950), Shooting an elephant and other essays, New
York: Penguin.
 2. See
http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/370054.George_S_Patton_Jr.,
retrieved May 26, 2012.
 3. See http://www.condenaststore.com/-sp/It-s-not-enough-that-we-
succeed-Cats-must-also-fail-New-Yorker-Cartoon-Prints_i8542217_.htm,
retrieved February, 2012.
 4. See http://thinkexist.com/quotes/billy_crystal/, retrieved April 22,
2012.
 5. Von Neumann, J., & Morgensten, O. (1944), Theory of games and
economic behavior, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
 6. See
http://boston.com/community/moms/blogs/parent_buzz/2012/07/aly_raisma
ns_parents_are_animated_in_the_stands_does_it_make_you_nervous_to_w
atch_your_child_compete.html; and
http://www.boston.com/sports/other_sports/olympics/articles/2012/08/02/pa
rents_of_olympians_arent_the_only_ones_who_feel_stress_when_their_chi
ldren_perform/; http://www.nbcolympics.com/video/gymnastics/chevy-top-
moment-1-aly-raisman-s-mom-s-reaction.html, retrieved August 4, 2012.
 7. Tajfel, H. (Ed.) (1978), Differentiation between social groups:
Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations, London: Academic
Press.
 8. Tajfel, H. (1970), Experiments in intergroup discrimination,
Scientific American, 223, 96–102.
 9. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979), An integrative theory of intergroup
conflict, in W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of
intergroup relations (pp. 94–109), Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole; Tajfel, H.,
& Turner, J. C. (1986), The social identity theory of inter-group behavior, in
S. Worchel & L. W. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp.
2–24), Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
 10. St. John, W. (2004), Rammer jammer yellow hammer: A journey in
the heart of fan mania, New York: Crown.
11. Ibid., p. 125.
12. Ibid., pp. 98–99.
 13. See http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1245389/, retrieved June
21, 2010; and Taylor, S., & Johnson, K. C. (2008), Until proven innocent:
Political correctness and the shameful injustices of the Duke lacrosse rape
case, New York: St. Martin’s Griffin.
 14. Leach, C. W., Spears, R., Branscombe, N. R., & Doosje, B. (2003),
Malicious pleasure: Schadenfreude at the suffering of another group,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 932–943.
 15. Empirical evidence for the nature of ingroup loyalty and outgroup
distaste (and the potential for biased perceptions) goes as far back as the
classic study examining Dartmouth and Princeton students’ biased
perceptions of film footage of a rough football game between the two
schools. Hastorf, A. H., & Cantril, H. (1954), They saw a game: A case
study, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49, 129–134. A
qualitative analysis of another football game from two perspectives is a
documentary, Havard Beats Yale, 29–29,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/01/23/when-harvard-beat-
yale.html, retrieved April 19, 2013.
16. St. John (2004), p. 93.
17. Ibid., p. 94.
 18. See http://www.fannation.com/si_blogs/for_the_record/posts/3541,
retrieved August 10, 2010.
 19. See http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?
columnist=ohlmeyer_don&id=4764245, retrieved May 26, 2012.
 20. Wann D. L., Peterson R. R., Cothran C., & Dykes, M. (1999), Sport
fan aggression and anonymity: The importance of team identification,
Social Behavior and Personality, 27, 597–602; Wann, D. L., Haynes, G.,
McLean, B., & Pullen, P. (2003), Sport team identification and willingness
to consider anonymous acts of hostile aggression, Aggressive Behavior, 29,
406–413.
 21. Hoogland, C., Schurtz, R. D., Combs, D. J. Y., Cooper, C., Brown,
E. G., & Smith, R. H. (2013), How does the severity of the misfortune
affect schadenfreude in sports? Unpublished manuscript.
 22. Cikara, M., Botvinick, M., & Fiske, S. T. (2010), Us versus them:
Social identity shapes neural responses to intergroup competition and harm,
Psychological Science, 22, 306–313.
 23. Wildschut, T., Pinter, B., Vevea, J. L., Insko, C. A., & Schopler, J.
(2003), Beyond the group mind: A quantitative review of the interindividual
intergroup discontinuity effect, Psychological Bulletin, 129, 698–722.
 24. See http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/sports/James-Hahn-
Gangnam-Style-Golf-Dance-Putt-PGA–189662021.html, retrieved March
8, 2013.
 25. See
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/letter_from_america/464752.stm,
retrieved May 15, 2012.
 26. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/golf/3913453.stm, retrieved
May 15, 2012;
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1017184/index.
htm, retrieved May 15, 2012; http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=CxTbNTyWIvc, retrieved May 15, 2012; and
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/letter_from_america/464752.stm,
retrieved May 15, 2012.
 27. See
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/letter_from_america/464752.stm,
retrieved May 15, 2012.
 28. An example of politics as blood sport is the career of Lee Atwater,
campaign manager for many Republican candidates and famous for his
take-no-prisoners style. http://www.boogiemanfilm.com/; Brady, J. (1996),
Bad boy: The life and politics of Lee Atwater, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo
Press.
 29. I take a number of examples in the section on politics and
schadenfreude from Combs, D. J. Y, Powell, C. A. J., Schurtz, D. R., &
Smith, R. H. (2009), Politics, schadenfreude, and ingroup identification:
The sometimes funny thing about a poor economy and death, Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 635–646.
 30. See
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2012/02/23/obama_gop_licking_the
ir_chops_over_rising_gas_prices_they_root_for_bad_news.html, retrieved
March 3, 2012.
31. Combs, Powell, Schurtz, & Smith (2009).
 32. See http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/06/26/colbert-only-bad-
economic-news-is-good-news-for-romney/, retrieved August 4, 2012.
 33. Gay, P. (1998), My German question, New Haven: Yale University
Press. Gay’s father had originally arranged passage on another ship, but,
concerned that the family get out of Gemany as soon as possible, using
papers he had forged on his own, he found places on another ship that
would leave two weeks earlier. The original ship ended up being one of
those unlucky vessels that went from port to port seeking a country that
would accept them. Less than a fourth of those passengers survived the
Nazi net; Also see Portmann, J. (2000), When bad things happen to other
people, New York: Routledge. pp. 54–55.
34. Gay (1998), p. 70.
35. Ibid., p. 83.
 Chapter 4
1. James (1950), Principles of psychology, vol. 1, New York, Dover, p.
318 (originally published in 1890).
 2. Swift, J. (1731), Verses on the death of Dr. Swift, D.S.P.D.,
http://www.online-literature.com/swift/3514/, retrieved June 21, 2010.
3. Orwell (1950).
 4. Nietzsche, F. (1967), On the genealogy of morals (trans. W.
Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale), New York: Random House, p. 16
(originally published 1887).
 5. James (1950), Principles of psychology, vol. 2, New York: Dover, p.
409 (originally published in 1890).
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 7. Baumeister, R. F., & Bushman, B. J. (2010), Social psychology and
human nature, New York: Wadsworth Publishing.
8. James (1918), vol. 1, p. 318.
9. Swift (1731).
 10. Jomini, A. H. (1827), Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon, vol. 2
(1827), p. 180; http://books.google.com/books?
id+AJUTAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA180, retrieved May 24, 2012.
 11. See http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2012/10/jon-stewart-
how-obama-allowed-romney-proceed-wall/58082/, retrieved December 3,
2012.
 12. See http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/11/30/1165769/-My-
favorite-moment-of-2012-Please-proceed-governor, retrieved December 3,
2012.
 13. See http://www.iep.utm.edu/psychego/, retrieved May 23, 2012;
Batson, C. D. (2011), Altruism in humans, New York: Oxford University
Press; Brown, S. L, Brown, R. M., & Penner, L. A. (Eds.) (2012), Moving
beyond self-interest: Perspectives from evolutionary biology, neuroscience,
and the social sciences, New York: Oxford University Press.
14. Hobbes (1968).
15. Freud, S. (1930), Civilization and its discontents, London: Hogarth.
16. Turchet, J. (Ed.) (1992), La Rochefaucauld: Maximes, Paris: Bordas.
 17. Ibid.; see also
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Francois_de_La_Rochefoucauld.
 18. Carnegie, D. (1964), How to win friends and influence people, New
York: Simon & Schuster.
19. Ibid., p. 4.
20. Ibid., p. 50.
21. Ibid., p. 14.
 22. Stengel, R. (2000), You’re too kind: A brief history of flattery, New
York: Touchstone.
23. Ibid.
 24. See http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/interviews/today-
corporate-traning-means-serious-business-growth-pallavi-jha-dale-
carnegie-training-india/articleshow/13637502.cms, retrieved May 28, 2012.
 25. See http://www.facebook.com/note.php?
note_id=204703126222217, retrieved June 2, 2012.
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Boston: Allyn & Bacon, p. xii.
27. Ibid.
28. Capote, T. (1966), In cold blood, New York: Random House.
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Martin’s Press, p. 232.
 30. Brecht, B. (1973/1928). Threepenny opera, London: Eyre Methuen
(trans. Hugh MacDiarmid), p. 46.
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Schuster, p. 3.
32. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
 33. Smith, R. H., Eyre, H. L., Powell, C. A. J., & Kim, S. H. (2006),
Relativistic origins of emotional reactions to events happening to others and
to ourselves, British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 357–371.
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Prometheus Books, p. 1. (originally published in 1759).
35. de Waal (2009); Keltner (2009); McCullough (2008).
36. Brown, Brown, & Penner (2012).
37. Brosnan & de Waal (2003).
 38. See http://www.livescience.com/2044-monkeys-fuss-
inequality.html, retrieved September 2, 2012.
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(2006), On preferences and doing the right thing: Satisfaction with
advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is limited, Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 273–289.
40. Baumeister & Bushman (2010), p. 60.
 41. Aristotle (1991), The art of rhetoric, London: Penguin Books
(written c. 367–322 BC; trans. H. C. Lawson-Tancred, part I, chapter 5, p.
90.
42. Baumeister & Bushman (2010), pp. 60–61.
 43. Bergson, H. (1911), Laughter: An essay on the meaning of the
comic, London: Macmillan (quoted in Billig, M. [2005]), Laughter and
ridicule: Towards a social critique of humour, London: Sage, p. 120.
 Chapter 5
1. Cited in Portmann (2000), p. xii.
 2. Rosten, L. (1968), The joys of Yiddish, New York: McGraw-Hill, p.
201.
 3. Marable, M. (2011), Malcolm X: A life of reinvention, New York:
Penguin Books.
 4. Watts, A. E. (2008), Laughing at the world: Schadenfreude, social
identity, and American media culture, unpublished dissertation,
Northwestern University; Raney, A. A, & Bryant, J. (2002), Moral
judgment and crime drama: An integrated theory of enjoyment, Journal of
Communication, 52, 402–415.
 5. De Palma, B. (Director) (1978), The fury [film], Chicago: Frank
Yablans Presentations.
 6. Portmann (2000); see also Ben-Ze’ev, A. (2000), The subtlety of
emotions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 7. Feather, N. T., & Sherman, R. (2002), Envy, resentment,
schadenfreude, and sympathy: Reactions to deserved and undeserved
achievement and subsequent failure, Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 28, 953–961; van Dijk, W. W., Ouwerkerk, J. W., Goslinga, S., &
Nieweg, M. (2005), Deservingness and schadenfreude, Cognition and
Emotion, 19, 933–939; van Dijk, W. W., Goslinga, S., & Ouwerkerk, J. W.
(2008), The impact of responsibility for a misfortune on schadenfreude and
sympathy: Further evidence, Journal of Social Psychology, 148, 631–636.
 8. Feather, N. T. (2006), Deservingness and emotions: Applying the
structural model of deservingness to the analysis of affective reactions to
outcomes, European Review of Social Psychology, 17, 38–73; Feather, N. T.
(1992), An attributional and value analysis of deservingness in success and
failure situations, British Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 125–145; Hafer,
C. L., Olson, J. M., & Peterson, A. A. (2008), Extreme harmdoing: A view
from the social psychology of justice, in V. M. Esses & R. A. Vernon (Eds.),
Explaining the breakdown of ethnic relations: Why neighbors kill (pp. 17–
40), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing; Heuer, L., Blumenthal, E.,
Douglas, A., & Weinblatt, T. (1999), A deservingness approach to respect
as a relationally based fairness judgment, Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1279–1292; van Dijk, Goslinga, & Ouwerkerk
(2008).
 9. See
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/24/60minutes/main5339719.shtml
?tag=currentVideoInfo;segmentUtilities, retrieved February 9, 2010.
 10. See
http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE55P6O520090629, retrieved
June 26, 2009.
11. Ibid.
 12. Feather (1992); Darley, J. M., Carlsmith, K. M., & Robinson, P. H.
(2000), Incapacitation and just deserts as motives for punishment, Law and
Human Behavior, 24, 659–683; Hafer, Olson, & Peterson (2008); Heuer,
Blumenthal, Douglas, & Weinblatt (1999).
 13. See
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/06/madoff200906,
retrieved July 6, 2009.
 14. See
http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE55P6O520090629, retrieved
July 30, 2009.
 15. See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30scene.html,
retrieved July 12, 2009.
 16. See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/business/27madoff.html,
retrieved June 15, 2009.
 17. See
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/27/wiesel.madoff/index.html,
retrieved May 15, 2009.
 18. See http://www.businessinsider.com/bernies-cell-2009-3, retrieved
May 20, 2009.
 19. Some scholars argue that the more a misfortune seems deserved, the
more the feeling produced in witnesses may shift from schadenfreude to a
different category of emotion, a kind of impersonal, general satisfaction
derived from the restoration of justice. In the case of the purely deserved, in
part because the pleasure may produce no reproach from others. The
emotion is, for lack of a needed term, “satisfied indignation,” rather than
schadenfreude. I think that this is an important distinction, but my
preference, as I stated in the Introduction, is to opt for a broader, more
inclusive view of schadenfreude. Otherwise, in this domain, we would be
tempted to remove a sense of deservingness from any instances of
schadenfreude. For examples of subtle treatments of these issues, see
Kristjansson, K. (2005), Justice and desert-based emotions, Farnham,
Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing; McNamee, M. (2003), Schadenfreude in
sport: Envy, justice and self-esteem, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 30,
1–16; and Portmann (2000).
 20. See http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/mind/s680880.htm, retrieved
April 5, 2010.
21. Portmann (2000), p. 114.
 22. See http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/works2.vi.ix.iii.html,
retrieved May 23, 2012.
 23. Seaman, A. R. (1999), Swaggart: The unauthorized biography of an
American evangelist, New York: Continuum.
24. Ibid.
 25. See
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,974120,00.html,
retrieved May 13, 2010.
26. Charley Carlson, personal communication.
 27. Baur, S. W. (2008), The art of the public grovel: Sexual sin and
public confession in America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
 28. See http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/05/12/1624904_physician-
heal-thyself.html, retrieved May 16, 2010.
 29. I also use this example extensively in, Powell, C. A. J., & Smith, R.
H. (in press), The inherent joy in seeing hypocrites hoisted with their own
petards, Self and Identity.
 30. See http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/01/29/lkl.ted.haggard/, retrieved
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your vows last a lifetime, Colorado Springs, CO: Waterbook Press.
 32. Jones, M. (2007), I had to say something: The art of Ted Haggard’s
fall, New York: Seven Stories Press, p. 145.
33. Ibid., p. 160.
 34. See http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=2626067&page=1,
retrieved April 2, 2009.
 35. Amann, J. M., & Breuer, T. (2007), The brotherhood of the
disappearing pants: A field guide to conservative sex scandals, New York:
Nation Books.
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hypocrisy.html, retrieved January 15, 2009.
37. Jones (2007), p. 232.
38. Ibid., p. 9.
 39. Wilde, O. (1891), The picture of Dorian Gray, Richmond:
University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center, p. 35.
40. Seaman (1999), p. 14.
41. Ibid.
 42. See
http://www.waynebrownministries.com/b2evolution/blogs/index.php/2010/
05/06/ted-haggard-on-the-rekers-sex-scandal-we-are-all-sinners?blog=23,
retrieved May 28, 2010.
 43. See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/us/19rekers.html, retrieved
May 28, 2010.
 44. See
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0306.green.html,
retrieved April 22, 2008; and http://www.slate.com/id/2082526/, retrieved
May 12, 2008.
 45. See http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg050503.asp,
retrieved April 22, 2008.
46. See http://www.slate.com/id/2082526/, retrieved May 12, 2008.
47. King James Bible, Matthew 23:25, 27–28.
48. Cialdini (2009), p. 53.
 49. Monin, B., Sawyer, P., & Marquez, M. (2008), The rejection of
moral rebels: Resenting those who do the right thing, Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 95, 76–93; Monin, B. (2007), Holier than me?
Threatening social comparison in the moral domain, International Review
of Social Psychology, 20, 53–68.
50. Monin (2007).
 51. Heider (1958); Tripp, T. M., Bies, R. J., & Aquino, K. (2002), Poetic
justice or petty jealousy? The aesthetics of revenge, Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89, 966–987.
52. Powell & Smith (in press).
 Chapter 6
1. Quoted in French, R. A. (2001), The virtures of vengeance,
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press; Agamemnon, The Oresteria (trans.
Robert Fagles), London: Penguin Books, 1975, p. 3.
 2. See
http://blog.al.com/live/2011/05/osama_bin_laden_death_brings_j.html,
retrieved March 25, 2012.
 3. See http://www.condenaststore.com/-sp/I-am-not-a-vengeful-man-
but-I-do-enjoy-a-touch-of-retribution-now-and-then-New-Yorker-Cartoon-
Prints_i8474436_.htm, retrieved June 2, 2012.
 4. As I noted in Chapter 5, it can be argued that the more a misfortune
seems deserved by objective standards, the more the feeling may seem
qualitatively different from schadenfreude, and thus an impartial
satisfaction derived from the restoration of justice. For my purposes, here, I
opt for a broader view of schadenfreude, although I acknowledge that this is
an important distinction.
 5. Hafer, C. L., & Begue, L. (2005), Experimental research on just-
world theory: Problems, developments, and future challenges,
Psychological Bulletin, 131, 128–167; Lerner, M. J. (1980), The belief in a
just world: A fundamental delusion, New York: Plenum Press; Lodewijkx,
H. F. M., Wildschut, T., Nijstad, B. A., Savenije, W., Smit, M., & Nijstad,
B. (2001), In a violent world, a just world makes sense: The case of
“senseless violence” in the Netherlands, Social Justice Research, 14, 79–94.
 6. Lerner, M. J., & Simmons, C. H. (1966). Observer’s reaction to the
“innocent victim”: Compassion or rejection? Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 4, 203–210.
 7. See http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v3n2/justworld.html,
retrieved May 20, 2008; and
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/03/us/nature-of-clothing-isnt-evidence-
in-rape-cases-florida-law-says.html, retrieved August 15, 2012.
8. Lerner (1980).
 9. Alicke, M. D. (2000), Culpable control and the psychology of blame,
Psychological Bulletin, 126, 556–574; Alicke, M. D., & Davis, T. L.
(1989), The role of a posteriori victim information in judgments of blame
and sanction, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 362–377.
 10. See
http://blog.al.com/live/2011/05/osama_bin_laden_death_brings_j.html,
retrieved March 23, 2012.
 11. See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/books/14dover.html,
retrieved March 18, 2010; and
http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2010/mar/08/sir-kenneth-dover-
obituary, retrieved March, 2010.
 12. Dover, K. (1994), Marginal comment: A memoir, London:
Duckworth.
 13. He decided to be unbothered if many of the things he wrote might
seem unimportant to other people because “how can we know, so long as
people are reticent through fear of being thought vain if they speak of what
is to their credit, or exhibitionists if it is discreditable, or, ‘unbalanced’ if
they reveal how little things affects them and big thing did not?” Dover
(1994), p. 2.
14. Dover (1994), p. 228.
 15. See http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/28/world/a-scholar-s-
memoirs-raise-some-ghosts-at-oxford.html?pagewanted=all, retrieved May
2, 2010.
16. Dover (1994), p. 230.
 17. According to an account in The New York Times, Dover’s “level of
moral culpability was roundly debated in British academic circles,” and the
publishing of his memoir some years later rekindled the debate and
broadened it beyond academia;
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/books/14dover.html, retrieved March
18, 2010.
 18. See http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/28/world/a-scholar-s-
memoirs-raise-some-ghosts-at-oxford.html?pagewanted=all, retrieved May
2, 2010.
19. Ibid.
20. Dover (1994), p. 230.
 21. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2010/mar/08/sir-
kenneth-dover-obituary, retrieved March 18, 2010.
 22. Hareli, S., & Weiner, B. (2002), Dislike and envy as antecedents of
pleasure at another’s misfortune, Motivation and Emotion, 26, 257–277;
Ortony, A., Clore, G., & Collins, A. (1988). The cognition structure of
emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 23. The German word was used in an ad campaign for Volkswagen in
1990. It meant “driving enjoyment.” See
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=farfegnugen, retrieved
May 26, 2012.
 24. I rank his memoir, The Doctor and the Damned, as one of the most
remarkable books that I have ever read. If I had unlimited funds, I would
produce a 30-part television drama on it and include every detail. I
appreciate, for example, the frank accounts of his feelings throughout.
25. Haas (1984), p. 284.
 26. Ibid. I should note that other parts of his memoir suggest that Haas
was not a vindictive man. Quite the opposite. He was fair-minded and
compassionate—and resourceful. He was a survivor.
 27. Manning, M. (2011), Malcolm X: A life of reinvention, New York:
Penguin Books, p. 229.
 28. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/20/AR2005092000201_pf.html, retrieved April
13, 2008.
 29. See http://www.jewishfederations.org/page.aspx?id=108589,
retrieved April 12, 2009.
 30. “I’m doing this because I have to do it. … I am not motivated by a
sense of revenge. Perhaps I was for a short time in the very beginning. …
Even before I had had time to really think things through, I realized we
must not forget. If all of us forgot, the same thing might happen again, in 20
or 50 or 100 years”;
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2005/09/21/nazi_hunter
_simon_wiesenthal_dies/, retrieved April 12, 2009.
 31. See
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/21/international/europe/21wiesenthal.htm
l?pagewanted=all, retrieved March 26, 2012.
 32. See
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2005/09/21/nazi_hunter
_simon_wiesenthal_dies/?page=full, retrieved March 23, 2012.
 33. Carlsmith, K. M., & Darley, J. M. (2008), Psychological aspects of
retributive justice, in M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (vol. 40, pp. 193–236), San Diego, CA: Elsevier; Kim, S. H., &
Smith, R. H. (1993), Revenge and conflict escalation, Negotiation Journal,
9, 37–43; McCullough (2008); Miller, W. I. (2007), Eye for an eye, New
York: Cambridge University Press; Tripp, T. M., & Bies, R. J. (2009),
Getting even: The truth about workplace revenge—and how to stop it, New
York: Jossey-Bass.
34. Haas (1984), p. 291.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. McCullough (2008).
 38. Murphy, J. G. (2003), Getting even: Forgiveness and its limits, New
York: Oxford University Press.
 39. Murphy, J. G. (2002), Vengeance, justice and forgiveness, Canyon
Institute for Advanced Studies, 2 (1), 1.
 40. Kleist, M. (2007), Michael Kohlhaas: A tale from an old chronicle
(trans. Frances H. King), New York: Mondial (originally published in
1811).
41. Murphy (2002), p. 1.
 42. Lester, M. L. (Director) (1985), Commando [film]. Available at
http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/c/commando-script-transcript-
arnold-schwarzenegger.html, retrieved March 12, 2013.
43. Auden, W. H. (1976), Collected poems, New York: Random House.
44. Kim & Smith (1993).
 45. Cited in Kim, S. H. (2005), The role of vengeance in conflict
escalation, in I. W. Zartman & G. O. Faure (Eds.), Escalation and
negotiation in international conflicts (pp. 141–162), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
 46. See, for example, Lotto, D. (2006). The psychohistory of vengeance,
Journal of Psychohistory, 34, 43–59.
47. King James Bible, Paul’s letter to the Romans 12:19.
 48. Carlsmith, K. M., Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2008), The
paradoxical consequences of revenge, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 95, 1316–1324.
49. Ibid., p. 1324.
 50. This fits with other empirical work showing that rumination about
prior mistreatment from others tends to prolong and aggravate negative
feelings. When people ruminate about their mistreatment, they get more
angry and remain angry longer; Mor, N., & Winquist, J. (2002), Self-
focused attention and negative affect: A meta-analysis, Psychological
Bulletin, 128, 638–662. When people ruminate about someone who has
harmed them, they become more aggressive than when they distract
themselves; Rusting, C. L., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1998), Regulating
responses to anger: Effects of rumination and distraction on angry mood,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 790–803. Moreover, they
are less likely to forgive an offense; Bushman, B. J. (2002), Does venting
anger feed or extinguish the flame? Catharsis, rumination, distraction, anger
and aggressive responding, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28,
724–731.
51. Kim (2005).
 52. Ben-Ze’ev (2000). I largely agree with scholars such as Aaron Ben-
Ze’ev who emphasize that schadenfreude proper is passive. If we take an
active role in someone else’s misfortune, something more complex is
occurring. However, I would not make such a hard-and-fast distinction.
Action complicates the picture, but in my view does not remove all traces
of schadenfreude.
 53. Sides, H. (2002), Ghost soldiers: The epic account of World War II’s
greatest rescue mission, New York: Anchor.
 54. See Baumeister, R. F. (1997), Evil: Inside human cruelty and
violence, New York: W. H. Freeman. Sadism involves delight in cruelty,
especially excessive cruelty. It doesn’t imply other motives aside from the
pleasure in the cruelty. Also, it is generally active rather than passive.
Sadistic people hurt others and enjoy inflicting the harm. The line between
extreme forms of schadenfreude and sadism, as I conceive the two, is
blurry. People could feel schadenfreude because they perceive that a
suffering person deserves to suffer. A witness to this pleasure might find it
sadistic because he or she does not think the suffering deserved. When
schadenfreude is active, its overlap with sadism is most difficult to
delineate because its active features link it closely with the raw enjoyment
of cruelty rather than with other motives, such as deservingness.
 55. Shakespeare, W. (1963), Hamlet: An authoritative text, intellectual
backgrounds, extracts from the sources, and essays in criticism, New York:
W. W. Norton (written approximately in 1599), Act III, sc. 4, lns 210–211.
 Chapter 7
1. See
http://archive.dailycal.org/article/13978/berkeley_junior_shot_down_in_am
erican_idol_tryout, retrieved April 19, 2012.
 2. Gandhi, M. K. (1983/1948), Autobiography: The story of my
experiments with truth, New York: Dover, p. 99.
3. James (1918), vol. 2, p. 414.
 4. See http://www.asianweek.com/2008/08/27/breakfast-is-out-to-
lunch/, retrieved December 12, 2010.
5. See http://yellow-face.com/, retrieved December 12, 2010.
 6. Perhaps this explains why public speaking is considered a singularly
widespread and intense fear: Gibson, J. W., Gruner, C. R., Hanna, M. S.,
Smythe, M. J., & Hayes, M. T. (1980), The basic course in speech at U.S.
colleges and universities: III, Communication Education, 29, 1–9.
 7. Goffman, E. (1952), On cooling the mark out: Some aspects of
adaptation to failure, Psychiatry, 15, 451–463, p. 463.
 8. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vqmy5qrvaVQ, retrieved
May 21, 2012.
9. Ibid.
10. Watts (2008).
 11. Booker, S., & Waite, B. M. (2005, May), Humilitainment? Lessons
from ‘The Apprentice’: A reality television content analysis, presented at the
17th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Society, Los
Angeles; Waite, B. M., Bendezu, J., & Booker, S. (2004, May), Why do we
like reality television? A personality analysis, presented at the 16th Annual
Convention of the American Psychological Society, Chicago.
12. See http://www.nbc.com/howie-do-it/, retrieved March 10, 2011.
 13. See http://www.nbc.com/howie-do-it/about/, retrieved March 10,
2011.
14. See http://www.nbc.com/howie-do-it/, retrieved March 10, 2011.
 15. See http://orwell.ru/library/essays/joys/english/e_joys, retrieved
August 15, 2012; Orwell, G. (1953), Such, such were the joys, New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company.
 16. See http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?
az=view_all&address=389x276680, retrieved March 3, 2013.
 17. See http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10912603/ns/dateline_nbc-
to_catch_a_predator/, retreived August 15, 2012.
 18. Shakespeare, Othello, the Moor of Venice, Act II, Scene III, 242–
244.
 19. See http://www.mediabistro.com/tvnewser/nbcs-chris-hansen-busts-
homer-simpson_b33598, retrieved March 10, 2011; and
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0905647/, retrieved March 10, 2011.
 20. See http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?
f=/c/a/2007/08/08/DDEGREAI31.DTL&ao=all; and
http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-08-08/entertainment/17255578_1_sexual-
solicitations-nbc-s-predator-reality, retrieved May 17, 2012.
 21. Adler, A. M. (2010), “To catch a predator,” New York University
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 229, retrieved March
10, 2011; and http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/229, retrieved March 10,
2011.
 22. See http://www.tvrage.com/Jimmy_Kimmel_Live/episodes/582351,
retrieved March 11, 2001.
 23. Terry, K.T. (2005), Sexual offenses and offenders: Theory, practice,
and policy, New York: Wadsworth Publishing.
 24. Trammell, R., & Chenault, S. (2011), “We have to take these guys
out”: Motivations for assaulting incarcerated child molestors, Symbolic
Interaction, 32, 334–350; http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?
id=90004#.T3d4nHi4L0c, retrieved March 31, 2012;
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2011/11/jerry_sa
ndusky_out_on_bail_are_child_molesters_tormented_in_american_prisons
_.html,retrieved,
March31,2012;andhttp://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/28/opinion/prisoners-
of-hate.html, retrieved March 31, 2012.
 25. See http://www.cjr.org/feature/the_shame_game.php?page=all,
retrieved April 21, 2013.
26. See http://www.pollyklaas.org/, retrieved May 28, 2012.
 27. Book, A. S. (1999), Shame on you: An analysis of modern shame
punishment as an alternative to incarceration, William & Mary Law Review,
40, 653–686; Ziel, P. (2004–2005), Eighteenth century public humiliation
penalties in twenty-first century America: The shameful return of scarlet
letter punishments in U.S. v. Gementera, BYU Journal of Public Law, 19,
499–522. There are exceptions, such as
http://www.thedailyaztec.com/2011/01/public-shaming-is-an-effective-
alternative-to-prison/, retrieved August 15, 2012;
http://www.publicengines.com/blog/2009/11/09/creative-sentencing-public-
humiliation/, retrieved, August 15, 2012; and http://lawvibe.com/get-
caught-stealing-and-face-public-humiliation/, retrieved August 15, 2012.
 28. See http://www.cjr.org/feature/the_shame_game.php?page=all,
retrieved April 21, 2013.
 29. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TgwOu1IlWuY, retrieved
March 4, 2013.
30. Ibid.
 31. Hansen, C. (2007), To catch a predator: Protecting your kids from
online enemies already in your home, New York: Dutton Adult, p. 5.
 32. One case involved an army sergeant who begged Hansen to take
pity on him. He said, “Sir, please I don’t want you to ruin my life.” He then
went down on his knees and put his hands behind his head, as if had just
been captured by an enemy soldier. This pleading failed to awaken
Hansen’s sympathy. As Hansen wrote, “On his knees, you could almost feel
sorry for the guy, but remember this is the same man who typed more than
fifty pages of often explicit chats to a girl he thought was fourteen years
old.” Ibid., p. 211.
 33. Reiss, S. & Wiltz, J. (2004), Why people watch reality TV, Media
Psychology, 6, 363–378.
 34. See http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,399467,00.html, retrieved
March 10, 2011.
 35. Whitman, J. Q. (1998), What is wrong with inflicting shame
sanctions? Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 655,
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2011.
 36. See http://en.allexperts.com/q/U-S-History-672/2008/8/Puritan-
Women-punishment.htm, retrieved March 12, 2011.
37. Ibid.
 38. McTiernan, J. (Director) (1988), Die Hard [Film]. Los Angeles:
20th Century Fox.
39. Ibid.
 40. For extensive statistics and analysis, see information at the Crimes
Against Children Research Center at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/, retrieved
June 12, 2012; Finkelhor, D. (2008), Childhood victimization: Violence,
crime, and abuse in the lives of young people, New York: Oxford
University Press.
 41. Snyder, Howard N. (2000, July), Sexual assault of young children as
reported to law enforcement: Victim, incident, and offender characteristics,
retrieved from http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf, June 2,
2012; Crimes Against Children Research Center, http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/,
retrieved June 12, 2012.
 42. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jesse-wegman/dateline-to-kill-
a-predat_b_41911.html, retrieved June 2, 2012.
 Chapter 8
1. Cited in Griffin, A. K. (1931), Aristotle’s psychology of conduct,
London: Williams and Norgate, p. 78.
 2. Spinoza, B. (2008), The ethics, New York: Bibliolife, p. 138
(originally published in 1677).
 3. See http://www.snpp.com/episodes/7F23.html, retrieved April 5,
2010.
4. Smith & Kim (2007).
 5. Forman, M. (Director) (1984), Amadeus (film based on a play by
Peter Shaffer [2001], Amadeus: A play by Peter Shaffer, New York: Harper
Perennial). There is little evidence that Salieri actually envied Mozart in the
way depicted in the play or film or that he engineered Mozart’s death. See
Borowitz, A. I. (1973), Salieri and the “murder” of Mozart, The Musical
Quarterly, 59, 268–279.
6. Fiske (2011).
 7. Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2006), Dehumanizing the lowest of the
low: Neuro-imaging responses to extreme outgroups, Psychological
Science, 17, 847–853; Harris, L. T., Cikara, M., & Fiske, S. T. (2008), Envy
as predicted by the stereotype content model: A volatile ambivalence, in R.
H. Smith (Ed.), Envy: Theory and research (pp. 133–147), New York:
Oxford University Press.
 8. Fiske (2011), p. 32; Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S.
(2004), Conflict monitoring and anterior cingulate cortex: An update,
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 539–546.
 9. Mitchell, J. P. (2008), Contributions of functional neuroimaging to
the study of social cognition, Current Directions in Psychological Science,
17, 142–146.
 10. Harris, Cikara, & Fiske (2008); Harris, L.T., McClure, S. M., van
den Bos, W., Cohen, J. D., & Fiske, S. T. (2007), Regions of the MPFC
differentially tuned to social and non-social affective evaluation, Cognitive
and Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 309–316; van den Bos, W., McClure, S.
M., Harris, L. T., Fiske, S. T., & Cohen, J. D. (2007), Dissociating affective
evaluation and social cognitive processes in ventral medial prefrontal
cortex, Cognitive and Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 337–346.
 11. Smith, R. H., Turner, T. J., Garonzik, R., Leach, C. W., Urch-
Druskat, V., & Weston, C. M. (1996), Envy and schadenfreude, Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 158–168.
12. See http://thetenbest.net/gorevidalquotes/, retrieved March 10, 2010.
 13. Twain, M. (2000), Life on the Mississippi, Toronto: Dover, p. 22
(originally published in 1883); I also use this example in a similar way in
Powell, C. A. J., Smith, R. H., & Schurtz, D. R. (2008), Schadenfreude
caused by an envied person’s gain, in R. H. Smith (Ed.), Envy: Theory and
research (pp. 148–164), New York: Oxford University Press.
 14. Percy, W. (2000), Lost in the cosmos, New York: Picador, p. 65. I
also make extended and similar use of this example in Powell, Smith, &
Schurtz (2008).
15. Percy (2000), p. 65.
16. Ibid.
17. Smith, Turner, Garonzik, Leach, Urch-Druskat, & Weston (1996).
 18. Takahashi, H, Kato, M., Matsuura, M., Mobbs, D., Suhara, T., &
Okubo, Y. (2009), When your gain is my pain and your pain is my gain:
Neural correlates of envy and schadenfreude, Science, 13, 937–939.
 19. See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/science/17angi.html?_r=1,
retrieved May 15, 2010.
 20. Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007), The BIAS map:
Behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes, Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 92, 631–648; Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2005),
The economics of strong reciprocity, in H. Gintis, S. Bowles, R. Boyd, & E.
Fehr (Eds.), Moral sentiments and material interests: The foundations of
cooperation in economic life (pp. 151–191), Cambridge: MIT Press;
Kirchsteiger, G. (1994), The role of envy in ultimatum games, Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 25, 373–389; Smith & Kim (2007).
Recent evidence suggests that there are two types of envy: a benign and a
malicious type. Schadenfreude is most related to malicious envy: see van de
Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Pieters, R. (2009), Leveling up and down: The
experience of malicious and benign envy, Emotion, 9, 419–429.
 21. Fortunately, the boy survived the explosion. Twain probably would
not have recounted the story so enthusiastically otherwise. And yet, even
the boy’s survival created mixed feelings. Twain noted that “when he came
home the next week, alive, renowned, and appeared in church all battered
up and bandaged, a shining hero, stared at and wondered over by
everybody, it seemed to us that the partiality of Providence for an
undeserving reptile had reached a point where it was open to criticism.”
Twain (2000), p. 22.
 22. Beckman, S. R., Formby, J. P., Smith, W. J., & Zheng, B. H. (2002),
Envy, malice and Pareto efficiency: An experimental examination, Social
Choice and Welfare, 19, 349–367; Zizzo, D. J. (2003), Money burning and
rank egalitarianism with random dictators, Economics Letters, 81, 263–266;
Zizzo, D. J., & Oswald, A. J. (2001), Are people willing to pay to reduce
others’ incomes? Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 63–64, 39–62.
 23. Smith, R. H. (1991), Envy and the sense of injustice, in P. Salovey
(Ed.), The psychology of jealousy and envy (pp. 79–99), New York:
Guilford Press; Smith, R. H., Parrott, W. G., Ozer, D., & Moniz, A. (1994),
Subjective injustice and inferiority as predictors of hostile and depressive
feelings in envy, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 705–711.
24. van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters (2009).
25. Cited in Portmann (2000), p. 139.
 26. Burke, E. (1987), A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our
ideas of the sublime, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 46 (originally published in
1756); the credibility of The National Enquirer is probably tarred by the
wacky fictions of the other publications. However, The National Enquirer
articles, often dismissed as malicious lies by those who are the focus of the
articles, often end up being largely true; see
http://www.slate.com/id/2102303/, retrieved May 15, 2010.
 27. Chang, J., & Halliday, J. (2005), Mao: The unknown story, New
York: First Anchor Books, p. 14.
28. Ibid.
29. Boucher, K., & Smith, R. H., (2010), unpublished data.
30. See http://www.slate.com/id/2067667, retrieved May 15, 2010.
 31. Byron, C. (2002), Martha Inc.: The incredible story of Martha
Stewart Living Omnimedia, New York: Wiley.
32. See http://www.slate.com/id/2067667, retrieved May 15, 2010.
 33. See http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/02/03/030203fa_fact?
currentPage=all, retrieved March 3, 2010.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
 37. Aronson, E., Willerman, B., & Floyd, J. (1966), The effect of a
pratfall on increasing interpersonal attractiveness, Psychonomic Science 4,
227–228.
 38. See http://www.chevychasecentral.com/trivia.htm, retrieved
September 4, 2012.
 39. See http://www.parade.com/celebrity/sunday-with/2012/05/20-jay-
leno-comic-highs-lows-cars-secrets-successful-marriage.html, retrieved
May 20, 2012.
 40. Sundie, J. M., Ward, J., Beal, D. J., Chin, W. W., & Oneto, S.
(2009), Schadenfreude as a consumption-related emotion: Feeling
happiness about the downfall of another’s product, Journal of Consumer
Psychology, 19, 356–373; Sundie, J. M., Kenrick, D. T., Griskevicius, V.,
Tybur, J. M., Vohs, K. D., & Beal, D. J. (2011), Peacocks, Porsches, and
Thorstein Veblen: Conspicuous consumption as a sexual signaling system,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 664–680; Veblen, T.
(1989), The theory of the leisure class, New York: Macmillan.
 41. See http://www.dailydot.com/video/lamborghini-crash/, retrieved
May 25, 2012; and
http://www.reddit.com/r/videos/comments/tn1y4/lamborghini_tries_to_sho
w_off_ends_up_crashing/, retrieved May 25, 2012.
 42. See http://www.dailydot.com/video/lamborghini-crash/ retrieved
May 24, 2012; and http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0145487/quotes, retrieved
May 24, 2012.
 43. See http://www.youtube.com/all_comments?v=1pgm8I0B8bY,
retrieved May 24, 2012.
44. Hareli & Weiner (2002).
45. Swift (1731).
 46. See http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/02/03/030203fa_fact?
currentPage=all, retrieved March 3, 2010; Byron (2002).
 47. See http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/02/03/030203fa_fact?
currentPage=all, retrieved March 3, 2010.
 48. See http://www.snpp.com/episodes/7F08.html, retrieved April 5,
2010.
49. Ibid.
 Chapter 9
1. Pushkin, A. (1964), The poems, prose, and plays of Alexander
Pushkin, New York: Modern Library, p. 430.
 2. Shakespeare, W. (1963), Julius Caesar, New York: The New
American Library p. 40, (originally published 1599).
 3. Goethe, J. W. (1906), The maxims and reflections of Goethe, New
York: Macmillan.
 4. Farber, L. (1966), The Ways of the will, New York: Basic Books;
Foster, G. (1972), The anatomy of envy, Current Anthropology, 13, 165–
202; Smith & Kim (2007); Vidaillet, B. (2009), Psychoanalytic
contributions to understanding envy: Classic and contemporary
perspectives, in R. H. Smith (Ed.), Envy: Theory and research. (pp. 267–
289), New York: Oxford University Press.
 5. I take some of the examples in this chapter from Powell, Smith, &
Schurtz (2008); Smith, R. H., & Kim, S. H. (2008), Introduction, in R. H.
Smith (Ed.), Envy: Theory and research (pp. 3–14), New York: Oxford
University Press; and Smith & Kim (2007).
 6. Alicke & Govorun (2005); Dunning (2005); Freud, A. (1937), The
ego and the mechanisms of defense, London: Hogarth Press and Institute of
Psycho-Analysis; Gilovich, T. (1993), How we know what isn’t so: The
fallibility of human reason in everyday life, New York: Simon & Schuster;
Paulhus, D. L., Fridhandler, B., & Hayes S. (1997), Psychological defense:
Contemporary theory and research, in S. Briggs, R. Hogan, R. Goode, & J.
W. Johnson (Eds.), Handbook of personality psychology (pp. 543–579)
Boston: Academic Press; Vaillant, G. E. (1992), Ego mechanisms of
defense: A guide for clinicians and researchers, Arlington, VA: American
Psychiatric Publishing.
 7. Duffy, M. K., Shaw, J. D., & Schaubroeck, J. (2008), Envy in
organizational life, in R. Smith (Ed.), Envy: Theory and research (pp. 167–
189), New York: Oxford University Press; Elster, J. (1998), Alchemies of
the mind: Rationality and the emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press; Foster, G. (1972), The anatomy of envy, Current Anthropology, 13,
165–202; Schoeck, H. (1969), Envy: A theory of social behavior, New York:
Harcourt, Brace, and World; Silver, M., & Sabini, J. (1978), The perception
of envy, Social Psychology Quarterly, 41, 105–117; Smith & Kim (2007).
 8. Elster (1998); Foster (1972), Schoeck (1969); Silver, & Sabini
(1978). H. Also see Powell, Smith, & Schurtz (2008); Smith & Kim (2007).
9. King James Bible, Exodus 20:17.
 10. Schimmel, S. (2008), Envy in Jewish thought and literature, in R. H.
Smith (Ed.), Envy: Theory and research (pp. 17–38), New York: Oxford
University Press.
11. King James Bible, Genesis 4:1–16.
 12. Milton, J. (1962), Paradise lost and selected poetry and prose, New
York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston, p. 126 (originally published in 1667).
 13. Alighieri, D. (1939), The divine comedy (trans. John D. Sinclair),
New York: Oxford University Press (originally published in 1308–1321).
 14. See http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=envy, retrieved
April 12, 2010.
 15. Aquaro, G. R. A. (2004), Death by envy: The evil eye and envy in
the Christian tradition, Lincoln, NE: Universe; Smith & Kim (2007).
16. King James Bible, Matthew 19:24.
17. Smith & Kim (2007).
 18. Unamuno, M. (1996), Abel Sanchez and other short stories, New
York: Gateway Editions p. 103 (originally published in 1917); cited by
Foster, (1972), p. 173; Smith & Kim (2007).
19. Elster (1998), p. 165.
20. Ibid., p. 172.
21. Smith & Kim (2007).
 22. Ben-Ze’ev (2000); Smith (1991); Smith, Parrott, Ozer, & Moniz
(1994).
23. Heider (1958), p. 287.
 24. Aristotle (1941), Rhetoric, in R. McKeaon (Ed.), The basic works of
Aristotle, New York: Random House (originally published in 322 BC);
Salovey, P., & Rodin, J. (1984), Some antecedents and consequences of
social-comparison jealousy, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
47, 780–792; Schaubroeck, J., & Lam, S. K. (2004), Comparing lots before
and after: Promotion rejectees’ invidious reactions to promotees,
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 94, 33–47.
 25. Forrester, J. (1997), Dispatches for the Freud wars, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press; Kristjansson (2005).
26. Smith (1991).
 27. Khayyám, O. (1952). The rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám (E.
Fitzgerald, Trans.) Garden City, NY: Doubleday, p. 170 (originally
published in 1858); I also use this and other similar examples in Smith, R.
H. (1990), Envy and the sense of injustice, in P. Salovey (Ed.), Psychology
perspective on jealousy and envy (pp. 79–99), New York: Guilford.
28. Heider (1958), p. 289.
 29. Hill, S. E., & Buss, D. M. (2008), The evolutionary psychology of
envy, in R. H. Smith (Ed.), Envy: Theory and research (pp. 60–70), New
York: Oxford University Press, p. 60.
 30. Quoted in Leach, C. W., & Spears, R. (2008), “A vengefulness of
the impotent”: The pain of ingroup inferiority and schadenfreude toward
successful outgroups, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95,
1383–1396, p. 1384; Nietzsche (1967), p. 37.
 31. Krizan, Z., & Johar, O. (2012), Envy divides the two faces of
narcissism, Journal of Personality, 80, 1415–1451.
 32. Hotchkiss, S. (2003), Why is it always about you?: The seven deadly
sins of narcissism, New York: Free Press, p. 16.
33. Forman (1984).
 34. See Smith (2004) for another extended example of transmuted envy,
this taken from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar.
 35. Elster (1998); Smith (2004); Simth & Kim (2007); Sundie, Ward,
Beal, Chin, & Oneto (2009).
36. Russo, R. (2008), Bridge of sighs, New York: Vintage.
37. Ibid., p. 86.
38. Ibid.
 39. Stephen Thielke, personal communication. Instead, envy would be
of the “benign” kind. See van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters (2009).
 Chapter 10
1. Marrus, M. R. (1997), The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945–46: A
documentary history, New York: Bedford Books, p. 207.
 2. Gilligan, J. (1996), Violence: Reflections on a national epidemic,
New York: Vintage Books.
 3. Twain, M. (1898), Concerning the Jews, Harper’s Magazine, March
1898; http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1898twain-jews.asp, retrieved
April 20, 2013.
 4. Here is a sample: Bauer, Y. (1982), A history of the Holocaust, New
York: Franklin Watts; Browning, C. R. (1993), Ordinary men: Reserve
police battalion 101 and the final solution in Poland, New York: Harper
Perennial; Evans, R. J. (2003), The coming of the Third Reich, New York:
Penguin; Evans, R. J. (2005), The Third Reich in power, New York:
Penguin; Evans, R. J. (2008), The Third Reich at war, New York: Penguin;
Gilbert, M. (2000), Never again: The history of the Holocaust, New York:
Universe; Goldhagen, D. J. (1997), Hitler’s willing executioners: Ordinary
Germans and the Holocaust, New York: Vintage; Hildberg, R. (2003), The
destruction of the European Jews, New Haven: Yale University Press
(originally published in 1961); Prager, D., & Telushkin, J. (2003), Why the
Jews? The reason for anti-Semitism, New York: Touchstone; Rosenbaum,
R. (1998), Explaining Hitler: The search for the origins of his evil, New
York: Random House; Wistrich, R. S. (2010), A lethal obsession: Anti-
Semitism from antiquity to the global jihad, New York: Random House.
 5. Kubizek, A. (1955), The young Hitler I knew;
http://www.faem.com/books/, retrieved June 14, 2012.
 6. Hitler, A. (1925), Mein kampf (trans. Ralph Manheim), Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin, p. 55.
7. Ibid., p. 52.
8. Ibid., p. 52.
9. Ibid. p. 10.
 10. Epstein, J. (2003), Envy: The seven deadly sins, New York: Oxford
University Press, p. 60.
11. Hitler (1925), p. 58.
12. Ibid., p. 56.
 13. Ibid., p. 58. The Jewish population of Vienna, absorbed by Germany
in the spring of 1938, was larger than in German cities proper.
14. Ibid., p. 57.
15. Ibid., p. 61.
16. Ibid., p. 62.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 63.
 19. People Magazine interview, April 12, 1976, vol. 5, no. 14. Also, in
his memoirs, Inside the Third Reich, Speer described Adolf Hitler’s sense of
humor to be almost entirely based on schadenfreude. “Hitler had no humor.
He left joking to others, although he could laugh loudly, abandonedly,
sometimes literally writhing with laughter. Often he would wipe tears from
his eyes during such spasms. He liked laughing, but it was always laughter
at the expense of others,” Speer, A. (1969), Inside the Third Reich (trans.
Richard and Clara Winston), Bronx, NY: Ishi Press, p 123.
20. Kubizek (1955).
21. Ibid.
 22. Freud, S. (1939), Moses and monotheism, New York: Random
House, p. 116.
 23. Toland, J. (1976), Adolf Hitler, New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell,
p. 701.
 24. Hitler ended his account of how he came to hate the Jews by
writing: “Eternal Nature inexorably avenges the infringement of her
commands. Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance with the
will of the Almighty Creator: by defending myself against the Jews, I am
fighting for the work of the Lord,” Hitler (1925), p. 65.
 25. The role of envy in anti-Semitism has been addressed by many. For
example, the French scholar Bernard Lazare, who became heavily involved
in the Dreyfus affair, wrote what is considered to be a remarkably impartial
analysis of anti-Semitism and included envy as an important factor. Here is
a selection from his book, Antisemitism: Its history and causes:
“Everywhere they wanted to remain Jews, and everywhere they were
granted the privilege of establishing a State within the State. By virtue of
these privileges and exemptions, and immunity from taxes, they would soon
rise above the general condition of the citizens of the municipalities where
they resided; they had better opportunities for trade and accumulation of
wealth, whereby they excited jealousy and hatred. Thus, Israel’s attachment
to its law was one of the first causes of its unpopularity, whether because it
derived from that law benefits and advantages which were apt to excite
envy, or because it prided itself upon the excellence of its Torah and
considered itself above and beyond other peoples,” pp. 6–7,
http://www.archive.org/details/Anti-
semitismItsHistoryAndCausesByBernardLazare. Freud suggests the
distinctiveness of Jews and then notes: “The second peculiarity has an even
more pronounced effect. It is that they defy oppression, that even the most
cruel persecutions have not succeeded in exterminating them. On the
contrary, they show a capacity for holding their own in practical life and,
where they are admitted, they make valuable contributions to the
surrounding civilization. The deeper motives of anti-Semitism have their
roots in times long past; they come from the unconscious, and I am quite
prepared to hear that what I am going to say will at first appear incredible. I
venture to assert that the jealousy which the Jews evoked in other peoples
by maintaining that they were the first-born, favourite child of God the
Father has not yet been overcome by those others, just as if the latter had
given credence to the assumption,” Freud (1939), p. 116. Freud argued that
the notion of Jews being a chosen people led to jealous and rivalrous
feelings in non-Jews. Nietzsche, despite his influence on so many Nazi
beliefs, was appalled by anti-Semitism, and wrote: “The struggle against the
Jews has always been a symptom of the worst characters, those more
envious and more cowardly. He who participates in it now must have much
of the disposition of the mob.” Quoted in Santaniello, W. (1997), A post-
holocaust re-examination of Nietzsche and the Jews, in J. Golomb (Ed.),
Nietzsche and Jewish culture (pp. 21–54), New York: Routledge. More
recent examples are Prager & Telushkin (2003); Patterson, C. (2000), Anti-
Semitism: The road to the holocaust and beyond, Lincoln, NE:
iUniverse.com; Aly, G. (2011), Warum die Deutschen? Warum die Juden?
Gleichheit, Neid und Rassenhass 1800 1933, Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag;
Gilder, G. (2009), The Israel test, New York: Richard Vigilante Books;
McKale, D. M. (2006), Hitler’s shadow war: The Holocaust and World War
II, New York: Taylor Trade Publishing.
26. Prager & Telushkin (2003), p. 30.
27. Also see Aly (2011).
 28. Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2008), Warmth and
competence as universal dimensions of social perception: The Stereotype
Content Model and the BIAS Map, in M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (vol. 40, pp. 61–149), Thousand Oaks, CA:
Academic Press; Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002), A
model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth
respectively follow from perceived status and competition, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878–902; Glick, P. (2002),
Sacrificial lambs dressed in wolves’ clothing: Envious prejudice, ideology,
and the scapegoating of Jews, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber (Eds.),
Understanding genocide: The social psychology of the Holocaust (pp. 113–
142), Oxford: Oxford University Press; Glick, P. (2008), When neighbors
blame neighbors: Scapegoating and the breakdown of ethnic relations, in V.
M. Esses & R. A. Vernon (Eds.), Explaining the breakdown of ethnic
relations: Why neighbors kill (pp. 123–146), Malden, MA: Blackwell.
 29. Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick (2008); Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu (2002).
Interestingly, this group is not the prototype of the kind usually focused on
when we think of prejudice. Anti-black prejudice by majority whites, for
example, stereotypically assumes low status and perhaps some degree of
competition, if resources are being taken away, say, through affirmative
action. But this condition predicts feeling ranging from pity to contempt, as
perceived threat increases. These are very different feelings from envy, and
the implications are profound. Hitler may have been disgusted by Gypsies,
but he hated the Jews.
 30. Segel, B. W. (1996), A lie and a libel: The history of the Protocols of
the Elders of Zion, R. S. Levy (Ed.) (trans. R. S. Levy), Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press.
 31. The classic example is a white person in the previously segregated
South who feels threatened by a loss in status and therefore develops hatred
toward blacks.
 32. Bachrach, S., & Luckert, S. (2009), State of deception: The power of
Nazi propaganda, New York: W. W. Norton.
 33. Epstein (2003). No wonder, as Joseph Epstein points out, that anti-
Semitism “has historically taken two forms; one in which the Jews are
castigated for being inferior, and another in which they are resented for
being superior,” p. 165; Epstein, J. (2002), Snobbery: The American
version, New York: Houghton Mifflin.
 34. Glick makes the point that few Germans would admit to having
hostile envy toward Jews. It is the nature of envy to find other plausible
causes to justify ill will. Here, conveniently, the other stereotypes of clever,
underhanded, dirty, and so on now combine with the perception of threat,
both to the country’s national goals and purity of race. Thus, the use of
terms suggesting “cleverness” rather than the kind of intelligence to be
admired.
35. Evans (2005).
 36. Cikara, M., & Fiske, S. T. (2012), Stereotypes and schadenfreude:
Affective and physiological markers of pleasure at outgroups’ misfortune,
Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3, 63–71.
 37. Metaxas, E. (2010), Bonhoeffer: Pastor, martyr, prophet, spy,
Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, p. 176.
38. Toland (1976), p. 505.
 39. Goldhagen (1996); Klee, E., Dressen, W., & Riess, V. (1991) (Eds.),
“The good old days”: The Holocaust as seen by its perpetrators and
bystanders (trans. Deborah Burnstone), Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky &
Konecky; Billig, M. (2005), Laughter and ridicule: Towards a social
critique of humour, London: Sage.
40. McKale (2006), p. 147.
 41. Spears, R., & Leach, C. W. (2008), Why neighbors don’t stop the
killing: The role of group-based schadenfreude, in V. Esses & R. A. Vernon
(Eds.), Explaining the breakdown of ethnic relations: Why neighbors kill
(pp. 93–120), Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
 42. Cikara, M., & Fiske, S. T. (2011), Bounded empathy: Neural
responses to outgroups’ (mis)fortunes, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
23, 3791–3803.
43. Farber, L. (1966), Ways of the will, New York: Basic Books, p. 36.
44. Fiske (2011).
45. Ibid.
46. Quoted in Patterson (2000), p. 79; McKale (2006).
 47. Cesarani, D. (2004), Eichmann: His life and crimes, London: W.
Heinemann.
 48. Peter Longerich, “The Wannsee Conference in the Development of
the ‘Final Solution,’” available online at the House of the Wannsee
Conference: Memorial and educational site website,
http://www.ghwk.de/engl/kopfengl.htm, retrieved August 27, 2012.
49. McKale (2006), p. 242.
 50. Roseman, M. (2002), The Wannsee Conference and the final
solution: A reconsideration, New York: Picador.
 51. Quoted in Roseman (2002), p. 144, from Eichmann trial, session 79,
June 26, 1961; session 107, July 24, 1961.
52. Ibid., p. 149.
53. Ibid., p. 148.
54. Ibid., p 165.
55. Pierson, F (Director) (2001), Conspiracy [film].
 56. Aly (2011); Arendt, H. (1963), Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on
the banality of evil, New York: Viking Press; Browning, C. (1992),
Ordinary men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in
Poland, New York: HarperCollins; Cohen, R. (2005), Soldiers and slaves:
American POWs trapped by the Nazis’ final gamble, New York: Knopf;
Haas (1984); Hilberg, R. (1961), The destruction of the European Jews, 3rd
ed., New Haven: Yale University Press; Goldhagen (1997); McKale (2006);
Klee, Dressen, & Riess (1991), p. 76.
57. Cohen (2005).
 58. Many American troops were taken prisoner. The Germans, in
violation of the Geneva Conventions, singled out some of this group to be
sent to Berga, in effect, to work them to their deaths; see Cohen (2005).
 59. Schadenfreude from the guards’ point of view; sadistic laughter
from the prisoners’ perspective.
 60. Cohen (2005), p. 137. I cannot emphasize enough what a
remarkable book this is.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., pp. 137–138.
63. Ibid., p. 54.
 64. Cohen emphasizes that some of the Christian families resisted this
treatment and offered the Jewish families food as they waited for the next
stage in the Germans’ plans. Generally, this compassion did not appear to
last, however.
65. Cohen (2005), p. 55.
66. Ibid.
 67. Adding to the sense that envy permeated the attitude of the Germans
and their complicit Hungarian counterparts was the general concern over
status in relation to the Jews. Hauer remembered, for example, the head of
the Hungarian gendarmerie verbally abused Hauer’s father simply because
he committed the “effrontery” of wearing a hat in his presence. The
Germans insisted on being treated with respect by their prisoners, which
meant appropriate servility. In fact, one of the reasons GI’s were selected
for Berga, even if they were not Jewish, was when they didn’t cooperate in
this regard. The best example was Private Hans Kasten, a remarkably
courageous man who refused to go along with the Germans’ insistence that
GI’s reveal who was Jewish among them. Cohen’s book is worth reading
for his account of Kasten’s actions alone.
 68. And, more perversely still, if the Germans treated the prisoners so
harshly, then it must be correspondingly deserved. Only people who were
so thoroughly depraved could be treated this way.
69. Cohen (2005), pp. 184–185.
70. Ibid., p. 258.
71. Ibid., p. 207.

Chapter 11
 1. Baker, J. A. (2006), “Work hard, study … and keep out of politics!”:
Adventures and lessons from an unexpected public life, New York: G. P.
Putnam, p. 44.
2. King James Bible, John 8:3–11.
3. Fitzgerald, F. S. (1925), The great Gatsby, New York: Scribner, p. 1.
 4. “If,” by Rudyard Kipling in; Kipling, R. (1999), The collected poems
of Rudyard Kipling, New York: Wordsworth.
 5. This may help explain why we have hundreds of trait labels (e.g.,
rude, inconsiderate, arrogant, narcissistic … “jerk” and so on) to understand
the actions we observe in others, but an impoverished set of imprecise
labels to describe situations (e.g., a tough or difficult situation). Sometimes,
people really are jerks, but a large swath of everyday behaviors are
probably more a result of situational factors.
 6. See
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/27/health/psychology/27muse.html?_r=1,
retrieved May 3, 2012.
 7. Milgram, S. (1983), Obedience to authority, New York: Harper
Perennial, p. 25.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
 10. Ross, L. (1977), The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings:
Distortions in the attribution process, in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (vol. 10, pp. 173–220), New York:
Academic Press.
11. Milgram (1983), p. 31.
12. Ibid.
 13. Gilbert, D. T., Pelham, B. W., & Krull, D. S. (1988), On cognitive
busyness: When person perceivers meet persons perceived, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 733–740; Gilbert, D. T., McNulty,
S. E., Giuliano, T. A., & Benson, E. J. (1992), Blurry words and fuzzy
deeds: The attribution of obscure behavior, Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 62, 18–25.
 14. The term “fundamental attribution error” can be misleading.
Clearly, the true and full explanation for anyone’s behavior, whether it is
explaining why a particular man showed up at the sting site or why a
particular father lost his patience with a nurse, will depend on the details of
each event. If you’ve had a chance to watch Predator, I think you would
agree that some of these men deserve much less sympathy than others.
Some are clearly hardcore, repeat offenders who have a record of
committing sexual violence without an apparent trace of guilt feelings.
They needed little bait to lure them into their explicit conversations with the
decoy and no cajoling to arrange a meeting. To attribute their behavior to
dispositional causes would hardly be an “error.” Some others, however,
were probably engaged in more of a fantasy exchange at first and would not
have showed up at the site if not for the persistent, creative strategies
employed by the Perverted Justice staff. A multitude of possible situational
factors may have heavily influenced their actions. Of course, let me
emphasize that none of such factors, singularly or collectively, exonerates
their showing up at the site—even though these factors may affect our
moral evaluations of these men and affect whether we conclude their
humiliation is fully deserved and is therefore pleasing.
 15. See http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jala/3/thomas.html,
retrieved May 3, 2012.
16. Ibid.
 17. Oates, S. B. (1994), With malice toward none: A life of Lincoln,
New York: Harper Perennial.
 18. See http://quotationsbook.com/quote/38116/, retrieved April 4,
2012.
 19. The event is featured prominently in Dale Carnegie’s book How to
win friends and influence people, for example.
 20. See http://www.civilwarhome.com/lincolnmeadeletter.htm, retrieved
April 4, 2012.
21. Oates (1994), p. 19.
 22. Quoted in http://www.mrlincolnandfriends.org/inside.asp?
pageID=23&subjectID=1, retrieved May 3, 2012; Douglas L. Wilson &
Rodney O. Davis, editor, Herndon’s Informants, p. 259 (letter from John
McNamar to William H. Herndon, May 23, 1866).
 23. See http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jala/3/thomas.html,
p. 30, retrieved May 3, 2012.
 24. Donald, D. H. (1995), Lincoln, New York: Simon & Schuster, p.
259.
 25. Ward Hill Lamon, a fellow Illinois lawyer, recounted a time early on
in their friendship when he had embarrassed himself in court. Lamon had
been wrestling with someone outside the courthouse, which caused a big
tear in the rear of his pants. But before he had time to change, he was called
into court to start a case. Lamon later wrote:
The evidence was finished. I, being the Prosecuting Attorney at the time, got up to address
the jury, … Having on a somewhat short coat, my misfortune was rather apparent. One of
the lawyers, for a joke, started a subscription paper which was passed from one member of
the bar to another as they sat by a long table fronting the bench, to buy a pair of pantaloons
for Lamon,—“he being,” the paper said, “a poor but worthy young man.” Several put down
their names with some ludicrous subscription, and finally the paper was laid by someone in
front of Mr. Lincoln, he being engaged in writing at the time. He quietly glanced over the
paper, and immediately taking up his pen, wrote after his name, “I can contribute nothing to
the end in view.”

This was, certainly, a kind of enjoyment of another’s “misfortune” but

hardly mean-spirited. From Ward Hill Lamon, Recollections of Abraham
Lincoln, pp. 16–17. Quoted in
http://www.mrlincolnandfriends.org/inside.asp?pageID=23&subjectID=1,
retrieved May 3, 2012.
 26. The historian Benjamin Thomas relates this story:
“Lincoln spoke of a man who accosted him on a train, saying: ‘Excuse me, sir, but I have an
article in my possession which rightfully belongs to you.’ ‘How is that?’ asked Lincoln in
amazement. Whereupon the stranger produced a jack-knife and explained: ‘This knife was
placed in my hands some years ago, with the injunction that I was to keep it until I found a
man uglier than myself. Allow me now to say, sir, that I think you are fairly entitled to it.’”
(see http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jala/3/thomas.html, p. 41, retrieved May 3,
2012).
27. Oates (1994), p. 116.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 126.
 30. See
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/abrahamlin104175.html,
retrieved April 4, 2012.
31. Donald (1995), p. 567.
 Conclusion
1. Bellow, S. (1964), Herzog, New York: Penguin, p. 23.
2. James (1918), vol. 2, p. 413.
 3. See http://www.forbes.com/2004/03/18/cx_ld_0318nike.html,
retrieved June 15, 2010.
 4. See http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/sports/jan-june10/tiger_04-
08.html, retrieved June 15, 2010.
 5. See
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1009257/index.
htm, retrieved June 15, 2010.
 6. See http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2009-11-29/sports/os-bk-
tiger-woods-accident_1_ocoee-in-serious-condition-million-mansion-
friday-evening-elin-nordegren-woods, retrieved June 15, 2010.
 7. See http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/12/02/arts/entertainment-
us-golf-woods.html?scp=2&sq=Tiger%20Woods%20Enquirer&st=cse,
retrieved June 15, 2010.
 8. See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/sports/golf/03woods.html?
_r=1&scp=17&sq=tiger%20woods&st=cse, retrieved June 15, 2010.
 9. See http://www.ajc.com/sports/text-of-tiger-woods-314300.html,
retrieved June 15, 2010.
 10. See http://www.nationalenquirer.com/celebrity/67747, retrieved
June 15, 2010.
 11. See http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory?id=9198393, retrieved
June 15, 2010; http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?
f=/n/a/2009/12/12/sports/s062742S18.DTL, retrieved June 15, 2010;
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/sports/golf/03woods.html?
_r=1&scp=17&sq=tiger%20woods&st=cse, retrieved June 15, 2010;
http://www.waggleroom.com/2009/12/2/1181429/tiger-woods-is-americas-
new-bill, retrieved June 15, 2010;
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/frank_deford/03/29/Tiger.Woo
ds.return.Masters/index.html, retrieved June 15, 2010;
http://www.esquire.com/the-side/tiger-woods-scandal, retrieved June 15,
2010;
http://www.golf.com/golf/tours_news/article/0,28136,1948231,00.html,
retrieved June 15, 2010; and http://hubpages.com/hub/Why-do-we-like-it-
when-people-fail, retrieved June 15, 2010.
 12. See http://www.jokes4us.com/celebrityjokes/tigerwoodsjokes.html,
retrieved May 11, 2012.
 13. See http://www.huliq.com/8059/89384/tiger-woods-cheetah-eyes-
tabloid-news, retrieved May 11, 2012.
 14. See
http://media.www.ecollegetimes.com/media/storage/paper991/news/2010/0
5/06/Top10s/Top-10.Tiger.Woods.Jokes-3917903.shtml#5, retrieved June
15, 2010.
 15. See http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?
columnist=ohlmeyer_don&id=4764245, retrieved June 15, 2010; and
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=4327128, retrieved May 12,
2012.
 16. See http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?
columnist=ohlmeyer_don&id=4764245, retrieved May 12, 2012.
 17. See
http://www.golf.com/golf/tours_news/article/0,28136,1990399,00.html,
retrieved June 15, 2010.
 18. See http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/usopen10/columns/story?
columnist=harig_bob&id=52671, retrieved June 15, 2010.
 19. See http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/usopen10/columns/story?
columnist=harig_bob&id=5267152, retrieved June 15, 2010.
 20. See http://www.frontporchrepublic.com/2010/03/an-apologia-for-
tiger-woods/, retrieved June 15, 2010.
 21. See http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/feb/20/geoff-calkins-
time-will-tell-if-tiger-woods-apolog/, retrieved June 15, 2010.
 22. See
http://www.golf.com/golf/tours_news/article/0,28136,1888274,00.html,
retrieved June 15, 2010.
 23. See http://blogs.golf.com/presstent/2010/02/tiger-rules-hell-talk-
friday.html, retrieved June 15, 2010.
 24. See http://www.usatoday.com/sports/golf/story/2012-07-22/ernie-
els-wins-british-open/56415126/1, retrieved August 20, 2012.
 25. See http://www.supergolfclubs.net/tiger-calls-out-ernie-els-not-a-
big-worker-physically/, retrieved May 30, 2012.
 26. See
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/sport/golf/4444156/Ernie-Els-to-
celebrate-Open-win-with-Nelson-Mandela.html, retrieved August 20, 2012;
and http://www.sbnation.com/golf/2012/7/22/3176267/ernie-els-2012-
british-open-speech-video, retrieved August 20, 2012.
 27. See http://www.buzzingolf.co.uk/matchmaker-jesper-parnevik-
angry-at-tiger-woods/617, retrieved June 15, 2010; and
http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=4924113, retrieved May 12,
2012.
 28. See http://www.snpp.com/episodes/7F23.html, retrieved April 5,
2010.
29. Ibid.
 30. Why the German language has a word for this concept, and English
does not is hard to say. Some languages do (e.g., leedvemaak in Dutch);
some don’t (e.g., French).
31. Ben-Ze’ev (2000); Portmann (2000).
 32. See http://chronicle.com/article/The-Pleasure-of-Seeing-the/125381,
retrieved January 12, 2011.
33. Ibid.
 34. See http://chronicle.com/article/article-content/125621/, retrieved
January 12, 2012.
 35. See http://strangebehaviors.wordpress.com/2007/07/12/the-elusive-
etymology-of-an-emotion/, retrieved June 27, 2010.
 INDEX

Note: Page numbers followed by an italicized letter f or n indicate material

found in figures or notes. Names in italics indicate fictional characters.

Abdul, Paula, 95
Abel, 127–128
Abraham, F. Murray, 110
academic misconduct, 76–77
action/inaction, envy and, 153–154
adaptive function/benefits. See also evolution
of compassion, xvii
of altruistic tendencies, 191n20
of envy, 132
of group identity, 42, 148
of social comparisons, 12–14
of vengeful urges, xvii, 87
Aeschylus, 79
Aesop fable (ant and grasshopper), 83
African Americans, treatment of, 85–86
The Age of Empathy (de Waal), xvii
aggression, envy-triggered, xvii, 133, 138
Alabama football fans, 36–40
alcohol/alcoholism, 21–22
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 85
Alicke, Mark, 14, 82
Amadeus (film), 110, 134–138, 211n5
Ambrosino, Dominic, 69
American Idol, xv, 93–96. See also reality television
America’s Next Top Model (television show), 96
amygdala, 111
amour propre (self-pride), 5
“anesthesia of the heart,” 64
anterior cingulate cortex, 111
anti-Semitism. See also Hitler, Adolf; Nazis
envy and, xvi–xvii, 147–151, 218n25
Epstein on, 219–220n33
of Hitler, 143–147
in scapegoating of Jews, 147–151
Anti-Semitism: Its history and causes (Lazare), 218n25
antisocial behaviors, 26
Apaches, 89
Apollo 13 (film), xiii
Aquaro, George, 128
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 70
Aristotle, 27, 63, 109
Aronson, Elliot, 119
Aston, Trevor, 83–84
Atherton, William, 107
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 19
attractiveness pairings, 11
attributional bias. See fundamental attribution error
Atwater, Lee, 198n28
Auden, W. H., 88
Aunt Dahlia, 184
authority, obedience to, 166–169

bad, born to be, 51–54

Baker, James A., III, 163
Bakker, Jim, 71
Bataan Death March, 91
Battle of the Bulge, 157
Baumeister, Roy, 63–64
bear, joke about grizzly, xii
Becker, Ernest, 60–61
The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (Lerner), 81
Bellow, Saul, 177
Bennett, Bill, 74
Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron, 185, 207n52
Berga, East Germany, 157
Bergson, Henri, 64
Berlin Olympics of 1936, 47
“the better angels of our nature,” xvii
“better-than-average effect,” 14–16, 15f, 192n31
Beyond Revenge: The Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct (McCullough),
xvii
Bible
on the theme of envy, 127–129
on judging others, 163
on vengeance, 89
Big Brother (television show), 96
bin Laden, Osama, 79, 82
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 151–152
The Book of Virtues (Bennett), 74
Booker, Sara, xv, 96
Born to Be Good (Keltner), xvii
born to be good or bad, 51–54
Botvinick, Matthew, 41
Boucher, Katie, 116
Bradley, Ed, 24–26
Brady, Tom, 40–41
Breakfast at Tiffany’s (film), 93
Brecht, Bertolt, 59
Bridge of Sighs (Russo), 138–139
British Open, 182
Brobdingnagians, 122
Brooks, Mel, 29
Brosnan, Sarah, 13, 63
The Brotherhood of the Disappearing Pants: A Field Guide to Conservative
Sex Scandals (book), 73
Bryant, Paul “Bear,” 36
Bumfights (DVD series), 25
Burke, Edmund, 115–116
Bush, George W., 45
Bushman, Brad, 63–64
Buss, David, 12, 132

Cain, 127–128
Capone, Al, 55–56
Capote, Truman, 57–58
Capra, Frank, 184
Carlin, George, 16, 21
Carlsmith, Kevin, 89, 90–91
Carnegie, Dale, 55–57
Carraway, Nick, 163
Cassavetes, John, 68
Castro, Fidel, 119
To Catch A Predator, xv, 98–108, 170–172, 223n14. See also reality
television
Chang, Jung, 116
Chase, Chevy, 1, 119, 163
cheating, moralizing about, 76–77, 77f
Cheever, Susan, 21–22, 193n6
Cheshire Cat, 85
children
envy over inequality, 130
parents experience and, 34–35
unequal treatment of, 13–14
unguarded behavior of, 59–61
Chronicle of Higher Education, 185
Cialdini, Robert, 57, 75
Cikara, Mina, 41–42, 151, 153–154
Civil War, 16, 19, 173–174
Clutter, Herbert, 57–58, 64
The Code of the Woosters (Wodehouse), 30–32, 184–185
Cohen, Alexis, 96
Cohen, Roger, 157–160
Cohen, Taya, 42
Colbert, Stephen, 46
Cold War, 86
Columbia Journalism Review, 102
Columbia University, 36
Combs, David, 45
comedians. See superiority theory of humor
Commando (film), 88
comparisons with others, 2–4. See also social comparisons
compassionate responses, xvii
competition
in life, xiii
self-interest in, 52–53
competitive instincts between groups versus between individuals, 42
Conspiracy (film), 156
Coscarelli, Joe, xiv
Cowell, Simon, 95–96
Crane, Stephen, 16
Crowley, Candy, 54
Crystal, Billy, 33
Cuddy, Amy, 148
“culpable control,” 82
culturally shared standards of deservingness, 68, 79

Dante, 128
Dateline NBC, 99–100, 103–104
“Dead Putting Society” (television show episode), 122
Democrats/Democratic Party, 45–46, 47f, 54
De Palma, Brian, 68
deserved misfortune. See also justice
examples of, 68–71
impersonal satisfaction and, 202n19, 204n4
of hypocrites, 71–77
“just desserts,” 69
pleasure from, xiv, 185–187
research/studies on, 76–77
shame and, 48
Die Hard films, 107
Diener, Ed, xvii
A Discourse on Inequality (Rousseau), 5
The Doctor and the Damned (Haas), 58
dog behavior, in unequal treatment studies, 13
Don Giovanni (Mozart), 136
Dover, Kenneth, 83–84
downward comparison. See also social comparisons
antisocial behaviors and, 26
dark origins of, 24–27
drunkenness and, 21–22
experimental evidence of, 6–8
group identity in, 32
humor and, 27, 30–32
in media, 23–24
passive vs. active, 22, 25, 31
personal benefits/gain, xii, 111
as pleasing, 22, 24–26
reality TV and, xv
restorative power of, 25
“safe” targets for, 26
strategies for, 22–23
drinking/drunkenness, 21–22
“drunkenfreude,” 21, 193n6
Duke University, 37–38, 41
Dutch soccer fans, 39
Eastern Kentucky, 91
Edwards, Jonathan, 70–71
Eichmann, Adolf, 86, 154–155, 158
Einstein, Albert, 150–151
Els, Ernie, 180, 182
Elster, Jon, 130
Emmons, Robert, xvii
empathy
human capacity for, xvii
self-interest and, 62–65
Entertaining (Stewart), 117
entertainment, humiliation as, xv
envy
adaptive function of, 132
balm/cure for, xvi
in competitive situations, xiii
denying feeling of, 126–129
description of, 109–110
hostility and, 114–115
inferiority/hostility in, xii, xvi
injustice and, 130–134
of Jews, 147–151, 220n34
likeability and, 121–122
motivated action/inaction and, 153–154
Nazi anti-Semitism and, 143–147, 148, 218n25
neuroscientific evidence on, 111
pleasure link, 114
schadenfreude link, xvi, 113–114 See also schadenfreude and envy
self-deception and, 129–130
of Stewart, Martha, 117–119, 122, 123
tabloids and, 115–116
transmutation of, 125–139, 137
as universal emotion, 110
Envy: The Seven Deadly Sins (Epstein), 144
Envy Up, Scorn Down: How Status Divides Us (Fiske), 6, 111
Epstein, Joseph, 144, 150, 219–220n33
“equalization” of lots, 130
ESPN, 178–179
evolution. See also adaptive function/benefits
altruistic tendencies and, 191n20
rival group suffering and, 41–42
self-interest and, 63
social comparison and, 10–16
evolutionary psychology, 28–29
experiments/research
on consumer schadenfreude, 120
on “culpable control,” 82
on dispositional inferences, 170–171
on envy, 113–114
on fandom, 39, 41–42
on hypocrisy and deserved misfortune, 76–77
on humanizing effect of a pratfall, 119
on inferiority, 133
on “just world” belief, 80
on “minimal group paradigm,” 35–36
on narcissism, 133–134
on obedience to authority, 166–169
on identification in politics, 45–47
on reality TV watching, 105
on relative standing/unequal treatment, 12–16, 61–63
on revenge, 89–91
on self-esteem, 6–10
on tabloid press, 116
on Stereotype Content Model, 151, 153
extreme circumstances, self-interest in, 57–59
Eyre, Heidi, 61

fable (ant and grasshopper), 83

Facial Justice (Hartley), 5
failure/success, of others, 61–62
fairness, justice and, 65
fans, emotional life of, 36–39
Farber, Leslie, 153–154
Faust, 52
Feather, Norman, 68
Fenton, Alice, 185–187
Festinger, Leon, 6
Fiske, Susan, 6, 41, 111, 148, 151, 153–154
Fitzgerald, Edward, 131
Flanders, Ned, xi–xii, 122–123, 183–184
football fans, 36–40
forgiveness, instinct for, xvii
Fort Lauderdale, 81
Foster, George, 130
Foundation for Humanity, 69
Frank, Ann, 86
Frank, Robert, 12
“free ride” experiment, 89–90
Freud, Sigmund, 55, 130, 218n25
friends, misfortune of, 50–51
From Here to Eternity (film), 9
From This Day Forward: Making Your Vows Last a Lifetime (Haggard), 73
fundamental attribution error, xvii, 165, 169–172, 175, 223n14
The Fury (film), 68, 69, 88

Gangnam Style dance, 43

gain, from others’ misfortune, xii–xiv
Gandhi, Mahatma, 93
Gardner, Howard, 52
Gay, Peter, 47–48, 198n33
genocide, of Jews, 154–157. See also Jews; Nazis
Gergen, Ken, 6–7
Germans, suffering of Jews and, 152. See also Nazis
Geronimo, 89
get even, desire to, 105
Getting Even (Murphy), 87
Gettysburg, Union victory at, 173
Ghost Soldiers (Sides), 91–92
Gilbert, Dan, 89, 170
Gilbert, Darius, 40
Gilligan, James, 141
Glick, Peter, 148–150, 156, 220n34
glückschmerz, 187
Goebbels, Propaganda Minister, 152
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 125
Goffman, Erving, 95
Golden Gloves winner, 91
Golding, William, 59
Goldman, Lev, 195n39
golf/golfing spectators, 43–44. See also Woods, Tiger
Golfweek Magazine, 182
good or bad, born to be, 51–54
Google NGram Viewer, xv, xvf
Goncz, Hungary, 160
Göring, Hermann, 141
Grammer, Kelsey, 2
“grandiose” narcissists, 133–134
gratification, self-focused, xvii
Greenson, Ralph, 9
grizzly bear joke, xii
group identity. See also outgroups/outgroup antipathy
“us” versus “them,” 32
adaptive function of, 42, 148
in downward comparisons, 32
group membership, self-esteem and, 34–36
group psychology, downward comparisons and, 26–27
Gruner, Charles, 28–30
Gulliver’s Travels (Swift), 122
Gusen I, 87

Haas, Albert, 58–59, 64, 85, 87, 92

Haggard, Ted, 73–74
Hahn, James, 43
Halliday, Jon, 116
Halliwell, Stephen, 84
Hamlet (Shakespeare), 92
Hannibal, Missouri, 112
Hansen, Chris, 99–101, 103–105, 107
happiness
social comparisons and, 5
understanding, xvii
Hareli, Shlomo, 121
Haring, Bernard, 70
Harrington, Padraig, 180
Harrison, Brian, 84
Hartley, L. P., 5
Harvard Medical School, 113
Harvard University, 51–52
Harvard Yard, 113
hate crimes, 25
Hatfields and the McCoys, 91
Hauer, Mordecai, 157–161
Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 106
Heider, Fritz, 130, 131
Herzog (Bellow), 177
Hesse, Fritz, 152
Hewel, Walther, 147
Heydrich, Reinhard, 154–155
high-status, adaptive benefits of, 12
Hill, Grant, 38
Hill, Sarah, 132
Hitchens, Christopher, 30
Hitler, Adolf. See also Nazis
Battle of the Bulge and, 157
envy of Jews, 141, 143–147, 219n29
evolution of anti-Semitism, 143–147, 149, 154, 217n24, 219n29
Kristallnacht and, 152
delight over suffering of Jews, 152
sense of humor of, 217n19
“solution of the Jewish Problem,” 154
watching the defeat of German sprinters, 48
Hobbes, Thomas, 27, 55
Holocaust/Holocaust survivors, 86–87, 157–161. See also Jews; Nazis
homeless men, assaults on, 24–26
Hoogland, Charles, 41
hostile responses, xvii
hostility, envy and, xvi, 114–115
Hotchkiss, Sandy, 134
How to Win Friends and Influence People (Carnegie), 55
Howard-Johnston, James, 84
Howie Do It, 97–98. See also reality television
Huffington Post, 99
human motivation, understanding of, 51
human nature
children’s behavior, 59–61
competing sides for, 52
self-interest and, 54–57
humiliation
as public punishment, 106
in Frasier example, 4
in reality TV, 23
sanction of, 108
“humilitainment”
appeal of, 94–98
 To Catch A Predator, xv, 98–108, 170–172, 223n14
as term, xv, 96
humor
in downward comparisons, 27, 30–32
of Hitler, 217n19
perceived sense of, 14–16, 15f
superiority theory of, 27–30
Hung, William, 93–96, 105
Hungary, 157
hypocrites
fall of, 71–75
suffering of, 75–77

In Cold Blood (Capote), 57–58

inaction, envy and, 153–154
“individual-group discontinuity effect,” 43
inferiority. See also Makes Me Wanna Holler (McCall)
feelings of, 133
in others, 8–10
Influence: Science and Practice (Cialdini), 57, 75
ingroups/ingroup identity, 29, 35, 37, 42, 47, 149, 197n15
injuries, of opposing teams, 41
injustice, envy and, 130–134
Insko, Chet, 42
intergroup dynamics/relations, 42, 48
IQ tests, relative performance on, 61–62
“Isn’t it Romantic?,” 3
It’s a Wonderful Life (film), 184
Jackson, Randy, 95
James, William, 49, 51–52, 93, 177
Jersey Shore (television show), 96
Jesus
on hypocrisy, 75
on difficulty of a rich man to enter the kingdom of God, 129
 on judging others, 163
Jesus Camp (film), 73
Jeeves, 30–32
Jews. See also Hitler, Adolf; Nazis
envy of, 220n34
genocide of, 154–157
Hitler’s anti-Semitism and, 143–147
Kristallnacht and, 151–152
Nazis’ treatment of, xvi–xvii
scapegoating of, 147–151
suffering of, 157–161
The Jimmy Swaggart Telecast, 71
Joseph II, Emperor, 136
Johar, Omesh, 133, 134
John 8:3–11, 163
Johnson, Bob, 57–58, 64
Johnson, Samuel, 13
jokes. See superiority theory of humor
Jones, Mike, 73
“just desserts,” 69. See also deserved misfortune
just world, belief in, 80, 81
justice
blaming victims and, 80–82
desire for, xiv
fairness and, 65
restoration of, 202n19
revenge and, 86–92
self-interest and, 82–86

Kant, Immanuel, 1, 67
karma, 81. See also justice
Keltner, Dacher, xvii
Kennedy, John F., 119
Kentucky basketball fans, 38–39, 41
Kerry, John, 24, 45
Kim, Sung Hee, 90
Kimmel, Jimmy, 101
Kinsley, Michael, 74, 117
Kipling, Rudyard, 164
Klaas, Polly, 102
Koningsbruggen, Guido van, 8
Koren, Ed, 79
Kovach, Bill, 19
Kraft durch Freude (“Strength through Joy”), 152
Kristallnacht, 151–152
Krizan, Zlatan, 133, 134
Krusty the Clown, 51
Kubizek, August, 146

Laettner, Christian, 38
“Lake Wobegon effect,” 192n31
Lamborghini, 120–121
Land of Nod, 127
laughter. See superiority theory of humor
Lazare, Bernard, 218n25
Leach, Colin, 133, 153
Lee, General Robert E., 173
Leno, Jay, 120
Leonard, Justin, 43–44
Lerner, Melvin, 80
Leviathan (Hobbes), 27
Levin, Brian, 25
Life on the Mississippi (Twain), 112
Lilliputians, 122
likeability, envy and, 121–122
Lincoln, Abraham, xvii, 172–176
Linz, Austria, 143, 146
Lord of the Flies (Golding), 59
Lost in the Cosmos (Percy), 112
Louisiana Tech, 38, 40
love, competition for, 49–50
Lovell, Jim, xiii, 189n3
low-status, adaptive benefits and, 12
luxury items, flaunting of, 120–121
lynching, 158

Madoff, Bernie, 68–70, 82

The Magic Flute (Mozart), 136
Makes Me Wanna Holler (McCall), 17–20
Malcolm X, 67, 85
Mandel, Howie, 97–98
Mandela, Nelson, 182
Mao: The Unknown Story (Chang and Halliday), 116
Mao Tse-tung, 116
“March Madness,” 39
The Marriage of Figaro (Mozart), 136
Martha Stewart Living (Stewart), 117
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, 117
Martin, Ricky, 93
Marx, Groucho, 28
Masters, The, 43
“mate value,” 11
math ability, perception of, 14–16, 15f
mating game, 51
McCain, John, 46, 47f
McCall, Nathan, 17–20
McClane, John, 107
McCollam, Douglas, 102–103
McCullough, Michael, xvii
McDonald’s (restaurant), 17
McKale, Donald, 152, 155
Meade, General, 173–174
meat-eaters, self-consciousness of, 75–76
medial prefrontal cortex, 111
Mein Kampf (Hitler), 143
“me-monsters,” 5
Michael Kohlhaas (novella), 88
Michigan State University, 85
Mickelson, Phil, 179
Midsummer Night’s Dream (Shakespeare), 37
Milgram, Stanley, 166–169
Milton, John, 128
“minimal group paradigm,” 35
misfortune. See also deserved misfortune
deservingness of, 48, 202n19
of friends, 50–51
gain from others,’ xii–xiv
pleasure from deserved, xiv
Miss Teen USA Pageant, 23
Monin, Benoit, 75
monkeys, in unequal treatment studies, 12–13
moral behavior. See hypocrites
Moral Compass: Stories for a Life’s Journey (Bennett), 74
moral limits. See Nazis Morse, Stan, 6–7
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 110, 125, 135–138, 181, 211n5
“Mr. Clean/Mr. Dirty” comparisons, 6–8
Murphy, Jeffrie, 87–88
My German Question (Gay), 47, 198n33

Napoleon, 53
narcissism, 60, 133–134
NASA, 45
NASA lunar mission, xiii
National Collegiate Athletic Association, 38
The National Enquirer, 115–116, 178
Nation of Islam, 85
natural narcissism, 60
Nazis. See also Hitler, Adolf
in The Doctor and the Damned, 58–59
envy of Jews, xvi–xvii, 142–143, 148
Kristallnacht, 151–152
in My German Question, 47
persecution/murder of Jews, 142
revenge on, 86–87
scapegoating of Jews, 147–151
New England Patriots, 40
New York Jets, 41
New York Stock Exchange, 117
The New York Times, xv, 19, 117, 157
The New Yorker, 117
New Yorker cartoons, 21, 33, 79
Nicklaus, Jack “The Golden Bear,” 177
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 51, 132–133, 147, 218n25
“no-fair” game, 12–14
Nordegren, Elin, 183
1935 Nuremberg Laws, 156

Oates, Constable, 31–32, 184

Obama, Barack, 44, 46–47, 47f, 53–54
obedience to authority, 166–169
Ohlmeyer, Don, 178–179
O’Keefe, Walter, 4–5
Olazábal, José María, 43–44
Old Testament of Hebrew Bible, 127
omnivores, self-consciousness of, 75–76
Orwell, George, 33, 49, 98
Oscar (Academy Award), 9
other-interest, self-interest and, xiii–xiv, 51–54
outgroups/outgroup antipathy, 29, 35, 37, 42–43, 47, 149–150, 197n15
outrunning grizzly bear joke, xii
Ouwerkerk, Jaap, 8
Owens, Jesse, 48
Oxford University, 83–84

Parade Magazine, 120

parents, children’s performance and, 34–35
Parnevik, Jesper, 183
partisan instincts/interests, 44–48
Patton, General George S., 33
peace, vs. war, 116
Pearl Harbor attack, 91
pedophile, 101
Percy, Walker, 112, 116
Perloff, Andrew, 41
persecution, pleasures of, 151–153
personal happiness, xvii
personality, as explanation for others’ actions, 165–166
Pharisees, 75
Phelps, Michael, 29
Philippines, 91
Pitts, Leonard, Jr., 72
plagiarizing, 76–77
Plato, 27
pleasure/pleasures
of envy, 114
of persecution, 151–153
of revenge, 86–92
“The Pleasures of Seeing the Deserving Fail” (Fenton), 185–187
politics, schadenfreude and, 44–48
Portmann, John, 68, 70, 77, 185
positive psychology movement, xvii
Potter, Harry, 30
Powell, Caitlin, 76
Prager, Dennis, 147–148
preachers, hypocrisy of, 71–75
Predator Raw. See To Catch A Predator
Presidential Debate of October 2012, 53
prestige, desire for, 105
Princeton University, 151
The Principles of Psychology (James), 51–52
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 149
Pushkin, Alexander, 125
“Put on a Happy Face” (song), 184
racial comparison. See Makes Me Wanna Holler (McCall)

Raisman, Aly, 35
Rammer Jammer Yellow Hammer (St. John), 36
Rattay, Tim, 40
reality television, xv, 23, 93, 96, 105–106, 119–120, 170. See also
American Idol; Howie Do It
The Red Badge of Courage (Crane), 16–17, 192–193n41
Redick, J.J., 38
Regan, Brian, 5
Reiss, Steven, 105
Rekers, George, xiv, 72, 74
relative advantage/differences, 12–14
relative performance, on tests, 61–62
relative standing, biased perception of, 15f
relativistic thinking/rule, 12
Republicans/Republican Party, 44–46, 47f, 53, 198n28
research/studies
on “culpable control,” 82
on envy, 113–114
on fandom, 39, 41–42
on hypocrisy and deserved misfortune, 76–77
on inferiority, 133
on “just world” belief, 80
on “minimal group paradigm,” 35–36
 on narcissism, 133–134
on obedience to authority, 166–169
on reality TV watching, 105
on relative standing/unequal treatment, 12–16, 61–63
on revenge, 89–91
on self-esteem, 6–10
resentment, envy transmuted into, xvii
respect, 64, 90, 102, 164, 221–222n67
ressentiment, 132–133
revenge
desire for, xiv
high-status and, 105–108
instinct for, xvii
pleasures of, 86–92
restoring self-esteem, 90
rumination and, 90, 207n50
revenge plots, 67
Rich, Frank, xiv
Rickles, Don, 28
righteous pleasure, 79
rival group suffering, 41–42
The Road Runner, 54
Rochefoucauld, François de la, 9, 55
Romney, Mitt, 46–47, 53–54
Rooney, Mickey, 93
Roseman, Mark, 155
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, 92
Rosten, Leo, 67
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 5–6
Rowling, J. K., 30
The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám (Fitzgerald), 131
rumination, effects of, 207n49
Russo, Richard, 138–139
Ryder Cup matches, 43–44
sadism, 89, 92, 157, 166, 171, 220n59, 207n54
Salieri, Antonio, 110, 125, 134–138, 181, 211n5
Satan, envy linkage to, 128
“satisfied indignation,” 202n19
scapegoating, of Jews, 147–151. See also Jews
The Scarlet Letter (Hawthorne), 106
schadenfreude
age of, xv
zero-sum, competitive situations and, 34, 180
antidotes, xvii, 163–166, 170–176
belief in a just world and, 80–82
in biography, 17–20
definition/meaning of, xi, xiii, 202n19, 204n4, 207n52
deservingness and, xiv, 67–71, 79, 181, 202n19, 204n4, 207n54. See
also deserved misfortune and justice
empathy and, xvii
envy and, xvi–xvii, 109, 111–114, 130–134, 153–154, 181
evolutionary roots of, 10–13
in fiction, 16–17, 30–32, 138–139
felt by Hitler, 152
first hand suffering of, 157–161
from gain, xii-xiii, 2
gossip, 141, 187
hostile action and, 134–139, 153–157
human depravity and, xvi–xvii, 48
humiliation and, 94–98
humor and, 27–30
hypocrisy and, 71–77
inferiority in others and, 8–10, 21–24, 94–98
ingroup gain, 35, 64
injustice and, xiv, 130–134
in media, 93–108, 115–121, 178–179
as natural human emotion, xviii
persecution and murder of Jews, 141–143, 151–153, 157–160
 passive vs. active, xvi, 22, 91, 153, 207n52
in politics, 44–48
punishment and, 70
revenge and, 67–68, 86–92
sadism and, 92, 157, 207n54, 220n59
self-interest and, 50–54, 82–86, 182–183
superiority and, xii, 1–4, 10–12, 16–20, 27–30
in sports, 39–44
usage in books published, xv, xvf
Scheler, Max, 132–133
Schurtz, Ryan, 41
Schwartz, Michael, 69
Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 88
Scroggins, W. T. “Dub,” 21
Seaman, Ann Rowe, 74
self-affirming thoughts, 9
self-deception, envy and, 129–130
self-esteem
experimental evidence of, 6–10
group membership and, 34–36
illusions and, 16
inferiority in others and, 8–10
movement of, 7f
narcissism and, 133–134
revenge and, 90
social comparisons and, 6–10, 29
self-evaluation, social comparisons and, 4, 6–10, 16, 180
self-importance, 105
self-interest
children and, 59–61
culture and, 64
empathy and, 62–65
extreme circumstances and, 57–59
human nature and, 54–57
 justice and, 82–86
other-interest and, xiii–xiv, 51–54
self-interested behavior, 64
self-pride (amour propre), 5
self-serving feelings, in mating game, 51
self-worth, downward comparison and, xii
Seligman, Martin, xvii
sense of humor
Hitler’s, 217n19
perception of, 14–16, 15f
sexual predator, 101. See also To Catch A Predator
Shakespeare, William, 37, 92, 100, 125
Shapiro, William, 158, 161
shared standards, 68, 79
“She Bangs” (song). 93
Shepard, Alan, xiii, 189n3
sibling rivalry, 60
Sides, Hampton, 91–92
Sideshow Bob, 51
Simmons, Carolyn, 80
Simpson, Homer, xi–xiii, xvi, 109, 122–123, 183–184
Simpson, Lisa, xi, xvi, 109, 183
The Simpsons, xi, xii, xvi, 51, 109, 122–123
Sinatra, Frank, 4, 9
situational causes, role of, 165–166, 168, 171–172
60 Minutes, 24–25
Skinner, B. F., 5
Slate Magazine, 74, 100, 117
slavery, 85–86
Smith, Adam, 62
Snierson, Dan, 105–106
Snyder, Don J., 1
soccer fans, 39
social comparisons
 in biography, 17–20
evolutionary roots of, 10–16
in fiction, 16–17
at intergroup level, 29
self-esteem and, 6–10, 16
self-evaluation in, 4
self-interest and, 61
in “state of nature,” 5
Social Psychology and Human Nature (Baumeister and Bushman), 63
Soldiers and Slaves (Cohen), 157
solitary state, social comparisons in, 5
South Africa, 182
Spears, Russell, 133, 153
Speer, Albert, 146, 217n19
SpiderMan, 121
Spinoza, Baruch, 109
“sport killings,” 24
Spode, 30–31
sports, schadenfreude in, 39–44
sports fans, emotional life of, 36–39
St. John, Warren, 36–38, 40
St. Andrews University, 83–84
standards, culturally shared, 68, 79
Stanford University, 75, 120, 177
“state of nature,” social comparisons in, 5
status, revenge and, 105–108
stealing, 76
Stereotype Content Model, 148, 151, 153
Stevens, Helen, 48
Stewart, Jon, 28, 54
Stewart, Martha, 117–119, 122, 123, 178
Stuckart, Wilhelm, 155–157
studies. See research/studies
success/failure, of others, 61–62
“sudden glory,” 27
suffering, of hypocrites, 75–77
Sundie, Jill, 120
superiority. See also social comparisons
evolution and, 10
inferiority in others and, 8–10
superiority theory of humor, 27–30
Survivor (television show), 96, 119–120. See also reality television
Swaggart, Jimmy, 71–72, 74
Swift, Jonathan, 49, 52, 122
tabloids, appeal of, 115–116
Tajfel, Henri, 35–37
Takahashi, Hidehiko, 114
Telushkin, Joseph, 147–148
Thornburg, Richard “Dick”, 107
“thrill of victory,” 28–29
The Today Show (television show), 23
Toland, John, 147, 152
The Tonight Show (television show), 119–120
Toobin, Jeffery, 117–118, 122
Totleigh Towers, 31
Tucker, Sophie, 4
Turner, Terry, 113
Twain, Mark, 21, 112, 114–115, 141, 147, 212n21

Unamuno, Miguel de, 130

unequal treatment, studies of, 12–13
University of Alabama, 36–38, 40
University of California at Berkeley, 93
University of Bristol, 35
University of Florida, 37–38
University of Kentucky, 38–39, 41
University of Michigan, 6
University of Tennessee, 38
University of Vienna, 13
Upton, Caitlin, 23
upward comparison, 6–8. See also social comparisons
U.S. invasion of Cuba, 119
U.S. Open (golf tournament), 29, 180, 182

Van Buren, President, 175

van Dijk, Wilco, 8, 9, 20, 26, 68
vegetarians, 75–76
vengeance, 105
vengeful urges/feelings, 87
victims, blaming of, 80–82
Vidal, Gore, 111–112
vindication, 105
vulnerable narcissists, 133–134

Waal, Frans de, xvii

Waite, Brad, xv, 96
Walden Two (Skinner), 5
Wannsee Conference, 154–157
The War of the Worlds (novel), 60
war, vs. lasting peace, 116
Watts, Amber, 96
Wegman, Jesse, 99, 108
Wesseling, Yoka, 8
Westwood, Lee, 179
Why is it Always About You? (Hotchkiss), 134
Why the Jews?: The Reasons for Anti-Semitism (Prager and Telushkin),
147–148
Wiesel, Elie, 69
Wiesenthal, Simon, 86
Wilde, Oscar, 74
Wildschut, Tim, 42
Wile E. Coyote, 54
Wills, Tom, 25–26, 27, 30
Wilson, Bill, 22
Wilson, Tim, 89
Wiltz, James, 105
Winn, Steven, 100
“winning,” laughter/humor and, 28–29
Wodehouse, P. G., 30–32, 195–196n39
World War I, Germany’s defeat in, 146
World War II, 157
Wolk, Josh, 105–106
Woods, Tiger, 29, 177–183, 187
Woolen, Saundra, 79, 82
Wooster, Bertie, 30, 184–185, 187
Yerkes National Primate Research Center, 12, 63

zero-sum game, 33–34

Zionism, 145. See also Jews