Anticipating

Military
Nanotechnology
JÜRGEN ALTMANN AND MARK GUBRUD

I
s the Kevlar helmeted, body
armored, night-visioned sol-
dier of today merely a pre-
view of the nanotechnology-
outfitted soldier of tomorrow?
According to some military vision-
aries, warriors will wield rifles that
fire small self-guided missiles, dis-
patch flying mini-robots and micro-
sensor nets as scouts and sentries,
and carry devices that can gather
water in any environment. They will
be networked to tactical command
through helmets that provide an
“augmented reality” overlaid with
information and instructions. They
will jump six-meter walls assisted
by active uniforms that also stop bul-
lets, bind wounds, regulate body
temperature, and monitor vital signs.
Implanted with biocontrols, they
will be ready for up to a week’s con-
tinuous alertness without suffering
effects of sleep deprivation.
Seldom mentioned is what hap-
pens when the high-tech soldier
encounters a low-tech grenade. Even
nanotechnology (NT) provides no
immunity to conventional explosive
devices, heavy-caliber ballistics,
chemical and biological agents that
© DEX IMAGE

manage to penetrate the layers of

protection, or nuclear weapons.

IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE | WINTER 2004 0278-0079/04/$20.00©2004IEEE | 33

 Likewise missing from most sce- rise to super-strong, smart, and the – still underdeveloped –[6] con-
narios are the high-speed, high- intelligent structures in the field of text of “social and ethical concerns”
stealth, high-impact NT-based material science and this in turn about nanotechnology [7]. Particu-
weapons that may be deployed could lead to production of nano- larly in the United States, nanotech-
against the nano-soldier. Will one robots with new types of explo- nology and the NBIC vision have
side hold a monopoly on this tech- sives and sensors for air, land, and been treated as means to provide an
nology, facing only hopelessly space systems. overwhelming technological advan-
under-equipped guerrillas or the “This would revolutionize the total tage in “the wars of the future”; lit-
creaky military machines of back- concept of future warfare,” he said [3]. tle consideration has been given to
ward dictatorships? Or will nan- The global security system challenges and opportunities for
otechnology fuel a new arms race remains unsettled, threatened by arms control and cooperative
and global confrontation? unilateralism, nationalism, and rear- approaches to international security.
Nanowar hype has begun to go mament. Costly arms buildups con- We briefly survey military NT
global. Shimon Peres, former Prime tinue against the backdrop of efforts in the United States, the
Minister of Israel opened a Dutch- nuclear dangers, and rapid evolution nation that is leading where others
Israeli NT conference on 15 April of technology propels continuous may follow. Next, we discuss the
2004, saying: modernization, even where the broad range of potential uses of
threat of war is thought to be NT by armed forces, and suggest
A nano-uniform for American remote. Given that nanotechnology some of the most pressing prob-
soldiers will be lighter than cot- is being developed simultaneously lems that could result. Finally, we
ton, but protect them against bul- in many nations, unless military consider an approach for coopera-
lets and gas, regulate their body applications are limited by con- tive regulation [8].
temperature, and enhance their scious political action before they
strength. They can easily lift 120 become available, military forces Military R&D of Nano-
kg with one hand. This new uni- may end up confronting each other technology in the U.S. [9]
form will be available in three with NT-based weapons. They may The United States accounts for two-
years [1].1 find themselves confronting crimi- thirds of global expenditures for mil-
nals, terrorists and rogue states itary R&D ($52 billion in 2002, fol-
At a celebration of the Weapons armed with such weapons, as well; lowed by France and the U.K. with a
and Electronic Systems Engineer- other than weapons of mass destruc- combined $7 billion, then Russia
ing Establishment (WESEE) of the tion and some major weapons sys- and China, combined about $3 bil-
Indian Navy on July 1, 2004, new tems, products of the global arms lion)2 [10]-[13]. Since the Second
Indian President A.P.J.Abdul industry are freely available on the World War the U.S. has been the first
Kalam asked the country’s scien- world market, traded at arms fairs to introduce many new military
tists to make a breakthrough. He and mercenary supply houses. technologies, so it comes as no sur-
asserted that nanotechnology would Nanotechnology and related tech- prise that in the U.S. National Nan-
lead to faster and ultra-miniaturized nology trends, such as robotics and otechnology Initiative (NNI - the
computers and would influence the the “convergence” of NT with U.S. government funded nanotech-
strategic sectors with rolling out of biotechnology, information technolo- nology program that began in 2000),
nano-satellites, stealth structures gy, and cognitive science (NBIC) [4], the military takes a considerable
and nano-vehicles, and even smart [5], are disruptive and transformative share of the funds: between 26 and
clothes and shoes. Kalam said after technologies that pose fundamental 32 percent in fiscal years 2000-2004,
their success in software, India questions for security in the interna- in 2004 running at $ 222 million
should keep abreast of this amazing tional system of the 21st century. [14], [15]. Spending figures for oth-
technology. He said carbon nano- However, to date there has been er countries are difficult to obtain,
tubes and its composites would give little analysis of these issues within but judging from the U.K. effort in
the range of $ 2-3 million per year
1When the authors asked about this astonishing statement at the M.I.T./U.S. Army Institute for Soldier
[16], the U.S. may outspend the rest
Nanotechnology (ISN), the response was:
“Our research will contribute to a battle suit of the future that will be much different than what the
of the world for military nanotech-
soldier wears today. The full realization of that vision is probably 15-25 years away. Between now and nology by as much as a factor of ten.
then, the soldier uniform will gradually become more high tech, as the Army rolls out technology This could narrow if more countries
incrementally. As for lifting 120 kg with one hand, I do not know whether that will ever be a reality. follow the U.S. example and make
We are working on an actuating polymer that may be capable of acting as an artificial exomuscle, but
military NT a high priority.
the technology is still in the very early stages. ... The media has sometimes overstated this research by
claiming it will lead to boots that will allow a person to jump over a building. We do not expect that
2For Russia, see [11], [12]. The China estimate of
to happen. What is more likely is that this research may lead to artificial muscles that could provide
autonomous medical care, acting as a tourniquet for a wound, for example” [2]. $1 billon is from 1994 [13].

34 | IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE | WINTER 2004

 Military nanotechnology is still with $50 million over five years; tured high explosives with tailored
mostly in the research phase. The industry is contributing an addition- composition and energy release
Defense Advanced Research Pro- al $40 million [22]. Some 150 staff [26], [27]. Part of this work is done
jects Agency (DARPA) is funding
work at universities, as are the R&D
agencies of the various branches of Small computers would be
the armed services (which also carry embedded in uniforms, weapons,
out research in their own laborato-
ries). DARPA programs cover elec- and equipment, and linked into
tronics (e.g., sub-50-nm lithography,
spintronics, molecular electronics,
pervasive networks on all levels.
nano-scale interconnects), materials
(such as nanotubes, conducting or conduct research in seven multidis- in the context of the nuclear stock-
electroactive polymers, magnetic ciplinary teams, including thrusts in pile stewardship program – with the
memory, functional fibers for tex- protection, performance enhance- plausible consequence that success
tiles), biology (e.g., nanomagnetic ment, and injury intervention and might lead to modifications in the
particles to analyze and manipulate cure. One guiding vision is a multi- design of some nuclear warheads.
biomolecules and cells, cantilever- functional dynamic battle suit that
based atomic-resolution imaging protects against projectiles and Potential Military
of biomolecules, biology-electron- chemical/biological agents, pro- Applications of NT
ics interfaces, nano-biomolecular vides communications, changes col- Nanotechnology will provide
motors, assembly of bone and skin, or for camouflage, can apply force armed forces with many opportu-
and fast-acting biological-warfare for lifting loads or compressing nities. Applications common to
sensors) [17]. The Naval Research wounds, and senses body state. In civilian and military sectors
Laboratory has founded an Institute December 2002, the Center for include small, very capable com-
for Nanoscience [18]. Here and in Nanoscience Innovation for puters, communications, sensors,
the traditional divisions, wide- Defense was founded at the Univer- and displays. They would be
ranging research is being done in sity of California, with cooperation embedded in uniforms, weapons,
the areas of nano-assembly, -optics, from industry and national laborato- and equipment, and linked into
-chemistry, -electronics, and ries [23]. For faster introduction of pervasive networks on all levels. In
-mechanics. The Army Research NT-based near-term improvements, logistics, battle management, and
Laboratory is working on nanotech- the U.S. Army has founded a Manu- strategy planning, new levels of
nology for chemical and biological facturing, Research, Development, artificial intelligence would be
defense, structural materials, and and Education Center for Nanotech- used; DARPA aims at cognitive
particulate materials; in nanoener- nologies at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, computing systems that learn and
getic materials, a focus is on insensi- focusing on smart munitions, fuses, decide autonomously in new situa-
tive (i.e., safe against unintended and structural and energetic materi- tions or allow interactions that are
ignition) high-energy propellants als [24]. Two of the three national “fundamentally like human-human
with improved burning rate and nuclear weapons laboratories fund- interactions” [28]. Nanofiber com-
mechanical properties [19]. The Air ed by the Department of Energy, posites would allow stronger, more
Force Research Laboratory is active Sandia and Los Alamos National heat-resistant, but much lighter
in biology, electronics, materials, Laboratories, jointly founded in materials for structures and
and physics; one focus is energetic 2002 the Center for Integrated Nan- engines. Vehicles would become
nanoparticles for explosives and otechnologies [25]. Much of its lighter, faster, and more agile,
propulsion [19]. The Defense Uni- research – in areas such as nano- while consuming less fuel. Nanos-
versity Research Initiative on NT bio-micro interfaces, photonics and tructured membranes for fuel cells
(DURINT) gives grants for NT electronics – seems to be general. and materials for hydrogen storage
equipment as well as research pro- However, work on specific military may make all-electric vehicles a
jects, with project titles ranging from applications is probably underway reality. Surface-covering displays
quantum computing via nanotubes at the laboratories, perhaps continu- may be used for user interface or
to nano-energetic systems [20]-[21]. ing the Sandia work on safety, arm- as variable camouflage.
Efforts are also being made to ing and fusing devices using More specifical military applica-
accelerate actual military applica- microsystems technology. Beyond tions include new propellants and
tions. The Army is funding the Insti- generic nanoscale research, the Liv- explosives of higher energy density,
tute for Soldier Nanotechnologies at ermore National Laboratory has and miniaturized guidance systems
M.I.T., founded in March 2002, reported projects on new nanostruc- for small munitions. Nanostructured

IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE | WINTER 2004 | 35

material could bring improved pene-
trators and some strengthening of
DARPA aims at cognitive
light armor. Firearms could gain computing systems that learn
range and accuracy at reduced
weight. Small missiles could become
and decide autonomously in new
practical even against human targets. situations.
Autonomous fighting vehicles
and aircraft exploiting advanced and
possibly “smart” materials as well across the blood-brain barrier or to ited speed, and small systems gen-
as substantial increases in comput- concentrate in certain organs could erally suffer from energy problems.
ing power could be built smaller as well deliver harmful substances. Artificial intelligence and robotics
than human-crewed tanks, combat A mechanism developed to kill can- may continue to advance only
aircraft and helicopters, submarines cer cells after recognition of a slowly. Nevertheless, some devel-
and boats, although for firepower mutant gene or protein could be opments can already be extrapolat-
against heavy targets the need to used to target (or spare) a certain ed, and developments in NT,
carry tons of ammunition would group, possibly even a certain indi- biotechnology, and information
limit the size reduction. Vehicles vidual, on the basis of either genet- technology will tend to accelerate
used for surveillance, reconnais- ic factors or some separately each other. Because many potential
sance, and target location could be administered biochemical marker. military applications depend on
miniaturized much further. Or an agent might be designed to general advance in these technolo-
NT and microsystems technolo- monitor its target’s biological status gy areas, they would in principle be
gy would permit vehicles and to ensure nonlethal incapacitation. accessible to all countries with
mobile robots of decimeter down to On the defensive side, NT may pro- active R&D programs.
millimeter size, some using bio- vide highly sensitive detectors of
mimetic forms of propulsion. One chemical or biological warfare Problems from Military
variant would be to use small ani- agents and more effective filters NT Applications
mals (rats, insects) controlled by and decontaminants. Preventive arms control begins with
implanted electrodes. Although the In nuclear weapons, nanostruc- an assessment of the impact of new
munitions payload of small robots tured conventional high explosive military technologies on interna-
would be limited, they could attack could be used in fission primaries – tional security, and NT raises flags
at sensitive spots, or act in swarms to resulting in lower weight and maybe in several areas (e.g., [31]):3
achieve a mass effect. Small satel- better compression of fissile-materi-
lites and launchers may significantly al pits. Safety, fusing, and ignition Threats to existing arms control
reduce space launch costs; swarms devices can become smaller. Vastly and the law of warfare: New tech-
of them could act as large effective more capable computers will allow nology can make old treaties seem
radar, communication, or electronic- better modeling of weapons out of date, and can thereby tempt
intelligence antennae. Small satel- physics, including new designs [30]. states to abrogate or disregard them.
lites could also be effective in attack- All this may allow some increase in The Biological Weapons Convention
ing larger satellites – by direct hit or yield-to-weight ratio, but would not (BWC) could be threatened if new
by manipulation after docking. change basic characteristics. types of agents emerge that are more
Implants in soldiers’ bodies Many of the above concepts controllable and more precisely tar-
could monitor their health status, may be decades from realization. getable.4,5 The Treaty on Conven-
and release drugs for therapy – or to Practical barriers may limit their tional Forces in Europe might be cir-
influence performance and mood. utility: micro air vehicles have lim- cumvented by smaller, lighter,
Identification, communication, or
espionage devices could be implant-
3Preventive limitation – prohibiting development, testing and/or deployment – of new weapons types has
ed to keep them hidden. Another
been part of several arms-control treaties, e.g., the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 (abrogated by the
type of implant would use elec- United States in 2002), the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, the Chemical Weapons Convention
trodes to contact nerves and the of 1993.
brain to reduce the reaction time or 4This is particularly problematic since the BWC does not contain a verification scheme; negotiations on
to communicate sensory impres- adding a Verification Protocol were halted in 2001 when the U.S. announced that it would no longer par-
sions or (simple) information [29]. ticipate.
NT approaches could soon lead 5Questions could also be raised about the Chemical Weapons Convention, but that well-crafted and well-
to extensions of chemical and bio- verified treaty focuses on toxic chemicals and attaches specific, updatable lists of banned chemicals. The
logical warfare. Nanoparticles greatest impact of NT would be the temptation to use small amounts of toxic chemicals in micro- or
designed to ferry therapeutic drugs nanoweapons.

36 | IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE | WINTER 2004

 SECURITY CONSEQUENCES
CONSEQUENCES OF ADV
ADVANCED NANO
NANOTECHNOLOGY
TECHNOLOGY

The popular image of nanotechnology has been heavily influenced by visions of what might be possible at an
advanced stage of development. Artificial nanosystems may eventually equal or outdo the capabilities of living
organisms. Self-replication of microscopic units could enable rapid exponential growth. Advanced NT-based
computers could replace human intelligence. Drexler’s proposed “molecular manufacturing” would use nanorobotic
manipulations, under program control, to flexibly produce a wide range of products with fully integrated
nanostructures [34], [35].

The security consequences of such a technology would be profound: Weapons and carriers, with performance
characteristics in some respects far beyond what we can achieve today, could be produced autonomously on a vast
scale. An early start on exploiting this technology for military purposes could in theory lead to military superiority.
This may propel an accelerating arms race and create pressures for preventive attack – by leading as well as lagging
military powers, or even between partners. Autonomous weapon systems intermingled in international territory
could give rise to extremely fast action-reaction cycles with a high escalation potential. The possibility of covert
infiltration of very small, possibly self-replicating robots within enemy territory and systems would create fears of a
sudden, stealthy attack. These factors would combine to destabilize traditional deterrence relationships [36].

Advanced NT could bring science fiction to life, creating frightening possibilities for weapons of terror and mass
destruction. Reduced costs of nuclear weapons production could stimulate proliferation and expansion of arsenals.
Replication and harmful action of bio-nanoweapons might be controlled by specific interaction with cell processes,
including recognition of genetic traits. Effects could be engineered for maximum horror: madness, disfigurement, flesh
consumed; or passivity might be preferred. If access to the technology is widespread, “molecular hackers” might
release actual “viruses,” affecting not cyberspace, but the real physical world.

The Foresight Institute has argued against restraint in development of military nanotechnology and explicitly rejects
the possibility of negotiated limitation [37]. Instead, Drexler has recommended vigorous efforts to develop defensive
“active shields,” NT systems designed to recognize malevolent systems and fight them [34]. However, there has been
little published work describing such hypothetical defensive systems, nor has any general argument been given that
advanced NT should lead to the dominance of defense over offense in weapons and warfare; we think the opposite
is more likely [36].

Few scientists think “molecular nanotechnology” is imminent, and some dismiss it altogether. However, there has been
too little systematic investigation of the issue to simply ignore the possible dangers. The most important task at present
is to get respected scientific bodies to address in a serious way the feasibility of existing proposals and potential time
frames for their realization. National and international bodies should then discuss and develop appropriate preventive
regulation for any technologies which appear to be both potentially feasible and strongly disruptive.

crewless tanks and combat aircraft that would otherwise cause unneces- lethal weapons may encourage
that evade the treaty’s specific defin- sary injury. NT applications to offensive uses. Deterrence would
itions for such weapons.6 The inter- nuclear weapons could increase pres- be weakened if strategic forces
national law of warfare would be sures for a resumption of testing.7 could be attacked by non-nuclear
challenged by autonomous combat means such as stealthy, precision-
systems that would be unable to dis- Destabilization of the military guided weapons or miniaturized
criminate non-combatants or those situation between potential oppo- systems covertly infiltrated in
disabled or willing to surrender, or nents: Small, highly accurate and advance of an attack. Autonomous
systems of confronting powers
6For example, “Battle tanks are tracked armored fighting vehicles which weigh at least 16.5 metric tons operating at close mutual range at
unladen weight and which are armed with a 360-degree traverse gun of at least 75 millimeters calibre.”
sea or in space would need to detect
7The U.S. has signed, but not ratified, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996. and react quickly to any attack, cre-

IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE | WINTER 2004 | 37

 WARNING: OBJECT IN MIRROR MAY
MAY BE YOURSELF

In the area of new military technology, exaggerated perceptions and worst-case assumptions are common, and can
have real consequences.

One U.S. military writer has warned of a Chinese thrust in military nanotechnology [38]:

An article by Major General Sun Bailin of the Academy of Military Science is particularly important because it
illustrates how asymmetric attacks on U.S. military forces could be carried out with extremely advanced technology.
General Sun points out that U.S. dependence on ‘information superhighways’ will make it vulnerable to attack by
microscale robot ‘electrical incapacitation systems’ (635).

The targets would be American electrical power systems, civilian aviation systems, transportation networks, seaports
and shipping, highways, television broadcast stations, telecommunications systems, computer centers, factories and
enterprises, and so forth. Sun also suggests that U.S. military equipment will also be vulnerable to asymmetrical attack
by “ant robots”.

However, the original article by Sun Bailin [41] excerpted in English in a book edited by the same U.S. author [39], does
not mention attacks on the U.S. at all. It turns out to be a report to a Chinese audience about a 1993 study from the
U.S. RAND Corporation regarding military applications of micro-electromechanical systems; microscale robots and
insect platforms were mentioned primarily as weapons of the U.S. [40].10

The present emphasis on military NT in the U.S. and the widely available information about it are bound to have
effects on Chinese military planning. Given China’s traditional secrecy about military matters, it is plausible that such
misrepresentations may in turn increase threat perceptions in the U.S. and reduce motives for restraint and
cooperative limitation.

ating potentials for accidental war to thoroughly weigh benefits, risks, puters, stronger and lighter materi-
and uncontrolled escalation. and necessary regulation.8 als, and the other emerging techni-
Emerging threats and opportunities cal potentials. Some applications –
may propel qualitative and quanti- The number and variety of such as highly sensitive detectors
tative arms races in all areas of mil- potential problems indicates that for biological agents – might be
itary NT applications, even instead of stumbling blindly into an great assets in helping to verify dis-
between non-hostile nations. The era of unlimited military NT armament agreements and other-
dual-use character of technologies exploitation it is worth thinking wise protect civilian society. Other
for light-weight vehicles, small hard about how to prevent the worst technical capacities, such as lethal
computers, and implants, will com- dangers and limit the rest. robots or manipulations of the body,
plicate proliferation controls. will pose critical dangers.
Covert arms exports will be easier Cooperative A military-centered perspective
with smaller systems. International Regulation may lead to the recommendation
NT thus poses anew basic questions that in “deterrence, intelligence
Dangers to humans and society of how to deal with potential mili- gathering, and lethal combat ... it is
in peacetime could be posed by new tary uses of fundamentally new essential to be technologically as far
NT-based biological agents, micro- technologies. NT will pervade ahead of potential opponents as pos-
robots, and sophisticated weapons industry and society, and the armed sible.”9 A broader approach to
in the hands of criminals and terror- forces will not be excluded from national security would try to antic-
ists. Very small or even invisible making use of highly capable com- ipate the probable reactions of
sensors and robots, developed for
the military, could be used by state 8Note that different countries may show different degrees of restraint with respect to manipulation of sol-
and non-state actors to invade priva- diers’ bodies.
cy. Implants and other body manip-
9Theme E Summary – National Security, in [4].
ulation might be mandated for wide
use by soldiers before society is able 10Potential enemy and terrorist use against the U.S. was only mentioned in a short paragraph.

38 | IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE | WINTER 2004

potential opponent states: Would geted generically on NT, such a ■ Small, mobile artificial sys-
they feel threatened? Would they blunt approach seeks to arrest tems (including biological
attempt to introduce similar tech- progress in chemistry, materials, –technical hybrid systems)
nologies, put more emphasis on biotechnology, and electronics. should be severely restricted,
weapons of mass destruction, or Instead, we recommend detailed allowing only exceptional
rely on asymmetric warfare? consideration of potential dangers use (such as search of col-
We believe that the security of or undesirable effects of NT use, lapsed buildings).
all sides would be served better if
the more dangerous applications of
NT were reliably and verifiably The security of all sides would be
contained. More than a decade
after the end of the Cold War the served better if the more
industrialized and nuclear-weapon dangerous applications of NT were
states should be able to reach such
agreements. It would be tragic if reliably and verifiably contained.
states that are now building part-
nerships were to find themselves at
odds in a dangerous new arms race with the goal of identifying specific ■ Body implants that are not
for failure to consider the implica- applications or military missions directly medically motivated
tions of new technology. which should be prohibited or should be subject to a renew-
Most of the specific applications restricted, independent of the tech- able moratorium of ten
that could be abused – new biologi- nology employed. Quantitative years’ duration.
cal-warfare agents, miniature tar- parameters of weapons systems,
get-seeking missiles, small robots – such as the size scale of systems or Banning autonomous killing
would require large R&D programs components, or particular materials would not be much of a constraint
to bring to fruition. Terrorist groups used, may in some cases be useful on present practices, which typical-
are unlikely to be able to obtain for defining arms control agree- ly do include a “human in the loop,”
such systems unless the capable ments, and in other cases may be but such a ban could become
states develop and deploy them on a irrelevant or unverifiable. The feasi- extremely important as artificial
large scale. Anyone advocating bility of achieving agreement to for- intelligence is more heavily relied
such development and deployment go particular applications and to on. Communications difficulties
might reasonably be asked to accept the required, possibly very and required reaction speeds would
explain why the new weaponry will intrusive verification measures, seem to necessitate autonomous
be less of a threat in terrorist hands must also be a criterion for evaluat- decision making for robots to be
than the weapons of recent genera- ing proposed limits. successful in combat. Do we really
tions. While there may be com- We propose the following want robot wars? It is doubtful
pelling reason to develop nano- guidelines: whether armed robots should be
enabled countermeasures to thwart permitted at all. Currently, their
terrorists’ use of existing technolo- ■ Existing arms control and dis- virtues are being extolled for the
gies, going beyond this limited armament treaties and purposes of remote-controlled
objective via an unrestrained effort humanitarian international assassination and surveillance of
to “get it before the bad guys do” law should be upheld (and combat zones, but the results are
risks putting the new technology updated where needed). In questionable.11
into the bad guys’ hands. particular the Biological Following these guidelines, con-
If international limits can be Weapons Convention should crete limitations and their associated
agreed to, including verification and be strengthened by a verifica- verification measures will need to
enforcement mechanisms, it is rea- tion protocol. be worked out in detail. Small scale
sonable to expect that they can be ■ All kinds of space weapons does produce distinct verification
implemented. All technological soci- should be banned, possibly issues that are also observed in bio-
eties already take measures to reduce with special rules for non- logical and chemical arms control.
toxic emissions, improve safety, and weapons use of small satel- For system sizes down to about 0.5
otherwise balance costs and benefits; lites and carriers.
11In one case, three Afghan peasants were killed
new measures are introduced every ■ Autonomous ‘killer robots’
because the cameras in the Predator drone were
year as technology evolves. should be prohibited; a human good enough for the remote operator to detect that
While some authors [32] have should be the decision maker one of them was tall, but not good enough to deter-
proposed moratoriums or bans tar- when a target is to be attacked. mine that he was not Osama bin Laden [33].

IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE | WINTER 2004 | 39

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