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Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice

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Tomas Sodeika

MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF BOREDOM

AND ZEN PRACTICE1

ABSTRACT

In this article, Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of boredom is compared with

some aspects of Zen practice. Heidegger is primarily interested in boredom as a “fun-
damental mood,” which takes us beyond the opposition of the subject and object. Thus,
boredom reveals the existence more initially than those forms of cognition that are the
basis of classical philosophy and special sciences. As an essential feature of the experi-
ence of boredom, Heidegger singles out that being in this state we feel that our attention
is held by something in which we find nothing but emptiness. In the article, this empti-
ness is compared with the Buddhist concept of shunyata, and various forms of experi-
encing boredom are paralleled with the different types of concentration achieved in Zen
practice (samadhi). Besides, the question is discussed how the Buddhist perception of
emptiness corresponds to Heidegger’s “openness.”
Keywords: Heidegger, Zen, boredom, phenomenology, emptiness, openness.

In the winter semester 1929–1930 at the University of Freiburg Martin

Heidegger gave a lecture entitled Basic Concepts of Metaphysics: World–
Finitude–Solitude. The very title may show a little strange. A somewhat unusual
selection of the “basic concepts of metaphysics” is striking. It seems no less
unusual than that Heidegger devoted almost half of the lecture time to a detailed
examination of the problem that is on the periphery of the traditional philosoph-
ical issue—the issue of boredom. Heidegger identifies three forms of boredom.
Presenting each of these forms he indicates a completely ordinary situation in
which the corresponding form may arise.

—————————
1 This project has received funding from the European Social Fund (project No 09.3.3-LMT-K-

712-01-0085) under a grant agreement with the Research Council of Lithuania (LMTLT).
206 Tomas Sodeika

THE FIRST FORM OF BOREDOM

As an example of a situation corresponding to the first form of boredom,

Heidegger proposes the following:

“We are sitting, for example, in the tasteless station of some lonely minor
railway. It is four hours until the next train arrives. The district is uninspir-
ing. We do have a book in our rucksack, though—shall we read? No. Or
think through a problem, some question? We are unable to. We read the
timetables or study the table giving the various distances from this station to
other places we are not otherwise acquainted with at all. We look at the
clock—only a quarter of an hour has gone by. Then we go out onto the local
road. We walk up and down, just to have something to do. But it is no use.
Then we count the trees along the road, look at our watch again—exactly
five minutes since we last looked at it. Fed up with walking back and forth,
we sit down on a stone, draw all kinds of figures in the sand, and in so doing
catch ourselves looking at our watch yet again—half an hour—and so on.”2

It is perhaps difficult to find a person who has not experienced anything like
this at least once in his life. However, to understand the essence of boredom you
need “a secure guideline, a reliable measure.”3 It is not surprising that
Heidegger chooses time as such a “measure.” Let us remember that Heidegger’s
analysis of boredom can be regarded as a continuation of the project which he
began to implement in Being and Time, where time is seen “as the transcenden-
tal horizon of the question of being.“4 Also, the German word “Langeweile”
(literally: “a long period”) indicates that boredom primarily refers to a certain
modification of time: “What is at issue in boredom (Langeweile) is a while
(Weile), tarrying a while (Verweilen), a peculiar remaining, enduring.”5
Heidegger emphasizes that boredom is “a peculiar being affected in a para-
lyzing way by time as it drags (zögernde Zeit) and by time in general, a being
affected which oppresses us in its way.”6 Moreover, what oppresses us here is
paradoxical: “… that which bores, which is boring, is that which holds us in
limbo and yet leaves us empty.”7 This feature of boredom will become more
plausible if we pay attention to what happens when, in an attempt to dispel
boredom, we try “to pass the time (Zeit vertreiben).” Heidegger notes that “[f]or

—————————
2 Heidegger, M. 1995. Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. McNeill, W., N. Walker

(Trans.). Bloomington–Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 93.

3 Ibid., 96.
4 Heidegger, M. 1996. Being and Time. Stambaugh, J. (Trans.). New York: State University of

New York Press, 35.

5 Heidegger, M. 1995, op. cit., 96.
6 Ibid., 98.
7 Ibid., 87.
 Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice 207

passing the time betrays to us where we want to get away from, and this is pre-
cisely that place to which time in its slowness holds us. In passing the time we
seek something to occupy us, something we can dwell upon.”8 However, all our
efforts are unsuccessful, because the things that we are trying to “linger on,”
“refuse” to help us. All of them find themselves as “boring things.” “Things [...]
have nothing to offer that they leave us empty. To leave empty means to be
something at hand that offers nothing. Being left empty means to be offered
nothing by what is at hand.”9 We can say that it is these two paradoxically in-
terconnected moments—“holding us in limbo” (das Hinhalten) and “leaving us
empty” (das Leerlassen) that make up the basic structure of boredom.

THE SECOND FORM OF BOREDOM

The second form of boredom looks quite different. Heidegger offers the fol-
lowing situation as a guideline:
“We have been invited out somewhere for the evening. We do not need to go
along. Still, we have been tense all day, and we have time in the evening. So
we go along. There we find the usual food and the usual table conversation,
everything is not only very tasty, but tasteful as well. Afterward, people sit
together having a lively discussion, as they say, perhaps listening to music,
having a chat, and things are witty and amusing. And already it is time to
leave. The ladies assure us, not merely when leaving, but downstairs and
outside too as we gather to leave, that it was very nice, or that it was terribly
charming. Indeed. There is nothing at all to be found that might have been
boring about this evening, neither the conversation, nor the people, nor the
rooms. Thus we come home quite satisfied. We cast a glance at the work we
interrupted that evening, make a rough assessment of things and look ahead
to the next day—and then it comes: I was bored after all this evening, on the
occasion of this invitation.”10

It can be seen that, compared with the first form, the source of boredom is
changing here. It is not boring objects that bore us, but “this being in there chat-
ting away, a letting oneself be swept (Sichmitnehmenlassen) along by whatever
is transpiring there.”11 Heidegger calls the characteristic feature of the second
form of boredom “casualness (Lässigkeit)” which manifests itself in two ways:
“First, in the sense of abandoning ourselves to whatever there is going on;
and second, in the sense of leaving ourselves behind (Sichzurücklassen):
—————————
8 Ibid., 99–100.
9 Ibid., 103.
10 Ibid., 109.
11 Ibid., 117.
208 Tomas Sodeika

ourselves namely, our proper self. In this casualness of leaving ourselves be-
hind in abandoning ourselves to whatever there is going on, emptiness can
form.”12

It is easy to see that the character of “emptiness” also changes accordingly.

In the first form of boredom, we experience a feeling of emptiness from the fact
that the objects with which we try to “passing the time” refuse us. In the second
form, the source of boredom is the very “passing the time.” “The evening is that
with which we are bored, and simultaneously, what we are bored with here is
passing the time. In this boring situation, boredom and passing the time become
intertwined peculiarly.”13 In other words, what in the first form of boredom was
supposed to help overcome boredom in the second form becomes boring itself:
missing “with something (bei etwas),” this “something” turns out to be nothing
more than once “passing the time.” Therefore, we can say that in the first form
of boredom, emptiness was only a lack of fullness. In the second form, howev-
er, this “emptiness precisely first forms itself. This emptiness is a being left
behind of our proper self.”14
If we consider this form of boredom in the horizon of time, then its differ-
ence from the first form can be seen even more clearly. In the first form of
boredom, the modification of time, which Heidegger defines as “dragging of
time” (zögernde Zeit), arises from the fact that we arrived at the railway station
too early. In the case of the second form of boredom, we know when we should
come to the party, and therefore “we leaving ourselves time for the evening” or
“take the time for the evening” (i.e., we actively manipulate time). Heidegger
interprets this “taking of time” as the enforcement of time to “endure in such
a way during the evening that in being there alongside and part of whatever is
going on we take no note of its flow or its moments.”15 As a result of such en-
forcement, the moments of the “now” seem to merge into a leaking sequence
(abfließende Jetztfolge) and turn into “a single stretched ‘now’ which itself does
not flow, but stands:”16

“The ‘now’ is stretched and made to stand and held in this stretched standing
in such a way that we are entirely there alongside and part of whatever is go-
ing on around us, i.e., in such a way that we are entirely present (ganz
Gegenwart) for what is present (das Anwesende). Entirely present (gegen-
wärtig) to the situation, we bring our time to a stand.”17

—————————
12 Ibid., 119.
13 Ibid., 113.
14 Ibid., 120.
15 Ibid., 124.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
 Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice 209

Taking part in the party, we are completely immersed in what is happening

‘now’ and thereby completely dissolved in the present. But in this way, we find
ourselves “we are cut off (abgeschnitten) from our having-been (Gewesenheit)
and our future.”18 Heidegger draws attention to the fact that we experience such
a transformation of time not as the disappearance of the past and future, but as
“a peculiar dissolution of the future and having-been into the mere present.”19
Both of these moments of the temporality of our experience “become modified
in the peculiar manner of becoming enchained within the mere present, i.e., in
a joining in that merely makes present.”20 A very peculiar transformation of this
“now” is taking place:
“Through the ‘now’ becoming compressed into being in the ‘now,’ the ‘now’
stretches itself. It is not that individual now-points are heaped upon one anoth-
er; rather insofar as the ‘now’ becomes what is now, and gives and expends it-
self as that which is now, the ‘now’ itself stretches itself. There are not several
nows, but fewer and fewer, indeed merely one, a stretched one which stands in
this peculiar being stretched. This standing of the ‘now’ and enduring is no
mere being at a standstill, as though nothing further would now happen any-
more, as though this stretched ‘now’ would as it was standing around aban-
doned somewhere. Rather this stretched ‘now’ stands into our Dasein.”21

It is this standing “now” that “leave[s] us empty, and in leaving us empty

simultaneously hold[s] us in limbo.”22 Moreover, it is here that Heidegger sees
“the unity of the two structural moments of being left empty and being held in
limbo.”23 It turns out that these are “not two pieces arbitrarily stuck together;
rather, letting ourselves go in this peculiar chattering away is a making present
of whatever is taking place.”24

THE THIRD FORM OF BOREDOM

Turning to the consideration of the third form of boredom, Heidegger admits

that, unlike the first two forms, it is difficult to find a typical situation that
would lead us to this form of boredom. On this occasion, he writes:

“If, however, in accordance with our earlier procedure, we look for an ex-
ample, then we see that there is none to be found. Yet not because this bore-
—————————
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 124–125.
21 Ibid., 125.
22 Ibid., 126.
23 Ibid., 126–127.
24 Ibid., 127.
210 Tomas Sodeika

dom does not happen, but because when it happens it is not at all relative to
a particular situation or particular occasion and the like, as in the first and
second forms of boredom. The fact that it is boring for one can occur out of
the blue, and precisely whenever we do not expect it at all; certainly there
can also be situations in which this fundamental attunement irrupts, situa-
tions which are personally quite different with respect to personal experi-
ence, occasion, and fate. To cite one possible, but entirely non-binding occa-
sion which has perhaps already been encountered by one or other of us,
without our having explicitly noticed the emergence of this boredom and
without our explicitly being annoyed of our own accord: ‘it is boring for
one’ to walk through the streets of a large city on a Sunday afternoon.”25

As in the previous two forms, in this form of boredom, Heidegger highlights

the structural moments of “emptiness (Leergelassenheit)” and “holding us in
limbo (Hingehaltenheit).” However, as one would expect, both of these points
appear in a modified form. So the source of emptiness here is no longer the
refusal of things to help us “passing the time” and not our “casualness.” The
emptiness here consists in the “indifference (Gleichgültigkeit) enveloping be-
ings as a whole.”26 Heidegger emphasizes the instantaneous and at the same
time the total character of this indifference:
“… each and every thing at once becomes indifferent, each and every thing
moves together at one and the same time into an indifference. [...] This indif-
ference does not first leap from one thing over onto another like a fire, so as
to consume each thing; rather all of a sudden everything is enveloped and
embraced by this indifference. Beings have—as we say—become indifferent
as a whole, and we ourselves as these people are not excepted.”27

Unlike the first two forms, in the third form of boredom, there are neither
boring objects (“von etwas”) nor a boring subject (“bei etwas”). Our subjectivi-
ty is somehow dissolved in indifference. But this indifference is at the same
time indifference of objectivity: “We find ourselves in the midst of beings as
a whole, i.e., in the whole of this indifference. Beings as a whole do not disap-
pear, however, but show themselves precisely as such in their indifference.”28 In
this regard, we can say that here we are dealing with the identity of the subject
and the object, or of “inside” and “outside.”29 Heidegger calls this identity
—————————
25 Ibid., 135.
26 Ibid., 138.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Therefore it is difficult to disagree with the following remark by Wolfgang Fasching: “We

tend to conceive of our consciousness as something we find ‘within ourselves’ in addition to what
we encounter as the external, objectively existing world: a subjective ‘inner world,’ so to speak,
an ‘inner phenomenon.’ Yet under closer examination, it appears to be questionable whether this
 Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice 211

“Selbst” while emphasizing that this “self” is not a boring subject and not
a boring object, but impersonal “it is boring for one.” This impersonal form
means that we are located beyond a distinction between the cause of boredom
and those who are bored, as well as beyond a difference between activity and
passivity. Therefore, it is not surprising that the same “beyond-ness” is also
found in the modification of the structure of time characteristic of the third form
of boredom: Unlike the “flowing” time of the first form of boredom and the
standing “now” of the second form, the time of the third form is “the time be-
yond such flowing and its standing.”30 This is what determines the modification
of the second structural moment of boredom—“holding us in limbo” (Hinge-
haltenheit), the modification that Heidegger describes as “being impelled to-
ward the originary making-possible of Dasein as such.”31 Revealing itself be-
yond its flowing and standing “time entrances (bannt) Dasein,” which “cannot
find its way to those beings that announce themselves in the telling refusal of
themselves as a whole precisely within this horizon of entrancing time.”32
Based on the structure of boredom discovered by Heidegger, this experience
can be defined as a state of consciousness when our attention is paradoxically
focused on content that does not interest us. It would seem that “holding in lim-
bo” and “emptiness” should be mutually exclusive, and yet even the experience
of boredom arises precisely by the combination of these two points.

“FORMAL INDICATION (FORMALE ANZEIGE)”

Although boredom is familiar to all of us, the structure of this mood revealed
by Heidegger confronts us with some difficulties. Thеse difficulties grow out of
the specificity of the concepts used by Heidegger. Heidegger emphasizes that
philosophical concepts

“… are all formally indicative concepts. That they are indicative implies the
following: the meaning-content of these concepts does not directly intend or
express what they refer to, but only gives an indication, a pointer to the fact
that anyone who seeks to understand is called upon by this conceptual con-
text to undertake a transformation of themselves into their Dasein. But as
soon as one takes these concepts without reference to their indicative charac-
ter, like a scientific concept according to the conception of ordinary under-

really captures the way we experience our consciousness. Actually, it can be doubted that anyone
has ever found any consciousness within herself, or, to be more precise, whether it is a phenome-
non we encounter in addition to the outer world.” (Fasching, W. 2008. “Consciousness, Self-
consciousness, and Meditation.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7, 466).
30 Heidegger, M. 1995, op. cit., 147.
31 Ibid., 144.
32 Ibid., 147.
212 Tomas Sodeika

standing, then philosophical questioning gets led astray with respect to every
single problem.“33

So we should not lose sight of the fact that Heidegger’s text does not present
us with the ready-made meaning of the considered subject but merely indicates
how we must change for this meaning to become open to us. Heidegger de-
scribes this change as “the transformation of themselves into their Dasein.” Yet
here again we encounter a certain difficulty. The fact is that the particle “Da-”
in the concept of “Dasein” is usually understood as an indication of a specific
place. Heidegger, meanwhile, warns against this understanding, emphasizing
that “the Da in Being and Time does not mean a statement of place for a being,
but rather it should designate the openness where beings can be present for the
human being, and the human being also for himself.”34 Following this remark,
all the Heideggerian concepts should be considered as indications that to under-
stand the relevant content, we need to transform ourselves into the correspond-
ing form of openness in which this content can only be present as a phenome-
non, i.e. as “what shows itself in itself, what is manifest.”35 It is in this way that
we must also understand the concepts by which Heidegger describes the phe-
nomenon of boredom.

BUT WHY JUST BOREDOM?

Heidegger defines the purpose of his research as follows: “made the full es-
sence of boredom transparent for us.”36 But in this case, the “transparency”
means something else than the knowledge of what boredom is. It is no accident
that Heidegger warns his students at Freiburg University: “… it is not a matter
of taking a definition of boredom home with you, but of learning and under-
standing how to move in the depths of Dasein.”37 Heidegger is primarily inter-
ested in boredom as a “fundamental mood” (Grundstimmung), that is, as a state
that discloses beings more fundamentally than any usual form of cognition. 38 In
—————————
33 Ibid., 297. Cf. Kisiel, Th. 2006. “Die formale Anzeige als Schlüssel zu Heideggers Logik der

philosophischen Begriffsbildung.” In: Heidegger und die Logik. Denker A., H. Zaborowski
(Eds.). Amsterdam: Rodopi, 49–64.
34 Heidegger, M. 2001. Zollikon Seminars. Mayr, F., R. Askay (Trans.). Evanston, IL: North-

western University Press, 120.

35 Heidegger, M. 1996, op. cit., 25.
36 Heidegger, M. 1995, op. cit., 130.
37 Ibid., 131.
38 In this regard, it is worth paying distinct attention to the following remark by Jan Slaby: “In

boredom, when it is allowed to become profound and is not evaded through dispersions or kept
shallow in one of its more mundane varieties, our very being is modified to an extreme.“ (Slaby J.
2010. “The Other Side of Existence. Heidegger on Boredom.” In: Habitus in Habitat II. Other
Sides of Cognition. Flach, S., J. Söffner (Eds.). Bern–Berlin–Bruxelles–Frankfurt am Main–New
York–Oxford–Wien: Peter Lang, 117).
 Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice 213

Being and Time, where anxiety (Angst) is seen as such “fundamental mood,” he
writes: “… the possibilities of disclosure belonging to cognition fall far short of
the primordial disclosure of moods in which Da-sein is brought before its being
as the there.”39 In the other works, he considers other forms of “fundamental
mood”—such as “homesickness,”40 “wonder,”41 or even “joy in the presence of
the Dasein—and not simply of the person—of a human being whom we love.”42
It is striking that in comparison with these “sublime” types of fundamental
moods, boredom seems to be a very banal experience. Accordingly, the question
arises: does not boredom be a less interesting version of fundamental mood
because of its banality?

A BIT PERSONAL

For a long time, I could not find a satisfactory answer to this question. The
hint came quite by an accident. After one of my lectures, in which I spoke about
the meditation practice of Zen, one of the listeners asked me a question: “Is it
not boring just to sit so long without doing anything?” The question was unex-
pected for me. For all the time of many years of Zen practice, I have never ex-
perienced boredom in Zendo. But suddenly I had an idea: Indeed, there is some
similarity between boredom and the state of mind in which we are during the
period of meditation! Suddenly I realized that the structure which Heidegger’s
phenomenology of boredom has discovered is almost the same as the structure
of what we experience during the practice of Zen.
Let us look at some of the main topics of Zen practice.

NEN

First of all, some terminological clarification. Katsuki Sekida, the author of

an excellent Zen practice guide writes:

“In Zen, the term nen, which may be translated as ‘thought impulse,’ is very
important [...]. The infiltration of a nen-thought throughout the brain produc-
—————————
39 Heidegger, M. 1996, op. cit., 127.
40 Heidegger, M. 1995, op. cit., 7.
41 Heidegger, M. 1994. Basic Questions of Philosophy. Schuwer, A., R. Rojcewicz (Trans.).

Bloomington–Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 133 passim.

42 Heidegger, M. 1993. Basic Writings. Krell, D. F. (Ed.). New York: Harper Collins Publish-

ers, 99. As Espen Hammer rightly remarked, “[f]or the author of the Beiträge, boredom, having
now replaced anxiety as the attunement that draws the philosopher's attention, announces itself as
the most adequate, and yet also widespread, a form of response to the lack of responsibility that
allegedly marks the consummate nihilism of the machine age.” (Hammer, E. 2004. “Being Bored:
Heidegger on Patience and Melancholy.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 12 (2),
277).
214 Tomas Sodeika

es a wonderful effect. At our ordinary reading speed, no such infiltration

normally occurs. But it does sometimes happen when you read the work of
a poet you particularly admire, or read the Bible, dwelling on every word
and taking ample time over it. On such an occasion you may be reading
word by word, carefully and with deep appreciation, and suddenly the pas-
sage will seem charged with infinite meaning, seeming almost to come as
a revelation from heaven.”43

Sekida distinguishes three types of nen, corresponding to the three phases of

the activity of our consciousness. The first nen, which works unconsciously, is
a “mental impulse” in which consciousness is merged with its content in such
a way that it does not recognize any difference between itself and this content.
The second nen which illuminates and reflects upon the immediately preceding
nen also does not know anything about itself. Immediately after the second nen
follows the third nen, which is that which is self-aware. It illuminates all its
preceding nen, integrating them into the stream of consciousness:

“The first and the second nen come and go momentarily, and when a serial
process of thought is occurring the second nen will frequently arise to illu-
minate the preceding nen, and the two will intermix as if they were entan-
gled with each other. This makes a person feel that, while thinking, he hears
a voice within him that knows his thinking and gives advice to him.”44

Closely monitoring the flow of our consciousness we can notice that in eve-
ryday life all three nen merge into a single stream of consciousness.

RINZAI ZENJI’S FOUR CATEGORIES OF SAMADHI

AND HEIDEGGER’S FORMS OF BOREDOM

Now we turn to a more detailed consideration of the structure of conscious-

ness practicing Zen. In the proceedings of the ninth-century Zen master Rinzai
Zenji, we read as follows:

“At the evening gathering, the master addressed the assembly, saying:
‘Sometimes I take away the person but do not take away the surroundings;
—————————
43 Sekida, K. 1989. Zen Training: Methods and Philosophy. Grimstone, A. V. (Trans.) New

York, Tokyo: Weatherhill, 99. The Chinese character that is read nen in Japanese, is comprised of
one element meaning “present” and another element meaning “heart, mind, consciousness”.
“Moment of consciousness,” “mind directed toward the moment,” or simply “attention” is thus
more accurate definitions of the concept as it is used in Zen (Diener, M. S. 1989. “Nen.” In: The
Encyclopedia of Eastern Philosophy and Religion. Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, Zen. Schreiber
I., F.-K. Ehrhard, K. Friedrichs, M. S. Diener (Eds.). Boston: Shambala, 248).
44 Sekida, K. 1989, op. cit., 109.
 Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice 215

sometimes I take away the surroundings but do not take away the person;
sometimes I take away both person and surroundings; sometimes I take away
neither person nor surroundings’.”45

According to Sekida, this statement is a description of four different catego-

ries of concentration of attention, which he denotes using the Sanskrit term
“samadhi” (=establish, make firm). Although in the Hindu and Buddhist medi-
tation practices this term indicates a state of consciousness, the achievement of
which requires intensive meditative practice, according to Sekida, the basic
form of such state is to some extent familiar to every person.

THE FIRST CATEGORY OF SAMADHI

The first formula in Rinzai’s dictum—“sometimes I take away the person

but do not take away the surroundings”—according to Sekida (he interprets this
as “man is deprived; circumstances are not deprived”), means a situation “in
which one’s mind is absorbed in outward circumstances.”46 Let us examine in
more detail: (1) what does “external circumstances” mean, and (2) what does
“absorbed” mean. We usually understand the meaning of the predicate “exter-
nal” through the opposition to the “internal”—by analogy with the delimitation
of the two parts of the physical space, determined by the boundaries of my
body. However, the “external circumstances” that Sekida speaks of should be
understood differently. The predicate “external” here means merely that “cir-
cumstances” have the form of an object. Therefore, not only physical objects
but also any of our experiences (thoughts, feelings, desires) will turn out to be
“external” when the form of our attention directed at them is objectivizing. This
form of attention is given to the third nen, which is a reflection aimed at the
awareness (second nen) of immediate experience (first nen).
Now let us consider in more detail what does mean the predicate “is ab-
sorbed” in the Sekida’s sentence “one’s mind is absorbed in outward circum-

—————————
45 The Record of Linji. 2009. Sasaki, R. F. (Trans.). Kirchner, T. Y. (Ed.). Honolulu: University
of Hawai‘i Press, 150. Frederick Frank has noted here an interesting parallel with Hegel's philos-
ophy: “This fourfold consideration of Rinzai suggests stages of spiritual development similar to
the Hegelian dialectic of An-sich-sein, Fürsich-sein, and An-und für-sich-sein. In Hegel too, the
absolute negativity, which performs its function of negation with respect to both subject and
object, has the two aspects of a simple negation (Vernichtung) and preservation (Aufbewahrung).
So it might seem to correspond exactly to the third and fourth stages of Rinzai's dialectic.”
(Franck, F. 2004. The Buddha Eye. An Anthology of the Kyoto School and its Contemporaries.
New York: Crossroad, 194). In more detail, the relationship between the Hegelian philosophy and
philosophy of Zen is considered in the excellent monograph of Peter Suares: Suares, P. 2010. The
Kyoto School’s Takeover of Hegel. Nishida, Nishitani, and Tanabe Remake the Philosophy of
Spirit. Lanham–Boulder–New York–Toronto–Plymouth: Lexington Books.
46 Sekida, K. 1989, op. cit., 91.
216 Tomas Sodeika

stances.”47 It refers to the certain modification of the third nen. The fact is that
the concentration of our attention can occur in two ways: either the attention is
directed to a certain content by our volitional effort, or the attention is attracted
by this content—maybe even against our will. When our “mind is absorbed in
external circumstances” we are dealing with the second of these two ways of
focusing attention. This is such a modification of objectifying attention when
the third nen is activated not due to our volitional efforts, but because the object
attracts our attention to itself. And the power of such an attraction can be so
intense that we cease to be aware of ourselves. This is exactly what Rinzai
means when he says: “sometimes I away from the person but do not take away
the surroundings.” Sekida highlights that we experience such kind of samadhi
not only in Zen practice, but also in everyday situations—“when we are watch-
ing a football game, reading, writing, thinking, fishing, looking at pictures, talk-
ing about the weather, or even stretching out a hand to open the door—in the
moment of sitting down or stepping forward.”48
It is easy to see that as a special case of this particular form of samadhi, the
first form of boredom revealed by Heidegger can also be considered. Indeed, in
the example given by Heidegger, boredom arises from the fact that the attention
of the traveler waiting for a train is held in limbo by surrounding objects
(Sekida’s “circumstances”). The traveler experiences this holding in limbo as
the resistance of objects to his attempts to distract himself. The peculiarity of
this category of samadhi is that the third nen here objectifies emptiness. Situa-
tions of this type have a paradoxical property—on the one hand, they hold our
attention, preventing us from being distracted, but on the other hand, they com-
pletely lack any content that gives the situation meaning. We perceive this
meaninglessness as a void, which makes us inevitably boring. We feel how
“emptiness” emanates from “boring objects,” and these objects, being complete-
ly “empty,” nevertheless hold our attention focused, preventing any kind of
distraction.

THE SECOND CATEGORY OF SAMADHI

The samadhi of the second category (“circumstances are deprived; man is

not deprived”) corresponds to the second formula of Rinzai’s dictum: “… some-
times I take away the surroundings but do not take away the person.” Sekida
defines it as “inward attention.”49 The phrase “circumstances disappeared” indi-
cates that there is no object. This means that our attention is focused differently
than in the case of the samadhi of the first category, namely, it is concentrated

—————————
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 93.
 Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice 217

in a “non-objectifying” way. The third nen, which gives attention to an objecti-

fying character, does not arise here and therefore attention is focused on the
level of the second nen—a non-objectifying awareness of immediate experience.
So when we are concentrated “inwardly”

“ …. there develops a samadhi in which a certain self-ruling spiritual power

dominates the mind. This spiritual power is the ultimate thing that we can
reach in the innermost part of our existence. We do not introspect it, because
subjectivity does not reflect itself, just as the eye does not see itself, but we
are this ultimate thing itself. It contains in itself all sources of emotion and
reasoning power, and it is a fact we directly realize in ourselves.”50

Emphasizing the fact that “we do not introspect” into this “innermost part of
our existence,” Sekida means that in this case, we are concentrating our atten-
tion not in an objectifying way, but as a complete devotion to the flow of this
“ultimate thing itself.” According to Sekida, the samadhi of this category
“forms the foundation of all zazen practice,”51 however, like the samadhi of the
first category, it can be found in everyday life too: “there can be fighting sa-
madhi, stealing samadhi, hating samadhi, jealousy samadhi, worrying, dread-
ing, upsetting samadhi.”52
The second form of boredom described by Heidegger can be attributed to
this category of samadhi. The boredom we experience during the party gener-
ates an “emptiness” related to what is happening there, i.e. to “circumstances.”
The feeling of emptiness that holds us in limbo here arises from “a letting one-
self be swept (Sichmitnehmenlassen) along by whatever is transpiring there.”53

THE THIRD CATEGORY OF SAMADHI

The third formula in Rinzai’s dictum—“sometimes I take away both person

and surroundings”—is interpreted by Sekida in such a way: “both man and cir-
cumstances are deprived:”54 “Self-consciousness appears when you notice your
thought, which immediately precedes your noticing it, and you then recognize
the thought as your own. If we do not perform this noticing action we do not
become aware of our thinking.”55 This remark can be summarized as follows:
The third nen “notices” the content, as “registered” by the second nen, as direct-
ly experienced by the first nen. The appearance of the third nen involves the
—————————
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 92.
53 Heidegger, M. 1995, op. cit., 117.
54 Sekida, K. 1989, op. cit., 93.
55 Ibid., 94.
218 Tomas Sodeika

emergence of “circumstances,” however, the second nen gives rise to “man.” So

the Rinzai’s statement “sometimes I take away both person and surroundings”
can be deciphered as follows: Neither the third nor the second nen have ap-
peared. Accordingly, attention has neither the “objectifying” (third nen) nor the
“non-objectifying” (second nen) form. Therefore, it is said: “both man and cir-
cumstances are deprived.” The samadhi of the third category is a stream
consisting exclusively of the first nen in which consciousness is identical to its
content and remains completely anonymous for itself. Sekida calls this state
“one-eon nen” and describes it as follows:
“One-eon nen is the hushed silence of the snow-clad Himalayas. Or it can be
likened to the eternal silence of the fathomless depths of the sea. There is
a koan that runs: ‘Pick up the silent rock from the depths of the sea without
getting your sleeves wet, and bring it to me.’ The silent rock is yourself. You
are asked to pick yourself up from the depths of the sea. But first, you will
have to find yourself at the bottom of the sea, where eternal silence reigns,
with no time, space, or causation and no difference between yourself and
others.”56
Our consciousness turns out to be in a suspended state. There are no factors
more that keep attention in a concentrated state. But at the same time there are
no factors more that contribute to the dispersion of attention. Yet it is an unsta-
ble balance, which at any moment can be disturbed by the arbitrary fluctuation
of our attention. So it happens in the initial stages of Zen practice:
“In a more shallow phase of samadhi, a reflecting action of consciousness
occasionally breaks in and makes us aware of our samadhi. Such reflection
comes and goes momentarily, and each time momentarily interrupts the sa-
madhi to a slight degree.”57
Zen practice shows that as samadhi deepens, such fluctuations gradually de-
crease: “The deeper samadhi becomes, the less frequent becomes the appear-
ance of the reflecting action of consciousness. Ultimately the time comes when
no reflection appears at all.”58 Of course, to achieve such a state of serenity
requires long and hard training, which does not necessarily have to be crowned
with success. The instability of equality does not allow predicting the develop-
ment of the process. And yet if nevertheless, gradually deepening samadhi, we
succeed in achieving stability of attention, then, in the end, there remains only
a uniform flow of self-concentrated “pure existence”: “… in this stillness, or
emptiness, the source of all kinds of activity is latent.”59
—————————
56 Ibid., 160.
57 Ibid., 94.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 34.
 Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice 219

The description of this condition is comparable to the description of the third

form of boredom by Heidegger. He describes how our attention is held in this
form (recall that it is no longer possible to identify anything that causes bore-
dom, or one who is bored), as “the specific being held in the limbo of the third
form: being impelled (Hingezwungenheit) toward the ordinary making-possible
of Dasein as such.”60
The observed similarity of descriptions suggests that the experience of bore-
dom is similar to the experience of Zen practice. As we have seen three forms of
boredom revealed by Heidegger correspond to the three categories of samadhi
described by Sekida. However, it seems to be a little strange that the structure of
the third form of boredom corresponds to the structure of both the third and
fourth categories of samadhi at once. What could this double correspondence
mean?

THE FOURTH CATEGORY OF SAMADHI

The samadhi of the fourth category (“neither man nor circumstances are de-
prived”) corresponds to the last formula in Rinzai’s statement: “sometimes
I take away neither person nor surroundings.” The Chinese Zen master Ch’ing-
yuan Wei-hsin (the Japanese call him Seigen Ishin), who lived in the T’ang era,
describes the change that occurs through the practice of Zen, as follows:

“Thirty years ago, before I began the study of Zen, I said, ‘Mountains are
mountains, waters are waters.’ After I got an insight into the truth of Zen
through the instruction of a good master, I said, ‘Mountains are not moun-
tains, waters are not waters.’ But after having attained the abode of final rest
(that is, Awakening), I say, ‘Mountains are really mountains, waters are real-
ly waters’.”61

If we understand this description verbatim, then it might seem that the prac-
tice of Zen is a meaningless implementation. In fact, why practice Zen if the
result is not different from the starting state? The point, however, is that the
concepts by which the evolution of the practicing Zen consciousness is de-
scribed in the Qing Yuan saying are “formally indicative” (in Heidegger’s
sense). This means that only one whose consciousness has already been trans-
formed by Zen practice can understand them correctly. Sekida emphasizes that
the fourth category of samadhi marks a state of consciousness that has been
reached by a “mature Zen student.” This maturity consists in the fact that

—————————
60
Heidegger, M. 1995, op. cit., 144.
61
Abe, M. 1985. Zen and Western Thought. LaFleur, W. R. (Ed.). Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 4.
220 Tomas Sodeika

through passing through the experience of samadhi of the first three categories,
the mind of a Zen practitioner acquires the ability to keep “one-eon nen” not
only in the meditation hall but also in everyday life:
“When you are mature in practicing absolute samadhi, returning to ordinary
daily life you spontaneously combine in yourself the first and third catego-
ries. You are active in positive samadhi and at the same time, you are firmly
rooted in [...] the self-mastery of absolute samadhi”62

The combination of the first and third categories of samadhi is a paradoxical

formation. We are used to believing that at a fundamental level our existence is
determined by the binary opposition of activity/passivity. Following this belief
we usually believe that the whole variety of forms of our existential self-
perception ultimately boils down to the fact that we perceive ourselves either as
active or as passive. However, Zen practice convincingly shows that activity
and passivity are not mutually exclusive alternatives.63 As James Austin accu-
rately observed,
“Zen meditation is a relaxed attentive state, a passive activity. Both aspects
are important. The intervals spent in quiet meditation are designed gradually
to calm the overactive mind, to clarify its perceptions, and to open up its
spontaneous receptivities. It will be on this basic foundation—the settled
mind—that the deep ‘inner power’ of our intuitive skills will gradually ripen.
Later, this innate capacity can slowly mature in the direction of insight-
wisdom and genuine compassion.”64

The “inner power” referred to here, Buddhists usually call “emptiness”

(shūnyatā).

EMPTINESS AND OPENNESS

In Samyutta Nikaya we read what follows:

“Then the Venerable Ānanda approached the Blessed One […] and said to
him”: “Venerable sir, it is said, ‘Empty is the world, empty is the world.’ In
what way, venerable sir, is it said, ‘Empty is the world’?”

—————————
62Sekida, K. 1989, op. cit., 94–95.
63It seems to be no accident that in some languages there is a grammatical form of the middle
voice which can be considered as an expression of the fact that the subject of what is happening
cannot be identified as either agent or patient. See e.g. Kemmer, S. 1993. The Middle Voice.
Amsterdam–Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 130–134.
64 Austin, J. H. 2009. Selfless Insight. Zen and the Meditative Transformations of

Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 11.

 Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice 221

“It is, Ānanda because it is empty of self and of what belongs to self that it is
said, ‘Empty is the world’.”65

It would seem that Blessed One (i.e. Buddha) here means only the absence in
the “world” of some substance—like the Cartesian res cogitans. Criticizing
such an interpretation, one of Zen’s modern masters, Nyogen Senzaki, notes:

“Emptiness is a term used in Buddhism that has caused considerable misun-

derstanding in Western minds. When a Buddhist speaks of emptiness, he
does not intend it to signify the opposite of fullness, but rather that uncondi-
tioned state in which there is nothing to be given and nothing to be received.
Since it cannot be expressed in speech, it can only be hinted at in dialogue or
referred to by use of the word ‘emptiness’.”66

Special attention here should be paid to Senzaki’s indication that the concept
of “emptiness” “can only be hinted at.” This indication is a warning against
a literal understanding of the concept of “emptiness.” What is meant here?
Philip Kapleau once has witty remarked: “Reading about Enlightenment is
like scratching an itchy foot through your shoe.”67 This witty remark can be
paraphrased as follows: “Reading about Emptiness is like scratching an itchy
foot through your shoe.” We will never understand what emptiness is for Bud-
dha and his followers if we restrain ourselves from reading Buddhist texts and
meta-texts. The fact that the word “emptiness” in these texts is only a “hint”
means that here we are dealing with some kind of metaphor. Moreover, the
meaning of this metaphor cannot be “decoded” in the usual way, i.e. by restor-
ing the “literal” meaning. Since such “decoding” would be carried out without
going beyond the flat of the text, understanding the meaning of the word “emp-
tiness” would turn out to be only an imitation of understanding—“like scratch-
ing an itchy foot through your shoe.” Adequate understanding can be achieved
only if we manage to overcome the “reading consciousness” in ourselves which
is completely subordinate to the logic dictated by binary oppositions—such as
man–circumstances, subject–object, activity–passivity, emptiness–fullness, etc.
This cannot be achieved only by a logical conclusion or by simple willpower. It
requires the practice of meditation, transforming our consciousness in such
a way that the principle of binarity ceases to dominate us.
If we succeeded in this transformation, the content of the concept of “empti-
ness” would wonderfully transform. Moreover, this transformation would have
nothing to do with a simple negation of the void, i.e. simply replacing “empti-
—————————
65 The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. 2000. A new translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya,

from the Pāli. Bhikkhu Bodhi (Trans.). Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1163.
66 Senzaki, N., R. S. McCandless. 1953. Buddhism and Zen. New York: Philosophical Library,

22–23.
67 Kapleau, Ph. 2000. Zen. Merging of East and West. New York: Anchor Books, 38.
222 Tomas Sodeika

ness” with “completeness,” as the principle of binary would require. For the
mature Zen student emptiness is paradoxical—it is identical and at the same
time not identical to itself. It is easy to see that here we are dealing with the
same paradox about “water and mountains,” which Ch’ing-yuan Wei-Hsin
speaks of. But only a mature Zen student can recognize such an “identity of
identity and non-identity.”68 For Zen practitioners the experience of such a par-
adoxical emptiness is an experience that ultimately justifies all this practice.
Therefore, the mature Zen student experiences emptiness as something highly
positive.
In common usage, the word “emptiness” has a negative estimated connota-
tion. In this regard, it would seem quite appropriate to indicate the structural
moment of boredom revealed by Heidegger—after all, we usually also recog-
nize boredom as something negative. But boredom interests Heidegger not as an
uncomfortable state that should be avoided if possible, but as a “fundamental
mood” that opens up access to “pre-logical being open for beings.”69 Instead of
complaining about being bored, trying to overcome boredom by inventing new
entertainments, or using boredom as a topic for “not boring text,” he tries to
explore the possibilities hidden in the experience of boredom which we could
enter into that openness, the search for which is the main goal of all Heidegger’s
philosophical searches, and which in his texts is hidden under different names—
Lichtung, Erschlossenheit, Unverborgenheit.

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

The far-reaching correspondences between the structure of the experience of

boredom revealed by Heidegger and the structure of consciousness of a Zen
practitioner suggest that we are dealing here with related things. Perhaps this is
the case. Moreover, as is well known, Heidegger himself recognized a certain
similarity between his searches for the possibility of thinking of being and some
Eastern traditions of spiritual self-perfection.70 Nevertheless, it would be wrong
to equate Heidegger’s phenomenology of boredom with Zen practice because
Heidegger expands his analysis exclusively in the form of theoretical discourse,
—————————
68 Hegel, G. W. F. 1977. The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling’s System of Philoso-
phy. Harris, H. S., W. Cerf (Trans.). Albany: State University of New York, 156.
69 Heidegger, M. 1995, op. cit., 344.
70 E.g. in the introduction to an edition of essays by Suzuki, William Barrett reports: “A Ger-

man friend of Heidegger told me that one day when he visited Heidegger he found him reading
one of Suzuki’s books; ‘If I understand this man correctly,’ Heidegger remarked, ‘this is what I
have been trying to say in all my writings’ ” (Barrett, W. 1996. “Zen for the West.” In: Suzuki
D.T. Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D.T. Suzuki. Barrett, W. (Ed.). New York: Doubleday
anchor books, xi). Many similarities with Heidegger can also be found in representatives of the
so-called Kyoto School. See e.g. Heisig, J. W. 2001. Philosophers of Nothingness. An Essay on
the Kyoto School. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
 Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Boredom and Zen Practice 223

entering into which we very easily lose sight of the “formally indicating” nature
of Heidegger’s concepts, based on which this discourse is being built. Then the
phenomenological description imperceptibly turns into an end in itself and what
was supposed to unfold in the elements of living experience turns into only an
imitation—instead of an experience of openness, we only have an iterative end-
less sequence of texts and meta-texts.

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 224 Tomas Sodeika

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR – professor, Institute of Philosophy, Vilnius University,

Universiteto g. 9, Vilnius 01122, Lithuania. Main fields of investigations: phenomenol-
ogy, philosophy of religion, media philosophy, ontology, philosophical practice. Main
publications: Philosophy and Text (Vilnius 2011), Secularization and Contemporary
Culture (Vilnius 2013), Transformations of Ontology (Vilnius 2015)
E-mail: sodeika@gmail.com

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