https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23065612.pdf?
refreqid=fastly-default
%3Ad7a971318b9f67aca581e0639761c6d1&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1
https://academic.oup.com/book/10382?
searchresult=1&utm_source=TrendMD&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=Oxford_Academic_Boo
ks_TrendMD_0
The 2014 general elections in India marked a significant shift in the political landscape, transitioning
from a prolonged period of coalition governments to the dominance of the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) at the center. Previously, coalitions had been the norm, but the BJP managed to secure a
majority in the Lok Sabha on its own. While some seats were won through alliances with regional
parties like Shiv Sena, the BJP emerged as the dominant force, with the Congress party dwindling to
just 44 seats.1 This shift potentially signaled a move towards one-party dominance in the Indian
political system.
This change has implications for center-state relations in India. The decentralization of power in the
Indian federal polity since the late 1980s and early 1990s had been attributed to two main factors.
Firstly, the rise of coalition governments had strengthened the states, reducing the frequency and
duration of President's Rule. Additionally, political decentralization coincided with economic
liberalization, which empowered states to attract investments and manage their economies. However,
the central government still retained a regulatory role, particularly in controlling state budget deficits.
Despite the potential for centralization of Indian federalism after 2014, several factors suggest that
there may be more continuity in center-state relations than significant change. While the Bharatiya
Janata Party's (BJP) dominance might imply a tilt towards centralization, the party also expresses a
commitment to accelerating liberalization, which has historically decentralized power. Unlike the
Congress, the BJP's priorities may prioritize economic liberalization over federal redistribution,
potentially limiting the scope for central control and emphasizing state autonomy. Furthermore,
enduring trends in decentralization in both politics and governance, as well as institutional checks like
state governments and the Rajya Sabha, could serve as deterrents to centralization efforts.
Additionally, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's previous advocacy for cooperative federalism and
proposals for restructuring intergovernmental relations indicate a willingness to maintain state
autonomy.2 The BJP's 2014 manifesto highlighted the importance of consultation and fiscal discipline,
suggesting a balanced approach to center-state relations under Modi's leadership. Thus, while there
are indications of potential centralization, various factors may contribute to a more nuanced and
balanced dynamic in Indian federalism.
It is imperative to look at the intricate interplay of political dynamics, economic imperatives, and
historical precedents when analyzing the potential shifts in center-state relations post-2014. By
thoroughly examining the BJP's commitments to both centralization and liberalization, as well as the
enduring trends in decentralization and institutional checks, a more comprehensive understanding of
the evolving landscape of Indian federalism emerges.
1 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13597566.2019.1614921
2 Arjan H. Schakel, Chanchal Kumar Sharma & Wilfried Swenden (2019) India after the 2014 general
elections: BJP dominance and the crisis of the third party system, Regional & Federal Studies, 29:3, 329-354,
DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2019.1614921
Those who anticipated a state-friendly direction highlighted the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP)
pragmatic approach to coalition building, forming alliances with various regional parties such as the
Sikh nationalist Akali Dal in Punjab, the Tamil AIDMK, or the Assamese nativist Assam Gana
Parishad.3
However, contrary to these expectations, centre-state relations have become more centralised since
2014, despite the BJP's rhetoric of competitive-cooperative federalism. Nonetheless, this
centralization process has not been consistent across three key dimensions: political, fiscal, and
administrative. The political centralization receives the most support, while fiscal centralization
receives the least, influenced by decisions made by the Finance Commission and the impact of a
comprehensive reform of India's indirect tax system.
In comparative literature, "competitive federalism" typically refers to a system where states are
granted increased autonomy to pursue their political, fiscal, and policy objectives without undue
interference from the central government.4 This autonomy implies that states must take greater
responsibility for their actions and decisions, crafting tax policies and social services tailored to their
electorate while maintaining competitiveness relative to other states within the federation. The
underlying idea is that competitive federalism maximizes the role of states as laboratories for
democracy and policy experimentation, inherently promoting decentralization.
However, in India, the concept of "competitive federalism" often carries a different connotation and
may not truly embody competition.5 For example, the Modi government has utilized it to denote
states' ability to compete for central funding based on goals and objectives set either centrally or
jointly by the center and the states. Interpreted in this manner, "competitive federalism" may actually
foster a centralizing rather than a decentralizing trend.
Furthermore, the Indian government's strategy to stimulate competition among states to attract foreign
investment loses its decentralizing potential when the ruling party at the national level selectively
promotes investments in states under its control, presenting them as premier business destinations. 6 In
such cases, "competition" becomes more akin to "partisan federalism" rather than genuine
"competitive federalism."
The ascension of Narendra Modi as Prime Minister, leading a government no longer reliant on
support from regionalist parties, resulted in a concentration of powers at the center. In comparison to
Manmohan Singh's tenure, the Prime Minister's Office gained increased significance, while power
within the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) became increasingly centralized around Modi and Party
President Amit Shah. This intra-party centralization is evident in the central government's
involvement in candidate nominations and campaigning during various assembly elections held since
2014. Election campaigns often revolved around Modi, with Chief Ministerial candidates sometimes
announced late or not at all, such as in the cases of Kiran Bedi before the Delhi legislative assembly
3 Ideology and Organization in Indian Politics: Growing Polarization and the Decline of the Congress Party
(2009-19) by Z Hasan 2022
4 Bednar, Jenna, William Eskridge, and John Ferejohn. "A political theory of federalism."
Constitutional culture and democratic rule 223 (2001): 224.
5 Sofi, Waseem Ahmad. Autonomy of a State in a Federation: A Special Case Study of Jammu and
Kashmir. Springer Nature, 2021.
6 Chudnovsky, Daniel, and Andrés López. "Policy competition for foreign direct investment." In Trade
Negotiations in Latin America: Problems and Prospects, pp. 135-154. London: Palgrave Macmillan
UK, 2003.
elections in 2015 and the controversial cleric Yogi Adityanath after the Uttar Pradesh state assembly
elections in March 2017. Thus, while competitive federalism may hold promise as a mechanism for
decentralization and democratic experimentation, its implementation in India raises concerns about its
alignment with genuine decentralization principles and its susceptibility to partisan influences.
While intra-party centralization doesn't necessarily translate to political centralization throughout the
broader polity, it has coincided with the weakening of some state-based parties, particularly notable in
Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Bihar, and Delhi. Additionally, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is likely
to face robust competition from opposition parties in the 2018 assembly elections, particularly in
states like Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh where anti-incumbency sentiment against the
BJP is prevalent.
Signs of political centralization are evident across several fronts:
1. There have been attempts to deploy President's Rule for partisan political purposes.
2. Key decisions affecting center-state relations, such as demonetization in 2016, have been made
unilaterally.
3. There is an intention to synchronize general and state elections.
4. The central government has exhibited a heavy-handed approach towards Jammu and Kashmir.
The Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) ability to deploy President's Rule for political gain hinges on the
appointment of partisan governors.7 Upon assuming power, the BJP continued the tradition of
dismissing state governors appointed by previous central governments of different political
affiliations. Shortly after taking office, the BJP, through the President (a Congress politician
nonetheless), removed nine governors appointed by the previous Congress-led UPA government.
Governors play a crucial role during the President's Rule in India.8 If a governor perceives a
"breakdown of the constitutional machinery" in a state's governance, they can recommend President's
Rule, leading to direct central rule under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution. The interpretation of
"breakdown of institutional machinery" is subjective and has been associated with insurgencies or
political stalemates in states. Such stalemates may arise from a government losing its majority in the
state assembly due to defections or coalition breakdown.
Since the Bommai case9 ruling in 1994, the basis for recommending President's Rule has been subject
to judicial review by the Indian Supreme Court. The BJP has attempted to leverage President's Rule
for political gain on two occasions. In 2016, the party advocated for President's Rule in Arunachal
Pradesh and Uttarakhand. In Arunachal Pradesh, internal strife within the Congress-led government
prompted the BJP-appointed governor to advance the state assembly session, facilitating the formation
of a BJP-led government.10 Similarly, in Uttarakhand, the central government instructed the President
7 Vaishnav, Milan. "The BJP in power: Indian democracy and religious nationalism." Retrieved August 21
(2019): 2022.
8 Sethy, Rabindra Kumar. Political Crisis and President's Rule in an Indian State. APH Publishing, 2003.
9 S. R. Bommai v. Union of India ([1994] 2 SCR 644
10 https://www.livelaw.in/breaking-supreme-court-restores-congress-government-arunachal-pradesh/
to suspend the state government a day before a scheduled floor test, following defections from the
Congress party.11
However, the Supreme Court intervened in both instances, striking down President's Rule. In
Arunachal Pradesh, the court questioned the justification for advancing the assembly session, leaving
inadequate time for the Congress government to prove its majority. In Uttarakhand, the court
dismissed the central government's authority to impose President's Rule before a floor test occurred in
the state assembly.12 Additionally, the Supreme Court reinstated both Congress governments in
Arunachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. In doing so, the court acted as a potential safeguard of
federalism, serving as an institutional veto player and reinforcing the jurisprudence
established since its landmark Bommai judgment in 1994. It is noteworthy that prior to these
cases, the court had never ordered the reinstatement of even one dismissed state government,
let alone two.13
The most evident instance of unilateral decision-making in policy occurred with the abrupt
announcement of demonetization on November 8, 2016, which rendered 500 and 1,000 rupee
notes invalid as legal tender and introduced new 1,000 and 2,000 rupee notes. This move had
immediate adverse effects on the economy, depleted state government revenues, and
contravened both democratic principles and the spirit of cooperative federalism. 14
Proponents argue that demonetization was intended to deliver a shock and had to be executed
discreetly, aiming to endure short- and medium-term hardships for long-term benefits,
particularly in eradicating black money. However, many analysts contend that the initiative
was primarily aimed at undermining political opponents rather than combating black
money.15 This sentiment was shared by numerous opposition Chief Ministers, including the
then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, who foresaw political motivations, especially with the
Uttar Pradesh assembly elections looming. Subsequent election campaigning and the results
in March 2017 seemed to validate this perspective.16
The centralising agenda of the government is evident in its advocacy for simultaneous
general and state elections. This proposal was initially presented in the BJP's general election
manifesto and further elaborated in a working paper by the NITI Aayog, the government's
11https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/centre-imposes-prez-s-rule-in-uttarakhand-a-day-before-floor-test/
story-WL3F0BcoVpljs4sRbx6JbI.html
12 https://www.livelaw.in/uttarakhand-hc-strikes-presidents-rule-rawat-restored-cm-floor-test-april-29/?
infinitescroll=1
13 P.D.T. Achary, “Why the Modi Government’s Decision to Impose President’s Rule in Uttarakhand is
Unconstitutional,” https://thewire.in/28341/the-imposition-of-article-356-in-uttarakhand-in-unconstitutional-on-
many-grounds/
14 “Ban on INR 500 and INR 1000 currency notes- Economic implications”
https://www2.deloitte.com/in/en/pages/tax/articles/economic-implications-ban-on-500-and-1000-notes.html
15 Beyes, Peter, and Reema Bhattacharya. "India’s 2016 demonetisation drive: A case study on innovation in
anti-corruption policies, government communications and political integrity." In OECD Global Anti-Corruption
Integrity Forum. 2017.
16 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/elections/assembly-elections/uttar-pradesh/news/uttar-pradesh-elections-
2017-results-all-you-need-to-know/articleshow/57585921.cms
