APIT, SARAH T. JD-3 CASE DIGEST ADR ATTY. UY SECOND SEM.

ANTONIO G. NGO, PETITIONER, VS. VISITACION GABELO, ERLINDA ABELLA,

FACTS:

Antonio Ngo filed a civil case against Visitacion Gabelo et al. Gabelo, in their Answer, alleged
that the case should be dismissed because Ngo did not file a barangay case prior to filing in
court. Trial ensued and the Regional Trial Court dismissed Ngo’s case. One of the reasons for the
dismissal was his failure to refer the case for barangay conciliation. Ngo filed a motion for
reconsideration. The trial court granted the motion and ordered the case to be referred for
barangay conciliation. Gabelo filed a petition for certiorari questioning the reinstatement made
by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Gabelo and dismissed the case filed by Ngo.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Ngo argued that his failure to refer the case to the barangay
prior to filing the case was deemed waived because Gabelo et al never filed a motion to dismiss.
Ngo further argued that he was actually able to later comply with the condition precedent when
he filed a barangay case upon order of the trial court. He even submitted a Certificate to File
Action as he claimed that Gabelo et al did not appear during the barangay conciliation
proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not Failure to Undergo Barangay Conciliation is a ground for dismissal of a
case.

HELD: Yes. But it is waivable. It must be raised at the earliest opportunity otherwise it is
waived. In this case however, Gabelo et al never waived the ground because they had raised the
same as an affirmative defense in their Answer. This is allowed under Section 6, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court which provides that if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any grounds for
dismissal provided for in the Rules may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and,
in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss
had been filed. It is undisputed that the case was never referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa for
conciliation. Gabelo et al successfully prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over
the case by timely invoking the ground in their answer as an affirmative defense. Thus, the
complaint is dismissible for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of barangay
conciliation as a condition precedent before filing an action.
Anent the argument that the defect was cured upon submission of the Certificate to File Action,
such argument has no merit. The Certificate to File Action is apparently defective because (1) it
is indicated there that a settlement was made but was repudiated yet in his pleadings before the
SC, Ngo said that Gabelo et al never appeared in the barangay proceedings, and (2) it appears
that not all the opposing parties were summoned by the barangay.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that lack of barangay conciliation affects a plaintiff’s cause
of action. A case is prematurely filed if filed without the requisite barangay conciliation. Lack of
barangay conciliation is not jurisdictional as the court may still hear the case if the same is not
invoked. Prior recourse to the conciliation procedure is not a jurisdictional requirement.
However, if the fact of non-compliance with and non-observance of such procedure has been
seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal
of the action is proper.
 CASE #2 A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

FACTS:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon
located in Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-
Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands
for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the
parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in
court. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the
(subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,
claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over
the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.

NOTES:

Respondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and
Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at
the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules.

Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word
delicadeza.
 CASE # 3 G.R. No. 149266 March 17, 2006
BENJAMIN AND ROSENDA ESPINO, Petitioners,
vs.
CARMITA LEGARDA, Respondent.

Facts:
• The case involves Carmita Legarda as the respondent and Benjamin and Rosenda Espino as the
petitioners.
• The events took place in Manila.
• Legarda filed three separate complaints against the Espinos and Jaime Abeja for accion
publiciana.
• Legarda claimed ownership of three lots in Manila, which the Espinos had entered and
constructed houses on without her late father's knowledge and consent.
• Despite demand, the Espinos refused to vacate the premises.
• Legarda reported the matter to the Barangay Chairman, but the Espinos ignored the summonses
issued to them.
• The lower court ruled in favor of Legarda.

Issue:
• Did Legarda comply with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, which requires conciliation
before filing a complaint in court?

Ruling:
• The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Legarda and affirmed the lower court's decision.

NOTES:
• The Espinos argued that Legarda failed to formally offer the Certification to File Action as
evidence during the trial.
• The Supreme Court agreed with Legarda, stating that the Certification need not be formally
offered in evidence since it was deemed admitted by the Espinos when they failed to deny it
under oath in their Answer.
• The Court also noted that the Espinos did not object to the lack of conciliation during the
hearing, and any objection should have been raised in the Answer or other pleading allowed
under the rules.
• The Court concluded that Legarda had satisfactorily shown that she complied with the law by
referring the dispute to the barangay for amicable settlement before filing her complaints with
the court.
• Therefore, the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
•

CASE # 4 G.R. No. 157830 November 17, 2005

Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari

Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario as his
attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney
Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed... before the
RTC... a complaint... for Annulment of Transfer
Certificate of Title... and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with
Damages respondent Pascual filed a Motion to Dismiss... on two grounds one of which was non-
compliance with the requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code... contending
that... there is no showing that the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was
filed in court granted respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration...
was denied... the said Attorney-in-fact shall be deemed to be the real party in interest, reading
from the tenor of the provisions of the Special Power of Attorney. Being a real party in interest,
the Attorney-in-fact is therefore obliged to bring this case first before the Barangay Court.
Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party in interest, and
since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute
involving real property
Issues:
YES
RTC... erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint.
Ruling:
Section 3 of Rule 3... provides:
Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting
in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed... to be the real party in interest.
To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the attorney-
in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a "real
party in interest" as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3[14] of the 1997 Rules of Court vis a vis
Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by
respondent.
In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of
the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction
over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for... conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in
court.
The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint.

CASE # 5

FELICIDAD UY,
petitioner, vs.
HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
61,Makati, Metro Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial Prosecutor of
Pasig, MetroManila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIE JAVIER,
respondents.
G.R. No. 111416 September 26, 1994
FACTS:

Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of the secondfloor of a
building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati, Metro Manila. She operated and
maintained therein a beauty parlor.

The sublease contract expired on 15 April1993. However, the petitioner was not able to remove
all her movable properties.

On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the former sought
to withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining movable properties
.
The argument degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner and Atayde and several of
Atayde's employees.

On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a complaint with the barangaycaptain of
Valenzuela, Makati
.
The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain for 28 April 1993. On the
said date, only the petitioner appeared. The barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26
May 1993.

On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for
slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati
.
On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered the petitioner to
submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses. On 14 June 1993, the petitioner
submitted the required counter-affidavits. On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss Criminal Cases for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508. On 2 July
1993, public respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the motion to dismiss.
A motion to reconsider theabove order was denied as well. Hence this present special civil action
for certiorari
.
ISSUE: WON THE CASE FILED SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF
FAILURE TOCOMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIRMENT OF P.D. NO. 1508,
NOW EMBODIED INSECTION 412 OF THE LGC OF 1991

HELD:
Yes. While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991,the
jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of
an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially
reproduced in the Code. The precise technical effect of failure to complywith the requirement of
P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Moreover, having brought the dispute before the
lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing
the authority of the body which they themselves had sought.Their act of trifling with the
authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and
instead filing the complaint right away with the trial courtcannot be countenanced for to do so
would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system. Parties to disputes cognizable by the
lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the