Grounds and Limits of

Political Obligation

HE PROBLEM OF political obligation is one of the most prominent

T issues of political philosophy. It is primarily concerned with the question:

how far, when and why an individual is obliged to obey law and the
commands of political authority. This may be accompanied by such duties of
the citizen as payment of taxes, political participation and voting, jury service
and military duty; etc. which are necessary for the maintenance of political
institutions. Broadly speaking, these duties are regarded as part of the individual's
political obligation. Political philosophy inquires into the logical and moral grounds
of political obligation so as to determine its proper scope and limits. This
question is so complex that it is not possible to find its definite answer which
would be universally acceptable. However, an inquiry into different viewpoints
expressed in this behalf can enlighten us in finding an answer to this problem
in a particular context. .·

THE DOCTRINE OF FORCE MAJEURE

Force Majeure means su . st . .
The d t · penor rength, an irresistible compulsion or coercion.
oc nne of force ma ·e
state as th ~ ure, therefore, regards the superior strength of the
e source of pohf bl' . ·
so powerful that th . d' . tea1 O tgation. According to this view, the state ~
- whether he likes e 1n 1v1dual h · but to obey
th as no option its laws and- comman~ ds
fear of punishment eom otrhnot. In this sense, political obligation is based on ~
.
disobedience of law r Th'
o er unple
. as ant consequences which would fo11ow froill
· 1s view of 1. • h t te or
government as the emb d' po 1tical obligation identifies t e sa
0
iment of political authority; its invincible power as the

[ 296 ]
 · · Political Obligation 297
Grounds and Lzmzts of
-
. .
source of its au thority. Since individ ua1 ts too weak to cha11 enge the authority
. . . obligation . . .
of the state, h1s poht1cal ts un11m1ted.
theory is th t . . ground .
The difficulty with this ru le of a, •~ ~ n_ot ~ase~ on any moral
du bi ou s ow the
It simply invokes the . . ;i g t ts nght · It does not all
he th er a
individual to inquire w 1
: is ng . t or ~ro~g~ it does not care to
secure
It do es : y Jaw or
his willing obedience. b t pe rn1 1t the md1v1dual to resista an
d h. h Id
ng in hi s ju dg em en t. It creates ground of
e wro h
com~an w _1c . cou . surrend er un de r th e th rea t of an anned ro bb er rat er
to
obedience w. hich is akm. e in terest of individual's ow
n health.
ce of a docto r in th
th~n followmg the ad~t ul d ha rd ly be treated as a sound
theory of
tic s, it co
W i~ these . ch~ractens
poht1cal obhgat1on.
RY
DIVINE RIGHT THEO ign is
of K in gs ho ld s th at th e authority of the sovere
ht
Th~ theory of divine rig ce to th e sta te is as imperative as obed
ience
e ob ed ien
denved from God; henc th eo ry ar e fo und in ancient Indian
political
s of th is
to God. The early hint wa s de ve lo pe d during the ascendan
cy of
is th eo ry
thought. In Europe, th s Ro be rt Fi lm er (1588-1653). In the
recent
pone nt wa
monarchy. Its chief ex e- co m m un ist Ti be t and some tribal kingdo
ms.
held in pr
times, this theory was up
the modem state.
It is seldom invoked in ited
g on all m or tal s, th is theory upholds an unlim
in
Since God's will is bind litica l ob lig ation on religious rather
than
estab lis he s po m as
political obligation. It t to be a ty ra nt , people have to obey hi
g tu rn s ou
moral ground. If a Kin I of En gl an d ( 1566-1625) sought to
justify
sin. Ja m es
a punishment for their
s tyrann ical rule prec isely on this ground.
hi ity' .
e di vi ne rig ht th eo ry with 'charismatic author
Some writers equate th d. Ch ar ism ati c authority is the characte
ristic
well -fo un de
This comparison is not ob ed ien ce of th eir followers because of their
com m an d
of political leaders who m ay or m ay no t be accompanied by invoking
es w hi ch
mystical, personal qualiti ar ism ati c au th or ity is purely personal which
eove r, ch
their divine origin. Mor e of th e pe rso n holding such qualities.
But
sapp ea ra nc
may vanish with the di ritan ce of th e sa m e authority. It is, therefor
e,
edes in he
divine right theory conc er th an charismatic authority
.
al au tn or ityJ ra th
akin to Ctrad1t1on ement
an y rig ht of th e in di vi dual to exercise his judg
Since this theory denies t an y w ro ng law or command, this too
can
an d to re sis
about right and wrong th eo ry of political obligation
.
ated as a ge nu in e
hardly be tre
EW
CONSERVATIVE VI ority
upho ld ob ed ience to the state or political auth
m
Adherents of conservatis m e (1 71 1- 76 ) argued that the advantages
of
avid Hu
for (P ractical /reasons. D ica l au th ority outweigh the disadvantag
es of
of po lit
obedience to any type
 298 An Introduction to Political Theory

having no government at all. He, therefore, upheld unconditional polit ical~

in view of practical utility of a government. Edmund Burke ( 1729-9 7) si I~ation
argued that politics was a matter of 'pruden ce and practicability'. De:ll~rl y
nd
the case for social continuity, he contend ed that revolution is evil O e1 tng
~ . '0~
because it involves violence and destruct10n, but • also because it result . _
- s 1n ---
misuse of power by those who manage to capture 1t. Burke ruled 0~
vers10ns of reform because they destroy the social fabric without providin~e~e
the mechanism of its repair. In his view, "society is far too complex a syste°r
to be tinkered with. A people' s constitution is the result of many minds in ma:
ages. It is no simple, no superficial thing, nor to be estimated by superfici:i
understandings ... A society is a delicate organism, developing and adapting itself
to circumstances. To interfere with any major institution would start a chain of
repercussions throughout the whole system, with results no man could foresee."

• •• :
1
• ' :co~~rvat~i ;t }:, ;:;·'. .·
_· ·,::that -:ptomotes . respect -:for: itF,~t:;JonCJ!'\~an~:Ung ~odal practic:es,
an~, tnsis~;!~~- _t:~lnt~~~ in:g,..,tho~e ·: i~iti~t1li~nif i htf tj\ hev-~:- ffood--!he test of ffme.
When ' chd_~;g ,1:.1,s"-fi11evjtabfe,. or it '.:h9~ (.a,ltj~'~ i>,:t?~en, .; p!ctce~, ~onservatives wilt
_ attempt
· '45'
-to,,,--:.:-~d~~~
-~ .'':...•i-' ~....
', it w.ith
-·~ '. ~·
w. .t<>~
:Q ·,-,v i_e·',,.:-~. Jt~$y;ringv,,•:··..minimvm,
~. -=.:.--; ~.._
..:. : ~~:,( ,..:fi
_ :dJ#i,rbance, ..•' in the existing
r•· t,.~; .,,./..• :.~ 1.,.,..--~\.~> .< . •,,

order. Oa,;icf ~(,fue:J 17tJ;76J/ ~ a·'.:~tti.tt}Jihilo~ph~~:J~nfJt f~,tfund Burke (1.729-

.97),, :~,•-i ~,t~t~1~~!'f.~f~f:_:~~f#~#~'~·-,!~~:ci~~vafbm.
an·'i~\r~~i~~~
Michae l Oakesh ott (1901-90), a contem porary conservative, defined politics
as the 'pursuit of intimations of the traditions of behavio ur'. According to him,
the aims of a politica l association lie within the commu nity itself which must
be discovered, rather than imported from speculative philosophy. Political activity
is neither a product of contrac t nor of any mutuali ty of purpose. It is akin to
the model of informal convers ation which develop s by its internal logic, rather
than a discourse on a well-tho ught out subject. Politica l obligation, then, is a
diffuse ooligation, like an obligati on arising out of friendship which does not
follow any fixed pattern, nor emanat es from any conditio ns of a contract.
Thus, political obligation is inciden tal to the politica l activity which arises from
the normal social life, rather than from the pursuit of any transcendental
objectives. In a nutshell, the conserv ative view of poli~ic~l _o!>ligation is based
on legitimacy rather than on consent or morality.

r - - r" ] - - i I
•li1M41¾1·1i!IM03·1•J=l!@:i•J:I
PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT
So~e !heories re~ard indi:idu_al 's ~onsent a~. the proper source of political
obhgatlon. Accord mg to this view, man is born free'; he can be expected to
 · ·
Grounds and Lzmits of Political Obligation 299
obey a ruler only. with his consent · In other words a
its power on Iy with an explicit or imp1lClt . . ' government can exercise
·
·f an mdiv of ·
consent. its cit'tzens. Some thmke
h 1 idual accep ts th rs
argue t at
system
through abiding by its rules his tacit e protectton of the prevailing
d. Others
hold that mere acceptance ~f a legit i;o:se nt :a~ b~ taken for grante
to explain
the source of political obligat · . . a e taut onty ts not sufficient
created that authority with th •~n. tt muS be prove d th at people themselves
e1r consent The theory of th e ' soc1a .1 '
the best formu lat· f h' ·. . contra ct
represents . ion o t 1s v1ewpomt.
es
~~e ~h;;f exponents of the theory of the social contract are: Thomas Hobb
(1712-78).
( 15 - 1 . ), John Locke (1632-1704), and Jean-Jaques Rousseau
postu.lated a 'state of nature' , th at 1s · 1 stage
· a hypo the1tea
These thinkers have
. .
the method
befor~ ~e creation of pohtical authority. Social contract represents
from the
of amv1ng at agreement for setting up the state; it marks a transition
state _of_ nature civil society. The terms of the contract define the grounds
t?.
and lun1ts of poht1cal obligation.
view,
Hobb es equates men in the state of nature with wild animals. In his
and short'.
man' s life in the state of nature was 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish
insecurity.
It was a state of war of each against all, and hen~e fraught with
ation into
Men enter ed into covenant to translate their urge for self-preserv
created
reality. Hence, they surrendered all their natural rights to the newly
cable,
political autho rity- the sovereign. This surrender was final and irrevo
to the
because any departure from this position would result in the reversion
ation, yet
state of nature. Although Hobbes postulates an unlimited political oblig
Hobbes
it is solely based on consent not imposed from above. That is why
stood
contends that "a conqueror acquires dominion only if his vassals are under
to have tacitly promised obedience".
man
Lock e's picture of the state of nature is not so gloomy. He argues that
rules of
is by nature a rational creature who is generally inclined to follow the
mutual
morality. Hence, the state of nature was a state of 'peace, good will,
al consent
assistance and preservation'. Civil society was established by mutu
allowed
of the people, only to deal with the few law-breakers who could not be
surrenders
to be the judge in their own case. Under the social contract, man
sted with
the right to be the judge in his.. own case to the state which is entru
property'.
the task of protection of his natural right to 'life, liberty and
if it fails
Government is, therefore, created as a trust which can be dissolved
obligation
to perform this function. Accordingly, Locke upholds a limited political
and concedes individual's right to resistance and revolution.
a state
Rousseau has painted a fascinating picture of the state of nature, as
beauty
of idyllic bliss fulne ss-wh en man was close to nature and enjoyed the
sing
and bounty of nature without any restriction. But in due course the increa
sense of
size of population and the consequent scarcity of goods brought a
constant
insecurity among men ~hen 'natural liberty' ceased to be a source of
 An Introduction to Political Theory
---
b
300
. fl'1 t between indi vidu al's actual will (motivated
8 by his ultimate good whic~
happiness. _This led_ to c~n ~ real will (motivated
er to ove rcom e this difficulty
his immedia~e self -mt e~e s~: community). In ord
coincided with e goo ~ a1 c:nt ract by placing
th them selv es und er the direction'
t red into the soc1 ence of the real
men en e the ' eneral will' which represented the ~onverg
ral hbe rty was replaced by
and control of b g f the community. Thus,. natu . f th .
will of all mem ers o for an effe ctiv e sec unt y o eir possessions .
. . . , hich provided · d 1· · ed political
'civil liberty w~ore postulated absolute sov erei gnty an un unit I . . .
Rousseau, th ere1, ' this obh.gatt.on is . ma auth onty ; it 15
. t· However not owe d to any exte h · d' ·d ·
. h' h
obl1ga 10n.t the gen,eral will of the com mum ty of w ic t e m iv1 ual himself
d o · d · ·d uaI to subordinate
addresse
art In other words it emb odie s con sent of the m 1v1
·
nation is not inimical to his true
:t,f ow ~r self' to his 'hi~her self . This subordi
of his 'low er self '. That is
freedom even if he feels the pinch of suppression
be free '.
why Rousseau quipped: 'ma n can be forced to

General Will
), a French philosopher, the general
AGceiding to Jean. Jaques Rousseau (171 2-78
real will of all members of a
will refers to the point of convergence of the
of each individual as well as th,e
community. . It reflects the ultimate good
Rousseau beli eve d that man would
common good of the whole community.
particular will to the direction of the
realize his true freedom by submitting his ~

general will.

alone postulates a conditional

Among the exponents of the social contract, Locke
tical obligation. Hobbes and
consent; hence he clearly creates a limited poli
lute sovereignty. They seem
Rousseau postulate unconditional consent and abso
e this obligation is based on
to :reate an unlimited political obligation. But sinc
rest it cannot be treated as
their consent, and it is intended to serve their inte
l sta~e structure----symbolized
:liroit<:<1 in the real sense. Hobbes creates a powerfu
others. He provides for no
Y Levz~than (a sea monster) who dominates all . .
roechamsm to curb the state 1'f th e actua1 soverei.gn turns out to be tyranmcal.
Rousseau, too creates an 11
abov e th ' . equa _ Y powerful sovereign, but it does not stand
l ty. ~heoret1cally this is all righ t, but in actual practice
sovereignetyco~lburu . .
WI e exercised by a government _consisti ng of a group of persons
who mig ht proi ect th . lfi · of tbe
J e1r se 1sh and £001is · ns as the expression
· h des1g
ss
general will Rou eau, o course r, f d b
. · ll com mun ities gov erne d Y
direct democracy wh ere sueh a ' ·tuavo·ure sma . . .
.
practicable in modem ti S si ation would not arise. But this 1s not
!.
0
Rousseau's solution does not show us the way
to prevent the abuse omfe1orc e by g . 0
f
. . ove mm ent. In fact , the who le idea
consent, given once for all is not a sound bas1s · of poli•tica • l ·obh·gat1·on. A
ent,
government based on cons f
• .1 electorate to be re musdt be de pend ent on the continuous consent 0.
a vigi ant newe and r
l'gh '
1 t Locke's formulation of th . e-expressed at regular intervals. In this
sound footing . e social contract may be treated to be on the
 d ,~/ /,lmlt.~of Pol//l t 11/ Ohllxat/on 301
-- -~ -- -- -- -= C:
- rou" ~-n

MORALIST VIEW
uc b .6 ..,
pol lt icnl oh Hg at ion tR u do un lo ed 1 1 1f fl C Jn\ t()l { CU
MoroJist v1oiw of ,, ( RW O( ( ' · b I (.ft
. d' I' . ' II UH unlimited ,,h1,·~u oufa '()I.I. . MomJ'·, y ,,, IIBC( ()fJ our
t ng ltlH1o d UN Wt
for vm ica' oid
,g , wh ic h hn r,o lH w, to do wh,u i~ rig ht, nnd t() uv
~onHc .o f n ghf and wron rul oH of moraltty from our
inner
nlt um kn ow lod ge of the
wh ~1 '~ wi·cmjl · ,We es of ou r own volttion . We regard
ob oy thc Hc rul
self- our conscience. We m . We reRpect oth en · perso n an
d
ins tuy of ou r so dn l sy ~te
rhoso nllcs us the mo 1,o ct ou r ow n pe rso n and property. We
the m to reR
property ~eca.usc we expect ne fic ial for ourselves as well as
de r bo cn us c it is be
try t.o mamtam public or bl k au thority should co nform to the
an d co mm n.n ds of pu
othcn;. Ideally, lowN ll ce rta inl y res pect them . As Keith
y do , we wi
principles of morulity . If the
rved :
1lyoms hns significantly obse
to ste al. to mu rde r. to rap e, and to do a number of
The law forbids us if
tha t mo st of us wo uld no t dream of doing anyway. even
other things tho ug h mu ch of the law simply
isL So it loo ks as
the law wcro not to cx we ulrcady think we should or
or no t to do , thi ng s tha t
tells us to do, e of rig ht. nnd wron g. Perhap s,
ind ep en de nt se ns
should not do out of un no thing more than a duty to
ob ey the law am ou nts to
the n, ou r duty to rig ht fro m wron g (' Po litical
, wh ich dis tin gu ish
obey the rules of mornlit.y lit ical Theory. t'd. by Ca trion
a
lig ati on ', Iss ue s in Po
Authority und Ob
.McKinnon; 2008).
pr ov isi on s of luw co inc ide with the rules of morality
Accordingly, whon tho we, feel naturnlly obliged
to obey
tnn oo us np pro vn l. the n
und receive our spon Th is arg um en t can be invoked to
bli c au tho rity.
law and the commands of pu
ligation.
vindi ctt t.e unlimited po liti cnJ ob es
, if u pur 11 cu Jn r law or u co mmand of public authority do
On the contrary no t ob liged to ob"·y it. lo other
jud ge m en t, we ore
nor coincide with our rnornl ag ain st his consl:ienc,·, a da sh ma y
pd s so m eo ne lo ne t
words, if u low com ob lig ati on . Fo r ,:.xampk, if u worker
nn d mo rnl
arise betw ee n lcg uJ ohlignlion ich lm s giv en u call for strikt· but the
u trn dc un ion wh
is moraJly co mmill t,J to ve to fo(e thl' (Ollsl·quenccs of a~·tin
g
nll y bn nn cd , he wi ll ho
strike hu s been le~
if he dw os t·s to ho no ur his moml conunitment.
a8oiu~t luw
ist po int of vic .·w . ind ivi dtm l 's obli~otion to obey political
Thus. from the morol (I . ~rh is tar gu ment ra n b,· invok ed to
d no t ub so lut
authority is co ndhionnl, on ith I lymns hns illustnu cd :
oli tic ol ob li& tU ion . As K~
vindknte lhnited 1> zi
roq ua n•~ oh cd icn \'C' co ju st lawat. The l'itize ns of Nu
ThiN ara ument only t be required to
y or pr cs~ n1 -d ny Hu rm a, for l'X tun pk , would no
Ocrantul ·ir ~ovcmmcnts. Bur ev~n libern
l_
ssivl· low s im pO Sl'U hy rh"
obey the tlpprc n just "'·nfot'Cl' th~ basil
· nd es of
to do u l,>t mo t-c thu
d"•mocrth: il·~ t(~nd lity in momlity
Disng rC "-trlC nts ub ou t 1J,c rol es ofjusti~l' ,md equa
mornlit~.. . ).
for thl ' p~ rm iss ibi lit~· of l'l~hstt·ibuti vr t:t,xtllion (ihid.
hn vl' implit·n 1h ms
 ., • In rn:..iudiv,i tu Politica.l Theory
- - -- - -- - --
. "\ f4
---
ed law or administr
__, 1,. -' that 'Ul e~isting. or a pro pos
.
a1ive
- .,
\\ ·h-'~:t, '"'1ttzcn ~ '".:. n '" • .
ch a system at1c
, . . ,, TL'flS., •, die, · may d~i de to def ), 1t. The y• ma y· eve nb laun
• .
.
obe yin g tt aga inst. t. eir con.science · Thi s
• • .
:t~th,n 1~
. r-v~ ~ it nor ro speak ot .. . .
~&upat.gn f\_' l'Pt7~~do$n ~lu ~
p~ tw- the 1de alts t vie w of poht1cal obligation •
. . t: ·-•, "r .
J'-~·tn..f \\~ WU t' "-

IDEALJST VIEW
ated an unc ond itio nal and unJinuted
The iJe~li~t school of tho ugh t orig ina lly cre
it a not e of cau tion . G W.F. Hegel
l_,bf ~~tion. but later it was mo difi ed to adm
S.31 )~ tamous e.~ nen t of ide alis m, eul ogi zed the stat e as 'the incarnation
(l- :-0-1
Go d on ear th'. He arg ued that when
of diYine re3Son· and the ·march of
y foll ows div ine rea son and thereby
ind i,id ual obeys the state. he ess ent iall
es his free dom . Heg el, ther efo re, pos tula ted an unl imi ted political obligation
e.-xM:is
wee n the stat e (wh ich was an abstract
\\it hou t drawing a clea r dist inc tion bet
of a gro up of fallible per son s exercising
entity) and government (wh ich con sist ed
ist reg ime s inv oke d Heg el's argument
sctual authority). It is unf ortu nat e tha t fasc
the ir citi zen s and led the m to the path
to demand unc ond itio nal obe die nce from
of unt old disaster.
'
Fascism.
the
Iva and-democratic theory adv anc
ed by B~nlto Mussolini {18 83- 194 5),
moral avlhorfty.
state· :as the supreme,
llalan dlctotor, which eulogized nation-
s# conven!ions and lega l limitations, and
It uho rled peo ple to set aside all rule
er in pursuit of national glorification.
religiously follow the dictates of their leaa

ide alis t trad itio n wh o declared that

It was T.H. Gre en ( 183 6-8 2) in the
nal obe die nce of its citizens. Green
government cannot clai m an unc ond itio
argued that ind ivid ual owe s his alle
gia nce to soc iety , not to the state or
pow er of soc iety sho uld be recognized
government. Accordingly, the org aniz ed
erm inin g pol itic al obligation. Green's
as political authority for the pur pos e of det
on his con cep t of the 'com mo n good'.
co n~ t of political obligation is bas ed
ted out that it is soc iety , not the stat e whi ch is the piv ot of the common
He poin '
good
• sharp ly opp ose d to the util itan an view.. .
Green 's .view of hum an nature 1s
. .
Whereas utihtanans treat th e h uman bem · g as a pleasure-see.king animal, Green
holds th h . · f
at . uma n bem gs do not seek. plea sure as such. The rational basis. o
hum . . . .
an activity 1s will or . reason, not des ire or pas sion . As self-consc10'th us
beings men d 1·
, an women wish t the goo d whi ch the y gra sp. along w1 t
other members of th e com mum~tyreaA ize d'
. r mg to Gre en, hum an beings do no
identify their self-interest as d . ·. cco
mon goo d not only com hIS lmc tly as the y ide ntif y the com mo n goo·_d.
Com pre ends the good O f all mem ber s of the commumt)',
but their con cep tion s of th d l . . .
e common goo a so 1de nt1cal. In his Lectures
on the Principles of Political Ob/' .
are
itself is obliged to promote the comiga twn ( l 882), Gre en arg ued that the stated
mon go 0 d as con ceiv · ed by its citizens, an
 Grounds and Limits of Political Obligation 303

that individual is. o~li~ed to obey only those laws which will promote the
common good. If md1v1duals think that they will serve the cause of the common
good by defying any command of the state, their political obligation does not
prevent them from such defiance.
According to G.reen, it is the consciousness of the common good which
prompts human bemgs to accept their duties. They tend to sacrifice their self-
interest for the sake of the common good for they realize that they can attain
self-realization only as members of the community, not as separate individuals.
The question of priority between the individual and the community is irrelevant
because individuals have no existence outside the community, and no community
can exist without its constituent individuals. The true basis of the community
lies in each individual treating every other individual as an end-in-itself, because
each member of the community is recognized as capable of pursuing ideal
objects. The true object of politics as well · as of morality is to improve the
moral character of individuals. This should be the criterion of evaluation of any
institution or law. In other words, each institution or law should enable the
citizens to exercise their good will and reason in the conduct of their affairs.
It is the moral nature of human being which postulates his freedom. Freedom
requires all members of the community to have equal opportunity of self-
development It is the duty of the state to create such conditions that are
conducive to human freedom. Green points out that law can force the individual
to perform certain acts, but these would be external acts only. No law can
make them moral because morality is dependent on something freely willed. In
Green's words, 'Will, nor force, is the basis of the state'.
Thus, Green's view of political obligation banks on the moral nature and
capacity of human beings. It reduces the state to an instrument of securing the
common good as conceived and defined by its citizens. By recognizing the
organized power of the community rather than the state as the object of
political obligation, Green rules out the claim of any government to demand
unconditional obedience from its citizens. Likewise, Harold J. Laski ( 1893-
1950) ruled out unconditional obedience to any government by drawing a
distinction between the state and government. He argued that if a government
claims allegiance of human beings, it will have to compete with other human
associations in securing their highest welfare.

THEORIES AGAINST POLITICAL OBLIGATION

MARXIST VIEW
According to the Marxist view, the state is by no means the organized power
of the community. It is · indeed the organized power of the dominant class-
 An Introduction to Political Theory
304 I
. th class owning the major means of production . Its purpose is
. ~ not I
part1cu 1ar1y e .
I:
e.are but hel ing the strong • competitor s to increase their- -we-------=--.
_ ~ th
~·
the genera l we l1 i , I
exploiting the weak competitor s as well as the dependent cl , I
an power by . . r .
1t1ca 1 o
bl . .
1gati~n tow~
ass. !

In a class-aivia easociety, ind1v1dual can have ~o p_o

provided
sta te. A t best ,
an individual can have any.
obhgat1on
h .towards society,.
•t • classless and stateless society. Till sue a society comes mto existenc e,
I is a . . d h k.
e can only think of worker's obhgat10n towar s t e wor . tng class. Under e
th
w .
capitalist system, where enemies of the w?rk1n~ class are 1n po:wer: the worker
has obligation 'against the state'. It requires him to show sohdanty with the
working class in order to create a strong organizatio n for revolution against the
capitalist regime.

Classless and Stat~l.eJS'.i S:,~o~J~i;~:. ·~:.:~.

J(
~ _;;,
:·; ,,,
. ~-;. ~, -/~'(' '/
,0,

According to Marxism, dassfess and stc;iteless- spci~fyi;,~~(i:./· '&/.,z

of social development. At this stage, the divis_~c>h ··~~.:;,;:_ > re>

classes disappears as all means of sodal p.roductfon '. ar~ .,Fjf t't ,
e: ,
ownership and every able-bodied - per.son voh,ntQ'.riJy · ,b:e,.(
state which used to serve ~ -·interests of the .: cJ~~$\ 9W,n,l.~ ~ #'.
• , (,, ,,,, . . / ,/;~>.. ,,,,. ,·/-:',.
·f
; . ~o/ .1:t-'/:r~{J.9~~~
production, becomes redund.a et at -this .,sta9e_ ~ /,.;- .. ~ ,,, ,

ANARCH IST VIEW

Anarchist view of political obligation is based on the philosophy of anarchism.
It advocates the abolition of all organized authority as well as the state mechanism
in order to build a society wherein all human beings shall freely and spontaneously
adjust with each other without requiring an external force to regulate their
relations. It, therefore, upholds negative political obligation. Anarchists like P.J.
Prot.dhon (1809-65) and Peter Kropotkin (1842-192 1) argued that all
governmental authority is illegitimate because the state is indeed a coercive
~nstitution, which is suited only to a corrupt and unjust society. The individual
is_ only obliged to uphold justice. So he is obliged to resist the state and devote
himself to building a new system where all members of society will spontaneously
cooperate with each other.

Anarchism
A political 9utfook hi _h h _ .
. ' w c olds that society should be .organized
. _._
without
~ _..
coercive power of the 5t t
M . · · a e. 1n Its view, government is an unnecessary ev~1
en are benagn by nat . :=::;z > I
of org • 1 th ure. 5 ociety is a natural institution. Men a (e capab e
an,z ng emselve-s intO I b t
they are corrupt d b a u5t society through voluntary ceoperation, u
Anarchists re·1 ect e0 II fy the intervention of the coercive power oJ the state.
orms of outho 't • I •at
interfere with the · ri Y, inc uding authority of the state, "'
spontaneous assoclairons and actions of lndlvlduals.

It is important to note that Ma · f

rxian and Gandhian views, as upholders 0
 Grounds and Limits of Political Obligation 305

stateless society, come closer to the anarchist view of political obligation.

~JMil@l#~HbiM-
Mahatma Gandhi ( 1869-1948), Indian social philosopher and activist,
recognized severe limits of political obligation, as his principle of 'civil
disobedience' indicates. Civil disobedience implies the act of deliberately
disobeying an unjust authority and breaking an unjust law. The duty of civil
disobedience to an unjust law is the counterpart of the duty of civil obedience
to a just law. Civil disobedience may be resorted to as a protest against an
unjust policy of government or in order to draw attention of the government
to a demand for political reform.
The term 'civil disobedience' was originally coined by an American writer-
Henry David Thoreau ( 1817-62), who published an essay in 1848 to explain
why he had refused to pay taxes to the state for several years for which he
had to undergo imprisonment. Thoreau argued that people must register their
protest against any injustice perpetrated by their own .government. Harold J.
Laski has cited the case of 'conscientious objectors' to military service during
the period of the First World War (1914-18), who had to undergo punishment
for refusing to render military service as they believed in peaceful solution of
all human disputes.
Mahatma Gandhi sought to combine the principle of civil disobedience with
his principle of non-violent struggle and satyagraha (the principle of insistence
on truth) during India's struggle for independence. Gandhi set a practical
example of civil disobedience when he led the march to the seashore in 1930
to defy the ban on making salt by the Indians. This ban was imposed by the
British colonial rulers which was thought to be unjust by Gandhi and his
followers. Gandhi firmly believed that civil disobedience was based on a profound
respect for law in general; only unjust law should be broken-that, too, when
all methods of persuasion and petition for withdrawal of such law had been
tried and had failed. The act of civil disobedience should be performed non-
violently and in full public view; and penalties entailed by this act should be
accepted willingly.

Disobedience to be civil must be sincere, respectful, restrained, never de,fiant,

must be based upon some well-understood principle, must not be capricious
and above all, must have no ill-will or hatred behind it.

Mahatma Gandhi (Young Indio: 1920)

It is again important that the true object of civil obedience is ·change of

 An Introduction to Political Theory
306
·t· concerned . This shou ld be resor ted to only against a
heart' of the aut h on ies If
. 1 . foreign rule or unjust government. a government generau
tyr~nm~a rehg1m~t'·1zens ' rights and it can be influ ence d through . democrat_'/1c
mamtams t e c1 . .
rt to civil disob edien ce will not be nece ssary . Final ly' civ•i
. . 1
met ho,d reso nds of any particular
disobedience should not be resorted !o ~or press mg the dema
section against the general or pubh c mterest.
ing th~ Governmen t's
People in a de'mocroc y · shoyld' be satisfied wfth ·draw
rnment ~f they wbhecf
attention to mistakes, If ahy. They coulcd remo~e the Gove
· Ours Is ,_
to. But they ·should ·not obstruct them .•by ogftoting oci~lnst them,.
0 foreign Governmen
t h~vi"'-g a mighty ormy ·PJ1P ~OVY, to Sllf>p~rt them. They
·
. have to derlve their strength ,, f~om the people. -.. .
~ I I, ) ,"J. ,/;
,, ,' ,
/ I
, p , ~ /;K. ,-!
.., ,1·.,: · ·~ ·· Maha
,
tma Gandhi rt(D.elhi Diary; 1948)
7 , ;-✓•

CONCLUSION
to be considered
Political obligation is a complex issue. Its grounds and limits have
to realize that
very carefully before conc~ding it. At the outset, it is nece ssary
An idealistic view
the individual owes political obligation to political authority.
realistic position.
of political authority may involve a serious departure from the
Hege l projected a
Rousseau postulated political obligation to the 'gene ral will' ;
ation; and Green
divine image of 'the state' as the object of political oblig
r of society' as
suggested political obligation towards the 'orga nized powe
abstract entities
distinguished from the state. But how do we encounter these
any ideal object,
in real life? Philosophically, we may owe political obligation to
of government
but in actual life such obligation is always demand~d by a band
i has succinctly
officials which must be considered with utmost caution. As Lask
s, in fact, the
pointed out: "The state's claim to preeminence always mean
intentions alone
sovereignty of a government composed of fallible men whose
mar of Politics,·
are not a sufficient justification for so vast a claim" (A Gram
1938).
~
It. · agency; a
is important to remember that government is only an external
the power of
good ~ove_rrunent is the product of human ingenuity. How ever
o; be transferred
~eat~n~ng is still retained by human beings them. .selves; it cann .
o e instrument created by th em. S0 th e md1v . . or herse lf remains
the best · d 1dual hims elf
time no single
individu1~ ge abs to whether a law is just or not. At the same ' t
can ecome wiser th an a11 Oth ers. So when a law or gover nm~n
order is thought to be un. st th
on the issue and th d -~~ , to ere should be full public debate and discuss10n bl'c
' issuee hec1s1o
. . n on that n opp · 1t • ld be taken when pu 1
opmio b ose or resist shou
Some sectional
interests or opinions ;s ee_~1largely crystallized and mobilized
s~i differ, and efforts should be made to understand
and analyse all point.s 0ayf view
. for · ·
to reahze that the failure of amvm g at a consensus. It is also necessafY
s should not
be treated as a sufficient gr gov;mment to fulfil all our aspiration
oun of resistance, because such failure could be
 Grounds and Limits of Political Obligation 307

pau cit y of res our ces , eno rm ity of the problem or genuine
th~ ~utcome ~f should not be resisted
s of oth ers .
· Fo r ins tan ce, a gov ern me nt
pn on ty of claim
to pro vid e for full em plo ym ent , uni ver sal education and medical
because it failed
gov ern me nt on ear th is exp ect ed to solve all our problems.
care, etc. since no
like direct action, strike, picketing,
Then, before resorting to extreme measures
ger stri ke or cou rtin g arr est in larg e numbers, all constitutional means and
hun
methods should be tried fairly.
ess ent ial to see tha t the res ista nce sho uld not be taken too far.
Finally, it is
wa rne d, res ista nce is the me dic ine of the constitution, not its
As Burke had
n to achieve a definite objective, and
daily bread. Reform should be undertake
uld be rev iew ed and a fur the r pro gra mme chalked out after
the situation sho
es are resolved, minor issues could be
fulfilment of that objective. If major issu
t to tak e car e of the ms elv es. Re vol uti on is not ruled out, but it should be
lef
not as a sudden overthrow of the
undertaken as a long-term programme,
tem . A. Ap pad ora i (Th e Sub sta nce of Politics; 1975) has rightly suggested:
sys
o leads the resistance may often be
"While the conscientious individual wh
he must remember that he may be
motivated by the highest moral purpose,
may take advantage of the opportunity
followed by others less conscientious who
ompanied by chaos and confusion,
to gain their selfish ends." If change is acc
by anti-social elements. If old order
the situation is most likely to be exploited
g the foundations for the construction
is destroyed indiscriminately without leavin
the res ult wo uld be dis ast rou s, bec aus e, to destroy is easy, to
of a new order,
reconstruct is difficult.