ISSUE 2; Whether the circumstantial evidence and expert opinion is sufficient to
convict a person for charge of murder?
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble supreme court that the in the present case there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence and expert opinion to convict the accused under section
354C, 376 and 302 of the Kipash Penal Code.
Section 354C of the Kipash Penal Code provides that Any man who watches, or captures the
image of a woman engaging in a private act in circumstances where she would usually have
the expectation of not being observed either by the perpetrator or by any other person at the
behest of the perpetrator or disseminates such image shall be punished on first conviction
with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year, but
which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine, and be punished on a second
or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not
be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 376(1) of Kipash Penal Code provides thatWhoever, except in the cases provided for
in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either
description for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 302 of Kipash Penal Code provides that Whoever commits murder shall be punished
with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
1. “Men may tell lies, but Circumstances do not”.
In the case of Gagan Kanojia and another Vs. State of Punjab it was held that
Indisputably, charges can be proved on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, when direct
evidence is not available.
In the instant case the prosecution is relying on circumstantial evidence because direct
evidence is not available due to the death of the victim and victim was also unable to give
even dying declaration due to the injuries inflicted by accused.
Also there is no direct witness available in this case.
But there is sufficient circumstances evidences available to prove the case of prosecution and
expert opinion with scientific evidence available to held the accused liable under the charges.
2. Section 114 of the evidence act provides The Court may presume the existence of
any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common
course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their
relation to the facts of the particular case.
In Palan v. State (1973 KLR 745) it was held, “After eliminating possible theories in favour
of the accused the circumstance that he was found in possession of the stolen articles has
been considered along with the other circumstances brought out in evidence and if it appears
to be reasonably beyond doubt, he can be found to be guilty of both robbery and murder.
In Shivappa v. State of Mysore (1970 SCC (Cri) 215), Baiju v. State of M.P. (1978 SCC (Cri)
142), Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (1983 SCC (Cri) 447), Gulab Chand v. State of
M.P. (1995 SCC (Cri) 552), Mukund v. State of M.P. (1997 SCC (Cri) 799) and A. Devendran
v. State of T.N. (1998 SCC (Cri) 220) para 20, murder and robbery were proved to have been
integral parts of one and the same transaction and the presumption arising under Illustration
(a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act was applied for holding the accused guilty of not only
having committed robbery but also murder of the deceased. The presumption was founded on
recovery of stolen property belonging to the deceased.
In the present case the accuse tries to rob the victim as in para 6 of moot proposition Shinu’s
cellular device was retrieved from Chotu, who purportedly acquired it from the accuse. Also,
according to the para 4 of the moot proposition the button of the shirt of the accused was
discovered from the ladies compartment of the train. These circumstantial evidence clearly
established the presence of the accused in the ladies compartment and robbery.
3. It is humbly submitted that the ruling of the high court on the question of intention
and knowledge required for homicide under Sections 299 and 300 of the Indian Penal
Code 1860 (IPC) is contrary to established precedents on the issue. The Court
ignored questions of causation and consequently erred when deciding whether the
defendant was liable for the victim’s death. Prosecution argue that the defendant’s
liability for the victim’s death is not extinguished if she jumped, or accidentally fell
off the train in the process of fending off the attack by the defendant.
In the case of Basappa v. State is a rare example of a case where an Indian court
articulated principles of causation in its decision-making. Basappa involved an “escape”
scenario. The victim was on the roof of a house, when the four defendants attacked him with
dangerous weapons. After they had inflicted injuries on his neck, the victim jumped from the
roof – a height of 12 feet – to escape the attack. He fell to the ground and was rendered
unconscious. Thereafter, the defendants threw him into a haystack which was on fire. Since
the body was completely charred, the autopsy could not indicate whether death had been
caused due to the weapon injuries, the injuries sustained due to the fall, or whether the victim
had been burnt to death. The question was whether the defendants would continue to be
responsible for the victim’s death if he had died because of injuries sustained due to the fall.
The court ruled that in light of the situation that the victim was in, he had the option of either
being “hacked to death” or attempting to escape by jumping off the roof. He had chosen the
latter, and his actions, the court ruled, were a “direct result” of the actions of the defendant –
“a normal and necessary consequence of the acts of the [defendant]”.
In R v. Williams, the Court of Appeal articulated the test again, when it held that the chain
of causation does not break where the victim is killed while fleeing from violence if two
requirements are satisfied. First, the conduct of the deceased victim must be foreseeable by a
“reasonable and responsible man in the assailant’s shoes”. Secondly, the unlawful act by the
defendant “must be such that all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise
must subject the other person to some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm”. The
Court noted that the nature of the threat was an important consideration in assessing the
foreseeability of the harm to the victim, as well as the conduct of the deceased victim.
