EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-3911. December 29, 1950.]
                REMIGIO MARASIGAN, petitioner, vs. PERFECTO R. PALACIO
                and JOSE N. LEUTERIO, Judges of the Court of First Instance
                of Camarines Sur, and FAUSTO NORTE, respondents.
                Jose R. Luntok, for petitioner.
                Victoriano Yamzon, for respondent Judge Leuterio and Fausto Norte.
                                                SYLLABUS
          1.     APPEAL; PAYMENT BY APPELLANT OF DOCKET FEE REQUIRED BY
    CLERK OF COURT; DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PAY DOCKET FEE IN FULL
    WITHIN REGLEMENTARY PERIOD; PRESUMPTION THAT PUBLIC OFFICER
    KNOWS AND PERFORMS HIS DUTIES. — Where an appellant was from the
    beginning ready and willing to pay into court the correct amount of
    docketing fee and the correct amount was not paid because paid of error of
    the clerk of the justice of the peace court, who believing P8 to be the correct
    fee, required petitioner to pay that amount only, it would be unjust to
    dismiss the appeal, just for that mistake of the government clerk. ( See also
    Segovia vs. Barrios et al., 42 Off. Gaz., 1233.)
                                               DECISION
    REYES, J :          p
                This is a petition for mandamus and certiorari.
          Petitioner was defendant in a case of forcible entry and detainer filed in
    the justice of the peace court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur by Fausto Norte,
    one of the herein respondents. Having been sentenced in that court to
    vacate the land in litigation and to pay damages and costs, defendant in due
    time took steps to perfect an appeal to the Court of First Instance of the
    province by filing his notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a supersedeas
    bond and at the same time depositing with the justice of the peace court the
    sum of P8 to cover the docketing fee in the Court of First Instance for which
    he was issued the corresponding receipt. Thereafter the justice of the peace
    gave course to the appeal by certifying the record to the Court of First
    Instance. Some three months thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion in the Court
    of First Instance asking that the appeal be declared abandoned on the
    ground that defendant had not paid within the 15-day period fixed by the
    Rules the full amount of the docketing fee, which in accordance with Rule
    130, section 5, paragraph 12, should be P10 instead of P8, the amount
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024                                               cdasiaonline.com
    actually paid by defendant. Defendant objected to the motion, explaining
    under oath that if he had paid only P8 for the docketing fee it was because
    that was the amount he was required to pay by the clerk of the justice of the
    peace; that being ignorant, he relied on the word of said clerk; and that if the
    said amount was not enough, he was willing to pay what was lacking.
    Overruling the objection, the Court of First Instance, in its order dated April
    29, 1950, granted the motion and declared the appeal abandoned,
    whereupon defendant gave notice of his intention to appeal to the Supreme
    Court and perfected the corresponding record on appeal. But the Court of
    First Instance disapproved the said record on appeal on the ground that the
    order declaring the appeal abandoned was not appealable.
          The prayer for mandamus to compel approval of the record on appeal
    is meritorious. But the granting of it would not result in speedy justice, for
    once the record is elevated here briefs will have to be filed and the question
    of whether or not the appeal from the justice of the peace court was properly
    declared abandoned under the circumstances above set forth, which is
    already discussed in this instance, will again be argued. Far better it would
    be, we think to have that question decided now by entertaining petitioner's
    alternative prayer for a writ of certiorari. This we now propose to do in line
    with counsel for respondent's own suggestion.
          In principle we find the present case identical with that of Segoviavs.
    Barrios et al., 42 O. G., 1233; 75 Phil., 764. In that case the court of first
    instance dismissed an appeal from the municipal court in a case of
    desahucio on the ground that the appellant had paid only P8 as docketing
    fee, and appellant petitioned for a writ of certiorari to have the order of
    dismissal annulled. In annulling the order this Court said:
                       "We find the petition meritorious. It was a grave abuse of
                discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction on the part of Judges
                Rillorasa and Barrios to set aside the order of Judge Davila, which
                appeared to be in harmony with law and equity. The very same day
                he was notified of the decisions the petitioner filed notice of appeal
                and five days thereafter paid the docket fee required by the clerk of
                the appellate court. It appears to have been the practice of the said
                clerk to collect only the sum of P8 as fee for docketing an appeal from
                the municipal or justice of the peace court in a desahucio case,
                basing his action on item (1) of section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
                Court, according to which the clerks of the Courts of First Instance
                shall collect a fee of P8 'for filing an action or proceeding and for all
                services in the same, if the sum claimed, exclusive of interest and
                damages, or the value of the property in litigation, or the value of the
                estate, is less than P200.' On the other hand the respondents contend
                that the provision of said section 5 of Rule 130 that is applicable to a
                desahucio case is item (11), which says: 'When the case does not
                concern property (naturalization, adoption, divorce, etc.) . . . P16.'
                There is plenty of room for a difference of opinion as to which of these
                two items, if at all, is applicable; as much so that the members of this
                Court are in disagreement on this point and deem it necessary to
                promulgate hereafter amendatory rule to do away with the
                controversy.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024                                                          cdasiaonline.com
                       "The fact remains that the petitioner, as appellant from the
                judgment of the Municipal Court of Iloilo, duly paid the docket fee to
                the clerk of Court of First Instance in the amount required by the
                latter in accordance with his practice based on his bona fide
                understanding of the statute on the subject; and when the judge
                required the appellant to pay P8 more he did so without delay under
                the circumstances, to dismiss his appeal would be whimsical, unjust,
                and unwarranted. Every citizen has the right to assume and trust that
                a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties
                and performs them in accordance with the law. To penalize such
                citizen for relying upon said officer in all good faith is repugnant to
                justice."
          It is contended, however, that after the clarification made in the above
    decision as to the amount of the docketing fee for an appeal to the court of
    first instance in a desahucio case, there is no longer any excuse for making
    the same mistake as that committed in that case, and that in any event
    ignorance of the law does not excuse any one from complying with it. But it
    appears that herein petitioner was from the beginning ready and willing to
    pay into court the correct amount of the docketing fee and that if the correct
    amount was not paid it was because of the error of the clerk of the justice of
    the peace court, who, believing P8 to be the correct fee, required petitioner
    to pay that amount only. In the circumstances and there being no question
    that petitioner has acted in good faith, it would be unjust to penalize him for
    the mistake of the Government clerk. As was said in the Segovia case, supra,
    "Every citizen has the right to assume and trust that the public officer
    charged by law with certain duties know his duties and performs them in
    accordance with the law. To penalize such citizen for relying upon said
    officer in all good faith is repugnant to justice."
          It is true that in the earlier case of Lazaro vs. Endencia, 57 Phil. 552,
    this Court has laid down a more strict rule in regard to this same matter. But
    that rule should not be followed blindly to the extent of causing a manifest
    injustice.
         In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the
    order declaring petitioner's appeal from the justice of the peace court
    abandoned is set aside. The said appeal should, therefore, be docketed and
    allowed to take its course upon payment by the petitioner of the amount
    necessary to complete the docketing fee for the appeal. With costs. So
    ordered.
         Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason                and Montemayor, JJ.,
    concur.
                Moran, C.J., Mr. Justice Paras and Mr. Justice Feria voted to grant the
    writ.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024                                                        cdasiaonline.com