ISRAEL  The executive committee of the National Council

acted as the administering power of the Jewish

 A product of Zionism (the Jewish national movement)
community
 Over the centuries, Zionism developed spiritual,
 Council controlled military training of youth
religious, cultural, social, and historical concepts
in the defense force (hagana)
linking Jews to the historical Jewish states in Israel.
 General Federation of Labor (Histadrut) founded
 Political variant (that saw the establishment of a
in 1920, coordinated labor-related matters and
Jewish state) developed in the 19 th century as a
engaged in social welfare and economic
result of political currents present in Europe such
endeavors.
especially nationalism and anti-Semitism.
 Several of the semi-governmental organizations (most
Historical Background notably the histadrut and Jewish Agency) continued to
play important roles after Israel’s independence.
 In 1897, Theodor Herzl (a Viennese journalist who had  Weizmann- president of the WZO
proposed establishing a self-governing community for the  Negotiated with leading representatives of Jewish
Jewish people in his book Der Judenstaat) organized a organizations and communities for their participation
conference at Basel, Switzerland, to assemble prominent in the work of the Jewish Agency.
leaders from the major Jewish communities and  In 1929 establishment of a new body, the Jewish
organizations around the world. Agency for Palestine or the Expanded Jewish
 This assembly shaped a Zionist political movement Agency (Popular term), which included
and established the World Zionist Organization Jews/Jewish organizations sympathetic to the
(WZO). idea of a Jewish national home but not
 The Basel Program became the cornerstone of Zionist ideologically committed to Zionism.
ideology.  It took over the activities designed to build a
 It enunciated the basic aim of Zionism: “to national home.
create for the Jewish people, a home in Palestine,  Throughout the mandate period, the Jewish and Arab
by public law: communities of Palestine were in conflict over the future
 With the aid of Chaim Weizmann (a prominent Zionist of the territory.
leader and chemist), the Zionist organization secured the  Arab opposition to Jewish immigration and land
Balfour Declaration (1917) from the British government purchase.
 Stating that “his majesty’s government view with  Arab revolts in 1920s & 1930s.
favour the establishment in Palestine of the national  British response: restrictions on Jewish immigration,
home for the Jewish people.” White Paper of 1939.
 By end of WW1, British had replaced Ottoman rule in  The British eventually conceded that the mandate was
Palestine. unworkable (b/c heavy cost in men and money) and
 Great Britain controlled the Palestine area from 1920 turned the problem over to the UN.
to 1948.  The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
 Jewish community in Palestine- the Yishuv (UNSCOP) studied the problem, and recommended
 The Yishuv established institutions for self- the mandate be terminated and that independence of
government and procedures for implementing Palestine be achieved, however it was divided over
political decisions, during British mandate. the future of the territory.
 By secret ballot, the Jewish community chose the  Majority recommended partition into a Jewish
assembly of the elected (Asefat Hanevcharin) as state and an Arab state linked in an economic
its representative body. union, with Jerusalem established as an
 Met at least once a year and between international enclave – a corpus separatum
sessions its powers were exercised by the (separate body).
national council (Vaad Leumi), which was  Minority recommended Palestine become a
elected by the assembly. single federal state, with Jerusalem the capita
 The British entrusted the National council with and with Jews and Arabs enjoying autonomy in
the responsibility for Jewish communal affairs their respective areas
and granted it considerable autonomy.
  On November 29,1947, the UN General Assembly,  Operation Magic Carpet or Operation Ali Baba
over Arab opposition, adopted the majority (Jews of Yemen and Iraq brought to Israel by
recommendation. airlifts)
 The Zionists accepted the decision, the  Jewish immigration declined between the early 1970s
Palestinians and other Arabs rejected the vote. and mid-1980s, when it exceeded emigration only
 Disorders broke out in all parts of the territory, slightly.
and as the end of the mandate came, these  Operation Moses (Jews of Ethiopia airlifted to
degenerated into a virtual civil war. Israel). More arrived in Operation Sheba.
 Israel declared independence as a Jewish and democratic  In 1989 Soviet authorities began to relax emigration
state on May 14, 1948. restrictions on Jews, and by 21st century more than
 Armies of the Arab states entered Palestine and 1million Soviets migrated to Israel.
engaged in open warfare with the defense forces of  Large Soviet migration raised questions about
the new state. The UN secured a truce and the whether the newcomers were Jewish under
military situation was stabilized in the spring of 1949 traditional interpretation of Jewish law (halacha).
by a series of agreements between Israel and  Geographically and demographically an Oriental country.
neighboring Arab states, but no general peace Culturally, socially, and politically it is Western.
settlement was achieved.  Israel has been obliged to undertake the training of the
 After gaining independence, Israel’s provisional immigrants for gainful employment and to provide
government repealed the British mandatory housing, schooling, and medical facilities.
restrictions on immigration and the sale of land  Although the basic religious tradition of the Jewish
and converted the Hagana into the Israel Defense population is an asset, the full integration of immigrants
Force (IDF) into Israel’s society remains a great social problem.
 The provisional government had 3 elements:  Following Israel independence, a large number of
 A state council that acted as parliament Arabs who lived in Israel, fled or took up residence in
 A cabinet elected by the state council from Arab states.
among its members  Israeli Arabs were granted full citizenship with full
 A president elected by the state council legal equality but were forbidden to travel in or out of
 David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency and security areas without permission from the military
leader of MAPAI (Israel labor party), the dominant (as they were considered security concern to the
political party, was selected as PM and minister of Jews)
defense  Establishment of military courts
 Chaim Weizmann was elected president  As evidence developed that Israeli Arabs
 The state council adopted a transition ordinance were not disloyal, the restrictions were
transferring its authority to a constituent assembly, gradually modified. On December 1, 1966,
which convened on February 14, 1949. the military government was abolished.
 The assembly called itself the First Knesset  The major long-term problem from Israel’s Arab minority
(parliament, which was a unicameral chamber is social integration. (Although Israeli Arabs vote, sit in
composed of 120 members. Knesset, serve in gov offices, have own schools and courts,
and prosper materially) they face difficulties in adjusting
Political Environment to Israel’s modern Jewish and Western-oriented society.
 Encouragement of Jewish immigration  The Societies are separate.
 Law of Return of July 5, 1950: “every Jew has the  Israeli Arabs discontented with second-class status.
right to come to this country as an ‘oleh’ (Jew  In the wake of the Yom Kippur War (1973) and
immigrating to Israel) with increased international standing of the PLO,
 Immigration serves Israel’s needs by providing the the Arabs of Israel seem to become more restive
manpower necessary for Israel’s security and and more politically aware.
developments.  In spring of 1976, they participated in their first
 Several problems from this policy: general protest and staged the most violent
 Israel has admitted whole communities virtually w/o demonstrations in Israel’s history.
regard to their economic usefulness or its own  The riots centered in Nazareth, grew out of a
absorptive capacity general strike to protest land expropriations
 in Israel’s northern section. It served as a  Role of religion and religious parties has continued to
catalyst, the demonstrations escalated and grow in Israeli politics.
became broader.  Rise of SHAHS (Sephardi Torah Guardians) party
 They started showing signs of growing has been significant
nationalism and greater militancy.  Ovadia Yosef as its spiritual mentor
 In the fall of 2000, they rioted both in  SHAHS split from the ultra-orthodox Agudat Yisrael
support of Palestinians and to express long- and contested the 1984 Knesset election
standing grievances. (twelve died in clash w/  The founders of SHAHS wished to get the funds,
police). political jobs, and other forms of support of which
they felt deprived.
Religion and the State  The role of religion in Israel’s life remains a major social
 A secular government. and political issue.
 Jewishness is a basic element underlying Israel’s political
Economic Conditions
system.
 However, the overwhelmingly Jewish character of the  Israel as an economic “miracle”
state does not ensure agreement on the appropriate  Was prophesized to have a troubled economy but had a
relationship between religion and the state, nor relatively prosperous economic standard by the late 1980s
religion and secular authorities, nor methods and  By the beginning of 21st century it had become a large
techniques employed by religious authorities. economy by regional standards and it’s people had
 Conflict between secular and Jewish perspectives become prosperous.
 “Who is a Jew?” question at the center of the religion-  Small size and lack of mineral and water resources affect
state controversy. economy.
 Ministry of religious affairs, concerned with meeting  Dependent of foreign supplies (oil, coal, gas)
Jewish religious requirements. Such as:  Government played central role in economy. They owned
 Supply of ritually killed meat (kosher) and operated railroads, postal service, telephone,
 Rabbinical courts telegraph, broadcasting facilities and roads and irrigation
 Religious schools (Yeshivot) projects.
 Meeting the religious needs of the non-Jewish  System was altered when Likud government came to
communities that enjoy religious autonomy. power.
 There is sharp and recurrent controversy concerning the  Goal to eliminate gov role in the economy and to
extent to which religious observance or restriction is apply free-market principles.
directly or indirectly imposed on the entire Jewish  The 1984 Knesset election campaign focused
population. attention on Israels economic situation and the
 Uses a modified millet system for distributing authority economy became priority.
among religious communities.  New economic program/economic stabilization
 The political reality of Israel has necessitated inclusion of program (July 1985)
political parties of the religious community in virtually all  Relied on a national consensus to generate
cabinets as coalition partners: they seek to control the reduction in public and private consumption;
Ministry of religious affairs. halt the spiral of price rises, devaluations,
 This has given the religious parties substantial and wage adjustments; and reduce inflation
political power and thus an ability to enforce many of from its high levels to as low a point as
their demands and perspectives concerning religion in possible.
the Jewish state.  The stabilization program had its effects but the
 Religious parties became prominent with economy was soon buffeted by unanticipated
accession in office of Menachem Begin and the political developments in the form of the
Likud (1977). Palestinian intifada that started in Dec 1987 and
 The coalition agreements by which the 1977 and the immigration of Soviet Jews (1989), and later
1981 governments were established reflected by the crisis resulting from Iraqi invasion of
the desire and ability of religious parties to press Kuwait in 1990.
for substantial concessions.  In first half of 1990s, the economy expanded rapidly. A
recovery of economic activity started in second half of
 1999, taking form of rapid expansion of GDP driven by  The government of national unity formed during
industrial exports. crises preceding the 1967 war and maintained till
 Besides a booming high-technology sector, Israel has 1970.
undertaken important structural reforms.  The 1984 nation unity government was
 Apparent progress in peace negotiations was helping unique in that it was based on a principle of
to attract tourists and foreign investments power-sharing between Labor and Likud (the
 Sharp decline of tourism resulting from two major political blocs)
Palestinian disturbances and terrorism widely  The coalitions proved stable till the 1950s when the
known as “al-Aksa intifada” (September 2000) Knesset was divided into numerous relatively small
 Israel has made some progress in the direction of a more parties necessitating extensive government
open, competitive, market-oriented economy, although negotiations.
public spending still accounts for more than half of the  Israel had 6 PM’s during first 3 decades of
country’s GDP and the top marginal income tax rate independence.
exceed 60%.  David Ben-Gurion (1948-1953, 1955-1963)
 Israel continues to make slow moves towards privatizing  Moshe Sharret (1954-5)
government-owned companies, including banks, the state  Levi Eshkol (1963-9)
telecommunications company (Bazeq), and others.  Golda Meir (1969-74)
 Yitzhak Rabin (1974-7)
Political Structure
 Menachem Begin (1977-83)
 Government is based on an unwritten constitution.  Yitzhak Shamir (1983-4, 1986-1992)
 Transition Law became basis of constitutional life in  Shimon Peres (1984-6)
the state.  The personal stabilizing influence of Ben-Gurion,
 ********************************* Sharret, Eshkol, and Meir, and the preponderant
strength of MAPAI and the Labor Party were
Political Dynamics important factors in maintaining stability.
 Political parties play a central role in the social and  The requirements of coalition government have
economic, as well as political, life of the country. placed limitations on the PM’s ability to control fully
 Numerous minority factions freely criticize the gov. the cabinet and its actions.
 Political parties are overwhelming in their presence  The PM does not appoint ministers; he she
and they are crucial for the political socialization of reaches accords w/ the other parties, and
Israelis as well as for the policy making of the state. together they select the individuals who hold the
 Vote for parties (instead of individuals) in several portfolios and who share in the cabinets
parliamentary elections. collective responsibility for governing Israel.
 Party decides who will be put on electoral list &  PM also doesn’t have power to dismiss ministers.
thus who will represent it in parliament and  PM does however possess substantial powers
government. that enable him or her to influence the process
 Role of religion has differentiated those who seek to by which ministers are selected and removed.
make Jewish religious law (halacha) a central factor in  The bargaining result from the coalition system has
state activity from those who have worked to permitted the religious parties – MAFADL, Agudat
eliminate virtually all vestiges of religious influence. Israel, Poalei Agudat Israel, TAMI, and SHAS – to gain
 Ex. Communist oppose concept of a Zionist considerable policy concessions and to play strong
state roles in government decision-making because they
 The multiplicity of parties, the diversity of the views were essential to secure a majority in the Knesset.
they represent, and the proportional representation  Political Jewish elite has dominated Israel’s political life.
electoral system have resulted in the failure of any  The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) is virtually unique in the
one party to win a majority of Knesset seats in any of Middle East in that it does not, as an entity, play a role in
the elections between 1949-1999, thus necessitating politics, despite its size, budget, and importance.
the formation of coalition governments.  Competence and skill have been the major factors
 Provisional government formed on independence involved in the determination of senior positions in
the IDF.
  The sophisticated nature of the political system and  1981 Knesset election --> not conclusive in identifying a
its institutions makes it extremely difficult for the popular preference for Likud or Labor.
army to play an independent political role and to seek  The electorate divided its votes between Likud &
Labor but neither majority of votes or seats in
to seize power through political means.
parliament was given to the two.
 Pres. Yitzhak Navon granted the mandate to form a
New Dimensions in Politics
new gov’t. to Begin and Begin succeeded in forming a
Likud-led coalition that received Knesset
 The turmoil in the political process & political life of Israel
endorsement.
during the Yom Kippur War (1973) set in motion forces
 The election highlighted the political dimension ofthe
that affected the political process.
ethnic issue:
 The effect was not obvious in the elections for the 8 th
 Likud secured major percentage of the Oriental
Knesset & local authorities.
Jewish vote.
 Golda Mier was charged with creating a new
government & did so in 1974, but resigned a month  Oriental Jews --> are non-Ashkenazi Jews
later (because of dissension w/in the Labor Party that (from Afro-Asian origin); they are called Edot
centered on the question of political responsibility for Hamizrach or “Eastern, or Oriental
serious lapses in decision-making at the outset of communities”; the term refers to Jews
war). whose origins are in Muslim lands.
 The situations set the stage for the selection of  Extensive Oriental Jewish support for Begin & Likud in
Yitzhak Rabin (hero of the 1974 war, ambassador to 1981 elections must be seen as a desire to achieve
US, Labor Party leader & P.M.) change via support of a party & gov’t. perceived as
 His gov’t . represented a departure from the past sympathetic to the Oriental plight.
that ushered a new era wherein some of Israel’s  This extensive support came in line of an
best-known names & people moved from the effective independent Oriental political
center of power. organization.
 Leadership began to be transferred from the  This organization did not exist at the time
immigrant-founder to the native-born sons. but both TAMI (in 1981 & 1984) and SHAS (in
 Golda Mier’s role gave way for representation of 1984) drew voters to their Oriental-based
diverse views in Israel’s 3-man shuttle diplomacy political movements.
negotiating team (Rabin, Yigal Allon, Shimon  Likud was widely seen as the party that would
Peres). assist the Oriental community in emerging from
 Many of the forces set in motion by the Yom Kippur its 2nd-class status.
War seemed to coalesce when Israel’s electorate
went to the 1977 polls.  The 2nd Begin government (1981-83) came to office with a
 Result: Largest votes to Likud Party, Labor Party narrow margin in parliament, but the P.M. was able to
lost a number of seats, Likud gained additional maintain control despite the traumatic events associated
members, Likud emerged as a leading political with the war in Lebanon & economic problems.
force (All of this prompted Labor dominance in  Begin was a popular & charismatic politician that
Israeli politics to end). appealed to broad sections of the population.
 The 1977 election was seen as a political  He remained in power until 1983 and was
“earthquake” that reflected substantial change. replaced by his P.M. Yitzhak Shamir.
 Menachem Begin & the Likud formed the  The Shamir gov’t. (which was also endorsed
gov’t and took control of Israel’s by the Knesset) was the same as Begin’s
bureaucracy. government in terms or personalities &
 As a consequence of this election, the Likud policies.
established the coalition responsible for
establishing & implementing policies and  The 1984 election results reflected a small but perceptible
programs for Israel. shift to the right in the electorate as a whole.
 The two major blocs (Likud & Labor) were relative
 Implementation of policies & programs
close in votes.
within the ideology developed by
 In a major sense, the results of the election were
Vladimir Zeev Jabotinsky.
inconclusive.
 Begin found Jabotinsky as an
inspiration for concrete policy &
 This division in the Israeli political body proved to be the
worked toward implementing
main factor that contributed and complicated the
Jabotinsky’s revionist vision of a
formation of a new government of national unity that was
Jewish State in all of the Land of
approved by the Knesset in Sept. 1984.
Israel.
 Negotiations leading to the formation of the
government was lengthy & complex.
  The basis for the new government was a complicated  Early 1990 --> A breakdown happened between the two
series of compromises & concessions. main elements & various smaller components of the gov’t.
 The new government became a new experiment  The Labor member;s’ resignation from the
in Israeli politics (at the basis which was agreed government & vote of no-confidence in the Knesset
by the two blocs in sharing power) led to the government’s fall.
 The national unity government, with the  Peres & labor gained an opportunity to secure a
power-sharing & rotation concepts, lasted to mandate to form a successor coalition.
a full term.  Peres was unable to construct a viable
 The jockeying for power between the left portion of government because of a series of political
the center & the right portion of the center continued maneuvering & promises of patronage that
in the 1988 election campaign. tarnished his image & raised doubts about his
 The results of the election were similar to the leadership qualities.
inconclusive outcome of the 1984 balloting.  Shamir then succeeded in establishing a
 Likud rose slighltly above Labor with only 1 seat government supported by Likud & parties &
in difference. individuals from the political Right & from the
 The Oriental Jewish community continued to religious bloc.
vote for Likud in greater numbers.  The new government was relatively narrow
 However, there were indications that & potentially fragile.
Oriental support for Likud was weakening &
now see that Likud is not the party most  In the new Shamir government, there emerged within
sensitive to their needs anymore, thus they Labor new questions about Peres’ role as party leader.
were turning more to SHAS & other parties.  Was tested thru the party hierarchy but Peres
succeeded in retaining his position as party leader.
 Labor’s poor showing in 1988 elections underscored the
power of the incumbency of Yitzhak Shamir & Likud.  The Likud-led gov’t. under his leadership was soon tested
 As P.M. of the national unity gov’t., Shimon Peres by the Iraqi SCUD missile attack. The gov’t. showed
established himself as the dominant figure in Israeli remarkable restrain in response to U.S.Pres. George
politics & transformed his image from a disliked Bush’s request.
politician to a self-confident political figure and an  Oct. 1991 --> After the Iraq War, Israel entered peace
asset to the Labor Party. negotiations with its Arab neighbors in Madrid, Spain.
 However, Peres’ diplomatic maneuvering did not  It gave way to separate bilateral meetings bet.
enable him to escape relative political obscurity Israel & other Arab delegations.
of the foreign ministry b/c he struggled to to  Jan. 1992 --> After 3 months of bilateral talks, the
revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace process. right-wing Tehiya & Moledet parties resigned from
 Even within the Labor Party, Peres found himself the gov’t. over Shamir’s willingness to discuss an
at a disadvantage compared to Rabin. This agreement on Palestinian self-rule in West Bank &
became especially important after the Palestinian Gaza Strip.
intifada outbreak in Dec. 1987.  The defection of the two parties deprived the
 A significant & unanticipated result of the 1988 voting was coalition of a majority in parliament making Likud
the success of the religious parties in capturing a total of & Labor agree to schedule a national election in
18 seats. This success came despite the fragmentation of June 1992.
the 3 existing religious parties -- NRP, SHAS, and Agudat  The election provided a new opportunity for Yitzhak
Israel. Rabin to try to unseat Shimon Peres as Labor leader.
 Another religious party, TAMI, was absorbed into  Feb. 1992 --> Rabin won the primary election as
Likud prior to the 1988 elections. party leader.

 December 1988 --> The establishment of a new &  The June 1992 election for the 13th Knesset was contested
different national unity government under Yitzhak Shamir by 25 political parties that represented all points of the
was a complicated process. political spectrum.
 He was able to establish a government wherein he  5 parties were banned from participating (b/c the
would remain as P.M. throughout its tenure. electoral commission determined that they
 Labor’s Shimon Peres was appointed as finance advocated racist & anti-democratic programs)
minister, wherein he would have little int’l. visibility &  New parties / coalitions were created (e.g. MERETZ,
opportunity to generate popular support within MAPAM, United Torah Judaism)
Israel.  Some parties were constructed by individuals /
 Peres’ chief Labor Party rival, Yitzhak Rabin, retained groups that split from major parties (e.g. New Liberal
the post of defense minister. Party)
 This government managed to survive until 1990.
  A number of new parties were also formed to reflect  The P.M. & the larger political parties were to be
specific concerns & interests (e.g. Democracy & strengthened.
Aliyah)  There was the assumption that the large parties
 Political commentators called the 1992 election would get larger & the smaller parties would get
outcome as another “earthquake”, or mahapach, in smaller, or lose their positions in the parliament
the sense of revolutionary change, as in 1977. entirely thus facilitating coalition formation &
 This time, Labor was the victor which ended a reducing the bargaining power of the small parties in
decade & a half of Likud rule. the Knesset.
 The crucial element in the outcome was the  This proved to be inaccurate.
creation of a blocking majority of 61  1996 --> the voters split their ballots (Peres vs
parliamentary seats composed of Labor, MERETZ, Netanyahu for P.M., but split the ballots & voting
and the Arab parties (w/c meant that Shamir for another party for parliament)
would not be able to reconstruct a Likud-right-  Rather than facilitating coalition formation &
wing religious party coalition) strengthening the P.M., the result was that
 Election result was: more parties in parliament could hold out
 A classic case of voters punishing the incumbent with the P.M. for their demands b/c the P.M.
party for years of bad / ineffectual gov’t. needed their votes for form a gov’t.
 Reflected the impact on the electoral system of  The shift from Labor to Likud brought with a change in the
new immigrants from the former Soviet Union substance & style of Israel’s peace process strategy &
(who were voting for the 1st time) tactics towards peacemaking.
 Yitzhak Rabin moved quickly to forge a coalition  Under the Labor gov’t. of Tabin & Peres, Israel made
that included MERETZ and SHAS. gains in its quest for peace & normalization of
 The new gov’t. was presented to the Knesset on relations with Palestinians & Arab countries.
July 1992, and won its approval.  Direct bilateral relations were held bet. Israel &
neighboring Arab countries (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan,
 Labor’s return to control of the Knesset & gov’t. meant Palestinians).
there would be changes for politics, policies, and  Agreements were concluded bet. Israel &
patronage. Palestinians, Israel & Jordan.
 External observers (esp. U.S.) were hopeful that the  1996 election outcome --> held against a background
peace process might be reinvigorated. And it proved of terrorist bombings, majority of Israelis perceived
to be the case. Labor’s peace strategy more riskier than Likud’s.
 1992 --> Rabin became P.M. at the head of a Labor-
led coalition gov’t.  Netanyahu’s rhetoric during the campaign & his record as
 Nov. 1995 --> Rabin was assassinated; Peres Likud leader --> modify Israel’s approach to the peace
called for elections in May 1996 which he then process, promised Israeli voters he would achieve a
lost to Benjamin Netanyahu & a Likud-led “secure peace”, he would never accept a Palestinian state.
coalition gov’t.  Prospects for peace with the Palestinians appear
 The 1992 election was conducted under the old bleak as he assumed leadership, and the Arab-Israeli
system wherein each voter cast only 1 ballot (for the conflict remained the country’s most important
party of the voter’s choice). problem.
 The 1996 election were held under a changed
electoral process that allowed for 2 ballots (1 for  Netanyahu’s tenure --> marked by efforts to govern
party list, 1 for direct election of the P.M.) based on the popular mandate as P.M. rather than as
head of the coalition gov’t. required by the outcome of
 The 1996 election outcome was interesting in a number of the Knesset elections.
ways:  He was dependent on a fractioned Knesset & a
 Shimon Peres, the incumbent, was defeated by coalition gov’t.
Benjamin Netanyahu (who focused on the need for  Foreign policy (esp. peace process) proved to be
security with peace achievable at the same time) problematic.
 Labor employed the legacy of P.M. Yitzhak Rabin to  Palestinian negotiations moved slowly under his
evoke sympathy for its cause, while Likud used the tenure.
memory of those killed in a wave of mass suicide  He could not keep his restive coalition of Likud &
bombings (Feb-March 1996) to inspire distrust of the secular-nationalist & religious parties together, and
Labor government’s security & peace policies). agreement was reached to hold new elections, for
 The ultra-Orthodox camp supported Netanyahu. both the Knesset & P.M. (1999)
 Reason: shared view on the peace process.
 Ehud Barak --> new chosen leader of the One Israel bloc
 The 1992 electoral law was intended to alter the process (comprised of Labor, Gesher, & Meimad).
of politics & its dynamics.  May 1999 --> elected as P.M. & defeated Netanyahu.
  Despite his victory, Barak was faced with a very
divided Knesset.  Israel’s quest for peace with its Arab neighbors dates
 Barak succeeded in cobbling together a coalition of from its establishment (when Arabs opposed the
the diverse political units in Israel. Palestinian partition proposed by UN & declared war in
 June 2000 --> the coalition unraveled. response to Israel’s declaration of independence when
 David Levy (leader of Gesher & minister of foreign the mandate was terminated)
affairs) --> left One Israel in protest of Barak’s  1949 armistice agreements --> intended to facilitate a
handling of the peace negotiations, and the National transition to “permanent peace in Palestine”.
Religious & ultra-Orthodox parties also left the  Israelis tended to be hopeful but negotiations were
coalition. bot begun, and Israel became preoccupied with the
 The most influential of the coalition defectors was the need for security (1976 Suez War reinforced that
SHAS party. need).
 Barak’s government was reduced from a total of 75
of the Knesset’s 120 seats in July 1999 to 30 seats in  Six Day War (1967) --> generated change in Israel & Israeli
August 2000. perceptions of their situation.
 He soon called for a new election.  The realities of Arab hostility & threat and the
 Barak faced Ariel Sharon (who replced difficulties of achieving a settlement became more
Netanyahu as Likud leader in the aftermath of obvious.
the 1999 election).  The dynamics of the conflict changed with Israel’s
 Ariel Sharon’s as P.M. his first priority was to put victory: Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula , Gaza
together a governing coalition. Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem & Golan Heights.
 His most urgent challenge was Palestinian  Israel adopted the position that is would not
violence. withdraw from these territories until
 Sharon initially managed to hold together his negotiations with Arab states had led to peace
diverse national unity government. agreements w/c recognized Israel’s right to exist
 The coalition included religious & & accepted Israel’s permanent status & borders.
immigrant parties.  The Arab view was articulated in the Palestine
 The parties set aside their differences & National Covenant (1984) --> called the creation of
focused on the Palestinian-Israeli Israel as “null & void”, and in the Arab League summit
conflict, despite the varying views of the as “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no
parties on security issues. negotiations with it”.
 Sharon’s central task --> sustaining the
coalition consensus on how to deal with  Period bet. Six Day War & Yom Kippur War (1973) -->
the intifada & the Palestinian focal point in the M.E. was the effort to achieve a
negotiations. settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict & to secure a lasting
Foreign and Security Policies peace.
 UNSC Resolution No. 242 (Nov. 1967) --> regional
 Primary objectives of Israel’s foreign & security policies: states, the superpowers, and the main
 (1) Quest for peace through negotiations with the instrumentalities of the int’l. system were engaged.
Arab states  Israel focused its attention on peace & security
 (2) Assurance of security in a region of hostility objectives and developed positions concerning
through an effective defense capability. the occupied territories & the Palestinians.

 The goals of peace & security come from the conflict with  The Yom Kippur War --> created a new environment for
the Arab states that remains a crucial problem that the quest of peace & development of Israeli F.P.
confronts Israel --> affects all of Israel’s policies &  Israel’s position deteriorated with the outbreak of
activities (domestic & foreign). fighting.
 Israel recognizes that peace & cooperation with  During & after the war, Israel’s ties with most of the
neighboring Arab states is vital for long-term survival sub-Saharan Africa were broken.
& development of the Jewish state. This remains the  No major African state publicly backed / gave
cornerstone of its F.P. assistance to Israel (except South Africa).
 This symbolized not only the injustice of the
 Israel’s concern with peace, national survival, and security int’l. community but also the success of the
is a consequence of its geostrategic situation (part. Arab oil weapon & the failure of Israel’s
Conflict with Arab neighbors). program of int’l cooperation.
 Wars, countless skirmishes & terrorist attacks, and  Israel provided many of these S.A. states
vituperative rhetoric, combined with the Holocaust & assistances.
with Arab hostility during the mandate period --> left
their mark on Israel’s national consciousness.
  Israel retained relations with only 5 African visit to Israel & start of direct negotiations between
states: South Africa, Malawi, Lesotho, the two countries.
Botswana, Swaziland.  The negotiations culminated in the Camp David
 The ruptures with Africa were a disappointment, but summit meeting (Sept. 1978) where Israel, Egypt,
a shift in the attitudes & policies of European states & and U.S. agreed to two frameworks for continued
Japan was more significant. negotiations.
 Japan shifted from being neutral to a more  Primary objective of post-Camp David
pronounced pro-Arab position. negotiations --> convert the frameworks to
 Israel’s int’l. isolation was exemplified by the peace treaties.
willingness of U.S.’ European allies.  The parties concentrated their efforts on the
 Europeans were reluctant to be associated with Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (signed at the
U.S. support for Israel & were concerned about White House on March 1979).
the reduction of Arab oil shipments to them.
 The war increased Israel’s dependence on U.S.  The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was a significant
accomplishment that represented a first step to a
 After the Yom Kippur War --> there were minor comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement & regional
modifications of Israel’s policy, no shifts in objectives and stability.
content.  Peace was established, but it was often a “cold”
 The primary goals remained the achievement of an peace, one wherein long-standing mistrust had not
Arab-Israeli settlement & the assurance of security. been replaced by the warmth of friendly relations.
 Israel’s view of itself as geographically isolated &
lacking allies, its geographical vulnerability, and its  Begin also fulfilled his government’s pledge regarding the
need to acquire & produce arms for self-defense Golan Heights.
were re-affirmed by the Yom Kippur War.  Dec. 1981 --> Knesset adopted the Golan Heights Law
 Israel believed that it won a military victory & (w/c extended Israel’s “law, jurisdiction, and
that its strategic concepts were vindicated. administration” to the area).
 Begin notes that Pres. Assad’s (Syria) refusal to
 After 1977 elections --> Begin gov’t. maintained Israel’s negotiate to a peace treaty with Israel as the main
focus on the goal of establishing peace w/c would include reason for the decision.
the end of war, full reconciliation & normalization, and an
open border w/c people & goods could cross w/o  The peace process was soon overshadowed by the 6th
hindrance. Arab-Israeli War (Lebanon war of 1982).
 On occupied territories: the gov’t. could rely on a  The continued presence in Lebanon of surface-to-air
consensus opposing a return to the armistice lines of missiles that had been moved there by Syria (in
1949, thus ruling out total withdrawal. Spring 1981) remained an Israeli concern.
 Focus of territorial disagreement: West Bank  June 1982 --> Israel launched a major military action
 There was a difference between: the PLO in Lebanon (“Operation Peace for Galilee”)
 Begin-Likud view (w/c opposed relinquishing which sought to remove PLO’s military & terrorist
any territory) threat to Israel & to reduce PLO’s political capability.
 Labor-led coalition gov’t. 1967 & 1977 (tried  Military objectives:
to limit Jewish settlements to those who  Assure security for Northern Israel
could serve a security function & had sought  Destroy the PLO infrastructure that had
ti avoid conflict bet. The settlements & the established a state w/in a state in southern
local Arab populations) Lebanon
 Begin gov’t. elected altered this policy  Eliminate a center of int’l. terrorism
 It supported settlements as a  Eliminate the PLO from Lebanon so that its
natural & inalienable Jewish right. territory would not serve as a base of
 The most articulate consensus continued to revolve operations w/c will threaten Israel
around the question of a Palestinian state & the PLO  Political objectives:
 Israel’s refusal to negotiate with the PLO & its  Goal of weakening the PLO so that it
opposition to the establishment of an wouldn’t longer be as politically significant.
independent Palestinian state on the West Bank  Hope that a new political order in Lebanon
& Gaza Strip were re-affirmed. might lead it to consider becoming the 2nd
Arab state to make peace with Israel.
 Israel’s national consensus focused on the need for peace,  Results of the war in Lebanon: ambiguous
and the main obstacle appeared to be the continuing Arab  Israel’s northern border became more
unwillingness to accept Israeli & to negotiate with it. secure
 But there were negotiations during the Nov. 1977  Israeli troops who remained in Lebanon
initiative of Pres. Anwar Sadat (Egypt) that led to his became targets of terrorists & casualties.
  Costs of war were high.  May 1989 --> Israeli cabinet adopted a similar Shamir
 Externally --> Israel’s military actions proposal as its official policy.
cause concern in many quarters (inc.  The election initiative became the focal point of
U.S.) & its int’l. isolation was increased. efforts to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process,
 Achievements --> military & terrorist & the U.S. sought to build on it.
infrastructure in Lebanon was  Over the months, U.S. worked to narrow the
destroyed. differences bet. Israel & Palestinians & to start
 Although an agreement bet. Israel & direct negotiations.
Lebanon calling for Israeli withdrawal & for  March 1990 --> the national unity gov’t. fell in a
normalization of relations bet. the two Labor-sponsored vote of no-confidence over
countries was concluded, it was soon Likud’s unwillingness to respond affirmatively to
unilaterally abrogated by the Lebanon gov’t. U.S. proposals.
under Syrian pressure.
 June 1990 --> Shamir formed a new Likud-led gov’t.
 Menachem Begin’s tenure as P.M. --> brought peace with  He noted that it included “all the national forces w/c
Egypt & reduced the military danger to the existence of have fought & worked for the sake of Eretz Yisrael”,
Israel by neutralizing the largest Arab army. and he pledged to continue working for peace on the
 Operation Peace for Galilee led to debate & basis of the Camp David Accords & his proposal for
demonstration w/in but did not expand the peace Palestinian elections.
domain for the Jewish state.
 P.M. Yitzhak Shamir’s gov’t. proposed continuity in  Aug. 1990 --> Iraq invaded Kuwait.
principles & policy.  Much of the world’s attention was diverted from the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
 Shimon Peres as P.M. (1984 to 1986) set three major F.P.  March 1991 --> After the Persian Gulf War,
objectives: Pres.George Bush announced to Congress that “the
 To withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon as quickly. time had come to put to an end to Arab-Israeli
 To improve relations with Egypt following the conflict”.
tensions caused by Israel’s invasion of Lebanon.  He dispatched Sec. Of State James Baker to M.E.
 To engage Jordan’s King Hussein in direct peace talks. for a round of exploratory diplomacy.
 Baker made several trips to the region &
 Shamir pledged that he would continue the policies sought the consent of Israel & the Arabs to
initiated by Peres. participate in an int’l. peace conference.
 Nevertheless, it was evident that his approach  Madrid conference of Oct. 1991.
would be different on the critical issues of Arab-
Israeli peace.  The Madrid conference did not achieve a breakthrough
 Shamir re-affirmed his adherence to the Camp but it broke the procedural & psychological barriers to
David framework & made it clear that he would direct bilateral negotiations bet. Israel & its immediate
not deviate from that path as P.M. neighbors by having Israeli & Syrian, Egyptian, Lebanese,
and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations meet at an opening
 Dec. 1987 --> Palestinians in Gaza Strip began a wave of public & official plenary session & deliver speeches &
violent protests & riots, w/c quickly spread to the West responses.
Bank & became a new feature of Palestinian life under  Bilateral negotiations bet. Israel & each of the
Israeli occupation. Arab delegations followed.
 The uprisings re-affirmed the urgency of withdrawing  Dec. 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 --> the Madrid meetings
from the bulk of the territories & returning them to were followed by bilateral talks in Washington.
Jordan.  Progress was measured by the continuation of
 S the process rather than by the achievement of
 Dec. 1988 --> Dialogue was open bet. U.S. & the PLO substantive accord on the issues in dispute.
of the UNSC Resolutions 242 & 338, recognition of  The Israeli-Palestinian & Israeli-Syrian
Israel & renunciation of terrorism. negotiations proved to be both the most central
 This development added to the growing internal & the most difficult.
& external pressures on Israel to work on a  Jordan & Lebanon --> the agreements would
constructive policy in dealing with the Palestinian be easy to achieve, but they would have to
intifada & to advance the peace process. await the resolution of the Syrian &
Palestinian talks.
 Jan. 1989 --> Defense Minister Rabin suggested that the  Syria --> central issues were peace, security,
gov’t. should consider adopting Labor’s idea that the and the future of the Golan Heights.
Palestinians in the West Bank & Gaza Strip elect their own  Israeli-Palestinian discussions -->
representatives to peace talks. disagreement centered on the Palestinian
 desire for an independent state in the West substantial agreement bet. Assad & Barak thru
Bank & Gaza Strip & the Israeli opposition of intermediaries.
that desire.  On the Lebanon front, Barak brought about significant
 The Madrid-inaugurated process included multilateral change.
discussions on several broader regional issues:  May 2000 --> Failing to negotiate a peace agreement
 Refugees, economic development, water with Syria & Lebanon, he unilaterally withdrew Israeli
resources, environment, arms control. troops from Lebanon back to a U.N.-marked
international border.
 Spring 1992 --> Israel’s Knesset election campaign showed
the Arab-Israeli peace process.  Despite some progress in other sectors, there was little to
 Election outcome: heralded as a significant & positive record on the Israeli-Palestinian front.
factor that would alter the regional situation, the  Madrid opened the way for negotiations bet. Israel &
progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, nature of PLO in Washington, but it was the secret talks in
the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Norway that led to the White House signing
 Aug. 1992 --> Agreement was soon reached with the ceremony & transfer of territory from Israel to PLO as
new Labor-led coalition gov’t. on the resumption of a 1st part of the process of an over-all accord to
the bilateral process. achieve peace & security.
 Spring 1993 --> secret negotiations bet. the PLO  The process was slow & the final status issues had not
& Israel began b/c of the slow movement in the been considered by the time Barak took office after
negotiation process. the 1991 Israeli elections.

 Spring & Summer 1993 --> The secret negotiations bet.  Summer 2000 --> A summit took place at Camp David w/c
Representatives of Yasir Arafat’s PLO & Israelis in Oslo, Pres. Clinton, Barak, and Arafat focused on a
Norway resulted in an exchange of mutual recognition comprehensive peace agreement.
(Sept. 1993) w/c was soon followed by the formal signing  Despite efforts, no agreement was reached.
on the White House lawn of a Declaration of Principles  The failure of the Camp David II summit & the
(DOP). ensuing violence brought the Oslo process to a
 The DOP was a first step on the long road to a halt.
comprehensive peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but  The peace process that marked the 1990s decade was
it was a crucial & historic breakthrough. replaced by violence -- the al-Aksa intifada broke out
 Summer 1994 -- > Israel & Jordan began official, in Sept. 2000 to 2001 & the periodic talk of “war”.
public, high-level negotiations.  Problem was further exacerbated in the wake of
 Late July 1994 --> P.M. Yitzhak Rabin & King 9/11 terrorist attacks in N.Y. & Washington when
Hussein of Jordan signed the Washington Palestinian terrorists escalated their attacks
Declaration (w/c ended their state of against Israeli civilians.
beligerence).
 Oct. 1994 --> Israel & Jordan signed a formal  Sharon made it clear in his election campaign that the
peace treaty (w/c ushered an era of peace & Oslo process “was dead” & the security of Israel was the
normalization of relations bet. the two states). paramount concern & objective of his administration.
 His demand: violence must stop before the
 The Madrid process moved ahead. negotiations could take place.
 When Barak assumed power in July 1999, great  Given the continuous violence & lack of confidence
optimism followed that there could now be progress bet. Israel & PLO, the peace process remained
in the peace process. stagnant.
 Barak transferred some territories in the West
Bank to Palestinian authority.  The 21st century began with Israeli F.P. continuing its
 He also hinted that he might return virtually all of quest for peace.
the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for peace.  Israelis questioned their situation after the end of the
Gulf War, defeat of Saddam Hussein, & the
 This generated criticism & protests from subsequent Madrid conference that inaugurated the
settlers & from others who saw the need to M.E. peace process.
keep the heights (given their security value  Despite efforts of the 6 P.M.’s in the 1990s & the first
for Israel). years of the 21st century (Shamir, Rabin, Peres,
 Negotiations brought the parties close together but Netanyahu, Barak, Sharon), Israel’s over-all
summit talks with U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton participating acceptance in the region was only marginally
failed to bring an agreement. advanced.
 June 2000 --> during Syrian Pres. Hafez Assad’s death,  Peace was achieved with Jordan only in 1994
the process had reached a stalemate, despite  Security for Israel deteriorated
  Israel was far from being accepted as an integral  Europe posed as a challenge & presented a significant
part of the M.E. opportunity for Israeli policy-makers.
 Israel sought to maintain positive relations w/ Europe
The Search for Friends & Allies based on the commonality of the Judeo-Christianity
heritage & democratic tradition and memories of the
 Israel’s broader approach to foreign policy began to take “guilt complex” of the Holocaust.
shape once it became clear that peace would not follow  With Israel seeking links to military powers &
the 1949 armistice accords w/ the Arab states that economic assistances, Europe seemed a logical
marked the end of its War of Independence. choice.
 The Arab threat & Israel’s isolation suggested a need  The establishment of the EEC (1957) & its evolution
for positive relationships w/ other states but Israel’s into the EU opened a new concern for Israeli F.P.
approach to alliances has been marked by  Israeli embarked on a course of action to maximize
ambivalence. economic (esp. trade) opportunities presented by the
 Israel directed its attention beyond the circle of increase economic potential of a Europe united
neighboring Arab states to the int’l. community --> to economically.
make an effort in establishing relations w/ European  Over time, Israeli successfully established
states & developing world (esp. Africa & Latin economic links with EEC & EU and with various
America), as well as superpowers, and to gain their European states on a bilateral level.
support in the int’l. arena.
 These relationships were seen as positive effect  Israel’s relations with developing states (began in late
on the Arab-Israeli conflict & bilateral political 1960s) have focused on the country’s ability to provide
and economic advantages that would help technical assistance in the development process.
ensure Israel’s strength thru national armed  1950s-60s --> emergence of new states in Africa &
power & increase int’l. support. Asia led Israel to pursue a policy in keeping with Afro-
Asian aspirations for economic development &
 Israel also held a positive view of the United Nations. modernization.
 With increasingly large anti-Israel majority in the UN  Israel’s multifaceted program focused on technical
& automatic support for Palestinian and Arab assistance, exchange & training programs, loans, joint
perspectives, Israel’s views changed and UN was economic enterprises, and trade.
regarded as an unhelpful factor in the quest for peace  The program grew dramatically & remains an
& security. element of Israeli F.P.
 This changed after the Madrid peace conference  3rd world support help to prevent UN from adopting
& bilateral and multilateral negotiations bet. anti-Israel measures after the 1967 war, and in early
Israel & its neighbors. 1970s, a committee of African presidents worked to
 Also, the Soviet Union collapse & disintegration achieve Arab-Israeli negotiations.
of the Soviet bloc led to the restoration of Israel’s  Despite substantial efforts in these sectors, the
relations w/ a number of states that previously centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict has enlarged
had been hostile. & enhanced the role of the superpowers (esp.
 All of this contributed to an improved US) in Israeli’s eyes.
relationship w/ Israel in the 1990s.
 But with the Oslo process failure & resort to  Israeli leaders early recognized the crucial role that the
the UN by the Palestinians and Arab states, great powers would play in ensuring the country’s defense
this view was altered again. & integrity.
 Start of 21st century --> Israel’s view of the UN was  Days ff. the independence --> it was believed that
marked by an ambivalence concerning the role the non-alignment in the cold war was possible & that
organization might play in Israel’s F.P. Israel could establish and maintain friendly relations
and secure support from both East & West (Soviet
 The developed & economically advanced European states Union & U.S.), although most realized that Israel’s
(plus Japan, Korea, Canada) have been of great long-term interests lay in the West.
significance to Israel.  Non-alignment was in accord with Israel’s perception
 These are states of economic development & long of its national interest & seemed to be a realistic
history as independent states. assessment in the policies and activities of both
 Most are middle & larger powers (inc. Britain, France, powers after WWII.
Germany, Netherlands, Italy) and also OECD &
European Union members.  Israel’s government (upon attaining statehood)
 Japan & Korea differed from the other members in proclaimed a non-commitment policy (non-identification)
history & background. in the East-West conflict.
 It was non-aligned & not identified with any bloc in
the cold war.
  This policy was made easier to adopt by Soviet  The lens of Zionism & the associated “ingathering of the
actions in support of the new state when: exiles” required Israel to be concerned for Jewish
 it voted for the 1947 partition plan communities elsewhere & their well-being and potential
 Accorded de jure recognition to Israel after its to emigrate from their imperiled locations to the Jewish
independence state.
 Supported its applications for UN membership  An additional concern --> world’s two largest Jewish
 Gave it moral, political, material support communities (U.S. & the S.U.)
 However, after the end of the War of Independence,
various factors (inc. Ideological sympathies, large size  Anti-Semitism was an endemic feature of Russian (and
& importance of Western Jewry, Soviet abandonment Soviet) society & history.
of support for Israel & denial of loan requests,  Not only were Soviet Jews unable to assist the Jewish
constant flow of economic aid from U.S. gov’t. & state in its birth & consolidation, Israel (during Cold
American Jewry) contributed to Israel’s shift to a pro- War) was unable to protect them & could not secure
Western orientation. large-scale emigration of those at risk.
 Israel’s support for the UN resolutions & actions  This began to change in the last years of
concerning the Korean invasions was seen by the Gorbachev’s era, and immigration of Israel
Soviet bloc as an unfriendly act. became a continuous flow w/ the end of S.U. &
of the Cold War.
 1949 to 1953 --> Relations bet. Israel & Soviet Union
deteriorated rapidly, and Israel’s F.P. no longer reflected  Relationship bet. USSR & Israel underwent substantial
belief in Soviet friendship & support. change over the years.
 Soviet support & expanded relations with Arab states  S.U. & Communist Part were opposed ideologically to
by mid-1950s tended to confirm this. Zionism, but in 1947, Soviet Union’s representative at
 The continuation of Soviet’s support for Arab states, UN, Andrei Gromyko, supported the Palestine
Soviet’s rupture of relations with Israel led Israel Partition Plan (w/c led to the creation of Israel).
farther into the Western camp (although it continued  1948 --> S.U. became one of the first states to
to seek restoration of ties w/ S.U.). recognize the new state of Israel & it was
 1989 --> Emigration began to grow & diplomatic instrumental in assuring arms from the Soviet bloc to
relations were restored in Oct. 1991 (on the eve of Israel during Israel’s War of Independence.
Madrid peace conference).  But positive relations in the early years deteriorated
in the early 1950s, culminating in the Soviet arms
 From WWII to 1990s --> The superpowers (S.U. & U.S.) supply to Egypt (announced in 1955).
were the encompassing major players in the int’l. system.  A factor in the relationship was the relationship bet.
 It the case of Soviet Union: It was not simply the Israel & Soviet Jewish population.
relationship w/ the superpower itself but also its bloc  Israel’s desire to ensure the well-being internally
partners. of the Soviet Jewish population & to ensure the
 Israel (like all other states) had to operate w/in right to emigration for those who wished to leave
the confines of the cold war. the USSR led to conflict w/ Soviet authorities &
 Both superpowers were also significant as the Moscow’s official position.
location / residence of large segments of the world’s  The relationship bet. S.U. & the Arab states grew in
Jewish population. the decade ff. the 1956 Sinai War.
 1967 --> S.U. contributed to the Six-Day War thru
 Israel was initially successful w/ its early policy of non- circulation pf a fallacious rumor concerning Israeli
alignment. military mobilization.
 While other states tried to play the U.S. & the S.U.  At this time, S.U. & its East European allies
against each other to secure from them the benefits (except Romania) broke diplomatic relations w/
of alliance, Israel was unable to do so in its early days Israel.
of independence.
 U.S. and S.U. sought Israel’s allegiance when it  After 1967 conflict --> Soviet Union attempted to become
became independent & it joined UN. a more significant factor in the peace process.
 But Israel’s non-identification gave way to a pro-  At the same time, with the advent of the Gorbachev
Western orientation & later to a U.S.-Israel approach to F.P., the relationship of the two states
connection / alignment. improved.
 The special relationship (or “alliance” as seen  Soviet Jewish emigration increased, several East
by some) bet. Israel & U.S. developed only European states restored diplomatic relations w/
later and remains unformalized in treaty Israel.
form even today.  Soviet Union maintained that it could not re-
establish relations w/ Israel until there was
substantial movement toward peace &
 withdrawal of Israel from the occupied  Israel has not mutual security treaty w/ U.S., not
territories. is it a member of any alliance system requiring
 Oct. 1991 --> USSR & Israel re-established diplomatic U.S. to take up arms automatically on its behalf.
relations.  U.S. commitment to Israel --> has take a
generalized form of presidential statements that
 Dec. 1991 --> Collapse of the USSR, Russia took over most have re-affirmed the U.S. interest in supporting
of the S.U.’s functions in the Middle East diplomacy (inc. the political independence & territorial integrity
co-sponsoring the Madrid process together w/ U.S.) of all M.E. states (inc. Israel).
 Israel remained skeptical about Russia’s ambitions in  U.s. is today an indispensable (if not fully dependable)
M.E., as reflected in its relations w/ militant Arab ally.
regimes (inc. Syria, Libya, Iraq) and its transfer of  It provides Israel with economic (governmental &
military technology to Iran. private), technical, military, political diplomatic,
and moral support.
 The U.S. has changed from a power providing limited  It was seen as the ultimate resource against the
direct support for Israel to become the world’s only S.U.
superpower linked w/ Israel in a free trade area & a  It is the source of Israel’s sophisticated military
crucial provider of political, economic, diplomatic, and hardware
strategic (security) support.  It is central to the Arab-Israeli peace process
 The complex & multifaceted “special relationship” w/  The U.S. & Israel have established a special
the U.S. that had its origins prior to Israel’s relationship full with broad areas of agreement &
independence has been centered on the continuing numerous examples of accord.
U.S. support for survival, security, and well-being of  There was and will be a divergence that comes
Israel. from the difference of perspective & over-all
 Early years of independent Israel --> U.S.-Israeli policy environment.
relationship was grounded in humanitarian  Nevertheless, they maintain a remarkable degree of
concerns, religious & historical links, and in a parallelism & compatibility on broad policy goals.
moral-emotional-political arena rather than a  And Israel continues to focus on the centrality &
strategic-military one. significance of the ties.
 Dec. 1947 --> U.S. declared an arms embargo )no
U.S. military aid, sales of military equipment, no
formal or informal military or strategic
agreement bet. U.S. & Israel).
 1970s to 1980s--> Extensive dealings only then
became significant.

 The concept of Israel as a “strategic asset” was more an

outcome of the developing relationship than a foundation
for its establishment.
 U.S. policy on arms supply evolved from embargo (in
1947) to principal supplier, and arms became an
important tool of U.S. policy to reassure Israel & to
achieve policy modification.

 The two states developed a diplomatic-political

relationship that focused on the need to resolve the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
 Although their agree on the general concept, they
often differ on the precise means for achieving the
desired result.
 Six-Day War --> U.S. & Israeli relationship became
especially close when a compatibility of policy
prevailed on many of their main concerns.
 Nevertheless, the two states often held different
perspectives on regional developments & on the
dangers and opportunities they presented.
 Israel’s special relationship with U.S. has not been
enshrined in a formal, legally binding document that
joins both states in a formal alliance.