DPSP:

1. Article 39 (a) - The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women equally,
have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. It means that every citizen of the country has the right to earn a livelihood
without getting discriminated on the basis of their sex.
2. Article 39(d) - Equal pay for equal work for both men and women. Wages will not be determined on the basis of sex rather
it will be according to the amount of work done by the worker.
3. Article 41 – Right to work
4. Article 42 - Provides for the upliftment of the working conditions for workers. It talks about creating a suitable and Humane
workplace.
5. Article 43 - Talks about the “living wage” for its citizens. Living wage not only includes the “bare necessities of life” but
also the social and cultural upliftment of the person. It also includes education and insurances for a person. The State shall
constantly try to create opportunities in the fields of Agriculture and Industries with special reference to cottage industries.

Fundamental Rights:
1. Article 14 – Equality before law and equal protection of laws
2. Article 19(1) - speech and expression, assemble peaceably without arms, form association, practice
profession/occupation/trade or business.
3. Article 21 - No person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.
4. Article 23- Forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in
accordance with law
5. Article 24 - No child below the age of 14years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other
hazardous employment
 Bangalore Water Supply and Sewage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978) (Phase 4 – Objective Interpretation) - Liberal interpretation was
given to word “industry” and holding that hospitals, clubs, educational, research and charitable institutions are industries. It overruled the
earlier decisions and upheld D.N Banerjee. An industry cannot exist without cooperative endeavour between employer and employee.
Merely because the employer is a Government Department or a local body the enterprise does not cease to be an “industry”. Likewise, what
the common man does not consider an industry need not necessarily stand excluded from the statutory concept. Absence of capital does
not negative industry. Even charitable institutions does not necessarily cease to be industries definitionally although popularly charity is
not industry. In short “trade” embraces functions of local authorities, even professions thus departing from popular notions.
Triple Test – Where the entity,
1. pursues systematic activity
2. which is organised by co-operation between employer and employees,
3. for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes
Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private or other sector. The decisive test is the
nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations.
Dominant Nature Test – Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify for exemption others not, involves employees on the total
undertaking. The whole, undertaking will be 'industry' although those who are not 'workmen' by definition may not benefit by the status. It
is to determine whether it is an industry or not and whether the person is workman or not. Must be seen if work is divisible or not and how
much of it is directed towards what.
Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign functions, strictly understood, alone qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or
economic adventures undertaken by government or statutory bodies. Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units
which are industries and they are Substantially severable, then they can be considered to come within sec. 2(j).

Attempt to amend definition via 1982 amendment (Phase 5) – In reaction to the judicial activism displayed by the court in Bangalore
water supply case, the government attempted to amend the scope of the definition in 1982 by applying the triple test through Industrial
disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982. This amended definition attempted to nullify the effect of many conflicting judgements on what is
included in the definition of ‘industry’ and what is not. Also, this definition was much more elaborative and expansive as compared to the
original definition under 1947 act.

IRC 2020 (Phase 6) – The new definition specifically excludes following activities from the definition of ‘industry’ - An organisation
involved in charitable, social, or philanthropic services, an activity related to defence, atomic energy, and space research carried over by
the federal government, any household activity and any other activity that central government restricts to come under the definition of
‘industry’ by its specific order. Other than that, almost everything comes under ambit of industry.

Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma (1997) – Whether Physical Research Laboratory (‘PRL’), a public trust registered under
the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, dedicated to research in space and allied sciences, was ‘industry’ within the meaning of the ID Act.
PRL was financed mainly by the Department of Space, Government of India with nominal contribution from Government of Gujarat and
two educational institutions. The court held that, although PRL was carrying on the activity of research in a systematic manner with the
help of its employees, yet its object was not to render services to others, nor, in fact, did it do so except in an indirect manner. Holding that
PRL was not an ‘industry’, the court ruled that it was more an institution discharging government function and a domestic enterprise than
a commercial enterprise. It is not engaged in a commercial industrial activity and it cannot be described as an economic venture or a
commercial enterprise as it is not its object to produce and distribute services which would satisfy wants and needs of the consumer
community.

General Manager Telecom v. A Srinivasa Rao (1997) – Whether the Telecom Department of the Union of India was 'an “industry” under
section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? The question had to be answered according to the decision of this Court in Bangalore
Water Supply case, which is a binding precedent. The dominant nature test for deciding whether the establishment is an “industry”.
According to this test the Telecommunication Department of the Union of India is an “industry” within that definition because it is engaged
in a commercial activity and the Department is not engaged in discharging any of the sovereign functions of the State.

All India Radio v. Santosh Kumar (1998) – The functions of Doordarshan cannot be said that the functions carried on by them are of a
purely sovereign nature. Advertisements are being telecasted and even serials are being telecasted on payment of appropriate charges and
on which there cannot be any dispute. Same is the position with All India Radio.

Coir Board, Ernakulam and Cochin v. Indira Devi (1998) – The court said that we cannot give such an exhaustive definition to an
industry where every activity which would employ a certain number of people and lead to some useful product would constitute an industry
as in that case every other business activity would call themselves an industry A division bench of two judges of the court felt that the case-
law on the question of ‘industry’ had left uncertainty and it was necessary that the decision in BWSS be re-examined by a larger bench, as
it had the effect of bringing in various organisations in the fold of ‘industry’ which, in their opinion, were quite possibly not intended to be
covered by the machinery set up under the Act.
 APMC v. Ashok Harikuni (2000) – The Agricultural Produce Market Committee (appellant) established under the State Act regulates the
marketing of agricultural produce for the benefit of the agriculturist. It is not intended to make any profit but the whole object is only to
regulate the agricultural produce both for protecting the interest of agriculturists and public at large. Is it a sovereign function based on
nature of the power conferred on the committee and the manner of its exercise? Merely an enterprise being a statutory corporation, a creature
under a statute, would not take it outside the ambit of “industry” as defined under the Central Act. Most of its functions could be undertaken
even by private persons.

State of UP v Jai Bir Singh (2005) – The Constitution Bench of five judges after considering rival contentions, and on a closer examination
of the decision in BWSS, held that a reference to a larger bench for reconsideration of the decision was required. Whether “Social Forestry
Department” of State, which is a welfare scheme undertaken for improvement of the environment, would be covered by the definition of
“industry”? In a constitutional democracy where sovereignty vests in the people, all welfare activities undertaken by the State in discharge
of its obligation under the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution are “sovereign functions. Reason for
reconsideration was that:
- Definition of “industry” given in the Act is, no doubt, wide but not so wide as to hold it to include in it all kinds of "systematic organised
activities" undertaken by the State and even individuals engaged in professions and philanthropic activities.
 WORKMEN (S.2(s) IDA)

Dharangadhara Chemical Works v. State of Saurashtra (1957) – The court held that the prima facie test to determine whether there
was relationship of employer and employee was the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the work done by the
servant, not only in the matter of directing what work the employee was to do but the manner in which he had to do the work. The nature
and extent of control might vary from business to business and was by its nature incapable of precise definition. The greater the amount of
direct control exercised over the person rendering the services by the person contracting for them the stronger the ground for holding it to
be a contract of service, and similarly the greater the degree of independence of such control the greater the probability that the services
rendered are of the nature of professional services and that the contract is not one of service [but a contract for service.
- Contract for service: Master can order or require what is to be done. Although the work is done for the business, it is not integrated into it,
but is only accessory to it.
- Contract of service: Master can not only order or require what is to be done but how itself should be done. A man is employed as part of
the business and his work is done as an integral part of that business.

Miss A Sundarambal v. Govt of Goa – 1988

(Look at the primary duty of the employee to see if they are workmen or not) • An educational institution is an industry but teachers cannot
be called workmen
Facts: wrongful termination of teacher 🡪 goes to court under IDA.
Issue: Whether the teacher employed in a school falls within the definition of “workmen” as per S. 2(s), IDA?

Held:
• While an educational institution was an industry it was possible that some of the employees in that industry might not be workmen as per
the Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board, etc. v. R. Rajappa & others.
• 2(k)- industry dispute r/w 2(j)- industry r/w 2(s)- workmen
• For a person to be a workman u/s 2(s), the following conditions are important: o He should be a person employed in an industry for hire
or reward.
o He should be engaged in skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical, or clerical work.
o He should not fall within the exemption clauses. (Mentioned in Section 2(s)) • Teacher is not a workman.
o Imparting education – noble vocation. Cannot call it skilled, manual or supervisory work. Designation of employee is not of value but
the nature of their duties is important (May & Baker India ltd. v. their Workmen)
o Even if teachers do some clerical/ administrative work, they are still not considered workmen because these are ancillary to their main
job of teaching.
• Still, principles of natural justice upheld, and teacher given 40k.
• Directing the legislature of Goa to make laws for the same.

Diwan Mohideen Sahib v Industrial Tribunal, Madras – 1966- SC

Facts:
Bidi Company (Proprietors) - Contractor- Workers
Proprietors hand over/ sale of raw materials to the Contractors 🡪 this is handed over to the workers to roll the bidis in the factories 🡪
delivery by the contractor of the manufactured bidis to the Bidi company 🡪 contactors paid the workers for their labour at piece rates.
(Note: P fixed the rates of the raw materials when given to the contractors who after supplying the manufactured bidis, received the price
for the same and gave a part of it to the workers as wages for labour, rest as commission kept by the contractors.)
No attendance register maintained by the contractors 🡪 no fixed hours mandated 🡪 not bound to come for work every day.
The appellants had reduced the wages of these workers who were rolling the bidi leaves. • The proprietors supplied the leaves and tobacco
🡪 send it to the individual contractors 🡪 the workers would roll.

Issue: Whether there is an industrial relation between the workers and the proprietors?

Appellant’s contentions:
The workers were working for the individual contractors and did not work for the company. • Sale of the raw materials to the individual
contractors and sale of finished products back to us.
Absolved of liability as the individual contractors’ liability were the workmen.

Respondent’s contentions:
Independent agreement b/w the individual contractors and the proprietors o Return the raw materials if the beedis were not rolled.
Finished products were not controlled by the individual contractors but could be only sold by the proprietors.

Tribunal’s holding:
No sale or resale of leaves and tobacco by and b/w P and the contractors since the manufactured bidis could only be given to P 🡪 all prices
fixed by P.
Appellants claimed no control over the bidi workers but were the suppliers of raw materials, specifications and was under their control.
 No particular duties discharged by the contractors. They were not independent contractors but mere employees functioning as managers
of the various factories, their remuneration dependent on the work that turned out. You are trying to avoid the statutory obligations.
The arrangement is within the ambit of the IDA and the individual contractors are only managers.
No real independence or autonomy, and therefore, the workers are workmen under the definition.
Single bench reversed the Tribunal’s finding 🡪 HC reversed it again.

Supreme Court:
Prima facie test 🡪 the existence of right and you control the manner in which the activity of production is to be done 🡪 nature and extent
of the control that you employ is going to differ from industry to industry.
Contractors were in reality performing the role of intermediaries or agents for the appellants, with the bidi workers essentially functioning
as employees of appellants. • The superficial labels of "contractor" and "independent" were unable to obscure the underlying employment
dynamics dictated by the appellants, leading to the rejection of the appellants' attempt to categorize the workers as anything but their
employees. (like lifting corporate veil).

Workmen of Nilgiri Cooperative Marketing Society v. State of Tamil Nadu (2004) – The society is a service society which has been
formed with the object of protecting the growers from being exploited at the hands of the traders. It has been found that the employment of
the workmen for doing a particular piece of work is at the instance of the producer or the merchants on an ad hoc basis or job to job basis
and, thus, the same may not lead to the conclusion that relationship of employer and employee has come into being. The workmen are
engaged both by the growers as also the traders. On some occasions, payment is made to the workmen through third parties in case the
grower is not in a position to pay the same immediately. The totality of the circumstances clearly go to show that although certain activities
are carried out in the market yards, the Society in general does not have the necessity of employing any workman either for the purpose of
loading, unloading or grading. Ultimately, the remuneration to the concerned workmen are borne either by the farmers or by the merchants.
The workers are therefore not workmen in our view. The court is required to consider several factors which would have a bearing on the
result:
- Who is the appointing authority?
- Who is the paymaster?
- Who can dismiss?
- How long alternative service lasts?
- The extent of control and supervision
- The nature of job as in whether it is integral to the business or not
- Nature of establishment
- The right of worker to reject the job

Hussain Bhai v. Alath Factory Employees Union (1978) – Whether the workmen were employees of contractor or principal employer?
Test laid:
- Where a worker or group of workers work to produce goods or services and these goods or services are for the business of another, that
other is in fact the employer.
- He has the economic control over the worker’s subsistence, skill and continued employment
- The presence of intermediate contractors with whom alone the workers have immediate or direct relationship ex contractu is of no
consequence when, on lifting the veil the management is the real employer and not contractor
- The absence of direct relationship or the presence of dubious intermediaries or the make believe trappings of detachment from the
management cannot snap the real life bond.

S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra (1983) – Whether the development officer is a workman? SC held that a broad and liberal and not a rigid
and doctrinaire approach should be adopted to determine whether the Development officer in the LIC were workman or not. Principal duty
of the appellant appeared to be to organise and develop the business of the corporation in the area allotted to him and for that purpose to
recruit active and reliable agents and to train them to canvas new business and to render best service to policyholders. Even though the
development officer had the power to recruit agents and to supervise their work, yet his duties were held to be primarily clerical.

H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994) – Whether a medical representative comes under the definition of workman? That a
person to be a workman he must be employed to do any of the categories of work envisaged in section 2(s). It is not enough that he is not
covered by either of the four exceptions to the definition. The court held that they did not perform duties of a ‘skilled’ and ‘technical’
nature. The court held that the work of promotion of sales of the product or services of the establishment was distinct from and independent
of the types of work covered by the said definition and hence the contention that the medical representatives were employed to do ‘skilled’
work within the meaning of the said definition had to be rejected. The mere fact that he was required to have technical knowledge for such
a purpose did not make his work technical.

S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. (1994) - In cases where the workman does more than one kind of work, the determinative factor is
the main duties and not some work incidentally done.
Heavy Engineering Corporation v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1996) - Can a doctor be said to be a workman if he does not work
in a supervisory capacity? According to the facts of the case, the doctor was supervising many staffs (the male nurses, nursing attendant,
sweeper and ambulance driver) working under him. When a doctor, discharges his duties attending to the patients and in addition thereto
supervises the work of the persons subordinate to him, the only possible conclusion which can be arrived at is that he cannot be held to be
a workman under Section 2 (s) of IDA.

Workmen of the Canteen of Coates of India Ltd. v. Coates of India Ltd. (2004) – The issue arose whether the workmen employed in a
canteen, which was run in the premises of Coates of India Ltd., could be regarded as the workmen of the respondent-company? The canteen
employees were neither directly appointed by the company nor the company had any supervisory control over them and hence, they could
not be treated as workmen employed by the respondent-company.
 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE (S.2(k) IDA)

Three parts:
- Must be dispute or difference
- Must be between ‘employers and employers’ or between ‘employers and workmen’ or between ‘workmen and workmen’
- Must be connected with the employment or non-employment or with the conditions of labour of any person

Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate (1958) - Whether a dispute concerning a person who is not a workman
can be an industrial dispute or not? The court was called upon to construe the term ‘any person’ used in the wide definition of ‘industrial
dispute’. The court by a majority held that a liberal construction of the expression ‘any person’, used in the definition of industrial dispute,
was impermissible despite the wide amplitude of those words. The court observed that ‘any person’ could not be everybody in this wide-
world and if the words were given their ordinary meaning, then the definition would become inconsistent with the objects and other
provisions of the Act, as well as the definition itself. ‘Any person’ in the definition clause meant a person in whose employment or non-
employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour, the employer was in a position to give relief and the workmen as a class, have
a direct and substantial interest. Workers espousing the case of the medical officer had failed to build up a case of ‘direct and substantial
interest’ with the dispute of non-employment of the medical officer and therefore the dispute was not an ‘industrial dispute.’

Workmen v. Dharampal Premchand (1968) - Eighteen employees of a commercial establishment was dismissed. Their cause was
espoused by the Mercantile Employees Association Delhi whose membership was not confined to the establishment alone. A dispute raised
by a single workman cannot become an industrial dispute unless it is supported either by his union or in the absence of a union, by a
substantial number of workmen. The court held that a union of workmen may validly raise a dispute as to dismissal even though it may be
a union of minority of the workmen employed in any establishment. Similarly, if there is no union of workmen in any establishment, a
group of employees can raise the dispute and the dispute then becomes an industrial dispute, though it may relate to the dismissal of an
individual employee. The dismissed 18 workers themselves would form a group that is sufficient to raise such a dispute as an industrial
dispute. “Condition of labour” is much wider in its scope and usually refers to the amenities to be provided to the workmen and the
conditions under which they will be required to work. It will include safety, health and welfare of workers.
 Rangaswami v Registrar of Trade Unions (1962) – This is a petition under S. 11 of the Trade Unions Act seeking to set aside the order
of the Registrar of Trade Unions, Madras refusing to register the union of employees of the Madras Raj Bhavan as a trade union under the
Trade Unions Act XVI of 1926.
Held – With the object of securing better service conditions and to facilitate collective bargaining with the employer, the employees formed
themselves into a union called the Madras Raj Bhavan Workers’ Union and applied to the Registrar of Trade Unions, Madras for registration
of their union. The Registrar was of the view that before a union can be registered, the members must be connected with a trade or industry
or business of an employer, and that condition not being fulfilled in the present case to entitle them to the registration. The application for
registration was rejected. The basis was that the work they were engaged in was domestic in nature and therefore can’t be seen as connected
with a trade or industry.
The workers argued that the Act refers to workmen employed in an industry. Although there is no definition of the term industry in the Act
itself, the definition of the term given in the Industrial Disputes Act could be adopted for ascertaining its meaning. High Court said that
industry should be one as would amount to a trade or business, i.e. a commercial undertaking. A comprehensive meaning of the term
“industry” was thought necessary by the legislature in regard to IDA. But the same thing cannot be said of the Trade Unions Act.

The Tamil Nadu Non-Gazetted Government Officers’ Union, Madras v. The Registrar of Trade Unions
Facts:
• Tamil Nadu Non-Gazetted Government Officers' Union, recognized by the government, applied for registration under the Trade Unions
Act.
• Registrar of Trade Unions denied the application, stating it did not qualify as a Trade Union under the Act.

Issue:
• Whether non-gazetted government officers can form trade unions.

Held:
• Registrar has the power to decline registration if the union does not meet Act requirements.
• Definition of "workmen" in the Act implies an exclusive description, rendering any arguments on manual vs. brain labour invalid.
• Recent case-law recognizes governmental activities as "industry" and employees as "workers," subject to exceptions.
• Test for a trade union is its object, not its personnel. Persons not considered "workmen" in an "industry" cannot form a trade union.
• Civil servants hold positions at the discretion of the Union or State, making collective bargaining incompatible with their employment
nature.
• Allowing civil servants to engage in collective bargaining would create contradictions with constitutional protections.

Central Machine Tools Institute v. Assistant Labour Commissioner (1979) - Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A.
Rajappa held that in a research institute - the institute is the employer and the scientists are the employees - it contributes to the wealth of
the nations (as the inventors get money and they further contribute to the expansion of other industries).
Can we use the interpretation of the term industry within the ID Act whilst looking at the TU Act? Two conditions involved for interpreting
the provisions of an earlier enactment in the light of the provisions of a later enactment. They are:
(1) The two Acts of the Legislature must be in pari materia, that is to say that they form a system or code of Legislature -
The two enactments are pari materia - form a code of legislation:
A. Fall under the same entry in the Concurrent List
B. Both the laws concern the same class of persons, employees and employers.
C. Both the laws are complimentary to each other - one provides for the settlement of industrial disputes, the other provides for
collective bargaining. Only with a Trade Union (collective bargaining) is it easier to achieve the remedies available under the ID Act.
D. Various provisions of the ID Act also specifically refer to the TU Act.
(2) the provisions in the earlier Act is ambiguous - The word “industry” used in the Trade Unions Act, 1926, in the absence of the definition
is ambiguous requiring interpretation by Courts. Thus, it is permissible to understand such an “ambiguous word” by looking into the
definition of the same word in a later law as both the laws are in pari materia. Hence, an industry within the ID Act would also be an
industry under the TU Act. Also in variation from the Rangaswami v. Registrar of Trade Unions, 1960 SCC OnLine Mad 243, the industry
need not be commercial in nature - there need not be a profit motive - it must only render material services to the community. Since this is
industry, the employees are workmen.

Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam v.Commissioner Of Labour And Ors (1979) & Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam v. Commissioner
of Labour and Ors (1995) (Sort of overrules Rangaswamy) –
- SC was unable to understand the ground on which the appellant applied to the Registrar of the Trade Unions for cancellation of its certificate
of registration. No ground mentioned in Section 10 of the Act was available to the appellant for making such application. As far as the
ground mentioned in Sub-Section (a) of the said Section is concerned, it is only the Trade Union which can approach the Registrar on the
said ground for the cancellation of its certificate. As regards Sub-section (b) of the Section, there is nothing in the application which would
show that any of the grounds mentioned therein exists.
- It would be apparent from this definition that any group of employees which comes together primarily for the purpose of regulating the
relations between them and their employer or between them and other workmen may be registered as a Trade Union under the Act. The
registration of the association of the said workmen as a Trade Union under the Act has nothing to do with whether the said wings of the
appellant are an industry or not.
- Even though the TTD may be a religious or spiritual institution, there may be certain units of the devasthanam which can be regarded as
industries as in those departments economic activity is carried on and material services are rendered to the public. In those departments
there is also co-operation between the employer and the employees. Persons employed in this department are workmen.
Lohia Machines Limited v. Registrar, Trade Unions (2008) (Consider name change application on merits) - Registrar of Trade Unions
must consider an application for registration of a trade union on its merits, and cannot reject the application solely on the ground of alleged
similarity of names with an existing union, especially if there are distinguishing features in the proposed name.

Bokajan Cement Corpn. Employees’ Union v Cement Corpn. of India Ltd. (2004) - The Supreme Court held that Section 6 (e) does
not provide for automatic cessation of members of union on cessation of employment. It deals only with eligibility conditions for admission
of ordinary and executive members of the trade union. The requirement of section 6 (e) that ordinary members of a trade union shall be
‘persons actually engaged or employed in an industry’ is only a condition for admission, not one that provides for automatic cessation of
membership on cessation of employment.

Allen v. Flood - The tort of conspiracy could only apply where the conspirators had acted unlawfully or used unlawful means. In this case,
the defendants had not used unlawful means, and their actions did not constitute a tort. The Allen v. Flood case is significant because it
clarified the legal boundaries of the tort of conspiracy, and established that mere interference with someone's economic interests, without
the use of unlawful means, was not sufficient to give rise to a claim in tort. It remains an important precedent in English tort law to this
day.

G.S. Dhara Singh v. E.K. Thomas (1988) – Any amount received on behalf of members by Union must be refunded to the members on
resignation from Union.

A.C.C. Rajanka Limestone Quarries Mazdoor Union v. Registrar of Trade Union (1958) - Where the Registrar takes no action on an
application for more than 3 months, a writ under Art. 226 can be issued commanding the Registrar to deal with the application.

Unit Prasad Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2007) - The learned Single Judge of the Jharkhand High Court agreed with the petitioner's
contentions and held that the Registrar of Trade Unions did not have the jurisdiction to decide on the legality and propriety of the election
conducted by a registered trade union. The court further held that the Registrar had exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the fresh election,
as the power to decide such matters lay with the civil court. The court also observed that the Registrar of Trade Unions had the power to
register trade unions and to maintain a register of trade unions. However, the Registrar's powers did not extend to deciding disputes arising
out of the registration of trade unions or disputes over the election of office bearers of a trade union.

Tata Workers Union v. State of Jharkhand

Facts:
• The Tata Workers Union, a Registered Trade Union, filed a writ application challenging an order by the Labour Commissioner-cum-
Registrar, Trade Unions, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Jharkhand, regarding the supervision of the Union election.
• MLA and member of the Executive Committee, intervened, stating that the election would be supervised by the Registrar.
• Notices were issued to submit grievances/suggestions during the election process, and the Registrar advised settling internal disputes
within the Union.
• The Registrar confirmed the Union's actions in a meeting, but a member filed a writ petition seeking Court direction to supervise the
election.
• Despite no evidence of malpractice during the election, disputes led to the Registrar staying the election, prompting the petitioner to file
another writ petition.

Held:
• The Court determined that the Registrar cannot intervene in holding the election of office bearers of a registered Trade Union.
• The competent authority was given the liberty to hold elections without government interference.
• During the pendency of the writ petition, the Registrar directed the petitioners to bring all records related to the election.
• Counsel for the parties agreed to hold the election under the supervision of the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police
for transparency and control.

Balmer Lawrie Workers Union, Bombay v. Balmer Lawrie and Company Ltd (1985) - Court held that where there are multiple
unions, the union with the largest membership of workmen will be clothed with the status of recognized union—and sole bargaining agent—
Why? Assumption that recognized union represents all the workmen in the industrial undertaking or in the industry
What the Representative Union must keep in mind? Obligatory to act in a manner as to not discriminate b/w members and other workmen
of undertaking who are not members. Neither the representative union nor the employer can discriminate b/w members of representative
union and other workmen wrt both benefits, advantages, disadvantages or liabilities arising out of settlements in any proceeding- to which
representative party shall be equally applicable to each workman in undertaking. No trace of discrimination b/w members and non both as
regards advantages and as regards obligations and liabilities.

MRF United Workers Union v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu Writ Petition No. 17991 of 2008, MRF Employees’ Union v. Govt. of Tamil
Nadu Writ Petition No. 24228 of 2016 - The case emphasize the importance of proper verification of union membership and the need for
employers to provide necessary facilities for the conduct of collective bargaining. Management is not allowed to engage in unfair trade
practices - that is to interfere with the right of the workmen to form a TU - Unfair trade practices - defined u. section 2 (ra) - list mentioned
within fifth schedule. The Management is also not supposed to dominate, interfere or to contribute support, financial or otherwise, to any
trade union. Refusal to bargain collectively even in good faith with a recognized trade union is an unfair labour practice. Rep of the workmen
- should be decided by the workmen and not the management - management cannot disregard a TU. To recognise trade union, done either
by secret ballot or varication by membership as per Code on discipline.
 Quinn v. Leathem (Economic Tort) (1901) – Economic torts are civil wrongs committed against an individual or entity's economic
interests. They generally involve intentional acts that cause economic harm, such as interference with contractual relations, inducing breach
of contract, and misrepresentation. In India, economic torts have been recognized by the courts as a distinct category of civil wrongs, and
they can be invoked in labour law disputes as well.
The trade union enforced a closed shop agreement against a meat producer. They approached one of his customers and asked him that he
should refuse any trade with Leathem unless Leathem agrees for closed shop agreement. Whether this amount to conspiracy to injure or
not?
Held – It amounts to conspiracy to injure which had the element of intention to cause harm to others. Lord Macnaghten: It is a violation of
legal right to interfere with a contractual relation by law if there be no sufficient justification for the interference.

R.S. Ruikar v. Emperor

Facts
• R.S. Ruikar led a strike against Empress Mills for not adhering to previous settlement terms. • Initial support for the strike was weak,
prompting Ruikar to organize picketing at mill gates • Ruikar was charged under Section 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1932,
for his speech and actions related to picketing.

Held
• The Trade Unions Act of 1926 protects unions from certain legal liabilities but does not confer immunity from all criminal offenses.
• Peaceful picketing is permissible as part of the right to strike, but molestation and violence are not allowed (S. 7 of Criminal Law Act).
• The Trade Unions Act, 1926, does not provide immunity from criminal offenses committed during a strike.
• The Court held that while trade unions have the right to strike and certain legal protections, they are not immune from all/ any criminal
prosecution for offenses like molestation committed during a strike.
• Any agreement to commit an offence, would under section 17 of the Trade Union Act make them liable for criminal conspiracy.
• Nature of Immunity
• The workmen need to resort to collective action against the employer. • These collective actions may take the form of strike or anything
alike at his shop or factory with a view to get the employer to listen or negotiate with the workmen. • In common law, such an action
can be actionable as ‘Conspiracy’ under IPC, therefore Section 17 give protection to the workmen against criminal conspiracies. • In
furtherance of the Trade Dispute the workmen are taken out of the scope of S. 120 B of IPC.
• Breach of contract does give rise to a civil cause of action, therefore under section 43 of the Indian Penal Code an agreement to commit
breach of contract through withdrawal of labour as an instrument of economic coercion in an industrial dispute, is a criminal conspiracy.
Both of this are actionable under 120A read with section 43 of the IPC.
• But section 17 of the TU act covers immunity against this allowing such withdrawal in breach of contract.
• This immunity allows workmen to materialise the right to strike.

Essentials/Elements of Immunity
• Only Workmen + Office Bearers + Registered Trade Union
• Advancement of the Objective of the TU = Collective bargaining
• In the furtherance of Agreement + Trade Dispute 🡪 S. 2(k)
• To apply S. 17 of the TU Act – Extent of conspiracy to be measured for the grant of immunity (R.S. Ruikar v. Emperor).

S. 17 does not provide immunity against:

• When punishment = death, life imprisonment or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or more.
• S. 17 (bare reading): does not insulate agreement to commit any offence whatsoever. • IMMUNITY is confined to agreement between
two or more persons to do or cause to be done, acts which are prohibited by law but which neither amount to an offence nor furnish ground
for civil action.

Section 18 of TU Act: Immunity from civil suit in certain cases

• The above section does not afford immunity to the members or office bearers of a trade union for an act of deliberate trespass. Dalmia
Cement Ltd. v. Narender Anandji, it was held that a registered Trade Union or their office bearer are liable in civil action in tort for an act
of deliberate trespass.
• The immunity also cannot be availed of by them for unlawful or tortious act. Further such immunity is denied if they indulge in an gherao.

Section 19:
• The net effect of the section is to validate agreement which is invalid being in restraint of trade under section 27 read with sections 23
and 24 of the Contract Act, 1872.

Rohtas Industries v Union (1976) - The strike was illegal under Section 23 read with Section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
conciliation proceedings were pending. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the union was liable to pay compensation to
the management for the loss incurred by it. Since the strike was illegal, it was also unlawful, but it was held that the union was not liable
because their object was not to cause injury to the management. Their only purpose was to benefit themselves and thus they were held not
liable.
Jay Engineering Works v, State of Bihar - Members of a trade union may resort to a peaceful strike, that is to say, cessation of work with
the common object of enforcing their claims. Such strikes must be peaceful and not violent and there is no exemption where an offence is
committed. Therefore, a concerted movement by workmen by gathering together either outside the industrial establishment or inside within
the working hours is permissible when it is peaceful and does not violate the provisions of law. But when such a gathering is unlawful or
commits an offence then the exemption is lost. Thus, where it resorts to unlawful confinement of persons criminal trespass or where it
becomes violent and indulges in criminal force or criminal assault or mischief to person or property or molestation or intimidation, the
exemption can no longer be claimed.

Vidyasagar Institute of Mental Health v. Hospital Employees Union

Facts:
• TU informed the hospital of some demands. The Employers only agreed to some of the demands.
• Notice of strike was sent. The TU also threatened to use coercive methods.

Held:
• TU does not have the right to disrupt the functioning of the hospital and cause inconvenience to patients, visitors, and other members.
• Trade Unions or workers have no right to hold demonstrations at the residence of the employer; peaceful demonstrations are allowed 200
meters from the premises. • Demonstrations at the residence of the employer are prohibited under the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) and
amount to unfair labour practice.
• The threat of a strike given by the defendant in this case is illegal.

Bharat Kumar v. State of Kerala

Facts:
• Petitioners Bharat Kumar K. Palicha and others approached the Kerala High Court. • They sought a declaration that the practice of calling
and enforcing bandhs (general strikes) is unconstitutional and illegal.
• Their argument was that bandhs violate fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.
• Bandhs deter citizens from pursuing their occupations, accessing education, and obtaining medical services.
• The petition also highlighted that bandhs are often accompanied by violence or threats thereof, further rendering them illegal.

Issue:
• Whether the practice of calling for and enforcing a bandh is unconstitutional and violates the fundamental rights of citizens under Articles
19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Held:
• The Kerala High Court distinguished between peaceful protests, protected under Article 19(1)(a) and (b), and bandhs, which coercively
halt all public and private activities.
• Bandhs infringe upon fundamental rights, including the right to move freely, practice any profession, and live without fear of harm.
• A bandh is an expectation that all activities come to a standstill for some time (for economic or political). It is different from general
strike or harthal as both private and public activities are stopped in a bundh.
• A bandh compares to gherao and states that the citizens are not physically prevented but by holding out a threat of consequence on failure
to obey 🡪 holds it to be a violation of the FR.
• State can in the interest of public order reasonably restrict FRs 🡪 no legislative definition of bandh or any by-laws to regulate it 🡪
therefore court can step in to protect the rights. • Nothing stands in the way of political parties calling for a general strike or harthal
unaccompanied by express or implied threat of violence to enforce it 🡪 it is not possible to hold bandhs not violative.
• The court dismissed the argument that calling for a bandh is a fundamental right of political parties, asserting that one group's rights
cannot impinge upon others'.
• No political party or organization has the right to paralyze industry and commerce state wide or nationally.
• Preventing citizens not in agreement from exercising their fundamental rights or performing their duties is unreasonable.
• Calling for bandhs is therefore deemed unconstitutional.

Communist Party of India v. Bharat Kumar

Facts:
• The issue centred around the distinction between a "Bandh" and a general strike or "Hartal." • The High Court had previously made a
clear distinction regarding the impact of a "Bandh" on the fundamental rights of citizens.

Issue:
• The main issue was whether it is considered a fundamental right to hold a Bandh, Hartal, or similar protests.

Held:
• The Court acknowledged that fundamental rights are enforceable not only against the "State" but also against private citizens.
• It upheld the High Court's distinction between a "Bandh" and a general strike or "Hartal," emphasizing the effect on the fundamental
rights of other citizens.
• The court emphasized that fundamental rights of the entire population should not be compromised for the claims of individual or specific
group rights.
• Consequently, it was established that there is no entitlement to declare or enforce a "Bandh" that disrupts the exercise of fundamental
freedoms of other citizens and harms the nation in various ways.

Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar

Facts:
• Kameshwar Prasad and other government employees contested Rule 4A of the Bihar Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956, which
barred government servants from engaging in any form of strike.
• They argued that this rule infringed upon their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, which guarantees citizens
the right "to form associations or unions."

Issue:
• Whether the rule prohibiting government employees from participating in any form of strike, was constitutionally valid.

Held:
• While the right to form associations or unions was guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c), it was subject to reasonable restrictions in the
interests of public order or morality, as specified in Article 19(4).
• Upon entering government service, individuals consented to reasonable conditions framed to ensure the proper functioning of the
administrative machinery and maintain discipline within the service.
• The rule was deemed violative of the appellants' rights under Article 19(1)(a) & (b) and was struck down. To analyse whether it is a
reasonable restriction, the court analyses whether there is a proximate and reasonable nexus between the nature of speech prohibited and
public order 🡪 does not fall since it bans ALL kinds of demonstrations, even the peaceful ones.
• However, the Court clarified that the rule prohibiting a strike could not be invalidated. • The Court emphasized that there is no fundamental
right to resort to a strike.
Hariprasad Shiv Shankar Shukla v A.D. Divelkar (1957) – When a portion of the staff or labour force is discharged as surplusage in a
running or continuing business, the termination of service which follows may be due to a variety of reasons; e.g., for economy,
rationalisation in industry, installation of a new labour-saving machinery, etc. The legislature in using the expression ‘for any reason
whatsoever’ says in effect: ‘It does not matter why you are discharging the surplus; if the other requirements of the definition are fulfilled,
then it is retrenchment. Retrenchment means discharge of surplus workmen in an existing or continuing business; it had acquired no special
meaning so as to include discharge of workmen on bond fide closure of business.

Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1990) – Retrenchment can be for
any reason whatsoever and not just surplus of labour.

Reinstatement – When retrenchment of a worker is invalid reinstatement can be ordered. When the order terminating the services of a
workman is struck, it is as if the order has never been and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages also. Where a worker is entitled to be
reinstated with full back wages but employer prefers to pay compensation instead of reinstating him, it is necessary that adequate amount
of compensation should be paid to him in order to meet justice.

Uptron v Shammi Bhan (1998) - What was contended before the Tribunal as also before the High Court was that the termination of the
services of respondent was covered by Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and, therefore, it could not be treated as "Retrenchment”. This argument
which was not accepted by the Tribunal and the High Court The respondent was a permanent employee of the petitioner. There was no
fixed-term contract of service between them. There was, therefore, no question of services being terminated on the expiry of that contract.
The contract of employment referred to in the earlier part of Clause (bb) has to be the same as it referred to in the latter part. What the
Clause, therefore, means is that there should have been a contract of employment for a fixed-term between the employer and the workman
containing a stipulation that the services could be terminated even before the expiry of the period of contract. If such contract, on the expiry
of its original period, is not renewed and the services are terminated as a consequences of that period, it would not amount to
"Retrenchment". Similarly, if the services are terminated even before the expiry of the period of contract but in pursuance of a stipulation
contained in that contract that the services could be so terminated, then in that case also, the termination would not amount to
"retrenchment".
If it is being done for disciplinary reasons, there has to an inquiry and the person should be able to present the case.

Anand Bihari and others v RSRTC and Anr. (1991) - The question whether a State Road Transport Corporation can retire the bus drivers
on the ground of their defective or subnormal eye-sight developed during the course of the employment has been examined by this Court.
This Court held that such terminations of service were unjustified, inequitable and discriminatory, though not amounting to retrenchment
within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The “illness” must have a bearing on the normal discharge of duties. It
is not any illness but that which interferes with the usual ordinary functioning of the duties of the post which would be attracted by the sub-
clause. It was impressed by this Court that service conditions of the bus drivers must provide adequate safeguards because such bus drivers
have developed defective eye-sight or subnormal eye-sight because of the occupational hazards. A scheme was directed to be framed for
providing alternative jobs along with retirement benefits and for payment of additional compensation proportionate to the length of service
rendered by them, in case of non-availability of alternative jobs.

Manju Saxena v. UOI

Facts:
• Appellant appointed as Lady Confidential Secretary, later promoted to Senior Confidential Secretary in respondent bank.
• Senior Confidential Secretary post became redundant; alternative positions offered with same pay scale and severance package, but
appellant rejected both offers. • Bank dismissed her on 1st October 2005, paying compensation of six months instead of notice as per
employment contract (Rs. 8,17,071).
• Appellant raised industrial dispute on 3rd October 2005 before Regional Labour Commissioner, seeking increment in severance package.
• Conciliation proceedings failed to reach a settlement.
• Respondent challenged CGIT's order via writ petition in High Court, which referred the matter back to CGIT to determine if appellant is
considered a workman under the Industrial Dispute Act.

Held:
• The petitioner voluntarily abandoned her services despite being offered alternative positions and a severance package, thus not
constituting "continuous services" under Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act.
• Referring to Hathisingh Manufacturing Ltd. v. Union of India, the bench outlined conditions for retrenchment under Section 25F,
emphasizing the importance of continuous service as an essential condition.

Orissa Textiles & Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa

• Held that restriction imposed under Section 25 O for closing are reasonable. • It was also held that merely because the restrictions are
genuine and adequate cannot mean that permission to close must necessarily granted.
• There can be cases where the interest of the public would require that no closure takes place. Undoubtedly where reasons are genuine
and adequate the interest of the public must be of compelling or overriding nature.
 LAY OFF (S.2(kkk))

Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate v. Management (1964) – SC refused to accept the contention that S. 25-C of the Act recognises a common
law right of the employer to lay-off his workman. ‘Lay-off’ would be permissible only where one or the other of the factors mentioned in
S.2(kkk) is present and for such ‘lay-off’ compensation will be awarded under S.25C.

Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v The Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. (1976) –
1. Whether the management had the right to lay-off?
The Court found no provision in the IDA that specifically conferred power on the management to lay off its workmen. S. 2(kkk) only
defined lay off but did not provide any substantive right to lay off. The power to lay off cannot be said to be inherent in the definition. Only
establishments having 100+ workmen are mandated to have SOs, which contain statutorily approved terms and conditions of employment.
Since this establishment employed only 30 and 33 workmen, respectively, there were no SOs and consequently no provision within that
laid down the conditions in which the management could lay off its workmen. There was also no stipulation in the workmen’s contracts of
employment that gave the management the right to lay off its workmen. Therefore, it was held as follows: In the absence of any statute,
SOs or contract giving the management power to lay off its workmen, the Court found that the lay-off was without the authority of law and
the workmen were entitled to compensation.
2. Whether the workmen were entitled to compensation during the period of lay off?
S. 25C read with S. 25A contemplates that in industrial establishments having 50-100 workmen, compensation worth 50% of wages is
payable during the lay off period. Where the number of workmen is less than 50, compensation (or no compensation) is payable as per SOs
or terms of employment. In his case, there were only 30 workmen. Where, however, the number of workmen is less than 50 and there are
no SOs or terms of employment governing lay off, the Court or Tribunal would have discretion to award up to full wages as compensation
during the lay off period

Associated Cement Companies v. Workmen (1960) (Other part of establishment under S.25E(i)) – Various tests are as follows:
1. Geographical Proximity
2. Unity of Ownership
3. Management and Control remain the same
4. Contract And Supervision By Same Employer
5. Unity of Employment and Conditions of Service are same
6. Functional Integrity where functions over the day are same
7. General Unity of Purpose (FUCUGUM)
The real purpose of these tests is to find out the true relation between the parts, branches, units, etc. if in their true relation they constitute
one integrated whole, we say that the establishment is one…..” - “If the statute does not, say….what constitutes one establishment, then the
usual tests have to be applied to determine the true relation” There is no strait-jacket formula. One need to take into consideration the overall
pictures of their activities and the interest, which they have in common.

Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats (1995) - Question before the division bench of the apex Court was regarding the constitutional
validity of section 25-M. The Court while upholding the constitutional validity of the said provision held that the object of the provision is
to avoid hardship to workmen and encourage industrial amity. Further, there is no need to take prior permission in extreme cases as
mentioned under sub-section (3). For the reason of greater interest in avoiding unemployment and industrial peace such provision was held
not to be arbitrary and unconstitutional.

Nutan Mills . ESIC – While laid off, employee is allowed to serve another master but then he will not be entitled to compensation.
However, he will still have the right to be reinstated when proper occasion arises.
 Kairbetta Estate v Rajamanickam (1960) – Lay-off generally occurs in a continuing business, whereas a lock-out is the closure of the
business.
1. Disciplinary action is not lock-out if it is in retaliation to what workers have done.
2. Security measure is not lock-out.
3. Not allowing 1 person to enter is not a lock-out.
4. Lay off is due to inability of employer but lock out has no relevance
5. Compensation payable in lay off but not in lockout if it is legal.

Rohtas Industries v Union (1976) – Whether an illegal strike causing loss of profit justifies award of damages? The Supreme Court held
that employers do not have the right to claim damages against the employee participating in an illegal strike and thereby causing loss of
production and business.

B.R. Singh v. Union of India (1990) (Right to Strike under IDA) - The right to strike has been recognized in almost all democratic
countries. Though not raised to the high pedestal of a fundamental right, it is recognized as a mode of redress for resolving the grievances
of workers. But the right to strike is not absolute under our industrial jurisprudence and restrictions have been placed on it.

Ramnagar Cane and Sugar Company v. Jatin Chakravorty (1960) – Conciliation proceeding between one union and employers if it is
concerning all the employers is a bar on any and all employers to go on strike during pendency of proceeding under S.22(1)(d).

Gujarat Steel Tubes v Mazdoor Sabha (1980) – Discharge against striking employees was punitive in nature because strike was illegal
and so termination could be made without notice. However, there must be proper inquiry by management. Individual guilt of every worker
must be ascertained. Management did not conduct inquiry and terminated all employees who were connected to the strike or absent from
work on the day of the strike. Termination order in this case would be faulty.

State of Bihar v. Deodhar Jha

Facts:
• Patna Electric Service 🡪 PSU
• TU made demands that were referred to adjudication.
• During pendency of suit, one employee was suspended on grounds of wilful disobedience. • Management locked out the employees that
went on strike afterwards. • Union demanded wages as strike was based on illegal lockout and restoration of jobs w/ retrospective effect.
• Company argued strike was in contravention of Sections 22(1)(b), 23(b), and 24.

Held:
• The suspension of workers was done with a view to terminate their employment and the suspension cannot constitute a lockout u/ Sec.
2(1)
• The HC said that the threat to go on strike is not always illegal as going on strike in not always illegal.

PC Roy v. Raycom
Facts:
• Poor financial status of company 🡪 economic emergency
• Employer delayed payment of wages during strike, even after payment, strike continued. • Wages were in arrears for 6 months.
• Notice for strike sent on 11th January for unpaid wages, arrears cleared on 4th Feb. o April-May wages were delayed.
• Workmen served notice of strike on 28th June and commenced on 29th. • Dues cleared on August 11th. Workers did not call of strike.
• Work resumed only on 3rd September.
• Claimed wages from June 29th to 3rd September.
• Company only wanted to pay till August 11th.

Issues:
• Till when is wages to be paid?
• Can strike begin a day after notice?

Held:
• Illegality of Strike?
o Notice for strike for PSU u/ S.22, no time frame for private enterprise. o Section 23 applies.
o Illegality depends on violence of strike for private company 🡪 no violence in this case.
• Wages to be paid.
o Held that employer is obligated to pay for work done regardless of employer’s financial situation.
o Must pay wages till Aug 11th.
• When can strike begin?
o Section 23 states no person can strike during pendency of conciliation proceedings and 7 days after conclusion of proceedings.
o Strike cannot be held during conciliation.
• Wages paid on Aug 11th, but work resumed in September, 🡪 strike ends when reason to strike ends. Strike post Aug 11th is illegal.

Essorpe Mills v. PO Labour Court

Facts:
• Respondent workmen in a public utility service went on illegal strike on 18.11.1990 and were suspended.
• Union served a notice on 14.3.1991 stating a strike would commence on or after 24.3.1991, with a copy to the Conciliation Officer.
• Workmen were dismissed for misconduct after a disciplinary enquiry. • Workmen challenged their dismissal, claiming it occurred during
pending proceedings and was thus illegal.

Issues:
• Whether notice dates 14.3.1991 could be considered a valid notice under Section 22? • Whether valid conciliation proceedings were
pending under Section 20 of the Act?

Held:
• Different stages under Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act require 6 weeks advance notice and 14 days for the employer to consider
the notice.
• Workmen cannot strike before the date specified in the notice.
• The notice given on 14.3.1991 did not comply with Section 22 as the period between the notice and strike date was less than the mandatory
period.
• Without valid notice, the employer is deemed unaware of the proceedings, and conciliation proceedings must meet legal requirements.

TK Rangarajan v Govt of Tamil Nadu (2003) (Government Servants’ right to strike-) The court further held that there is no legal and
statutory right to go on strike and there is no moral or equitable justification to go on strike. Government employees cannot claim that they
can take the society at ransom by going on strike. Even if there is injustice to some extent, as presumed by some employees, in a domestic
welfare state, they have to resort to the machinery provided under different statutory provisions for redressal of their grievances. Strike as
a weapon is mostly misused which may result to chaos and total misadministration. Strike affects the society as an entire administration
comes to a grinding halt.

As per S.22, there is a separate mechanism of going on strike for persons employed in a Public Utility Services. This is done to prevent
workmen employed in public utility services from holding the community at large to ransom by resorting to strikes. A qualification is
attached thereto requiring them to fulfil certain additional conditions as enumerated in the four clauses of S.22 (1) of the Act. Objective is
to make alternative arrangements for running the public utility services vital to the day to day life of the community in the event of strike.
S.2(zk) in IRC is strike definition. Added that if more than 50 per cent of the employees are going on mass casual leave, it is treated as a
strike. The intention of the Government is that concerted casual Leave on a given day by 50% or more workers to be treated as strike as it
not only hampers production but also deteriorate the employer-employee relations.
 People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. UOI (1982) - Female construction workers paid less as compared to Males.
Held –
1. The court noted that the principle of equal pay for equal work applied not only to workers who were employed in the same establishment
or industry but also to workers who were employed in different industries or establishments, provided they were performing the same or
similar work.
2. Equal pay for equal work regardless of gender, caste, religion, or any other factor.
3. Principle of equal pay for equal work was not an absolute principle and that there could be certain reasonable classifications, such as on the
basis of skills, experience, or qualifications, that could be used to differentiate between workers and pay them different wages.

Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) – The petitioner and other drivers employed by the Delhi Administration have comparable
responsibilities. The wage scale in the Delhi Police Force is 210–270 rupees for non-matriculated drivers and 225–308 rupees for
matriculated drivers. Issues: The primary issue in the case was whether the government's policy of paying different wages to workers
engaged in the same or similar work based on the classification of their posts violated the principle of equal pay for equal work.
Held –
1. The court observed that the government's policy of classifying posts and paying different wages to workers engaged in the same or similar
work violated the principle of equal pay for equal work. The court directed the government to take steps to ensure that workers who
performed the same or similar work were paid the same wages, regardless of their post or status.
2. The court also noted that the principle of equal pay for equal work applied not only to workers in the same establishment but also to workers
in different establishments or industries, provided they were performing the same or similar work.

Mackinnon Mackenzie v. Audrey D’Costa (1987) - Audrey D'Costa was employed as a stenographer with Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co.,
a private company, and was being paid a lower salary than male stenographers who were performing similar work. D'Costa filed a petition
with the Industrial Tribunal seeking equal pay for equal work. The company argued that D'Costa's job responsibilities were different from
those of male stenographers and hence, she was not entitled to the same salary.
Held –
1. The Supreme Court held that the principle of equal pay for equal work was a fundamental right of every worker, and the employer could
not discriminate between male and female workers based on their gender. The court observed that in this case, D'Costa was performing the
same work as male stenographers and hence, she was entitled to the same salary as them. The court directed the company to pay D'Costa
the difference in salary for the period of her employment.
2. “Broadly similar” - To decide whether the work is the same or broadly similar and whether any differences are of practical importance, the
Authority should take an equally broad approach, for the very concept of similar work implies differences in details, but these should not
defeat a claim for equality on trivial grounds. It should look at the duties actually and generally performed not those theoretically possible
by men and women.
3. The applicability of the Act does not depend upon the financial ability of the management to pay equal remuneration as provided by it.

State of A. P. Vs V. G. Sreenivasa Rao AIR (1989) - A bunch of appeals having similar issues were clubbed together. In each of these
appeals, employees who were promoted on a later date were being paid a higher salary than those who had been promoted earlier, i.e.
juniors were being paid more than seniors in the same cadre. The lower courts held that this was violative of the doctrine of equal pay for
equal work.
Held - The Supreme Court held that granting higher pay to junior employees over their senior counterparts in the same cadre is not illegal
or violative of Articles 14, 16, and 39(d) of the Indian Constitution if there is a rational basis for it. The court held that seniority alone
cannot be the sole basis for higher pay, and other relevant factors must also be taken into account, such as merit, expertise, and qualifications.
The court observed that there was no absolute right to equal pay for equal work and that pay disparities in the same cadre may be justified
by relevant factors. The court further held that the government order was based on the recommendations of the Pay Revision Committee,
which had taken into account various relevant factors, and thus there was a rational basis for the grant of higher pay to junior employees.
The court also held that the principle of natural justice was not violated, as the Pay Revision Committee had given an opportunity to all
concerned to make representations. In some cases, this was a result of the juniors having been in service in the lower cadre for a longer
period of time than their seniors, while in other cases, the juniors were promoted from a cadre having a higher pay scale than that of the
seniors. Thus there is no violation.

Standard Vacuum Refining Co. of India v Their Workmen (1961) –

Living wage - The concept of a living wage is not a static concept; it is expanding and the number of its constituents and their
respective contents are bound to expand and widen with the development and growth of national economy.

Workmen v. Management of Reptakos Brett (1992) - Whether the Company is entitled to re-structure the DA scheme by abolishing the
slab system and substituting the same by the Scheme-prejudicial to the workmen-on the ground that the slab system has resulted in over-
neutralisation thereby landing the workmen in the high-wage island?
After this judgement the 6th factor was included into the calculation of minimum wages children education, medical requirement, minimum
recreation including festivals/ceremonies and provision for old age, marriages etc. should further constitute 25 % of the total minimum
wage.
The employees are entitled to minimum wages at all times and under all circumstances. An employer who cannot pay the minimum wage
has no right to engage labour and no justification to run the industry. A worker's wage is no longer a contract between an employer and an
employee. It has the force of collective bargaining under the labour laws.

Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd v Their Workmen (1955) - That the restrictions imposed upon the freedom of contract by the fixation of minimum
rates of wages though they interfere to some extent with the freedom of trade or business guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
are not unreasonable and being imposed in the interest of general public and with a view to carry out one of the Directive Principles of
State Policy as embodied in Art. 43 of the Constitution are protected by the terms of el. (6) of Art. 19. On the other hand, the employers
cannot be heard to complain if they are compelled to pay minimum wages to their labourers even though the labourers, on account of their
poverty and helplessness, are willing to work on lesser wages.

People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. UOI (1982) - The court clarified that article 23 is enforceable against the state as well as private
citizens, holding that the scope therein is broad and unlimited. It rejected the respondent’s argument which limited the scope of article 23
merely to the payment of ‘any wage’ , and read it to impose a positive burden on the state to pay the minimum wage. It also held that
extracting work from a helpless, impoverished labour force, without the minimum wage payment would attract the offence of forced labour
as ‘force’ was to be read expansively to include ‘economic force’.

State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi (2007) – Whether Anganwadi Workers are employed in a civil post or in work listed in scheduled
employment?
Court observed that the work of the Anganwadi workers was in furtherance of a social welfare scheme of the government and not in
discharge of a statutory requirement. These workers are volunteers approved by a committee. There are no existing regulations on
appointment (as is required for civil posts). The only existing guideline prescribes that they must be graduates; in cases of helpers, they
must have passed grade four (or five depending on the state); and in cases of workers, they must have passed grade ten. The scheme shows
that these are not even salaried workers and specifically mentions that they are paid in ‘honorarium’, in accordance with their qualifications.
As such, it is apparent that Anganwadi workers work in furtherance of state duty rather than state function.
The latest legal development in 2019 makes for an interesting marker of the government’s intention with respect to the issue of payment to
Anganwadi workers. The new code on wages alleviates the issue by mandating all employers to not pay less than the minimum wages to
their employees. Such a provision does away with the requirements laid down in the Ameerbi case and clarifies that an employer-employee
relationship is adequate for payment of minimum wages. However, the question – whether Anganwadi workers are employees under the
new code, still remains to be answered. Unfortunately, the definition of ‘employee’ as well as ‘worker’ under the code does not include
welfare scheme workers.
• Justice Muralidhar (Delhi HC) in the case of Punita K. Sodhi v. Union of India (2009) observed that, “If we only examined
whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassment conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing
level of discrimination. A complete understanding of the view of the aggrieved requires an analysis of the different perspectives
of men and women. Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women. A male supervisor might
believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate that she has a ‘great figure’ or ‘nice legs’. The
female subordinate, however, may find such comments offensive. Men tend to view some forms of sexual harassment as
‘harmless social interactions’ to which only overly-sensitive women would object. The characteristically male view depicts
sexual harassment as comparatively harmless amusement. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual
conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that woman may
perceive”