ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities

ISAF, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES

AND OPPORTUNITIES

Dr Raja Muhammad Khan

Abstract

Afghanistan, the crossroads of civilizations, has been at the centre stage of

global power play for centuries. The Soviet invasion (1979-1989) and resultant
US covert campaign against former Soviet Union has deeply influenced the
social, political and economic sphere of Afghanistan and its neighbouring
Pakistan. Soviet withdrawal in 1989, followed by US’s hasty departure,
encouraged factional fighting and civil war in Afghanistan. The situation
paved the way for the religiously-motivated Taliban Government, which being
ruthless in nature, neither succeeded in securing public acceptance at home, nor
could win the recognition of international community. The US-led military
operation in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 further destabilized the
country. After eleven years of military campaigning, the US-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), could not subdue the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Ironically, whilst today the international and domestic support for the US-
led war on terror is waning, Taliban are growing stronger strategically and
more influential politically, and posing a more formidable challenge to both
the legitimacy of the Afghan administration and effectiveness of ISAF. Despite
the drawdown plan of ISAF by 2014, a comprehensive political and military
strategy for the Post-2014 Afghanistan has yet to be agreed upon. Envisioning
a troubled future, US has engaged in covert negotiations with the Taliban
either to have an honourable exit, or else for a peaceful co-existence. However,
no major breakthrough could be attained yet, owing to deplorable demands
on either side. The people of war-torn Afghanistan need stability and peace
in their homeland. Attaining such, a situation would call for an indigenous
Afghan-led peace process, taking on board all stakeholders in Afghanistan,
supported by regional actors, NATO and United States. This paper aims at
undertaking a detailed appraisal of Challenges and Opportunities for ISAF
in Afghanistan from an academic approach.

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 ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities

Introduction

In the ultimate analysis, if people of Afghanistan and their coming

generations view US and coalition as friends, war can be won. If they
think otherwise it would be considered as lost.
(General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani)1

During the joint news conference with President Hamid Karzai

at White House, on January 11, 2013, President Obama announced
pulling out of all US forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
President Obama said, “By the end of next year, 2014, the transition
will be complete. Afghans will have full responsibility for their security,
and this war will come to a responsible end.”2 Indeed, 2014 represents
a transition point not only for Afghanistan but also for the entire
region. The strategic landscape of Afghanistan is witnessing a steady
but profound shift, as the drawdown date of ISAF (i.e. 2014) is rapidly
approaching. The political and strategic groundwork undertaken
within this timeframe will largely determine the outcome for the
future of Afghanistan. Despite differences, there remains established
closeness between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both share similar culture
and society – same religion and norms. Thus, being a responsible
neighbour, Pakistan will continue to monitor the developments in
Afghanistan. It will also continue to play a constructive role to end the
war in the interest of Afghanistan and for a long-term regional peace
and stability.

Some key questions about the nature of post-2014 geopolitical order

in Afghanistan need further probing. These include: What will be the
future political setup in Afghanistan best suited to ensure stability in
relations with all its neighbours? What will be the nature of ISAF and
particularly US commitments to Afghanistan after 2014? Would there
be a complete departure of ISAF or will US preserve PMBs (Permanent
Military Bases) beyond 2014? Will Afghan security forces be able to
take on the security responsibilities of the country after drawdown of
ISAF? What role India foresees in the future Afghan setup? How will

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the border security mechanisms between Pakistan and Afghanistan work;

particularly under an environment of a greater mistrust and militants
attack on Pakistani positions from Afghan soil?

A calibrated response to these questions will shape the nature of

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, United States and ISAF. In the
past, this relationship has been professed by a mirage of daunting and
glaring issues between US and Pakistan – ranging from cooperation to
a near hostility. The latest manifestation of this bumpy relationship has
been the almost seven months blockade of NATO logistic supply lines,
in the aftermath of the NATO attack on Pakistani military posts, killing
24 soldiers on 26 November 2011. This was indeed, the latest blatant
violation of Pakistani sovereignty by ISAF, and happened while Pakistan
is an ally and frontline partner of the US-led coalition in Afghanistan.
Such like incidents clearly indicate that the relationship between Pakistan
and US lacks a credible strategic foundation, thus, continues to largely
remain transactional in nature.

Despite eleven years of deployment with absolute operational

freedom, ISAF has not succeeded in creating conditions on the ground
conducive for peace and stability in Afghanistan. Besides Afghanistan,
Pakistan, its immediate neighbour, is facing the consequences of conflict
that has steadily spilled over into its territory. Indeed, the progress of
ISAF in Afghanistan with regard to security and development during the
last one decade is being visualized as a source of pessimism. It has not
improved from what it was envisaged by Professor Barnett R. Rubin, a
US expert on Afghanistan, presently Director of Studies in the Centre on
International Cooperation, New York University in 2009; as

“The situation in Afghanistan has turned so far against the

United States, NATO, the international community, and
those Afghans who originally hoped that the post-September
11 intervention would finally bring them a chance for
normal lives.”3

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ISAF: Achievements versus Mandate

The basic objective of establishing ISAF, set forth by Bonn

Conference of 5 December 2001, formalized through United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001, was to assist
Afghan Government for the maintenance of security in Kabul and its
surrounding areas, to create favourable atmosphere for the transitional
Afghan Administration as well as the UN personnel.4 In this regard, it is
pertinent to mention the UNSC Resolution (1386/2001) adopted in its
4443rd meeting; that

“Authorizes, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement,

the establishment for 6 months of an International Security
Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in
the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding
areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the
personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure
environment.”5

Over the years, the role of ISAF extended throughout the country.
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, ISAF was assigned peace
enforcement mandate in Afghanistan. After taking over the command of
ISAF in August 2003, NATO maintains significant troops’ contributions
in Afghanistan. Indeed, NATO is assisting Afghan Government in
exercising and extending its authority and influence throughout, “paving
the way for reconstruction and effective governance.”6

After initial success of ISAF against Taliban in 2001-02, the US

diverted its efforts and resources towards the Iraq war. Resultantly, there
remained a lull-period from 2002 to 2005, which gave Taliban a respite
to reorganize their movement and regain the local support. ISAF and
US could have used these years for winning the hearts and minds of
the Afghan masses, who otherwise were frustrated during Taliban rule.
This was not done and, unfortunately, ISAF and US are yet to succeed
in engaging Afghan masses in economic activities through formulation
of a long-term strategy. General Stanley McChrystal in his assessment

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report also stressed for buying the loyalties of locals, rather use of military
might.7 Since mid-2010, ISAF claims to have achieved considerable
progress in Southern Afghanistan, with regard to bringing violence to a
manageable level. Nevertheless, these gains proved fragile and reversible,
as proved by a surge of violent attacks, and also recognized by the ISAF
officials. In a statement, former British Ambassador to Afghanistan Sir
Sherard Louis Cowper-Coles said that,

“The real danger that the fragile gains made in the country
would quickly evaporate when British and American troops
leave in 2014. What we are doing, essentially, is cultivating
an allotment in a jungle, and the question is what happens
when the gardeners leave?”8

According to US Council on Foreign Relations, US military also views

its gains in Afghanistan as “fragile and reversible.”9 There is a consensus
among the scholars of international relations that, for a durable and
sustainable peace and stability in Afghanistan, Afghan conflict has to be
brought to a responsible end through a political process. This political
process needs to be all-inclusive and Afghan-led with assistance afforded
by ISAF, particularly United States and relevant regional stakeholders.
From the point of view of the classical realists and constructivists, all
major stakeholders have yet to contribute for Afghan peace. A plausible
and logical argument of this honest confession is that, none alone could
bring peace and stability in that war-torn country after eleven years of
sustained violence. Resultantly, the poor Afghans are spending their lives
in the same impecunious condition with the same uncertainty and in
dearth as it was during or prior to Taliban regime.

The writer and scholar Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam Mausner of

Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) write in their joint
publication entitled, ‘How the US Will Win or Lose the War’ that, “No
strategy for Afghanistan can be successful unless it answers the most basic
question of going to war: can we win?10 The answer is yes, provided that
victory is defined in realistic and practical terms. With the appropriate US
leadership, it is still possible to help build an Afghanistan that is stable and

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secure enough to ensure that it cannot become a centre for international

terrorism again, or a centre of Jihadist operations throughout the world,
a threat shared by Pakistan and other nations in the region. This will
not be an arrangement that ensures victory underscoring the level of
development, mature democracy, and Western concepts of human rights
in Afghanistan. It can, however, be a kind of victory that allows the
Afghans to pursue their destiny in relative peace.

While General McCrystal lost his job for giving a realistic picture of
his assessment of the situation in Afghanistan in 2009, his successor and
the defamed former Director CIA Gen. David Petraeus too could not
claim a victory despite heavy surge in US troops and Special Forces – up
to 148,000 ISAF troops. Gen. Petraeus once questioned by Diane Sawyer,
ABC World News’ anchor, whether the US was winning in Afghanistan.
He replied, “We’re making progress.”11 He further said that, “We’re really
loathed to use this very loaded term of winning or losing.”12 The former
US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, on a similar question replied,

“Modern wars rarely end in decisive victories and that they

are usually concluded through negotiated settlements. We
have not had a declared victory in a war, with the possible
exception of the first Gulf War, since World War II. It is the
phenomenon of modern conflict. The key is, are our interests
protected? Is the security of the United States protected? Are
the Americans safer at the end because of the sacrifice these
soldiers have made? That’s the real question.”13

After this forthright assessment of US engagement in Afghanistan,

the question arises, where does Afghanistan and poor Afghans stand in
the US priorities? At the end of the day, US interests overrides Afghan
interests. This appraisal further gives rise to questions like, does ‘Operation
Enduring Freedom’ carry some meaning for the ultimate peace and
stability in Afghanistan or was it only meant to ensure the long-term
security and protection of United States regional interests – including
deterring threats of potential terrorists hailing from this soil.

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Dilemma and Challenges Facing ISAF

In many ways, ISAF presence in Afghanistan is a source of sustaining

the conflict, yet at the same time, it is crucial for protecting a weak
government in Kabul. This paradox is critical from Pakistan’s perspective
when it reviews its relationship with ISAF and its security role in
Afghanistan. United States, a super power and the largest contributor
of troops, holds the key of Afghan theatre. London-based International
Council on Security and Development (ICOS), in its report notes that,
“Insurgents are now avoiding fire fights and direct attacks on NATO-
ISAF/Afghan positions, and are focusing on using roadside bombs and
targeted killings instead.”14

By virtue of its mandate, ISAF is responsible for the security of

Afghanistan and, resultantly, Pakistan directly faces consequences of
its actions there. Unfortunately, from 2010 to mid-2012, Pak-US
relationship has been rocked by the elements of mutual mistrust and
uncertainty. Academia and analysts in Pakistan consider under-mentioned
factors as the benchmark with relation to the progress made by ISAF in
Afghanistan in last 11 years. It is all the more important to understand
the fact that these indicators cover broad spectrum of issues beyond
tactical level discussion and directly affect Pakistan, both domestically
and regionally.

Level of Violence in Afghanistan

Despite heavy military presence and military operations, there has

been a gradual deterioration in the security situation in Afghanistan,
compared to Kabul’s pre-2005 situation. Some of the key areas,
totalling over half the Afghanistan land mass, are still dominated by the
Taliban and warlords. Surely, this does not mean a Taliban takeover of
Afghanistan is imminent, but implies the fact that ISAF is not winning
either. US Department of Defense in its 2010 semi-annual report to
Congress titled “Progress towards security and stability in Afghanistan”
painted a bleak picture of security situation in Afghanistan. The report

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says, “Overall trend of violence throughout the country increased over

the same period a year ago, much of this can be ascribed to increased
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) activity…. The Afghan
insurgency has a robust means of sustaining its operations. Small arms
weapons and ammunition are readily available throughout the region, in
addition to sources of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and home-
made explosive materials and technology.”15

US Department of Defense in its 2012 semi-annual report to

Congress painted a cautiously optimistic picture of security situation in
Afghanistan in these words,

“The year 2011 saw the first year-over-year decline in

nationwide enemy-initiated attacks in five years. These
trends have continued in 2012. The performance of the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the close
partnership between the ANSF and ISAF have been keys to
this success… Despite these and other positive trends during
the reporting period, the campaign also continued to face
both long-term and acute challenges…. The insurgency
remains a resilient and determined enemy and will likely
attempt to regain lost ground and influence”16

The spectacular attacks in Kabul on high value targets signify the fact
that level of violence had not been contained to a low-scale and ISAF have
not been able to create conditions on ground conducive for security in
Afghanistan. The mounting civilian casualties within Afghanistan, partly
due to infamous night raids by ISAF, remain one of the contributory
factors that promote and add to the wave of violence in Afghanistan.
Attacking peaceful ceremonies, resulting in killing of innocent civilians,
women and children, disgracing the Afghan dead bodies through
urination and desecration of Holy Quran17 are some of very provocative
acts, undertaken by the personnel of ISAF and such acts catalyze the
growing wave of violence in Afghanistan.

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Political Process in Afghanistan

The increase in insurgent violence in Afghanistan can partly be

attributed to failure of US in bringing the Taliban and other insurgent
leaders to the negotiating table. In Bonn Conference on Afghanistan
in December 2001, Taliban and Pashtun representatives were left out,
whereas, small groups were made part of the conference and later in
interim Afghan government. Out of total expenditures of $550 billion
in Afghanistan by ISAF and US, only $89 billion were spent for Afghan
rebuilding, with bulk spent on ANA/ANP.18

Qatar peace process and other negotiations between Taliban and US,
initiated some time back, did not make headway. Both parties are blaming
each other for being inflexible in their demands. Analysts view that the
peace process has little prospects of success unless there is a degree of trust
and confidence amongst the Taliban that US will deliver on its promises
and commitments. Another drawback with these negotiations was that,
only selected individuals and less important/isolated groups of Taliban
or Haqqani Group were chosen for dialogue. President Obama and
President Karzai have agreed on 11 January 2013 to continue facilitating
the Qatar chapter of Taliban office for a purposeful dialogue in future.

So far, ISAF and US have not made any meaningful offers to persuade
Taliban and other groups to come to the negotiations table. Taliban and
other opposition groups are not ready to accept the Afghan Constitution,
as it is against the basic Afghan tribal structure. Furthermore, Taliban are
not ready to accept US demand of laying down arms as a precondition
for negotiation. Taliban fear that the, aim of negotiations is just to break
the momentum of their movement, otherwise, the ultimate aim of US
remains to defeat them with force.

Challenges to Afghan Security Forces

Establishment of a professional and capable Afghan national security

forces before ISAF leaves remains a crucial step. This is essential, as ANSF

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has taken over control of maximum areas of Afghanistan from ISAF.

Though the process of delegation of security responsibilities to ANSF by
ISAF is still continuing, yet there are apprehensions about the capabilities
of the former to take on these responsibilities. In September 2012, ISAF
handed over 282 bases to ANSF and closed around 202 bases and posts
as part of its drawdown plan.19 Since then the handing-over process of
remaining 400 military posts and bases is going on. US is renovating
even some strategically located bases and likely to hold those till its final
departure or may like to convert those as PMBs. Nevertheless, Brig Gen
Steven Shapiro said in a statement that, “As our Afghan security force
partners take more responsibility for their own security, more bases will
be closing and transitioning.”20 He further said that, “Our footprint here
will continue to shrink.”21

In the preceding years, the desertion rate of ANA remains high, while
green on blue attacks are on the rise, forcing ISAF to halt the training
process in some areas. Security of those districts transferred to ANA is
posing new challenges. To be effective, ISAF needs to continue training
of ANSF until it attains excellence. ISAF needs to work closely with
ANSF for creating an ethnic balance among all positions of ANSF. There
is an immediate need to halt infiltration of Taliban among the ranks
of ANSF, a new emergent challenge. Besides, there is a very high rate
of attrition (2% per month — 7,5000 per year) and huge dropouts of
about 30-40 per cent from training centres and academies. To make up
for this loss, new recruitment drive is undertaken repeatedly.

Erecting a Parallel Force Mechanism

Over the years, ISAF has established a parallel force mechanism in

the form of new militias, local armed groups, like Afghan Local Police
(ALP), Special Police, village protection teams, and other mushroom
organizations, to control Taliban insurgency. For an example, for 68
districts of Afghanistan, 16,000 ALP personnel have been deployed with
latest weapons and equipment. The process may provide temporary relief
to ISAF, but in the long-term it will be difficult to manage, especially

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after the drawdown of ISAF. Thus, ALP may become a nuisance for their
opponents in a future scenario. Killing ISAF troops in Kandahar by ALP
chief in August 2012 is a case in point. Coupled with this, green over
blue incidents account for 14% of coalition casualties in 2012 only.22

Increase in the Poppy Cultivation

Although poppy is cultivated in Afghanistan since centuries, yet there

has been unprecedented increase in its cultivation in the country from
2002 to 2012. The opium and other drugs are then smuggled all over the
world, especially, Europe and Russia. Each year Europe receives over $65
billion opium from Afghanistan and 30,000 Russians are becoming drug
addicts because of this trend.23 According to UN drug control agency, the
opium produced in Afghanistan is equal to 9 per cent24 of Afghanistan’s
entire economy. Irrespective of its beneficiaries, ISAF has not been able
to control its cultivation, processing and its smuggling elsewhere, which
is creating concern among global human right organizations.

The Element of Mistrust and Respecting Sovereignty

Immediately after the US led ISAF military operation in 2001-2,

Pakistan established over 1,000 military check posts and deployed
150,000 troops along Pak-Afghan border to control the militants’ flow on
either side.25 Despite severe economic losses and unprecedented human
sufferings during the campaign against terror, Pakistan is still not trusted
by ISAF and US and is repeatedly criticized for its lack of ‘quantum of
efforts’ and is being pressed to ‘do more’. A quick empirical overview
would point to the fact that the number of Pakistani civilian casualties have
exceeded 41,000 (deaths) besides martyrdom of over 5,000 personnel of
security forces during last decade of war on terror.26 As compared to these
Pakistani casualties, ISAF casualties are 3,256 only.27 Among coalition
partners, US casualties are 2,175 until mid January 2013.28

Economically, Pakistan has suffered losses of over $68 billion,29

besides indirect losses in shape of missed opportunities of Foreign Direct

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Investment. Furthermore, incidents like Salala attack, killing 24 Pakistani

soldiers, Abbottabad raid to kill Osama Bin Laden and CIA driven drone
attacks significantly shapes Pakistan’s perception about International
Security Assistance Force and US. Such incidents violated the sovereignty
of Pakistan and created misperceptions among the masses that perhaps
peace and stability in the region is not the ultimate objective of US and
the main driver of ISAF. To prevent such incidents in future, the already
established mechanism of border security management between Pakistan
and ISAF needs to be made effective, with reliable communication from
both sides to prevent any misinterpretation of intent. With respect to its
sovereignty, Pakistan has legitimate reservations about the role of ISAF,
though there is a difference in the perceptions of Pakistan and US about
this conflict.

Imperatives for Economic Development

International community, especially European Union, has been

generous in giving the financial assistance for reconstruction of war-torn
Afghanistan. A lot of foreign capital has flown into Afghanistan, but this
inflow has only provided minimal contributions in the nation-building
and economic-development process. With the exception of Northern
and some Eastern parts, generally there has been a stalled economic
development process in Afghanistan, mainly owing to uncertain
and deteriorating security situation. Initially Pakistan appreciated a
situation that ISAF would be able to contain violence and bring peace in
Afghanistan, paving way for the regional economic development through
the projects, like TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas
pipeline. Nevertheless, so far TAPI remains a distant dream. Within
Afghanistan, there exist limited opportunities for economic activities to
provide for the jobless youth, a vital segment that tends to engage in
militant activities because of economic deprivations.

Douglas A. Wissing, a distinguished US writer and journalist, revealed

some not-widely-known facts about the US campaign in Afghanistan in
his book, “Funding the Enemy: How US Taxpayers Bankroll the Taliban.”

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He wrote about misuse of American taxpayer’s money and said, “With

the vague intention of winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan, the
US government has mismanaged billions of development and logistics
dollars, bolstered the drug trade, and dumped untold millions into
Taliban hands.”30 Billions of dollars have been given to Taliban so that
they do not attack the US soldiers and target its military bases. This
amount, if utilized appropriately, could have created significant economic
opportunities that would have benefited the common Afghan, instead of
a militant group, fighting ISAF and US.

Pak-Afghan Border Security: Cross Border Raids inside Pakistan

Issue of cross-border incursions and raids by militants inside Pakistan,

both by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and their Afghan allies, has
been a point of concern for Pakistan. Then the security arrangements
on Pakistan-Afghanistan border remain one of the most important and
contested issues between Pakistan and ISAF. Following the Malakand,
Swat and South Waziristan military operations against TTP in 2009-10,
the top leadership of TTP, along with its several hundred members, fled
Pakistan and found sanctuaries in adjoining provinces of Afghanistan,
despite heavy deployment of ISAF in those areas. Now frequent raids
are originating from these areas on Pakistani military posts and against
civil population inside Pakistan. With still deployed in most of Afghan
territory having operational command of Afghanistan, ISAF failed to
address this issue to the satisfaction of Pakistan.

Growing perception in Pakistan is that ISAF’s inaction on these raids

is its tacit approval, or else a quid pro quo by ISAF, that it would take
action against these elements only if Pakistan responds by doing the same
in North Waziristan. It is realized that efforts in resolving this problem
through a strict border control mechanism would significantly boost
Pakistan-ISAF relationship and truly transform the strategic landscape
of the region in favour of the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
most effective and well-coordinated strategy could be that while Pakistan
pounds militants from western flank, ISAF reciprocate Pakistani efforts
by denying militants a free ride across border.

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Deviation from Primary Objectives

The initial military objective of ISAF for Operation Enduring Freedom

(OEF) as outlined by President George W. Bush on 20 September 2001
and 7 October 2001 was: “destruction of terrorist training camps and
infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of Al Qaeda leaders, and
the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.”31 Besides, Gen James
John claims that “the maximum estimate is less than 100 (Al Qaeda
members) operating in (Afghanistan), no bases, no ability to launch
attacks on us or our allies.”32 Since this claim was initially made in mid
2010, which implies that there would be further reduction in the number
of Al Qaeda operatives by January 2013, thus minimizing threat for Al-
Qaeda takeover. This also means that ISAF and particularly US may not
be eyeing for a long-term stay in Afghanistan. However, there remains
ambiguity about the future plans of US. United States and Afghanistan
have agreed in the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA)-2012, on a
long-term stay there. In one article, Alissa J. Rubin quotes an American
official who confirms about SPA that, “This is the proof in the pudding
that we intend to be there.”33 Rubin clearly indicates that US plans to
stay in Afghanistan for an indefinite period.

Besides, immediately after Lisbon Summit-2010, a senior official of

the State Department said that, “The issue of changing combat missions is
an independent national decision, which will be made by all 28 members
of NATO. In the case of the United States, we simply have not taken
that decision yet.”34 He further said that President Obama has “not
decided yet” to change to a non-combat mission in 2014. Nevertheless,
President Obama himself said that, “Certainly our footprint will have
been significantly reduced (by 2014). Beyond that, it is hard to anticipate
exactly what will be necessary to keep the American people safe as of
2014. I’ll make that determination when I get there.”35

Difference in Perception about the Conflict

The first and the foremost challenge is the difference in perception

about the conflict. United States and ISAF perceive that the centre

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of gravity of Afghan resistance lies in the tribal areas of Pakistan and

believe that Pakistan provides support to insurgent forces attacking ISAF
and Afghan forces. US have also been suspicious about the presence of
Quetta Shura, a body of Taliban under Mullah Omar in Quetta, Pakistan.
Pakistan rejects this presupposition and is of the view that it is actually the
ungoverned space within Afghanistan, which acts as a source of logistical
support for insurgency. Furthermore, Pakistan firmly believes that the
centre of gravity of Afghan conflict remains inside Afghanistan.

This conflict in threat perception remains an obstacle for improving

cooperation between Pakistan and ISAF. Linked with this misperception
is another misconstrued idea of ‘strategic depth’. Pakistani strategists
believe that ‘Strategic depth’ does not imply controlling Afghanistan. “If
Afghanistan is peaceful, stable and friendly we have our strategic depth
because our western border is secured … You’re not looking both ways.”36
By this very concept, Pakistan does not pursue the policy of controlling
Afghanistan. There appears to be diminution in misperception following
the improvement in the bilateral relations between US and Pakistan,
particularly after mid 2012, once Pakistan reopened NATO supply route
through its soil. Pakistan is also facilitating US-Taliban negotiations and
has released some of imprisoned Taliban leaders from its jails.37

Lacking a Clear Strategy of Ending Afghan War

The second challenge to this cooperation is the lack of a clear strategy

and objectives among the ISAF allies, and an ambiguous modus operandi
of concluding this conflict. This creates varied perceptions within Pakistan
about the motivations and long-term strategic goals of Western powers in
the region. For example, on one side it is argued by most ISAF member-
countries that they would be withdrawing from Afghanistan by 2014, while
on the other end, one particular country has secured bilateral agreements
with Kabul to stay beyond 2014. This lack of clarity and mixed signals
approach creates doubts within Pakistan, and Islamabad fears that conflict
will prolong in the region if complete withdrawal of ISAF forces does not
take place. Furthermore, harmonizing the interests of Pakistan with that

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of the extra-regional powers active in Afghanistan is pivotal, as Pakistan

will remain a key player in new regional security architecture.

Until now, United States has not clearly defined its future strategy
about its complete pull out or otherwise. Though President Obama
announced complete drawdown by the end of 2014, yet this statement
seems ambiguous, as he is asking immunity for his troops from Afghan
Government after 2014. Regarding attainment of the objectives of war in
Afghanistan, even President Obama is unclear. In response to a question
about the cost of the war in terms of lives and money, President Obama
said that

“We achieved our central goal ... or have come very close to achieving our
central goal, which is to de-capacitate al Qaeda, to dismantle them, to make
sure that they can’t attack us again. Have we achieved everything that some
might have imagined us achieving in the best of scenarios? Probably not. This
is a human enterprise, and you fall short of the ideal.”38

Beyond Reconstruction: Indian Role in Afghanistan

As an established US ally, Pakistan has made incomparable and

enormous contributions towards international community. This is
particularly true in the case of US during Cold War as well as in the
ongoing War against terrorism. Now Pakistan feels that, US while
disregarding its sacrifices, is promoting Indian role in Afghanistan, at the
cost of Pakistani security concerns. Pakistan has its apprehensions about
the future role of India in Afghanistan. It desires that Indian role should
be restricted to reconstruction activities following a timeline. Moreover,
training of ANSF and Afghan intelligence organizations and establishing
consulates along Pak-Afghan border by India would further complicate
threat matrix for Pakistan concerning its security along western borders.
Indeed, there is a historical context to this rivalry between Pakistan and
India over the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan feel itself
vulnerable from India along its eastern borders, opening another front
along its western borders would be the worst security threat for Pakistan.

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Pakistan always remained apprehensive about traditional Indian

military threats on the issue of Kashmir along its eastern borders. Despite
progress in the Indo-Pak peace process in the recent years, there remains
tension between the two militaries during January 2013. Moreover,
sporadic incidents by even non-state actors can cause misunderstanding
among the rival states, as happened after Mumbai Attacks. President
Obama himself declared Kashmir issue as the root cause of South Asian
instability in 2008.39 He stressed for its just solution, but unknown
reasons barred him from undertaking any such step.40 ISAF in general
and United States in particular would have to take practical measures
to arrest and address this Pakistani concern before final drawdown by
2014. Pakistan will not accept any force in Afghanistan that is hostile to
its strategic and security interests and Islamabad will continue to exercise
its influence to prevent the worst from taking place. Besides, Pakistan
cannot accept India as a successor state to replace US in Afghanistan,
owing to its security concerns.

Challenges Constraining Pakistani Limits of Engagement

There is a deep scepticism about public opinion related to US-led

ISAF presence in Afghanistan. This uncertainty is further fuelled by
continuous and unchecked drone attacks and violation of sovereignty
of Pakistan. With these events as evidence and frequent accusations on
various accounts by US, masses in Pakistan have strong reason to believe
that Pakistani and international forces’ interests are at odds in the region,
which resultantly limits Pakistan’s capacity to engage with ISAF.

Nevertheless, prospects of any meaningful cooperation between

allies depend upon shared threat perception, commitments that are
sustainable, clear strategy and expectations that can be met. This matrix
of variables can be generally applied to test the strength of partnership and
cooperation between allies. When this benchmark is applied to Pakistan-
ISAF relationship, significant challenges come to the light as discussed
above. Pakistan believes that in order to develop an equitable and
acceptable framework for cooperation, these challenges must be resolved

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on a priority basis as a confidence building measure. Keeping in view the

2014 timeline and shifting trends in regional strategic landscape, such
a framework based on confidence-building measures between Pakistan
and ISAF is essential to be formulated, for any substantive and timely
progress in resolving the Afghan conflict.

The Way Forward: A Revised Context of Pak-ISAF Partnership

No country will benefit more from a secure and stable Afghanistan

than Pakistan. Pakistan seeks peaceful relations with both its Eastern
and Western neighbours based on sovereign equality, respect for mutual
interests and dignity. It is, therefore, in the national interest of Pakistan
that Afghanistan should be peaceful and stable. As highlighted above,
there lie many complexities that Pakistan perceives as formidable obstacles
to achieving peace in Afghanistan. Some of the steps are recommended
below as a way forward for a stable and peaceful Afghanistan.

Constitutional Reforms in Line with Afghan Traditions: Historical,

cultural, geographical and political discourse of Afghanistan’s history
suggests that there has never been a strong centralized federal government
in Afghanistan, as the current constitution dictates. Rather, there has
been an acceptable quasi-central government with strong tribal periphery.
Connected to this reality is the fact that there are multiple power centres
in Afghanistan’s tribal society, which make it a difficult task to reconcile
competing interests. How practical and sustainable is this idea of having
a structure that constitutes a strong central government, as envisioned by
US, remains a big question. To be acceptable by all Afghan factions, be
it ethnic and/or religious diasporas, there is a need to reform the current
constitution, accommodating the tribal needs of the country. ISAF and
US need to extend full cooperation to incumbent Afghan Government
in this regard.

Governance Reforms: One of the pertinent causes contributing to

the sufferings of Afghan people is the abhorrent state of governance in
Afghanistan. Corruption, nepotism, violation of merit and dishonesty

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 ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities

is the order of day in Afghanistan. Owing to these factors, caused by

poor governance, there is a growing discontentment among the public.
ISAF and United States need to enforce such reforms, which build up
confidence of the people in the national governance system. Otherwise,
a common Afghan is compelled to think that ISAF is deliberately
supporting a corrupt governance system, to suit its stakes, instead of
entertaining whims and desires of Afghans. ISAF has to take measures to
arrest this rapidly growing perception.

Security Reforms: With respect to security, there also exists

uncertainty among the people of Afghanistan. Where they feel sacred and
terrorized from Taliban and other warlords, they do not feel protected
from the ISAF either. If Taliban have been brutal towards Afghan people,
ISAF also has bombed many innocents during night raids, marriage
ceremonies and funeral processions. There is a growing need for ISAF
to take measures that dilute the sense of insecurity prevailing among
Afghan masses and actively attempt at replacing those sentiments with a
sense of security for a common Afghan.

Synergy of Interests: International, Regional and

Domestic: Looking towards post-2014 scenario, unless there is a
synergy of interests at international, regional and domestic level, Afghan
conflict will persist and its people will be the ultimate sufferers. Complete
withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan is the only attractive option
for domestic stakeholders in Afghanistan including Taliban. Such a
strategy would have the acceptance of regional and global powers.
However, ISAF has to bring peace and stability before its departure from
Afghanistan, rather leaving the country with an uncertain future, leading
to anarchy and civil war. This indeed is an exigent task, asking for a
change of strategy; offensive to reconciliatory and political approach.

Reconciliation and Political Integration: As the focus in

Afghanistan shifts from surge to transition, the important prerequisite for
the success in the country lies in the formulation, implementation and
pace of reconciliation process in place. Who are reconcilable elements?

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 ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities

Can there be a distinction between reconcilable and irreconcilable

elements within Afghan resistance? What political compromises will be
made between relevant stakeholders? These are some of the key questions
that should be answered without ambiguity, as failure to do so will result
in continuation of stalemate in Afghanistan and transition may not
occur, which is a desirable end state.

The political integration process in Afghanistan has to be all inclusive

and Afghan led with all the domestic power centres included in a grand
bargain so that an end state i.e. transition takes place. In this context,
Pakistan has always expressed its desire to help reach this end state through
its historical, cultural and political relations with Afghanistan. Pakistan’s
Chief of the Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani outlined the
broad contours of Pakistan’s vision for a peaceful Afghanistan in a letter
to US president Barack Obama in 2011, in which he stated:

“What is the way forward in Afghanistan? The end condition

that we seek in Afghanistan is enduring peace based on stable
environment. It is important to define peace and stability in
Afghan context, which may well be less than perfect. Here
stability is the key, which is essentially a function of balance.
Balance in turn, is achieved by identifying and reconciling
extremes. It implies that all the factions in Afghanistan
should have a stake in peace process….. Manoeuvring space
is dependent on available time and resources. Time is short
and resources limited. Idealism will have to operate within
confines of hard ground realities…..In the ultimate analysis,
if people of Afghanistan and their coming generations view
US and coalition as friends, war can be won. If they think
otherwise it would be considered as lost.”41

Working out a Framework for Cooperation between Pakistan and

ISAF: The framework of cooperation between Pakistan and ISAF should
be based upon two pillars; First, the shared belief of a peaceful and stable
Afghanistan through an all-inclusive approach; Secondly, basis of the
cooperative framework should rest on sovereign equality, mutual respect

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 ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities

and a drive for sustainable peace. This framework will tantamount to a

strategic overhauling of the entire Pak-ISAF relationship and absence
of these pillars will only add to regional instability. This framework of
cooperation should include components such as benchmarks, timelines,
mutual discussions on strategic and tactical issues, clear responsibilities
and roles, prioritizing issues and a feedback process.

Benchmarks should include setting realistic targets that are achievable

in a constrained timeframe. Timelines would naturally include the
transition timetable set at 2014. Mutual discussion on strategic and
tactical issues will bring transparency into the framework while removing
mutual suspicion and scepticism. Clear responsibilities should entail
unambiguous role of stakeholders involved in conflict resolution. For
example, Pakistan is the only country that can ensure peace within its own
boundaries while ISAF is responsible for the security of Afghanistan. The
feedback process should include the top political and military leadership
of ISAF, Pakistan and Afghanistan to critically evaluate the progress
on ground and pace of achieving agreed political objectives to end the
conflict. The stability of this framework will stem from a shared belief in
stability of Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Pakistan sees the region in transition as both an opportunity and a peril;

in both short and long-term perspective. The outcome of this transition
will largely depend upon the strategic decisions taken today in favour of
peace and stability. Pakistan finds itself at the centre of debate and desires
to build a region where regional interests converge and stability thrives,
thereby creating a space for economic growth and prosperity long desired
by the people of the region.

In this context, Pakistan sees its relationship with ISAF as critical

for redrawing the contours of regional environment that is conducive
for ending the longest conflict in recent history. Ultimately, it would be
Pakistan’s relationship with ISAF that would determine the trajectory of
developments in the region generally and in Afghanistan particularly.

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 ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities

For this trajectory to be in a positive direction, the onus is on both

Pakistan and ISAF to clear mutual suspicion and anxieties that is the
product of lack of a unified regional vision. If, from an ISAF perspective,
the broader vision is to shape the regional environment aimed at containing
regional powers, then Pakistan and ISAF may well be on the divergent
paths while the negation of this vision will bolster the relationship.

Pakistan also expects ISAF to improve its performance in Afghanistan

that creates conditions on the ground for reconciliation, integration and
bringing the violence to manageable levels. On a parallel path, Pakistan
expects to be in a decision-making loop at both strategic and tactical
level for better coordination and management of border. Erecting a
legitimate, all inclusive, accountable and representative political structure
in Afghanistan is the most fundamental and toughest challenge faced by
both, ISAF and Pakistan.

Finally, in the light of the discussion, can there be reasons for optimism
for future? The answer remains unpredictable as too many complex
variables are at play, some may not be in total control of stakeholders.
What is hopeful, however, is an overall realization to bring the Afghan
conflict to a responsible end, which has bled the region, hurt Pakistan
badly and worried the entire world.

Being critical in nature, ISAF-Pakistan relationships could become

a bridge between the two civilizations at a crucial juncture in human
history and help bring a long lasting peace to Afghanistan, stability in the
region and security to the world. Pakistan desires a peaceful, stable and
friendly Afghanistan. Indeed, “We cannot wish for Afghanistan anything
that we don’t wish for Pakistan.”42

Author

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan is the Head of Department of International

Relations in the Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence
University, Islamabad. He did his Ph.D in International Relations. His area

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 ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities

of expertise includes South Asia, Asia-Pacific, Foreign Policy of Pakistan and

Global Energy Resources.

Endnotes
1 Pakistan’s army chief seeks stable Afghanistan, Pamela Constable, The Washington Post Tuesday, 2
February 2010. Afghanistan News Centre, 2 February 2012. Accessed on 6 September 2012 at; http://www.
afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2010/february/feb22010.html. By Pamela Constable The Washington
Post Tuesday, 2 February 2010; A08.
2 Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by President Obama and President Karzai The White House,
11 January 2013. Accessed on 13 January 2013 at; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/11/
joint-statement-president-obama-and-president-karzai.
3 Barnett R. Rubin, The Way Forward in Afghanistan: Three Views End the War on Terror, Survival, Online
Publication Date: 1 February 2009.
4 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) — Afghanistan. Official website of Allied Command
Operations. Can be accessed at; http://www.aco.nato.int/page20844847.aspx
5 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1386 (2001)-S/RES/1386 (2001), Adopted by the Security
Council at its 4443rd meeting, on 20 December 2001. Accessed on 6 September 2012, at; http://www.nato.
int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1386.pdf.
6 Ibid.
7 Raja Muhammad Khan, ‘An Assessment of ISAF Mission in Afghanistan’, The Frontier Post, 12 September
2012, accessed at http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/181074/.
8 Jason Groves, Political Correspondent, ‘We are betraying them’: Envoy’s heartbreak at watching soldiers
wounded in Afghanistan take part in Paralympics ceremony, Mail on Line, 30 August 2012. Accessed on
1 September 2012 at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2196025/Paralympics-Opening-Ceremony-
Envoys-heartbreak-watching-soldiers-wounded-Afghanistan-part.html.
9 (Jayshree Bajoria, The Taliban in Afghanistan, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 October 2011. Accessed on
5 September 2012 at: http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551).
10 Anthony H. Cordesman, Adam Mausner, Winning in Afghanistan: How the US will Win or Lose the War,
Centre for Strategic & International Studies, 15 September 2009. Accessed on 4 September 2012, http://csis.
org/publication/winning-afghanistan-1.
11 Lana Zak and Ben Forer, Is US Winning in Afghanistan? Gates and Petraeus Won’t Say, ABC World News,
6 June 2011. Accessed on 1 September 2012 at; http://abcnews.go.com/International/gates-petraeus-us-
winning-afghan-war/story?id=13771705.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Jayshree Bajoria, The Taliban in Afghanistan, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 October 2011. Accessed on
5 September 2012 at: http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.
15 US Department of Defense unclassified,(26 April 2010), Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability
in Afghanistan, accessed from: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf,
(accessed 24 August 2102).
16 US Department of Defense unclassified, (April 2012), Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in
Afghanistan, (accessed 24 August 2012).
17 Desecration of holy Quran, Daily Times, 27 February 2012. Accessed on 13 January 2013 at; http://www.
dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\02\27\story_27-2-2012_pg1_1
18 Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operation Since 9/11”,
Congressional Research Service, 29 March 2011. Accessed on 6 September 2012, at; http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.
19 Muhammad Hassan Khetab, “NATO closes 202 Afghan Bases”, Pajhwok Afghan News, 26 August 2012,
accessed on 4 September 2012, at http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/08/26/nato-closes-202-afghan-bases.

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 ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities

20 Deb Riechmann, Afghanistan Drawdown: 202 Bases Closed, NATO Says, Huff Post World, 26 August 2012.
Accessed on 5 September 2012, at; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/26/afghanistan-drawdown-
bases-closed_n_1831164.html.
21 Ibid.
22 Lisa Lundquist, “Afghan Soldier Kills 3 ISAF Troops in Uruzgan Province”, The Long War Journal, 29
August 2012, accessed at 4 September 2012, at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/afghan_
soldier_kills_2.php.
23 Mary Burdman, “US – Russia War on Drugs”, Executive Intelligence Review, Issue 5 November 2010,
accessed on 6 September 2012, at http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2010/3743us_rus_wodrugs.html.
24 Afghanistan Sees Increase in Poppy Cultivation. Jack Healy, The New York Times, 11 October 2011 and
Guardian, April 2012.
25 Bilal Rashid, “Pak-US Ties: Way Forward”, Pakistan Observer, 21 September 2012, accessed on 21
September 2012 at http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=118544
26 Iftikhar A. Khan, “Pakistan Lost Two Brigades in War on Terror” Dawn, 20 October 2011, accessed on 2
September 2012 at http://dawn.com/2011/10/20/pakistan-lost-two-brigades-in-war-on-terror/.
27 Coalition Military Fatalities By Year-Operation Enduring Freedom; http://icasualties.org/oef/
28 Ibid.
29 ‘Cost of being a Frontline State: $68b’, Express Tribune, 3 June 2011, accessed on 2 September 2012 at
http://tribune.com.pk/story/181426/cost-of-being-a-frontline-state-68b/.
30 Douglas A. Wissing, Funding the Enemy: How US Taxpayers Bankroll the Taliban, Prometheus Books,
New York, (27 March 2012).
31 Asad Munir, “US performance in Afghanistan”, The News, 4 August 2011, accessed on 2 September 2012,
at http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-61066-US-performance-in-Afghanistan.
32 Gwynne Dyer, “How to Get Out of Afghanistan”, Dawn, Accessed on 3 September 2012 at http://archives.
dawn.com/archives/29999.
33 Alissa J. Rubin, With Pact, US Agrees to Help Afghans for Years to Come, The New York Times, 22
April 2012. Accessed on 8 September 2012 at; http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/world/asia/us-and-
afghanistan-reach-partnership-agreement.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
34 NATO agrees to 2014 Afghan exit at Lisbon summit International news, France, 20 November 2010.
Accessed on 8 September 2012, at; http://www.france24.com/en/20101120-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan-
nato-lisbon-summit-karzai.
35 Ross Colvin and Matt Spetalnick, Obama sees end to Afghan combat mission by the end of 2014, Reuters,
20 November 2010. Accessed on 8 September 2012, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/20/us-nato-
summit-usa-idUSTRE6AJ10820101120.
36 Pakistan’s army chief seeks stable Afghanistan, Pamela Constable, The Washington Post Tuesday, 2
February 2010. Afghanistan News Centre, 2 February 2012. Accessed on 6 September 2012 at; http://www.
afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2010/february/feb22010.html. By Pamela Constable The Washington
Post Tuesday, 2 February 2010; A08.
37 Rod Nordland, More Taliban Prisoners May Be Released, The New York Times, 17 November 2012.
Accessed on 11 January 2013 at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/world/asia/taliban-leaders-among-
prisoners-freed-in-pakistan.html?_r=0
38 Obama, Karzai accelerate end of US combat role in Afghanistan, Reuters, 12 Jan 2013. Accessed on 13
January 2013 at; http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/12/us-obama-afghanistan-idUSBRE90A0ZT2013
0112?feedType=RSS&dlvrit=286409.
39 Moeed Yusuf, On the Issues: US-Pakistan-India, United States Institute of Peace, November 2010. Accessed
on 13 January 2013, at: http://www.usip.org/publications/the-issues-us-pakistan-india.
40 Obama’s Kashmir comments, The News International, 17 July 2012. Accessed on 13 January 2013 at; http://
www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-8-120895-Obamas-Kashmir-comments.
41 Gen Kayani vows to root out militancy. Accessed on 4 September 2012 at; despite losseshttp://
thepeopleofpakistan.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/gen-kayani-vows-to-root-out-militancy-despite-losses/.
42 Ibid.

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