ISASecure®
What’s new in ISA/IEC 62443-4-2
And what does it mean with respect to ISASecure Certifications
www.isasecure.org
Kevin Staggs
Honeywell
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About the Presenter – Kevin Staggs
• Honeywell employee for 43 years
– Senior Engineering Fellow
– Hardware, software and system design experience
– 20 years experience in IACS cybersecurity
• 15 years with ISA-99 committee
– Co-chairman of Working Group 4
• Founding member of ISA Security
Compliance Institute
– Currently Technical Committee chairman
• CISSP, CSSLP and CCSP Certified
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International Society of Automation
Setting the Standard for Automation
• Professional Automation Engineering Society
• 40,000 Global Members
• ANSI Accredited SDO
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ISA Security Compliance Institute
Setting the Standard for Automation
ISA Security Compliance Institute
Wholly owned non-profit subsidiary of ISA
Conformity Assessment to ISA/IEC 62334 standards
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Contributors to ISASecure® Certification Specifications
for the ISA/IEC 62443 standards
YPF
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ISA/IEC 62443 Standards Family
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ISA/IEC 62443 Standards Family
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What is ISA/IEC 62443-4-2
• Derived component requirements from 62443-3-3
• Defines component types that make up a control
system:
• Host device
• Network device
• Embedded device
• Application
• ICS Component may contain multiple types
• Introduces additional component specific integrity
requirements
• Requires that components be developed with a
Secure Software Development Process (62443-4-1)
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Component Type Definitions
• Embedded device
• special purpose device designed to directly monitor or control an
industrial process
• Host device
• general purpose device running an operating system (for example
Microsoft Windows OS or Linux) capable of hosting one or more
software applications, data stores or functions from one or more
suppliers
• Network device
• device that facilitates data flow between devices, or restricts the flow of
data, but may not directly interact with a control process
• Software application
• one or more software programs and their dependencies that are used to
interface with the process or the control system itself (for example,
configuration software and historian)
• Examples included in Annex A of standard
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ISA/IEC 62443-4-2 Requirements
• Common security constraints for all component types
• Essential functions
• Compensating countermeasures
• Least privilege
• Software development process
• Requirements based on 7 foundational requirements
• Derived from 62443-3-3
• Not all requirements have derived requirements
• Follows the Security Level – Capability model from 62443-3-3
• Mapping of requirements to SL in Annex B
• Most requirements are common for all component types
• Designated by CR in requirements
• Component specific requirements
• Designated by SAR, EDR, HDR, and NDR
• Introduction of component specific integrity requirements
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Derived Requirement Example
• 62443-3-3 requirement
SR 1.3 – Account management
The control system shall provide the capability to support the management of all
accounts by authorized users, including adding, activating, modifying, disabling
and removing accounts.
• 62443-4-2 derived requirement
CR 1.3 – Account management
Components shall provide the capability to support the management of all
accounts directly or integrate into a system that manages accounts according to
ISA-62443-3-3 [11] SR 1.3.
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Cases of no Derived Requirements
• 62443-3-3 requirement
• SR 2.3 – Use control for portable and mobile devices
• SR 5.4 – Application partitioning
• SR 7.5 – Emergency power
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Type Specific Derived Requirements
• 62443-3-3 requirement
SR 3.2 – Malicious code protection
The control system shall provide the capability to employ protection
mechanisms to prevent, detect, report and mitigate the effects of malicious code
or unauthorized software. The control system shall provide the capability to
update the protection mechanisms.
• 62443-4-2 derived requirement
CR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code
The protection from malicious code requirements are component-specific and
can be located as requirements for each specific component type in Clauses 12
through 15.
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Type Specific Derived Requirements
• 62443-4-2 type specific derived requirement
SAR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code
The application product supplier shall qualify and document which protection
from malicious code mechanisms are compatible with the application and note
any special configuration requirements.
EDR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code
The embedded device shall provide the capability to protect from installation
and execution of unauthorized software.
HDR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code
There shall be mechanisms on host devices that are qualified by the IACS
product supplier to provide protection from malicious code. The IACS product
supplier shall document any special configuration requirements related to
protection from malicious code.
NDR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code
The network device shall provide for protection from malicious code.
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New Requirements for Components
• Required for all types of components
• CR 1.14 – Strength of symmetric key-based authentication
• Required for embedded devices, host devices and
network devices
• CR 2.13 – Use of physical diagnostic and test interfaces
• CR 3.10 – Support for updates
• CR 3.11 – Physical tamper resistance and detection
• CR 3.12 – Provisioning product supplier roots of trust
• CR 3.13 – Provisioning asset owner roots of trust
• CR 3.14 – Integrity of the boot process
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CR 1.14 Details
• CR 1.14 – Strength of symmetric key-based
authentication
For components that utilize symmetric keys, the component shall provide
the capability to:
a) establish the mutual trust using the symmetric key;
b) store securely the shared secret (the authentication is valid as long
as the shared secret remains secret);
c) restrict access to the shared secret; and
d) ensure that the algorithms and keys used for the symmetric key
authentication comply with CR 4.3 – Use of cryptography Subclause
8.5.
• Required for SL-C Level 2 and above
• One requirement enhancement required for SL-C Level 3
and above
Components shall provide the capability to protect critical, long lived
symmetric keys via hardware mechanisms
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CR 3.10 Details
• CR 3.10 – Support for updates
Devices shall support the ability to be updated and upgraded.
• Required for SL-C Level 1 and above
• One requirement enhancement required for SL-C Level 2
and above
Devices shall validate the authenticity and integrity of any software update
or upgrade prior to installation.
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CR 3.11 Details
• CR 3.11 – Physical tamper resistance and detection
Devices shall provide tamper resistance and detection mechanisms to
protect against unauthorized physical access into the device.
• Required for SL-C Level 2 and above
• One requirement enhancement required for SL-C Level 3
and above
Devices shall be capable of automatically providing notification to a
configurable set of recipients upon discovery of an attempt to make an
unauthorized physical access. All notifications of tampering shall be logged
as part of the overall audit logging function.
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CR 3.12 Details
• CR 3.12 – Provisioning product supplier roots of trust
Devices shall provide the capability to provision and protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of product supplier keys and data
to be used as one or more “roots of trust” at the time of manufacture of the
device.
• Required for SL-C Level 2 and above
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CR 3.13 Details
• CR 3.13 – Provisioning asset owner roots of trust
Devices shall
a) provide the capability to provision and protect the confidentiality, integrity,
and authenticity of asset owner keys and data to be used as “roots of trust”;
and
b) support the capability to provision without reliance on components that
may be outside of the device’s security zone.
• Required for SL-C Level 2 and above
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CR 3.14 Details
• CR 3.14 – Integrity of the boot process
Devices shall verify the integrity of the firmware, software, and configuration
data needed for the component’s boot and runtime processes prior to use.
• Required for SL-C Level 1 and above
• One requirement enhancement required for SL-C Level 2
and above
Devices shall use the component’s product supplier roots of trust to verify
the authenticity of the firmware, software, and configuration data needed for
the component’s boot process prior to it being used in the boot process.
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Security Levels (Annex B)
CRs and REs SL 1 SL 2 SL 3 SL 4
FR 3 – System integrity (SI)
CR 3.1 – Communication integrity
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RE (1) Communication authentication
✓ ✓ ✓
SAR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
EDR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
HDR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RE (1) Report version of code protection
✓ ✓ ✓
NDR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
CR 3.3 – Security functionality verification
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RE (1) Security functionality verification during normal
operation ✓
CR 3.4 – Software and information integrity
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
RE (1) Authenticity of software and information
✓ ✓ ✓
RE (2) Automated notification of integrity violations
✓ ✓
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ISASecure Component Certification
• ISASecure Component Security Assessment (CSA)
released
• ISA/IEC 62443-4-2 Security Capability Assessment
• ISA/IEC 62443-4-1 Process Assessment
• Vulnerability Identification Test
• Replacing EDSA Certification program
• Functional Security Assessment (pre 62443-4-2)
• ISA/IEC 62443-4-1 Process Assessment
• Communications Robustness Testing (CRT)
• Note: ISA/IEC 62443-4-1 requires CRT
• Testing performed as part of product development
• Testing and results validated as part of process assessment
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Security Capability Assessment
• For components:
– Independent certification of security capability level
(SL) as defined by the ISA/IEC 62443-4-2 standard
– All component types within the component have been
assessed
– Free from known security vulnerabilities at time of
assessment
– Developed using a secure development lifecycle as
defined by ISA/IEC 62443-4-1 standard
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Process Assessment
• Independent certification of suppliers Secure
Software Development Lifecycle as defined by
the ISA/IEC 62443-4-1 standard
• As long as ISASecure SDLA certificate is valid:
– Supplier has a process for responding to security
issues discovered in supported products
– Product updates and upgrades have been created
using an assessed secure development lifecycle
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Three ISASecure® certifications available
1. Component Security Assurance (CSA) product certification
ISA/IEC 62443-4-2
ISA/IEC 62443-4-1
Vulnerability Identification Test
2. System Security Assurance (SSA) product certification
ISA/IEC-62443-3-3
ISA/IEC 62443-4-1
Vulnerability Identification Test
3. Security Development Lifecycle Assurance (SDLA)
process certification
ISA/IEC-62443-4-1
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Acronyms Used Today
• CR – Component requirement
• SR – System requirement
• SL-C – Capability security level
• SAR – Software application requirement
• EDR – Embedded device requirement
• HDR – Host device requirement
• NDR – Network device requirement
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Phone: +1 919-990-9222 Mobile: +1 919-323-7660
Email: aristaino@isa.org
Web Site: www.isasecure.org
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