CD

The American Political Science Association

APSA
Volume 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization January 2016
I n Th i s I s s u e
O pposition C oordination in A frica
“Opposition in Michael Wahman, University of Missouri

A
Authoritarian uthoritarian incumbents, in autocracies with and without elections, have
Regimes” often used ‘divide and rule’ as a strategy to mitigate the threat from
internal opposition. Theoretically, the move from closed authoritarianism
1 Editorial Board Note to electoral authoritarianism should have required authoritarian rulers to extend
Eitan Tzelgov and Staffan I.
Lindberg their winning coalitions and make a strong appeal beyond their core group of supporters.
1 Opposition Coordination in Nevertheless, after the broad African reintroduction of multipartyism in the early 1990s
Africa
Michael Wahman many authoritarian leaders were able to maintain power without extending their winning
1 Destined for Defeat? Why coalitions due to significant fractionalization among opposition challengers. One such
People Run for the Opposition in example is Kenya. Amid a fractionalized opposition, incumbent president Daniel Arap
Electoral Authoritarian Regimes
Keith Weghorst Moi was able to win both the 1992 and 1997 elections despite never securing more than
2 The Disturbing Normality of 40 percent of the presidential vote. Even more astonishing, Moi’s KANU party managed
Protest under Authoritarianism
Andreas Schedler to keep hold of an outright majority in parliament despite only winning 30 percent and
2 How Opposition Cooptation and 38 percent in the 1992 and 1997 parliamentary elections respectively. Kenya saw its first
Institutional Constraints Affect electoral turnover in 2002, when Moi’s successor, Uhuru Kenyatta lost to opposition
State Repression in Autocracies
Courtenay R. Conrad and Ae Sil challenger Mwai Kibaki. Unlike 1992 and 1997, the 2002 general election featured a
Woo
unified opposition. It has been widely acknowledged that the unification of the opposition
3 Terrorism as a Tactic in
Dictatorships was one of the key explanations to the long awaited KANU defeat.
Deniz Alksoy
23 Section News (click to continue on page 4)
26 New Research
32 Editorial Committee

D estined for D efeat ? W h y P eople R un for the

O pposition in E lectoral A u thoritarian R egimes
F rom the E ditorial
B oard Keith Weghorst, Vanderbilt University

A
Allow me to congratulate the lead bout 30 percent of countries in the world are electoral authoritarian
editor of this issue, Eitan Tzelgov, regimes. 1 There is a growing literature on electoral authoritarianism but
for pulling together a terrific set there remains significant ground to be covered in this research program.
of articles by excellent authors.
Eitan was a postdoc at the V-Dem First, little research on electoral authoritarianism focuses on Africa. Yet, the majority of
Institute who did a tremendous
electoral authoritarian regimes are found in sub-Saharan Africa. Over half of the countries
amount of service to the project for
there have this form of government. Second, explanations of opposition behavior are
two and a half years, and has just
frequently endogenous to the goals of the ruling elite. Few scholars explicitly theorize about
joined the faculty at University of
opposition actors. Third, studies of elections in authoritarian settings commonly focus on
East Anglia. We will miss him a
voting behavior and interparty competition without sufficient attention to candidates, the
lot, even if he will continue to be
individuals actually competing against one another in elections.
involved in V-Dem as an associate
researcher.
My dissertation, completed in 2015, studies the opposition in electoral authoritarian
The current issue will be followed regimes. Specifically, I ask why do individuals run for off ice on opposition tickets, given those
by one on democratization and n 1. Based Michael K’s Miller’s classification in Michael K. Miller, “Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development”
Comparative Political Studies 49 (May 2015): 1526-52.
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Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

T he D isturbing N ormalit y of P rotest U nder A u thoritarianism

Andreas Schedler, CIDE, Mexico City

W
hich is the role of peaceful mass protest in the generation of authoritarian regime crises? 1 Comparative
scholars tend to concord that the “predominant political conflict in dictatorships” does not unfold
between rulers and masses, but “among regime insiders.” 2 The primary threats to the political survival
of authoritarian rulers are “horizontal”; they arise from within the ruling coalition. “Vertical” challenges from
below in the form of mass protests by ordinary citizens rarely succeed in toppling dictators.

Normal Protest
Students of comparative authoritarianism also tend to agree on the exceptional nature of anti-authoritarian mass demonstrations.
While the competition among elite factions” is endemic under dictatorship, street protests against authoritarian rule are
supposed to be rare occurrences. Authoritarian regimes strive to either preempt or repress them and are usually successful in
doing so. In equilibrium, they generate popular quiescence. Due to repression, contentment, uncertainty about the preferences
of others, or problems of collective action, most of the time most citizens comply with the behavioral demands of the regime. 3

1. This essay contains fragments from the forthcoming (homonymous) book chapter “The Disturbing Normality of Protest under Authoritarianism,” in Johannes
Gerschewski, Wolfgang Merkel, and Christoph Stefes, eds., Crises in Autocracies (in preparation). In addition to further methodological detail, theoretical reflection,
and data analysis, the book chapter (available in a preliminary version from the author at request) contains comparative data on democracies as well as information on
repressive responses by governments. I thank Max Bader, Jason Brownlee, Martin Dimitrov, Zachary Elkins, Svein-Erik Helle, Wendy Hunter, Kurt Weyland as well as
the editors of the prospective volume for their valuable comments on earlier (extensive) versions of this piece.

2. Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 5 (emphasis removed).

3. See e.g. Xi Chen, Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution
in Iran (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2004); and Elizabeth A. Stein, “Mainstream Newspaper Coverage: A Barometer of
Government Tolerance for Anti-Regime Expression in Authoritarian Brazil,” Research Paper no. 31 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2007), available at shoresteincenter.
org.

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H ow O pposition C oop tation and I nstitu tional C onstraints A ffect S tate

R epression in A u tocracies
Courtenay R. Conrad, University of California, Merced
Ae Sil Woo, University of California, Merced

A
lthough democratic institutions are generally associated with improved respect for human rights,
dictators that sanction the creation of political opposition parties and institutionalized legislatures
often engage in more repression than their less “democratic” counterparts. What can be done to
limit repression associated with the creation of “democratic” institutions in autocracies? In this article, we argue that although
dictatorial legislatures and opposition parties are associated with increases in targeted government repression, the effect of
such cooptative institutionalization is likely dependent on environmental context. More specifically, we seek to determine
whether the positive and significant effect of opposition cooptation on government repression goes away in dictatorships that
allow freedom of the press or effective courts. 1

In the next section, we review existing literature on the effect of autocratic cooptation on state repression in autocracies.
We then present a theory arguing that the positive effect of political parties and institutionalized legislatures on autocratic
repression against the opposition is mitigated when leaders face constraints on repression—specifically, when they must

1. We define repression as “the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for
the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or
institutions.” This definition comes from Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Political Science 10 ( June 2007): 1-23. We use
the term human rights violations interchangeably with state repression. We define cooptation as the “intentional extension of benefits to potential challengers to the
regime in exchange for their loyalty.” This definition comes from Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “A Dictator’s Toolkit: Understanding How Cooptation Affects
Repression in Autocracies,” Journal of Peace Research 51 (March 2014): 332-346.
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 Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

T errorism as a T actic in D ictatorships

Deniz Aksoy, Princeton University

S
ince the attacks of 9/11 scholarly interest in understanding causes and consequences of terrorism has greatly
increased. An important theme in this burgeoning literature is the relationship between regime type and
terrorism with a focus on the differences in patterns of terrorism across democracies and non-democracies. In
this essay, I first provide an overview of the debate on regime type and terrorism in the political violence literature.
Second, I highlight the importance of moving away from a dichotomous classification of regime type and unpacking democracies
and non-democracies. To date, much more work has been done on unpacking democracies relative to dictatorships. Accordingly, I
emphasize recent literature that illustrates how institutional variation within non-democracies affects the emergence of terrorist
groups within these regimes. In the rest of the essay, I point out ways in which future work on terrorism in dictatorships can be
improved.

Regime type and terrorism

Long list of scholars have shown that democracies experience more terrorism than non-democracies. This finding holds when
we focus on different aspects of terrorism, such as the frequency of terrorist attacks, lethality of attacks, emergence of terrorist
groups, as well as number of terrorist groups operating in a country. 1 Since democracies give regime opponents and discontented
1. See for instance William Lee Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, “Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (March 2001):
155–64; Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, “Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments,” International Studies Quarterly 55 ( June 2011): 357–378; and
(click to continue on page 20 )

F rom the E ditorial B oard , continued

(continued from page 1)

conflict, and then we are looking forward to Keith Weghorst’s essay asks why individuals empirics indicate that a more free media is
issues on democracy support, as well as on choose to run against regime candidates, related to reduced levels of repression, but an
linguistic-ethnic divides and democracy. As knowing their chances of winning are slim. effective judiciary is found to be unrelated. These
always, I welcome suggestions from members Challenging established theories, which focus preliminary results contribute to the debate on
on topics to be covered in the future! on material benefits and regime co-optation as the role of democratically oriented institutions
the driving factors, the author argues that better and the limits of power-use in authoritarianism.
Staffan I. Lindberg, Executive Editor answers can be found by studying opposition
candidates themselves, emphasizing parameters In the final piece Deniz Aksoy argues that in
This issue is devoted to opposition in that vary between opposition and ruling order to explain the emergence of terrorist
authoritarian regimes. Most studies of parties’ candidates, as well as among opposition groups in authoritarian polities, scholars should
authoritarian political systems examine their candidates themselves. stop treating authoritarian systems as a single
inner workings, or the ways regime insiders use category, and instead study the relationship
resources to limit activities threatening their In another piece that highlights agency of between different authoritarian institutions and
hegemony. The authors here focus explicitly regime opponents, Andreas Schedler provides terrorism. The author also points to promising
on opposition to these regimes and offer new a provocative argument regarding what he directions for further research, such as studying
insights, as well as venues for further research in terms the disturbing normality of protest in the consequences of terrorism in autocracies.
the study of authoritarian opposition. authoritarian regimes. Contrary to previous
studies, Schedler’s piece presents evidence that Overall, these works demonstrate the benefits
The first three authors examine facets of mass protests in authoritarianism are frequent, of focusing on the opposition forces in
opposition activity. Michael Wahman discusses well attended, and often highly critical of the authoritarianism. While they are able to limit
factors undermining the cohesion of opposition regime. the set of options available to the opposition,
parties in Africa both at the voter and the elite regime insiders are not omnipotent. Thus,
levels. The author calls for better fusion of work The two remaining pieces focus more explicitly studying opposition actors directly can shed
on opposition parties’ coordination (which, in the contentious relationship between regime light on the constant power struggles in these
the context of authoritarian politics, has mainly and opposition. While previous work showed regimes, on the strategy of regime opponents,
been studied through the lens of the political that when these regimes have legalized parties, and provide a better understanding of
economy of the regime), and on opposition they exhibit higher levels of targeted human regimes’ stability and collapse.
voters’ coordination (such as studies of strategic rights violations, Courtenay Conrad and Ae-Sil
voting). Woo hypothesize that institutions increasing Eitan Tzelgov, Issue Editor
the cost of repression should limit its use. The

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W ahman , continued
(continued from page 1)
Table 1. SF-ratio in presidential elections in Africa
Election No Average opposition SF-ratio Number of Elections

1 .4509959 25

2 .3724596 26

3 .3550526 22

4 or higher .3073492 16

Average opposition SF-ratio Number of Elections

Electoral Autocracies .3813 68

Democracies .3696 21

One Round .40977 28

Two Round .3616 61

Total .3785 89
With the rapid global spread of the This essay will put specific emphasis voter coordination and the literature on
electoral authoritarian regime-type, on Sub-Saharan Africa, the continent elite coordination. Surprisingly, there has
many scholars have questioned how and with the highest number of electoral been very little fusion between these two
if authoritarian elections contribute to autocracies in the world and a context literatures within the study of comparative
democratization, authoritarian stability where opposition fragmentation has democratization. Coordination (or the
or authoritarian legitimization. As remained an important obstacle for lack of coordination) could derive from
conflicting results have suggested that political competition. I will argue that both the willingness of elites to coordinate
elections in multiparty autocracies before understanding the way in which before elections and from voters’ ability to
might have had diverse effects on opposition cohesion affects electoral vote strategically. The literature on elite
democratization in varying environments, outcomes or, indeed, democratization, coordination has most prominently
some researchers have turned to a we need a better understanding of promoted explanations related to the
more conditional understanding of the dynamics underlying opposition political economy of authoritarianism,
the relationship between elections and cohesion in electoral autocracies and new whereas the literature on strategic
democratization. In this understanding, democracies. The field has progressed voting has been preoccupied with the
the central question is not if, but under in this respect, but is still scattered. importance of electoral institutions and
what circumstances, elections in electoral This essay will summarize two separate social cleavages (and the interaction
autocracies lead to democratization. In sets of literature with relevance for between these two). Moreover, both
this literature, opposition strategy in opposition coordination: research on these sets of literature have a spatial
general and opposition coordination Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries element in seeking to understand the
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011);
in particular has been attributed great Daniela Donno, “Elections and Democratization coordination of opposition parties
importance. In a global study of elections in Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of both within and between electoral
Political Science 57 ( July 2013): 703-16; Jennifer
and democratization, Howard and and geographical units. I will argue
Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian
Roessler (2006) identified opposition Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” that future research on opposition
coordination as the most powerful Comparative Political Studies 40 (November 2007): coordination would benefit from
1279-1301; Marc Morjé Howard, and Philip
predictor of “liberalizing electoral Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in consolidating the literatures on voter
outcomes.” Others have questioned the Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” American coordination and elite coordination and
Journal of Political Science 50 (April 2006): 365–381;
causal impact of opposition coordination, hypothesize how these two sources of
Staffan Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa
arguing that the relationship between (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); opposition coordination interact within
opposition victories and opposition Danielle Resnick, “Do Electoral Coalitions Facilitate and between sub-national electoral
Democratic Consolidation in Africa,” Party Politics
coordination is endogenous or argued 19 (September 2013): 735-57; Milan Svolik, The units.
that opposition coordination does not Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012); Michael Wahman,
improve democratization in the long “Opposition Coalitions and Democratization by
Opposition Coordination in Africa
run.1 Elections,” Government and Opposition 48 ( January Cox (1997) introduced the “Second to
1. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, Defeating 2013): 3-32.

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Wahman

First loser ratio” (SF-ratio) to measure multiparty elections had been outcomes in electoral autocracies. 4
electoral fragmentation. A low SF- conducted, showing a gradual increase
ratio would indicate that elites and/ in voter coordination over time. These Voter Coordination
or voters have coordinated around the averages may manifest the importance When discussing opposition coordination
strongest challenger (i.e. the second of information, a factor stressed in in Africa, surprisingly little energy has
loser is much smaller than the first earlier research. 3 As opposition parties been devoted to understanding the
loser), whereas a high SF-ratio shows and voters gain electoral experience incentives and actions of voters and their
considerable fragmentation (i.e. the they are more likely to update and ability to forge coordination through
second loser is almost as big as the adapt their electoral strategies. As strategic voting. The most ambitious
first loser). Looking at this standard electoral experience increase voters contribution to our understanding of
measure of fragmentation, what can we can more accurately predict the winner opposition coordination in Africa to
say about opposition coordination in and candidates have more realistic date is Leonardo Arriola’s Multiethnic
Africa? Table 1 introduces the SF ratio expectations about their chances of Coalitions in Africa (2013). This book
for opposition candidates (i.e. the ratio winning elections when going it alone. sets a new standard for the study of
between the second and first opposition opposition coordination in Africa
candidate’s vote share) participating in Table 1 also shows opposition SF-ratios and beyond. However, a weakness in
African presidential elections (based on in the first round of elections based on Arriola’s argument is that it does not
results from the first round of voting). whether a country was classified as emphasize or theorize the importance
Data are from the Bogaards (2013) an electoral autocracy or a democracy of voters in the rational calculation of
dataset, an update of Lindberg’s (2009) (according to the classification by coalition making. Consistent with the
original data. The table shows both Wahman et al. 2013) and whether long-dominant ethnic voting thesis
the average across all elections in the the electoral rules permitted a second in African politics, ethnic groups are
period 1990-2010 and averages for round of voting if the first round was seen as stackable building blocks used
each uninterrupted election cycle of a indecisive. Surprisingly, there is only to manufacture popular majorities. It
country’s history of multipartyism. 2 a marginal difference in SF ratios is argued that voters generally follow
between democracies and electoral their ethnic figureheads. If leaders
First, the table shows that on average autocracies. Also, the finding that two- decide to go-it-alone, constituencies
among the 89 presidential elections round elections have more coordination will stay loyal; when leaders decide
in my sample the second opposition than one-round elections is surprising. to create coalitions, voters will follow
candidate got 38 percent of the votes We would expect that the possibility regardless of the nature of that coalition.
received by the top opposition candidate. of a run-off election would encourage However, the ethnic voting thesis is
This, indeed, shows a substantial opposition candidates to go-it-alone in put under increasing pressure in the
amount of opposition fragmentation in the first round and coordinate in the study of African politics. Numerous
African presidential elections. However, second round. However, the perhaps studies have indicated that ethnicity
there is an interesting decreasing most notable case of African opposition is but one of many determinants of
trend, implying that over time African coordination is Ghana where the African vote choice and that class,
opposition parties have become more opposition has consistently shown high performance evaluation, and urban/
coordinated. Whereas the average levels of coordination despite the fact rural divides also matter for the choice
opposition SF-ratio was as high as .45 that both the 2004 and 2008 contest of voters. Theoretically, if elections are
in the first multiparty election, it was resulted in a run-off. These results are in not merely ethnic censuses, voters may
down to .31 after three uninterrupted line with the state of the literature that coordinate through strategic voting
2. In the table I have excluded countries that were has shown a weak relationship between in a way that approximates voters in
coded as “military multiparty” in the Wahman et al electoral system design and electoral established Western democracies. Such
(2013) dataset. See Matthijs Bogaards, “Exchange:
Reexamining African Elections,” Journal of Democracy coordination might appear both within
24 (October 2013): 151-160; Gary W. Cox, Making 3. Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz, “Information and Ethnic 4. Jennifer Gandhi and Ora John Reuter, (2013);
Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, Politics in Africa,” British Journal of Political Science Harris Mylonas and Nasnos Roussias, “When Do
1997); Staffan Lindberg (ed.), Democratization by 43 (April 2013): 345-73; Jennifer Gandhi and Votes Count? Regime Type, Electoral Conduct,
Elections: A New Mode of Transition (Baltimore: Johns Ora John Reuter, “The Incentives for Pre-electoral and Political Competition in Africa,” Comparative
Hopkins University Press, 2009); Michael Wahman, Coalitions in Non-democratic Elections,” Electoral Political Studies 41 (November 2008): 1466-91;
Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius, “Authoritarian Studies 20 ( January 2013): 137-59; Michael Michael Wahman, “Offices and Policies—Why do
Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in a Wahman, “Electoral Coordination in Anglophone Opposition Parties Form Pre-Electoral Coalitions
Comparative Perspective,” Contemporary Politics 19 Africa,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 52 in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes?” Electoral
( January 2013): 19-34. (April 2014): 187-211. Studies 30 (December 2011): 624-57.

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and between districts. Voter coordination between districts with the strength to create a national
A question that has received very little parliamentary majority for their
Voter coordination within districts attention is to what extent voters are favored presidential candidate. Much
The clearest incentives for voters to prepared to desert locally popular more research is needed to understand
coordinate within districts would candidates in favor of more nationally the limits of local bloc-voting and to
appear under the type of parliamentary viable alternatives. Indeed, there uncover under what circumstances
disproportionate election rules are several examples of presidential voters’ demand for local candidates are
frequently used in Anglophone Africa. contenders that arrived overwhelming low despite elites’ willingness to supply
Although some research has studied support in their home areas without such alternatives.
party fragmentation nationally, little having a realistic chance in the general
is known about how parties coordinate election. One recent example is Atupele Elite Coordination
on the constituency level. A strict Muluzi, the presidential candidate for Elite coordination in new democracies
interpretation of Duverger’s (1954) the United Democratic Front (UDF) in and electoral autocracies is still poorly
psychological effect (i.e. the theory that the 2014 Malawi election. As predicted understood. This is hardly surprising
voters would dessert unviable candidates by opinion polls published before given that our understanding of this
not to waste their votes) can, however, the election Muluzi finished fourth topic is limited even in consolidated
only be tested at the constituency level. in the elections nationally. However, democracies. Most research on
Looking particularly at constituency he crushed all opponents in the coalition formation has been concerned
level election results in single member predominantly Muslim Eastern region with post-electoral rather than pre-
district (SMD) elections in five African (Machinga and Mangochi districts) electoral bargaining. Amid interest in
countries over time, Wahman (2014) by securing 58 percent of the vote, the relationship between opposition
shows that constituency level election compared to only 18 percent for his coordination and democratization
results converged to Duvergerian closest opponent. On the other hand, some recent work has, however, studied
expectations in Botswana and Ghana, there is also some evidence suggesting elite incentives and prospects for elite
but not in Kenya, Malawi, and, Zambia. that voters in some cases refuse to bloc coordination. Some of the work has been
Outside the African context, Burttoff vote for nationally unviable candidates. cross-regional, whereas a substantial part
(2015) argued that tribal dynamics in In a recent paper by Brass and of the literature has focused specifically
Jordan reduced opposition coordination Cheeseman (2013) a specific focus is put on Africa.7
despite disproportional electoral on the electoral misfortunes of Musalia
rules. The lack of within-district Mudavadi, the presidential contender Although the general arguments from
coordination in several disproportionate for the Amani Coalition in Kenya’s previous studies have diverged, one
electoral systems across Africa is 2013 election. 6 In an election generally conclusion seems to hold across studies:
puzzling given Conroy-Krutz’s (2013) seen as a two-horse race, Mudavadi was political institutions, such as election
experimental evidence from Uganda only able to finish second in his home system design and presidentitalism,
suggesting that voters do indeed favor region of Western Kenya. Beyond the seem to have had limited importance
popular candidates over unpopular presidential race, presidential coattail for the prospects of elite coordination
candidates. However, a minimal level theories also hypothesize that voters under electoral autocracy. Instead,
of information is needed for voters to may desert locally viable but nationally authors have been looking elsewhere
vote strategically. In the absence of marginal parties in favor of parties to explain variations in coordination
reliable polling, earlier election results across cases and time. Arriola (2013)
45-55; Conroy-Krutz (2013); Staffan Lindberg,
would be a good indication as to which “Consequences of Electoral Systems in Africa: A
develops a “pecuniary theory” of
voters could base their expectations. Preliminary Inquiry,” Electoral Studies 24 (March coalition formation, stressing the
Indeed, Table 1 showed a gradual 2005): 41-64; Shaheen Mozaffar, James R.
Scarritt, and Glen Galaich, “Electoral Institutions, 7. See Leonardo Arriola, Multi-Ethnic Coalitions
increase in voter coordination over time. Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election
However, due to high party volatility in Africa’s Emerging Democracies,” American Political Campaigns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Science Review 97 (August 2003): 379-390; Wahman 2013); Matthijs Bogaards, “Electoral Alliances in
many African countries earlier election (2014). Africa: What Do We know, What Can We Do?”
results are often not good indicators of Journal of African Elections 13 ( June 2014): 25-42;
contemporary party strength.5 6. Jennifer N. Brass and Nic Cheeseman, “Beyond Gandhi and Reuter (2013); Dennis Kadima, ed., The
Ethnic Politics: The Limits of Bloc-Voting in Kenya,” Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa ( Johannesburg:
5. Gail Burttoff, “Coordination Failure and the paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and EISA, 206); Wahman
Politics of Tribes: Jordanian Elections under African Studies Association (ASA), Baltimore, 21-24 (2011).
SNTV,” Electoral Studies 40 (December 2015): November 2013.

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importance of political economy More research is needed in order to coordination in Africa is still scattered.
and access to private capital. In understand such dynamics. When do More research is needed to uncover
Arriola’s theory, the main obstacle to opposition parties effectively control the relationship between voter and
coordination is credible commitment. their home areas by consolidating and elite coordination. We also need better
Put simply, rivaling opposition safeguarding their political base from knowledge on how coordination differs
candidates cannot be sure that potential local defection and when do they divide between and within electoral units.
coalition partners will ultimately honor due to internal differences and political There is a clear relationship between
coalition deals. However, if coalition opportunism? voter and elite behavior. A strategy of
formateurs are able to offer financial opposition fragmentation along regional
benefits up front, junior partners face Elite coordination between districts lines is dependent on voters’ persistent
lower risks when accepting coalition The most important obstacle to loyalty and the absence of strategic
deals. In countries where opposition opposition coordination in Africa is voting. Going-it-alone is an attractive
parties have access to private capital, low party nationalization. Wahman strategy for regional leaders trying to
coalition formateurs are more likely (forthcoming) showed that party build local platforms for subsequent bids
to have the resources necessary to nationalization in Africa is significantly or those creating vehicles for subsequent
“buy” the support of fellow opposition lower than in Latin America and that incumbent party co-optation. However,
challengers. Similarly, Wahman (2011) there is an important difference in local elites are unlikely to supply non-
also stresses the problem of credible the level of nationalization between nationalized alternatives if voters lack
commitment, arguing that dominant incumbent and opposition parties the demand for such nationally non-
incumbent parties are often able to coopt on the African continent. Not only viable offerings. African party systems
opposition parties when opposition are opposition parties generally less are diverse. The way in which parties
challengers do not see realistic chances nationalized than their incumbent and voters behave differs between
of ousting the incumbent regime or in counterparts, opposition parties African democracies, but also within
situations where the incumbent and the are also more likely to exhibit low countries. Some voter groups are more
challengers are not distinguishable in nationalization under adverse conditions prone to bloc voting, others are more
terms of policy platforms. 8 such as low levels of urbanization, large politically sophisticated. Future work
territorial size and, most importantly, on opposition coordination in Africa
Elite coordination within districts ethnic heterogeneity. Incumbent would benefit from a holistic view
The classic perception of African parties manage to keep nationalized of African opposition parties, taking
politics, identifying ethnicity as the despite these adverse conditions. both voter and elite incentives into
dominant political cleavage, is currently Using state resources incumbent account. When doing so, researchers
losing popularity. Ethnicity may have parties are able to build nation- should pay tribute to the fact that
been exaggerated as a determinant wide organizations and multi-ethnic African parties vary in mobilization
of vote choice nationally. Even more coalitions, whereas opposition parties strategies. Understanding the way in
importantly, looking at local electoral have often concentrated their electoral which opposition parties interact will
dynamics we see that competition is efforts to particular geographical areas. remain key in advancing our knowledge
often intra- rather than inter-ethnic. Danielle Resnick (2014) argues that on elections and democratization in
Political constituencies, especially those opposition parties have often made a electoral authoritarian regimes.
with a relatively high level of ethnic dual appeal, concentrating campaigns
homogeneity often feature significant to urban areas (where campaigning Michael Wahman is an assistant professor
intra-ethnic competition. Quite often is cheap) and areas where they can of political science at the University
party discipline is low and disgruntled claim some sort of ethnic linkage. The of Missouri. The author would like to
primary election losers compete in resulting consequence is low opposition thank Emir Yazici for excellent resesearch
elections on independent tickets. elite coordination across space. 9 assistance.
One example is the 2014 Malawian Conclusion
parliamentary election where a total of The literature on opposition
420 independent candidates competed 9. Danielle Resnick, Urban Poverty and Party
Populism in African Democracies (New York:
in the country’s 193 constituencies. Cambridge University Press, 2014); Michael
Most of these candidates had Wahman, “Nationalized Incumbents and Region
Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party
previously contested party primaries.
Nationalization in Africa,” Party Politics 22
8. Ibid. (forthcoming).

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W eghorst , continued
(continued from page 1)

parties have little chance of victory? opposition actors make in the moments recent democratizers (14 percent). 5 The
Based on three total years of fieldwork prior to defeating an authoritarian power of autocrats to co-opt is directly
from 2009-2014, I develop an original government. undermined by laws they establish that
theory of candidacy and test it in constrain co-optation.
Tanzania, where the ruling party Chama Prevailing Explanation
Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has governed Prevailing accounts of what motivates Lastly, this approach does not permit
for over fifty years. I emphasize that opposition participation in electoral heterogeneity in what candidates expect
early life experiences with partisan authoritarian regimes emphasize the to get by holding office, comparative
politics and civic activism impose a role of co-optation. In the context advantages parties have in appealing
path dependence on party choice when of legislative candidacy, opposition to candidates, and goals that can be
the decision to run for office arises. The candidates run for office in order to reached without even winning.
path of partisan versus civic activism be co-opted by the ruling elite—to
into candidacy also impacts the benefits win a plum spot in government or to New Theory
that candidates expect from office and extract resources. A popular opposition My theory of opposition candidacy has
their willingness to bear financial candidate can demonstrate his/her value three main components. First, it turns
and non-material candidacy costs. to the ruling party and maximize what the clock back on where most studies
Thus, when individuals engage in the he/she extracts from it. 4 The view that of candidacy begin—after individuals
strategic calculus of running for office, ruling party and opposition candidates have already made the decision to run
heterogeneity in perceived benefits are uniformly motivated by material for office. The theory centers early
and costs makes the opposition more gains is also echoed in literature on partisan and civic activism before
appealing to certain kinds of candidates. political elites in Africa’s democracies. candidacy and how these experiences
This approach follows a minority of influence later candidacy decisions. The
studies 2 that challenge the view of the In a co-optation approach, oppositions’ second component turns to intraparty
political elite in authoritarian settings motivations are generally derived from politics of candidate nomination after
as uniformly seeking material goods goals of the ruling party and what they an individual seeks out candidacy. To
and the spoils of clientelism. offer: autocratic elites create power- date, the literature has focused primarily
sharing institutions to distribute spoils on election prospects as a contest
The case of Tanzania is particularly to challengers to keep them at bay. The over voter support after nominations
compelling. It resembles other electoral validity of these assumptions needs are completed. The third component
authoritarian regimes on measures further interrogation. explores what candidates gain from
of government use of repression and the outcomes of the nomination and
violence. 3 Further, it features a unique First, opposition voters have already election contests. I theorize that
form of federalism offering within- stood against the government and may candidates are heterogeneous in the
case variation in opposition strength. not support an opposition candidate who benefits they expect from office, whether
Tanzania has a national government “sells out” to the ruling party. Second, those benefits can be obtained by losing
where CCM has dominated politics there is little empirical evidence of nomination and election competitions,
and a semi-autonomous President and the “transaction” of co-optation taking and willingness to bear financial and
legislature in Zanzibar where CCM place. One might expect the ruling non-material campaign costs.
faces a stronger opposition. In the party to co-opt their most threatening
October 2015 elections, the opposition challengers—opposition candidates
in Zanzibar won enough votes to defeat popular enough to overcome electoral
CCM for the first time in history. While disadvantages and win legislative seats.
the partisan government annulled the This intuition is incorrect. Over half of
5. Figures based on Martin Goeke and Christof
elections, my study highlights decisions electoral authoritarian regimes punish Hartmann, “The Regulation of Party-Switching in
2. Notably, Kenneth F. Greene, Why Dominant party-switching of elected legislators Africa,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29
Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative (August 2011):263-280 and Kenneth Janda, “Laws
Perspective. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
by forcing them to vacate their seat against Party Switching, Defecting, or Floor-
2007). and re-run, substantially greater than Crossing in National Parliaments.” paper presented
advanced democracies (8 percent) and at the 2009 World Congress on the International
3. Based on David L. Cingranelli and David L. Political Science Association, Santiago, Chile, 12-16
Richards. 2010. “The Cingranelli and Richards 4. See Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, July 2009.
(CIRI) Human Rights Data Project” Human Rights ”Elections Under Authoritarianism” Annual Review
Quarterly 32 (May 2010): 401-424. of Political Science 12 ( June 2009): 403-422.

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Weghorst

Component 1. Life trajectories of “Career with activities like grassroots Thus, even though ruling party election
Partisanship” versus Civic Activism organization and membership in civil prospects are very promising, only a
The choices individuals make regarding society organizations sets in place a small subset of prospective candidates
candidacy are set into motion years path that leads to later candidacy with will ever make it onto a ruling party
before they make a decision to run the opposition. ticket. The ease of winning opposition
(or not). These life trajectories shape nominations drives prospective
distinctive avenues into candidacy. Component 2. Intraparty Competition candidates to the opposition.
The only decision prospective
My research identifies two primary candidates completely control is Winning a party nomination is also not
paths leading to candidacy ambitions, pursuing candidacy (or not) with a a hurdle that candidates encounter once.
one to ruling party candidacy and particular political party. Seeking Incumbent legislators from the ruling
the other to the opposition. The to run does not ensure victory in an party face substantial competition in re-
road to ruling party candidacy is election or even whether an individual election bids. My research in Tanzania
partisan, starting in party-sponsored is nominated by a party to compete. tracked the political careers of several
soccer clubs and Boy/Girl Scout- As scholars, we argue that prospective hundred members of parliament (MPs)
like programs and continuing later in candidates weigh their chances of who have since left the legislature.
positions in local and national party winning office, but mostly interpret While the majority of opposition MPs
offices. Through this process, a ruling those odds as the competitiveness of an who leave the legislature are defeated
party grooms prospective candidates election. in re-election bids or voluntarily step
into party loyalists. In turn, these down, nearly 60 percent of turnover of
individuals derive political capital and Considering election prospects alone MPs from ruling party CCM occurs at
supplementary income from association do not get us far in understanding the nomination stage.
with the ruling party. Running with opposition candidacy in settings where
the opposition is not attractive to the deck is severely stacked in favor of The competitiveness of ruling party
them because leadership and political the ruling party. Why then would any nomination contests may also play into
reputation are inseparable from the strategic, calculating individual choose the hands of the opposition during
ruling party. to run for severely disadvantaged an election. In bitterly-contested or
opposition parties? Focusing on mismanaged primaries, ruling party
Opposition candidacy emerges from internal party competition helps answer candidates’ direct resources away
a different trajectory. Opposition this question. from election campaigns and spurned
parties lack the financial resources and nomination seekers may foment
organizational capacity to recruit youth The prospects of winning an election intraparty factionalism or defect to the
and groom them into loyal partisans are inversely related to nomination opposition. 8
to run as candidates. Instead, they chances. In areas where their victory
draw from civic organizations and is a foregone conclusion, a ruling party On election day, opposition candidates
civil society. These groups are highly has their pick over a large pool of face significant disadvantages that
visible, have public credibility, and can highly qualified individuals to field as make winning seats difficult. However,
offer administrative support, activist a candidate. In electoral authoritarian the barriers to candidacy for the ruling
networks, and basic resources like offices, regimes, nominations contests are party occur even earlier than the election
copiers, etc. Further, the priorities of significantly more challenging for the itself. When considering the interplay
civic activists often overlap with the ruling party than the opposition. This
in Transitional Polities: A Research Note,” Party
opposition’s stated goals like fighting is not only in terms of the number of Politics 14 (September 2008): 620-639; Shane Mac
corruption, deepening democratization, nomination competitors faced, but Giollabhui, “How Things Fell Apart: Candidate
Selection and the Cohesion of Parties in South
and protecting human rights. This also the political and party-based Africa and Namibia,” Party Politics 19( July 2011):
alignment results in “social-electoral” qualifications of their challengers, and 577-600; Magnus Ohman, The Heart and Soul of
coalitions where the opposition and the centralization and exclusiveness the Party: Candidate Selection in Ghana and in Africa
(Uppsala, Sweden: Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2004).
civil society figures coalesce around of the nomination procedures used. 7
election times. 6 Thus, early experience Perspectives on Politics 12 ( June 2014): 332-352. 8. See: Nahomi Ichino and Noah L. Nathan. “Do
Primaries Improve Electoral Performance? Evidence
6. See: Guillermo Trejo, “The Ballot and the Street: 7. In addition to my work, see: Bonnie N Field and from Ghana,” American Journal of Political Science 57
An Electoral Theory of Social Protest in Autocracies,” Peter M. Siavelis. “Candidate Selection Procedures (April 2013): 428-441.

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between election and nomination Opposition candidates most commonly campaigns. The ruling party can also
prospects, opposition candidates are identified policy and ideological restrict access to public media. The
less strategically misguided under a benefits as a reason to run for office. opposition must develop creative
cost-benefit framework. Following scholars like Kenneth campaign strategies and also lean
Greene, I show that promises to on candidates to self-finance their
Component 3. Differences between implement rapid political reform, campaigns. By contrast, a ruling party
Opposition and Ruling Party Candidates: deepen democratization, and advance can support their candidates’ campaigns
Diverse Benef its; Benef its of Losing; socio-political issues like women’s with public funds. This leads to an
Costs of Running rights lure candidates to the opposition. expectation that opposition candidates
The logic undergirding accounts of These candidates also enjoy the prestige will bear more financial costs of election
co-optation is that candidates want of holding public office, like speaking campaigns.
similar things from office—material, to local and international audiences
patronage goods—and that the ruling through public forums, news media, In a survey I implemented with
party has a comparative advantage in and party press conferences. legislative candidates in Tanzania,
delivering these benefits. Drawing from I found that opposition candidates
in-depth interviews with legislators In addition to heterogeneity between actually contribute less to campaigns
in several African countries, my ruling party and opposition candidates than CCM candidates. In terms of
research suggests that candidates are in terms of what they want from office, total costs, personal contributions, and
not uniformly motivated by material there are also differences in whether party support, ruling party campaigns
goods. I find that there are four main the benefits may be obtained from were substantially more expensive.
benefits of office candidates seek in losing a nomination contest, losing an Even though the ruling party can
electoral authoritarian regimes: (1) election, or both. For the ruling party, bankroll candidates, CCM hopefuls
the public prestige and prominence of a failed primary candidate can extract expect campaign investments to yield
being a public official, (2) the chance conciliatory positions in the ruling significant returns in office. Candidates
to implement ideological and policy party offered to keep him/her from from the opposition and ruling party
goals, (3) opportunities to advance defecting and gain greater popularity also spend their campaign funds
private career interests, as well as (4) for later nomination contests. differently. The opposition allocates a
material goods associated with holding larger proportion of resources to large
office. My dissertation demonstrates For the opposition, losing an election public events like rallies as well as
that all candidates value each of these can serve several goals. First, being on party regalia (fulana in Swahili). These
benefits to some degree, but opposition the ballot is one way to increase valence public displays of opposition support
candidates and ruling party candidates amongst voters even without spending help shape citizen perceptions about
differ in how much they value each much on a campaign. By running and the electoral viability of opposition and
benefit. losing, candidates also gain experience allay voter fears that of being singled
in a “baptism by fire” and learn campaign out by the government as a lone-wolf
Candidates from CCM mainly desired skills along the way. Individuals who opposition supporter.
material benefits of legislative office, see benefits in losing may not be very
including discretionary development discouraged by the opposition’s poor There are, however, two other ways in
funds, tax benefits, and Parliamentary electoral prospects. which opposition candidates pay higher
sitting allowances (“mapasho”). Material costs on the campaign trail. First,
benefits constituted about 40 percent of The final difference between opposition opposition candidates also engage
all benefits of office identified by ruling versus ruling party candidates pertains in more labor-intensive campaign
party candidates. CCM respondents to campaign spending and willingness tactics: about 40 percent of opposition
also identified holding office as a means to bear financial and non-material candidates named personal canvassing
of advancing private business interests. (physical security) candidacy costs. as a very effective way to turnout their
Candidates from all parties also cited supporters. They report this strategy as
CCM as the best provider of material Running on opposition tickets in the most effective way to win over
benefits. electoral authoritarian regimes can
be very costly. The opposition lacks
access to government coffers to fund

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Weghorst

CCM supporters, even in spite of the interact with and challenge autocratic electoral authoritarian regimes value
hazards of going door-to-door to court governments. Far too often, we rely more than the government resources
loyal supporters of an authoritarian on theories about autocratic actors to that the ruling party controls. They
government. do the theoretical work of explaining are also not simply staunch anti-
opposition behavior. government critics who rabble-rouse
This canvassing finding speaks to for the sake of doing so. Advancing
the second higher cost opposition Second, understanding candidacy policy issues through the prominence
candidates incur during campaigns: requires us to turn the clock back on of campaigns and legislatures is one
they are significantly more willing to the choice to run for office and look component of a profile of benefits they
bear non-material costs of running. My to life trajectories leading up that seek from running. Further, reaching
survey work in Tanzania assesses this snapshot decision. This insight also their goals of running need not hinge
through several approaches, including applies to candidacy more generally. My on winning a seat in the legislature.
attitudes towards Swahili proverbs work shows that early exposure to civic Opposition candidates are also willing
(“methali”) which are particularly activism initiates a path to opposition to pay a lot more than their ruling party
well-suited for measuring risk candidacy, while “career partisanship” is counterparts to get those benefits—not
attitudes. Opposition candidates are a critical stage of ruling party candidacy. in financing campaigns but in risks of
less discouraged by punishments from standing against electoral authoritarian
investigations of personal and financial Third, intraparty politics in electoral regimes.
affairs to physical suffering and violence authoritarian regimes is a promising
in the pursuit of their political goals. direction for research on opposition and Discerning why candidates run on
Even members of youth and women’s candidacy. Considering how election opposition tickets is the first step to
wings of opposition parties are more prospects are structured by candidate unlocking more significant questions
willing than ruling party legislators to selection procedures is important. for understanding the future of
take on these non-material costs and Between parties and within them over democratization in the twenty-first
risks. time, nomination contests vary in century: how does weak and budding
competitiveness, centralization, and opposition grow and strengthen?
Conclusions exclusiveness. Those factors shape the Insight on how nascent opposition
The research program of electoral attractiveness of seeking a nomination evolves into a credible challenger of the
authoritarianism has come far in with the ruling party versus opposition, government can shed light on how the
recent years. This piece points to areas even for purely strategic individuals. opposition may eventually defeat them.
of future advancement. First, greater
attention must be paid to opposition Last, my work joins a new vein of Keith Weghorst is a pre/post-doctoral
candidates. These individuals are the research in authoritarian settings—and fellow at Vanderbilt University’s
public face of the opposition and on developing countries more broadly— Department of Political Science.
the front lines of struggles against the that questions whether the motivations
ruling party. More generally, focusing of elites to run for office are so
on opposition as actors with agency monolithic. My research in Tanzania
is key to understanding how they shows that opposition candidates in

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S chedler , continued
(continued from page 2)

The literature disagrees, though, protests seem to form an integral do they serve the smooth functioning
on the causal relevance of peaceful part of political normality in many of authoritarianism.
protests, once they do occur under authoritarian regimes. 6 My hunch is
dictatorship. Some scholars emphasize that the accumulating case evidence of If anti-authoritarian citizens are
their disruptive potential: When frequent protest under authoritarianism competent observers of their political
popular protests pierce the surface of may hold beyond a few prominent environment, they should know it’s
authoritarian tranquility, they tend to countries. Tertium datur, intermediate hard to topple a dictatorship through
escalate and push regimes into crises possibilities exist, between quiescent public protest. If they are committed
of survival. 4 Others emphasize their equilibria and contentious crises of to the cause of political freedom, they
reactive nature: Mass protests tend to dictatorship. should be reluctant to drop their quest
irrupt in response to emergent troubles for regime change in favor of minor,
of the political regime. In and by Disturbing Protest more acceptable policy demands. I
themselves, they are unlikely to cause Country experts tend to read regular therefore expect them to be neither
such troubles. 5 protests in autocracies such as China in quiescent nor revolutionary nor
functionalist terms: Rather than putting opportunistic – but disturbing. Even if
However, as an accumulating body of authoritarian regimes into question, citizen protest fails to bring down the
case evidence suggests, the assumption they contribute to their smooth regime or to purchase particularistic
that popular protests are rare under operation. Acts of public protest concessions from the regime, it is not
dictatorship as well as the related under dictatorship are conventionally futile. It serves to communicate dissent
debate about their disruptive or reactive seen as acts of anti-regime challenge, and herein to irritate the official story
nature appear to be misleading. In as instances of popular contention, of authoritarian legitimacy. Its main
many autocracies and most prominently confrontation, defiance, resistance. role is informational.
in contemporary China, citizens seem Contemporary students of “contentious
to be willing and capable of generating authoritarianism” (Xi Chen), by Protest demonstrations do what they are
contentious challenges on a regular contrast, interpret them as acts of tacit supposed to do: they demonstrate. They
basis; and authoritarian rulers seem to collaboration between protesters and publicize popular discontentment, show
be willing and capable of “normalizing” authorities that do not challenge the that the surface of citizen quiescence
and absorbing these challenges into authoritarian status quo, but actually it deceptive. By tearing the veil of
their operating routines. Rather than serve to perpetuate it by rendering it generalized “preference falsification”
rare, disruptive events that provoke more legitimate and more efficient. 7 (Timur Kuran) they may not ignite
existential crises, or reactive moves that revolution. But they do not play
aggravate such crises, recurring popular I suspect that extant theoretical into the hands of the dictator either.
perspectives misconstrue both the Neither frightening nor submissive,
4. See e.g. Mark Granovetter, “Threshold Models of
causal force and the motivational bases they still unsettle the authoritarian
Collective Behavior,” American Journal of Sociology
83 (May 1978): 1420–1443; Susanne Lohmann, of citizen protest against dictatorship. standard script of social harmony and
“The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The As I hypothesize, most protest popular gratitude. They disturb the
Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany,
1989–91,” World Politics 47 (October 1994): 42–101; demonstrations against authoritarian dramaturgical self-complacency of the
Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social regimes are neither disruptive, nor regime.
Consequences of Preference Falsification (Cambridge,
reactive, nor submissive. Neither do
MASS. and London: Harvard University Press,
1995); Jay Ulfelder, “Contentious Collective Action they bring down dictators (or accelerate My (largely) inductive hypothesis of
and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes,” their downfall in the wake of crises) nor the “disturbing normality” of peaceful
International Political Science Review 26 ( June 2005):
311–334; and Johannes Gerschewski and Wolfgang 6. See e.g. Graeme B. Robertson, The Politics of popular protest in authoritarian
Merkel (2015), “Crises in autocratic regimes: An Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post- regimes carries two simple empirical
analytical framework” (unpublished typescript, Social Communist Russia Countries (New York: Cambridge
Science Research Center, Berlin, 2015). University Press, 2010); Guillermo Trejo, Popular
implications. Firstly, if mass
Movements in Autocracies: Religion, Repression, and demonstrations indeed are ordinary
5. See e.g. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Indigenous Collective Action in Mexico (New York: phenomena in many authoritarian
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies regimes, rather than exceptional
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University 7. See e.g. Peter L. Lorentzen, “Regularizing Rioting: disruptive events, we need to see
Press, 1986), p. 48; Sidney Tarrow, “‘Aiming at a Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian
Moving Target’: Social Science and the Recent Regime,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8
them happening with some frequency.
Rebellions in Eastern Europe,” PS: Political Science & (August 2013): 127–158; Kevin J. O’Brien, “Rightful Secondly, if “normal” protest strives to
Politics 24 (March 1991): 12–20. Resistance,” World Politics 49 (October 1996): 31–55.

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Schedler

Figure 1: Organized or spontaneous protest demonstrations by regime type, annual averages, 1990–2012
Democracies: Authoritarian regimes:

N regimes = 32, N regime years = 397, N protest demonstrations = 882, overall Ø = N regimes = 66, N regime years = 929, N protest demonstrations = 3006, overall Ø =
2.2 3.2

Source: Social Conflict in Analysis Database (SCAD); regional coverage: Africa, Central
America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

Source: Social Conflict in Analysis Database (SCAD); regional coverage: Africa, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

communicate genuine political dissent, This simple distribution of protest demonstrations autocrats face on an
rather than performing a delicate dance frequencies provides strong empirical ordinary basis? Are we talking about
of self-discipline and good conduct support for my initial “normality fleeting, minuscule events in remote
for central authorities, we should see hypothesis.” Rather than rare and regions, or large, prolonged protest
it go beyond small scales and local unusual events, protest demonstrations campaigns in major cities? Figure 2
concerns. To probe the plausibility of (as well as other types of contentions indicates broad empirical variance.
these hypotheses, I look at some simple actions) seem to belong to the regular
descriptive data from the recently political landscape of numerous Size. While large protests involving
released Social Conflict in Analysis authoritarian regimes. As it appears, over 100 thousand participants are
Database (SCAD) by Idean Salehyan rather than calmly presiding over rather rare (3.2 percent), the portion of
from the University of North Texas and quiescent, silent subjects, many autocrats very small protests (with less than 100
Cullen Hendrix from the University of have to manage a rather constant stream participants) is not very large either
Denver (www.scaddata.org). of contentious challenges from below. (16.8 percent) (of course, very small
events are most likely to go unreported
Protest Frequency The Scale of Demonstrations by international news agencies). Well
The SCAD database is the successor to How significant are the protest over a third of all demonstrations under
the Social Conflict in Africa Database, authoritarianism sponsor between 100
advanced by Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell, and Axel
extending its coverage to Mexico, and 1000 participants (36.2 percent)
Hadenius in their Authoritarian Regimes Dataset
Central America and the Caribbean (“Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated and another third between one and ten
(1990–2013). Its units of analysis are Data in Comparative Perspective,” Contemporary thousand (33.6 percent). Rather than
Politics 19 [ January 2013]: 19–34). Given my
individual conflict events, rather than exclusive interest in protest demonstrations, I self-sacrificial performances of super-
the conventional country-years. From excluded all demonstrations that were staged in minoritarian radicals, these seem to be
support of the government. In its appendix, the
1990 through 2012, these data cover quite broad and significant expressions
book chapter mentioned in Footnote 1 includes the
66 autocracies and 929 regime years. corresponding list of regimes, regime years, and event of dissidence (see Figure 2).
Within this sample of authoritarian frequencies. Note that I am treating authoritarian
regimes as a homogenous category, ignoring the
regimes, they register 3006 protest profound differences between authoritarian subtypes Duration. In autocracies, only few protest
demonstrations, an average of 3.2 events that have animated the study of authoritarian demonstrations seem to be part of sustained
regimes over the past years (see e.g. Barbara Geddes,
per year, which is, as Figure 1 shows, “What do we know about democratization after
nonviolent “resistance campaigns.”9 The
slightly higher than in democracies (2.2 twenty years?” Annual Review of Political Science overwhelming majority consists in short-lived
demonstrations per year). 8 2 ( June 1999): 115–44; Axel Hadenius and Jan one-day events (80.1 percent). Only a fraction
Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism,” Journal
8. The SCAD dataset does not distinguish between of Democracy 18 ( January 2007): 143–156; Andreas 9. See Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why
regime types. To identify authoritarian country- Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
years I drew the dividing line between democracy Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism 9 (Oxford, UK: Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press,
and dictatorship following the operational proposal Oxford University Press, 2013). 2011).

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 Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

Schedler

Figure 2: Scale and motives of protest demonstrations under authoritarianism, 1990–2012

a) Number of participants b) Duration

N = 2,157 N = 2,962

c) Territorial reach d) Grievances

N = 2,806 N = 2,962

e) Protest targets

N = 2,962

Source: Author calculations with data from Social Conflict in Analysis Database (SCAD); regional coverage: Africa, Central
America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

last longer than a week (6.4 percent) (see headlines). Only 8.5 percent of protest demonstrations under authoritarianism
Figure 1b). demonstrations under authoritarianism are on-and-off events that happen on
took place in villages or cities with a specific day and seldom survive their
Territorial reach. Popular rebellions less than 100,000 inhabitants. Yet, at first week, they do seem to assemble
do not necessarily start in the capital the other end of the territorial threat significant numbers of participants
city. The 2011 mass protests in Tunisia, scale, genuinely national protests are (between 100 and 100,000) on
Libya, and Syria, for instance, began uncommon as well (5.6 percent). The significant places (the capital city or
in provincial cities. Yet, unless protests bulk of protest either takes place in the other major cities).
reach a country’s political center, they capital city (58.5 percent) or in major
are more easily contained. As Figure 2c cities outside the capital (27.4 percent). The Motives of Demonstrations
indicates, rural protests are rare events Above all, students of contentious
in autocracies (or do not make it into the In sum, even if most protest action in contemporary China have

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Schedler

been reading popular protest under innocuous complaints about economic that popular protests are unlikely to
authoritarianism as essentially regime- issues (19.8 percent) or foreign affairs shake or even shatter an authoritarian
supportive: useful and domesticated, (14.0 percent). However, at least regime, we have to conclude that their
tolerated, encouraged, or even managed half of protest demonstrations under expressions of dissent are principled,
by political elites. Do such functional authoritarianism fail to respect the rather than opportunistic.
diagnoses of regime-friendly protest taboo of criticizing the political regime
apply to other authoritarian regimes and do articulate grievances about Despite their rough and preliminary
as well? Are the peaceful protest democracy, elections, and human rights quality, our empirical explorations
demonstrations that take place in (47.3 per cent) (see Figure 2d). suggest the possibility that the current
autocracies protest demonstrations comparative literature on authoritarian
at all? Do they really count as Targets. Contrary to the image of local regimes has been developing a large
autonomous acts of defiance, challenge, movements bringing local issues to the blind spot. In the neo-functionalist
resistance, confrontation, rebellion, attention of local authorities, two thirds emphasis it places on strategic
protest, dissidence? Or are they no of all protest demonstrations under equilibria, institutional safeguards, and
more than sophisticated forms of tacit authoritarianism target the central distributive policies, it tends to overlook
collaboration between subnational government (67.9 percent). Only a small the contentious quality of authoritarian
protest entrepreneurs and national minority of reported demonstrations governance. As it seems, there is more to
authorities? address local authorities (5.5 percent) the politics of authoritarian governance
(see Figure 2e). Of course, international than the design of institutions and the
The SCAD Database does not news agencies are likely to underreport distribution of rents. It involves constant
(and cannot) contain fine-grained demonstrations that do not target the public engagement with multifarious
information on the discursive framing national centers of power. public challenges by principled
of conflict events. Yet, it does register in opponents who do not wish to signal
a rough manner what kind of grievances Conclusion their fundamental conformity through
protesters articulated (“the first issue The empirical patterns that emerged calibrated acts of self-constrained
that was mentioned at the source of the in our simple, descriptive, explorative protest, but rather to communicate
tension / disorder”) and whether “the analysis of peaceful protests in Africa, serious dissent through genuine acts
central government” was “the target of Central America, Mexico, and the of defiance. Even when democratic
the event.” 10 Caribbean are inconsistent with the citizens know they can’t bring down
notion that mass contention is rare under the regime, they can at least rumple its
Grievances. While in almost one authoritarianism. They also run counter pretensions of popular consent. Even
eighth of registered demonstrations the notion of anticipatory obedience when they can’t chase the autocrat out
under authoritarianism the motives of by risk-averse protesters. Rather than of the presidential palace, they can
protest remain unclear (13.4 percent), staging innocuous forms of protest at least disturb his self-complacent
a fair number of protests indeed that limit themselves to pre-approved narrative of dictatorial popularity.
limit themselves to articulating more themes and non-threatening strategies,
contentious actors regularly articulate Andreas Schedler is professor of political
10. Idean Salehyan and Cullen Hendrix, “Social
Conflict in Analysis Database Version 3.1: Codebook
sensitive grievances in challenging science at CIDE in Mexico City.
and coding procedures,” Codebook Version 3.1 (Austin: ways. If they know what scholars of
University of Texas, 2014), pp. 4–5, available at www. comparative politics know, namely,
scaddata.org.

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C onrad and W oo , continued

(continued from page 2)

consider the costs of repression Aside from providing venues through ranging from expression and belief
associated with a free media or effective which to “buy off ” the opposition and to association and assembly to social
domestic courts. In the final section of rarely leading to true democratization, freedoms,” are often applied broadly
the paper, we replicate the empirical institutionalized cooptation in the and indiscriminately and are intended
findings of previous work on cooptation form of political opposition parties to limit the ability of diffuse groups to
and government repression, extending and legislatures often results in mobilize against the incumbent regime.
it to show that the nefarious effect of increased repression. State torture, Institutionalized political parties and
cooptative institutions on repression for example, is higher in dictatorships legislatures reduce dictators’ costs of
can sometimes be minimized when where power is shared by legalized identifying threatening opposition
leaders are otherwise constrained. parties. When dictators allow multiple members. As such, when dictators are
political parties to exist, members of able to institutionalize opposition
Autocratic Cooptation & Repression the opposition are more likely to speak parties and convince them to meet in a
Although a dictator’s primary goal is to out against the incumbent regime. legislature, they are better able to know
remain in power, threats to dictatorial Because dictatorships are “protorture” (and target) threatening opposition
rule are frequent. In order to better regimes, they are likely to respond groups with more precision, driving
solidify their hold on power, dictators to opposition demands by violating indiscriminate violations of human
have increasingly turned to the creation human rights. Dictators may even go rights down and targeted violations
of cooptative domestic institutions so far as to liberalize but continue to of physical integrity rights that “seek
like state-recognized political violate human rights as a costly signal to modify behavior and attitudes
opposition parties and institutionalized to the opposition that they are willing by threatening human life through
legislatures. When they are created, to do so. 3 imprisonment, disappearances, torture
these institutions are rarely intended to or mass killings” up. As a result of these
generate full transitions to democracy, Although many arguments explaining arguments, previous research presents
and instead help dictators to divide why dictatorships engage in more and finds support for two testable
their domestic political opposition, repression than their democratic hypotheses. 4
reduce opposition threats, better counterparts focus on dictators’ lack
control opposition demands, distribute of ability to influence politics by other Hypothesis 1. Institutional cooptation
spoils to ruling party politicians, feign means, the most recent literature on should decrease the repression of
democratic legitimacy, and extend the the effect of cooptative institutions empowerment rights.
duration of the authoritarian regime. on human rights disaggregates state
In particular, the creation of political repression. Dictatorial institutions Hypothesis 2. Institutional cooptation
opposition parties is argued to be a created to coopt the opposition can should increase the repression of physical
method by which authoritarian leaders have heterogenous effects on different integrity rights.
can distribute patronage and manage forms of state repression. When leaders
elite conflicts; dictatorial legislatures are unclear about the nature of their In the following section, we extend
also provide an “institutional forum” to opposition and the origins of potential previous research on cooptative
lower the transaction costs of granting threats to their tenure, they engage institutions and human rights,
concessions and better enable the in empowerment rights violations to arguing that the positive effect of
dictator to monitor and control the quell diffuse threats. Empowerment cooptative institutions on targeted
opposition. 2 rights violations, which “involve state autocratic repression—physical integrity
2. See, for example, Michael Bratton and Nicholas or state-affiliated limitations on rights violations—is mitigated when leaders
Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (February 2000): face additional institutional constraints
Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective 107-127.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); on repression—specifically, when they
Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions Under 3. See, for example, James R. Hollyer and B. Peter must consider the costs of repression
Dictatorship. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Rosendorff, “Why Do Authoritarian Regimes
Press, 2008); Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling,
associated with a free media or effective
“Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance,” Quarterly 4. For more on this argument and the definitions of
Dictatorships,” Economics & Politics 18 (March Journal of Political Science 6 ( June 2011): 275-327; empowerment rights and physical integrity rights,
2006): 1-26; Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: James Raymond Vreeland, “Political Institutions see Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “A
Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships enter into Dictator’s Toolkit: Understanding How Cooptation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); the United Nations Convention against Torture,” Affects Repression in Autocracies,” Journal of Peace
Will H Moore, “The Repression of Dissent: A International Organization 62 ( January 2008): 65- Research 51 (March 2014): 332-346
Substitution Model of Government Coercion,” 101.

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domestic courts. We then replicate courts that make the judicial costs and when other actors are willing and
the results of previous research and of violating rights non-negligible. able to punish noncompliant executives.
extend those analyses to test our Because they increase the dictator’s State authorities facing effective
hypotheses about the mediating effect costs of repression, these institutions judiciaries are more likely to incur
of constraining institutions on state cut against the incentives to repress costs from litigation under domestic
repression. that often accompany the creation law for two reasons. First, victims are
of cooptative dictatorial institutions. more likely to bring allegations of
Autocratic Cooptation, Constraint, As a result, the positive effects of violations before the court when they
and Repression opposition parties and institutionalized believe the judiciary to be effective.
Although cooptative institutions are legislatures on repression are mitigated Second, increasingly effective judiciaries
argued to lead to increased physical in dictatorships that have either a free are more likely to turn litigation into costs
integrity violations in autocracies, other press or an effective court. either because the violating leaders must
domestic institutions are commonly comply with the court’s stated remedy, or
linked to improvements in government With regard to media freedom, we are because the court enjoys sufficient support
respect for human rights. The most interested in the freedom of the press to punish noncompliant executives.7
commonly cited constraint on state from government censorship. A free
repression is democracy; the relationship press can serve as a “watchdog” on In conjunction, the theory presented
between democracy and respect for government violations of human rights. above and these discussions about the
human rights is so well-known that it As a result, governments in countries constraining effect of the media and
has been referred to as the Domestic where the media is free from government the judiciary on state repression lead us
Democratic Peace. Several “democratic” intrusion are generally more responsive to posit a conditional hypothesis about
institutions are argued to be responsible to citizen demands. In short, a free the effect of cooptative institutions
for this relationship, including those press can act as a constraint on human on physical integrity violations in
that increase accountability to the rights violations—even in autocracies— autocracies, which we test in the
public like elections, those that protect by reporting government violations following section.
minorities like courts, and those that of human rights and making it more
split government decision-making costly for the government to engage in Hypothesis 3. Institutional cooptation
into many hands. Regardless of which repression. For example, freedom of the is positively associated with the violation
institution is responsible for the positive press is consistently associated with the of physical integrity rights in countries
relationship between democracy and termination of government torture where there are few constraints on state
human rights protections, institutions across political regime types.6 repression. As constraints on state repression
are argued to “work” because they (i.e., media freedom, judicial effectiveness)
increase the costs of repression for Effective courts are also known to increase, institutional cooptation becomes
leaders—even dictators. 5 limit human rights violations—even in less positively associated with the violation
dictatorships. On average, state leaders of physical integrity rights.
In addition to contested elections, which facing effective domestic courts are
dictatorships clearly do not possess, less likely to violate human rights than The Conditional Effect of Cooptation
two domestic political institutions have executives in states with ineffective on Repression
been argued to constrain repression judiciaries. Courts are effective when To test our Hypothesis 3, we use
by increasing the costs of violating they are free from state manipulation, replication data previously used to
physical integrity rights: a free press/ 6. On responsiveness, see Bill Kovach and Tom test Hypothesis 1 and 2. 8 Because we
Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism: What
media that serves as a “watchdog” over
Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should 7. For a brief review and a discussion of empirical
the government and effective domestic Expect (Three Rivers Press 2007). For a conflicting measures, see Julio Rios-Figueroa and Jeffrey K.
view and a definition of media freedom, see Jenifer Staton, “An Evaluation of Cross-National Measures
5. See, for example, Christian Davenport, State Whitten Woodring, “Watchdog or Lapdog? Media of Judicial Independence,” Working Paper, 2009.
Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace Freedom, Regime Type, and Government Respect
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); for Human Rights,” International Studies Quarterly 8. These data come from Erica Frantz and Andrea
Emilia Justyna Powell and Jeffrey K. Staton, 53 (September 2009): 595-625; On torture, see Kendall-Taylor, “A Dictator’s Toolkit: Understanding
“Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Courtenay R Conrad and Will H. Moore, “What How Cooptation Affects Repression in Autocracies,”
Treaty Violations,” International Studies Quarterly 53 Stops the Torture?” American Journal of Political Journal of Peace Research 51 (March 2014): 332-346.
(March 2009): 149-174. Science 54 (April 2010): 459-476. Data on the dependent variable come from David L.
Cingranelli and David L. Richards, “The Cingranelli-
Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset,” Volume

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Conrad and Woo

Table 1: Effect of Cooptation and Constraint on Physical Integrity Rights Repression

F & KT F & KT Media Court

Results Replication Constraint Constraint

Cooptation .22* (.08) .22* (.07) .31* (.10) .24 (.15)

Media Freedom – – .29 (.22) –
Judicial Effectiveness – – – -1.94* (1.27)
Cooptation x Media Freedom – – -.16 (.09) –
Cooptation x Judicial Effectiveness – – – .04 (.49)
N 1,583 1,583 1,583 1,560

NOTES: Results from an ordered logit model. * Significant within 95% CI; two-tailed test. Column
2 shows results from Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014), Table II, Column 3. Column 3 replicates those
results. Coefficients on control variables and cutpoints were omitted to save space, but are available
upon request.

are interested only in the conditional measure Media Freedom using data from leader being constrained by a free media.
effect of cooptative institutions on the CIRI Data Collection Project. Their Cooptation is positively and significantly
physical integrity violations, we limit measure ranges from 0 to 2, where higher related to physical integrity violations in
our replication and analyses to that values represent higher levels of freedom countries with no media freedom (i.e.,
dependent variable. We use data from of expression and freedom of the media. when Media Freedom = 0). The negative
the CIRI Project to measure physical We measure Judicial Effectiveness using coefficient on Cooptation x Media Freedom
integrity violations, inverting the scale so a continuous measure based on an item shows that as the media gets more free, the
that higher numbers equal more physical response theory (IRT) model that culls positive association between Cooptation
integrity violations. We measure our information from multiple measures of and government repression decreases.
key independent variable, cooptation, judicial independence and power, the Although we do not present substantive
using data from on political parties and measure ranges from 0 to 1, where higher effects here for space considerations, this
legislatures. The variable “takes values of values represent country-years with more result is consistent with Hypothesis 3: the
0 (no legislature and no political parties); effective domestic judicial system. In the positive effect of opposition cooptation
1 (no legislature and one or more political results presented in Columns 4 and 5 of on physical integrity violations is lessened
parties; legislature and no political parties); Table 1, we include a term that interacts as media freedom increases. The results
2 (legislature and one political party); and 3 each of these measures with cooptation to presented in Column 5 of Table 1 for judicial
(legislature and multiple political parties).” test our conditional hypotheses.9 effectiveness as a constraint provide less
support for our hypothesis. The coefficient
Column 2 of Table 1 shows the original Column 4 shows the effects of opposition on Cooptation indicates a positive effect on
results. Before testing our conditional cooptation on repression conditional on the physical integrity violations when courts
hypothesis, we attempted to replicate 9. Original results come from Erica Frantz and are ineffective, although the coefficient
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “A Dictator’s Toolkit:
these results; the results of our replication Understanding How Cooptation Affects Repression
does not reach traditional levels of
are shown in the third column of Table 1. in Autocracies,” Journal of Peace Research 51 (March statistical significance. Judicial effectiveness
Although our results are slightly different, 2014): 332-346. Frantz and Kendall- Taylor did not has a negative and significant effect on
indicate in their replication materials the precise
they are remarkably similar, boosting our method by which they combined their data sets government repression in countries where
confidence in the replication. In order following multiple imputation to deal with missing there is no cooptation of the opposition.
data. We chose to combine the imputed data sets
to test our hypothesis that the effect of using Clarify. For more information on Clarify, see
The interaction term indicates that the
opposition cooptation on physical integrity Gary King, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg, point estimate on Cooptation when
repression is dependent upon domestic “Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving judicial effectiveness equals zero increases
Interpretation and Presentation,” American Journal
constraint, we require measures of Media of Political Science 44 (April 2000): 347-361. Data on as judicial effectiveness increases. The
Freedom and Judicial Effectiveness. We media freedom come from the CIRI data cited above; coefficient is not significant, however, and
data on judicial effectiveness come from Drew A.
2010.08.15. (Binghamton, NY: Binghampton Linzer and Jeffrey K. Staton, “A Measurement Model tests of substantive significance show that
University, 2010), available at www.humanrightsdata. for Synthesizing Multiple Comparative Indicators: the effect of cooptation is insignificant
org. Data on the main independent variables come The Case of Judicial Independence,” Manuscript
across the range of judicial effectiveness.
from Jose Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi (Atlanta: Emory University, 2011), available at
and James Raymond Vreeland, “Democracy and www.polisci.emory.edu/faculty/jkstato/resources/
Dictatorship Revisited.” Public Choice 143 (April WorkingPapers/LinzerStaton.pdf
2010): 67-101.

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Conrad and Woo

Conclusion repress. Although our research design does have independent effects on behavioral
Although not definitive, our empirical not provide us with much leverage over outcomes; instead, their effects are often
results provide tentative support for the determining the causal effect of opposition conditional on the larger institutional
hypothesis that the nefarious effect of cooptation on government repression, it environment.
opposition cooptation on physical integrity does provide us with information about
rights repression can potentially be interesting associations and offers us Courtenay R. Conrad is an associate professor
moderated in countries where leaders face fodder for future research on opposition of political science at the University of
domestic constraints that make repression cooptation and government repression California, Merced. Ae Sil Woo is a graduate
costly. More specifically, although courts do in autocracies. Future work on these student in political science at the University of
not seem to minimize the effect of cooptative topics should take seriously the potential California, Merced. The authors would like to
institutions on repression, access to a free joint effects of domestic institutions on thank Nate Monroe, Eitan Tzelgov, and Yi-
media limits human rights violations even both opposition and leader behavior in ting Wang for helpful comments on previous
when leaders are otherwise motivated to authoritarian regimes. Institutions rarely drafts.

19
Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

A ksoy , continued
(continued from page 3)

populations easier access to peaceful Some scholars therefore believe that of political violence and instability.
channels of political participation, this constraints on the executive powers of For example, democracies differ from
finding has been puzzling for scholars of democratic incumbents make them more one another in terms of their electoral
political violence. likely targets of terrorism. For example, institutions, which are shown to
Quan Li argues that democracies influence the ease of access to peaceful
To explain patterns of terrorism in experience more transnational terrorism channels of electoral competition. In his
democracies and dictatorships, one strand than non-democracies due to more highly influential study, Bingham Powell
of literature focuses on the existence executive constraints, and relatedly finds evidence that democracies with
of political and civil freedoms, such Robert Pape notes that democracies are permissive proportional electoral rules
as freedoms of movement, association more likely targets of suicide terrorism experience less political violence and
and expression in democracies. 2 The than non-democracies because they instability than those with majoritarian
main idea in this set of studies is that are more likely to make concessions rules, and a large body of subsequent
political and civil liberties influence to groups and more restrained in their research on domestic political violence,
the ability of discontented political use of force than non-democracies. ethnic violence and rebellions find
actors to disseminate information, Overall, this set of research suggests similar evidence for the role of electoral
recruit members, and coordinate violent that repressive responses to terrorism institutions in influencing the occurrence
activities. Accordingly, in democracies in dictatorships raise the cost of using and intensity of these outcomes.5
where such freedoms exist, it is easier to violence for discontented groups. As a
form and operate terrorist organizations. result, dictatorships do not experience as Scholars of terrorism have only recently
However, in dictatorships the lack of much terrorism as democracies. started to acknowledge the importance
political and civil freedoms severely of institutional design moving beyond
limits the organizational capacity of A more recent explanation emphasizes the dichotomous classification of regime
discontented actors who might have the differences in the nature of political types. However, this research has largely
incentives to use violence to attain competition across democracies and focused on democracies. Thus, to explain
their political goals. Thus, dictatorships non-democracies. Erica Chenoweth differences in patterns of terrorism
experience lower levels of terrorism than argues that democracies experience across democracies, scholars have
democracies. more terrorism than non-democracies begun focusing on different aspects of
because of relatively intense political institutions, such as electoral institutions,
A second line of argument focuses mostly competition, which motivates groups political party systems, number of veto
on the ability of incumbent executives with different interests to compete for players, and levels of decentralization,
to respond to terrorist violence. 3 influence. In democracies fierce political and judicial independence, which are
While dictators can ostensibly repress competition results in crowding effects, likely to influence discontented groups’
discontented groups without concern and groups that want to express their motivations to use terrorism.6
for protecting civil liberties and use grievances and attain their political 5. G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies:
draconian measures against the suspects goals perceive a need to “outdo” one Participation, Stability and Violence (Washington,
or perpetrators of terrorism, democratic another. This often entails an escalation DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982); Matthew
Krain, “Violence, and Event Count Models
executives are constrained in their ability to violence.4 Contemporary Democracies Revisited: Democracy,
to use harsh counterterrorism measures. Political Violence, and Event Count Models,”
Comparative Political Studies 31 (April 1998):
David B. Carter, “Terrorist Group and Government
Overall, an important limitation of 139–64; Stephen M. Saideman, David J. Lanoue,
Interaction: Progress in Empirical Research”, research on regime type and terrorism Michael Campenni et al., “Democratization, Political
Perspectives on Terrorism 6 (October 2012): 108–124. is the dichotomous classification of Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled, Cross-
Sectional Time Series Analysis from 1985–1998,”
2. See for instance Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of regimes into two broad categories of Comparative Political Studies 35 (February 2002):
Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13 ( July 1981): 379– democracy and non-democracy. We 103–129; Frank S. Cohen, “Proportional Versus
99; and Alex Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in
Terrorism and Political Violence 4 (December 1992):
know that there is important variation Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies 30
14–25. across democracies in terms of the (October 1997): 607–30.
political institutions that are relevant
3. See for instance Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic 6. See for example Deniz Aksoy and David Carter,
Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science for the emergence and management “Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of
Review 97 (August 2003): 343–361; and Quan Li, Terrorist Groups,” British Journal of Political Science
“Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational 4. Erica Chenoweth, “Democratic Competition and 44 ( January 2014): 181–204; Joseph K. Young and
Terrorist Incidents?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 Terrorist Activity,” Journal of Politics 72 ( January Laura Dugan, “Veto Players and Terror,” Journal
(April 2005): 278–297. 2010): 16–30. of Peace Research 48 ( January 2011): 19–33; James

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Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

Aksoy

Authoritarian Institutions and Terrorism explanation of patterns of terrorism coauthors and I argue that active
While research on the relationship across dictatorships focusing on opposition political parties can also
between democratic political institutions the role of authoritarian political have some unexpected consequences
and terrorism is burgeoning, relatively institutions. Even though most for dictators. Opposition political party
little attention has been paid to the dictatorships experience less terrorism activities, even under dictatorships, can
relationship between authoritarian than democracies, terrorism is still a bring together similarly minded people,
institutions and political violence. significant phenomenon under such facilitate communication among elites
This is largely due to the disconnect regimes. For example, between 1970 and dissemination of information.
between the terrorism literature and the and 2007 roughly 2021 terrorist groups Accordingly, political parties often
rich comparative politics literature on existed globally, and roughly one-quarter increase the collective action capacity of
authoritarian institutions. of the groups emerged in authoritarian opponents or discontented groups.
regimes. Moreover, of the nearly 84
A voluminous literature on authoritarian thousand attacks in the Global Terrorism Legislatures under dictatorships can
institutions argue that non-democracies Database, one of the most widely used serve as a forum to bargain over policy
differ significantly from one another in sources of data on terrorism, around 40 concessions to secure the loyalty of
terms of their institutional arrangements percent occurred in non-democracies. opposition and they can provide a venue
and political institutions can influence Furthermore, within this time period for the opponents to voice their political
important political outcomes, policy dictatorships differed from one another grievances without threatening the
choices and dictators’ chances of survival in terms of how much terrorism they dictators and their regimes. 9 Accordingly,
in power. 7 An important argument experienced. For example, Chile under in Aksoy, Carter and Wright (2012) we
in this literature is that institutions, Pinochet, one of the most repressive argue that when opposition political
such as legislatures and parties, can be military governments in Latin America, parties exist, organized opposition can
instrumental in helping a dictator secure experienced orders of magnitude more seek concessions within the legislature.
the tacit support of potential opponents terrorism than the former Yugoslavia Under this scenario, the existence of an
and discontented groups. Accordingly, under Tito. opportunity to extract concessions, or at
authoritarian political institutions can least be on the regime payroll, diminishes
shape the incentives and opportunities We focus on two political institutions incentives for the organized opposition
available for discontented political actors relevant for appeasing discontented to use violent means like terrorism.
to use alternative means to achieve their opponents: opposition parties and However, when there is no legislature
political goals, including terrorism. legislatures. Many dictatorships have and opposition political parties are
elected legislatures, which hold regular active, the organized opposition lacks
In Aksoy, Carter and Wright (2012) sessions and bring together multiple a venue to obtain concessions from
my coauthors and I provide the first political parties while others lack a the dictator. Under this scenario, the
A. Piazza, “Terrorism and Party Systems in the legislature but have active opposition opposition has more incentives to use
States of India,” Security Studies 19 (February 2010): political parties, and there are also violent means like terrorism to obtain
99–123; and Bruno S. Frey and Simon Luechinger,
“Decentralization as a Disincentive for Terror,” other dictatorships without legislatures their political goals. We propose two
European Journal of Political Economy 20 (April 2004): or political parties. Literature on ways in which transition from organized
509–515.
authoritarian institutions shows that political parties to terrorism can take
7. See for example Benjamin Smith, “Life of the opposition political parties can be useful place. First, moderate members of the
Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and in enabling dictators to co-opt their opposition can be radicalized since there
Persistence under Single-Party Rule,” World Politics
57 (April 2005): 421–451; Beatriz Magaloni, opponents as parties can help bargain is no opportunity to extract concessions
Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival with opposition political leaders and within the regime structure. Second,
and its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); Jennifer Gandhi and
distribute rents in a more efficient political parties can be a cover for the
Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and manner to opponents.8 However, my activities of radicals who are willing to
the Survival of Autocrats,” Comparative Political use violence.
Studies 40 (November 2007): 1279–1301; Joseph 8. See for example Lisa Blaydes, Elections and
Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (New York:
How Legislatures Impact Economic Growth and Cambridge University Press, 2011); Ellen Lust-Okar,
Investment,” American Journal of Political Science Structuring Conflict in the Arab World. Incumbents,
52 (April 2008): 322–343; and Jennifer Gandhi and Opponents, and Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge 9. Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under
Wonik Kim, “Coopting Workers under Dictatorship,” University Press, 2005). Dictatorship (New York: Cambridge University Press,
Journal of Politics 72 ( July 2010): 646–658. 2008).

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Aksoy

Our analysis based on data on terrorist experience more terrorism than others studied the impact of terrorism on
groups and terrorist attacks from the with a theory based on audience costs. voters’ behavior, electoral outcomes, and
Global Terrorism Database provides a In dictatorships with high audience government duration in democracies,
range of evidence to support our theory. costs, domestic population has some we know relatively little about
Regimes with active opposition parties ability to mobilize and hold the leader political consequences of terrorism
and no legislature are the most likely to accountable for policy failures. Building in dictatorships.11 Indeed, the only
experience the emergence of terrorist on the idea that dictatorships differ from work that exists on this topic studies
groups. Moreover, autocracies with this one another in terms of the degree to the influence of terrorism on military
particular institutional arrangement which they generate audience costs, they coups. There are many other potential
are also the targets of a significantly argue that dictatorships which generate political consequences of terrorism
higher number of terrorist attacks across higher audience costs experience as that future work should systematically
time. The results suggest that, when much terrorism as democracies and study. For example, related to the
opposition parties exist in dictatorships, much more terrorism than dictatorships previous discussion of the relationship
giving parties access to an elected that generate lower audience costs. between institutions and terrorism, the
legislature diminishes the incentives to Institutional arrangements matter question arises as to whether or not
use terrorism. because they determine the extent to terrorism creates incentives for dictators
which a dictatorship generates high to change the institutional structure
Several further studies examined audience costs. Accordingly, the authors of the regimes they lead (e.g. closing a
variation in terrorism across argue that single-party and military legislature or banning political parties)?
dictatorships.10 Wilson and Piazza regimes generate high audience costs Similarly, while there is some work on
develop a theory based on the idea that and experience high levels of terrorism, the connections between repression and
dictatorships can respond to political while personalist dictatorships generate terrorism in democracies we know very
dissent with either repression or co- low audience costs thus experience less little about the connections between
optation. They argue that dictatorships terrorism. terrorism, repression and human rights
that largely employ repression against abuses under dictatorships. Thus,
dissent are more likely to experience Avenues for future research another topic for future research is
terrorism than dictatorships that employ Future work on the link between repression in authoritarian regimes and
a combination of repression and co- dictatorships and terrorism can be its effects on terrorism.
optation. Using autocratic regime-type improved with a focus on several key
classification put forth by Barbara areas. First, researchers should explore Deniz Aksoy is an associate research
Geddes as an indicator of the type of and resolve inconsistencies in existing scholar and lecturer in the department of
strategy dictatorships largely use, they findings regarding emergence of politics and the Woodrow Wilson School
find that single-party dictatorships tend terrorism and terrorist attacks. Existing of International and Public Affairs at
to be better at using both repression studies on authoritarian institutions and Princeton University.
and co-optation, thus they experience terrorism put forth alternative theories
relatively little terrorism. Military of why some dictatorships are more
autocracies, which overwhelmingly use likely to experience terrorism, yet have
11. For political consequences of terrorism in
repression to crush dissent, experience some interesting contradictory findings. democracies see for example Arzu Kıbrıs, “Funerals
more terrorism. For example, the argument and finding and Elections: The Effects of Terrorism on Voting
that single party regimes experience less Behavior in Turkey,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
55 (April 2011): pp. 220–247; Claude Berrebi and
In another recent piece, Conrad, Conrad terrorism in Wilson and Piazza’s work Esteban Klor, “Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism?
and Young explain why some dictatorships is contradicted by Conrad, Conrad and Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate,”
American Political Science Review 102 (August 2008):
10. Matthew C. Wilson and James A. Piazza,
Young. 279–301; and Laron K. Williams, Michael T. Koch,
“Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects and Jason M. Smith, “The Political Consequences
of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks” Another major topic, which has received of Terrorism: Terror Events, Casualties, and
American Journal of Political Science (October 2013): Government Duration,” International Studies
551–577; and Justin Conrad, Courtenay Conrad, and little attention, is the effects of terrorist Perspectives 14 (August 2013). For influence of
Joseph Young, “Tyrants and Terrorism: Why Some violence on dictators and their regimes. terrorism on coups in dictatorships see Deniz Aksoy,
Autocrats are Terrorized While Others are Not,” David B. Carter, and Joseph Wright, “Terrorism in
International Studies Quarterly 58 (September 2014): While a long list of scholars have Dictatorships,” Journal of Politics 74 ( July 2012):
539-549. 810–826.

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Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

S ection N ews

V-Dem Dataset and Public Release accepted in the two calendar years immediately Committee Chairs:
On January, 4th Varieties of Democracy prior to the APSA Annual Meeting where the Jordan Gans-Morse
(V-Dem) Project released its first award will be presented (2014 or 2015 for Department of Political Science
complete dataset. It is the largest and most the 2016 Annual Meeting). The prize can be Northwestern University
comprehensive database on democracy of awarded to analyses of individual country cases Scott Hall #203
its kind, enabling a vast research agenda as long as they are clearly cast in a comparative 601 University Place
and nuanced descriptive analyses that are perspective. A hard copy of the dissertation, Evanston, IL 60208
comparable across time and space. The accompanied by a letter of support from a jordan.gans-morse@u.northwestern.edu
V-Dem dataset includes five Democracy member of the dissertation committee, should
Indices (electoral, liberal, participatory, be sent to each member of the prize selection Sebastian Mazzuca
deliberative and egalitarian), 34 indices of committee. Department of Political Science
various components of democracy, and about Deadline: March 15, 2016 Johns Hopkins University
350 unique and disaggregated democracy 358 Mergenthaler Hall
indicators. It covers 173 countries from Committee Chair: 3400 N. Charles Street
1900 until today. For download and full Henry Thomson Baltimore, MD 21218
documentation, go to the V-Dem website Nuffield College smazzuca@jhu.edu
via: https://v-dem.net/en/data/. New Road
Oxford, OX11NF Simeon Nichter
The data is also available for online analysis UK Department of Political Science
at the V-Dem webpage. Sophisticated but henry.thomson@nuffield.ox.ac.uk UC San Diego
intuitive and accessible online analysis 9500 Gilman Dr.
tools allows scholars, students, media, Committee Members: La Jolla, CA 92093
NGOs, practitioners, and others who Mai Hassan nichter@ucsd.edu
are not familiar with statistical software Department of Political Science
to nevertheless benefit from use of this University of Michigan Best Book Award
nuanced, comparative, and historical data 1303 Granger Avenue, Apt#2 Given for the best book in the field of
source. Ann Arbor, MI 48104 Comparative Democratization published in
mhass@umich.edu 2015 (authored, co-authored or edited). Copies
Call for Nominations: 2016 Section Awards of the nominated book should be sent to each
at APSA Annual Meeting: Christian von Soest committee member in time to arrive by March
The Comparative Democratization Section Head of Research Program 2: Violence and 15, 2016. Books received after this deadline
will present five awards for scholarly Security cannot be considered.
work at the 2016 APSA annual meeting GIGA German Institute of Global and Deadline: March 15, 2016
in Philadelphia: the Linz Prize for Best Area Studies
Dissertation, and the Best Book, Best GIGA Office Berlin Committee Chair:
Article, Best Field Work, and Best Paper Friedrichstrasse 206 Kurt Weyland
prizes. Members are strongly encouraged to 10969 Berlin, Germany Department of Government
submit nominations (including, for several christian.vonsoest@giga-hamburg.de University of Texas at Austin
awards, self-nominations) to the appropriate 158 W. 21st St. A1800
committees listed below. Please also forward Best Article Award Austin TX 78712-1704
this information to colleagues and graduate Single-authored or co-authored articles focusing kweyland@austin.utexas.edu
students. We ask you to note the eligibility directly on the subject of democratization and
criteria, deadlines for submissions, and published in 2015 are eligible. Nominations Committee Members:
materials that must accompany nominations; and self-nominations are encouraged. Copies of Sheena Chestnut Greitens
direct any queries to the committee chairs. the article should be sent by email to each of the Department of Political Science
committee members. University of Missouri
Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in Deadline: March 15, 2016 113 Professional Building
the Comparative Study of Democracy Columbia, MO 65211-6030
Given for the best dissertation in the sheena.greitens@gmail.com
Comparative Study of Democracy completed and

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Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

Section News

Rachel Beatty Riedl Best Paper Award Kate Baldwin, assistant professor of
Sciences Po bordeaux Given to the best paper on Comparative political science, Yale University, published
Les afriques dans le monde Democratization presented at the previous year’s The Paradox of Traditional Leaders in
Institut d’Etudes politiques APSA Convention. Papers can be nominated by Democratic Africa (Cambridge University
11, allee Ausone panel chairs or discussants. Self-submissions are Press, 2016). The book examines the effects
Domaine Universitaire also encouraged. of powerful hereditary chiefs on democracy
33607 Pessac Cedex Deadline: March 15, 2016 in sub-Saharan Africa. In a counter-intuitive
France argument, the book shows that elected
rachelriedl@gmail.com Committee Chair: politicians can respond most effectively
Kenneth F. Greene to rural constituents through institutions
Best Field Work Award Department of Government constructed and maintained by unelected
This prize rewards dissertation students who 158 W 21st St., Stop A1800 traditional leaders who are not worried
conduct especially innovative and difficult University of Texas at Austin about electoral time horizons.
fieldwork. Scholars who are currently writing Austin TX 78712-1704
their dissertations or who complete their Tel. 512-232-7206 Michael Bernhard, Raymond and Miriam
dissertations in 2015 are eligible. Candidates Fax 512-471-1061 Ehrlich Eminent Scholar Chair in Political
must submit two chapters of their dissertation kgreene@austin.utexas.edu Science, University of Florida, published
and a letter of nomination from the chair of “The Moore Thesis: What’s Left after 1989”
their dissertation committee describing the field Committee Members: in the August 2015 Democratization. The
work. The material submitted must describe the Allen Hicken article reconsiders Barrington Moore’s work
field work in detail and should provide one or University of Michigan on the historical emergence of democracy
two key insights from the evidence collected in 505 S. State Street in the context of post-communist
the field. The chapters may be sent electronically Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045 democratization. He and Krzysztof
or in hard copy directly to each committee ahicken@umich.edu Jasiewicz, William P. Ames, Jr. Professor of
member. Sociology and Anthropology, Washington
Deadline: March 15, 2016 Edmund Malesky and Lee University, also coedited the May
Department of Political Science 2015 Eastern European Politics and Societies,
Committee Chair: Duke University “Whither Eastern Europe? Changing
Barry Driscoll 221 Gross Hall Approaches and Perspectives on the Region
Department of Political Science Campus Box 90204 in Political Science.”
Grinnell College Durham, NC 27708
1210 Park St ejm5@duke.edu Michael Bratton, University Distinguished
Carnegie Hall, Room 302 Professor of Political Science, Michigan
Grinnell, IA 50112 NEWS FROM MEMBERS State University, released a paperback
driscoll@grinnell.edu Claire L. Adida, assistant professor of edition of Power Politics in Zimbabwe (Lynne
political science, University of California- Rienner Publishers, 2015). Recognized as
Committee Members: San Diego, published Why Muslim a 2015 “Outstanding Academic Title” by
Michael Broache Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Choice magazine of the American Library
University of Tampa Societies (Harvard University Press, 2016) Association, the book analyzes Zimbabwe’s
401 West Kennedy Boulevard with David D. Laitin and Marie-Anne failed power-sharing experience, examines
Box Q Valfort. The book examines the integration the institutional origins of that arrangement,
Tampa, FL 33606 of Muslims in French society, the rational and explains its demise.
mbroache@ut.edu and irrational threads of Islamophobia
in Europe, and how to develop policies Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of
Colm Fox promoting religious diversity. Her book Politics, University of Oxford, received
Singapore Management University Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa: the 2015 Association for Slavic, East
90 Stamford Road, Level 4, #04-052 Coethnic Strangers (Cambridge University European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEES)
Singapore 178903 Press, 2014) received an Honorable Mention Distinguished Contributions to Slavic, East
colmfox@smu.edu.sg by the African Conference Group’s 2014
Best Book committee.

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Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

Section News

European, and Eurasian Studies Award at Distinguished Africanist Award for John W. to the challenge of urban violence in Latin
their annual conference held in Philadelphia Harbeson, Professor Emeritus of Political America.
in November 2015. Science, The City College of New York,
and professorial lecturer, Johns Hopkins Olena Nikolayenko, associate professor
He also published numerous chapters and University and George Washington of political science, Fordham University,
articles including “Mikhail Gorbachev” in University. He is also the first recipient of organized the guest lecture “Ordinary
Mental Maps in the Era of Détente and the this award. Citizens in Extraordinary Times: Civil
End of the Cold War (Palgrave Macmillan, Society in Ukraine” featuring Yale World
2015); “The End of the Soviet Union” in Jonathan Hartlyn, Kenneth J. Reckford Fellow Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, a Ukrainian
the Fall 2015 Journal of Cold War Studies; Distinguished Professor of Political Science rock musician and civic activist. Held at
“The Scottish Question in British Politics” and Senior Associate Dean for Social Fordham University on November 20,
in Resplendent Adventures with Britannia: Sciences and Global Programs, University 2015, the lecture is available for viewing at
Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, published Fordham’s YouTube channel using the URL:
(I.B. Tauris, 2015); and “Politicheskoe “Normative and Empirical Perspectives on https://youtu.be/47IWTJXPnvc.
liderstvo i politicheskaya vlast” [Political Constitutionalism and Presidentialism” in
Leadership and Political Power] in the the Winter 2015 Latin American Politics and Cheryl O’Brien, assistant professor of
January 2016 Polis: politicheskie issledovaniya. Society. The article is a review of four books political science, San Diego State University,
published in 2013 regarding the relationship published “Transnational Issue-Specific
David E. Dixon is now professor and between constitutionalism and presidential Expert Networking: A Pathway to Local
chair of political science, California State rule in Latin America. Policy Change” in the December 2015 Social
University-Dominguez Hills. He coedited Science & Medicine. The article analyzes the
the second volume of Rhetoric, Religion, Juliet Johnson, professor of political science, implications of issue-specific networking
and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1965 McGill University, will publish Priests of on subnational policies to combat violence
(Baylor University Press, 2014) with Davis Prosperity: How Central Bankers Transformed against women.
W. Houck, which features fifty new speeches the Postcommunist World (Cornell University
and sermons from famed leaders and little- Press) in February 2016. The book explores After nearly 30 years as Vice President
known activists demonstrating the use of the revolutionary campaign to transform of Research and Studies at the National
religious rhetoric to upset the racial status postcommunist central banks into Western- Endowment for Democracy, Marc F.
quo during the American civil rights era. style monetary guardians and the influence Plattner has stepped down from this
The public access student research journal of a Western central banking network on position to focus on contining to serve
Zarytheus, of which he is managing editor, their development. as editor of the Journal of Democracy.
is now based at California State University- Christopher Walker has been appointed to
Dominguez Hills. Carl LeVan, assistant professor of take over as Vice President for Research and
international service, American University, Studies at the Endowment.
John P. Entelis, professor of political published “Parallel Institutionalism and the
science, Fordham University, published Future of Representation in Nigeria” in the Bo Rothstein is now professor of
“The Algerian Conundrum: Authoritarian December 2015 Journal of Contemporary government and public policy at the
State, Democratic Society” in January 2016 African Studies. The article argues that a University of Oxford. He copublished
as a part of the Prospects for Political Reform ‘parallel institutionalism’ has mediated “Making Development Work: The Quality
Post-Arab Spring monograph series with the Nigeria’s heterogeneity and sustained the of Government Approaches” with Marcus
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 1914 unification of the Northern and Tannenberg in December 2015 policy
The article argues that, while Algerian Southern Nigeria protectorates. report for the Swedish government’s Expert
civil society bristles with democratic Group for Aid Studies. He also published
aspirations, the Algerian state remains Eduardo Moncada, assistant professor an article with Eric M. Uslaner entitled
highly authoritarian under the control of an of political science, Columbia University, “The Historical Roots of Corruption: State
embedded military-industrial complex. published Cities, Business, and the Politics of Building, Economic Inequality, and Mass
Urban Violence in Latin America (Stanford Education” in the January 2016 Comparative
The African Politics Conference Group University Press, 2015). The book examines Politics.
section of APSA recently named their how urban political economies and patterns
of urban violence shape municipal responses

25
Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

Section News/New Research

coedited The Malawi 2014 Tripartite

Sanjay Ruparelia, associate professor of Elections: Is Democracy Maturing? (National Sean Yom, assistant professor of political
politics, The New School, published Divided Initiative for Civic Education, 2015) with science, Temple University, published
We Govern: Coalition Politics in Modern India Nandini Patel. The book explores the From Resilience to Revolution: How Foreign
(Oxford University Press, 2015). The book different aspects of the recent election Interventions Destabilize the Middle East
examines the rise, performance, and decline and studies the process of democratic (Columbia University Press, 2015). The book
of the broader parliamentary left and wider consolidation in Malawi. He also published examines how past foreign interventions
dynamics of national coalition governments “Rural Bias in African Electoral Systems: have influenced regimes to form or neglect
in modern Indian democracy. Legacies of Unequal Representation in broader coalitions in Iran, Jordan, and
African Democracies” with Catherine Kuwait. He also published “Understanding
Andreas Schedler, professor of Boone in the December 2015 Electoral the Arab Spring: One Region, Several
political science, Center for Economic Studies. Puzzles, and Many Explanations” in the
Teaching and Research (CIDE), October 2015 Government and Opposition.
published “Communicating Authoritarian Jennifer Widner, professor of politics and
Elite Cohesion” in the January 2016 international affairs, Princeton University,
Democratization with Bert Hoffman. The seeks partnerships with scholars for the N ew R esearch
article develops a theoretical framework Innovations for Successful Societies (ISS)
to analyze the communicative imperatives program based at Princeton University. Journal of Democracy
authoritarian regimes face as a consequence Aiming to research the building of The January 2016 (Vol. 27, no. 1) Journal
of their self-inflicted opacities. institutional performance in new of Democracy features clusters of articles on
democracies, ISS has released new case “What’s Wrong with East-Central Europe?”
Dr. Schedler also published “A Subversão studies on several questions germane to “The Authoritarian Threat,” “Ethiopia,”
Criminal da Democracia Mexicana” in comparative democratization including and “The Quest for Good Governance,” as
the October 2015 Journal of Democracy em norms and practices of governance and well as individual articles on China and Sri
Português and En la Niebla de la Guerra: variations of civilian engagement. If Lanka.
Los Ciudadanos ante la Violencia Criminal interested in collaborating, please e-mail
Organizada [In the Fog of War: Citizens and Jennifer Widner at jwidner@princeton.edu. “On Democratic Backsliding” by Nancy
Organized Criminal Violence in Mexico] Bermeo
(CIDE, 2015). Matthew Wilson is now assistant professor Old-fashioned military coups and blatant
of political science at West Virginia election-day fraud are becoming mercifully rarer
Jan Teorell, professor of political science, University. He and Gretchen Casper, these days, but other, subtler forms of democratic
Lund University, will copublish “Measuring associate professor of political science, regression are a growing problem that demands
High Level Democratic Principles using Pennsylvania State University, coauthored attention.
the V-Dem Data” in the forthcoming “Using Sequences to Model Crises” in the
International Political Science Review with May 2015 Political Science Research and What’s Wrong with East-Central Europe?
Michael Coppedge, professor of political Methods. The article explores the application I. “The Fading Mirage of the ‘Liberal
science, University of Notre Dame, Staffan of sequence analysis on the study of Consensus’” by James Dawson and Sean
Lindberg, professor of political science, bargaining between actors during national Hanley
University of Gothenburg, and Svend-Erik crises and the robustness of a commonly Across East-Central Europe, the political center
Skaaning, professor of political science, used sequence analysis metric. ground has long been characterized by the uneasy
Aarhus University. The article presents new cohabitation of liberal and illiberal norms, but
measures of polyarchy, liberal democracy, Ashutosh Varshney, Sol Goldman the latter have been gradually overpowering the
deliberative democracy, egalitarian Professor of International Studies and the former.
democracy, and participatory democracy that Social Sciences, Brown University, published
cover most polities between 1900 and 2013 “Asian Democracy through an Indian Prism” II. “Liberalism’s Failure to Deliver” by Ivan
and how these measures reflect variations in in the November 2015 Journal of Asian Krastev
quality of democracy. Studies. Varshney contributes this article Is democracy in East-Central Europe suffering
concerning Indian democracy to a larger because of a lack of liberal zeal among elites, as
Michael Wahman, assistant professor of symposium on Asian democracy in a special
political science, University of Missouri, issue of The Journal of Asian Studies.

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Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

New Research

Dawson and Hanley contend, or is it because Mungiu-Pippidi “Why Some Countries Are Immune from
liberal policies have failed to deliver to their Are the “virtuous circles” crucial to good the Resource Curse: The Role of Economic
promises? governance always the product of long- Norms” by S. Erdem Aytac, Michael
term developments under unique historical Mousseau, and Omer Faruk Orsun
“China and the ‘Singapore Model’” by circumstances, or can they be started or “Communication Authoritarian Elite
Stephan Ortmann and Mark R. Thompson accelerated by wise policies? Cohesion” by Andreas Schedler and Bert
China’s government looks to Singapore, the only Hoffmann
country in the region to modernize without II. “Georgia’s Break with the Past” by
liberalizing, in hopes of finding the key to Alexander Kupatadze “The Moore Thesis: What’s Left after
combining authoritarian rule with economic Much can be done to uproot graft when a major 1989?” by Michael Bernhard
progress and “good governance.” event such as the Rose Revolution sweeps in a
determined new team on a wave of massive “The Problem with Autocracy Promotion”
The Authoritarian Threat public support. by Oisin Tansey
I. “The Hijacking of ‘Soft Power’” by
Christopher Walker III. “Taiwan’s Fight Against Corruption” by “Is Democracy about Redistribution?”
Although the leading authoritarian regimes Christian Goebel by Carl Henrik Knutsen and Simone
are today integrated in many ways into the Bold leadership from people in key posts can Wegmann
global system, they have not become more effectively promote public integrity, but they
like the democracies; instead, they have been must be ready to accept tenures that are stormy Democratization (Volume 22, no. 7, 2015)
devising policies and practices aimed at blocking and short. “Utilitarian and Modern: Clientelism,
democracy’s advance. Citizen Empowerment, and Civic
IV. “Uruguay’s Shift from Clientelism” by Engagement in the Arab World” by Sabri
II. “Weaknesses of Autocracy Promotion” by Daniel Buquet and Rafael Pineiro Ciftci and Ethan M. Bernik
Lucan Way A change in the shape of partisan competition,
While “autocracy promotion” presents a real and the traditional parties’ ability to adapt “Why Do Some Arab Citizens See
danger, its influence so far has been limited. to it, has led to the decline of once-pervasive Democracy as Unsuitable for their
Because authoritarian regimes are concerned clientelism. Country?” by Lindsay J. Benstead
first with furthering their own interests, their
interventions often have contradictory effects, “A Win for Democracy in Sri Lanka” by “The Primacy of Political Security:
sometimes even inadvertently fostering greater Neil DeVotta Contentious Politics and Insecurity in the
pluralism. The surprising electoral defeat of President Tunisian Revolution” by Thomas O’Brien
Mahinda Rajapaksa in January 2015 was
Ethiopia reinforced by his failed comeback in August “Perceived Human Rights and Support for
I. “The 100% Election” by Leonardo R. parliamentary elections. New Democracies: Lessons from Mexico”
Arriola and Terrence Lyons by Courtney Hillebrecht, Dona-Gene
The ruling EPRDF and its allies won every Democratization (Volume 23, no. 1, 2016) Mitchell, and Sergio C. Wals
single seat in parliament in Ethiopia’s May “What Is Democracy? A
2015 elections, signaling a hardening of the Reconceptualization of the Quality of “Democracy Assistance and Women’s
regime’s authoritarian rule. Democracy” by Gerardo L. Munck Political Empowerment in Post-Conflict
Countries” by Paulina Pospieszna
II. “Silencing Dissent” by Simegnish Yekoye “Are Lions Democrats? The Impact of
Mengesha Democratization on Economic Growth “Democracy, Autocracy, and the News:
Ethiopia’s ruling party has long been tightening in Africa, 1980-2010” by Giovanni Marco The Impact of Regime Type on Media
its grip, using antiterrorism laws and harsh Carbone, Vincenzo Memoli, and Lia Freedom” by Sebastian Stier
restrictions on media and civil society to silence Quartapelle
voices critical of the regimes. “Translating Membership into Power at the
“Three Waves of Semi-Presidential Studies” Ballot Box? Trade Union Candidates
The Quest for Good Governance by Robert Elgie
I. “Learning from Virtuous Circles” by Alina

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Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

New Research

and Worker Voting Patterns in Indonesia’s Social Samaritan Justice: When and Why “Back to the Future?” Cuban–Russian
National Elections” by Teri L. Caraway, Needy Fellow Citizens Have a Right to Relations under Raúl Castro” by Mervyn
Michele Ford, and Hari Nugroho Assistance” by Laura Valentini J. Bain
“Rationalism in Politics” by Peter J.
“Illiberal Democracy and Violent Conflict Steinberger Communist and Post-Communist Studies,
in Contemporary Indonesia” by Chris Vol. 48, no. 2-3, June-September 2015
Wilson “Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic “Challenges and Promises of Comparative
Instability” by James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Research into post-Soviet Fascism:
“In the Name of King, Country, and People Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland Methodological and Conceptual Issues
on the Westminster Model and Bhutan’s in the Study of the Contemporary East
Constitutional Transition” by Winnie Bothe Communist and Post-Communist Studies, European Extreme Right” by Andreas
Vol. 48, no. 4, December 2015 Umland
SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES “Slovenia in Crisis: A Tale of Unfinished
ON DEMOCRACY Democratization in East-Central Europe” “Fascism or Ustashism? Ukrainian Integral
African Affairs, Vol. 114, no. 457, October by Bojan Bugaric and Alenka Kuhelj Nationalism of the 1920s–1930s in
2015 Comparative Perspective” by Oleksandr
“Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social “Between Democracy and Putsch? – Zaitsev
Network Approach” by Anja Osei Censure Motions in Romania (1989–
2012)” by Lavinia Stan “Elusive Proteus: A Study in the
“Autocratic Legacies and State Ideological Morphology of the
Management of Islamic Activism in Niger” “Explanation of Spatial Differentiation of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists” by
by Sebastian Elischer Electoral Results in the Czech Republic Ivan Gomza
and Slovak Republic” by Petr Voda and
“The 2012 Crisis in Mali: Ongoing Michal Pink “National Democracy, the OUN, and
Empirical State Failure” by Jaimie Bleck Dontsovism: Three Ideological Currents in
and Kristin Michelitch “Perceptions of Civil Rights, Security Ukrainian Nationalism of the 1930s–40s
and the “War on Terror”: East and West and their Shared Myth-System” by
“Burundi’s Electoral Crisis – Back to Compared” by Åse B. Grødeland Myroslav Shkandrij
Power-Sharing Politics as Usual?” by Stef
Vandeginste “Determinants of the Labour Market “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics
Institutions in Post-Socialist Economies” and Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA
“The Struggle over Truth – Rwanda and by Michał Pilc in Ukraine” by Ivan Katchanovski
the BBC” by Filip Reyntjens
“Germans 25 Years after Reunification “Voting, Identity and Security Threats
American Political Science Review, Vol. – How Much Do They Know about the in Ukraine: Who Supports the ‘Radical
109, no. 4, November 2015 German Democratic Republic and What Freedom’ Party?” by Lenka Bustikova
“Is Democratic Leadership Possible?” by Is Their Value Judgment of the Socialist
Eric Beerbohm Regime?” by Daniel Stockemer and Greg “The “Right Sector” and Others: The
Elder Behavior and Role of Radical Nationalists
“Feminisms, Women’s Rights, and the in the Ukrainian Political Crisis of
UN: Would Achieving Gender Equality “Russian Influence on News Media in Late 2013 – Early 2014” by Vyacheslav
Empower Women?” by Zehra F. Kabasakal Belarus” by Joanna Szostek Likhachev
Arat
“Converging Party Systems in Russia and Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 49, no.
“Why Are Immigrants Underrepresented Central Asia: A Case of Authoritarian 1, January 2016
in Politics? Evidence from Sweden” Norm Diffusion?” by Sean P. Roberts “Partisan Cues and Vote Choice in New
by Rafaela M. Dancygier, Karl-Oskar Multiparty Systems” by Jeffrey Conroy-
Lindgren, Sven Oskarasson, and Kare Krutz, Devra C. Moehler, and Rosario
Vernby Aguilar

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Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

New Research

“Silencing Critics: Why and How “The Historical Roots of Corruption: State “Competitive Authoritarianism and
Presidents Restrict Media Freedom in Building, Economic Inequality, and Mass Popular Protest: Evidence from Serbia
Democracies” by Marisa Kellam and Education” by Eric M. Uslaner and Bo under Milošević” by Nebojša Vladisavljević
Elizabeth A. Stein Rothstein
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 59,
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. “Splitting the Difference? The Politics of no 4, December 2015
14, December 2015 District Creation in Indonesia” by Jan H. “When Do Dictators Decide to Liberalize
“Power and Institutional Change: Re- Pierskalla Trade Regimes? Inequality and Trade
Reforms of Latin American Pension Openness in Authoritarian Countries” by
Systems in a Comparative Perspective” by East European Politics, Vol. 31, no. 4, 2015 Wen-Chin Wu
Kaori Baba “Losing Control: a Principal-Agent
Analysis of Russia in the United Nations “Dictators and Death: Casualty Sensitivity
“Political Parties, Clientelism, and Security Council’s Decision-Making of Autocracies in Militarized Interstate
Bureaucratic Reform” by Cesi Cruz and towards the Libya Crisis” by Yf Reykers & Disputes” by Cigdem V. Sirin and Michael
Philip Keefer Niels Smeets T. Koch

“The Non-Democratic Origins of Income “Neither Security nor Development? “Stasis or Decay? Reconciling Covert War
Taxation” by Isabela Mares and Didac Czech and Hungarian Identities and and the Democratic Peace” by Michael
Queralt Interests in the Provincial Reconstruction Poznansky
Teams in Afghanistan” by Ondřej Horký-
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, no. Hlucháň and Balázs Szent-Iványi Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 53,
13, November 2015 no. 4, December 2015
“The Role of Subnational Politicians in “Beyond Instrumentalisation: NGO “Grievances, Governance and Islamist
Distributive Politics: Political Bias in Monitoring Coalitions in Croatia, Violence in sub-Saharan Africa” by
Venezuela’s Land Reform Under Chávez” Montenegro, and Serbia” by Natasha Caitriona Dowd
by Michael Albertus Wunsch
“(Dis)unity in Diversity: How Common
“Party Nomination Rules and Campaign “Who Commits to the Rule of Law? Beliefs about Ethnicity Benefit the White
Participation” by Georgia Kernell Constrained Government and Foreign Mauritian Elite” by Tijo Salverda
Direct Investment in Postcommunist
Comparative Politics, Vol. 48, no. 2, States” by Michael Touchton “Does Democratisation Foster Effective
January 2016 Taxation? Evidence from Benin” by Giulia
“When Autocratic Regimes Are Cheap Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 37, no. 4, Piccolino
and Play Dirty: The Transaction Costs of November 2013
Repression in South Africa, Kenya, and “The Right to Food Under Hugo Chávez” “‘Mundele, it is because of you’ History,
Egypt” by Jens Rudbeck, Erica Mukherjee, by Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann Identity and the Meaning of Democracy in
and Kelly Nelson the Congo” by Meike J. De Goede
International Political Science Review, Vol.
“The Importance of Winning: Victorious 37, no. 1, January 2016 Latin American Politics and Society, Vol.
Insurgent Groups and Authoritarian “Institutional, Societal, and Economic 57, no. 4, Winter 2015
Politics” by Terrence Lyons Determinants of Party System Size: “What Determines Foreign Policy in
Evidence from Brazil” by Simone Bohn Latin America? Systemic versus Domestic
“Mandate and the Market: Policy Factors in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico,
Outcomes under the Left in Latin “Trust in Government Institutions: The 1946–2008” by Octavio Amorim Neto and
America” by Glen Biglaiserr Effects of Performance and Participation Andrés Malamud
in the Dominican Republic and Haiti” by
“The Merits of Problem-Solving over Alissandra T Stoyan, Sara Niedzwiecki, “The Co-optation of LGBT Movements
Powering: Governance Reforms in Brazil Jana Morgan, Jonathan Hartlyn, and in Mexico and Nicaragua: Modernizing
and Argentina” by Katherine Bersch Rosario Espinal Clientelism?” by Marcus J. McGee and
Karen Kampwirth

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Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

New Research

Middle East Journal, Vol. 69, no 4, Fall SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON Making Freedom: Apartheid, Squatter
2015 DEMOCRACY Politics, and the Struggle for Home. By
“The Emergence of Ex-Jihadi Political Anne-Maria Makhulu. Duke University
Parties in Post-Mubarak Egypt” by Jérôme ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES Press, 2015. 228 pp.
Drevon American Justice 2015: The Dramatic Tenth
Term of the Roberts Court. By Steven V. ASIA
“Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Mazie. University of Pennsylvania Press, Anti-Americanism in Democratizing
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood” by Khalil 2015. 167 pp. South Korea. By David Straub. Walter H.
al-Anani Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center,
American Pendulum: Recurring Debates 2015. 246 pp.
“Politicized Identities, Securitized Politics: in U.S. Grand Strategy. By Christopher
Sunni-Shi’a Politics in Egypt” by Alam Hemmer. Cornell University Press, 2015. Divided We Govern: Coalition Politics in
Saleh and Hendrik Kraetzschmar 224 pp. Modern India. By Sanjay Ruparelia. Oxford
University Press, 2015. 480 pp.
“Islamic Women’s Groups and the Quest The American President: From Teddy
for Political Representation in Turkey and Roosevelt to Bill Clinton. By William E. India: Democracy and Violence. Edited by
Iran” by Mona Tajali Leuchtenburg. Oxford University Press, Samir Kumar Das. Oxford University Press,
2015. 886 pp. 2015. 258 pp.
Party Politics, Vol. 22, no. 1, January 2016
“How Democracy Functions without Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism. Metamorphosis: Studies in Social and
Parties: The Republic of Palau” by Wouter By John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart. Political Change in Myanmar. Edited by
P Veenendaal Oxford University Press, 2016. 391 pp. Renaud Egreteau and François Robinne.
NUS Press, 2016. 428 pp.
“The Validity of the RILE Left–Right Language Assistance under the Voting
Index as a Measure of Party Policy” by Rights Act: Are Voters Lost in Translation? EASTERN EUROPE AND THE
Martin Mölder By Shauna Reilly. Lexington, 2015. 131 pp. FORMER SOVIET UNION
The Policy-Making Process and Social
“Democratic Dynasties? Internal Party Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Learning in Russia: The Case of Housing
Democracy in Bangladesh” by Inge Shapes American Politics, 2nd ed. By James Policy. By Marina Khmelnitskaya. Palgrave
Amundsen A. Stimson. Cambridge University Press, Macmillan, 2015. 279 pp.
2015. 173 pp.
Representation, Vol. 51, no. 3, 2015 Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet
“Electoral Systems and Opinion What Would Madison Do? The Father of Eurasia. Edited by Martin Brusis. Palgrave
Representation” by Christopher Wlezien the Constitution Meets Modern American Macmillian, 2016. 251 pp.
and Stuart N. Soroka Politics. Edited by Benjamin Wittes and
Pietro Nivola. Brookings Institution Press, LATIN AMERICA AND THE
“Research Note: The Influence of Party 2015. 240 pp. CARIBBEAN
Candidate Selection Methods on Barrio Rising: Urban Popular Politics
Candidate Diversity” by Anika Gauja and Youth Participation in Democratic Life: and the Making of Modern Venezuela. By
William Cross Stories of Hope and Disillusion. By Bart Alejandro Velasco. University of California
Cammaerts et al. Palgrave Macmillian, Press, 2015. 321 pp.
“Electoral Dioramas: On the Problem 2016. 237 pp.
of Representation in Voting Advice The Organization of American States as
Applications” by Thomas Fossen and Bert AFRICA the Advocate and Guardian of Democracy:
van den Brink African Institutions: Challenges to Political, An Insider’s Critical Assessment of Its Role
Social, and Economic Foundations of in Promoting and Defending Democracy.
Africa’s Development. By Ali A. Mazrui By Rubén M. Perina. University Press of
and Francis Wiafe-Amoako. Rowman and America, 2015. 257 pp.
Littlefield, 2016. 184 pp.

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New Research

The Politics of Local Participatory Democratic Equilibrium: The Supply and By Michael F. Oppenheimer. Oxford
Democracy in Latin America: Institutions, Demand of Democracy. By Michael W. University Press, 2016. 260 pp.
Actors, and Interactions. By Françoise Fowler. Lexington, 2015. 219 pp.
Montambeault. Stanford University Press, Political Turbulence: How Social Media
2015. 265 pp. Do International Corruption Metrics Shape Collective Action. By Helen Margetts
Matter? The Impact of Transparency et al. Princeton University Press, 2015. 279
MIDDLE EAST International’s Corruption Perception Index. pp.
EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab By Omar E. Hawthorne. Lexington Books,
Spring: International Cooperation and 2015. 159 pp. The Politics of Majority Nationalism:
Authoritarianism. By Vera Van Hüllen. Framing Peace, Stalemates, and Crises. By
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 242 pp. The Economics of Immigration: Market- Neophytos Loizides. Stanford University
Based Approaches, Social Science, and Public Press, 2015. 242 pp.
The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East: Policy. Edited by Benjamin Powell. Oxford
Northern Lebanon from al-Qaeda to ISIS. University Press, 2015. 249 pp. The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy. By
By Bernard Rougier. Princeton University Richard Youngs. Carnegie Endowment for
Press, 2015. 259 pp. The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the International Peace, 2015. 215 pp.
Origins of Inequality. By Angus Deaton.
Workers and Thieves: Labor Movements and Princeton University Press, 2013. 360 pp. The Rise of Democracy: Revolution, War and
Popular Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Transformations in International Politics
By Joel Beinin. Stanford University Press, La revanche des passions: Métamorphoses Since 1776. By Christopher Hobson.
2016. 164 pp. de la violence et crises du politique. By Pierre Edinburgh University Press, 2015. 254 pp.
Hassner. Fayard, 2015. 360 pp.
COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, The Shape of the New: Four Big Ideas and
GENERAL Media and Politics in New Democracies: How They Made the Modern World. By
The China Model: Political Meritocracy and Europe in a Comparative Perspective. Scott L. Montgomery and Daniel Chirot.
the Limits of Democracy. By Daniel A. Bell. Edited by Jan Zielonka. Oxford University Princeton University Press, 2015. 492 pp.
Princeton University Press, 2015. 336 pp. Press, 2015. 322 pp.
Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and
Democracy, Culture, Catholicism: Voices The Midas Paradox: Financial Markets, Practice. By Peter Jones. Stanford
from Four Continents. Edited by Michael Government Policy Shocks, and the Great University Press, 2015. 237 pp.
Schuck and John Crowley-Buck. Fordham Depression. By Scott Sumner. Independent
University Press. 350 pp. Institute, 2016. 509 pp. Uninformed: Why People Know So Little
About Politics and What We Can Do About
Pivotal Countries, Alternate Futures: Using It. By Arthur Lupia. Oxford University
Scenarios to Manage American Strategy. Press, 2016. 434 pp.

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Vol. 14, No. 1 Comparative Democratization J anuary 2016

Editorial Committee

APSA-CD
is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association’s Comparative
Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published
three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for
Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and
expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter
is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the V-Dem Institute and the International Forum.

Executive Editor Eitan Tzelgov is a senior post-doctoral fellow at the

Staffan I. Lindberg is professor of political science V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. He studies
and director of the V-Dem Institute, University legislative institutions and political parties. His
of Gothenburg; is one of four PIs for Varieties of dissertation, awarded the Carl Albert Award by the
Democracy (V-Dem); Wallenberg Academy Fellow; Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science
selected member Young Academy of Sweden; and a Research Association, examines the strategic use of parliamentary speeches
Fellow in the QoG Institute. He is author of Democracy and by the legislative opposition.
Elections in Africa and editor of Democratization by Elections:
A New Mode of Transition?, and has also worked on women’s Yi-ting Wang is an assistant professor of political
representation, clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral science at National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan;
systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian and a Research Associate of the Varieties of Democracy
legislature and executive- legislative relationships. (V-Dem) Institute. Her research interests include
party politics, legislative institutions, regime
Members transitions, and quantitative methodology. Her work primarily
Anna Lührmann is a post-doctoral fellow at the focuses on legislative institutions and politicians’ accountability
V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Her strategies with an emphasis on questions of conditions for
doctoral thesis – completed in summer 2015 at democratic stability
Humboldt University (Berlin) - studies the causes and effects of
United Nation’s electoral assistance. She currently works on Brigitte Zimmerman is assistant professor of political
several research projects concerning electoral manipulation, science and Peter Thacher Grauer Fellow in public
regime legitimacy and the impact of democracy promotion. policy, UNC-Chapel Hill; affiliated researcher at the
V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg; and
Kyle L. Marquardt is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem project manager for experiments. Her research agenda
V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. He studies examines accountability institutions in consolidating democracies,
identity politics and the politics of authoritarianism. His with a geographic focus on sub-Saharan Africa. In her dissertation,
current project uses data from extensive field and survey she analyzed the strategic responses of political officials to anti-
research from Eurasia to examine the relationship between corruption interventions, documenting patterns of corruption
language and separatism. Other projects involve the use of list substitution through extensive fieldwork. Other current research
experiments to analyze support for authoritarian leaders and addresses discrimination in petty corruption, incumbency
Bayesian latent variable analysis of the components of social advantage in diverse institutional contexts, the political economy
identities. of FDI and foreign aid, and the ethics of field research.

Kelly M. McMann is an associate professor Managing Editor

of political science at Case Western Reserve Melissa Aten is the senior research and conferences
University and the V-Dem project manager for officer at the National Endowment for Democracy’s
subnational government. She currently is conducting research on International Forum for Democratic Studies and
how democracy develops within countries, studying contemporary associate director of the Network of Democracy
cases in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union and historical Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George
cases in Europe. Her earlier research focused on corruption and Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs,
activism and has been published in the books Corruption as a where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.
Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia and Economic
Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

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