[ G.R. No.

209278, September 15, 2021 ]

IRENE CONSTANTINO DATU, PETITIONER, VS. ALFREDO FABIAN

DATU, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, a ground to void marriage under Article 36 of the

Family Code, is a legal, not a medical, concept. As such, it is enough that
parties prove that an enduring part of their personality renders them inca-
pable of performing their essential marital obligations. That the psychologi-
cal incapacity be rooted in a particular psychological illness is no longer
necessary.

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Deci-
1

sion and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Regional
2 3

Trial Court Decision that voided the marriage between Irene Constantino
4

Datu (Irene) and Alfredo Fabian Datu (Alfredo) due to the latter's psycho-
logical incapacity.

Irene and Alfredo were married on December 15, 1980 in Subic, Zam-
bales. Together, they had two children.
5 6

On January 3, 2005, Alfredo filed before the Regional Trial Court of Olon-
gapo City a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psycho-
7

logical incapacity. On September 6, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo

City, after having been deputized to appear on behalf of the Republic, man-
ifested that "no evidence of collusion exists between the parties." Irene
8

filed her Answer on April 25, 2006, which was later amended on July 5,
2006. 9

During trial, Alfredo testified that he was formerly employed by the United
States Navy in 1978. However, after only 14 months in service, he was dis-
charged for medical and psychiatric reasons. Specifically, after undergoing
psychiatric and medical evaluations, he was found to have been suffering
from schizophrenia. 10

Alfredo had already been discharged when he was introduced to Irene by

some of her friends at church, the Assembly of God. They had already
11
been acquainted when Alfredo fetched Irene at Shakey's Pizza, Olongapo
City where Irene worked. They then went to Irene's boarding house and
ended up sleeping together. 12

The next morning, Irene was washing some clothes when her older sister
dropped by and saw that Alfredo was sleeping on her bed. Irene's sister
then demanded that the two get married, which led to their civil marriage.
They then lived together at the boarding house and eventually had a
church wedding. 13

Alfredo also recalled an incident that happened before their church wed-
ding, where Irene suddenly got angry at him for mixing what she was cook-
ing. Her "disgusting attitude" made Alfredo leave, but when Irene apolo-
14

gized, he accepted her apology "for the sake of religion."15

Alfredo said that he likewise thought that Irene violated her marital
covenant because she did not submit to him as was written in the Book of
Ephesians. Irene allegedly became materialistic, forcing him to loan money
to build their conjugal home. Irene was allegedly a nagger, because of
which, he did not find peace and contentment in his marital life.
16

Alfredo believed that his utterances come from God. According to him, he
had himself discharged from the United States Navy because of a premoni-
tion that he would suffer a severe tragedy. He also refused to work or to en-
gage in business to fulfill God's prophecy. To answer to this higher calling,
he left Irene. Alfredo said that he has been living with his maid and has no
plans of marrying again. 17

Alfredo's aunt, Policornia Dela Cruz Fabian (Policornia), likewise testified

for Alfredo. She corroborated his testimony that he was discharged from
the United States Navy for medical and psychiatric reasons. She de- 18

scribed her niece-in-law Irene as "inggitera," "mukhang

19

pera," and "tsismosa." She recounted incidents when Irene would al-
20 21

legedly ask Alfredo to borrow money from her. She added that Irene al-
legedly spread rumors about her husband's laziness. There were times
when Policornia advised Irene to be more patient with Alfredo. Policornia
also testified that Alfredo recited spiritual messages that God allegedly di-
rects his actions.
22

Alfredo also offered in evidence, among others, the expert opinion of clini-
cal psychologist Martha Johanna D. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz). The psycholo-
gist testified that Alfredo had gone to her office in Olongapo City for a psy-
chological evaluation. She also contacted Irene for an evaluation, but Irene,
in writing, declined her invitation. 23

Dela Cruz's assessment of Alfredo's mental status revealed that he "[did]

not have any psychomotor agitation but his judgment [was] impaired." She 24

found that Alfredo's psychosis was due to schizophrenia, paranoid type.

She likewise said that there was no cure for Alfredo's psychosis, although
Alfredo was already under medication for his schizophrenia. She main-
tained that at the time she testified in court, Alfredo was still suffering from
schizophrenia. 25

Dela Cruz likewise analyzed the letter Irene sent declining her invitation for
psychological evaluation. Based on the letter, she determined that Irene
was suffering from shared psychotic disorder, concluding that the spouses
cannot live together or both will become suicidal. 26

For her part, Irene testified that she was a junior supervisor at Shakey's
Pizza in Olongapo City before marrying Alfredo, but she resigned to be-
come a full-time wife and mother. When she testified in court, Irene admit-
ted that she separated herself from Alfredo because he has already found
another woman in his life. 27

According to Irene, she and Alfredo executed an agreement where Alfredo

would give her 60% of his salary as monthly support. However, Alfredo
eventually failed to comply with the agreement, refusing to give support de-
spite Irene's requests. This led Irene to do her best to support herself and
her children, including securing scholarships for their children when they
were in college. Also, with the help of an investigator from the United
States Veterans Affairs Office, she was able to claim $400.00 as a benefit
for being Alfredo's legal wife. Irene said that she used the money for daily
expenses, no longer insisting on asking for support from Alfredo, who had
allegedly insulted her.28

Irene admitted that she and Alfredo have different religious beliefs, and that
Alfredo believed himself to be the son of God who can have as many wives
as he pleases. Irene also said that Alfredo indeed believed that wives
should be submissive to their husbands. As for their children, Irene admit-
ted that her children are on speaking terms with their father and that he
gives them money personally. 29
On re-direct examination, Irene admitted that she did not want her marriage
voided because the financial support she has been receiving might be cut
off. Finally, on re-cross examination, Irene admitted that the benefit she re-
ceives from the United States Veterans Affairs Office was due to her hus-
band's schizophrenia. 30

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor Alfredo, finding that he was psycho-
logically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to
Irene. In so ruling, the trial court emphasized that the multiple expert opin-
ions Alfredo offered in evidence sufficiently proved that he had schizophre-
nia even before he married Irene, and that the mental disorder was a mani-
festation of his psychological incapacity.
31

These pieces of evidence included a medical certificate from Dr. Jose

Rommel T. Soriano (Dr. Soriano), a psychiatrist who stated that Alfredo
was suffering from schizophrenia; written findings by the United States Vet-
eran Affairs Office confirming the psychosis; and the report from Dela Cruz,
the psychologist who testified that Alfredo has exhibited symptoms of
schizophrenia. The trial court held:
32

Plaintiff has sufficiently proven that he is suffering from schizophrenia

(paranoid type) even before they got married. No less than three expert
opinions were offered in evidence to prove the same.

Convincing documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence were pre-

sented to show that the plaintiff was discharged from the U.S. Navy be-
cause of such mental disorder. There is admission on re-cross examination
from the defendant (wife) that they are receiving monthly apportionment
from the U.S. Veterans Affairs due to her husband's mental illness of
schizophrenia.

....

The question now is whether or not the plaintiff's mental disorder can be
considered as a psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36 of
the Family Code.

....

It was unanimously proven by different expert opinions that the plaintiff's

schizophrenic behavior includes his delusion of being an emissary of God,
who may have several wives and when he decided to leave the defendant,
he believes that it was God's order. . . .

....

The pieces of evidence presented by both parties indicate that the plaintiff
indeed failed to comply with his essential marital obligations, such as his
failure to live with his wife due to his belief that God ordered him to leave
his wife and that he can have many women to live with him, like King
Solomon. He also failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity to his
wife because of his hallucinations that God has been speaking to him. He
also failed to support his children because he believes that God ordered
him not to work. These facts are bolstered by the testimony of his wife and
the evaluations of the expert witnesses.

. . . The fact that his condition has never improved for almost thirty years,
which includes the period of the subsistence of his marriage to the defen-
dant bespeaks of the gravity of his illness.

. . . Staying together as a couple no longer served the core purpose of their

union. Having each other proved to be of no help anymore to the condition
of the plaintiff. In fact, the defendant admitted on re-direct examination that
she only wanted the marriage to subsist because of the monthly apportion-
ment that she gets from the plaintiff's disability benefits. Both of them ad-
mitted that life was better off without each other because of the mental dis-
position of both parties. These things indicate that the plaintiff’s incapacity
is beyond medical help if he would be with the defendant.

In view of all these, the Court finds that the plaintiff is indeed psychologi-
cally incapacitated to assume his essential marital obligations to the defen-
dant. 33

The trial court, however, found no evidence of juridical antecedence and in-
curability of Irene's psychological incapacity. Since the psychologist, Dela
Cruz, found that Irene acquired shared psychotic disorder after she had
married Alfredo, it held that the mental disorder had no juridical an-
tecedence and only existed after Irene had married Alfredo. 34

Finally, the trial court held that despite the marriage being void, Alfredo's
obligation to support his two children subsists and must still be fulfilled.
35
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court's September 25, 2007
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of

herein parties null and void due to the psychological incapacity of the plain-
tiff to assume his essential marital obligations to the defendant.

The plaintiff is, however, obliged to continuously provide support to his two
(2) children with the defendant and the latter is entitled to his visitation
rights.

Upon finality of this Decision, let copies thereof be furnished [to] the Munici-
pal Civil Registrar of Subic, Zambales, and the National Statistic Office,
Quezon City, for proper annotation in its Book of Marriages, after payment
of the necessary legal fees.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

36

On October 23, 2007, Irene filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground of
collusion, conflict of interest on the part of Alfredo's counsel, and fraud
which allegedly caused the grant of Alfredo's Complaint. 37

The trial court, however, denied the Motion for New Trial in its December
27, 2007 Order, finding that none of the grounds under Rule 37 of the
38

Rules of Court were present in this case. The trial court noted how Irene
actively participated in the proceedings, with the trial court even admitting
her late amended Answer. As such, "[t]o raise howl about the proceedings
only after the case was decided against her interest makes her claim look
like an afterthought."39

Furthermore, the trial court refused to believe that Alfredo's psychological

incapacity was merely "feigned" given the "tightly corroborated testimonies
of the psychologist and [Alfredo], as well as [Irene], convincingly proving
[Alfredo's] personality aberration."
40

This caused Irene to file an appeal, which was nevertheless denied by the
Court of Appeals in its September 28, 2012 Decision. 41

The Court of Appeals echoed the trial court's findings, upholding that Al-
fredo suffered from schizophrenia. It highlighted that even Irene herself ad-
mitted that the pension she receives from the United States Veterans Af-
fairs Office was due to Alfredo's schizophrenia. It also gave credence to
42

the evidence offered by Alfredo to confirm his schizophrenia. The Court of

43

Appeals then held that Alfredo's schizophrenia, from which he had been
suffering even before his marriage to Irene, justified the marriage's dissolu-
tion.
44

On Irene's claims that the trial proceedings were tainted by fraud, collusion
between the parties, and conflict of interest on the part of Alfredo's counsel,
the Court of Appeals said that these were baseless and self-serving. As to
45

the prosecutor's perceived lackadaisical performance of duty, the Court of

Appeals found this observation subjective and could not be considered an
error so as to grant the appeal.46

The dispositive portion of the September 28, 2012 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the lower court

is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

47

Irene moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied it in the
48

September 18, 2013 Resolution. 49

Irene filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari on October 16, 2013. Upon
50

the directive of this Court, Alfredo filed his Comment, to which Irene filed
51 52

a Reply. 53

Irene takes exception from the Court of Appeals' declaration that it had
made independent findings of fact, stating that it "contented itself in merely
lifting portions of the trial court's decision as well as those stated in Al-
fredo's Petition without duly considering the basis and veracity
thereof." She also disputes the competence of Alfredo's documentary evi-
54

dence, specifically, the written findings of the United States Veterans Af-
fairs Office and the medical certificate issued by Dr. Soriano. According to
Irene, nothing in the written findings of the United States Veterans Affairs
Office provided that Alfredo was discharged due to schizophrenia, and
worse, these written findings were not even authenticated in court, just like
Dr. Soriano's medical certificate. Thus, Irene insists that the trial court and
the Court of Appeals should not have relied on these pieces of evidence. 55
Irene likewise impugns Dela Cruz's evaluation of Alfredo, saying that the
psychologist allegedly only paraphrased the descriptions stated in Dr. Sori-
ano's medical certificate. Irene says her findings, along with those of the
56

United States Veterans Affairs office and Dr. Soriano, did not even conform
with the symptoms of schizophrenia as described in People v.
Madarang. As such, she insists that the lower courts had no basis to rule
57

that Alfredo suffered from schizophrenia. 58

Because Alfredo allegedly did not have schizophrenia, Irene argues that
the characteristics of psychological incapacity—gravity, juridical an-
tecedence, and incurability —are not present. With no competent evidence
59

of Alfredo's schizophrenia, she contends that gravity and incurability were

not proven. Furthermore, with no evidence that, prior to his marriage, Al-
fredo was discharged from the United States Navy due to schizophrenia,
Irene says juridical antecedence was likewise absent. 60

Lastly, Irene insists that the trial proceedings were tainted by fraud, collu-
sion, and conflict of interest on the part of Alfredo's counsel. According to
her, the prosecutor halfheartedly performed his duty when he submitted a
one-page manifestation on the lack of collusion between the parties. She
also emphasizes that she had to write the court for the prosecutor to file an
Answer on her behalf. As for respondent's counsel, she alleges that she
was the first to engage the services of Atty. Alreuela M. Bundang-Ortiz
(Atty. Bundang-Ortiz), consulting the latter about her marital problems. It
was even Atty. Bundang-Ortiz who allegedly drafted the agreement of sup-
port that the spouses executed. Thus, the lawyer allegedly had a conflict of
interest when she acted as counsel for Alfredo. 61

Countering Irene, Alfredo mainly argues that the issues raised in the Peti-
tion were substantially factual, which are not cognizable by this Court. As
such, he says the findings that he was discharged from the United States
Navy due to schizophrenia and that he has been suffering from the disorder
even before he married Irene may no longer be disturbed. 62

Alfredo maintains that his psychological condition rendered him psychologi-

cally incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. He ar-
gues that he has clearly shown that his inability was attended by gravity, ju-
ridical antecedence, and incurability.
63
Lastly, Alfredo argues that the trial proceedings were not tainted by fraud
and collusion. For one, Irene failed to substantiate her claims. As for the al-
leged conflict of interest, he says all that Atty. Bundang-Ortiz did was nota-
rize the agreement of support between the parties, which did not make her
a counsel for either party at that time.
64

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not respondent Alfredo Fabian Datu indeed suffered from
schizophrenia;

Second, whether or not all the elements of psychological incapacity have

been proven by respondent Alfredo Fabian Datu; and

Finally, whether or not the proceedings before the trial court were tainted
by fraud, warranting a reversal of the assailed Decision.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari is denied.

Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear that only questions of law,
65

or those pertaining to the law applicable to a given set of facts, may be

raised in a petition for review on certiorari. This Court is not a trier of facts
and, therefore, is generally bound by the findings of fact of the Court of Ap-
peals. 66

Of course, there are exceptions to this rule. In some instances, this Court
may take cognizance of questions of fact, or those requiring a "review [of]
the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the parties" or an "assess-
67

ment of the 'probative value of the evidence presented."' A question of fact

68

is also involved when this Court is asked to determine "the correctness of

the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the par-
ties." These exceptions are:
69

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, sur-

mises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner
's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed ab-
sence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. (Citation
70

omitted)

Here, Irene asks this Court to review the truthfulness of Alfredo's allegation
that he was discharged from the United States Navy because of
schizophrenia, and that he already had the disorder even before he married
her. Irene also assails the assessment, both of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, of the evidence presented by Alfredo, specifically, the written
findings of the United States Veterans Affairs Office, the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Soriano, and the psychiatric evaluation and testimony of Dela
Cruz. Obviously, Irene raises factual issues, which this Court finds no rea-
son to review.

For one, the lower courts' factual findings are the same. It is true that the
Court of Appeals heavily lifted portions of the Regional Trial Court Decision
in making its findings, but this only means that it agreed with the trial court's
findings.

Also, the finding that Alfredo suffered from schizophrenia is sufficiently sup-
ported by evidence. Even if we disregard the purportedly unauthenticated
documents issued by the United States Veteran Affairs Office and Dr. Sori-
ano, we find that Dela Cruz's expert testimony sufficiently proved that Al-
fredo suffered from schizophrenia. Irene herself, on re-cross examination
during trial, admitted that she receives pension from the Veterans Affairs
Office because of Alfredo's schizophrenia.

Given that Alfredo's disorder was sufficiently established, this Court has no
reason to review, much less overturn, this factual finding.

II

Irene nevertheless claims that Alfredo's schizophrenia does not make him
automatically psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family
Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapac-
ity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Irene is correct in the sense that psychological incapacity is not a medical

illness. That a person is suffering from a certain psychosis, such as
schizophrenia, will not make them automatically psychologically incapaci-
tated to comply with the essential marital obligations under Articles 68 to 71
of the Family Code. This was clear in Tan-Andal v. Andal, where this
71 72

Court emphatically declared that psychological incapacity is a legal con-

cept, not a medical one.

The erroneous medical orientation toward defining psychological incapacity

originated from Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, which explicitly
73

required in its second guideline that the root cause of the psychological in-
capacity "be identified as a psychological illness[.]"
74

Tan-Andal, however, clarified that psychological incapacity, as envisioned

by the Family Code Revision Committee, is, again, a legal concept. In- 75

stead of being a medical illness, psychological incapacity is "[a] durable or

enduring [aspect] of a person's personality, called 'personality structure,'
which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines
the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for
him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her es-
sential marital obligations."
76

As a legal concept, psychological incapacity cannot be characterized as in-

curable. Instead, it is permanent relative to a specific partner. However,
77

psychological incapacity can be grave, not in the sense that it is a serious

or dangerous mental illness, but that it excludes "mild characterological pe-
culiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts[.]" The incapac-
78

ity must be shown to be due to a genuinely serious psychic cause. And, as 79

explicitly required by the law, the incapacity must have existed before or
during the celebration of the marriage.

Here, this Court finds that Alfredo is psychologically incapacitated to com-

ply with his essential marital obligations, not because he suffers from
schizophrenia per se, but because his psychosis has been found to be an
enduring part of his personality structure. This psychosis, in turn, led him to
do clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermined Irene and their family. As
the lower courts found, Alfredo believes himself to be the son of God. In his
mind, his refusal to live with Irene and to provide for the family was God's
will. He also believes that he can have as many wives as he wants, which
is not only illegal but is in utter disrespect and disregard of his marital vow
to Irene. His incapacity is grave, not a "mild characteriological peculiarity,"
a ''mood change," or an "occasional emotional outburst"; his psychosis was
grave enough for him to be discharged from military service.

Irene insinuates that Alfredo might just be faking his illness and, relatedly,
his psychological incapacity, saying that "it is easy to feign and manipulate
insanity on the basis of what one says his beliefs and ideals are." She also
80

argues that the documentary and testimonial evidence Alfredo offered did
not show that he exhibited the symptoms of schizophrenia as this Court de-
scribed in People v. Madarang. In Madarang:
81

Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder charac-

terized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often ac-
companied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia
pracecox, it is the most common form of psychosis. Symptomatically,
schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behav-
ior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and im-
mature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed. The in-
terpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delu-
sions and hallucinations. In the most disorganized form of schizophrenic liv-
ing, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place and is associated with serious
thought disorder and profound habit deterioration in which the usual social
customs are disregarded. During the initial stage, the common early symp-
tom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness,
hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and
dreamy and may appear "faraway." He does not empathize with the feel-
ings of others and manifests little concern about the realities of life situa-
tions. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an intolera-
ble lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional involvement with
other people to protect himself from painful relationships. There is shallow-
ness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of spon-
taneity. Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanli-
ness. A variety of subjective experiences, associated with or influenced by
mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest behavioral changes and
oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension and confusion and be-
comes distracted in conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a
train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will be noticed as
blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or re-
spond appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he
may appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt
to hold his attention. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
82

Madarang, however, is a criminal case where the accused had to prove be-
yond reasonable doubt that he indeed suffered from schizophrenia to justify
his exoneration of parricide. Such strict level of scrutiny is not required
here, where only clear and convincing evidence is the required quantum of
proof. We need not even focus on whether the evidence presented proved
83

that Alfredo indeed suffered from schizophrenia because, to reiterate, psy-

chological incapacity need not be identified as a psychological illness. What
is clear, however, is that Alfredo, due to a genuine psychic cause, failed to
comply with his essential marital obligations. As the trial court said:

The pieces of evidence presented by both parties indicate that the plaintiff
indeed failed to comply with his essential marital obligations, such as, his
failure to live with his wife due to his belief that God ordered him to leave
his wife and that he can have many women to live with him, like King
Solomon. He also failed to observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity to his
wife because of his hallucinations that God has been speaking to him. He
also failed to support his children because he believes that God ordered
him not to work. These facts are bolstered by the testimony of his wife and
the evaluations of the expert witnesses. 84

Consequently, Alfredo and Irene's marriage is void due to Alfredo's psycho-

logical incapacity.

III

Finally, we find no evidence of extrinsic fraud to warrant Irene a new

trial of the case. Fraud, as a ground for filing a motion for new trial:
85

. . . refers to a fraud committed to the unsuccessful party by [their] oppo-

nent preventing [their] from fully exhibiting [their] case by keeping him away
from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never
had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plain-
tiff; or when an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his de-
feat. (Citation omitted)
86
Here, there is no evidence that Alfredo committed fraud to prevent Irene
from fully exhibiting her case in court. Neither was there any evidence of a
false promise or compromise. On the contrary, Irene was fully informed of
the trial proceedings, including the filing of the Complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage. When Irene initially had no means to avail herself of le-
gal services, the trial court allowed her to file a belated Answer with the as-
sistance of the Public Attorney's Office.

As to the claim that Atty. Bundang-Ortiz had a conflict of interest when she
represented Alfredo in court, we find that Irene failed to substantiate
this. Conflict of interest "exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent inter-
1aшphi1

ests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his
duty to oppose it for the other client."
87

Here, there is no evidence that Atty. Bundang-Ortiz had ever represented

Irene before she represented Alfredo. As to the lawyer's admission that she
notarized the agreement of support between the parties, we see no conflict
of interest, for she did not represent either of the parties in her capacity as
a notary public.

With no evidence of the fraud she alleges, Irene's Motion for New Trial was
correctly denied.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Sep-

tember 28, 2012 Decision and September 18, 2013 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93166 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carandang, Zalameda, Rosario, and J. Lopez,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2836.

1
Rollo, pp. 3-33.
2
Id. at 35-49. The September 28, 2012 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 93166
was penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias and was concurred in
by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela
of the Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3
Id. at 69-70. The September 18, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
93166 was penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias and was con-
curred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Nina G. Antonio-
Valenzuela of the Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4
Id. at 71-79. The September 25, 2007 Decision in Civil Case No. 02-0-
2005 was penned by Assisting Presiding Judge Consuelo Amog Bocar of
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73.
5
Id. at 35. Court of Appeals Decision.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 37.
8
Id. at 38.
9
Id. at 73. Regional Trial Court Decision.
10
Id. at 72-73.
11
Id. at 72.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 73.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 74.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 75-76.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 75-78.
34
Id. at 78.
35
Id. at 79.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 40, Court of Appeals Decision.
38
Id. at 80-81.
39
Id. at 80.
40
Id. at 81.
41
Id. at 35-39.
42
Id. at 43.
43
Id. at 44.
44
Id. at 46.
45
Id. at 47.
46
Id. at 47-48.
47
Id. at 48.
48
Id. at 50-67.
49
Id. at 69-70.
50
Id. at 3.
51
Id. at 82. Resolution dated December 9, 2013.
52
Id. at 89-93.
53
Id. at 96-100.
54
Id. at 16, Petition for Review on Certiorari.
55
Id. at 18-19.
56
Id. at 19-20.
57
387 Phil. 846 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
58
Id. at 22.

See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En

59

Banc].
60
Rollo, pp. 24-26, Petition for Review on Certiorari.
61
Id. at 26-30.
62
Id. at 89-91.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 91.
65
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to ap-

peal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional
remedies and shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pen-
dency.
66
Id. at 182.
67
Id. at 183.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 182-133.
71
See Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997)
[Per J. Pangban, En Banc], where this Court held that "[t]he essential mari-
tal obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Fam-
ily Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children." These provi-
sions are as follows:

ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
ARTICLE 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse
from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption
shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.

ARTICLE 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the
family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall
be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the
income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or ab-
sence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the
separate properties.

ARTICLE 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the
duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70.

....

ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall
have with the respect to their unemancipated children or wards the follow-
ing rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them
by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in
keeping with their means;

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship
and understanding;

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them
honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate
their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties
of citizenship;

(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, super-
vise their activities. recreation and association with others, protect them
from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to
their health, studies and morals;

(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circum-

stances; and

(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and
guardians.

ARTICLE 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority

shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and un-
der their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law.

....

ARTICLE 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
guardian ship over the property of the unemancipated common child with-
out the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the fa-
ther's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child
exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond
in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per cen-
tum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court
of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign
country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part
thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which

all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations re-
ferred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and re-
solved.

The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when

the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a
stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on
guardianship shall apply.
72
G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2011, [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
73
335 Phil. 664 ( 1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc).
74
Id. at 677.

Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021, [Per J. Leonen, En
75

Banc].
76
Id. at 31.
77
Id. at 33.
78
Id. at 34 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664
(1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
79
Id.
80
Rollo, p. 26, Petition for Review on Certiorari.
81
387 Phil. 846 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
82
Id. at 859-860.

Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021, 27 [Per J. Leonen,
83

En Banc].
84
Rollo, p. 77, Regional Trial Court Decision.
85
RULES OF COURT, Rule 37, sec. 1 partly provides:

Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsid-
eration. — Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may
move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new
trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the sub-
stantial rights of said party:

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary pru-

dence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such ag-
grieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable dili-
gence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented
would probably alter the result.

Baclaran Marketing Corp. v. Nieva, 809 Phil. 92, 103 (2017) [Per J.
86

Jardeleza, Third Division].

87
Paces Indusrrial Corp. v. Atty. Salandanan, 814 Phil. 93, 98 (2017) (Per
J. Peralta, En Banc].