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West European Politics

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The Kreisky phenomenon

a b
Karl R. Stadler
a
Professor of Modern and Contemporary History ,
University of Linz ,
b
Director of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of
Labour History ,
Published online: 03 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Karl R. Stadler (1981) The Kreisky phenomenon, West
European Politics, 4:1, 5-18, DOI: 10.1080/01402388108424302

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 The Kreisky Phenomenon
Karl R. Stadler*

Austria, which between the wars could neither find its political
identity nor put its economy in order, has made a spectacular
recovery after its resurrection in 1945, and especially since the State
Treaty ten years later which restored its sovereign independence.
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Today, Austria is one of the most stable and reasonably prosperous

small nations in Europe, pursuing a policy of 'active neutrality'
between the Great Power blocs and cultivating good relations with
other neutral and non-aligned states. Behind her internal consolida-
tion and her new role in international politics is the remarkable
personality and diplomatic skill of Bruno Kreisky, Federal Chan-
cellor of Austria and leader of the Socialist Party.

If a 'phenomenon' is defined as 'a highly exceptional or unaccountable fact

or occurrence', then Bruno Kreisky's leadership of the Austrian Socialist
Party since 1967 and the premiership of Austria since 1970 certainly merits
inclusion in the list of highly exceptional facts in modern politics. It is not as
if men of Jewish origin had never before attained the highest office of state:
the names of Disraeli and Leon Blum come to mind (apart, of course, from
the leaders of modern Israel); or that returned emigres had never become
leaders of nations: Masaryk, de Gaulle and Willy Brandt are among the
more prominent recent examples. And the labour movement everywhere
has always attracted middle or upper-class intellectuals of high calibre who
served it as leaders, writers or thinkers. But it is the combination of all these
factors in the person of Kreisky, his rise to prominence in Austria, and the
part he plays in international politics, that must rank among the more
remarkable occurrences in the contemporary world.

KREISKY'S ROAD TO POWER

Bruno Kreisky was born on 22 January 1911 into a well-to-do Viennese

family with a long tradition of public service, economic enterprise
and academic and political activities. The horrors of war, the confrontation
with the abject poverty of some of his schoolfellows, and the 'new dawn'
which the revolution of 1918 seemed to herald led him at an early age into
the socialist youth movement where he was soon elected to office as
chairman of its education committee. The destruction of Austrian Social
Democracy in February 1934, and the establishment of the Dollfuss-
Schuschnigg authoritarian corporate state, found him among the first to

*Professor of Modern and Contemporary History, University of Linz, and Director of the
Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Labour History.
 6 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

rebuild the movement as a network of underground cells, the 'Revolu-

tionary Socialists'.
The first major test for the young politician came in March 1936, when
twenty-seven of the leaders of the underground party who had attended a
secret conference in neighbouring Czechoslovakia were betrayed and were
put on trial for high treason. Though intended as a warning to the whole
movement, with the threat of death sentences for the two chief defendants,
the outcome of the trial was a resounding defeat for the government, as a
result of the courageous stand of the accused and a wave of national and
international support for their cause. One of the best speeches from the
dock, revealing great political foresight, was young Kreisky's. Released
before the completion of his twelve months' sentence, he returned to his
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studies and sat the last of his finals examinations on 14 March 1938, when
Austria had already ceased to exist.
Arrested by the Gestapo, and in constant danger, as a socialist and a Jew,
of being sent to a concentration camp, he was lucky in obtaining his release
on condition that he emigrated to Sweden. There he spent the war years,
working for the cooperative movement and as a journalist, and gathering the
Austrian exiles there in an all-party association. Unlike his socialist
comrades in London and New York, who envisaged an all-German revolu-
tion against Hitler in which Austria would play her part, Kreisky right from
the start considered the restoration of his country's independence as the
major political aim. At the end of the war he organised Swedish relief for
starving Austrian children and joined the staff of the Austrian Embassy in
Stockholm until his return to Vienna in 1951.
Although by that time Austria had made considerable progress since the
chaos and despair of 1945, all was not yet well. The continuing occupation of
the country by four Allied armies, the existence of an Allied Council to
control and supervise the Government, and particularly the policy of the
Soviet Element in its occupation zone, the easternmost part of Austria,
where the USSR alone of the victors laid claim to all so-called 'German
property', provided constant irritants. In the two general elections of 1945
and 1949, the electorate had clearly shown its preference for the Western
way of life by giving overwhelming support to the (conservative) People's
Party and the Socialist Party. After the last Communist Party minister had
left the Government in 1947, the Conservatives and Socialists, who between
them represented around 85 per cent of the population, formed a 'Grand
Coalition' which was to hold together until 1966. Economic recovery took its
time in spite of the impetus given by Marshall Aid. In such a situation,
national unity was essential in order to obtain the State Treaty, the precondi-
tion for the ending of occupation and the final settlement of Allied claims
and interests. The Austrian State Treaty finally came into force in 1955.
After a short spell in the Foreign Ministry, Kreisky was chosen to become
political secretary to Theodor Korner, a First World War general and later
socialist leader who had just succeeded Karl Renner as Federal President of
Austria in a popular referendum. His experience abroad, and his predilec-
tion for foreign policy, made it inevitable that his Party nominated Kreisky
for the post of State Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1953, sent him into
 THE KREISKY PHENOMENON 7

Parliament in 1956, and chose him as Foreign Minister in 1959. In the same
year he was elected one of the deputy leaders of the Socialist Party which was
then entering a troubled period. After the elevation to the federal presi-
dency of Adolf Scharf who had led the Party from 1945 to 1957 most
effectively, uncertainties of leadership and personal rivalries affected its
standing in the country, and while it succeeded in getting its candidate,
Franz Jonas, elected Federal President upon Scharfs death in 1965, the
coalition with the People's Party broke apart in the following year after an
electoral setback for the Socialist Party.
This was a turning point in the history of the Second Austrian Republic:
the period of government by coalition ended and gave place to single party
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government, first by the People's Party, until 1970, and by the Socialist Party
since then. It was also a turning point in the Socialist Party's history, for in
1967 it elected Kreisky to the leadership and thus accelerated its conversion
from the old Austro-Marxist type of class party to the new-style socialist
party, open above all to the new managerial and technical intelligentsia to
whom democratic planning and the task of modernising society was to hold a
special appeal.
To Kreisky a period in opposition meant time to prepare for the next
round: teams of experts in various fields, 1,400 in all, discussed and
submitted detailed programmes for economic, technological, educational
and social reform, and the 1970 election campaign itself, when it came, owed
more to the style of presidential elections in the United States than to
traditional methods in its presentation of the candidate: its mobilisation of
non-party actors and scholars, jet pilots and artists declaring for Kreisky,
and a wealth of literature addressed to different social strata. In contrast to
the routine politicians around him, Kreisky appeared as a new type of
political leader who had done his homework and who cared for the common
people.1
The outcome of the 1970 election nevertheless surprised nearly everyone.
In a country known for the stable electoral behaviour of the population, a
shift of around six per cent has the effect of a political landslide. The
Socialists, by taking six seats from the Conservatives and one from the
Freedom Party, became the strongest single party in Parliament, though still
facing a non-socialist majority of three, and Kreisky formed a minority
government, picking up majorities for his administration's bills as he went
along. The success of his first year in power encouraged him to seek a new—
and stronger—mandate from the people, and the election of 1971 provided
him with the safe majority he needed for stable government, a majority
which was still further increased in the two subsequent elections of 1975 and
1979. Thus we can now look back on ten years of Kreisky in power: is
Austria at the commencement of the 1980s really 'A small house in order', as
The Economist called it in a recent survey?

'AN ISLAND OF THE BLESSED"

In comparison with many other industrial countries Austria does seem to
merit this papal compliment, especially since the recession of 1974-5: there is
 8 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

a system of 'social partnership' in place of strife, political and industrial

peace, full employment and a low rate of inflation. That Austria was able to
weather the storm was in no small measure due to Kreisky's skill in combin-
ing 'sound' economics with social reform, in retaining the confidence of both
international finance and of labour at home, and in conducting consensus
politics in the guise of a reformist socialist system. His cabinets contain a
technocratic element and ministers with avowed socialist convictions, with
the occasional non-party expert thrown in for good measure; he appoints
prominent non-Socialist to key positions in the Civil Service, the National
Bank and the nationalised industries, and seeks advice from members of all
parties and none; but there is no doubt that decisions are largely his own.
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To the historian of the labour movement, bearing in mind the radical

traditions of 'Austro-Marxism', Kreisky may seem to have travelled a long
way from the Party of Friedrich Adler and Otto Bauer and his own revolu-
tionary past. In actual fact, the secret of his unrivalled position in the
Socialist Party lies in his avowal of a socialist conviction tempered by the
requirements of modern society. His 'reformism' has a dialectic attached to
it whereby 'the quantity of reforms gradually becomes quality', as he
recently said to a British journalist.2 The class struggle is no longer waged in
factories and on the streets but is conducted in boardrooms and mixed
commissions of management and labour. And as for the long-term goals of a
socialist party, he loftily speaks of an asymptotic line — a line, that is, which
continually approaches a given curve but does not meet it within a finite
distance.
Critics find Kreisky's pragmatism short on socialism; but the electorate
seems to approve of it, beyond the traditional reservoir of the industrial
working class, extending well into the professional classes and even the
farmers. The ten years of socialist government have been marked above all
by a plethora of social reforms. To the employed they brought the forty-hour
week and a minimum paid holiday of four weeks as well as a greater say in
management through a new labour relations act. Important measures are
under way to improve the position of women; the appointment of four
women as secretaries of state was a signal step in this direction. All educa-
tion is free, as are school books and fares for pupils. Young couples are paid
marriage grants, they are assisted in starting a home, and special payments
are made on the birth of each child. Reforms in the legal field include the
new family law, improvements in the penal law and the liberalisation of the
abortion law. The establishment of two new ministries, one for Science and
Research, the other for Health and Environment, is meeting new needs just
as does the institution, on the Scandinavian model, of the 'ombudsman', to
whom the citizen with a grievance or complaint against authority can turn.
Government in Austria could be even more effective if it had to face a
determined opposition to control it and to spur it on. This, unfortunately, is
not the case, for the People's Party does not seem to have overcome the
shock of its defeat in 1970 nor to have found a new role for itself as the
alternative political force. This is admittedly difficult in a country where
between seventy and eighty per cent of all legislation is passed with the
support of one or the other — or both — non-socialist parties. Also, after
 THE KREISKY PHENOMENON 9

half a century of conservative majorities, excluding the Nazi years, the

Christian-Social Party, or the People's Party as its successor, seemed the
natural party of government. Its decline set in even before 1970, after the
death of its two great leaders, Leopold Figl and Julius Raab, who together
with Karl Renner and Adolf Scharf laid the foundations of the Second
Republic. It is not only a problem of leadership, of new chairmen following
one another in rapid succession, but above all a failure to take into account
changes in modern Austrian society. The most recent election results reflect
its decline from the absolute majority of 1966 to its present-day strength.
TABLE
THE GENERAL ELECTION OF MAY 1979
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Percentage Share Parliamentary strength

Socialist Party (SPO) 51.03 +0.61 95 +2
People's Party (OVP) 41.90 -1.05 77 -3
Freedom Party (FPO) 6.06 +0.65 11 +1
183

The Austrian Freedom Party, the only one of the smaller political group-
ings represented in Parliament, has a curious history. As former members of
the NSDAP were denied a vote in the first elections of 1945, it was anybody's
guess which side they would support when they were enfranchised for the
1949 election. Kreisky's predecessors in the Socialist leadership thought it
unfair that while the labour vote was split between socialists and com-
munists, the People's Party should have a monopoly of the non-socialist
vote, and they succeeded in obtaining Allied permission for a 'League of
Independents' to be formed in time for the elections. Their remarkable
success then, almost 500,000 votes or 11.7 per cent, roughly equivalent to
the number of former Nazi members, gave rise to fears of a revival of
Nazism.
The development of this grouping, subsequently named the Freedom
Party, proved these fears were unfounded. From a motley collection of
resentful unteachables and militarists, traditional anti-clericals and national
liberals, it gradually shed, together with half its electoral strength, most of
the less respectable leaders and officials, and with a younger generation
coming up it has turned itself into the nearest thing to a liberal party Austria
is ever likely to have, seeing that both conservatives and socialists claim their
share of the liberal inheritance. Against some opposition from within his
own party, Kreisky secured the parliamentary support of the FPO necessary
for the survival of his minority government in 1970 by changing the electoral
law in its favour and by having several of its supporters nominated to
important positions in the civil and diplomatic service and in the state sector
of the economy. While it has a small nationalist, pan-German fringe,
notably among war veterans and students, the FPO has undoubtedly
become a respectable non-socialist party which tends to go with the OVP on
economic issues and with the SPO on questions of concern to liberals.
To the right of the FPO, but carefully avoiding policies which would bring
it into conflict with the law against neo-nazism, is the minute nationalist (and
 10 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

'nationalist' in Austria means German nationalist) National Democratic

Party which is a quantite negligeable with its few hundred members and a few
thousand voters in elections. However, the presidential election in May 1980
presented the party with an extraordinary chance. Six years previously,
upon the death of Federal President Franz Jonas, Kreisky had persuaded his
party to nominate for the presidency Rudolf Kirchschlager.a non-party man
and practising Catholic who had served him well as Foreign Minister.
Kirchschlager acquitted himself so well in office that when he was
nominated for a second term by the SPO, the OVP advised its followers to
give him their vote. For a while it looked as if there might be an election with
only one candidate, a ludicrous situation, made worse when Norbert
Burger of the NDP announced his intention of standing as a protest
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candidate against the establishment. Luckily the FPO then decided to give
the electorate a real choice by nominating Wilfried Gredler, a former
member of parliament now serving as ambassador in Peking, as a candidate
for all non-socialist Austrians.
The outcome of the contest was remarkable: Kirchschlager increased his
vote from 52 per cent to nearly 80 per cent, and Gredler obtained a very
respectable 17 per cent; but what came as a shock to the country was
Burger's 3.2 per cent. Analysts have been busy ever since trying to explain
what made 140,000 Austrians vote for an unknown little man whose
platform included the pledge to re-introduce capital punishment, establish
forced-labour centres for law-breakers and abolish the freedom of abortion.
Dissatisfaction with the Kreisky government and with the OVP for not
opposing Kirchschlager, may have played some part; but basically it seems
to have been a protest vote par excellence. In his first comments Kreisky
stressed the positive side of the result: over 96 per cent of the electorate
voted for democratic candidates. Others, however, remembering the small
beginnings of the NSDAP in the early 1920s and the effects of the world
economic crisis, demand action against an incipient danger.
It may well be, as Kreisky suspects, that the Communists are beating the
anti-fascist drum to hide their own weakness and to increase their following
in the labour movement. Starting after the war with the support of around
five per cent of the electorate and with never more than five seats in
parliament, the prolonged Soviet occupation, the establishment of the
'people's democracies' around Austria, the crushing of the Hungarian rising
in 1956 and of the 'Prague Spring' in 1968, have wiped out the KPO as an
independent political force. Individual communists in the trade unions and
on the shop floor may still be respected — and elected — as spokesmen of
working-class discontent, the Party itself, however, has not been repre-
sented in Parliament since 1959; its share of the national vote was 0.96 per
cent in 1979. The only party to take it seriously is the SPO which in the
aggressively anti-communist 'Declaration of Eisenstadt' destroyed all KPO
hopes of a united front on the Left. This was another tactical move on
Kreisky's part — to prevent his opponents from ever again raising a 'red'
scare as they had done under his predecessors.3
 THE KREISKY PHENOMENON 11

THE BASIS OF SOCIAL PEACE

A stable political system as it exists in Austria today is unthinkable without a

firm economic basis, and Austria's performance in the 1970s has been one of
the lesser wonders of the western world. Its growth rate of 52 per cent in the
period 1970-79 was surpassed only by Japan; output per head by 1978
exceeded the average for the richer Europeans grouped in the EEC. The
growth rate has been stimulated, in the old-fashioned Keynesian way, by a
mounting public sector deficit which nevertheless did not lead to a roaring
inflation. On the contrary, by the end of 1979 Austria actually had a lower
inflation rate than any other developed country.4
The key to an understanding of Austria's social peace lies in the coopera-
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tion between government and the unions. The Austrian Federation of Trade
Unions (OGB) with its 15 constituent member unions is socialist-
dominated, which undoubtedly helps in hammering out a joint economic
policy with the government; its president is also Speaker or first president of
parliament and an elder statesman of the Socialist Party. The bargain struck
between government and the unions amounts to this: in return for union
moderation on wages, the government, by its general policies and improve-
ments in the social security system, steadily increases the 'social wage', while
its overall economic policy is determined by the commitment to maintain full
employment. It is probably true to say that the success of this policy won
Kreisky the last two general elections, at a time when unemployment was
rife amongst Austria's neighbours (with the sole exception of Switzerland).
An unemployment rate of around two per cent is a guarantee of industrial
peace; the time lost in strikes was 7.9 seconds per employed person in 1979!
There is little doubt about the stabilising effect the large public sector has
on the Austrian economy. Over 400,000 people are employed in some
460-odd enterprises directly or indirectly owned by the state — about one
sixth of the total workforce. If the employees of the 'pure' public sector —
teachers, civil servants, police etc. — are added, the share rises to one third.
According to Denis Healey, who regards Austria as a model for industrial
relations: 'Three times as much of the economy is under state influence in
Austria as it is in [the United Kingdom].'5 This is largely the inheritance of
the German take-over of the Austrian economy in 1938, the confiscation of
Jewish property, and German industrialisation in strategically-safer loca-
tions during the War; and even before the settlement of the 'German
Property' issue with the Allies, state ownership appeared to all parties in
Austria the best basis for negotiations.
Nevertheless, the large public sector has not been used as a lever to
introduce socialism by the backdoor; social change is brought about 'in
homoeopathic doses', as one commentator noted. Kreisky's pragmatism
allows him to seek the help of multinational companies, as is shown by the
recent agreement with General Motors which has been induced to build a
large engine plant near Vienna which will create 2650 new jobs at a cost to
the taxpayer of 2,600 million Schillings. Austria's small conventional arms
industry is not above exporting to countries whose political complexion is
anathema to Christians and Socialists alike; a 2,000 million Schillings order
 12 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

for armoured cars from Chile caused a wave of agitation in August 1980,
notably in the Socialist Party, which led to the cancellation of the contract by
the Government. And in the energy sector where Austria is particularly
vulnerable she possesses a nuclear power station in Zwentendorf which was
built at a cost of around 6,000 million Schillings but has still not gone into
operation as a result of an adverse vote in a referendum in 1978. Two further
referenda, one for and one against its opening, were scheduled for Autumn
1980. On this issue Kreisky for once (in 1978) misjudged the mood of the
electorate, but he has seen to it that in the meantime Austria's energy needs
are met by Soviet natural gas and Polish coal on the one hand, and Middle
East oil on the other.
Not surprisingly, Austrians are content with the state of the country. The
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most recent opinion poll showed that 81 per cent preferred Austria to all
other countries, while only 10 per cent would prefer to live in Switzerland
and five per cent in Western Germany. Compared with fifteen years ago,
when the percentages were 64, 16 and 14, respectively, this development is
undoubtedly immensely satisfying to Kreisky, especially since it has been
accompanied by a remarkable growth in national consciousness. Whereas
fifteen years ago not even half the population believed in the existence of a
separate Austrian nation, and 15 per cent denied it absolutely, today the
percentages are 68 and 6; the pan-German tradition of 1848,1918 and 1938 is
clearly a thing of the past.6

TOWARDS NEUTRALITY

1980 was a year of anniversaries: thirty-five years of the Second Republic (it
is worth remembering that the First Republic lasted less than twenty);
twenty-five years after the State Treaty which restored full freedom to the
country; and the first ten years of the Kreisky administration. With rare
showmanship, the Government turned the remembrance of that 15th of
May 1955, when the signed treaty was held aloft and displayed from the
balcony of Belvedere Castle to a jubilant crowd, into a demonstration of
national unity. The foreign ministers of the four signatory powers re-enacted
their agreement on Austria and expressed their satisfaction with their handi-
work, while countless others who had served in one of the occupation forces
or boards were wined and dined and reminisced about those far-off days. In
a great symposium allied diplomats and historians debated with one another
and with their Austrian colleagues as to who was responsible for the ten
years' delay in the signing of the Treaty, and Austrians argued among
themselves about the question whether the People's Party or the Socialists
had contributed more to the final settlement.
It is of course true that both Parties had wanted the Treaty, and that the
then coalition government deserves the credit for a solution that made
Austria free and viable. Nevertheless, it is a historic fact that throughout the
negotiations Adolf Scharf, the socialist deputy premier, ably supported in
the later stages by the diplomatic skill of Kreisky, adopted a much firmer line
towards the Soviets than his conservative colleagues. As early as 1945 Scharf
had turned down the proposal for a mixed Austrian-Soviet company to
 THE KREISKY PHENOMENON 13

operate the oil fields, and in 1955 he insisted on the return, against compen-
sation, of all Soviet-run enterprises in Eastern Austria, thus preventing the^
establishment of Soviet economic enclaves in the country which might have
led to friction and political pressures in the future.
One last dispute arose over the wording of the Austrian declaration of
neutrality. While it was agreed among the Austrians that in order to allay
Russian fears of Austria becoming part of the NATO system a binding
guarantee should be offered, the Socialists would have preferred the term
'non-aligned' or 'bloc-free' to 'neutrality>vvnich the Americans in particular
interpreted as neutralism. Since their conservative colleagues were not
prepared to make a stand on this question, Scharf and Kreisky were forced
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to agree, and luckily the Western Powers made no difficulties.

There can be no doubt that Austria owes her position in today's world,
modest though it may be, both to her freedom from foreign interference and
to her neutral status which is something half-way between Swiss and Swedish
neutrality. As Kreisky interpreted it at the time:

Swedish neutrality is unlike Swiss neutrality in that it is neither part of

the constitution nor guaranteed in any form by the Great Powers. Nor
is it a commitment undertaken in treaties with one or more states. It is
rather the intention of Sweden to conduct its affairs in times of peace in
such a way that in times of war its neutrality can be recognised in
international law . . . If there is thus legally some affinity betv/een
Austrian and Swiss neutrality, Austria's membership of the United
Nations and of the Council of Europe makes its foreign policy
resemble that of Sweden. Hence one can assume that a specifically
Austrian variant of neutrality will develop alongside Swiss and
Swedish neutrality.7

So as not to make it appear as if it had been forced upon an unwilling

people, Austrian neutrality did not form part of the Treaty but was passed by
Parliament as a constitutional law three months after the ratification of the
Treaty and on the day after the last foreign soldier had left the country.
Austrian neutrality is trictly confined to the military aspect: no alliances or
bases for any foreign power, nor any undue dependence on either bloc,
hence also no membership of the European Community (though special
economic agreements have been made with it). The term implies no political
neutralism: successive governments made it clear where their sympathies lay
in the Hungarian crisis of 1956 and the 'Prague Spring' of 1968; they aided
the victims then, just as Vienna still receives Soviet Jews and dissidents from
the communist countries today; and Parliament, political parties and the
press are free to take sides on political issues. Finally, Austrian neutrality is
not a policy of abstention from world politics: the country plays an active
part in the United Nations and in the Council of Europe, it is a member of
both the OECD and EFTA, and it readily assumes peace-keeping functions
at the request of the world organisation. Some 12,600 Austrian soldiers have
been provided for non-combatant duties so far, from a military hospital in
the Congo and in Cyprus, where police and other personnel have also been
 14 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

stationed, to peace-keeping forces in Egypt and currently in Syria and on the

Israeli borders.
This is no more altruistic than the offer to build a new UN headquarters in
Vienna, for the intention is to make Vienna a third 'UN-city' after New York
and Geneva. The new 'International Centre', completed in 1979 at a cost of
9000 million Schillings, will house UNIDO, IAEA, UNCITRAL,
UNRWA, UNSCEA, UNFDAC and several other divisions, boards and
commissions of th(e United Nations. 'A large army would cost us more and
bring us less', says Kreisky, to justify this enormous outlay to the Austrian
taxpayer. To have an Austrian diplomat, Kurt Waldheim, in the position of
secretary-general of the world organisation is another source of satisfaction
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to Austrians who believe, with Kreisky, that the safety — and the very
existence — of small states can be best ensured by the UN to which, to quote
Kreisky:
To date no better alternative . . . has been found. In any event, the
growing trend in world politics towards submitting important issues to
an increasing degree to new summit conferences has yielded no
convincing results.8
THE'THIRD WORLD'
This is not to say that important decisions can not occasionally be reached
outside the UN. European detente, which Kreisky believes started with the
conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955, has since been furthered by
the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation. Its Final Act Kreisky
sees as the beginning of a dynamic process towards detente and normalisa-
tion between East and West which can only succeed, however, 'if new,
constructive forms of cooperation are found which go beyond the limits of a
mere exchange of commodities and financial transactions'.
In his address to the thirty-fourth General Assembly of the UN on 30
October 1979, from which the above passages are quoted, Kreisky reminded
his listeners that when he last spoke to that gathering five years earlier his
main concerns had been the oil problem, the situation in the Middle East,
and relations between the industrialised countries and the developing
nations. None of those had been brought nearer a solution in the meantime,
and his speech was a reasoned plea for the recognition of the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people on the one hand, and for a 'Marshall
Plan' for the developing nations on the other.
It may appear curious that the prime minister of a small land-locked
country in Central Europe should make himself a spokesman for the
concerns of the non-European world, but this again is typical of Kreisky. His
activities in connection with the State Treaty, and the large number of new
political and economic relations Austria was able to enter into after 1955,
must have convinced him early on that his country needed to make its mark
in some special field. After its removal from the sphere of Great Power
conflict, and situated between the Communist bloc and a rapidly growing
European Community, Austria might easily have sunk into oblivion, friend-
less and ignored. Only by taking up the cause of other nations even less
 THE KRE1SKY PHENOMENON 15

favoured, could Austria hope to play a useful part in world affairs. This is
nothing to do with Kreisky being 'too big for Austria', or Austria being 'too
small for Kreisky', as commentators sometimes claim, but a realistic assess-
ment of the chances of a neutral nation. It is no accident that there are many
parallels between Kreisky's and Olaf Palme's policies.
Kreisky has no illusions about Austria's ability to render substantial aid
herself or about her weight in international affairs. What he did aim at was to
contribute to a climate of informed opinion in Europe, to provide a platform
for overseas spokesmen, and to offer opportunities for experts from both
sides to work out programmes. A special centre for these tasks, the 'Vienna
Institute for Development', was founded in 1964, whose advisory board
contains a number of personalities prominent in international politics.
While Austria's material contribution remains small and as problematical as
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that of other industrial nations, she has earned a measure of respect and
goodwill in the United Nations which, in addition to the election of Kurt
Waldheim, has led to one term on the Security Council as a non-permanent
member and to various other offices and chairmanships.
Not surprisingly, Kreisky used the opportunity of his speech before the
General Assembly to remind his listeners of his old idea of a 'Marshall Plan
for the Developing Nations'. Just as the United States had set a 'great,
historic example' in making possible the recovery of Europe after the War,
so now a similar effort was needed to build up the infrastructure of those
states. In an address to the third general assembly of UNIDO at New Delhi
on 31 January 1980 he explained what he meant by this:
If the economies of the Third World nations are to be placed on a
sounder footing and if industrialisation is to be promoted, the prime
requisite is the development of the infrastructure. Developing the
infrastructure does not entail deviating from the path to industrialisa-
tion. Certainly, the industrialisation process seems to proceed more
slowly in the initial stages than when development is concentrated on a
few major industrial projects. However, the modernisation of an
economy is less risky and has more lasting results when it is accom-
plished on the basis of a well developed infrastructure.9
What he had in mind were in particular the development of railway and
telecommunications systems and of hydrological projects, in preference to
haphazard industrialisation, and these could be financed cooperatively by
the industrial nations of East and West together with the new oil states.
Kreisky would dearly like to see a pilot project of several small European
states, two or three oil states, and some developing countries in a new kind
of partnership; and this is where his Middle East policy comes in.

MIDDLE EASTERN CONCERNS

To Bruno Kreisky the Middle East is one of the most sensitive areas today,
where the confrontation of the Great Powers might lead to military conflict
owing to the lack of stable alliances and clearly marked spheres of influence.
In a recent interview he noted three developments which characterised the
 16 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

last decade: the peace between Egypt and Israel, the growing weight of the
cause of the Palestinians, and the key role of oil in European and Middle
Eastern politics, and to these problems the world should pay urgent
attention.
It was probably on Kreisky's initiative that the Socialist International
embarked on its 'Middle East Mission' which consisted of three fact-finding
tours of the area in 1974, 1975 and 1976, each led by Kreisky. In his own
words, their task was not to offer detailed suggestions for a solution, but
merely 'to indicate a framework and the general direction where there is the
potential for peaceful development'. This framework includes the following
five points: the willingness of Israel to return to the borders of 1967, the
establishment of a Palestinian state, the return of conquered territories to
Syria and Egypt, agreement about the status of Israeli settlements in the
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ceded areas and of Arab settlements in Israel, and finally the return of a
certain number' of Palestinian refugees — probably not more than a
symbolic gesture.
In the meantime, Kreisky was the first Western statesman to recognize the
PLO and to allow it to open an 'information office' in Vienna; a growing
number of countries have followed suit since. And he is most outspoken in
his criticism of Israeli policy, especially since Menachem Begin's tenure of
office. Many observers find this puzzling in view of Kreisky's Jewish origins.
It could, of course, be argued that anyone but Kreisky would lay himself
open to charges of antisemitism; but his attitude to Jews and Jewishness is
more complex and quite logical.
In a recent series of interviews with an Israeli journalist he explained why
he could support the Palestinian 'liberation struggle' while considering
Zionism racist:
If one believes, as I do, that there are Jews — but not a Jewish people
— simply members of the Jewish faith, and this is essential, then it is
possible not to be a Zionist without being thought a scoundrel. As you
know, I do not consider my Jewish origins as something negative; but I
cannot bring myself to believe that being Jewish is something special.
To the question whether he considered himself an assimilationist, he
replied that he thought assimilation was 'not a duty, but a right'. He insisted
that there was right on both sides: whereas assimilationists wish to cease
belonging to a minority, the minorities themselves — like Austria's
Slovenes, Croats and others—wish to go on existing. In Austria with its own
multinational past it should be possible for a man to say: I want to be an
Austrian, just that, regardless of his ancestry. This, of course, is Kreisky's
own position, although he does not deny that with all due respect and
admiration for Israel's achievements there is an element of 'irrationality' in
his very critical attitude towards that country.10
But the PLO is not making it easy for its allies. Kreisky had hardly
informed the world that the PLO had abandoned its aim of destroying Israel,
when Arafat's own grouping within the PLO, El Fatah, published a paper
after its May congress in Damascus according to which, 'the political,
economic, military, cultural and ideological liquidation' of Israel remained
 THE KREISKY PHENOMENON 17

the objective of the PLO. It is said that Kreisky remonstrated with Arafat in
no uncertain terms, whereupon Arafat explained in an interview with The
International Herald Tribune^1 that this was no official document but a draft
originating with a small faction within El Fatah and that his 'relations with
Mr Kreisky, who is a friend of my people, were unclouded'.
While arguing for the recognition of the PLO, Austria is of course not
prepared to identify herself unreservedly with the Arab cause. At the
UN-sponsored world conference of women held at Copenhagen in July
1980, Austria was among the 22 states (including those of the European
Community) abstaining from voting for an action programme which linked
Zionism with racism and colonialism and would have channelled aid to
Palestinian women exclusively via the PLO.
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NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED

Kreisky's concern for the Middle East has yet another facet. It is not only
that he wishes to contribute Austria's weight to any peacekeeping move, and
to ensure the unhindered flow of oil to Europe; the nations of the area also
figure in his efforts to encourage the non-aligned states to take a more active
part in world affairs. The crisis over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a
case in point. While criticising the Soviet Union, he refused to allow Austria
to become involved in a new round of cold war moves. In his opinion it was
up to the non-aligned nations to support one of their number — especially
since Cuba which is in good standing with the Soviets was currently leading
this grouping — instead of allowing it to become a new conflict between
Russia and the United States. Unfortunately, his suggestion was not taken
up, just as his visit to Tehran on behalf of the Socialist International failed to
open a way towards the freeing of the hostages.
But in a curious way Austria herself has become involved in the
Afghanistan crisis. In February 1980 Lord Carrington suggested in Rome
'the neutralisation of Afghanistan on the Austrian model', adding that this
neutrality could be guaranteed by the Powers as was the case with Austria.
The Viennese press was quick in pointing out that the comparison was
invalid because Austria had not been 'neutralised' but had chosen neutrality
of her own free will, and that this had not been guaranteed by any Powers
but merely 'noted'. Kreisky told a Dutch journalist that in his opinion
Afghanistan could not achieve a neutral status like Austria's because the
country, 'has for a long time been within the Russian sphere of influence'.
This all the Powers know. His solution was 'the withdrawal of [Russian]
troops and the establishment of a government which is loyal towards the
Soviet Union'.12 Oddly enough, Lord Carrington's suggestion has more
recently been taken up by the Italian Communist leader, Enrico Berlinguer,
who thought it worth trying; but Austrians of all parties would rather not be
mentioned in one breath with a country experiencing a foreign occupation.
The opposition has particularly of late taken to criticising Kreisky for his
frequent excursions into world politics, where it suspects an undue prefer-
ence on Kreisky's part for non-aligned countries in place of the traditionally
close ties with the West, especially the USA. It is sometimes claimed that
 18 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

Kreisky is slowly turning away from neutrality and towards neutralism, but
this assertion would be hard to substantiate. Admittedly, he is sparing in his
praise for the Great Powers whom he blames for the political instability of
the world and the failure to extend effective aid to the needy nations; he
occasionally criticises American policy, more in sorrow than in anger, and
openly resents NATO declarations involving Austria's status. But the differ-
ence between neutrality and neutralism is as clear to him today as it was
fifteen years ago when he wrote in an article for the London Observer:
Neutralist countries, while they are also free from military alliances,
are distinguished by their refusal to take a clear-cut stand in principle
in the East-West conflict. Yet it is wrong to consider the neutralist (or
'non-aligned') countries as necessarily crypto-Communist. And it is
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even more wrong to think that the neutrals are unwilling, or even
reluctant, to make any sacrifices for freedom and democracy, which is
their cause too.
It would also be unjust to believe that the policy of neutral countries
is dictated by a distaste for political commitment. Neutrality has by no
means impeded our freedom of action in the political field. On the
contrary, never before perhaps, has Austria enjoyed such a high
degree of mobility and independence. Like the Swiss, we are aware of
our limitations but we are equally aware of our obligations.13
It is not the least of Kreisky's achievements that he has made the most of
the opportunities which Austria's geographical and political position offers.

NOTES
1. The only biography of Kreisky is by two journalists: Paul Lendvai and Karl Heinz
Ritschel, Kreisky. Porträt eines Staatsmannes, Vienna: Zsolnay and Econ, 1974. His own
publications include Aspekte des demokratischen Sozialismus, Munich: List, 1974,
Neutralitat und Koexistenz, Munich: List, 1975, and Die Zeit, in der wir leben, Vienna;
Molden, 1978.
2. Christopher Hitchens, 'Ten Years of Austrian Socialism', New Statesman, 23 May 1980.
3. Melanie A. Sully, Parties and Elections in Austria since 1945, London: Hurst, 1980.
4. For a comprehensive overview cf. Sarah Hogg, 'A small house in order: A survey of the
Austrian economy', The Economist, 15 March 1979.
5. Interview with ARD, 21 July 1980.
6. Report of the Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft, Vienna, 28 December 1979.
7. Bruno Kreisky, Die österreichische Neutralitat, Vienna: OGB, 1960, p. 9.
8. Bruno Kreisky, 'Address held at the United Nations', Diskussion, Nr.5, 1979, p. 30.
9. Third General Conference of UNIDO, New Delhi, address by Dr. Bruno Kreisky, 31
January 1980, p. 5.
10. Jedioth Achronot (Israel), series of interviews 15, 22, 29 February, 7 March 1980.
11. The International Herald-Tribune, 31 July 1980.
12. HetParool (Amsterdam), 6 May 1980.
13. The Observer (London), 16 May 1965.