Lesson 14
From the Arab Spring to the Arab Winter
Ben Ali (1987) Gaddafi (1969) Mubarak (1980) Assad (2000)
Bouteflika (1999) Saleh (1990) [1978]
On December 17th, 2010,
the street-seller Mohamed
Bouazizi set himself on fire in
front of the municipality of
Sidi Bouzid to protest against
the seizure of his work cart
by the police and the
humiliation he suffered from
the officers who harassed
him
The protests held in the
place of Bouazizi's
immolation were broadcast
and shared on social media,
encouraging a larger number
of people to march in
protests against the
corruption and the violence
of the regime.
December 2010
January 2011
Ben Ali flees to
Saudi Arabia
February 2011
Mubarak
resigns
April 2011
August 2011
Gaddafi is
overthrown
October 2011
Gaddafi is killed in
the city of Sirte
Jan-Feb 2012
Saleh is overthrown
Why and how it had
happened ?
Why it had happened
NOW?
What do you think?
GDP per Capita Current US$
“It was not the economy” Approach
• “In the preceding decade, economic growth was not low in the “revolution countries” […] The macroeconomic
situation was also relatively stable after the imbalances of the early 2000s were absorbed […] Subsidies were not being
cut, unemployment while high, was not rising, and growth rates and investment ratios were on the rise and at
comfortable levels.” Cammett, M. Diwan I. (2014). The Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings (1st ed.), p. 6.
• “The Arab uprisings in 2011 were commonly attributed to the effects of globalization, even though they came more
than two years after globalization had gone into dramatic reverse. […] So a case can be made that it was not rapid
globalization, but it sudden and dramatic slowing, that has been the cause of Arab and MENA discontent.” Springborg,
R. (2016). Globalization and its discontents in the MENA region. Middle East Policy, 23(2), 146-160.
• “despite favourable income inequality measures, subjective well-being measures in Arab countries were relatively low
and falling sharply, especially for the middle class, and in the countries where the uprising were the most intense. The
increasing unhappiness reflected in the perception of declining standards of living was associated with dissatisfaction
with the quality of public services, the shortage of formal sector jobs, and corruption.” Devarajan, S., & Ianchovichina,
E. (2018). A broken social contract, not high inequality, led to the Arab Spring. Review of Income and Wealth, 64, S5-
S25.
5/31/2024 SAMPLE FOOTER TEXT 15
Economic conditions were
good
Reforms were implemented
(maybe not fast enough)
Fault of corrupted and
authoritarian governments
18 November 2008
Dominique Strauss-Kahn n'a pas manqué
de féliciter le président Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali pour la pertinence de ses choix
économiques : « Je m'attends à une
forte croissance en Tunisie cette
année, la politique économique
adoptée ici est une politique saine et
constitue le meilleur modèle à suivre
pour de nombreux pays émergents.
Who were the protesters?
Educational background of the protesters
60
50
40
30
20
10
Egypt (% population) Egypt (% protesters) Tunisa (% population) Tunisia (% protesters)
Elementary or less Secondary/technical BA or above
Participation to the protests by income
quintiles
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Egypt Tunisia
The economic dissatisfaction of the
population
Egypt
“Most of the Gulf-sourced
investment favoured mega-projects
in real estate such as hotels, tourist
resorts, and luxury shopping malls,
and fully or partially privatized public
works, such as ports, airports, and
utilities. These projects created
temporary jobs in construction but,
except for tourism, few permanent
jobs.”
Pfeifer, K. (2016). Neoliberal transformation
and the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. In
Bahramitash, R., Esfahani, H. S. (Eds.). (2016).
Political and Socio-Economic Change in the
Middle East and North Africa: Gender
Perspectives and Survival Strategies. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 35.
“the informal sector absorbed
many of the displaced public
workers plus 75 percent of the
new labor market entrants over
these eight years, coming to
account for 61 percent of total
employment in 2006.
Ivi, p. 53.
Tunisia
• every year 140000 new job-
seekers accessed the
market, while the Tunisian
economy was able to produce
only from 60000 to 65000
employment opportunities,
mostly located in Tunis and
on the coast. Furthermore, a
large part of the work
positions was directed to the
low-skilled workforce,
therefore unemployment was
particularly common among
the educated youth.
• Hibou, B. (2011). Tunisie. Économie politique
et morale d'un mouvement social. Politique
africaine, (1), pp. 9-10.
la Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa (CPG)
Between 1976 and 1986, the CPG granted full
employment to the (male) labour force of the
region. In 1986, the implementation of
market-oriented economic reforms led to a
gradual reduction of the employment
opportunities offered by the CPG. The number
of employees fell from 14-15.000 in 1980 to
5000-5800 2006. In 2007, pressured by the
population, the company opened several job
positions. Nonetheless, many vacancies were
filled by "friends" and protégées of the
managers and the pro-regime trade union
leaders. The population reacted with a series
of strikes, rallies, sit-ins, and occupations,
advocating their right to work. The regime
retaliated with mass arrests, unfair trials, and
the violent repression of the movement
Jordan
• The public sector stopped to be the main
source of employment opportunities for the
population
• The investment were directed to banking and
real estate, creating few employment
opportunities for the population
• The creation of few Qualified Investment Zones
(QIZs) led to the employment of foreign
workforce.
• The official data reports that the level of
unemployment has been gravitating around
13%. Nevertheless -according to unofficial
statistics- the real number is almost double
that.
• The Jordanian economy has been unable to
generate jobs for the rising number of
graduated workers. The military and security
sectors -which already employ one-quarter of
the national labour force- have already
reached the limit and cannot absorb more job-
seekers
Decline of the public sector as main
employer
Creation of few employment
opportunities
Economy controlled by corrupted elites
Rise of the informal economy
Repression and police violence
• Mohamed Morsi (president of Egypt from 2012
to 2013)
• Muslim Brotherhood
• Accused of centralising power
• Ousted by the army
Ennahda (Tunisia)
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
PJD Morocco
Things I might ask in the test
• Reform in the 19th century? How and why? (Mohammed Ali, Selim
III, Mahmud II)
• Tanzimat
• How Egypt Became a British Protectorate
• Why the Ottoman Empire decided to side with the Central
Powers?
• Husayn-McMahon, Sikes-Picot, Balfour Declaration
• UK and the Persian Oil (from 1909 to 1947)
• Calouste Gulbenkian
Things I might ask in the test
• Mohammad Mossadeq
• The Free Officers coup and developmentalism
• Suez Crisis
• MAPAI, Istradaut, Haganah, Irgun, Stern Gang
• Conditions of the Palestinians peasants during the 1920s and
1930s
• 50-50 agreements
• The Oil Shocks
Things I might ask in the test
• The White Revolution
• Which social classes opposed the Shah
• Political factions in Iran during the 1990s and early 2000s
• End of import substitution Industrialisation in Algeria, Egypt, or
Jordan
• Describe the structure of the Authoritarian Bargain
• Difference among political Islam, Traditional Islam and Islamic
Fundamentalism
• The Algerian FIS
Things I might ask in the test
• The Turkish Refah Partisi (1980s-1990s)
• Approach toward the MENA region during George W Bush and
Barack Obama administrations
• Israeli governments’ approach toward the occupied territories:
from Labour to LIKUD
• The factors leading the PLO toward negotiation and the two states
solution
• The dilemma of the Saudi economy
• The economic factors leading to the Arab Spring
