VOL.

427, APRIL 14, 2004 545

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

*
G.R. No. 150707. April 14, 2004.

APOLONIA LL. OCAMPO Now Substituted by MARIANO

O. QUIEN, AMELITA Q. TAN, MILOVAN O. QUIEN,
LUISA OCAMPO-LLORIN, MELITA F. OCAMPO, FELIX
OCAMPO, JR., RAMON OCAMPO, MIGUEL OCAMPO,
JUANA OCAMPO, ANDRES OCAMPO SR., VIOLETA
OCAMPO, MERCEDITA OCAMPO, ANTONIA OCAMPO,
ELISA OCAMPO, BEATRIZ OCAMPO, JUAN JOHNNY
OCAMPO, JONAS OCAMPO, MARIA DOLORES
OCAMPO, REBECCA OCAMPO, FIDELA OCAMPO, LUIS
OCAMPO, JR. and ERNESTO O. FORTUNO, petitioners,
vs. FIDELA LL. OCAMPO, FELICIDAD LL. OCAMPO,
BELEN OCAMPO-BARRITO, VICENTE BARRITO,
NEMESIO LL. OCAMPO, IMELDA OCAMPO and JOSE
OCAMPO, respondents.

Civil Law; Property; Co-ownership; Partition; The settlement

of the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for
partition.—Since the original Complaint was an action for
partition, this Court cannot order a division of the property,
unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-
ownership. The settlement of the issue of ownership is the first
stage in an action for partition. This action will not lie if the
claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. Parties
filing the action are in fact required by the Rules of Court to set
forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to
the property. It would be premature to effect a partition thereof
until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely
resolved.
Same; Same; Same; Mortgage; The effect of a mortgage by a
co-owner shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to that
person upon the termination of the co-ownership.—The Civil Code
provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is
that the mortgagor be the abso-

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

546
 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 546

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

lute owner of the thing mortgaged. Co-ownership cannot be

presumed even if only a portion of the property was mortgaged to
Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose only of one’s interest in
the ideal or abstract part of the undivided thing co-owned with
others. The effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to
the portion that may be allotted to that person upon the
termination of the co-ownership. In this case, Fidela mortgaged a
definite portion of the property and thus negated any
acknowledgement of co-ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Mere issuance of a certificate of title does
not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named therein.—We are not
unmindful of our ruling that the mere issuance of a certificate of
title does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may
be under co-ownership with persons not named therein. But given
the circumstances of this case, the claim of co-ownership by
petitioners has no leg to stand on. Again, we stress, Belen clearly
traced the source of her sole ownership of the property in question
and thereby foreclosed the unproven and unsubstantiated
allegation of co-ownership thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Donation; Once perfected, a donation is
final, its revocation or rescission cannot be effected, absent any
legal ground therefor.—Donation is an act of liberality whereby a
person gratuitously disposes of a thing or a right in favor of
another who accepts it. Once perfected, a donation is final; its
revocation or rescission cannot be effected, absent any legal
ground therefor. A donation may in fact comprehend the entire
property of the donor. At any rate, the law provides that donors
should reserve, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means
for their own support and that of all their relatives who, at the
time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be
supported by them.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

German A. Gineta for petitioners.
Esteban R. Abonal for respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a

civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance
of evidence. In an action involving property, petitioners
should rely on the
547

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 547

Ocampo vs. Ocampo
strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness
of respondents’ claim.

The Case
1
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of2
the Rules of Court, assailing the October 31, 2001 Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56941. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the awards for

damages and attorney’s fees are hereby deleted, the judgment
appealed
3
from is, in all other respects, AFFIRMED. Without
costs.”
4
The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision,
rendered on October 30, 1996, which decreed thus:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds, holds and

declares that defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to
Vicente Barrito, are the true and lawful exclusive owners of the
following properties, namely:

(a) A parcel of residential/commercial land situated in the

poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE
by Carmen Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, on the SE by the
Burgos Street, on the SW by a street, and on the NW by
Julian Ocampo and Carmen Ocampo, containing an area
of 1,119 square meters, more or less, presently covered by
TCT No. 13654 in the name of Belen Ocampo-Barrito,
married to Vicente Barrito and previously covered by TCT
No. RT-4389(983) in the name of Fidela Ocampo, declared
under TD No. 18856 and assessed at P17,240.00.
(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the North and East by a
barrio road, on the South by a creek, and on the West by
Lot 237, with an area of about 300 square meters,
declared under TD No. 19639 with an assessed value of
P6,240.00.
(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the North by Lot 10323, on
the East by Lot

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 8-45.

2 Id., pp. 46-62. Penned by Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by
Justices Ruben T. Reyes (Division chair) and Mariano C. del Castillo (member).
3 CA Decision, p. 16; Rollo, p. 61.
4 Rollo, pp. 63-81. Penned by Judge Jose S. Peñas, Jr.

548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ocampo vs. Ocampo
 9543, on the South by Lot 10325, and on the West by Lot
10322, with an area of about 4884 square meters, declared
under TD No. 35122 and assessed at P6,780.00

as described and referred to in paragraph 9, sub-paragraphs

(a), (b) and (c) of the original complaint and it is hereby ordered
that:

1. The complaint and supplemental complaint are dismissed

for failure of the plaintiffs to prove their cause/causes of
action by preponderance of evidence and on the added
ground of prescription;
2. The plaintiffs are ordered to pay as their joint and several
obligation, to defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo, Belen
Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito, the total sum of
P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and other expenses of
litigation and P50,000.00 for moral damages;
3. The plaintiffs jointly and severally pay the cost of this
suit.
4. Upon the finality of this decision, the notice of lis pendens
annotated at plaintiffs’ behest in the Certificates of Title
covering the properties in question, of defendants be
cancelled; and the plaintiffs, their agents and
representatives as well as successors-in-interest are
ordered to respect the right of ownership of said
defendants thereto, and to vacate and restore the lawful
possession of all portions of said properties to herein
defendants, 5their agents, representatives and successors-
in-interest.”

The Facts

The CA adopted the RTC’s summation of facts as follows:

“Notwithstanding its somewhat deficient grammar and syntax,

the following summation of the relevant and material antecedents
of the case by the court a quo, is substantially correct—

‘This is a civil suit for partition and damages filed by plaintiffs against
the defendants.
‘The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose
Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten (10) children,
namely: Fidela, Felix, Andres, Nemesio, Jose, Apolonia, Felicidad, Luisa,
Rosario, and Luis. Of the aforementioned children, the following are
already dead, namely: Felix, who is survived by his widow, Melita F.
Ocampo and children Felix, Jr., Ramon and Miguel; Andres, who is
survived by Juana Ocampo and children Jose, Andres, Imelda, Violeta
and Mercedita; Jose, who is survived by his children Antonia, Elias and
Juan (Johnny); Rosario, who is survived by Ernesto O. Fortuno; Luis,
who is survived by his children Rose,

_______________

5 RTC Decision, pp. 17-19; Rollo, pp. 79-81.

 549

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 549

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

Ricardo, Jonas, Maria Dolores, Rebecca, Fidela and Luis, Jr.; and Luisa,
who is survived by Carlos Llorin and children Mecita, Manuel, Carlos,
Jr., Carmelita and Marilou L. Arellano.
‘The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses
Jose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they acquired several parcels
of land and, upon their death, left the following properties, namely:

(a) A parcel of residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion

of Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE by Carmen
Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, on the SE by the Burgos Street, on
the SW by a Street, and on the NW by Julian Ocampo and
Carmen Ocampo, containing an area of 1,119 square meters,
more or less, presently covered by TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the
name of Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No. 18856 and
assessed at P17,240.00;
(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the North and East by a barrio road,
on the South by a creek, and on the West by Lot 237, with an area
of about 300 square meters, declared under TD No. 19639 with an
assessed value of P6,240.00; and
(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
bounded on the North by Lot 10323, on the East by Lot 9543, on
the South by Lot 10325, and on the West by Lot 10322, with an
area of about 4,884 square meters, declared under TD No. 35122
and assessed at P6,780.00.

‘that all the above named parcels of land are actually owned in
common by the children of the late spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana
Llander Ocampo although the land denominated as parcel (a) of the
complaint is ostensibly registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone
but acknowledged by her as a property owned in common by all of them,
brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition said properties but
defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably
refuse to do so and moved by a common purpose, both of them mortgaged
to the PNB the land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint to secure
the payment of a P110,000.00 loan, the proceeds of which were x x x
exclusively to the benefit of said defendants only; that the same
defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo have been receiving the
fruits of the properties to the exclusion of their co-heirs amounting to not
less than P2,000.00 a year; and, that because of their relationship, they
undertook earnest efforts to amicably settle this controversy but because
of defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo[’s] utterly
unreasonable and unjustified actuations, the same failed.

550

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ocampo vs. Ocampo
xxx xxx xxx
‘In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering
the partition of the properties described in paragraph 9 of the complaint;
ordering defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo, to release or
otherwise cancel any and all encumbrances on TCT No. RT-4389(983)
which they had caused to be annotated thereon, particularly, the
mortgage in favor of the PNB; requiring Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad
Ocampo to refrain from further encumbering said properties or otherwise
subjecting the same to any lien and for that purpose, a writ of
preliminary injunction to be issued against them to enjoin the
commission of such acts; ordering defendants Fidela Ocampo and
Felicidad Ocampo to submit an accounting of the fruits and other produce
they had received from said properties; further ordering Fidela Ocampo
and Felicidad Ocampo to indemnify plaintiffs the sum of not less than
P15,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and related expenses of litigation,
plus the costs of the suit; and, further granting plaintiffs such other
remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
‘On 17 December 1987, counsel for plaintiffs filed a Motion to Admit
Supplemental Complaint dated 2 December 1987 which was granted by
the Court as there was no opposition to it.
‘The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-
Barrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses; that on 30 September 1987, TCT
No. RT-4389(983) in the name of defendant Fidela Ocampo and covering
the lot described as parcel (a) in paragraph 9 of the original complaint
was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 1364 was issued to defendant
Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to defendant Vicente Barrito, on the
strength of an allege[d] Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly executed
by defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo in their favor on 13 January 1984; that
at the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos was presented for
registration and when TCT No. 1364, Registry of Camarines Sur, was
issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, both the donor and donees
were notoriously aware that said parcel of land was among the lots
subject of this Civil Case No. IR-1867 of which the donor Fidela Ll.
Ocampo and the mother of the donees, Felicidad Ll. Ocampo, are
defendants, that said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and
sisters, and that the donor Fidela Ll. Ocampo was not the exclusive
owner thereof; that the transfer of defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo and
Belen Ocampo-Barrito of the ownership over said property now subject of
this partition is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to deprive
plaintiffs of their legitimate share therein, knowing as they do that the
same are a co-ownership of the original parties plaintiffs and de-

551

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 551

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

fendants herein; that defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo and the spouses
Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito have not acted in good faith,
deliberately causing damage and injury to the plaintiffs by their
avaricious desire to obtain sole ownership of said properties through
dubious and illegal means that the defendant spouses Belen Ocampo-
Barrito and Vicente Barrito, through dubious means and undue influence
over Fidela Ll. Ocampo, a very old spinster whom they have lately taken
into their custody, succeeded in having the latter execute this supposed
deed of donation inter vivos; that defendants have not acted with justice,
honesty and good faith, causing injury to plaintiffs’ rights in a manner
inconsistent with morals and good customs, hence, are liable for moral
damages of not less than P50,000.00; and that to set an example for the
public good and to deter others similarly minded from doing so,
defendants should be assessed exemplary damages of not less than
P50,000.00.
‘Plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered (a) declaring the Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos allegedly executed by Fidela Ll. Ocampo in favor of
Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito be declare[d] null and void,
(b) ordering defendants Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito to
reconvey so much of the property subject thereof as pertain to the
plaintiffs, (c) directing defendants, jointly and severally, to indemnify
plaintiffs such amounts as this Honorable Court may consider fair and
reasonable by way of actual, moral and exemplary damages, inclusive of
attorney’s fees and related expenses of litigation, and (d) granting
plaintiffs such other remedies as may be just and equitable in the
premises.
xxx xxx xxx
‘As Special Defenses, defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito allege that the
original defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo, her predecessor-in-interest, since
1949 has been the absolute owner in fee simple of the property by virtue
of the issuance of the certificate of title in her name; that her
predecessor-in-interest held the same certificate of title to the same
parcel of land (TCT No. RT-4389(983) free of all encumbrances and
adverse claims and was in notorious, public, and actual possession of the
property in concept of absolute owner from 1949 until 13 January 1984,
when said predecessor-in-interest validly conveyed the property by
donation inter vivos which she accepted in the same public instrument;
that TCT No. 1364 was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito on the
strength of the donation inter vivos executed in her favor by her
predecessor-in-interest and has since 30 September 1987, been the
absolute owner thereof; that since 1949 none of the plaintiffs ever
questioned the absolute ownership and title of defendant Belen Ocampo-
Barrito’s predecessor-in-interest over the property making the decree of
registration incontrovertible; that it is fatal for plaintiffs’ cause of action
to allege that

552

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

defendants exerted ‘undue influence over Fidela Ll. Ocampo’ for the
latter to ‘execute the deed of donation’ while clearly admitting in both the
original and supplemental complaints that defendants are residents of
Mindoro Occidental a far away place from Nabua, Camarines Sur, the
place where the same predecessor-in-interest admittedly resides; and,
that Belen Ocampo-Barrito’s title cannot be collaterally attacked in these
supposed partition proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
‘Defendants pray that the case be dismissed for utter lack of merit and
plaintiffs be ordered to pay defendants the sum of P200,000.00 for moral
damages, P50,000.00 for exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as
compensatory damages, to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of
P15,000.00, and for other just and equitable remedies.
xxx xxx xxx
‘As the Special and/or Affirmative Defenses, defendant Fidela Ll.
Ocampo alleges that she is the true and absolute owner of the real
properties described in paragraph 9 of the original complaint having
acquired the same by lucrative title and has, since becoming owner
thereof, been in actual possession thereof excepting the portion of the lot
described in paragraph 9 (a) of the complaint and covered by Torrens’
title which was and is still being unlawfully occupied by plaintiffs
Quiens; that the properties have been declared for assessment in
defendant’s name as exclusive owner thereof and since her acquisition of
said properties, has paid the taxes thereon; that defendant had exercised
continuously all the legal incidents of ownership on said lands to the
exclusion of and adversely to the public, plaintiffs herein included; that
the [D]eed of Donation Inter Vivos and the subsequent transfer of the
property mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint to other defendants
Belen Ocamp[o]-Barrito is valid conveyance which binds the said
property; and, that assuming that plaintiffs have a cause of action, the
same is barred by laches.
xxx xxx xxx
‘Defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo prays that judgment be rendered
dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiffs to indemnify such sum
as will be proved as well as [s]uch amount as this Court may assess by
way of moral and exemplary damages and costs, including necessary
6

expenses for litigation, and for just and equitable reliefs.’ ”

_______________

6 CA Decision, pp. 3-10; id., pp. 48-55. Citations omitted.

553

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 553

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

According to the appellate court, 7

other than the
Acknowledgment of Co-ownership executed by Respondent
Fidela Ocampo, no documentary evidence was, offered to
establish petitioners’ claim of co-ownership. The CA held
that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail
over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence
that had been adduced by respondents to prove their
defenses. Communal ownership of the property in question
was supposedly not proven, either, by the ancient
photograph showing Spouses Chino Jose and Juana
Llander Ocampo with their ten children in front of the
disputed property; or by another picture showing the name
“Oniang Ocampo—1-15-61” engraved on the said house or
building.
The court a quo rejected the argument of petitioners
that the title to the subject property had been placed in the
name of Fidela, because their parents followed the Chinese
custom of placing properties in the name of the eldest son
or daughter who was single. Petitioners explained that
upon the death of the eldest sibling, the properties would
revert to the younger brothers and sisters. According to the
CA, however, not a shred of evidence was adduced to prove
that such a Chinese custom existed or was observed in that
place.
The CA also dismissed petitioners’ contention that
common ownership was indicated by the fact that some of
the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed and lived on the
subject property. It ruled that fraternal affection could
have been the motive that impelled respondents to allow
their relatives to use it.
In contrast to the arguments of petitioners, the CA said
that respondents were able to give clear proof of their
ownership of the property: the Transfer Certificate of Title
and the corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of
Fidela, and later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito.
Nevertheless, the CA eliminated the awards for
damages and attorney’s fees, because the trial court had
failed to cite the factual, the legal and the equitable bases
therefor.

_______________

7 Exhibit “A”; Records, p. 103.

554

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

8
Hence, this Petition.

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

“1. Where the evidence presented, oral and

documentary, on the question of co-ownership, is
overwhelming as it is unopposed, unrebutted and
unimpeached, has co-ownership been proved?
“2. Where co-ownership is confirmed by long, public
possession by co-owners, did the courts commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding that there is no
co-ownership?
“3. Where the evidence of respondents is weak, puerile
and inconsistent, did the courts commit a grave
misapprehension of facts when they gave credence
to it?
“4. Where a deed of donation inter vivos entered in bad
faith deprives the heirs of their hereditary shares,
is said deed valid?
 Where a declaration against interest has not been
“5.
opposed, assailed, rebutted or impeached, did the
courts commit grave abuse of9 discretion in holding
there is no such declaration?”

At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who

owns the disputed property?

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:
Ownership of the Subject Property

At the outset, we clarify that although there were three (3)

properties originally involved in the litigation brought
before the RTC, petitioners’ appeal dealt only with the first
one, referred to in the Statement of Facts above—a parcel
of residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion of
Nabua, Camarines Sur. In their

_______________

8 The case was deemed submitted for decision on October 17, 2002,
upon this Court’s receipt of respondents’ Memorandum signed by Atty.
Esteban R. Abonal. Petitioners’ Memorandum, signed by Atty. German A.
Gineta, was received by the Court on October 7, 2002.
9 Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 10; Rollo, p. 187. Original in upper case.

555

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 555

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

CA appeal, petitioners declared that “the focus of this case

is on the first [property] which is located at downtown
Poblacion of Nabua and therefore 10a valuable piece of
property, 1,119 square meters in all.” Because petitioners
had not questioned the RTC Decision with regard to the
other properties, then the adjudication of these matters
became final. Thus, only one11
property is left for resolution
in the present proceedings.
Since the original Complaint was an action for partition,
this Court cannot order a division of the property, unless it
first makes12 a determination as to the existence of a co-
ownership. The settlement of the issue 13
of ownership is the
first stage in an action for partition. This action will not
lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject
property. Parties filing
14
the action are in fact required by
the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the
nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would
be premature to effect a partition thereof until and15unless
the question of ownership is first definitely resolved.
 Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in
a civil case has
16
the burden of proving it by a preponderance
of evidence. Petitioners’ chief evidence of co-ownership of
the property in question is simply the Acknowledgement of
Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier,
both the trial and the appellate courts were correct in
finding that this piece of documentary evidence could not
prevail over the array of testimonial and documen-

_______________

10 Annex “C” of the Petition; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 3; Rollo,

p. 84.
11 See Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 11. See also Memorandum for Petitioners,
p. 3; Rollo, p. 180.
12 Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 438; 325 SCRA 552,
February 15, 2000; Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 586; 264
SCRA 534, November 21, 1996.
13 Ibid.
14 §1 of Rule 69 provides: “A person having the right to compel the
partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in
his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining
as defendants all other persons interested in the property.”
15 Viloria v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 851; 309 SCRA 529, June 30,
1999; Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
16 Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, supra; See also §1 of Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence.

556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

tary evidence that were adduced by respondents, as will be

expounded below.
Petitioners failed to trace the successive transfers of
ownership of the questioned property that eventually led to
them. Allegedly, it was originally owned by their parents—
Spouses Ocampo—whose deaths passed it on to the
children. Petitioners, however, presented absolutely no
proof of ownership of their predecessors-in-interest. In
insisting that it was so transferred and thus co-owned, the
former rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership
executed by Fidela, their eldest sibling.
On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her
alleged sole ownership of the property and presented
preponderant proof of her claim.
First, she presented
17
a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Residential Land, referring to the subject property,
executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix
Ocampo as buyer. The document dated July 6, 1948, was
signed in the presence of two witnesses and acknowledged
before Juan B. Ballecer, a notary public.
 The theory of petitioners is completely demolished by
this document, which they never contested. According to
them, the land in question was the conjugal property of
their parents; and that upon the latter’s deaths, the former
inherited it in common. If indeed the land was the conjugal
property of Spouses Ocampo, then petitioners should have
presented evidence to prove such ownership by their
alleged predecessors-in-interest. Since the former failed to
do so, how then can they prove the transfer to them of
ownership that has not been established in the first place?
It is axiomatic that no one can transfer
18
to another a right
greater than that which one has; thus, the legal 19
truism
that the spring cannot rise higher than its source.
Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo
declared his “exclusive ownership” of the property, “having
been acquired by purchase[;] and [having] been in [his]
continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material
possession for more than 50 years together

_______________

17 Exhibit “10”; Records, p. 191.

18 Spouses Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 870; 295 SCRA 556,
September 17, 1998.
19 Victorio v. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 520, March 28, 2001.

557

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 557

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

with [his] predecessors in rights and interest, in20 [the]

concept of owner without any claim of other persons.”
Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 10,
1953, this property had been sold to Fidela by Felix
Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that Fidela had
entered the property, actually occupied it, and exercised all
powers of dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners.
As proofs of ownership of the property by Fidela, Belen 21
presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4389 (983),
which named the former as 22owner in fee simple; and a
Declaration of Real Property, evidencing payment of real
property taxes, also by Fidela as owner.
To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion
over the 23property, Belen also presented a Real Estate
Mortgage executed by the former as absolute owner.
Fidela had executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia
Ocampo, one of the original petitioners in this case, who is
now represented by her heirs. Belen correctly argues that
in agreeing to be a mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and
recognized Fidela as the true owner of the land in question.
The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a
contract of mortgage is that the24mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing mortgaged. Co-ownership cannot be
presumed even if only a portion of the property was
mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose
only of one’s interest in the ideal or abstract
25
part of the
undivided thing co-owned with others. The effect of a
mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to the portion that
may be allotted
26
to that person upon the termination of the
co-ownership. In this case, Fidela mortgaged a definite
portion of the property and thus negated any
acknowledgement of co-ownership.

_______________

20 Exhibit “10”; Records, p. 191.

21 Exhibit “4”; Records, p. 145.
22 Records, pp. 68-69.
23 Exhibit “11”; Records, p. 193.
24 Article 2085(2) of the Civil Code.
25 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II (1992 ed.), pp. 200-
201.
26 Article 493 of the Civil Code.

558

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

Third,27 Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter

Vivos executed on January 13, 1984, between herself as
donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate
source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the
property.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in
an effective transfer
28
of title to the property from the donor
to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by
Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the
fact that at the time of the execution of the
Acknowledgement—assuming that its authenticity and due
execution were proven—the property had already been
donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior
document, is clearly inconsistent with the document relied
upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTC’s ratiocination:

“On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo

herself made a written acknowledgement for her co-ownership
over all the properties disputed with plaintiffs in this case, the
same cannot be considered as a declaration against Fidela’s
interest since the alleged acknowledgement was written and
executed on 24 December 1985 when she was no longer the owner
of the property as the year previous, on 13 January 1984, she had
already donated all her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-
Barrito, so that, in effect, she had no more properties
29
with which
she can have an interest to declare against.”

Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgement of Co-

ownership may be considered as a declaration against
interest. A statement may be admissible as such a
declaration if it complies with the following requisites: 1)
the declarant is dead or unable to testify; 2) it relates to a
fact against the interest of the declarant; 3) at the time of
the declaration, the declarant was aware that it was
contrary to his or her interest; and 4) the declarant had30 no
motive to falsify and believed the declaration to be true.

_______________

27 Exhibit “3”; Records, pp. 143-144.

28 Article 712 of the Civil Code, provides: “Ownership and other real
rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by
testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts,
by tradition.” (Italics supplied.)
29 RTC Decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 76. Citations omitted.
30 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II (9th revised ed.,
2001), pp. 644-645.

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VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 559

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

As correctly found by the trial court, however, the

Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could not be a fact
against the interest of the declarant, since her right over
the property had already been extinguished by the prior act
of donation. Thus, at the time of the declaration, Fidela
could not have acknowledged co-ownership, as she had no
more property against which she had an interest to declare.
Finally,
31
Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No.
13654 as proof of her ownership of the property. To be
sure, the best proof of ownership of the land is the
Certificate of Title (TCT). Hence, more than a bare
allegation is required to defeat the face value of
respondent’s TCT, which 32
enjoys a legal presumption of
regularity of issuance. It is quite surprising that despite
the process of transfers and titling of the subject property—
commencing in 1948 and eventually
33
leading to the sole
ownership of Belen in 1984 —it was only after 1984 that
petitioners started asserting their claim of co-ownership
thereof.
We are not unmindful of our ruling that the mere
issuance of a certificate of title does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may 34be under co-
ownership with persons not named therein. But given the
circumstances of this case, the claim of co-ownership by
petitioners has no leg to stand on. Again, we stress, Belen
clearly traced the source of her sole ownership of the
property in question and thereby foreclosed the unproven
and unsubstantiated allegation of co-ownership thereof.
In addition to the TCT presented,
35
Belen offered as
evidence the Tax Declaration indicating that she, as
owner, had been paying real estate taxes on the property,
all to the exclusion of petitioners. On the other hand,
petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or
document to prove their ownership. Having filed an action

_______________

31 Exhibit “2”; Records, p. 142.

32 Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Halili v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 326 Phil. 982; 257 SCRA 174, May 30, 1996.
33 The property was donated to Belen Ocampo-Barrito on January 13,
1984.
34 Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 556; 292 SCRA 544, July
15, 1998.
35 Records, p. 71.

560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

involving property, they should have relied on the strength

of their own title 36and not on the alleged weakness of
respondents’ claim.
Petitioners assert that their claim of co-ownership of the
property was sufficiently proved by their witnesses—Luisa
Ocampo-Llorin and Melita Ocampo. We disagree. Their
testimonies cannot prevail over the array of documents
presented by Belen. A claim of ownership cannot be based
simply on the testimonies of witnesses; much less on those
of interested parties, self-serving as they are.
As to the photographs presented by petitioners to bolster
their claim of co-ownership, we affirm the CA’s disposition
showing the flimsiness of their claim as follows:

“The other piece of documentary evidence presented by appellants

really proved nothing. The ancient photograph showing the
spouses Chino Jose and Juana Llander Ocampo together with
their ten children, simply proved that there was such a picture
taking of the spouses with their children. But the photograph does
not prove communal ownership by appellants over the disputed
parcels of land; neither does it prove that the said properties were
indeed owned by the spouses Chino Jose and Juana Ocampo, and
then later on transferred to and commonly owned by their
children. By the same token, the picture exhibited by appellant
showing the name ‘Oniang Ocampo—1-15-61’ (or Apolonia
Ocampo, one of the children of the spouses Chino Jose and Juana)
engraved in the house or building, does not prove communal
ownership of the properties in question. At best, it is susceptible
of various meanings, like: that of Oniang Ocampo was born on 1-
15-61, or that she got married on that date, or that she was
celebrating a special event on the date mentioned, or that she
even died on the date mentioned. And even assuming ex gratia
argumenti, that the said engraving proved ownership over the
disputed building, some such fact can only work to the prejudice
of herein appellants. Why? Because it would mean that only
Oniang (or Apolonia) was the owner of the building and that the
building is not, therefore, a communal property of the children of
the late spouses Chino Jose and Juana. Adverting to this piece of
evidence, the Trial Court postulated—

‘The engravings on the house ‘ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG.—1-15-61

cannot serve as evidence that the property is of common ownership. At
most, this can only establish the fact that said building was constructed
for a certain ‘Oniang’ on 15 January 1961. If, indeed, the property is of
common ownership, there could not have been any difficulty to engrave
thereon ‘HEIRS OF JOSE OCAMPO

_______________

36 Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, supra.

561

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 561

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

and JUANA LLANDER-OCAMPO—1-15-61’ instead of ‘ONIANG

37

OCAMPO BLDG.—1-15-61.’”

Neither can we accept petitioners’ contention that co-

ownership is shown by the fact that some of the children of
Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up businesses
on the property. The appellate court correctly found that
since the litigants in this case were blood relatives,
fraternal affection could have been a good motive that
impelled either Belen or Fidela to allow petitioners to use
the property. Without any proof, however, co-ownership
among the parties cannot be presumed.
Nor are we persuaded by the contention that Spouses
Ocampo placed the subject property in the name of only one
person in accordance with a Chinese custom. As mentioned
earlier, that custom consisted of placing properties of
parents in the name of the eldest unmarried son or
daughter, with the implicit understanding that ownership
thereof would later revert to the siblings.
In contrast to the failure of petitioners to prove that 38
such custom existed and was practiced in that place,
Belen presented evidence that clearly negated any claim of
ownership by the former’s predecessors-in-interest. Having
shown that the property in question was originally owned
by one Adolfo Ocampo—not by Spouses Ocampo, from
whom petitioners derive their right—the claim of custom
becomes immaterial.
The fact that Fidela was not presented in court will not
necessarily favor petitioners and prove that the property in
question is indeed co-owned. If they felt that her testimony
would prove their cause, then they could have39easily called
her as an adverse or a hostile witness. But since
respondents were confident in the documents they
presented in court, they did not see any need to call her as
a witness.
 Petitioners also question the motives of Fidela for
donating her properties, when she is still alive and needs
money in her old age. They clearly overlook the nature of a
donation.

_______________

37 CA Decision, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 58-59.

38 Article 12 of the Civil Code provides: “A custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence.”
39 §12 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

562

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person

gratuitously disposes 40of a thing or a right in favor of
another who accepts it. Once perfected, a donation is final;
its revocation or rescission
41
cannot be effected, absent any
legal ground therefor. A donation 42may in fact comprehend
the entire property of the donor. At any rate, the law
provides that donors should reserve, in full ownership or in
usufruct, sufficient means for their own support and that of
all their relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of
43
the
donation, are by law entitled to be supported by them.
In questioning the motives of Fidela for donating the
subject property, petitioners are contradicting even
themselves. On the one hand, they assert that she would
not have disposed of her property, since she would need it
in her old age; on the other, they argue that it was not hers
alone anyway. It should be clear that the law protects
donors by providing that, without any reservation of
sufficient means for themselves, the donation44 shall be
reduced upon the petition of any person affected.
To be sure, petitioners’ arguments all pertain to
circumstances extraneous to the Deed of Donation itself.
The law is clear that when its terms have been reduced to
writing, an agreement must be presumed to contain all the
terms agreed upon; and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
45
terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.
Petitioners did not question the consent of Fidela to the
donation. Never was there any intimation that she had
either been coerced or defrauded into entering into it. As all
the essential elements
46
of a donation—consent, subject
matter and cause —have been satisfied, we see no reason
to entertain any doubt about the Deed pertaining thereto.

_______________

40 Article 725 of the Civil Code.

41 Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence (1993 revised
ed.), p. 353.
 42 Article 750 of the Civil Code.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 §9 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
46 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, supra, p. 531.

563

VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 563

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

The question of why the land was registered several years

after the donation is purely speculative. What is important
is that there was a duly proven Deed of Donation, which
formed the basis of Belen’s claim and led to the registration
of the property in her name.
Petitioners also question Fidela’s filing of an unlawful
detainer suit after the date of the Deed of Donation. Again,
we remind petitioners that because this action involves
property, they should rely on the strength of their own
title, not on the alleged weakness of the claim of
respondents. At any rate, the burden of proof of the claim of
co-ownership rests on the former.
Moreover, the final resolution of this case entails the
review of factual findings of the courts below. It is a settled
doctrine that in a civil case, final and conclusive are the
factual findings of the trial court, if supported by clear and
convincing evidence on record. Usually, the Supreme Court
does not review those findings—especially 47
when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, as in this case. From the records
of the present case, no cogent evidence appears that would
impel us to apply the above doctrine differently. The courts
below have not overlooked essential facts that, if
considered, may produce a different outcome. The trial
court correctly explained thus:

“This Court from the outset had the opportunity to see and hear
the tell-tale [signs] of truthfulness or perjury—like the flush of
face, or the tone of voice, or the dart of eyes, or the fearful pause
[—] and finds that credibility is with the defendants [herein
respondents]. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence is with
defendants whose testimonial
48
evidences are buttressed by their
documentary evidences.”

Finally, we agree with the CA in eliminating the awards

for damages and attorney’s fees for respondents’ failure
49
to
show any factual, legal or equitable bases therefor.

_______________

47 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 720; 324

SCRA 714, February 4, 2000; Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 546;
266 SCRA 596, January 23, 1997; Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
48 RTC Decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 79. Citation omitted.
 49 National Power Corp. v. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc., 421 Phil. 532;
369 SCRA 629, November 20, 2001; Spouses Yu Eng Cho v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 385 Phil. 453; 328 SCRA 717, March 27, 2000.

564

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. ALS Management &
Development Corp.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the

assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Ynares-Santiago,

Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.

Note.—A co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a

co-owned property when his share is mortgaged by another
co-owner without the former’s knowledge and consent.
(Nufable vs. Nufable, 309 SCRA 692 [1999])

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