of whether military interrogators violated their own agencies' policies is

outside the jurisdiction and expertise of the DOJ OIG. Moreover, we did not
attempt to determine whether military witnesses would dispute the accuracy
of reports made to the OIG by FBI employees. An investigation of this scope
would have been beyond our jurisdiction and our available resources.

However, in this report, we identify potentially applicable DOD

policies in each discussion of a particular technique reported by FBI agents
based on the description of those policies supplied in the Church Report or
the Schmidt-Furlow Report. For comparative purposes, we also indicate
whether prior investigations found instances of conduct similar to that
reported by the FBI agents.

v. Organization of the OIG Report

This OIG report is organized into 12 chapters. Chapter One contains

this Introduction. Chapter Two provides background information relevant
to the issues addressed later in this report. It describes how the FBI
became involved in the military zones as a result of its changing emphasis
on preventing terrorism in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Chapter Two also describes the organizational structure of FBI
Headquarters with respect to international terrorism and detainee
operations. It also discusses other DOJ entities involved in overseas
detainee issues, as well as inter-agency entities and agreements relevant to
this OIG investigation. In the last part of Chapter Two, we discuss each of
the three zones (GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq), including a brief review of
military detainee operations, a discussion of the FBI's missions and
deployments within the zone, a discussion of the FBI's organizational
structure as it related to the zone, and a detailed description of FBI
interview activities in cooperation with the military within the zone.

Chapter Three provides background information regarding the pre-

existing interrogation policies of the FBI prior to the September 11 attacks.
These policies, which prohibit the use of coercive interrogation techniques,
are based on constitutional considerations regarding the voluntariness of
custodial confessions and the FBI's position, from years of law enforcement
experience, that rapport-based interview techniques are the most effective
and yield the most reliable information. In Chapter Three, we also address
the various interrogation policies that the DOD adopted for use in the
military zones, and we explain reasons for the dramatic differences between
the FBI's interrogation policies and those issued by the military for use in
military zones overseas.

Chapter Four examines the FBI's initial deliberations regarding how

its agents should conduct themselves in the context of the FBI's new

8
terrorism prevention function overseas, and its unfamiliar role of being
subordinate to other agencies that controlled most detainees in the military
zones. These deliberations began in 2002 when the FBI sought to assist in
the interrogation of certain high value detainees in the custody of other
agencies. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III decided that the FBI would not
participate in interrogations involving aggressive techniques that were
approved for other agencies in the military zones.

Chapter Five examines the dispute between the FBI and the DOD
relating to Muhammad AI-Qahtani, a detainee held at GTMO who is widely
believed to have been an additional hijacker in the September 11 conspiracy
but who was prevented from entering the United States by immigration
officials at the airport in Orlando, Florida. We examine the treatment of this
detainee in detail because his interrogation became a focal point for tension
between the divergent interrogation models followed by the FBI and the
military. The dispute regarding the interrogation strategy for AI-Qahtani,
which was elevated to senior officials in the FBI and DOJ, was ultimately
resolved in favor of DOD's interrogation approach.

In Chapter Six, we examine the FBI's response to the Abu Ghraib

disclosures in the spring of 2004. We discuss the development of the FBI's
formal written policy addressing agent conduct with respect to detainees in
GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq: an Electronic Communication (EC) issued by
the FBI Office of General Counsel on May 19, 2004 (the "FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy"). Chapter Six also examines how the FBI addressed the
concerns raised by agents in the field after the policy was promulgated.
These concerns related to whether the FBI agents would be deemed to have
"participated" in coercive interrogation techniques used by other agencies by
their presence alone, and the circumstances under which FBI agents would
be required to report interrogation tactics used by other agencies. We also
describe the internal investigations that the FBI conducted following the
Abu Ghraib disclosures.

In Chapter Seven we examine the communication of FBI policies to

agents who were deployed to the military zones. First, we describe the FBI's
early efforts to provide training or guidance to its agents regarding how they
should address detainee issues, including the question of what action they
should take in response to witnessing the use of aggressive interrogation
techniques by other agencies. Second, we describe the expanded training
programs that the FBI developed for agents deployed to the military zones
after the Abu Ghraib disclosures and the issuance of the FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy.

Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten detail the results of the OIG's
investigation into what FBI agents saw, heard about, and reported with
respect to detainee mistreatment in GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Each of

9
these chapters follows the same organization. The responses to the GIG's
survey are summarized in tabular form. We then describe the FBI agents'
observations regarding specific techniques, with particular attention to the
harshest techniques and those techniques most commonly observed in the
particular military zone. In the last part of each of these chapters, we
examine the disposition of reports by FBI agents to their superiors or to
military personnel regarding their concerns about detainee treatment.

In Chapter Eleven we discuss our investigation of eight separate

allegations that FBI agents in the military zones were involved in detainee
abuse or mistreatment. While some of the allegations we investigated were
made by detainees, others allegations came from other FBI agents, in most
instances in response to the GIG's survey.

Chapter Twelve presents the GIG's conclusions and recommendations

regarding the FBI's involvement in detainee interrogations in the military
zones.

10
 CHAPTER TWO
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In this chapter we provide background information regarding the
FBI's activities in overseas military zones. In Part I we explain how the FBI
became involved in the military zones as a result of its changing emphasis
on preventing terrorism in the wake of the September 11 attacks. In Part II
we describe the FBI Headquarters organizational structure with respect to
international terrorism and detainee operations. In Part III we describe
other DOJ entities involved in overseas detainee issues, and in Part IV we
describe inter-agency entities and agreements relevant to this OIG
investigation. In Part V we describe each of the three zones (GTMO,
Afghanistan, and Iraq), including a brief review of military detainee
operations, a discussion of the FBI's missions and deployments within the
zone, a discussion of the FBI's organizational structure as it related to the
zone, and a detailed description of FBI interview activities in cooperation
with the military within the zone.

I. The Changing Role of the FBI After September 11

The FBI is the nation's lead domestic agency for the collection of
foreign counterintelligence information, which includes information relating
to international terrorist activities. 16 Since September 11, the Attorney
General and the FBI Director have elevated counterterrorism and the
prevention of future terrorist attacks against United States interests as the
top priority of the DOJ and the FBI. In response to the attacks, Attorney
General Ashcroft directed all DOJ components to focus their efforts on
disrupting any additional terrorist threats. The Attorney General
summarized the Department's new mandate in a speech he gave on
October 25,2001, in which he said: "Our single objective is to prevent
terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists off the street." This caused a
dramatic shift in the focus of the Department of Justice, including the FBI.
Former Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson described this change to
the OIG as a huge paradigm shift within DOJ from prosecution to
prevention. Similarly, other high-level DOJ and FBI officials told us that
after September 11, they worked to transform the FBI into an organization
that would prevent attacks as opposed to react to attacks.

16 The authority for the FBI's broad mission to act at the nation's lead domestic
intelligence agency is set forth most clearly in Presidential Executive Order 12333,
implemented on December 4, 1981.

11
 Part of the transformation of DOJ and the FBI focused on increasing
information sharing within DOJ and the FBI and among all the entities
involved in the collection of intelligence relating to terrorist activities. 17
Previously, the FBI's overseas presence was primarily carried out by its legal
attaches (LEGAT), who were assigned to U.S. Embassies around the world
and who facilitated and supported the FBI's investigative interests in the
overseas arena that pertained to threats against the United States. While
the LEGAT system remains in place, after September 11 the FBI sought to
place significant numbers of agents directly in zones outside the United
States where first-hand intelligence relating to potential domestic terrorism
threats could be gathered. 18 In particular, the FBI began sending agents to
Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and traq. While the activities of the agents
assigned to GTMO were directed for a short time by FBI field offices, the
responsibility for these overseas assignments quickly shifted to officials at
FBI Headquarters. In the next section, we describe the FBI Headquarters
entities relevant to international terrorism generally, and FBI agent
assignments to overseas military zones in particular.

II. FBI Headquarters Organizational Structure for Military Zones

To assess FBI observations of detainee treatment and how concerns

regarding detainee treatment made their way from line FBI agents up the
FBI chain of command, it is important to understand the various FBI

17 One effect of September 11 and the FBI's change in emphasis was the dissolution
of divisions between the "intelligence" and "criminal investigative" functions. Prior to the
September 11 attacks, procedural restrictions - known informally as the "wall" - were
created to separate intelligence and criminal investigations. These restrictions were created
in response to concerns that if intelligence investigators consulted with prosecutors about
intelligence information or provided intelligence information to criminal investigators, this
interaction could affect the prosecution of a case by allowing defense counsel to argue that
the government had misused its authority to conduct surveillance under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Although information could be "passed over the wall" -
shared with criminal investigators - this occurred subject to defined procedures. In late
2001 and 2002, the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the issuance of new guidelines on
intelligence sharing by the Attorney General, and a ruling by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillanc~ Court of Review combined to dismantle the "wall." In its ruling, the FISA
Court of Review wrote, "[E]ffective counterintelligence, we have learned, requires the
wholehearted cooperation of all the government's personnel who can be brought to the
task." In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (2002).
18 The FBI's merging of the intelligence and criminal investigative functions stands
in contrast to the military, which continues to have separate entities for its law enforcement
functions and its intelligence function, as we describe in Section IV.B.l of this chapter.

12
Headquarters entities responsible for counterterrorism, intelligence
collection, and detainee issues. 19

A. Counterterrorism Division

In 1999, the FBI created a separate Counterterrorism Division (CTD).

At FBI Headquarters, CTD has been responsible for the deployments of
personnel and the management of information to and from Afghanistan,
Iraq and GTMO.20 In addition, the number of agents assigned to
counterterrorism nearly tripled between 1995 and 2002. Within CTD,
various entities had jurisdiction over, or management responsibility for, the
collection of terrorism-related counterintelligence information and the
agents collecting such information in Afghanistan, and Iraq. The primary
components within CTD with such responsibilities were the International
Terrorism Operations Sections (ITOS-1 and ITOS-2), and the
Counterterrorism Operational Response Section (CTORS). The Assistant
Director for CTD reports to the Executive Assistant Director for
Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism, who reports to the FBI Director.

1. International Terrorism Operations Sections

One of the four major components of the FBI's CTD is the

International Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS), which is responsible for
overseeing the FBI's international terrorism investigation, including both
criminal and intelligence investigations. The mission of the ITOS is to
prevent terrorist acts before they occur, and to mount an effective
investigative response to any terrorist attacks with the goal of prosecuting
those responsible. ITOS responsibilities are divided between ITOS-1 and
ITOS-2. With respect to the matters covered in this report, ITOS-1 played
an important role. In this regard, the focus of ITOS-1 has been operational
matters relating to Afghanistan and al-Qaeda within the United States.
ITOS-1 distributed information being sent back from FBI agents in
Afghanistan to the relevant FBI field offices, and similarly forwarded
requests by field offices to agents deployed overseas for further
investigation. ITOS-2, on the other hand, had "oversight responsibility for
all FBI counterterrorism operations in Iraq" including the handling of
intelligence gathered there, as well as for all other terrorism matters
elsewhere. The Section Chief for ITOS-1 reports to a Deputy Assistant
Director (Deputy AD) in CTD, who in turn reports to the AD for CTD.

19 Appendix B contains organizational charts for DOJ, the FBI, and the
Counterterrorism Division of the FBI.
20 Six different Assistant Directors were in charge of CTD in the slightly greater
than three-year period covered by this report - from late 2001 to the end of 2004.

13
 2. Counterterrorism Operations Response Section

The Counterterrorism Operations Response Section (CTORS) was

created in January 2003 as part of the FBI's reorganization and expansion
in counterterrorism efforts. CTORS now includes the Military and Liaison
Detainee Unit (MLDU), the Fly Team, and the FBI Headquarters portion of
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The Section Chief of CTORS reports
to the Deputy AD for Operational Support, who reports to the AD for CTD.

a. Military Liaison and Detainee Unit

The agents who are sent on these overseas assignments are overseen,
for the duration of the assignment, by the Military Liaison and Detainee
Unit (MLDU) (initially called the GTMO Task Force). Since its inception, the
MLDU has focused largely on logistics and training. 21 It was originally
formed as an ad hoc task force within the FBI's CTD in late 2002 or early
2003 "to oversee the newly created FBI mission in Afghanistan." MLDU's
duties were been expanded to support agents deployed to Iraq, and it has
been responsible for the FBI's operations in GTMO' as well. MLDU now has
liaison personnel with all of the major military combatant commands-
Northern Command, Central Command, and Southern Command. The Unit
Chief for MLDU reports to the CTORS Section Chief.

b. Fly Team

The "Fly Team" was originally established as part of the FBI's

counterterrorism effort on June 1,2002. This unit's functions include
serving as the FBI's first rapid responders with investigative capabilities
whenever there is an incident overseas, such as the London terrorist
bombings in July 2005. The Fly Team's duties include assessing what the
FBI can contribute to such situations and recommending to FBI
management what resources should be directed to these incidents. The Fly
Team has roughly 30 investigators, many of whom have been deployed for
detainee interviews and other duties in Afghanistan and Iraq several times.
Many Fly Team members were formerly in the military and therefore
operated more easily in the battlefield environment. For these reasons, they
are often paired up for deployments in military zones with agents from field
offices. The Unit Chief for the Fly Team reports to the CTORS Section Chief.

c. Joint Terrorism Task Forces

The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) are squads within FBI field
offices that focus primarily on addressing and preventing terrorism threats.

21 At the end of 2002 or beginning of 2003, the GTMO Task Force became the
MLDU.

14
JITFs include members from other federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies, including local police departments. Before the September 11
attacks there were 35 JITFs nationwide. As of March 2005 there were 103.
The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJITF) is a unit within CTORS
that was created to support JITFs and to enhance communication and
cooperation among federal, state, and local government agencies by
providing for coordination of terrorism intelligence collection activities.
Later in this report, we discuss a limited number of instances involving the
participation of non-FBI JITF members in detainee interrogations. The Unit
Chief for the NJITF reports to the CTORS Section Chief.

B. Critical Incident Response Group

The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) facilitates the FBI's rapid
response to, and management of, crisis incidents. The CIRG includes a
Crisis Negotiation Unit, an Aviation and Surveillance Operations Section,
and a Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). Throughout the period covered by our
review, HRT has contributed a number of agents for FBI force protection
purposes in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) is

another branch of the CIRG that has played a significant role in the military
zones. The mission of the NCAVC is to combine investigative, operational
support functions, research, and training in order to provide assistance to
federal, state, local and foreign law enforcement agencies investigating
unusual or repetitive violent crimes. The NCAVC is composed of three
Behavioral Analysis Units and a Violent Crime Apprehension Program Unit.
Agents from Behavioral Analysis Unit number 1 (BAU-l), which focuses on
terrorism threats, were sent to GTMO to provide behavioral based
investigative and operational support. The CIRG also has a Chief Division
Counsel who provides legal guidance to the group, and who reports to the
CIRG SAC. The CIRG SAC reports to the Executive Assistant Director for
Law Enforcement Services, who reports to the FBI Director's Office.

C. Office of General Counsel

The FBI Office of the General Counsel provided staff to GTMO and
responded to detainee related inquiries from other FBI divisions, including
inquiries coming from agents assigned to GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
The Office of the General Counsel also assisted in developing policy and
preparing FBI Officials for congressional hearings. At GTMO an Associate
General Counsel provided legal advice. The General Counsel reports to the
Director of the FBI.

15
III. Other DOJ Entities Involved in Overseas Detainee Matters

In addition to the FBI, other offices within DOJ were involved with
overseas detainee issues discussed in this report. The Deputy Attorney
General and his staff advised and assisted the Attorney General in providing
overall supervision and direction to all organizational units of DOJ,
including the FBI. As part of those duties, the Deputy Attorney General and
members of his office participated in intra and inter agency meetings at
which detainee-related issues were discussed. The FBI reports to the
Deputy Attorney General and the Attorney General.

In addition, DOJ's Criminal Division exercises general supervision

over the Department's enforcement of all federal criminal laws not
specifically assigned to other divisions. Included within the jurisdiction of
the Criminal Division are all criminal terrorism cases. The Criminal
Division is led by an Assistant Attorney General. Members of the Assistant
Attorney General's staff helped supervise and coordinate international
terrorism investigations. In that role, they collected information from the
FBI and U.S. Attorneys' offices and shared it with the DOD, the CIA, and the
White House. Other members of the Assistant Attorney General's staff
oversee the Criminal Division office that handles all criminal foreign policy
of the United States, including liaison with the Department of State and the
National Security Council (NSC). The Criminal Division receives criminal
referrals from the FBI. The Criminal Division was the entity responsible for
oversight of federal criminal matters relating to terrorism and acted as the
primary liaison to the FBI's Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU).22

The DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) assists the Attorney General in
his function as legal advisor to the President and all executive branch
agencies. The Office drafts the legal opinions of the Attorney General and
provides its own written opinions and oral advice in response to requests
from the Counsel to the President, various agencies of the executive branch,
and offices within DOJ. During the years covered by this report, OLC
generated written opinions and advice relating to certain detainee issues.

IV. Inter-Agency Entities and Agreements Relating to Detainee

Matters

A. The Policy Coordinating Committee

Officials from DOJ and the NSC told the OIG that many inter agency
discussions on a variety of overseas detainee matters, such as developing

22 The National Security Division of DOJ is now the entity responsible for oversight
of criminal matters relating to terrorism.

16
processes for sorting detainees and later for the repatriation or release of
detainees, took place in a Policy Coordinating Committee. The Policy
Coordinating Committee for detainee issues was led by a National Security
Council (NSC) staff member, and was composed of representatives from
DOJ, the Department of State (DOS) (including members of the DOS Office
of the Legal Advisor), the DOD (General Counsel's Office and sometimes
others from the Joint Chiefs), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). A
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division was the official
DOJ point of contact for the PCC, and others from the Criminal Division,
the Deputy Attorney General's Office, and the FBI attended at various times.

By late 2001 or early 2002, there were regular (sometimes weekly)

PCC video conferences or meetings on detainee issues that were chaired by
the NSC legcil advisor. Issues that could not be resolved at the PCC could
be "bumped up" to the "Deputies" meeting, which was attended by the
Deputy Attorney General or his designee (such as Patrick Philbin, the
Associate Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence/National Security). If a
resolution still could not be reached, an issue could be raised to the
"Principals" meeting, which included the Attorney General or his designee.

Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division,

David Nahmias, said that separate from the PCC meetings, a group of
individuals reviewed enemy combatant or potential enemy combatant cases
to evaluate the government's options on how to proceed. Nahmias and
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Alice Fisher
both described an informal working group, formed after the Jose Padilla
case arose, which included representatives from DOJ's Criminal Division
and OLC, as well as representatives of the CIA and the DOD.23 The group
was intended to promote inter agency coordination on certain detainee
matters. The role of DOJ at these meetings, according to Nahmias, was to
share information about people domestically who, in theory, could be enemy
combatants, and to see who were being held as enemy combatants who
potentially might be prosecuted. He told the OIG that the CIA
representative considered intelligence aspects of these cases, and the DOD
considered military aspects.

23 Jose Padilla was arrested by the FBI when he entered the United States on May
8,2002, based on a federal material witness warrant. The President declared Padilla an
enemy combatant, and Padilla was transferred to military custody in June 2002. He was
subsequently transferred to DOJ custody and was convicted of conspiracy to murder,
kidnap and maim individuals in a foreign country, conspiracy to provide material support
to terrorists, and providing material support to terrorists on August 16, 2007.

17
 B. Inter-Agency Memorandums of Understanding

There are several Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between the

FBI or DOJ and other government agencies that are relevant to detainee
abuse issues or otherwise relevant to this review.

In 1984 DOJ and the DOD entered into an MOU relating to the
investigation and prosecution of criminal matters over which the two
Departments have jurisdiction. The 1984 MOU provides that most crimes
taking place on a "military installation" will be investigated by the DOD.
When such a crime is committed by a person subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, the DOD will also prosecute the matter. With respect to
"significant cases in which an individual subject/victim is other than a
military member or dependent thereof," the DOD must provide notice of the
matter to DOJ. Witnesses and documents indicate that pursuant to this
1984 MOU, the DOD has assumed jurisdiction over the investigation of
potential crimes relating to detainee abuse at DOD facilities in the military
zones.

In 1995, DOJ entered into an MOU with several intelligence agencies,

including the DOD and the CIA. This MOU requires each employee of an
intelligence agency to report to the agency's General Counselor Inspector
General any facts or circumstances that reasonably indicate that an
employee of an intelligence agency has committed a crime. If the subject of
the allegation is an employee of a different intelligence agency than the
person making the report, the General Counsel of the accusing person's
agency must notify the General Counsel of the accused employee's agency.
The General Counsel of the accused employee's agency must then conduct a
preliminary investigation of the matter. If the inquiry reveals a reasonable
basis for the allegations, and the crime falls within certain specified
violations of federal criminal law (including crimes involving intentional
infliction or threat of serious physical harm and crimes likely to affect the
national security, defense, or foreign relations of the United States), the
General Counsel must report the matter to DOJ. The MOU also requires
employees of intelligence agencies to report to their General Counsel any
violations of specified crimes by persons who are not employees of any
intelligence agency (such as civilian contractors), and these crimes must
also be reported to the DOJ.

In 2003, the FBI and the CIA entered into an MOU concerning the
detailing of FBI agents to the CIA to assist in debriefing certain high value
detainees at "sensitive CIA debriefing sites." The MOU primarily addresses
how information obtained by FBI agents detailed to such sites will be used
and protected. The FBI agreed to observe strict need-to-know principles
and limit knowledge of the existence of the MOU. This MOU did not address

18
standards for detainee interrogations or how detainee abuse allegations
would be handled.

In late 2004, the FBI entered into an MOU with the DOD Criminal
Investigative Task Force (CITF). As detailed below, CITF is the military's law
enforcement arm with responsibility for gathering evidence for the military
commission process and possible war crimes prosecutions. The FBI's MOU
with CITF primarily addresses information sharing between the agencies in
the performance of law enforcement functions (not intelligence). It does not
address detainee treatment standards or reporting of detainee abuse
allegations.

We are not aware of the existence of any MOU between the FBI or
DOJ and the DOD or the CIA relating to standards for interrogation of
detainees in DOD or CIA custody.

v. Background Regarding the FBI's Role in the Military Zones

In this section we provide background regarding the FBI's activities in

each of the three military zones discussed in this report. FBI operations
began in Afghanistan in late 2001, shortly before the FBI began sending
agents to GTMO. The FBI sent its first deployment of agents to Iraq in
March 2003.

A. Afghanistan

The United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to

remove the Taliban government from power, capture or kill al-Qaeda
personnel responsible for the September 11 attacks, and destroy or
diminish al-Qaeda's ability to mount further terrorist attacks.

1. Military Operations and Detention Facilities

The DOD conducted U.S. military operations in Afghanistan under the

DOD's Central Command (CENTCOM). Beginning in May 2002, senior
command in the military theater was vested in Combined Joint Task Force
180 (CJTF-180), later redesignated CJTF-76. Church Report at 6-7,180-
183. The military's primary bases were located near the cities of Bagram in
the north and Kandahar in the south. Church Report at 181-83. As
operations in Afghanistan progressed, the military established several
forward operating bases, sometimes called firebases, in remote areas around
the country to support units operating in the field. These bases were
operated by DOD Special Operations Forces or conventional forces. Church
Report at 184. Several firebases were operated jointly by the military and
the CIA.

19
 According to the Church Report, over 30,000 U.S. military personnel
were serving in Afghanistan as of August 2004, and U.S. forces had
detained, beyond individuals questioned in an initial screening process,
roughly 2,000 persons since late 2001. Church Report at 233.

20
 The military had custody and control over the detainees throughout
Mghanistan, and FBI agents were required to arrange access to the
detainees through military police and military intelligence personnel.

2. The FBI's Mission

In September or October 2001, prior to the invasion of Mghanistan,

FBI agents met with CENTCOM to discuss the military's and the FBI's
knowledge about al-Qaeda. Shortly thereafter, the military requested the
assistance of the FBI in Mghanistan. In December 2001, the FBI sent the
first group of eight agents to Kandahar, Mghanistan. According to the Team
Leader for this group, this deployment of FBI agents into a theater of war
working side by side with the military was unprecedented. 24 In addition, as
a result of the Mghanistan deployment and the deployment to GTMO in
January 2002, the FBI had personnel at "both ends of the pipeline" for
counterterrorism information. 25

The FBI mission in Mghanistan evolved over time. Initially, the

primary focus was interviews of al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees captured by
coalition forces and review of captured documents. FBI agents understood
from the outset that they would likely be interviewing detainees together
with U.S. military or CIA personnel. In addition, FBI agents assisted the
military with "sensitive site exploitation" missions, which involved the
collection of time-sensitive information at selected priority targets, such as

24 Similarly, an FBI Supervisory Special Agent deployed in Iraq told us that FBI
agents had not been deployed to a combat zone since World War II.
25 The Church Report stated that CENTCOM forces in Afghanistan first transferred
detainees to GTMO on January 7, 2002. Church Report at 182-183.

21
caves and homes that had been vacated by al-Qaeda personnel during
coalition attacks.

In February 2004, based on a DOD request, the FBI expanded its

contingent in Afghanistan and positioned investigators with more forward
deployed military units to assist in the collection of intelligence. In June
2004, the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) sent a team to Afghanistan
to assess the role of FBI personnel in that country.26 As a result of that
assessment, the FBI CTD issued an Electronic Communication (EC) that
clarified the FBI's primary mission in Afghanistan as "the collection of
actionable threat intelligence which may have a possible nexus to the
United States, its citizens and interests." The EC identified the following
priorities within this mission, including:

Interviewing detainees or Persons Under Custody (PUC) and

other individuals of interest at the detainee collection points
and other smaller facilities, using rapport-based strategies, to
obtain actionable intelligence in the war on terrorism.
Participating in "Sensitive Site Ex loitations" and "forward
sta ed interro ations"
,with an emphasis on
collecting strategic intelligence with a nexus to the United
States. Establishing a liaison with all coalition forces to ensure
the collection and appropriate communication of information
with a nexus to the United States.. Supporting the _
in Afghanistan with FBI technical
ortin s ecialized ·oint FBI-CIA

. Providing training to the Government of

Afghanistan .

3. FBI Deployments

Based on the results of the OIG survey and other information, we

estimated that between 200 and 250 FBI agents served in Afghanistan
between late 2001 and the end of 2004. An FBI Deputy OSC stated that the
FBI personnel in Afghanistan "were there as a force multiplier, but it was
the [military's] show." Between late 2001 and the end of 2004, the number
of FBI personnel deployed in Afghanistan at anyone time ranged between
10 and 25. These totals included agents who conducted interviews as well
as other FBI personnel who did not have detainee interview responsibilities,

26 This assessment followed several incidents in which FBI agents were involved in
ambushes or other violent actions. Because of these incidents, FBI participation in
sensitive site exploitations was temporarily suspended.

22
such as Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) personnel, bomb technicians, and
technically trained agents.

FBI agents who served in Mghanistan volunteered from FBI field

offices. FBI Headquarters personnel said they tried to recruit agents who
had previously served in the military or had special weapons and tactics
(SWAT) team experience. Sometime in 2004, the FBI increased the length of
these assignments from 60 days to 90 days for agents. Between December
2001 and April 2002, the tenure for OSCs in Mghanistan varied between
one and two months. Thereafter, most of the OSCs served in Mghanistan
for 90-day rotations.

FBI personnel in Mghanistan depended upon the military for

transportation, translators, supplies, housing, and protection.

4. Organizational Structure of the FBI in Afghanistan

During much of the period covered by our review, the rotations of FBI
agents deployed to Mghanistan were supervised by an experienced agent
serving as the On-Scene Commander (OSC). Thirteen agents served as the
FBI's OSC in Mghanistan at various times during the period covered by this
review. CTD established the position of Deputy OSC in Mghanistan in early
2004, and six agents served in that position through the end of 2004.
However, for most of 2002 and all of 2003, the FBI did not have any OSC
present in Afghanistan, and the FBI's Mghanistan operations were managed
from the New York Field Office or, beginning in June 2002, from FBI
Headquarters in Washington. In mid-2003, a senior agent was present in
Afghanistan.

OSCs and Deputy OSCs in Mghanistan and elsewhere served as the

direct representatives of FBI Headquarters. They assigned and supervised
the deployed personnel, served as points of contact and liaison with military
and intelligence personnel, kept FBI Headquarters informed about the
agents' work, the logistics issues, and the military personnel with whom
they were working, and arranged for the transfer of information, leads, and
requests to and from u.S. FBI offices and the military. To varying degrees,
OSCs and Deputy OSCs also participated in detainee interviews as time and
other duties permitted.

The FBI OSCs in Mghanistan supervised the preparation of Daily

Situation Reports that were transmitted to FBI Headquarters. The OSCs

23
and Deputy OSCs also maintained daily contact with FBI Headquarters by
satellite telephone.

5. FBI Activities in Afghanistan

FBI agents' activities in Mghanistan consisted primarily of detainee

interviews, participation in military sensitive site exploitations (comparable
to domestic execution of search warrants and crime scene processing),
collection of detainee biometric information, and traditional FBI criminal
investigation work as a result of bombings against U.S. citizens or
facilities. 27 Because the primary focus of this report is detainee
interrogations, we describe the FBI's interview/interrogation activities in
more detail below. The FBI's other activities in Afghanistan are summarized
in the second part of this subsection.

a. Detainee Interviews by FBI Agents

Most of the detainee interviews conducted by the FBI in Afghanistan

took place at military facilities, such as the detainee collection facilities at
Bagram and Kandahar. Due to the small number of FBI personnel in
Afghanistan, it was not possible for them to interview all of the detainees
that came through U.S. military facilities. Several agents told us that FBI
personnel focused their efforts primarily on Arabic-speakers and al-Qaeda
personnel, rather than the Afghan locals such as the Taliban. As a result,
FBI agents had contact with only a small percentage of the detainees who
were interrogated in Afghanistan by military personnel.

The number of detainees each FBI agent interviewed while in

Afghanistan also appears to have been small, often fewer than 20 detainees
during an agent's deployment. Agents frequently interviewed the same
detainee several times. In addition, many FBI agents also briefly
interviewed "Persons Under Control" (PUC). (According to the Church
Report, all captured persons were initially considered PUCs. If they satisfied
screening criteria set by the Secretary of Defense, they became "detainees."
Church Report at 191-192.)

The FBI Daily Situation Reports from May through December 2004
(which were the only Situation Reports produced to the OIG) indicated that
during that 8 month period the total number of FBI custodial detainee
interviews was 681 and the total number of field interviews of PUCs was
303.

27 The written work product from those deployed generally consisted of interview
FD-302s or ECs, After-Action Reports for sensitive site exploitations, and Daily Situation
Reports.

24
 The FBI determined who it wanted to interview b various methods,

FBI interviews of detainees, at least at Kandahar from late 2001 into

early 2002, were conducted in the same tents and rooms used by the
military interrogators. We were told that before the FBI could conduct its
lengthier detainee interviews, military interrogators completed their priority
interrogations to obtain time-sensitive tactical battlefield intelligence. For
the FBI interviews, detainees were brought in by the Military Police, and sat
down with the FBI agents at a table with folding chairs. Some detainees
were brought in hooded or blindfolded, depending on their level of
compliance or security risk, and most detainees were restrained with hand
shackles. According to an after-action memorandum from a former OSC to
FBI Headquarters dated March 5, 2002, during the early months of FBI
deployments in Afghanistan, agents in Kandahar "were limited" in their
ability to conduct "in depth interviews due to limitations with translators,
lack of available intelligence, space restrictions, and prioritization of
interviews to the military."

As explained in Chapter One, we are not addressing

FBI activities at these sites.

b. Joint Interviews with Military Investigators

FBI agents often worked jointly with military personnel in Mghanistan

in planning, preparing for, and conducting detainee interviews, particularly
until mid-2004. Of the roughly 200 agents who served in Mghanistan and
responded to the OIG survey, 86 stated that they jointly interviewed
detainees with military or intelligence agency personnel.

25
 Other agents told us that FBI agents only conducted interviews with
other FBI agents. Some agents told us they avoided joint interviews because
they knew the military was operating under different rules. The FBI OSC in
Mghanistan in the spring of 2004 told us that as of approximately April
2004, the military would not invite FBI personnel in to interviews in which
they thought there would be a conflict between FBI rules and military rules.
He stated that if there was a joint interview,it was understood from the
start what the FBI could and could not do. However, the evidence indicates
that the FBI's practice of conducting joint interviews with other agencies
continued at least occasionally after April 2004. Other information
indicates that military observers were often present during FBI interviews in
Mghanistan.

c. Other FBI Activities in Afghanistan

Substantial FBI resources were also devoted to other aspects of its

counterterrorism mission, such as participation in military "sensitive site
exploitations" and the collection of detainee biometric data.

The FBI also collected and disseminated to other agencies detainee

biometric information such as fingerprints, DNA samples, and standard

26
identification photographs. As groups of detainees were captured on
battlefields throughout Afghanistan and brought to detention facilities, FBI
agents worked with military personnel in the initial fingerprinting, DNA
sample collection; and photographing of the detainees. This work was done
largely by FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division CJIS
ersonnel at various locations in Af hanistan.

The FBI also conducted traditional criminal investigations of

bombings and other crimes against American citizens, companies, and
facilities in Afghanistan. For example, an FBI agent told us that in
September 2004 he interviewed several detainees in Kabul who were in the
custody of the Afghan National Directorate of Security, in connection with
the bombing of the Dyncorp building in which three Americans were killed.

B. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1. Military Operations and Detention Facilities

In October 2001, soon after the start of the United States' military
operations in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks, the United
States began detaining suspected al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban fighters.
The President declared these detainees "illegal enemy combatants" and the
United Stated decided to detain them at the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. Church Report at 99. After receiving the order to establish
detention operations at GTMO, the military was directed to have detention
facilities up and running within 96 hours.

The first planeload of 20 detainees arrived at GTMO on January 11,

2002, less than 5 days after the order was given to build a detention facility
to house 100 captured enemy combatants. Church Report at 99. According
to FBI documents, agents from the FBI and the DOD Criminal Investigative
Task Force (CITF) began formally interviewing detainees on February 4,
2002.

a. GTMO Camps

(1) Camp X-Ray

The first camp to house detainees was called Camp X-Ray. Camp X-
Ray was the site of an old detention facility that had housed Haitian
refugees. Cells at Camp X-Ray were temporary 8 foot by 8 foot by 10 foot
units constructed of chain-link fencing. The cells did not have solid walls;
the military used tarps to keep out the sun and rain. Detainees slept on 4-
inch thick mattresses on cement slabs. The roof of each cell was

27
constructed of metal and wood. Portable toilets and showers were available
for the detainees outside of their individual cells. The interrogation rooms
were also very primitive, although the walls were plywood rather than chain
link. Camp X-Ray was used to house detainees for 3 months until more
permanent detention facilities could be built.

(2) Camp Delta

Construction on Camp Delta began almost immediately after Camp X-

Ray was completed. Detainees were moved to Camp Delta starting on
April 28-29,2002. Camp X-Ray was closed when the last detainees moved
out.

Camp Delta consists of multiple detainee cell blocks or "camps"

numbered consecutively in the order in which they were built. Detainees
are assigned to the camps based on an assessment of their cooperation or
potential for violence.

Camps I through III house detainees considered to be less compliant

than the most cooperative detainees at GTMO. The living conditions at
these three camps are almost identical. The individual cells or detention
units are 8 feet long, 6 feet 8 inches wide, and 8 feet tall and are
constructed of metal mesh material on a solid steel frame and a metal roof.
Each unit has its own floor-style flush toilet, a metal bed frame raised off
the floor, and a sink and faucet with running water. There are two
recreation yards and four showers per block. Exhaust fans mounted in the
ceiling ventilate the cell blocks.

Camp IV houses the more compliant and cooperative detainees at

GTMO. Camp IV received its first detainees in February 2003. The
detainees live in communal living areas that resemble dormitories. The
camp has a common recreational area to which the detainees have access 7
to 9 hours a day.

Camps V and VI house detainees who are considered to be the most

dangerous detainees at GTMO and those that have the most valuable
intelligence. Camp V is a 2-story maximum security complex made of
concrete and steel designed to hold 100 detainees. Completed in May 2004,
it was modeled after the Miami Correctional Facility in Bunker Hill, Indiana.
The camp is composed of five wings. Each cell is 7 feet six inches long and
12 feet 10 inches wide and is made of cast cement containing a cement
formed bed, stainless steel sink, toilet,and window. The cells have cement
floors. Camp V has its own interrogation facilities, which are two rooms per
floor with video and audio capability that can be monitored from a central
control room. Church Report at 103. Camp VI, the most recent addition to
Camp Delta, is another concrete and steel structure modeled after a jail in

28
Lenawee County, Michigan, designed to hold approximately 200 detainees.
It was initially planned as a medium security facility for GTMO, but was
later modified to be a maximum security facility.

Camp Delta also includes a 20-bed hospital dedicated to providing

medical care to the detainees. It has an outpatient clinic, two operating
tables, a dental clinic, a physical rehabilitation area, and quarantine
chambers for contagious arrivals.

(3) Other GTMO Facilities

Camps Echo and Iguana are located just outside Camp Delta. Church
Report at 103. Camp Echo is a small camp that houses detainees who have
been segregated from the general detainee population for a variety of
reasons, such as disciplinary issues, meetings with counsel, or preparation
for departure from GTMO. Each wooden building in the camp has two cells.
A cinder block wall separates the cells. Each cell has a toilet, a sink, and a
bed. A shower is adjacent to each cell. Outside each cell is an area for a
guard to sit or for use during an interrogation.

Camp Iguana was originally designed as a lower security detention

facility to hold a small number of juvenile detainees believed to be under the
age of 16. Camp Iguana is now generally used to house detainees who are
no longer deemed to be enemy combatants, or who are awaiting transfer to
their home country.

The Navy Brig, a small detention facility at GTMO outside the camps
described above, that has been used to house detainees for various .
purposes, such as disciplinary reasons or for special interrogations. A
control center located at the end of the communal living area operates all
doors and cells within the facility and two rows of metal segregation cells. A
cell is approximately 6 feet long, 8 feet wide and 8 feet tall. Each cell has a
window located on the cell door facing the communal living area. The
control center has a view of all cell doors and all detention areas.

b. GTMO Organizational Structure

The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), located in

Miami, Florida, is one of nine unified Combatant Commands in the

29
Department of Defense. It is responsible for providing contingency
planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central and South
America, the Caribbean, Cuba and the Bahamas, and their territorial
waters, as well as the force protection of U.S. military resources at these
locations. SOUTHCOM is also responsible for ensuring the defense of the
Panama Canal and the canal region. GTMO falls within the jurisdiction of
the SOUTHCOM.

According to the Church Report, the command organization at GTMO

"evolved significantly over time." Church Report at 103. The original
organization had separate chains of command for intelligence operations
(JTF-170) and detention operations (JTF-160). Id. at 104. These two
separate joint task forces created a bifurcated chain of command that,
according to the Church Report, impeded cooperatiqn between the military
intelligence and military police units responsible for GTMO. Id. These
separate chains of command were combined on November 4, 2002, and
were re-designated JTF-GTMO. Id. at 104-05. JTF-GTMO is responsible
both for operating the detainee detention facility at GTMO and for
conducting interrogations to collect intelligence in support of the United
States' efforts to combat terrorism. Major General Geoffrey Miller was
appointed on November 4,2002, to lead this new joint task force. Id. at
105. He was succeeded by Brigadier General Jay Hood. 28

JTF-GTMO is composed of three groups, each of which reports to the

JTF-GTMO commander and deputy commander, who in turn report to the
commander of SOUTHCOM. The Joint Detention Operations Group (JDOG)
includes six military police companies and is responsible for security at the
various camps. The Joint Interrogation Group (JIG), discussed in more
detail below, is responsible for the collection and dissemination of
intelligence from all the detainees in the custody of the DOD at GTMO. The
Joint Medical Group (JMG) is responsible for the detainee hospital.

The JIG combines military intelligence elements to pursue its

interrogation mission. According to the Church Report, the centerpiece of
the JIG is the Interrogation Control Element, which coordinates and
supervises the efforts of the military intelligence interrogators, analysts,
linguists, and civilian contract personnel who work on interrogations.
Church ReP.art at 105. The collection of intelligence at GTMO~ed
rimaril throu h detainee interro ations, but also t h r o u g h _
. The Interrogation
Control Element at GTMO includes members of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). Throughout this report, members of the DIA, Defense

28 As of October 2007 the current Commander of JTF-GTMO is Rear Admiral Mark

H. Buzby.

30
HUMINT Service, and other military intelligence gathering entities will be
referred to as "military intelligence." The JIG at GTMO also included a
"Special Projects" team that focused on detainees believed to be of high
value.

The interrogation operations at GTMO included some entities that did

not fall within the Interrogation Control Element, including the FBI and the
DOD Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF). Unlike the FBI, in which
intelligence gathering and criminal investigative functions are now merged,
the military has kept its law enforcement groups separate from its
intelligence collection groups. The law enforcement groups that make up
the CITF are the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), the Army
Criminal Investigation Command (CID), and the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations (OSI). CITF conducts interrogations in order to gather
evidence for the military commission process and possible war crimes
prosecutions. Church Report at 107.

2. The FBI's Mission

In a December 2001 Electronic Communication (EC), FBI

Headquarters directed the Miami Field Office to coordinate with the U.S.
military and establish an FBI presence on the U.S. Naval base at GTMO.
Accordin to the EC, the Miami Field Office was to

On January 7,2002, the first FBI agents arrived at GTMO. This first
group of agents consisted of one Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), one
Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), and two Special A ents SA from
the Miami Field Office. These a ents were assi ed to
. When they
arrived there were only cells at Camp X-Ray that were left over from the
Haitian refugee operation of many years past. Navy personnel were building
more chain link cells to house the incomin detainees whose arrival was
imminent.
29 On January 11, 2002, the first
plane load of 20 detainees arrived at GTMO. Church Report at 99.

FBI Director Mueller told the OIG that he visited GTMO in early 2002.
He said he then decided to reorganize how the FBI managed its operations
at GTMO because it appeared that a much larger FBI component would be

31
participating in the FBI's mission there than previously anticipated. He also
stated that to better manage GTMO staffing and oversight, the FBI's
activities should be handled from FBI Headquarters. The entity established
to do that, as described above, was first called the GTMO Task Force and
was later named the Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU). Director
Mueller said he was told at that time that the FBI was working closely with
the military.

3. FBI Deployments

Between January 2002 and December 2004 over 400 FBI agents were
deployed to GTMO. Approximately half of these agents were assigned to
conduct detainee interviews. Others were sent to GTMO to fulfill roles
relating to detainee interviews, such as behavioral analysis of detainees,
that could be used to develop interview strategies, translation of detainee
interviews, and photographing or fingerprinting of detainees for
identification purposes. The remainder were sent to GTMO in mo~eneral
su ort roles such as administrative su ort, computer support, _

FBI personnel in GTMO primarily used FBI-supplied equipment and

transportation, but sometimes relied on military equipment when FBI
equipment was unavailable. The housing used by the FBI was supplied by
the military and was at first very limited, which in turn limited the number
of FBI personnel who could be on the island at any given time.

4. FBI Organizational Structure at GTMO

As noted above, the first group of FBI agents sent to GTMO consisted
of one SSA, one ASAC, and at least two technically trained agents from the
Miami Field Office. Shortly thereafter, the SSA and his replacements began
to act as the FBI's "On-Scene Commanders" (OSC). From January 2002 to
August 2003, the FBI assigned 16 different temporary OSCs, some of whom
served multiple deployments. These OSCs were deployed to GTMO on
temporary duty assignments for terms ranging from 2 to 6 weeks. By
August 19,2003, the FBI created a longer-term position at GTMO for the
OSC, and from that point on the OSCs have served for terms of up to 2
years.

The FBI generally assigns a "case agent" to each of its major

investigations. The Miami Field Office assigned a case agent to coordinate
all GTMO-related investigative activities. Although, as noted above,
responsibility was subsequently transferred to FBI Headquarters, this case
agent initially assigned by the Miami Field Office remained assigned to
GTMO for over a year in that position. This case agent told the OIG that the
FBI's chain of command was not as clear cut on GTMO as it would be back

32
in the United States. He said there was a high turnover of agents and
temporary supervisors at GTMO, and that personnel worked long days on
many different tasks. He said that this atmosphere did not lend itself to a
regimented system in which everything was done in "lockstep" with SAC
authority.

In March 2002, the FBI contingent at GTMO had grown to

approximately 25-30 people on the island at any given time, and the
number of FBI personnel remained relatively constant until approximately
September 2003, when it dropped to approximately a dozen people.

By August 2004, the FBI had sent a representative from its General
Counsel's office to work at GTMO and provide legal assistance to FBI
personnel at GTMO. The first legal advisor served at GTMO for nearly 3
years.

5. FBI Activities at GTMO

a. Detainee Interviews by FBI Agents

FBI documents reflect that FBI agents, along with agents from the
CITF (in some cases) and military intelligence (in other cases), began
formally interviewing detainees on February 4, 2002. The FBI's first GTMO
case agent told the OIG that early on the interview process at GTMO was
not very systematic or organized. He said the process was driven by the
limited space available for interviews and that each agency assigned to
GTMO vigorously competed for that space. He said FBI agents generally
were given very short notice of when they would get a 4-hour block for
interview time. It was up to each agent to determine which detainee was
most important to interview when space became available. In addition, due
to the high turnover in OSCs noted above, FBI interviewing practices varied
widely. Some OSCs permitted agents to conduct joint interviews with the
military and others instructed agents only to conduct interviews with other
FBI agents.

Initially, the FBI separated the detainees at GTMO by "activities" or

"themes." This system soon became cumbersome and inefficient because
the military was categorizing the detainees geographically. Accordingly, the
FBI's initial system was eventually abandoned and the FBI adopted the
military's system of separating the detainees by geographic region. Later,
the FBI agents who were sent to GTMO to conduct detainee interviews were
divided into two groups, one for detainees from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
States, the other for detainees from North Africa, Europe, and Central Asia.
Each of these two groups was led by an SSA and was staffed by FBI special
agents and intelligence analysts.

33
 Early on, the military and intelligence components at GTMO were,
according to FBI officials, unclear as to what the FBI's role at GTMO would
be. Art Cummings, Section Chief of CTORS and later ITOS-l, was sent to
GTMO by FBI headquarters to address some of the initial start-up issues,
and he served as GTMO's fifth OSC. He told the OIG that when he first
arrived, the Commander of JTF-170, Major General Dunlavey, and the
military's intelligence task force thought the FBI was there "to put handcuffs
on people." Cummings said he explained to Dunlavey and his Executive
Officer that the FBI were experts in conducting adversarial interviews and
getting people to talk to them when it is not in their interest to do so.
According to Cummings, Dunlavey seemed surprised when Cummings
explained that the FBI could offer this service at GTMO. The original FBI
case agent for GTMO also said that early on the military and CIA at GTMO
were worried that the FBI was going to "gum up the works" by "collecting
evidence" instead of just collecting intelligence in order to stop the next
terrorist attack. Cummings said that initially there was no disagreement
with the military about interview techniques. He also said that during this
period most interviews were done separately. However, if a detainee was
very important for both groups then the interview would be conducted
jointly.

In May 2002, the military and the FBI adopted the "Tiger Team"
concept for interrogating detainees. According to the first GTMO case agent,
these teams consisted of an FBI agent, an analyst, a contract linguist, two
CITF investigators, and a military intelligence interrogator. 3o He said that
the Tiger Teams continued for about the next 4 or 5 months. Each Tiger
Team conducted two detainee debriefings a day. There were several reports
from each debriefing because each agency participating in an interview
produced a report. The first GTMO case agent said that in his opinion the
Tiger Teams were successful, from the FBI's perspective, mainly because the
FBI agents were usually the most experienced members of the team.
Therefore, he said, most Tiger Teams were essentially being run by the FBI
agent on the team. However, the FBI withdrew from participation in the
Tiger Teams in the fall of 2002 after disagreements arose between the FBI
and military intelligence over interrogation tactics. Several FBI agents told
the OIG that while they continued to have a good relationship with CITF,
their relationship with the military intelligence entities greatly deteriorated
over the course of time, primarily due to the FBI's opposition to the military
intelligence approach to interrogating detainees. This conflict is addressed
in detail later in this report.

30 An FBI On-Scene Commander said that the CIA was invited but rarely came
because they were upset with how the detainees were assigned to the teams. According to
the OSC, there were detainees of interest to the CIA that were off limits to the Tiger Teams.

34
 b. Other FBI Activities in GTMO

As noted above, the first FBI a ents Sent to GTMO in January 2002
were assigned to . It was only after
February 4, 2002, that FBI agents began to participate in interviews. In
addition, from 2002 - 2004, the FBI sent agents to GTMO to take
fingerprints and photographs of detainees.

C. Iraq

In late March 2003, the United States and other coalition military
forces invaded Iraq. Within a few weeks, these coalition forces defeated the
Iraqi military, deposed Saddam Hussein and his government, and
established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad. On
June 28, 2004, responsibility and authority for governing Iraq was formally
transferred to the Iraqi interim government, while coalition forces continued
to support Iraqi security and reconstruction.

1. Military and CIA Operations and Detention Facilities

As in Afghanistan, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was

responsible for military operations in Iraq. Beginning in May 2003,
Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) assumed responsibility for
coalition military operations. In June 2003, CENTCOM transferred the title
and authority of CJTF-7 to the U.S. Army V Corps. Church Report at 243,
249-250.

Operations in Iraq resulted in the capture of large numbers of "enemy

prisoners of war" (EPW) and civilian detainees. One of CJTF-7's missions
was to interrogate detainees for intelligence relevant to the Iraqi insurgency
and other matters. Church Report at 250. The Church Report described the
evolution of military detention facilities in Iraq at length.

We determined that FBI agents conducted interviews at the following

facilities in Iraq, which are described in greater detail in Section 5.a. below:

• The Abu Ghraib prison, which was the primary civilian

detention facility in Iraq.
•

35
 •

• Camp Ashraf, a facility operated by the

near the Iranian border to house captured members of the
Mujahedin-E-Khalq (MEK), an anti-Iranian paramilitary group.
• Other locations.

2. The FBI's Mission in Iraq

On February 10,2003, FBI Director Mueller signed Operations Order

1015, which stated that the FBI's mission in Iraq was to "deploy a task-
organized exploitation unit to fully exploit all Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)
sites and personnel for information regarding planned terrorist attacks in
the United States, or against U.S. personnel or interests outside the Iraq
theater of operations (ITO), and to gather intelligence related to other
matters of U.S. national security." In furtherance of this mission, the order
authorized the FBI to conduct operations,in Iraq with the military and other
U.S. government intelligence agencies. Operations Order 1015 described
CTD's "plan for integration of FBI assets with" the military and the CIA in
Iraq once U.S. ground combat forces had secured areas and facilities in
Iraq, and to collect and interview or analyze Iraqi Intelligence Service
personnel, documents, and electronic media.

The FBI's primary objective in Iraq was collection and analysis of

information to help protect against terrorist threats in the United States and
protect U.S. personnel or interests overseas, rather than waiting for the
military and other agencies to pass on such information to the FBI. The FBI
was particularly concerned about terrorist sleeper cells within the United
States, and believed that information from Iraq could be relevant to
uncovering those cells. More specifically, CTD stated in a January 2004
briefing packet for agents that the mission of the FBI's Baghdad Operations
Center was to "take deliberate and carefully planned actions to protect the
United States against terrorist attack and espionage activity by engaging in
intelligence gathering activities, including high value detainee interviews,
document exploitation, biometric processing and other activities as
directed."

The FBI also supported Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) efforts to

address terrorist acts within Iraq, including the processing of bombing and
other crime scenes, and to share intelligence information with other U.S.
agencies and military units. The FBI's objectives in Iraq also included the
investigation of Saddam Hussein and his personnel for crimes against the
Iraqi people.

36
 3. FBI Deployments to Iraq

FBI agents who served in Iraq volunteered from FBI field offices. In
2004, the FBI increased the length of the assignments for agents deployed
to Iraq from 60 days to 90 days. The FBI also increased the tenure for On-
Scene Commanders (OSC) in Iraq from 3 to 6 months as of January 2004,
and their Deputies served for at least 90 days.

The number of FBI personnel deployed to Iraq increased significantly

during 2003 and throughout 2004. The FBI Daily Situation Reports
indicate that between 13 and 24 FBI personnel, including technical
personnel and analysts, worked in Iraq at any given time between June and
August 2003, and that between 23 and 44 FBI personnel worked there at
any given time from September through December 2003. From January
through December 2004, the number of FBI personnel in Iraq usually
ranged between 50 and 60.

Most FBI personnel deployed to Iraq worked in the FBI's Baghdad

Operations Center (BOC), which was located first within the Baghdad
International Airport complex, and starting in mid-2004 within the Green
Zone downtown.

FBI agents and interpreters conducted detainee interviews and

athered detainee biometric information rimaril at the Abu Ghraib

4. Organizational Structure of the FBI in Iraq

The FBI agents deployed to Iraq were supervised by an FBI On-Scene

Commander (OSC). Between March 2003 and the end of 2004; eight FBI
OSCs and five Deputy OSCs served in Iraq. We interviewed most of the
OSCs and Deputy OSCs who served in Iraq during 2003 and 2004.

As in Afghanistan and GTMO, the FBI in Iraq had a subordinate and

dependent role to the military. Several agents told us that FBI personnel
considered themselves guests of the military, who established the rules to
be followed there by other u.S. agencies. The FBI also depended upon the
military in Iraq for critical services and materials, such as protection,
transportation, housing, and food. All detainees in Iraq were in the custody
and control of the u.S. military. The FBI was not designated as the lead
agency for any purpose in Iraq, and the scope of the FBI's activities in those

37
zones, including its access to detainees, was at the discretion of the military
or the CIA.

5. FBI Activities in Iraq

During the early stages of the Iraq conflict, from March through July
2003, FBI agents were deployed to Kuwait and Iraq to focus on the
collection, analysis, and exploitation of documents collected from many
former Iraqi Intelligence Service sites in Iraq. We found no evidence that,
during this early period, any of these FBI personnel interacted with
detainees or worked at military sites where they were held.

Mter this early period in 2003, the other primary FBI

counterterrorism activities in Iraq included: (1) detainee interviews; (2) the
collection of biometric information from detainees; and (3) participation in a
limited number of military sensitive site exploitation missions. FBI agents
have also devoted significant time and resources to conventional criminal
investigations of bombings, murders, and kidnappings involving American
citizens in Iraq.

a. Detainee Interviews by FBI Agents.

FBI agents in Iraq generally focused their interview efforts on al-

Qaeda personnel, foreign fighters, and detainees who had also been in
Afghanistan. These groups together constituted only a small part of the
detainee population. As a result, FBI agents interviewed only a small
percentage of the detainees in the custody of the military at its various
detention facilities. The Church Report stated that between March 2003 and
March 2005, over 50,000 detainees were held in Iraq. Church Report at 292-
302.

. FBI documents give a sense of the volume of interviews

that the agents conducted in Iraq. In July 2004, the FBI reported in a
classified statement for the record to a congressional committee that
between Janu and March 2004 FBI a ents in Iraq
. The FBI Situation Reports
in late 2004 indicate that FBI agents conducted. interviews in October
a n d . interviews in November 2004 at the various military facilities in
Iraq.

The nature of FBI agent activities and interactions with military

personnel varied with the different military detention and interrogation

38
facilities in Iraq. These are described below for each of the major Iraq
facilities.

Abu Ghraib Prison. The Abu Ghraib prison was selected by the
Coalition Provisional Authority as the primary civilian detention facility in
Iraq, despite its Saddam-era history and poor condition, when the CJTF-7
commander concluded there were no other suitable facilities available.
Church Report at 248. Detention operations began at Abu Ghraib in
approximately September 2003, and the prisoner population there,
including criminals, insurgents, and detainees with potential intelligence
value, soon grew to an estimated 4,000 to 5,000. Id. at 248,250. As of
January 2004, over 7,000 detainees were held there in September 2004,
Abu Ghraib held approximately 3,000 detainees, a number which held
steady as of February 2005. Id.; The Washington Post 2/21/05 at AI, A22.

Abu Ghraib consisted of three sections: the main compound and

prison building from the Saddam Hussein era; a make-shift concertina-wire
detention area in the interior courtyard; and facilities within the courtyard
walls for interviews by FBI and other non-military personnel, comprising
two or three tents and at other times two trailers. One former OSC
described Abu Ghraib as dismal, run down, medieval, and "grossly
understaffed." Another agent who conducted interviews there stated that
the situation was "borderline chaotic," and that the prison was understaffed
and frequently attacked by insurgents.

FBI interviews of detainees at Abu Ghraib began in September 2003.

Our review found that FBI agents seldom interviewed detainees within the
main stone prison building at Abu Ghraib, and seldom went into that
building for other reasons. Instead, FBI personnel conducted most of their
detainee interviews in the military tents or trailers within the larger prison
compound.

FBI Agents made arrangements with military personnel for access to

detainees for interviews. Military guards delivered handcuffed detainees to
the FBI and returned them to their cells after the interview. Typically, two
FBI agents conducted the interview with an interpreter. One FBI agent who
served at Abu Ghraib in 2003 stated that the military officer assigned to the
particular prisoner was always required to be present and observe the FBI
interview.

According to an FBI agent who served at Abu Ghraib in November

2003, FBI agents who wanted to conduct interviews were instructed by
Military Police (MP) personnel regarding detainee interview procedures, and
were given a form to read and sign in which the agents acknowledged that
certain interrogation techniques were permissible, others were not, and still
others required command level approval before they could be used.

39
However, the FBI agent said that this form "was of no importance to me
because I had no intention of using any of [the listed techniques]." He
stated that the only interrogation techniques that he recalled being
described on the form were leaving lights on and sleep deprivation.

Another FBI agent stated that in 2004 the military described

permissible interrogation practices in a standard printed form of not more
than one or two pages that military intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib
gave agents to review and sign. She stated that there was nothing on the
form that surprised her as being allowed for use by the military, but there
were a number of techniques that the FBI does not use. The form identified
the techniques with labels such as "Fear Up" or "Ego Down," and the
practices on the form related to sleep deprivation, diet manipulation, and
intimidation tactics 31 .

Several FBI agents told us that, for the security and safety of FBI
personnel, they did not work or stay at Abu Ghraib at night, but left at the
end of each day to go back to the FBI's Baghdad Operations Center. An FBI
OSC said that he established this policy because Abu Ghraib was being
mortared every night by insurgents, and Improvised Explosive Devices (lED)
were found nearby every morning. As a result, FBI personnel did not go to
Abu Ghraib until mid-morning, and left well before dark.

The abuse of prisoners by military personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison

has been the subject of several investigations, including the Taguba and
Jones investigations, the Church Commission, and the Schlesinger Pane1. 32
Press reports and prior investigations have indicated that many of the
detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred inside the main stone prison at
night. As detailed in Chapter Ten, FBI agents told us they observed some
aggressive or abusive conduct at Abu Ghraib, but with a few exceptions they
said they generally did not observe or otherwise learn about conduct as
extreme or abusive as that described in the published reports. The fact that
FBI agents worked at the prison in the daytime and conducted interviews
outside of the detention areas in the prison is the likely reason that the
agents did not observe this more extreme conduct.

31 A third agent told us about the use of such a form at the

_ (discussed in the next section) in early 2004.
32 VADM A.T. Church, III, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations
and Detainee Interrogation Techniques (March 2005); 2004 US Army, LTG Anthony R.
Jones, Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib, AR 15-6; Honorable James R.
Schlesinger, Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations
(August 2004); MG Antonio M. Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the BOOth Military Police
Brigade (2004).

40
 FBI agents began interviewing detainees, assisting military
interrogators, and receiving assistance from military personnei:at in
the fall of 2003, and by mid-2004 FBI agents were working in
_ . The decision to send FBI p.ersonnel to work with
_ later in 2004 stemmed from the conclusion that
interviewing agents would be best positioned there to obtain information
that was fresher and more useful than what they were obtaining at Abu
Ghraib. According to a former Deputy OSC, however, he met with t h e .
commander in the spring of 2004 in connection with the decision to involve
FBI agents, and told him that the FBI could not and would not participate in
interviews in which techniques or tactics beyond those permitted for FBI
agents were used. According to the Deputy OSC, the commander told him
this would not be a problem.

Another FBI agent told us that the military used a form at t h e .

detainee interrogation facility that was similar to the form used at Abu
Ghraib. The agent told us that before he was allowed to enter t h e .
in the first half of 2004, the military required him to sign a
pre-printed form indicating that this was a classified facility and that the
types of methods used to ather information from detainees included the
use of

41
 From the time the military moved in mid-2004
through the end of the year, the FBI deployed between 8 and 14 FBI
~onnel at _ at anyone time. The FBI contingent working at •
_ included agents, language specialists, a Computer Analysis and
Response Team (CART) examiner, a reports officer, a Criminal Justice
Information Systems Division (CJIS) biometric processing technician, and a
supervIsor.

, a ents would sometimes wait

until the detainees were sent to or Abu Ghraib, before
interviewing the detainees at those facilities. As elsewhere in Iraq, FBI
agents who worked at _ considered themselves as visitors or "guests"
on "turf." They said they were instructed by the FBI to
conduct themselves as FBI agents in detainee interviews and otherwise.

FBI ~so told us that the military commanders were always

present at _ , were actively engaged to ensure that control was
maintained over the detainees, guards, and interrogators, and participated
in the twice-daily shift-change staff meetings. FBI personnel.participated in
the 24-hour per day operations at the facility, which were divided into two
12-hour shifts seven days per week.

After the
, the detainees were
made available to FBI personnel. The FBI focused on selected detainees
believed to have some U.S. connection or information regarding potential
terrorism threats to the United States, such as friends or famil living in the

. Beginning in 2004, the FBI agents' work expanded to

include assistance to the milit in debriefin detainees for locall useful
milit information

Church Report at 249. Between July

and September 2003, for example, FBI a~d one or two
interviews of such detainees per week at _ . An OSC told us
that the military brought in ~onditionedtrailers, which were
used for various purposes at _ , such as housing, offices, mess

42
hall, and detainee interview rooms. The FBI primarily sought to interview
detainees who had been members of the Iraqi intelligence services,
particularly those who may have traveled to the United States. The military
also asked for FBI assistance in questioning former Iraqi political leaders
held there. In general, the military personnel escorted the detainees to the
trailers and back to their cells after the interviews were completed.

The Church Report stated that the ~assumed

responsibility for the detention facility at _ in April 2003.
Church Report at 249. The March 2004 Taguba Report of the military's
investigation of the 800 th Military Police Brigade ment~ionsof
detainee abuses, including abuses by four soldiers at _ in May
2003, but did not describe the alleged incidents. Taguba Report at 6, 7.

The bulk of the FBI's work at related to collecting

detainee biometric data. However, FBI agents also conducted a significant
number of detainee interviews at the camp. A team of FBI agents was first
deployed there during the first half of 2004 and conducted approximately
120 detainee interviews during ~Duringthe second half of 2004,
other FBI personnel traveled to _ for short periods to interview
specific detainees.

Camp Ashraf. Camp Ashraf, which is located in eastern Iraq near the
Iranian border, was operated by . As of early 2005,
the camp housed approXimately 3,800 members of the Mujahedin-E-Khalq
(MEK), an anti-Iranian paramilitary group designated as a terrorist
organization by the State Department in 1997. Church Report at 249. The
MEK members held there were Iraqi defectors who had been allied with
Saddam Hussein in an effort to overthrow the current Iranian government.

FBI personnel told us that the FBI started interviewing MEK

personnel at this camp sometime during the fall of 2003. In 2004, FBI
agents continued to interview detainees there to support potential criminal
cases in the US. During 2004, between 10 and 17 FBI personnel worked at
Camp Ashraf at anyone time. In addition, between November 2003 to
January 2004, FBI personnel biometrically processed some 3,600 MEK
detainees there.

43
 Mosul and Other Iraqi Cities. The FBI's counterterrorism operations
in Iraq included detainee interviews during the period of September 2003
through March 2004 in and around the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. The
FBI contingent in Mosul varied from seven to nine people. Their work
included assistance to military intelligence and Iraqi personnel with
detainee interrogations. FBI agents also went to Fallujah and Ramadi
during this period to gather information and documents from high value
targets after they were captured by the military and the Iraqi police.

b. Joint Interviews with Military Investigators

Many FBI agents who served in Iraq told the OIG that they worked
jointly with military personnel in planning, preparing for, and conducting
detainee interviews, particularly in 2003. Of the approximately 275 FBI
personnel who served in Iraq and responded to the OIG survey, 125 stated
that they jointly interviewed detainees with military or intelligence agency
personnel. In some of these cases, however, the non-FBI participant was a
contract interpreter or was merely observing the interview rather than
participating in it.

The practice of conducting joint interviews with other agencies

appears to have been more common in the early part of the Iraq conflict
than in later years. A former Deputy OSC told us that in late 2003 and
early 2004 it was not unusual for both FBI and military personnel to
question a detainee together, and several other agents described conducting
joint interviews during this period at various detention facilities.

As 2004 progressed, however, it appears that FBI agents teamed up

with each other as much as possible for detainee interviews. 34 A former
OSC told us that in the first half of 2004, his agents generally did not jointly
interview detainees with military personnel, and that to the extent that they
did the FBI agent controlled the interview and FBI rules were followed.
Some agents stated that they never jointly interviewed detainees with
military interrogators in the second half of 2004. Moreover, another former
OSC told the OIG that during his work in Iraq between July 2004 and
January 2005, the general rule for FBI personnel was that all FBI interviews
were to be done with a team of two FBI agents in the room at all times.

An FBI supervisor at _ told us that he established guidelines

for detainee interviews at'the facility with guidance from the OSC and FBI
Headquarters, including the rule that the interviews were to be conducted

34 This evolution in practice may have been related to the Abu Ghraib disclosures in
April 2004 and the issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, which reiterated that
agents should not participate in interrogations involving techniques not approved under
FBI policies (see Chapter Six).

44
by teams of two FBI agents only, ending a practice of joint interviews with
the military at the facility. Howeve~utyOSCs during the
second half of 2004 told us that at _ it was not unusual for
FBI agents to be teamed up with military interrogators for particular
interviews of detainees, and that he was not aware of any policy that FBI
agents had to work only with other agents.

Other FBI agents said they worked in close coordination with the
military. For example, one FBI agent told us that he conducted joint
interviews with a military analyst who sat in and took notes, and that the
military analyst would make suggestions to the FBI agent for further
questioning based on his experience in Mghanistan and his understanding
of the information needed. The FBI agent also stated that there was a
military interrogator who was assigned to interview the same detainee. The
military interrogator would interview this detainee during the day while the
FBI agent interviewed the detainee at night. In between shifts, the two
would share the information they had received and develop strategies for
further questioning of the detainee.

Another FBI agent noted that in Mosul there was no established

prison, and FBI agents deployed there conducted more joint interviews of
detainees with military interrogators than elsewhere in Iraq.

c. Other FBI Activities in Iraq

The FBI also devoted significant resources in Iraq to collecting

biometric data from large numbers of detainees, and conducting a small
number of military sensitive site exploitations.

The FBI's CJIS agents collected biometric information from more than
8,000 detainees in Iraq during the latter part of 2003 through the end of
2004. 35 For example, in September through December 2003, CJIS agents
fingerprinted, photographed, and collected DNA from approximately 2,000
detainees at Abu Ghraib, , Mosul, and other

35 At Abu Ghraib Prison, CJIS personnel did not process the detainees inside any of
the interior brick and mortar structures, but instead worked in tents within the walled
prison compound.

45
locations. The FBI also participated in military sensitive site exploitations in
Iraq, but to a much lesser extent than in Afghanistan.

In addition to counterterrorism work, the FBI allocated substantial

resources during 2003 and 2004 to criminal field investigations of bombings
and murders in Baghdad and other locations. FBI resources were also
focused in large measure on the recovery and analysis of Improvised
Explosive Devices (lED) and vehicle borne IEDs. This FBI activity included
extensive work on the bombings of the Jordanian and Turkish Embassies,
the Red Cross and United Nations buildings, and the mosque in an Najaf, as
well as several high-profile murder investigations of U.s. or CPA personnel.

46
 CHAPTER THREE
BACKGROUND REGARDING INTERROGATION POLICIES
In this chapter we describe the interview policies of the FBI and the
interrogation policies adopted by the military for questioning detainees.
These policies, and the tensions between them, provide essential context for
the rest of this report. First, we describe the FBI's policies for conducting
custodial interviews that were in place when the FBI began participating in
the questioning of detainees in military zones. These policies were based in
large part on constitutional requirements of voluntariness and legal
admissibility of witness statements in subsequent prosecutions, together
with the FBI's belief that rapport-based interview techniques are the most
reliable and effective means of obtaining accurate information. Second, we
summarize the vastly different interrogation policies adopted by the
Department of Defense (DOD) for use in the military zones. The DOD
policies approved many methods that were prohibited for use by FBI agents
under FBI policies.

I. Pre-existing FBI Policies and Practices

Most of the FBI's written policies regarding permissible interview

techniques for agents and for agent conduct in collaborative or foreign
interviews were developed prior to the September 11 attacks. When these
policies were drafted, they reflected the FBI's primary focus on domestic law
enforcement, which emphasized obtaining information for use in
investigating and prosecuting crimes. These policies are designed to assure
that witness statements meet legal and constitutional requirements of
voluntariness so that they are admissible in court and do not undermine the
admissibility of any other evidence developed in the investigation as a result
of the witness interview.

However, constitutional and evidentiary considerations were not the

only rationales for the FBI's prohibition on the use of coercive interview
techniques. On various occasions, the FBI has asserted its belief that the
most effective way to obtain accurate information is to use rapport-building
techniques in interviews.

A. FBI InterviewfInterrogation Techniques

The FBI's interrogation policies are set forth in the FBI's Legal
Handbook for Special Agents ("the LHBSA" or "the Handbook"), the Manual
ofInvestigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG), and the Manual of

47
Administrative and Operational Procedures (MAOP).36 Section 7 of the
Handbook relates to "Confessions and Interrogations." Section 7-1 of the
Handbook states: "The most important limitations on the admissibility of
an accused's incriminating statements are the requirements that they be
voluntary; that they be obtained without the government resorting to
outrageous behavior; and that they be obtained without violating the
accused's right to remain silent or to have a lawyer present." Section 7-2
states: "A conviction based on an involuntary statement, without regard to
its truth or falsity, is a denial of the accused's right to due process of law. A
coerced confession will undermine the legitimacy of a conviction." Section
7 -2.1 of the Handbook states, among other things, that "[i]t is the policy of
the FBI that no attempt be made to obtain a statement by force, threats, or
promises."

The Handbook discusses the factors affecting judicial assessments of

voluntariness, including: (a) notification of charges; (b) age, intelligence,
and experience of the accused; (c) physical condition of the accused; (d)
physical abuse, threats of abuse, use of weapons, number of officers
present; (e) threats and psychological pressure; (f) privation: food, sleep,
medication; g) isolation, incommunicado interrogation; (h) duration of
questioning; (i) trickery, ruse, deception; m
advice of rights; and (k)
promises of leniency or other inducements. The Handbook notes that
courts use a "totality of circumstances" test when determining the
voluntariness of a witness's statement, and that the presence of anyone or
more of the factors mentioned above will not necessarily render a statement
involuntary. LHBSA at 7-2.2. FBI training materials also focus on the
"totality of the circumstances" standard and give examples of circumstances
under which courts have held that confessions are coercive and

36 Although some FBI agents told us that they conduct "interviews." rather than
"interrogations," several FBI policies use the latter term. An FBI Unit Chief described the
distinction: "An interview is the process ofobtaining information from an individual willing
to provide information about themselves or others. An interview is also usually the first
step prior to moving to an interrogation phase with someone believed to be unwilling to
provide accurate or truthful details about information they have. When the interview is
done immediately prior to an interrogation it is used to obtain the information the person is
readily willing to provide, biographical info and 'their version of events,' and is used to build
rapport and identify themes that can be used during the interrogation. The interrogation
phase is the process used to obtain the information that the person does not want to
provide for any number of reasons.... The interrogation phase will typically involve the
interrogator accusing, directly or indirectly, the interrogee of something, such as
withholding information or having provided false information." FBI training materials make
a similar distinction. E.g. FBI Law Enforcement Communication Unit, "Interviewing and
Interrogation" (10/14/04) at 72. However, the FBI and DOD policies discussed in this
section regarding the use of potentially coercive techniques do not distinguish between the
interview and interrogation phases with respect to preserving the voluntariness of a
statement. In this report, we generally do not distinguish between interviews and
interrogations for purposes of discussing compliance with FBI or DOD policies.

48
inadmissible, including: a confession made to avoid a credible threat of
physical violence; a confession induced by an explicit promise of leniency;
and a confession induced by misleading the subject to believe that failure to
confess will result in adverse consequences for others. 37

In general, prior to a custodial interrogation in a criminal

investigation, an accused individual is entitled to be warned of his
constitutional rights, typically by receiving a Miranda warning. LHBSA 7-
3.1. If, after being advised of his rights, a suspect in custody indicates that
he wishes to remain silent or that he wants an attorney, all interrogation
must cease at that time. LHBSA 7-2.1(1). Section 7-15 of the Handbook
states: "Persons interviewed by Agents while in police custody in a foreign
country must be given the usual warning of rights under American Federal
law as fully as possible."

The FBI's MAOP also describes the importance of FBI agents not
engaging in certain activities when conducting investigative activities,
including foreign counterintelligence. MAOP Part 1, Section 1-4. The MAOP
states that "[n]o brutality, physical violence, duress or intimidation of
individuals by our employees will be countenanced...." MAOP, Part 1,
Section 1-4(4). The MAOP also stresses that "[a]s member of a federal
investigative agency, FBI employees must at all times zealously guard and
defend the rights and liberties guaranteed to all individuals by the
constitution." MAOP, Part 1, Section 1-4(2). According to the MAOP,
violations of these policies must be reported to FBI Headquarters. MAOP,
Part 1, Section 1-4(5); see also MAOP, Part 1, Section 13-1(2) ("It is
imperative that any information pertaining to allegations of misconduct or
improper performance of duty coming to the attention of any Bureau
employee be promptly and fully reported to FBIHQ.")

Although the FBI's involvement in intelligence gathering functions

expanded significantly after the September 11 attacks, the FBI often
participated in intelligence-gathering activities before that date. Before the
September 11 terrorist attacks and the change in FBI priorities, the FBI had
not established a different set of procedures for interviews or interrogations
for situations where no prosecution in u.S. courts was contemplated.

B. Working with Other Agencies

Prior to the September 11 attacks, the FBI had policies in place for
working with other government agencies, both domestic and foreign, in joint

37 A. Louis DiPietro, "Lies, Promises, or Threats - The Voluntariness of

Confessions," reprinted in FBI Academy training manual "Interviewing and Interrogation"
(10/14/2004) at 92-96.

49
 or cooperative investigations. However, the FBI's work with the military in
GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq raised issues regarding which agency's
interrogation policies would apply, and how the FBI would work with
. personnel from other agencies operating under different interrogation rules.

1. FBI Interaction with Other Domestic Law

Enforcement Agencies

The FBI has extensive experience working jointly with other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies. FBI agents often conduct joint
interviews in the normal course of their duties. FBI agents told us that they
are trained to always adhere to FBI protocols, not to other agencies' rules
with respect to interview policies or evidence collection.

Yet, the FBI's experience working with other domestic agencies

provided limited precedent for the FBI's work with the military overseas on
detainee interviews. In past cases, the other agencies were usually other
law enforcement organizations (such as state or local police) that were also
focused on prosecuting crimes in domestic courts and were subject to
similar concerns about voluntariness that drive the FBI's established
interrogation policies. Typically, there was not a major conflict between the
policies and practices of these agencies and those of the FBI. Moreover, in
most cases prior to September 11 the FBI was the lead agency and therefore
positioned to direct which interrogation policies would apply.

After the September 11 attacks, the FBI's mission expanded to

include working jointly with the military frequently. This mission gave rise
to circumstances in which (1) entities other than the FBI were the lead
agencies and had custody of the witnesses, (2) prosecution of crimes was
not necessarily the primary goal of the interrogations, and (3) the
evidentiary rules of u.S. Article III courts did not necessarily apply.

2. FBI Interaction with Agencies of Foreign

Governments

Even prior to the September 11 attacks, FBI investigations required

agents to work abroad. For example, the FBI regularly investigated terrorist
attacks that occurred abroad but that involved u.S. targets. These activities
required the FBI to cooperate with or assist the law enforcement agencies of
foreign governments. The FBI has an extensive system of Legal Attaches
(LEGAT) stationed in u.S. embassies to coordinate FBI work in foreign
countries.

FBI policy states: "Agents have no jurisdiction in foreign countries,

hence, cannot exercise the power of arrest, search or seizure in such
places." LHBSA 3-11; see also MIOG, Part 2, Sections 1-2.3.3 and 23-
8.2(3)(a). The FBI's Legal Handbook further states that agents cannot

50
participate in interviews with prisoners except in places of incarceration and
in the presence of foreign authorities. It also states, "Agents are not to
participate in any unauthorized or unlawful actions even though invited to
do so by a cooperating foreign officer." ld.

In some cases, the FBI worked with agencies of foreign governments

that were governed by a different set of rules for interrogations. In such
cases, for example, an FBI agent might observe a foreign agent using a
technique in a foreign interrogation that was lawful for the foreign agent but
that would be prohibited for an FBI agent. This scenario provides a
potential analogy for the issue of FBI cooperation with u.s. military
investigators conducting interrogations using techniques permitted by the
military but not by the FBI.

As detailed in Chapter Six of this Report, on May 19, 2004, the FBI
issued a policy specifically relating to the treatment of prisoners and
detainees (the "FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy"). The Policy includes the
following statement, which the FBI's Office of General Counsel characterized
not as a new policy but rather as "reaffirm[ing] prior FBI policy":

FBI personnel who participate in interrogations with non-FBI

personnel ... shall at all times comply with FBI policy for the
treatment of persons detained. FBI personnel shall not
participate in any treatment or use any interrogation technique
that is in violation of these guidelines regardless of whether the
co-interrogator is in compliance with his or her own guidelines.
If a co-interrogator is complying with the rules of his or her
agency, but is not in compliance with FBI rules, FBI personnel
may not participate in the interrogation and must remove
themselves from the situation. (Emphasis in original.)
However, we did not find any pre-September 11 FBI written policies
specifically addressing the scenario of FBI agents working with agencies of
foreign governments who were governed by a different set of rules for
interrogations, or that defined what constitutes "participation" in an
interrogation controlled by another entity.

c. FBI Duty to Report

Another set of FBI policies in place prior to the September 11 attacks

that are potentially applicable to the FBI's activities in GTMO, Afghanistan,
and Iraq related to the duty of FBI personnel to report allegations of
misconduct by FBI employees and other government employees. The FBI's
MAOP requires FBI agents to report allegations of misconduct by FBI
employees to FBI Headquarters:

51
 As the government's primary investigative service ... [i]t is
imperative that any information pertaining to allegations of
misconduct or improper performance of duty coming to the
attention of any Bureau employee be promptly and fully
reported to FBIHQ, and it is the continuing responsibility of
Bureau officials to see to it that the employees under their
supervision are properly indoctrinated regarding this
requirement so that they not only will fully understand it, but
will comply with it.
MAOP Part 1, Section 13-1 (1) and 13-1(2). Part 1, Section 263-2 of the
MIOG provides similar guidance, stating that all allegations of "criminality
or serious misconduct" on the part of FBI employees must be reported to
FBI Headquarters.

The Legal Handbook for Special Agents $pecifically addresses the

obligation of agents to report misconduct during witness interviews. The
Handbook's Policy for Confessions and Interrogations states:

If, during an interview with a witness, suspect, or subject,

questions are raised by such persons or if anything transpires
which gives reasonable grounds to believe that subsequently
such questions or incident may be used by someone in an effort
to place an Agent or the FBI in an unfavorable light, an
electronic communication regarding such questions or incident
should be immediately prepared for the SAC. The SAC is
responsible for promptly advising FBIHQ and the USA of such
questions or incident and FBIHQ must be promptly informed of
all developments. LHBSA 7-2.1(2).

Thus, the duty of an FBI employee to report on activities of other FBI

employees goes beyond reports of criminal conduct. This duty includes an
obligation to report on misconduct, improper performance, and events that
may reasonably be used to place an agent or the FBI in an "unfavorable
light."

In contrast, prior to the issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy, the duty of an FBI employee to report on the activities of non-FBI
government personnel was limited to criminal behavior. This limited duty
arose not from any FBI policy, but from federal law, which requires all
government employees, including those of the FBI, to report criminal
behavior by any government employees, including employees of the DOD, to
the Department of Justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 535. We did not find any FBI
policy prior to May 2004 imposing an obligation on FBI employees to report
misconduct by non-FBI government employees falling short of a crime, such
as conduct that might violate other agencies' own interrogation policies.

52
II. Department of Defense Interrogation Policies

In this Section we provide a brief summary of the detainee

interrogation policies adopted by the Department of Defense (DOD) after the
September 11 attacks for prisoners and detainees. 38 These policies are
relevant to the OIG's review for several reasons. First, the tension between
DOD policies and the FBI's interview policies was an important factor in the
FBI's efforts to provide workable guidance for its agents in the military
zones. FBI agents in the military zones faced difficulties as a result of the
stark differences between the FBI's conventional law enforcement
techniques and the more aggressive interrogation techniques of military and
intelligence agencies.

Second, a significant portion of our review was directed at

determining what information FBI agents acquired during their deployments
in the military zones regarding the treatment of detainees by any u.S.
government personnel, not just by FBI agents themselves. The vast majority
of the incidents that the FBI agents reported to us involved the conduct of
interrogators from the DOD and the CIA. However, interrogators from other
agencies were governed by their own agencies' interrogation policies, not the
policies of the FBI.

It is generally beyond the jurisdiction of the OIG and the scope of this
investigation to make determinations regarding whether particular conduct
by non-FBI interrogators violated their agencies' policies. However, as
detailed in Chapter Six, beginning in May 2004 FBI policy required FBI
agents to report to their superiors any incidents of known or suspected
abuse or mistreatment of detainees by other agencies' interrogators. As
explained in Chapter Six, some FBI agents were told that, under this policy,
they should report any interrogation technique that the agent believed was
outside the legal authority of the interrogator. Under this interpretation,
FBI agents would need to have some familiarity with other agencies' policies
in order to comply with the FBI's policy.

Third, FBI agents in the military zones had a unique opportunity to

observe the conduct of other agencies' interrogators. The public allegations
of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison, GTMO, and other detention
facilities mainly related to the conduct of non-FBI personnel. Therefore,
while we do not make determinations regarding whether the conduct of
other agency personnel reported to us by FBI agents violated their agencies'

38 As detailed in subsequent chapters, some of the interrogation techniques that

caused the most concern to the FBI were used by the CIA, not the military. However, as
stated in Chapter One, our review generally did not cover activities at facilities used by the
CIA. Moreover, the vast majority of FBI agent observations discussed in this report relate
to DOD interrogations.

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policies, we refer in this report to potentially applicable policies of other
agencies.

However, it is important to note that we did not review all DOD

policies regarding interrogation of detainees. Our summary of the
interrogation policies of DOD is based primarily on information contained in
the Church Report.

A. Legal Background: the Geneva Conventions, the

Convention Against Torture, and Related Statutes

The legal background for DOD policies regarding the interrogation of

detainees includes the United States' obligations under the Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
and the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (collectively "the Geneva Conventions").39
Additional relevant authorities include the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 23 LL.M.
1027, and the Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340. The applicability of these
authorities to various categories of detainees, as well as the meaning of
"torture" as the word is used in these authorities, have been the subject of
extensive debate and controversy. It is beyond the scope of this report to
address these legal issues. Rather, we briefly summarize these authorities
to provide context for the more specific DOD interrogation policies that are
relevant to our review.

In general, the Geneva Conventions require that enemy prisoners of

war and certain captured civilians be treated humanely at all times. The
Geneva Conventions also prohibit the use of physical or mental torture, or
other forms of coercion, to obtain information from prisoners of war, and
prohibit the use of physical or moral coercion to obtain information from
protected civilians. The provision known as "Common Article 3" protects
detainees from cruel treatment, torture, and outrages upon personal
dignity, "in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment." The War
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, criminalizes under U.S. law certain breaches
of the Geneva Conventions, including breaches of Common Article 3.

On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum

declaring that none of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to
members of al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere. The memorandum also
stated that members of the Taliban are "unlawful combatants" and do not
qualify as prisoners of war entitled to the stronger protections of the Geneva

39 The Geneva Conventions also include Geneva I and II, which relate to treatment
of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field or at sea.

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Conventions. However, the President stated that al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees were to be treated "humanely and, to the extent appropriate and
consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the
principles of Geneva." Church Report at 187.

The United States also has obligations under the Convention Against
Torture. The Convention Against Torture defines torture as "any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person" for certain purposes. The United States conditioned
its ratification of the treaty on an understanding that in order to constitute
torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering, and that mental pain or suffering refers to
prolonged mental harm from:

(1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe

physical pain or suffering;
(2) the administration or threatened administration of mind
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality;
(3) the threat of imminent death; or
(4) the threat that another person will be imminently subjected
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, orthe
administration of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.

The Convention Against Torture also prohibits cruel, inhuman, or

degrading treatment or punishment. However, the Bush Administration has
taken the position that the Convention Against Torture does not apply to
alien detainees held outside of the United States. .

The Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340, prohibits torture outside the

United States. Its definition of torture tracks the language of the U.S.
understanding on which the Convention Against Torture was ratified,
summarized above. Citing a DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Opinion (6 Op.
OLC 236 (1982)), the DOD has stated that GTMO is within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and, as such, is
not "outside of the United States" for purposes of the Torture Statute.
Therefore, according to this interpretation, the Torture Statute applies in
Afghanistan and Iraq but does not apply in GTMO.

On December 30, 2005, the President signed into law the Detainee
Treatment Act, Pub L. No. 109-148. Section 1002 of the Detainee
Treatment Act established the U.S. Army Field Manual as a uniform
standard for detainee treatment and interrogation techniques available for
use on detainees in DOD custody. Section 1003 provided for a global

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prohibition on the use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on all
persons in the custody or effective control of the u.s. government. This
provision responded to the Administration's argument that the Convention
Against Torture did not apply to alien detainees held outside U.S. territory.

In July 2006, the Administration announced that, pursuant to the

Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006),
the u.s. government would henceforth apply Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions to all detainees.

B. DOD Interrogation Policies Relating to GTMO

When interrogations began at GTMO in January 2002, military

interrogators relied on Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation,
for guidance as to permissible interrogation techniques. Field Manual 34-
52 listed the following techniques as permissible:

• Direct questioning.
• Incentive - use of luxury items to reward cooperation, with the
implication that the items will be withheld for failure to
cooperate. No withholding of any basic human need such as
food or medicine.
• Emotional Love - playing on detainee's emotional attachments
to create a psychological burden that might be relieved through
cooperation.
• Emotional Hate - playing on detainee's emotional hate, such as
desire for revenge.
• Fear Up (Harsh) - exploiting a detainee's pre-existing fears,
including behaving in an overpowering manner with a loud and
threatening voice.
• Fear Up (Mild) - using a calm, rational approach to exploit the
detainee's pre-existing fears.
• Fear Down - the detainee is soothed and calmed to build
rapport.
• Pride and Ego-Up - use of flattery to prompt cooperation.
• Pride and Ego-Down - goading the detainee by challenging his
loyalty, intelligence, etc., to induce the detainee to provide
information disproving the interrogator.
• Futility - rationally persuading the detainee that it is futile to
resist questioning.

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 • We Know All- convince the detainee that the interrogator is all-
knowing and resistance to questioning is pointless.
• File and Dossier - preparing a decoy dossier that convinces the
detainee that everything is already known, so resistance is
pointless.
• Establish Your Identity - insist that the detainee is someone
else to induce him to reveal information to clear himself.
• Repetition - induce the detainee to break the monotony by
answenng.
• Rapid Fire - questioning in rapid succession, without permitting
detainee to answer.
• Silent - staring at detainee for extended period to induce
nervousness.
• Change of Scene - engaging the detainee in a different
environment to ease his apprehension or catch him with his
guard down.

Church Report at 35-37, 107.

On December 2,2002, in response to arequest from the Commander

of the intelligence task force at GTMO for approval of additional counter-
resistance techniques not specifically listed in Field Manual 34-52, the
Secretary of Defense approved the following techniques for use at GTMO:

• Yelling
• Use of multiple interrogators
• Deceiving the detainee by having the interrogator present a false
identity
• Stress positions ("like standing") for a maximum of four hours
• The use of falsified documents or reports
• Isolation for up to 30 days, with any extensions beyond the 30
days requiring approval from the JTF-GTMO Commander
• Interrogation of the detainee in an environment other than the
standard interrogation booth
• Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli
• The use of a hood placed over the detainee's head during
transportation and questioning
• The use of 20-hour interrogations

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