Synergising Indian Navy and the Coast Guard

Synergising Indian Navy and the

Coast Guard

Alok Bansal*

Armed Forces all over the world are beginning to realise the importance
of jointmanship, and accordingly enormous efforts have been made of
late to promote jointmanship and bring about integration of the three
armed forces in India. However, no attempt has been made to formally
integrate the Coast Guard, which has also been termed as an armed force
of the union, with the other forces, especially with the Indian Navy
(IN). Presently, the naval-coast guard relations are cordial and joint
operations are conducted without any major hitch but in the absence of
any formal mechanism, there is scope for problems in future. Although
a beginning was made by incorporating a Coast Guard component into
the tri-service command at Port Blair, the Coast Guard has been kept
out of the ambit of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQIDS).
This reflects that the service is not likely to be placed under the Chief of
Defence Staff (CDS) as and when it is created. For some inexplicable
reasons, the Coast Guard (CG) has been treated like one of the Central
Police Organisations (CPOs), even though the service is an armed force
of the union and functions under the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The
paucity of resources at sea requires that various agencies operating
at sea must coordinate their efforts and pool their resources to obtain
optimum results. As the two premium agencies operating in the seas
around India, there is a need to institutionalise the relationship between
the two services.

The two Indian maritime security forces, the IN and the CG are diverse
services, but have a common role towards the nation’s defence. “The

*Captain (IN) Alok Bansal is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Analyses
(IDSA), New Delhi.

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Alok Bansal

CG ships and aircraft, and personnel manning them along with the shore
infrastructure, have the inherent capability to switch over to a variety
of specialised tasks in times of hostilities.”1 They need to cooperate to
optimise limited resources and to enhance their effectiveness in their
areas of operation. This paper aims to analyse the problems likely to arise
in future cooperation between the IN and the Indian CG and to suggest
remedial measures. The irritants which have the potential to undermine
mutual cooperation have been studied with the purpose of eliminating
them. The study has been carried out with the aim that relationship
between the IN and the CG does not suffer from inter-service rivalry
and mutual bickering as has happened in the case of the Army and the
Border Security Force (BSF).

It is intended to highlight the differences in service conditions of the

two services with special reference to absence of common or equivalent
rank structure, differences in recruitment and promotional norms and
its likely impact on command and control while operating together. It
is also intended to highlight the absence of clear cut guidelines for the
jobs likely to be entrusted to the CG in times of war and in less than war
situations to suggest remedial measures to overcome these shortcomings
and to optimise IN and CG resources and their organisational structures
to evolve a doctrine for the joint operations.

Background

It has been three decades since the inception of the CG. The youngest unit
of the Armed Forces, the Indian Coast Guard was formally inaugurated
by the then Prime Minister Morarji Desai on 19 August 1978, making
India one of the few countries to have established such a force to fulfil its
obligations in the maritime zones under its jurisdiction.2 An interim CG
organisation had been set up earlier within the Navy on 1 February 1977
with the aim of undertaking non-military maritime duties and enhancing
ocean management. The requirement of the new organisation emerged
from the preliminary discussions at the third United Nations Conference
on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). The existing infrastructure and the

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 Synergising Indian Navy and the Coast Guard

organisation for the protection of life and property at sea had not kept
pace with the substantial increase in the maritime activity taking place
in the waters surrounding India. The Indian Navy (IN) was the only
organisation capable of enforcing Indian jurisdiction in the maritime
zones. It was therefore felt necessary to create an organisation for the
safety of off-shore installations in peacetime, control of smuggling
across the seas and for meeting various international obligations at sea
like pollution control, search and rescue and preservation of various
marine species. According to a former Director General (DG) of CG,
“The Indian Coast Guard was created … to maintain economic and
environmental discipline … in its waters, and protect national and other
interests in its maritime zones.”3

It was probably felt that entrusting these additional responsibilities to the

IN would not only dilute the primary function of a defence force but also
expose the service to undesirable civilian influences. In addition, these
peace-time law enforcement duties would have required large financial
outlays and would have led to a substantial increase in the naval and
consequently the defence budgets. This would have positively raised
eyebrows in the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean in the Seventies
and the Eighties and would have led to wider international ramifications.
Based on some of these factors, it was decided to create an Indian CG
organisation under the Ministry of Defence.

The CG Act was brought into force on Aug 19, 1978, constituting CG
as the fourth Armed Force of the Union. The statutory duties of the
CG as prescribed in the Act include protection of maritime and other
national interests in the maritime zones of India, by such measures
as the CG deems fit. These measures could provide for enforcing the
provisions of the Maritime Zones of India (MZI) Act, assisting Customs
and other authorities in anti-smuggling operations, providing protection
and assistance to fishermen, ensuring safety and protection of artificial
islands, off-shore terminals, installations and other structures and devices
in the maritime zone, preserving and protecting the maritime environment
and preventing marine pollution, safety of life and property at sea and

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Alok Bansal

assistance in collection of scientific data.4 Although, the Rustomji

committee, which recommended setting up of the CG, had recommended
that in an emergency, the service be placed under the operational control
of IN to supplement the naval fleet, there is no specific mention of this
in the CG Act. Nevertheless, the CG has been assisting the IN and
rendering yeoman service during peacetime operational commitments.5

For the first ten to twelve years of its operation the CG was basically
manned by IN personnel and all the ships and establishments were
commanded by IN officers or ex-IN officers who had joined the CG.
Even today, the DG and some of the top hierarchy of the CG consist
of naval and retired naval officers but at the lower levels the number
of IN personnel manning the CG ships and establishments has come
down drastically. Today, most of the CG ships and establishments are
commanded by CG officers. In the absence of common or equivalent rank
structure and differences in promotional norms, difficulties have been
experienced in command and control while operating together. Because
of the lack of clear cut guidelines on the jobs likely to be entrusted to
the CG in times of war and in less than war situation, there is a growing
feeling in the lower echelons of the CG that they are doing most of
the dirty jobs of the IN. On top of this, except a handful of officers,
most of the CG officers have not served on IN units except during their
initial training. They are, therefore, not totally aware of its operating
procedures and this often creates problems in the smooth conduct of
joint operations.

Growing Maritime Interests

Indian maritime interests are growing at a very fast pace in terms of sea
trade, off-shore hydrocarbon explorations and other economic activities
in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Besides, a 7500 km border is
open to sea and is easier to breach and the geopolitical scenario around
us is not too encouraging as we continue to remain surrounded by hostile
neighbours. Indian offshore oil assets are spread over an area of over
48,000 square kilometres and are expected to double by 2015. Overseas

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 Synergising Indian Navy and the Coast Guard

trade, 95 per cent of which transits through the sea, is expected to cross
$ 400 billion by 2010 and $ 1 trillion by 2020, when over 8000 tankers
are expected to be touching Indian ports.6 With growing trade, mostly
by sea, there is a proportionate increase in Indian liabilities towards the
protection of shipping, off-shore assets and protection of EEZ. Any
laxity on the nation’s part may cripple the economic lifeline of the
nation. Thus, there is a need to consolidate Indian maritime defence in
the best possible way. In a developing country like India, IN and the
CG will never have adequate resources to meet all their requirements
of platforms and equipment. Therefore, it would be logical to augment
the resources of one service by making available the resources of the
other in times of crisis. In view of the similarities of facilities required
by the two services and the nationwide resource crunch, the cooperation
between the two is inevitable.

Coast Guard’s Potential for National Defence

Being a maritime service the CG possesses numerous resources and skills

which could make enormous contribution to the nation’s defence. In
times of war, it could not only meet the naval requirement of additional
ships and aircraft for various military tasks like patrolling and convoy
escort, but also provide a vast pool of trained manpower which could be
used to man the naval ships and aircraft. In times of hostilities it may be
feasible to acquire additional weapon platforms from friendly countries,
but it is virtually impossible to get trained manpower to man them at short
notice. Today it takes five and a half years to train an officer through the
National Defence Academy. Even if the Navy were to recruit graduates
from outside, it would take two and a half years to train them to become
effective watch-keeping officers. The two most demanding areas are
training mariners and teaching command. It may be feasible to train and
indoctrinate a large number of newly enlisted personnel into military life
quickly and effectively but it takes time for them to acquire the ways of
the sea by spending time at sea, whether on board an aircraft carrier or
a CG boat. Similarly, command cannot actually be taught, because it
is learnt through experience. The true lessons of command can only be
acquired while commanding a ship.7

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Alok Bansal

The CG can provide the Navy with a cadre of experienced mariners who
have gained the knowledge of the sea through extended and extensive
sea-time on numerous ships, boats and small craft – experience that
cannot be traded. With the basics of military training already provided,
these mariners can take up any naval task, with very little additional
training. The CG can also bring to the Navy a pool of officers with
command experience. With numerous smaller ships and patrol vessels,
these officers would be an invaluable asset for any sudden expansion
of naval assets and responsibilities in times of a protracted war.8 It is
therefore essential that CG should be able to “dissolve” into the Navy in
case of any eventuality and the navy must be able to “fuse” CG in times
of war by suitably equipping it and frequently exercising with it.9

Challenge of Terrorism

A new phenomenon that has made naval CG cooperation even more

crucial is the growing phenomena of terrorism. Hitherto confined to
land, terrorism could spread its tentacles over Indian maritime assets
also. Owing to the suitability of geographical environs, it is feared that
terrorism may shift into maritime realm. If so, terrorists could then
exploit the vulnerabilities of global trade and shipping and disrupt the
sea lines of communications passing through the neurological choke
points. They could even carry out attacks on hub ports.10 Arms, weapons
and explosives are readily available in the world market. A number of
nations are ready to promote its proliferation – whatever be the pretext.
Terrorism is here to stay and will remain an important element of the
political process to intimidate governments and influence public opinion.
The smuggling – limited to gold, silver and drugs till recently – has now
proliferated to include weapons and explosives. Further, much of the
military technology is freely available to the smugglers and terrorists.
Their modus operandi is likely to become more sophisticated, due to
easy accessibility of hi-tech equipment and connivance of the states
themselves. Use of warships, aircraft or submarines to a limited extent
cannot be ruled out.

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 Synergising Indian Navy and the Coast Guard

To counter this threat, India needs to keep its coastline and the waters
around under constant surveillance. Proactive and preventive capabilities
are essential and the maritime forces have to play a lead role in such
interfaces.11 With the resources currently available with the CG it is well
nigh impossible for it to maintain continuous presence. The naval assets
will have to be pressed into service to meet these terrorist threats which
would continue to be supported by our enemies. It would be more of
a low intensity conflict than an internal security problem. Even with
the existing resources of the two services, the IN and the CG have just
managed to bring the situation under control on the western and southern
coasts.

Problems in Naval Coast Guard Cooperation

Today, the CG and the IN are getting along fairly well. This, however,
is due to the fact that, barring two short interregnums, CG has been
headed by a naval officer. Despite this the bickering has started at the
lower levels. The situation could worsen as time passes and the CG
is manned totally by its own cadre of officers. This has happened in
the case of the BSF and the Army, where the former was supposed to
be a service with an army ethos and culture but as the army officers
on deputation were phased out and BSF/Police officers took over, its
orientation and attitude changed. Today, it has acquired police culture
and resents being put under army command and control when the need
arises. It is feasible that the CG could also evolve the same way in
times to come, especially since the CG Act has no specific provision
to place the CG under the operational control of the Indian Navy when
the need arises.12 The bureaucratic conflicts have the potential to cause
considerable harm and may affect both the Navy and the CG.13

Some of the important problem areas that adversely affect the relationship
between the IN and the CG have been analysed in the subsequent
paragraphs. All of them have the potential to cause serious inter-service
rivalry and bickering in future.

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Alok Bansal

Service Conditions

Differences between the service conditions of the IN and the CG,

especially the lack of common or equivalent rank structure and difference
in promotional norms, has the maximum potential to cause problems
in any future cooperation between the Navy and the CG. IN inducts
officers through the National Defence Academy and the Naval Academy
and as direct entrants in the technical branches. The CG officers are also
inducted through the Naval Academy, but while the Naval officers join
the Academy as cadets, the CG officers join as Assistant Commandants.
This anomaly can be basically attributed to the fact that the CG officers
at the time of induction are usually older than their naval counterparts.
As a result, by the time a naval officer finishes his Midshipman’s time
and gets commissioned, his course mate in the CG is already an Assistant
Commandant of one and a half year seniority. Later, when a CG officer
comes up for watch-keeping ticket, the naval officers who have already
got the ticket are still junior to him. In the past CG officers have got their
tickets under naval officers who were technically junior to them – purely
by taking into account years of service. Further, if a CG officer got his
promotion at the right time he could become a Commandant in eight
years. By this time a much senior naval officer would not have been
considered for promotion to the rank of Commander. In the absence of
clear cut directives and common rank structure, the Commandant got
equated to the Commander and led to serious problems.

One of the most glaring examples pertains to a CG ship based in the

Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the early Nineties. The ship commanded
by a naval Lieutenant-Commander, entered Campbell Bay during one
of its patrols to the southern group of islands. When it had to sail, a
problem arose as to who should make the sailing order.14 Commander CG
District Ten (COMDIS 10) based at Campbell Bay was a Commandant
who in service was much junior to the Commanding Officer (CO) of
the ship who had not yet been considered for promotion to the rank of
Commander. Both the CO and the shore authority felt that they ought
to make the sailing order based on their own logic and thinking. The

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CO eventually made his sailing order and left harbour but was asked
to return back by the Commander CG Region (COMCG) based at Port
Blair. The CO of the ship at this juncture expressed his intention to
hand over command to his Executive Officer (Second in Command).
The CO was subsequently allowed to make the sailing orders and the
matter was somehow hushed up and no clear cut directives were issued
at that time on this contentious issue. This sort of an ambiguity can be
catastrophic in times of war. Even today there are problems regarding
the issuing of sailing orders in ANC, where the sailing orders for CG
ships are being issued by COMCG rather than the Commander in Chief
of ANC.

Another incident pertains to joint operations in Palk Bay. During an

escort operation, which involved an IN and a CG ship jointly escorting
a merchant ship repatriating Sri Lankan refugees, the CO of the IN
ship, a Lieutenant Commander, was appointed the Officer in Tactical
Command (OTC). However, the CO of the CG ship, who was a Deputy
Commandant and whose total service was almost three and a half years
less than the commissioned service of his naval counterpart, objected to
it claiming that he was senior as he had become a Deputy Commandant
before the naval officer had become a Lieutenant Commander. In order
to avoid unpleasantness and to skirt the issue, an even more senior naval
officer was appointed the OTC and the shore authority controlling the
operations requested higher ups about the relative seniority of the COs
by signal but failed to receive a definite reply.

The problem therefore definitely exists; unfortunately, no attempt has been

made to address it. Rather than taking the problem head on, a deliberate
attempt has been made to sweep the issue under the carpet. The remedy
invented by the CG Headquarters to remove these situations causing
unpleasantness was to reduce the number of CG ships being commanded
by naval officers. The result was that Deputy Commandants of less than
eight years service including time spent in Naval Academy, basic Sub-
Lieutenant’s courses and afloat training that is less than six years after
the award of watch-keeping tickets were commanding ships like Inshore

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Alok Bansal

Patrol Vessels, Seaward Defence Boats and Fast Patrol Vessels, leading
to a spurt in navigational accidents – numerous ships were damaged on
account of grounding and mishandling during the mid-Nineties. It is not
intended to cast aspersions on the navigational skills of the CG officers,
who are as good or as bad as any naval officer of equivalent seniority;
but just to bring out the relative inexperience of some of these officers
commanding ships.

Except for wartime risks and the risks inherent in operating and firing
various hi-tech weapons, the CG officer is essentially doing the same job
as the naval officer. When the day of reckoning comes, however, being
an armed force of the Union, the CG too will have to go in harm’s way
and come under fire.15 Therefore, the CG officers justifiably feel that they
should also get most if not all the facilities available to other defence
personnel, like rations in kind for officers and sixty days annual leave.
In case of lower ranks, there exists a rank structure in the CG which is
more or less equivalent to that of the Navy. Although in the formative
years the promotions were much faster in the CG, and even today
continue to be relatively fast, this has not really caused much problem.
Due to the presence of a similar rank structure, there is generally a good
understanding amongst the naval sailors and CG naviks about inter se
seniority. Moreover, their direct interaction is also considerably less as
compared to the officers. Initially, there were a few problems regarding
the status of Pradhan Naviks (equivalents of Petty Officers in the Navy)
who, according to the CG Rules, are not subordinate officers (equivalent
of Senior Sailors in the Navy). There was also a problem of mess-men
as the CG Naviks initially felt that it was not in their charter of duties to
serve Senior Sailors or their equivalents in the CG. However, most of
these problems have been resolved by now.

Common service conditions for the two services with a common

or equivalent rank structure for the officers is considered a must for
removing mutual irritants and enhancing cooperation between the two
services. CG being the fourth Armed Force of the Union must be given
privileges as applicable to the other defence forces. Qualifications and

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other requirements for entry in the CG should be made similar to those

for the Navy. The promotion norms also need to be made similar. In
order to retain the naval character of the force, it is felt that a significant
number of the officers manning the CG should be naval deputationists.
Similarly, as in the US, the CG officers should be deputed to naval ships
and units. This will not only improve mutual understanding but also
acquaint the officers with each other’s operating procedures.

Sharing of Training Facilities

As of now, most of the training is common for the Navy and the CG.
The CG is using the existing naval facilities for the basic and subsequent
professional training of their officers and lower ranks. Some years back,
a serious thought was being given to start a CG Academy near Hazira,
but the idea seems to have been shelved now. It is essential that the
CG should continue to use naval facilities for training. With the Naval
Academy at Ezhimala becoming operational, the Navy should be in a
position to meet the entire training requirement of the CG. The CG
should also start inducting their officers after the “Plus Two” stage so
that they could train together with the naval cadets in the Naval Academy
just like the naval cadets train together with their Army and Air Force
counterparts at the National Defence Academy. This will establish
excellent lifelong rapport amongst the officers of the two services.

The subsequent professional training for the two services is generally

carried out together. Almost all the CG officers and lower ranks
complete their initial and subsequent professional training in the naval
establishments. This system of training together needs to be continued
if the two services are to operate together in times of war and in less
than war situations. However, there is a growing feeling amongst
the CG personnel, specially the officers, that they get a step-motherly
treatment in the naval training establishments. In order to eliminate
this feeling, it is necessary that all the major training establishments of
the Navy training CG personnel should also have the CG personnel in
their training teams. This will enable the training package for the CG

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Alok Bansal

personnel to be continuously modified to suit the CG requirements. This

will also eliminate the feeling of alienation that many CG officers suffer
from when they are undergoing training in the naval establishments.

It is also felt that all the naval personnel, especially the officers, should
undergo a basic capsule on subjects like pollution control, anti-smuggling
and anti-poaching operations. The CG should set up training facilities for
training their personnel in these subjects and naval officers should also
go there for short courses. At the same time, it is felt that the quantum of
gunnery training being imparted to the CG officers needs to be enhanced
so as to enable the CG to undertake its war-time responsibilities more
effectively. It is also imperative that some Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW) training should also be imparted to the CG personnel, especially
officers. This along with the likely presence of sonar and ASW weapons
in future CG ships will enable the CG ships to be used for anti-submarine
patrols in times of war.

Maintenance, Logistics and Communication Facilities

The CG is presently utilising the logistics and communication facilities

of the Navy and to some extent the maintenance facilities of the Navy.
Of late, the CG has started setting up its own facilities. It is strongly
felt that rather than duplicating the infrastructure, the CG should set
up logistics, Communication and maintenance facilities where naval
facilities do not exist, like Porbandar, Haldia and Campbell Bay. By this
sort of an arrangement the two services can utilise each other’s resources
most optimally.

The CG should pay the Navy for the facilities used by it, including the
training facilities and the manpower. As the finances for the CG are
provided by the Department of Revenue (Customs), this could help in
keeping the defence budget low.

Doctrines for Joint Operations

Today, the Navy and the CG are moving forward in their development
without much regard to the other service’s thinking and planning. They

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have a common role towards the nation’s defence. The CG is expected

to operate in support of the Navy in times of emergency. This requires a
great deal of cooperation between the two services in peace-time so that
the CG could change over to its war-time role more smoothly. The two
services need to develop as forces complementary to each other so as
to avoid wasting scarce national resources in duplicating infrastructure.
This requires the two services to take a holistic view and plan their future
developments with mutual consultation. If the CG is to function as an
integral part of the Indian maritime force structure during hostilities,
it should be provided with the wherewithal for playing such a role
efficiently. In addition, the staff requirements of each new addition
of either service need to be dovetailed keeping the integrated force
requirements in mind. They need to ensure commonality of basic ship
designs, common operation procedures, unambiguous command and
control organisation for joint operations and cross deputations from one
service to the other so that the personnel are not only familiar with one
another but also with the problems and procedures of the other service.

The Navy and the CG are two Armed forces of different characters and
need a doctrine to govern their relationship, which must clearly highlight
that the main roles of the CG are maritime law enforcement and marine
safety missions. However, maritime defence should be one of the three
missions of the CG and accorded equal importance. The following
principles should govern this relationship:
(a) The CG should complement the Navy’s capabilities rather than
duplicate them, for optimum utilisation of scarce national resources.
(b) By incorporating combat capability in existing CG platforms,
the CG could provide significant accretion to the maritime defence
capabilities at a nominal cost and in LIC and other low threat scenarios,
the CG should meet the Navy’s platform requirements.
(c) In times of war or other emergencies the CG should carry out
tasks such as Naval Control of Shipping, search and rescue, harbour
defence and security and surveillance. As far as possible efforts
should be made to allocate only such jobs as are similar to the tasks
being performed by the CG in peace-time.
(d) The selection of ships and aircraft for the CG should be in

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consultation with the Navy to facilitate inter-operability and

standardisation for logistics support. The CG should therefore avoid
operations and procedures that would change in the event of the
Navy’s control, and develop its own combat system and command
and control system.
As the CG grew out of the Navy, presently there are many areas of
duplication as well as blurring of responsibilities. Efforts would have
to be made to sort them out. The CG draws upon the expertise and the
infrastructure of the Navy and will continue to do so for times to come.
Within a short span of three decades, the CG has begun to acquire an
independent identity of its own. While retaining its separate identity,
the CG can provide significant support to the Navy, both in times of war
and peace. The growing network of CG bases, its infrastructure and
equipment could fill crucial gaps, especially in maritime surveillance
and escort role, in the inshore and off-shore regions, thereby relieving
the Navy of part of its responsibility and freeing it to concentrate on the
major role of engaging and neutralising adversaries away from the home
water.16

Maritime Defence Zones

The United States has established Maritime Defence Zones (MDZ) to

enhance cooperation between the Navy and the CG, thereby reducing
combat deficiencies. It is felt that establishment of these zones in
India will help the Navy and the CG to establish standard practices for
protecting the ports and the coastal waters.

MDZ are naval commands, headed by CG Area Commanders who

report to their respective naval Commanders-in-Chief when activated
for operations and for planning and exercise purposes during normal
peacetime. MDZ responsibilities include contingency planning,
exercising the plan with regular and reserve forces and operational
command of designated Naval and CG forces when mobilisation occurs.
The MDZ area of operations includes the navigable waterways, port
areas, harbour approaches and ocean area up to the limit of EEZ. The
MDZ staff is made up of officers from both the Navy and the CG. The

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forces destined for MDZ operational control when activated include

most of the CG ships, aircraft and port security units, naval mine warfare
units, inshore undersea warfare units and a limited number of frigates,
destroyers and maritime patrol aircraft.17

In the Indian context, there is a need to establish five Maritime Defence

Zones – two each on the Western and Eastern coasts and one for the
Andaman and Nicobar islands. These could be headed by a naval officer
of the rank of Rear Admiral or a CG Inspector General. The forces
allocated for the MDZ should include almost all the CG ships and aircraft
and naval ships earmarked for Local Naval Defence (LND), including
minesweepers and missile boats.

The threat with which the MDZ must deal includes the entire spectrum
of covert and overt hostile actions that could compromise a port or sink
a ship at sea. This ranges from mine and submarine warfare to terrorist
attacks to intelligence gathering and special operations. In the face of
these challenges, the CG must take advantage of every opportunity and
every available resource in peace-time to develop expertise and amass
experience doing the kind of things that can readily be applied to MDZ
operations in the event of hostilities.18

MDZ must ensure that the battle groups, amphibious groups, submarines
and support ships deploy unimpeded from Indian ports when hostilities
are imminent. It must also ensure that the reinforcement and resupply
shipping in support of forward deployments safely departs Indian ports
and coastal areas and safe and secure water transportation of economic
cargoes continue from Indian ports and coastal areas.

Wartime Role of the Coast Guard

It is imperative that closer ties are established between the CG and the
Navy so as to facilitate a smoother transition whenever the CG is required
to fight alongside the Navy in times of war. It would be ideal to take a leaf
from the US Coast Guard, which “is a military, multi-mission, maritime
service ... .. and one of the nation’s five Armed Services”19. Besides

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defence of the US coast, the CG ships and aircraft actively participated

in the Vietnam War and made sacrifices along with the personnel of other
services.20 According to the US CG policy document it along with the
Navy is expected to create “fully interoperable, multidimensional, naval
and maritime forces” to meet future maritime challenges. To achieve
this “the Navy and Coast Guard must work even more closely”.21 In the
Indian context this can be achieved in peace-time by CG participation
in joint readiness exercises and multi-service interdiction training and
operations. The process has been initiated and would be a catalyst in
improving the CG readiness and an asset in improving the professional
relations between the Navy and the CG. Coastal defence and coastal law
enforcement are complementary. As brought out earlier, with careful
planning, a Rupee spent on either of these missions will directly benefit
the other.22 Since 1990 a non statutory forum called the Navy Coast Guard
Board (NAVGUARD) has been established to resolve contentious issues
and provide solutions to issues of mutual interests, covering the whole
gamut from standardisation of equipment to community interactions and
welfare measures.23

Reality dictates that the CG would always be most useful when it takes
on the mission the Navy cannot fulfil. The Navy comprises of a force of
large, high technology extremely expensive ships. The CG comprises
of essentially low cost ships. It is, therefore, envisaged that the CG
would take on the responsibilities where low intensity conflict exists.
With the addition of some inexpensive combat systems, these ships will
be ideally suited for low intensity conflicts. The CG will provide the
platform and personnel and the Navy would provide combat systems for
these platforms. While incorporating the combat capability in existing
CG platforms, the CG will provide a low coast addition to the national
defence resources.24

The CG should support the Navy as a general purpose force in being,

and for operations in low to high threat environments. Generally, CG
units should confine their operations to littoral waters in low threat
environments. The wartime tasks of the CG should include defence

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 Synergising Indian Navy and the Coast Guard

of off shore installations, local naval defence of ports and harbours,

examination services, control of merchant shipping, augmentation of
naval resources in amphibious operations, maritime surveillance and
Patrol and Logistic Support.

Conclusion

The CG was established to fulfil the long felt need of an organisation

to ensure the safety of life and property at sea and for enforcement of
national laws in the waters under our jurisdiction. This had become
essential from the trends emerging from the preliminary discussions at
the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. It was also considered
desirable that these predominantly peace-time law enforcement activities
should not be undertaken by the Navy, since these will detract from the
Navy’s operational role and interfere with combat training. Moreover, it
would not be cost effective to deploy sophisticated warships and trained
manpower of the Navy in a law enforcement role on a continuous basis
in peace-time. It was also felt that entrusting these jobs to the Navy
would probably require higher defence outlays and cause an uproar in
our neighbouring countries.

The CG Act was brought into force on 19 August 1978. This act formally
constitutes the CG as an Armed Force of the Union under the Ministry of
Defence. The CG is, however, not paid out of defence estimates but its
budget is covered under the allocations for the Department of Revenue
(Customs). The duties assigned to the CG by this act are mainly maritime
law enforcement and marine safety missions. Even though the founders
of the CG expected the service to contribute to the maritime defence, no
mention of this is made in the CG Act.

The Navy and the CG are two maritime forces operating in the same
environment, with overlapping functions and responsibilities in
certain areas in peace-time. Indian maritime interests are growing at a
tremendous pace and to guard them would be beyond the resources of
any one maritime force, especially in view of the resource crunch. Low

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Alok Bansal

intensity conflicts have become part and parcel of the scenario evolving
around us. Infiltration of arms and explosives from across the maritime
boundaries has increased the security threat to Indian maritime assets
and the spectre of maritime terrorism is looming large. This requires
increased maritime surveillance, which can only come about with close
naval and CG cooperation.

In order to enhance cooperation between the two services and to remove

the problems likely to arise in their future cooperation, personnel from
both the services must be sent on cross-deputation to the other service.
The service conditions, rank structure, perks and privileges must be
similar for the two services. CG personnel should continue training in
naval training establishments and the logistics and maintenance facilities
of the two services should complement each other rather than duplicate
them. MDZ on the US pattern must be established and a set doctrine
must govern joint operations. The requirement of platforms of the two
services must be coordinated and as far as possible commonality of
equipment must be maintained. CG platforms must be built to naval
specifications and must have the capability to stage naval helicopters
and to be fitted with naval weapons and sensors. There is also a need to
give the CG a representation in HQ IDS. This will not only affirm its
identity as an Armed Force but also enable the HQ IDS to get valuable
inputs on the maritime zones and CG.

Notes

1 “Indian Coast Guard: 25 Glorious Years”, New Delhi, Coast Guard Headquarters, 2003, p. 37.
2 A. Kamath, “The Emergence of Indian Coast Guard”, Vikrant, March 1980, p. 37.
3 Prabhakaran Paleri, “Role of the Coast Guard in the Maritime Security of India”, New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2004, p.
32.
4 Madhvendra Singh, “Does India Really Need Two Maritime Services”, Trishul, Vol V No 2, p. 15.
5 Ibid.
6 PS Das, “India’s Maritime Concerns and Strategies”, USI Journal, Vol CXXXVI No 565 July-September 2006, p. 456.
7 Madhvendra Singh, n.4, p. 22.
8 Ibid.
9 Paleri, n. 3, p. 261.
10 Gurpreet S Khurana, “Cooperation Among Maritime Security Forces: Imperatives for India and South East Asia”, Strategic
Analysis, Vol 29 No 2, Apr-Jun 2005, p. 297.
11 PS Das, n. 6, p. 458.
12 Madhvendra Singh, n. 4, p. 20.
13 Paleri, n. 3, p. 261.
14 The sailing order is made by the senior officer amongst the afloat units and the shore authorities.
15 Madhvendra Singh, n. 4, p. 19
16 KR Singh, “Defence of India’s shores - The Growing Importance of the Coast Guard”, Asian Defence Journal, 3/90,
p. 78.

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 Synergising Indian Navy and the Coast Guard

17 S idney A Wallance, “The Role of Coast Guard Within The Maritime Strategy Must Not Be Overlooked”, Sea Power, January
1988, p. 24.
18 Ibid.
19 Bruce Stubbs and Scott C Truver, “America’s Coast Guard: Safeguarding US Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st
Century”, Washington DC, US Coast Guard HQ, 2000, p. 1.
20 Robert Erwin Johnson, “Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coat Guard, 1915 to the Present”, Annapolis,
Naval Institute Press, 1989, pp. 336-337.
21 Bruce Stubbs, n. 19, p 7.
22 J.P. Carneiro, “A Functional Coast Guard of the 21st Century – Some Thoughts”, USI Journal, Oct-Dec, 1991,
pp. 516-517.
23 Paleri, n. 3, p 274.
24 Carneiro, n. 22, pp 516-517.

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