Domestic Developments in UAE

Founded in 1971, UAE is a federation of seven Arab monarchies. A monarch heads each

federating unit, while the federal government is represented and governed by Federal

Supreme Council and Federal National Council (FNC). Federal Supreme Council is the

highest legislative and executive organ of UAE. Comprising of the heads of seven Emirates

and its decisions are binding. It is empowered to elect Prime Minister, the President, and the

members of FNC. (United Arab Emirates: The Cabinet, nd) But in practice only the monarchs

of Abu Dhabi and Dubai always serves as the president and PM of UAE. It is because both

emirates are the richest of all federating units. And their contribution to the development and

modernization is higher than other entities. In this way, these two states decide foreign, and

defense policies. While internal matters are handled by the ruling elites of the respective units

(Quamar, 2017). FNC is comprised of forty member, initial members were nominated by the

ruling elites of the federating units. FNC rules were revised in 2006. It was decided that half

of FNC members will be nominate by the rulers of each emirate. While half will be elected

by the Electoral College. Members of Electoral College were selected by the rulers. To

ensure smooth functioning of election, election commission was also established in same year

(Government of UAE, nd). Till day four rounds of elections, in 2006, 2011, 2015 and 2019

were conducted. Practically this body is just nominal and do not hold any powers of

sanctioning or rejecting legislation. Further they cannot trial federal ministers (Hussain,

2015). The initiation of Arab spring in various parts of Gulf, alarmed UAE government.

Minor instances of protest erupted in UAE as well. Protestors demanded political reforms,

judicial independence and improvement in human rights situation in the country. UAE

government adopted a two-pronged strategy for dealing with the situation. On one hand,

government started imprisoning and punishing prominent activists. Increased political

victimization let Amnesty International to criticize UAE for human rights abuses. On other
hand, process of political and economic reforms was initiated (Hussain, 2015). In 2014

UAE’s president (Sheikh Khalifa) was facing serious health issues. Because of which he was

not able to perform governmental tasks efficiently. Thus he was replaced by Mohammad Bin

Zayed (crown prince of Abu-Dhabi). Royal members occupy influential ministries but

technocrats, professionals and business tycoons are also part of the new cabinet

(Kumaraswamy, Quamar & Hameed, 2020. P 253). Among the political reforms initiated

earlier, restructuring of FNC was the most important. In 2015 members of the Electoral

College were enlarged and women representation was increased. For ensuring gender

equality government allocated 50% of FNC seats for women. (Talwar, 2018). UAE

government was convinced that the root cause of agitation in the country is growing

unemployment and dissatisfaction of masses. Thus government paid special attention to

health and economy. Thus special attention is concentrated on these issues (Quamarthe,

2017).

Regional Developments

On the regional front, UAE is very active for countering Islamists influence in the region.

UAE along with Saudi Arabia played an active role in dethroning Egyptian president

(Mohammad Mursi) and backed Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Quamar, 2017). UAE is also very

active in Libya. Currently there is a UN backed government but UAE is supporting Libyan

National Army (LNA). This armed group is intensively struggling for gaining control of the

capital.UAE was also active in Saudi efforts to restore Mansur Hadi’s government in Yemen.

Hadi was ousted from power by the Iranian backed Houthi rebels. The Saudi-led military

operation in Yemen resulted in grave human rights violations. Alliance also failed in

restoring Hadi regime. UAE interests Yemen are not limited to the restoration of a pro-Arab

leadership. But also include the security of Bab el-Mandeb, major route for transporting oil

and gas to Europe. Bab-el Mandeb lies near to port of Aden in South Yemen. Southern
Transition Council (STC) is an armed group in Yemen that is voicing for the division of

Yemen as it existed before 1990. This group is a significant cause of conflict between Saudi

Arabia and UAE. UAE is aimed at controlling the Aden Port. While Saudi backed Hadi

regime is opposing STC and its demand for the division of Yemen (Kumaraswamy, Quamar

& Singh, 2019). In 2017 UAE, Saudi Arabia, and some other countries cut off diplomatic

relations with Qatar and also imposed an economic blockade on the latter. This situation was

not only alarming for Qatar but also had financial repercussions for UAE because Qatar

relied on GCC for a great amount of trade. Qatar crisis was peacefully concluded in 2021,

despite the fact that political differences remained intact. Among the growing regional

tensions UAE took a bold step (ignoring Saudi and American displeasure) of consulting with

Iran and requesting it for cooperation in diffusing regional tensions. In this direction National

Security Advisor of UAE along with the younger brother, of crown prince paid a day long

visit to Tehran in October 2019 (The Hearst, 2019).

Oman

6.2.1 Domestic Developments in Oman

Muscat was occupied by Portugal in 1507. Portuguese were drove out of Oman in 17 th

century. In 1783 Oman was expanded to Gwadar (present day Pakistan). Oman became

British protectorate in 1891. Relations between Britain and Oman were previously guided by

the “Treaty of Friendship” signed in 1798. Through the “Treaty of Friendship, Commerce

and Navigation”, Oman gained independence in 1951. Said bin Taimur remained Oman’s

sultan from 1932 till 1971 (History of Oman, nd). In 1970 Sultan was over throne and

replaced by Qaboos Bin Saeed. Sultan Qaboos centred all power in his personality. He

remained Prime Minister, minister of interior and foreign relations and the commander of

Oman’s armed forces. For a better administration a “consultative assembly” was established
in 1981. It was a bicameral representative body constituting Majlis-al Dawla and Majlis-al-

Shura. Majlis al-Shura is considered to drafted laws within three months of legislation. After

which it is referred to Majlis al-Dawla for review. If both bodies disagree on any legislation,

issue will be addressed in a joint session. Once the issue is finalised it need sultan’s approval

for becoming a law. Majlis-al Dawla and Majlis-al- Shura are supposed to provide

recommendation for social legislation. But is not empowered to interfere in foreign, security

and financial matters (Foreign Ministry of Oman, nd). Sultan was facing serious health issues

in 2014. Since then Sultan personal involvement in policy making got decreased. As sultan

don’t have children, thus political uncertainty regarding possible heir to the throne emerged.

In this direction Assad bin Tariq al-Said, Fahad bin Mahmoud al-Said and Haitham Bin Tariq

al-Said (Sultan’s cousins) were the possible options (India-Gulf Relations, 2018). Omani

constitution states that the successor to the throne will either be chosen by the consensus

decision of the royal family. Or the serving sultan must name the possible successor secretly,

which will be disclosed upon his death. Upon the death of sultan’s death in January 2020,

royal family opted for “Haitham bin Tariq al-Said”. Who was named by the decreased sultan

in his secret envelop (Mckernan, 2020).

The popular unrest that erupted in 2011 also reached Oman. But the difference was that

public showed no resentment against sultan and there was a general acceptance for the rule of

sultan. The protestors demanded constitutional and economic reforms. As unemployment

remained a major issue for Omani public, thus people want their government to ensure more

job opportunities. These protests led to a number of political, economic and social reforms by

Sultan (Kumar, 2015. P 108). Compared to other Gulf States, Oman is small economy. As per

2017 estimates oil contributed around 44% to its GDP, 75% to export and 84% to

governmental revenues. Falling oil prices have negatively impacted Oman’s economy. If it

continued with the pace of existing production, Oman is left only with 15 years of reserves.
Keeping in view these factors Omani government decided to diversify its economy away

from oil. For gaining this objective Oman eagerly pursued the development of its ports,

mining, tourism, sports and aviation sector. Additionally for sustaining its economy

government imposed “additional taxes, reduced subsides, increased the visa fees for

foreigners” etc (Kumaraswamy, Quamar & Singh, 2018. P 125-126). Oman is also seeking

foreign investment in infrastructure sector. It is developing Duqm port, as a transportation

and military hub, in Persian Gulf. In this port China, India and many European countries are

investing. For reducing its dependency on busy maritime routes, government of Oman also

initiated plans for connecting Persian Gulf Region through a network of roads and railways.

On the political level government focused on anti-corruption measures. In 2014 Oman signed

“UN Convention on Bribery and Corruption”. With this considerable number of ministers

were replaced (Kumar, 2015). For addressing the issue of unemployment government

announced a policy of nationalization of job market in 2018. This policy restricted areas

where expatriates could get visas. On the political front Majlis al-Shura was empowered to

question financial policies of government (Kumar, 2017).

6.2.2 Regional Issues

As for as foreign policy is concerned Oman always followed policy of neutrality and non-

interference in regional conflicts. Yemen crises have direct implications for Oman. First, it

can press large number of Yemeni people for seeking refuge in Oman. Secondly the

turbulent “Dhofar region” of Oman is bordering Yemen. Insurgents in Dhofar can easily get

reinforcement from the insurgent and terrorist groups active in Yemen. Further the instable

Yemen remains unable to ensure border management. In this crises Oman rejected to become

a part of regional grouping. And refused to join Saudi-led alliance. But because of increased

terrorism it formally joined the Saudi-led “Islamic Military Alliance” (India-Gulf Relations,

2018). Oman is also mediating between the Saudi Kingdom and Houthi rebels. In an effort
for peaceful resolution of Yemen crisis Oman arranged a secret meeting between Saudi

officials and Houthi representatives in 2018 (Ghobari & Noah, 2018). Same goes to the

Qatar crisis when Oman stayed neutral during intra-Gulf rift. Oman also refrained from

offering its mediatory services between the two (India-Gulf Relations, 2018). Oman was the

first country in Gulf to welcome Israeli PM in October 2018. During visit Israel-Palestine

peace process and other issues of bilateral importance were discussed. In November 2018 rail

connectivity between Gulf and Israel via Jordan was discussed (Judd, 2020). Israel was

hoping to get Oman’s formal recognition but it is pending still pending. Unlike other Arab

and Gulf countries, Oman enjoys good relations with Iran. Oman supported Iran’s nuclear

program both before and after its nuclear deal. Both countries enjoy cordial security and

economic ties. Oman is also mediating between Iran-US and Iran-Saudi Arabia. (Alagoz,

2022)