De Internationalization
De Internationalization
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Management International Review
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De-Internationalization1
Abstract
Key Results
Authors
Introduction
What is De-Internationalization?
Perspectives on De-Internationalization
Economics
tion will be taken whenever achieved (or expected) profits n< tt*, where ;r* de-
notes the minimum acceptable profit level (over a period of time). Numerous fac-
tors may lead to unsatisfactory profit levels, including; i) deterioration of relativ
cost conditions due inter alia to price inflation in the host country, altered ex
change rates, or the introduction of new, more efficient production technology
elsewhere, 11) falling prices due inter alia to increased competition, the introduc-
tion of new product offers (substitutes), and weakened local currency which may
affect the value of repatriated profits, and Hi) reduced demand, e.g. obsolete prod
uct offer, adverse economic conditions in the host country or export market, con
tractionary macroeconomic policies, etc.
Unsatisfactory profit levels do not necessarily lead to de-internationalization
actions. Clearly, both "positive" and "negative" courses of action may be avail-
able in situations characterized by low profits. For example, firms may at-
tempt - depending on the actual circumstances - to deal with unsatisfactory profi
levels by reducing costs (lay-offs, adoption of more efficient production processes,
etc.), and/or increasing sales revenues - for example, achieving a larger sales vol-
ume by "downgrading" the product offer, or, alternatively, to focus on more
affluent market segments with an "upgraded" product.
While traditional economic reasoning concentrates on the operative conse-
quences of changes in sales revenues and production costs, transaction cost eco-
nomics calls attention to factors that influence the choice of foreign operation
methods - which are mainly regarded as a question of the degree of control the
firm should have over a foreign operation (Anderson/Gatignon 1986). This per
spective gives particular importance to the transaction cost ramifications of alter
native modes of operation (i.e. governance structures) under different condition
of transaction specific assets and internal/external uncertainty (Williamson 1985)
The relevance of transaction cost economics in the context of de-internation-
alization, lies primarily in its analysis of the strategic motives underlying choice
of operation modes, and by extension, of change of mode. While this perspective
may have little to say about the relational, managerial, and organizational pro-
cesses leading to such changes - or their implementation - it is, however, pos-
sible to deduce predictions about when such changes may be observed. In gen-
eral, significant changes (parametric shifts) in the factors that influence the initial
choice of operation modes are likely to induce or lead to corrective action
(Riordan/Williamson 1985, Teece 1986). For example, a significant reduction in
the value of specific assets (e.g. the value of a previously unique technology may
diminish if alternative and better technologies become more readily available)
would reduce the benefits of using a high-control operation mode such as a wholly-
owned foreign subsidiary (because of the high administration costs associated
with such modes). As a result, a firm might be better off by dismantling its own-
ership involvement in a foreign venture, and organize its transactions with sup-
pliers or distributors within contractual or arms-length relations.
An important stream of literature dealing with entry and exit dynamics in gen-
eral (Siegfried/Evans 1994), and foreign divestments in particular (Shapiro 198
Benito 1997), is rooted in the industrial organization field. The main idea is th
the decision to exit from an operation is a function of, on the one hand, incentives
to exit and, on the other hand, impediments to exit (Siegfried/Evans 1994). Th
most obvious incentive to exit is low profits, or outright unprofitability, which in
turn may be due to high costs, permanent decreases in demand, or the entry in
an industry by aggressive, more efficient new competitors. The existence of sp
cific assets, i.e. assets which do not have valuable alternative uses (Williamson
1985), constitute an important impediment to exit (Caves/Porter 1976). Even
though sunk costs may, from a purely economic perspective, be seen as an "ir
tional" barrier to exit, in reality they function as a perceptual exit barrier (St
1981). The role of such investments is often to deter entry by signalling a cre
ible ex ante commitment by incumbents to stay in an industry or market (Shapiro/
Khemani 1987). However, what serves as an entry deterrent, also deters e
ex post.
Specific assets can be either tangible or intangible. In general, the empiri
evidence suggests that durable tangible specific assets, such as high sunk cost
machinery, discourage exit (Siegfried/Evans 1994). In a similar vein, intangib
assets such as goodwill, advertising and research and development intensity, fir
specific human capital, and even emotional attachment to the firm and/or indu
try, can also operate as exit barriers by raising the perceived cost of leaving t
arena (Caves/Porter 1976). An additional exit barrier is interrelatedness betwee
units, such as joint production and distribution facilities, which may prevent
in a strict sense, unprofitable unit from being divested because it may contrib
positively to the company's overall activities. Finally, the IO literature sugge
that divestment may depend on diversification. Caves and Porter (1976) argue t
owners of independent plants have a lower opportunity cost and are therefore will-
ing to accept a lower rate of return than operations belonging to a multi-plan
multi-industry company would be expected to achieve. Moreover, divestment
facilitated in diversified companies since decisions are likely to be made by top
managers who are geographically and/or emotionally remote from the units t
are candidates for divestiture (Wright/Thompson 1987).
Strategic Management
Internationalization-Management Perspective
tinue moving out over time would include learning from mistakes, failures and
the like which result in some reversals from time to time within an overall pat-
tern of international growth. It is evident that companies do learn from mistakes
and adjust behavior, so that reversals do not necessarily start a de-international-
ization spiral (Benito/Welch 1994). However, it is also clear that, in certain cir-
cumstances, reversals are taken as evidence of a need to pull back, to reduce in-
volvement, or, in the extreme, to withdraw from international operations al-
together. As in the process of forward movement, much depends on the attitude
of management, the stage of internationalization, the extent and type of commit-
ment to international operations (both resources and psychological) within the
company and the preceding experience from international activity (Johanson/
Vahlne 1977, 1990, Welch/Luostarinen 1988, Buckley/Ghauri 1993).
This is particularly illustrated in the behavior of early exporters. Because of
the way in which exporting is often initiated, the commitment by management to
the exporting activity may be weak, even tenuous at the outset (Bilkey/Tesar 1977,
Welch/Wiedersheim-Paul 1980). External change agents frequently play a major
role in triggering the exporting start, as exemplified in the role of fortuitous in-
quiries or orders found in many exporting studies (Bilkey/Tesar 1977, Munro/
Beamish 1987, DFAT 1995). Inevitably, the risk of problems or reversals at this
stage leading to complete withdrawal from the exporting activity is especially
high (Welch/Wiedersheim-Paul 1980). An early Australian study of exporters and
non-exporters found "that a substantial portion of non-exporters (had) exported
at some stage" (Layton/Dunphy 1978). Similarly, Bonaccorsi (1992) reports that
in the years 1978-1984, more than 45 per cent of the total number of Italian ex-
porters in that period exported for only one year. While such complete forms of
de-internationalization might be expected in this early phase, they are neverthe-
less suggestive of some of the issues which might have a bearing on withdrawal
decisions at later phases of international involvement.
Even when a company has more established international operations, exter-
nal forces (e.g. changed foreign market conditions; foreign government action)
are often the key triggering forces in causing management to examine the nature
and extent of the company's international involvement. Poor foreign market per-
formance, perhaps due to problems with distributors, or adverse developments
such as import restrictions or competitive action, might well cause a re-think about
the exporting activity. The type of response in such situations still depends very
much on how management views the reverses. For highly committed manage-
ment, and when international markets are critical to the company's survival, com-
plete withdrawal could be viewed as almost inconceivable.
Likewise, for multinational companies, with operations in many countries and
in many forms, a future without international operations in today's context would
probably be very difficult to contemplate, let alone suggest. For such companies,
responses to reverses in one or more foreign markets are more likely to be under-
taken in the context of strategic re-positioning of their global operations. For ex-
ample, the former head of the UK industrial conglomerate, BTR, in discussing
the company's decision to sell its minority stake in a Malaysian petrochemical fa-
cility, commented: "this disposal continues our strategy of divesting non-core
interests and concentrating on industrial manufacturing" (Burt 1996). The deci-
sion had been made in the context of "difficulties with the petrochemical opera-
tions". During the early 1990s many multinationals were involved in restructur-
ing, downsizing, and outsourcing as part of a redefinition of their businesses and
strategic priorities (Hendry 1995). Companies like Digital have closed manufac-
turing operations in many countries and have undertaken substantial divestments
throughout their global network (Muffett 1994). One might argue that long be-
fore any of these steps reached terminal de-internationalization stage for a given
multinational that the company would have been taken over by, or merged with,
another seeking international expansion. As an illustration, after heavy losses on
Asian futures markets the British investment bank, Barings, was taken over by
the Dutch financial group, ING, which was seeking to extend its international
activities (Economist 1995).
The by-product of mergers and acquisitions amongst companies with substan-
tial international operations may well be that duplicate operations within or across
nations are closed down. The merger between pharmaceutical companies Phar-
macia and Upjohn has led to worldwide restructuring of the merged operation,
"which will see the group close up to half its facilities" (Luesby 1996). In a gen-
eral sense, stage of internationalization may be viewed as an indicator of the ex-
tent of embeddedness of commitment to international operations within a com-
pany. In this respect, internationalization can be viewed as a barrier to de-inter-
nationalization.
The extension of commitment flowing from extended international operations,
which is reflected in the allocation of resources such as people and the building
or purchase of physical assets and the like, make it difficult for companies to with-
draw (barriers to exit). Perhaps as importantly though, people have made these
decisions to commit at some stage, so that there is psychological pressure to con-
firm the appropriateness of the steps undertaken, i.e. the decisions need justifica-
tion. This is done by moving forward, not reversing the process, thus the argu-
ment that this is one of the underlying forces in internationalization (Johanson/
Vahlne 1977, Welch/Luostarinen 1988). Inevitably therefore there is a manage-
rial bias towards sticking with the path chosen, in this instance internationaliza-
tion, and even supporting it in many cases despite adverse developments. Earlier
economics literature has identified the potential importance of so-called barriers
to exit, as noted above, to which managerial commitment can be added.
The importance of this factor is supported by research in the management field
where there has been a concern to understand the influences on decision-makers
which lead to escalating commitment to a failing course of action (Staw 1981,
Brockner 1992). Such seemingly irrational persistence has been found despite ev-
ident negative feedback. Explanations have been grouped into project, psycho-
logical, social and structural, with many studies demonstrating the importance of
the self-justification factor (Staw/Ross 1987, Brockner 1992). Drummond (1995)
comments: "the evidence consistently shows that subjects who are told they were
responsible for the initial decision to invest show a greater propensity to commit
further resources in the face of negative feedback than subjects who are told they
were not responsible for the initial decision". This pattern is supported amongst
decision-makers by a tendency to bias information collection and evaluation in a
way which supports the decisions they have taken (Bazerman 1990).
While there is well established research on the issue of escalation of commit-
ment, very little work has been undertaken on the reverse of this process, so-called
de-escalation: in a recent review of the literature, Drummond (1995) found that
"only a handful of papers have considered the phenomenon of de-escalation", add-
ing that "we know very little about how decision-makers actually experience
mounting evidence of failure in a venture which is important to them". Clearly
though, as negative feedback mounts, committed decision-makers face conflict-
ing pressures: to persist, and thereby justify, or to withdraw (Staw/Ross 1987).
From her own study, Drummond (1995) concluded: "Withdrawal is most prob-
able under conditions of low commitment and high perceived power to enact with-
drawal . . . Information alone is insufficient to effect withdrawal. Perceived power
may be the ultimate arbiter".
In the context of internationalization, if a given group of managers is respon-
sible for a range of international commitment decisions, and particularly if the stra-
tegic direction is driven from the top and inculcated through the corporate value
system (Ghoshal/Bartlett 1994), it is likely to require a major, threatening, nega-
tive outcome for management to seriously embark on a process of de-internation-
alization, which would involve unravelling what they have put in place. An ex-
treme case recently has been the withdrawal of Daiwa Bank from the U.S. market,
precipitated by massive losses and forced by the U.S. authorities as a result of a
breach of financial regulations. This has led to a major domestic and international
restructuring program by Daiwa, in consultation with the Japanese finance minis-
try, and may even lead to a merger with Sumitomo Bank which took over its U.S.
operations (Baker 1996). Of course, negative feedback from foreign markets does
not normally come in the form of such a powerful shock, more typical would prob-
ably be deterioration over time, so that the case for withdrawal is not so clear-cut
and the decision is, therefore, so much more difficult for the responsible manag-
ers to take. In addition, alongside the forces which create resistance to withdrawal
within the company are potentially powerful forces on the outside that may have
to be confronted, for example trade unions and governments. The strong reaction
of the French government to the planned closure by Hoover of its Dijon vacuum
cleaner factory in 1993 is a case in point (Hill/Cassell 1995).
While there has been a wide variety of variables stressed and issues focused on
in the diverse contributions relevant to the development of ideas about de-inter-
nationalization, there has also been a certain consistency in the evolving ideas. In
this section we shall seek to draw some of the common elements together and ex-
tend them through the construction of a conceptual framework which might serve
as a basis for undertaking further research and theory building.
From the various perspectives on de-internationalization it is evident that as
the commitments to international operations build up over time, it tends to be-
come more difficult for a given management group to undertake withdrawal from
international operations altogether, and even on a partial basis. The barriers to exit
emphasized in the economics literature are supported by the extensive manage-
ment research showing the importance of self justification and the strength of
forces supporting escalation of commitment to a course of action even when feed-
back is showing that it is producing negative results. From economics, manage-
ment and marketing perspectives this can be readily justified as a need to handle
Probability k i
of Full De-
Internationalization
t
e
t
w
erations increases - i.e. as internationalization unfolds.
The above conclusion can be seen as a relatively consistent theme of the var-
ied literature relating to the issue. However, partial withdrawal, which has been
shown to take place in a number of different forms, cannot necessarily be seen as
following such a consistent pattern. It has already been noted that companies
often reduce operations in some foreign markets over time as part of an overall
process of international expansion. The forces of resistance still apply to moves
of this nature - both within and outside the company. The larger the foreign
operation which may be deemed appropriate for shutdown, the more difficult it
tends to be to carry this out: the company can easily become embroiled in politi-
cal battles with the local government, trade unions, its own work force and other
Probability t
of Partial De- .
Internationalization Novice
Exporter
\ Global
International Firm
in
o
m
N
u
la
m
f
a
t
a
in
la
si
even partial withdrawal may be less likely. The global operator in Figure 2, with
a wider array of global options, becomes more likely to make partial de-interna-
tionalization moves, even though its overall commitment to international opera-
tions is greater, and thereby it has a lower propensity to fully de-internationalize.
This argument can be seen as consistent with research in the management lit-
erature in which de-escalation is viewed as a "more probable outcome where al-
ternative investment opportunities exist" (Drummond 1995). Likewise, as pointed
out in the economics literature, multinational companies, when deciding whether
and where to undertake foreign direct investments, may choose to establish pro-
duction units in a number of countries in order to have the flexibility to relocate
production if and when necessary (de Meza/van der Ploeg 1987).
While the above depiction of the link between de-internationalization and
stage of international operations in a broad sense may be a reasonable conclusion
from relevant research, it only takes us a limited distance in terms of providing
an appropriate conceptual setting for de-internationalization moves and in seek-
ing to explain them. The link between stage of internationalization and de-inter-
nationalization does however provide a clear indication that international with-
drawal actions should not be viewed in a vacuum. It can be argued that de-inter-
nationalization should be seen as part of the broader perspective of international
strategy, which, with advanced internationalization, is likely to have become an
integral part of overall company strategy. The connection to the overall company
situation is particularly important once the international component of company
performance becomes large enough such that substantial inter-dependency exists.
In this context, full de-internationalization involves a major upheaval for the com-
pany, so that it is that much more difficult to even contemplate. Likewise, attempts
to alter company performance in significant ways are likely to involve interna-
tional operations in some form or other, perhaps involving both expansion and
partial withdrawal moves. Figure 3 represents an attempt to provide this broader
conceptual setting for de-internationalization steps, with international expansion
and withdrawal moves depicted as potential outcomes of the same set of company
influences.
As shown in Figure 3, de-internationalization is seen as an outcome of a set
of forces which are linked to past international operations and commitments, but
are also affected by current developments within and external to the company. For
example, severe problems may have emerged in managing the company's foreign
subsidiaries at the same time as the external environment of these subsidiaries has
become less favorable, because of government decisions and the actions of emerg-
ing local competitors. Alternatively, the company may be experiencing serious
disagreements with a joint venture partner over the running of their joint opera-
tion. While these developments of themselves might prompt a consideration of
de-internationalization options, this would be balanced by the extent and type of
past commitments made in the subsidiaries or joint venture activities, and in inter-
International Operations
,
I , -External
Impact Input
Ov
Performance
Input
Change
in
Management
Decisions
Outcomes
- De-Internationalize
- Maintain
- Expand
ii
Actions
; International Strategy ;
Company Strategy
Conclusion
ation within economics and the tendency to seek justification by escalating com-
mitment found in management studies. The cycle of escalation can be, and clearly
is, broken, as a variety of cases demonstrates, especially in the area of divestment
of subsidiary operations. In this respect, though, it is important to differentiate
between partial and full de-internationalization. Clearly, partial de-internationali-
zation is more readily contemplated when there are pressures to do so - within
the company or externally. For a company with widespread global operations,
withdrawals in some parts of the overall portfolio may be regarded as minor ad-
justments in the company's total international position. Nevertheless, even at the
partial level, there are internal commitments and external vested interests that con-
strain the preparedness of even large multinationals to undertake withdrawal.
Change of management may be a key factor in facilitating the process of de-inter-
nationalization, whether deliberately engineered to achieve the objective of re-
• structuring, as in the IBM case, or as an outcome of events such as acquisition. A
managerial implication that emerges from this exploration into de-international-
ization, seems to be that while partial withdrawal can be viewed as a normal as-
pect of international activity, it is something for which the ground needs to be
carefully prepared, even as commitments are being entered into (Welch/Welch
1993). Policies regarding the movement and placement of management staff may
therefore be critical in building a more flexible approach to de-internationaliza-
tion.
The conceptual framework presented in this article can be seen as a first step
in drawing together ideas relevant to the issue of de-internationalization. It is nec-
essarily broad in scope, encompassing as it does a large range of situations and
stages in the development of international operations by companies. Further re-
finement is also necessary, perhaps involving research which follows de-interna-
tionalization moves by a number of companies through an extended period of time
and internationalization stages in order to clarify the circumstances and influences
on decisions to withdraw. Inevitably, such research faces the problem that with-
drawal is not a subject that most companies or managers like to dwell on.
Notes
1 Part of this paper was written while Gabriel R. G. Benito was at the Department of Internation
Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School. The authors thank Bent Peters
for his useful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of the paper was presented at th
AIB annual meeting, Banff, Canada, September 26-29, 1996.
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