BOOKS LIST:

1. Presidential Bandwagon
2. Moral Politics
3. Patronage Democracy
4. Noynoy: triumph of a people's campaign

BOOK: Presidential Bandwagon

About the Author:
Yuko Kasuya is a professor in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Keio
University. Her research interests include regime transition, political institutions, Southeast Asia
(especially the Philippines), and East Asia (especially Japan). She is the author of Comparative
Politics (Minerva Publishing, in Japanese, 2014) and Presidential Bandwagon: Parties and Party
Systems in the Philippines (Anvil, 2008). Her articles can be found in journals such as Electoral
Studies, The Pacific Affairs, and Party Politic, among others. She holds a PhD in international
affairs from the University of California, San Diego, an MA in development studies from the
Institute of Social Studies (Netherlands), and a BA in law from Keio University. She was vice
president of the International Political Science Association from 2018 to 2021, and has been
V-Dem East Asia Regional Center’s founding director since 2019. Her current projects concern
democratic backsliding in Asia.

Chapter 1: Introduction
Democratic Consolidation and Party System Stability
● The People Power in the PH became the inspiration and prototype for other
anti-authoritarian movements around the world such as South Korea, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Thailand. They oust their authoritarian leaders by means of street
protest.
● After the civic triumph, the Philippines has faced several political crises.
● Former President Estrada and Arroyo confronted complaints of impeachment filed in
lower house of Congress for corruption.
● In the case of Estrada, the impeachment complaint was passed the House and Senate
in 2000. Estrada was removed from the office in 2001 before the Senator-judges rule the
case due to the mounting pressure from streat protestors.
● People Power II happened due to the extra-constitutional manner of government
change.
● Philippines is not alone in experiencing crises after a democratic transition.
● In Ecuador, President Mahuad Witt was forced to resign in the midst of financial crisis in
2001.
● In Bolivia, indigenous people compelled President Sanchez de Lozada culminated in
widespread protests in 2003.
 ● In 2006, Thailand was dragged into political chaos in 2006, experiencing months of
street mobilization demanding resignation of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawara.
● Under what conditions is a new democracy more likely to be consolidated?
Consolidating democracy means in essence making the rules of democratic governance
the ‘only game in town’. In consolidated democracy, no significant political groups
attempt to overthrow democratically elected leaders; political change or conflict
resolution must emerge from constitutional procedures.
● Myriad issues in consolidating democracy; civil military relations, the rule of law, civil
society.
● The book focuses on party politics; degree of party system stability.
● Political parties in its ideal form unite and chanel citizen’s political demands, provide
information to voters in an efficient manner, recruit future political leaders, and discipline
politicians in the legislative arena. For parties to perform such functions, party system
must be relatively stable over time.
● The operations of democracy is greatly affected party system stability.
● Late President Aquino and former president Ramos argued that the country need to
develop a stronger political party institution through which people can channel their
demands rather than taking to the streets. By which the Philippines will not suffer again
by extra-constitutional means.
● Political Scientists Hutchcroft and Rocamora stated that the creation of stronger political
parties is the most important way to closing the democratic deficit.
● The recent debate about the change of constitution to a parliamentary form of
government is because parliamentary system is better suited to strengthen parties and
party systems than the current presidential form of government.
● The party system become unstable in the Post-Marcos Era.
● From 1946 to 1972, the country had a stable two-party system. The Liberal Party and
Nacionalista Party.

The Arguments
Ano nga bang ang Presidential Bandwagon Framework?
The Presidential Bandwagon Framework equalizes to the framework of party system formation
in the Philippines. We can illustrate this framework by dividing it into three components:
1. The Party Affliation Behavior of Legislative Candidate refers to the party affiliation
behavior ng mga legislative candidates na naapektuhan ng presidential elections. In
particular, aspiring politicians tend to affiliate themselves with parties that has viable
presidential candidates. This is because of the following:
● Elections are patronage driven
● The president and viable presidential candidates control the patronage
provisions to voters of the legislative candidates.
● The party nomination in legislative is permeable. One does not need to be
a long-term loyal party member to be nominated. Yung bilang ng mga
candidates and parties na magcocompete sa legislative elections ay
nakadepende sa bilang ng mga viable presidential candidates at sa mga
parties na kanilang kinabibilangan.
 2. Legislative Party System Instability refers to the instability of party system in the
post-Marcos era. This is due to the instability at the level of presidential elections. Noong
pre-authoritarian period, only LP and NP competes which helps maintaining the stability
of two-party competition in the legislative election. After democratization, party system
become unstable. This is due to the fact that the number of presidential candidates
exceeded two and adopted different party labels from one election to another. As a
result, the set of preferred party affiliation becomes unstable resulting to instability of
legislative-level party competition.
3. Presidential Competition Instability explains that the presidential single term-limit
enacted under the 1987 constitution plus the weak party-voter connection resulted to the
instability in presidential competition. As a limit, the incumbent presidential candidate
cannot seek for reelection. Sa kasong ito, ang absence ng isang incumbent signals a
higher chances of winning resulting to the increase in the number entrants. Also, the
weakness of party-citizen ties makes it easy for entrants to launch new parties. As a
result, presidential candidates change labels from one election to another. The author
states that in the pre-Marcos era, the presence of incumbents in all presidential election
contributed to maintain stable two party system stability.

Synthesis:

● The shortened presidential limit when we talk about the weak-party voter ties, the more
fragmented the presidential competition becomes. This also introduce frequent change
in party labels from one election to another. This also contributed to the instability in the
party system in the legislative level in post-Marcos elections.
● The observation that the change in the canvassing rule contributed to the post-Marcos
party system change. In the pre-Marcos era, two party representatives are allowed to
count ballots in each precinct. According to observers, the presence of these party
representatives kept the party system stable. However, the book shows that it is not the
major cause of legislative multi-party system.
● In the Chapter 8, the district level competition for seats in House Representatives has
remained largely the same despite the change in canvassing rule.
● Hindi yung increase sa number ng district legislative candidates ang nagcause ng
multi-party system after ng People Power. Rather, it was cause by the way legislative
candidates chose their party affiliation and also the degree of variations in parties
competing across districts.
● For an example, in the post-Marcos era, a set of LAMP and Lakas competed in some
areas while a set of LP and LAMP candidates competed in others.
● When seen in national level, the multi-party system emerged in the post-Marcos
Philippines.
● Isa rin sa dahilan ng pagbago or way ng pagpili ng legislative politicians ng kanilang
parties ay ang pagkakawatak watak sa presidential competition na dahilan rin ng
pagbago ng presidential term limit from two to on.
 ● The book recognizes that the presidential term limit is an important factor that influences
party system stability in the case of the Philippines. But of course, it is not the sole factor
of system instability.
● This book is also concerned the Classic Theory of Party System Formation pioneered by
Carl Landee (1965). The faction-based theory emphasizes the local political factions and
its effect to the national level party system which is the projection of local level faction
pattern.
● The local bifactionalism prevailed in the pre-Marcos elections and it was the foundation
of stability of national bipartisan. Post-Marcos era multipartism is a reflection of change
from bifactionalism to multi-factionalism cause by increasing modernization.
● This books shows that is not empirically supported as far as the Congressional District
Level is concerned. In the Chapter 8, it was found that the number of serious candidates
did not change between pre- and post-elections suggesting that factional patterns had
not change from bipolar to multipolar rivalry.
● The book debunked Lande’s claim that bifactionalism was a dominant pattern in
pre-Marcos era. Rather, there was a variation in the number of contestants arrangement
known as ‘freezone’. The freezone is in where more than two candidates ran. In here,
multiple candidates could be nominated by a single party, made it appear that there was
a two-party competition.
Important Points in Chapter 4:
● Election in the Philippines are patronage driven in which politician believe that this is the
best strategy to win.
● Campaign strategies are policy, personality (non-material) and patronage (material).
However, patronage is the most important for most Filipino politicians.
● Principal ways of providing patronage includes porbarreling (government funded projects
tagetting economic inefficient ares benefiting political ambitions), casework (assistance
to constituents who have problems), and vote buying (distribution of money and
materials) near election day.
● Porkbarrel is exploited by incumbent legislators.
● In senatorial race, policy and personality is used. Whereas, house aspirants uses
patronage. This is due to the difference in constituents size. Senators are nationwide
while house members are from defined single member districts.

Organization of the Book:

Chapter 2
● The groundwork for the analyses that follow in the subsequent chapter.
● Basic political institutions in the Philippines
● Shows the way legislative party system has changed between pre and post authoritarian
periods, and analyzes the difficulties that existing theories have in resolving the
questions why party system destabilized in the Philippines.

Chapter 3:
● The theory chapter that provides the Presidential Bandwagon Framework.
 ● This is the framework for party system formation in the Philippines
● Chapter 4 and 6 demonstrate the empirical existence of the three conditions in the
framework.
Chapter 4
● Addresses the first condition: elections are driven by patronage in the Philippines.
Chapter 5
● Discusses the second condition: the president significantly influences
legislators’patronage provision specifically pork barreling.
Chapter 6
● Concerned with highly permeable nature of party nomination, which is the third condition
in the framework.
Chapter 7 and 8
● Empirically test my hypothesis regarding party system instability which I derive from the
three conditions discussed in the previous three chapters.
● Shows empirically that instability in the presidential electoral competition was an
important factor in party system instability at the legislative level.
Chapter 9
● Analyzes why presidential elections became unstable in the post-marcos era and identify
the term limit change as the major factor.
Chapter 10
● Extends the argument on the Philippines to a cross-national context.
● Using the data from 38 new democracies, this chapter showssn the single presidential
term limit, through prohibiting the entry of the incumbent president in every election, has
destabilizing effects on legislative party politics.
Chapter 11
● Concludes with a discussion of the comparative implications of this single-country study,
followed by some predictions about the future of Philippine party politics.
Book: Noynoy: Triumph of a People's
Campaign
About the Author:

The 1985-1986 Cory’s campaign was compact and focused due to the morality played as the
masses struggled for macho tyrant and female emancipator. Whereas, in 2009-2010 Noynoy’s
campaign pluralist character of the political machinery was shown.

● Snap Election in Feb 7, 1986, only 28% sides with Cory

● June 30, 2010 he sworn as the 15th president of the Philippines. He gathered high
margin of votes. Filipinos with sense of civic and responsibility and commitment to
democracy.
● Sen Benigno Ninoy Aquino Jr was assassinated on 21st of Aug 1983, and Pres Corazon
Aquino passed away on 1st of August 2009. Their deaths became symbol for us to get
honesty and decency in public service.
● Three year exile in US and he finally came back to the Philippines, while he knew that he
might be dead in a few minutes. On August 31, almost 2M people joined the “People’s
march”from Sto Domingo Church to Manila Memorial Park in Sucat Parañaque. “The
Filipinos are worth dying for” a famous quote of Ninoy. His death released a tremendous
energy to fight against the administration. Laban was led by Ninoy Aquino , which
opposed Marcos during 1978 elections. People power is referred as unarmed civilians
defying military power. Cory led people to freedom, and she also valued accountability
and transparency in governance.
● Mar Roxas withdraw his candidacy as president on september 1, 2009, to give way to
Ninoy. It was branded as “people campaign” even the merchandises were volunteered
and funded by people. The preparation at first was chaotic.

Chapter 3. Market Segmentation

July Teehankee refers to two type of votes

● Command votes refers to baluarte or traditional voters
● Market votes refers to votes need to be marketed properly, public opinion and popularity
is a must.
● Ground war referes to the machineries of party
● Air war is the use of media to disseminate information
● In politics, we also use marketing principles wherein the candidate is the product and
voters are consumers.

Market segmentation
A. Very income
B. High income
 C. Middle class (A, B, C is 8% of all households)
D. Low income/ house (60% of all households)
E. Meager income (32% of all households)

The New Masa is exposed in internet and mass media; therefore informed.
Whoever wins at class D is usually winner in national elections.
● Underestimated voters- elderly (who experienced mostly everything)
● Noynoy gets the Class D voters. He presented a well-thought-out program based on his
resolve to eradicate corruption and impunity in order to eliminate poverty.

Dr Enriquez told that “Pakikipagkapwa is what Filipinos valued the most.”

Dr Jocano speaks of the “centrality of loob that represents reality of life.”

Filipino believes that inner self is more important than the exterior.
● Magaan ang loob (feeling good)
● Saloobin (intention)
● Kaloob (gift)
● Utang na loob (gratitude)
● Kabutihang loob (kindness)
● Sama ng loob (hurt feeling)
● Magandang loob (graciousness)
● Malakas ang loob (courageous)
● Mababa ang loob (humility)

Chapter 4
● Villarroyo (Villar and Arroyo) movement is pro-poor strategy. It was Cory aquino’s son vs
GMA’s clone.
● Billy Esposo said that “every crisis creates a hero”. “The conditions of 1986 were
re-created and opened way to a new brand entry”.
● Mario Taguiwalo believes that “succeeded in connecting the good Aquino legacy to the
good of the poor”. Or “brand extension”
● Noynoy’s conviction: the democratic idea of common good remains abstract unless the
poor are freed from poverty and injustice.
● Noynoy is simple and makatao. Noynoy maintains the good image and legacy of his
father and mother. At an early age, he felt the pressure as the only man in the house
during the presidency of Cory Aquino. He survived an ambush in 1986.

Delicadeza
● In 1998, six yrs after the end of his mother’s term in office, he entered politics. He was
elected to the House of Rep in 1998 and was re-elected in 2001 and 2004. Senate in
2007.
● He is human rights advocate and sought the proper relocation of informal settlers.
● Millions voted for Noynoy because he had no records of graft and corruption.
● It was his honest and simple character
 ● Noynoy believes that a true working democracy provides not only political freedom but
also a better life for all Filipinos.
● Democracy should provide jobs, education, social services, and equitable economic
prosperity for everyone. Poverty exists because of corruption. Extreme poverty is an
attack on liberalism.
● “Kayo ang boss ko” embedded in his consciousness is the principle that sovereignty
resides in the people.

Chapter 5
● LP branding, pres Manuel Roxas Sr., was the founder of Liberal party. Not all politicians
are engaged in corruption and patronage politics.
● War room provides political map wherein they study the weak and strong areas of
politicians Under LP/ Noynoy.
● Influx of LP, when Cavite local officials joined LP (boosted the ground support, cavite has
the second biggest number of votes). 125 different local officials from diff party joined LP.

Chapter 6
● Non-conventional (volunteers) & Conventional (LP Party and other party allies)
● Lowkey campaigning; volunteers in effort to strengthen the LP brand of Politics- “Noon at
ngayon, Liberal Marangal” and “Kung Walang Corrupt, Walang mahirap”
● Volunteers formed the muscles and LP Party formed the skeletal framework.
● Wake up call: The power of air war (media, commercials, other campaign materials)

Chapter 7: Ground War (Non-conventional)

● Volunteers used their own hard money in campaigning and supporting Noynoy. (Like
what Leni supporters did in 2022 National Elections)The team of Mar Roxas has 2 years
to prepare but the supporters of Noynoy managed it within two months. Such efforts of
groups and volunteers were worth it.
● Noynoy and Mar won in CARAGA region. The head of campaign is Chit Asis. Ariel and
Lynn Aguirre were leaders of Corvetsfor Noynoy in davao

House to house campaign

● Landslide win of Noynoy in Cavite campaign led by Dr Charles Yu
● Noynoy won in Albay. Dr Ofelia Samay Sy is the president of Pinoy Power Bicol Coalition
of Volunteers.
● LP chair for Bicol Naga Mayor Jesse Robredo

Mang Reynaldo: The Silent Volunteer

Chapter 8: Air War

● Interviews and press conferences were used during the campaign (para sa mga lugar na
hindi na nila kayang puntahan) (nakakatipid ang press cons dahil hindi na kailangan
mag transpo and magdala ng campaign materials)
● Chiz Escudero’s group has 150 radio stations access
The air war refers to maximum utilization of broadcast media, was a crucial component in their
campaign. “new media” was used as important tool for the air war. Engaging in social media
helps to build loyalty to youth and other audiences since the 98.1% of people watch videos in
the Internet.
● Commercials (a big help)
● Kung walang kurap, walang mahirap
● Daan matuwid o daang baluktot

Chapter 9 Family and Friends

Sisters read the speech of Noynoy in campaign rallies when he cannot make it.
● They helped to raise funds for his campaign
● They showed their 100% support in this campaign.
● Pinky was very hands on and he stuided the weakness and strengths in surveys.
● They took care of newspaper and magazine interviews, cover photoshoots and TV
guesting.

Classmates and Friends

● In February 7 2010, they raised a fund for his campaign
● Araw na dilaw
● Ilaw na dilaw is a hug success
● Lawyers for Noynoy became watchers and they trained the municipality watchers
● Cousins and Nieces
● Humanitarian and Volunteerism campaign
● Maria Montelibano and his husband were members of Gawad Kalinga
● Noynoy is not the change but he is the one who will bring the change.

"We wanted to promote the spirit of volunteerism to enhance youth awareness and participation
in the May elections through the use of the new media to reach everyone around the world,"
Bam said. The caravan, which was led by YOINOY and Pinoy Power, aimed at harnessing
people power and a sense of ownership among the youth volunteers, to demonstrate that "just
as it was the people who asked Sen. Noynoy Aquino to run for the president, it would be the
people who will ensure his victory on May 10, 2010."

Celebrity and Cory Veterans issued testimonies why they have been supporting Cory and
now Noynoy.
● Jun Factoran formed the Cory Veterans for Noynoy
● People wanted to help the campaign of noynoy ; People’s campaign
● Parc House was the nerve center of the campaign (where conventional and non
conventional meets)
● Gil Carolino saw that posting stickers and tying yellow ribbons as a dynamic effective
way of creating the bandwagon effect during the crucial period in the campaign.

Chapter 10 Victory
 ● 88% of adult filipinos had much trust and 4% with little trust
● The aquino brand garnered majority in the provinces of Tarlac, Albay, Batangas, Capiz,
Negros Occidental, Cebu, Bohol and cities of Bacolod, Cebu, and Iloilo.
● Good governance versus patronage message won in class ABCD but not in class E.
● Pnoy took his oath of office on June 30 at the Independence Grandstand in Rizal Park.

Challenges: devastated economy, empty government coffers, compromised institutions,

privileged political class in congress and senate and media (freedom than
responsibilities)
● Education as a central strategy
● Rebuilding economy for filipinos
● Pnoy should prioritize the poor because they mostly support Villar or Estrada (because
of patronage driven)
● First week of Pnoy attracts business and consumer confidence (investment growth)
which could unleash economic growth potential resulting in consistent annual growth
levels of 6% to 7%.
● Enduring economic and diplomatic relations with strategic partners.
● Foreign investments 2.4 billion dollars creating 43,600 new jobs.

People’s priorities according to the book- Top 3

1. Livelihood programs (agriculture 25%)
2. Job opportunities
3. Prices of basic commodities (lower price of medicine and health programs 25% )
Subparts
● eradicating corruption (25%)
● promoting affordable houses and house programs (21%)
● develop economy 18%
● build classrooms 16%
● women’s rights 10%
BOOK: MORAL POLITICS
Reviews of Moral Politics

1. Aries A. ARUGAY (UP Diliman)

● There are many studies about political mobilization and democratization in

post-authoritarian Philippines that have often painted the country as an exemplar
of democratic deepening and popular participation.
● Over time, this euphoric mood faded as the country’s democracy eroded despite
its supposedly robust and dynamic civil society. Kusaka’s study puts the
commitment of the country’s middle class and civil society under an ethnographic
microscope.
● Transcending the heavily interest-based academic literature on the subject, he
offers a new analytical framework that emphasized the role of moral politics, or a
politics between the “good” and “bad.”
● The book is a culmination of the author’s scholarly residence in the Philippines
for more than fifteen years. It is thick with narratives from his informants mostly
from the urban poor in Metro Manila but he also includes middle-class residents,
scholars, and members of civil society.
● This type of “investment” in time as well as effort to learn Filipino is rarely found
in foreign scholars given the relative ease of research access to the country.
● One can even say that the efforts of local scholars who often hail from the middle
and upper classes of Filipino society pale in comparison to Kusaka’s meticulous
and robust research design that combines ethnography, life history, and other
interpretive methods of inquiry often found in outstanding scholarship of urban
studies.

BOOK MAIN POINT:

● The book’s central research question delves on the ambiguous democratizing role of the
Filipino middle class and by extension, civil society.
● Kusaka exposes a quandary that was already being probed by Filipino scholars
particularly in the aftermath of the country’s “lost decade of democracy” from 2001 to
2010.
● During this highly contentious and polarizing episode, the country witnessed two popular
upheavals, undue military intervention in politics, and institutional crises.
● My own research on civil society coups and polarization was simultaneous with the
author’s study of urban politics in Metro Manila.
● Moving away from the naïve interpretation of civil society as a ballast for Philippine
democracy, Moral Politics argues that the contingent commitment of political elites, the
middle class, and civil society toward democracy must be viewed in the lens of either
moral unity or antagonism within what he called the civic sphere, the mass sphere, and
the frontier between them.
● Major episodes of political mobilization in the country like “people power” revolts are
moments of moral unity through a coalition of the members of the civic and mass
spheres united by their antagonism over immoral politicians.
● Apart from the introduction, the book has seven chapters that combine theoretical
discussions with rich data gathered for over a decade of ethnography in urban Metro
Manila as the locus of moral politics, whether in the slums of Quezon City or downtown
middle-class neighborhoods.
● The empirical backbone of the book are the three chapters that flesh out the moral
antagonism between the civic and mass spheres of Metro Manila in three thematic
areas: people power, elections, and urban governance. Rich in personal narratives and
iterative interviews conducted over time, Kusaka unveils the sentiments, opinions, and
logic of the urban poor that may surprise the reader who conventionally believes in the
stereotypical descriptions of the Filipino masses.
● The book’s findings are less informative to serious scholars of Philippine studies who
engage in either rigorous fieldwork or grounded studies traversing everyday politics in
the country. However, Kusaka’s deep dive into the intricacies of class-based antagonism
over the perennial questions of inequality, democracy, and political justice remains
relevant in today’s iteration of Philippine politics.
● The author himself recognized this in the book’s addendum that discusses Duterte’s
2016 electoral victory as president and how it potentially unleashed a new cycle of
morally antagonistic politics. There is little doubt that Kusaka’s study portends the bone
of political contention in current Philippine politics. Duterte’s moral crusade against illegal
drugs, terrorism, communism, and liberal democracy permeates both the country’s civic
and mass spheres. While the study sought to explain the ambiguity of the Filipino middle
class and civil society, the book ended as a probe into the personal narratives of the
country’s urban poor. Kusaka seemed to confound analytically distinct concepts in
political science such as civil society, social movements, middle class, elites, rich, and
poor.
● The reader, particularly with a more social science persuasion, will not get the neat
delineations often found in empirical studies. If the book’s central inquiry is about the
middle class, it did not reconcile this with its empirical data. From a theoretical point of
view, the Gramscian perspective of treating civil society as an arena of class conflict was
the appropriate choice, but is unoriginal given previous studies such as Hedman’s In the
Name of Civil Society (2005) that actually discusses middle class-based civil society in
the Philippines. Kusaka contended that Tocqueville’s civil society has not been helpful in
understanding of the poor’s relationship with Philippine democracy as intermediated by
civil society organizations. But between Tocqueville and Gramsci lie other theoretical
perspectives on civil society that the author fails to discuss.
● His treatment of Mouffe’s antagonistic democracy also was disjointed and did not
integrate it with Gramsci. Finally, the book’s research design does not offer a robust
validation of its arguments. The choice of the three thematic areas focuses on moral
antagonistic relations, but fails to specify whether they are expressions of moral
nationalism, civic inclusivism, civic exclusivism, or populism.
● Kusaka’s discussion of populism is also heavily simplistic despite the extant academic
literature on this subject. The populist leader as a moral entrepreneur goes beyond the
simple anti-rich antagonism especially give the recent rise of right-wing populism.
Despite these notes, Kusaka’s rich study about the urban poor in Metro Manila is the
standard for empirics in Philippine social science.
● While scholars might not have the time, resources, and tolerance to conduct a decade of
ethnography, they can adopt some of his reflectivist leanings, a sensitive and ethical
treatment of research subjects, and a commitment that does not necessarily treat
research with a cold balance sheet. Research is always for someone and for some
purpose.

2. Vincent Casil (Ateneo de Manila University)

● As Filipinos are in search for solutions to their nation’s problems of corruption, poverty,
inequality, and different forms of injustice, Kusaka’s Moral Politics in the Philippines:
Inequality, Democracy and the Urban Poor takes a step back from seeking remedies to
these problems and re-examines how these issues are commonly articulated. The book
investigates moral politics, a discursive framework, to come to terms with how citizens
form their understanding of social problems through their notions of good and evil.
● Under moral politics’ frame, citizens view their nation’s maladies as caused by morally
wrong actions done by an individual (e.g. public leader) or a group of people (e.g. street
vendors). By grasping how moral politics works, Kusaka’s text shows how it prevents
Filipinos from attaining significant social improvements. There are many notable themes
in Kusaka’s work, but this review highlights only two points: first, Kusaka’s examination
of how neoliberalism takes effect in the country, especially in view of the shaping of the
subjects, and second, his examination of how moral politics contributes or deters the
development of democracy in the Philippines by identifying how moral politics prevents
Filipinos from grasping the real issues.
● By emphasizing both insights, Kusaka not only shows how moral politics is formed but
also extends the argument by showing that this kind of politics has a profound effect on
the community. On the Production of the Neoliberal Subject Kusaka acknowledges that
his work on moral politics addresses issues on the development of concepts by the
middle class and civil society. Both groups take part in the civic sphere, which is one of
the contexts where he examines how moral politics works. In his book, he reaffirms the
claim that the middle class is a diverse group. People in this class have the capacity to
support various ideals and advocacies.
● Their spectrum could run from leftist NGO supporters to professional workers who hold
antagonistic views against the masses.1 In the same discussion, Kusaka highlights a
critical view of civil society. Contrary to previous studies that are focused on its
contribution to democracy, he points out problems of exclusivism in civil society.
● He highlights that even civil societies tend to subscribe to a “we/they” labeling as they
tag who are good or right citizens, excluding in effect those who do not fit their notion of
citizenry.2 More than what Kusaka has initially acknowledged as significant of his
research, his discussion of neoliberalism is also noteworthy. Kusaka’s work can be read
along with the recent work of Ortega’s Neoliberalizing Spaces in the Philippines:
 Suburbanization, Transnational Migration, and Dispossession, which is also a study on
the effects of neoliberalism in the country.
● However, while Ortega focuses on how peri-urban spaces create various forms of
alienation as they are transformed by the neoliberal notion of development,3 Kusaka
directs his attention to how the subjects and their moral politics are being shaped in view
of their distinct class experiences.
● Kusaka never denies that moral politics in the Philippines is a “direct reflection of [the]
worldwide rise of neoliberalism.” Noting such insight, Kusaka’s book also sets the ground
to examine the effects of neoliberalism to Filipino subjects. Hence, neoliberal production
of the subject is investigated in the Philippine setting, with its “substantive division of the
public sphere caused by class disparities in language, media, and living space.”
● The Philippines’ stratified society serves as the setting for the study of the influence of
market-driven subjectivity. If homo economicus (a self-entrepreneur) is the ideal
neoliberal subject promoted by the market, then Kusaka’s research poses the question
of the extent of this ideal’s influence in a society beset by wide class disparities, such as
the Philippines. His data shows that the values of homo economicus are only widely
accepted by the middle class rather than the masses. Middleclass Filipinos exhibit
self-entrepreneurship through the attitudes of independence, selfsufficiency, and hard
work to achieve economic success.
● They see themselves as self-reliant taxpayers who deserve good governance from their
politicians. These attitudes, however, are not as prominent if one is in the mass sphere.
The masses see nothing wrong with the attitudes of dependency, given their
impoverished condition.
● They are also more inclined to appeal for help and mutual assistance, which goes
against the ideals of independence and self-reliance. Kusaka demonstrates the
importance of class position to understand the effects of neoliberalism, and it should not
be dismissed merely because of its problematic conceptual baggage in the traditional
Marxist class theory. Certainly, Marxist class theory hardly captures the new forms of
labor in capitalist societies.
● The bourgeoisie and proletariat, whose identities are based on their relation to
production, are inadequate categories given the recent rise of new, Moral Politics in the
Philippines, (e.g. middle-class professionals and top-managers), where ownership of
production is an ambiguous basis for class distinction. Although this issue is a large
debate that requires further research, one can initially sense that Kusaka avoids this
issue, as his work’s distinction on dual public spheres can read as based on
socio-economic status and not under traditional Marxist class theory. Similar to many
social science literatures, Kusaka’s class division can be interpreted as grounded on
socio-economic status rather than the relation to production.
● Basing class on socioeconomic status refers to “economic position and educational
attainment,” which are more specified markers easily grasped by an individual.8 By
incorporating class condition in his analysis, Kusaka provides data to pose the question
on whether neoliberal ideals are completely embraced across all social classes. His data
debunks an acontextual employment of the concept of a neoliberal subject, which
 presupposes that all individuals under a capitalist society have succumbed to the ideals
of homo economicus.
● Results of Kusaka’s study further encourage empirically grounded studies on neoliberal
subjectivity. Using surveys and interviews of people from different social spheres,
Kusaka draws descriptions of their ideals and values as experienced from the ground.
This approach addresses the issue of the failure to verify how neoliberal ideals are being
adopted by the people.
● Kusaka’s method can consider the “success or failure” of neoliberal discourses; it could
supply significant facts to examine the efficacy of forms of subjectification, i.e. to verify
the assumption that neoliberal ideals are effectively internalized by the subject. On Moral
Politics and Democratic Ideals Kusaka’s study certainly provides conceptual and
empirical contributions on studies of neoliberalism and how it works in the Philippines.
● Aside from these issues, his work also offers pointers in addressing democratic and
social problems in the country. His book’s underlying goal is to advance the “ideal” of
democracy: an ideal that is not only a political system that provides “open competition for
political power” through election but more importantly, a realization of “socio economic
equality.”
● Such a task can be put forward if obstacles against democracy can be addressed and
resolved, and such an undertaking can be realized if one can first identify these
hindrances. Kusaka’s work on moral politics presents a subtle account of what prevents
the realization of the ideal of democracy and provides some suggestions on how it can
be advanced in the Philippines.
● Discussions on why the ideals of democracy are hardly realized usually look at
corruption and economic underdevelopment as its causes. While many Filipinos blame
corrupt government officials as the culprit, others view the socio-economic structure as
the problem.
● Leftist national democratic organizations, for instance, would cry slogans of feudalism,
bureaucrat-capitalism, and imperialism as the root causes of the Philippines’
impoverished condition. Instead of following these discourses on corruption and
economics, Kusaka shifts the discussion to moral politics as another issue that needs to
be addressed. This shift does not mean a complete rejection of corruption and economy
as factors that affect democracy; on the contrary, his discussion on moral politics
presents another context on how discourses on corruption and economic problems can
be investigated to depict their actual impact on the society.
● By noting how moral politics views social problems in terms of the notions of good and
evil, Kusaka describes the tendency of this politics to simplify issues, hindering an
in-depth understanding of what is really the cause and solution to the social
problems.This distracting effect of moral politics is one of the reasons why it prevents
people from addressing important democratic issues such as social inequality. As
Kusaka points out, issues on just distribution and social structure are hardly discussed,
since moral politics is confined within the moral issues of its people and their leaders. As
a case in point, Kusaka cited the 2010 presidential elections.
● Despite the Filipino people exhibiting moral solidarity against the corruption of Arroyo’s
administration, the victory of Aquino—who is still a member of the traditional
 elite—shows how moral politics still preserves elite democracy. Through the election’s
results, we see that this type of politics does not rectify the unequal social structure but
could even maintain the parochial interests of the elites.
● Another problematic consequence of moral politics to democracy hinted at by Kusaka is
how it can generate disunity between the social classes rather than advancing the
common good. As its discourse demarcates groups as good and evil or “we” or “them,” it
simultaneously produces exclusivism in their own social sphere, exacerbating the
antipathy between the masses and the middle class, and furthering the instability of
Philippine democracy. This gap between the masses and the middle class begins with
what Kusaka refers to as the two public spheres.
● The poor are in the mass sphere, while the middle-class is in the civic sphere. Each
sphere represents the “living environments and discursive spaces of the middle and
impoverished classes,” which is established by division in “language, education, media,
and livelihood gaps.”
● The disparity of the experiences of the two classes generates different and even
antagonistic moral politics that is detrimental to democracy. One of the cases Kusaka
cited is the antagonistic view of the masses and the middleclass during elections. While
the poor have no qualms in voting for populist leaders or of accepting bribes, people in
the civic sphere disapprove these acts.
● The middle class even denies the moral legitimacy of the poor, as they are viewed as
ignorant, susceptible to manipulation, and culpable for exacerbating Philippine
malaise.13 Kusaka sees the same gap in the issue of urban governance. Illegal vendors
and settlers are more prone to practice non-legal means for their survival challenges.
But the civic sphere would again view the masses differently. Because of their failure to
follow the laws, they are perceived as lacking discipline and order; even worse, they are
even seen “as an evil presence that threatens public safety and impedes modernization
of the city.”
Conclusion
● By taking note of the issues of neoliberalism and democracy, Kusaka locates the notion
of good and evil within their proper contexts. He articulates the effects of neolibearlism
on moral politics in view of the subjects’ class position. He even extends his study of
moral politics to its effect on the community, i.e. on how this kind of politics can be a
source of exclusivism and divisiveness among social classes. Kusaka presents a
realistic depiction of results to be expected if one pursues this liberal form of politics and
discourse.
● Results he described are not even about its unproductiveness but focus more on
detrimental effects on the community. Their class-based notion of right and wrong could
deter social change. Progressive and noble calls for justice, especially from the civic
sphere, could become an exclusivist discourse, worsening the antagonism of the
masses and middle class.
● Kusaka’s study implies that moral politics should not have a primary role in advancing
the ideals of democracy. How then can this politics take part in the democratic
discussion? Kusaka is not clear. What he evidently intends to pursue is interest politics,
as this form of politics could provide a possibility of agreement in the context of
 differences. Kusaka depicts this condition in terms of “agonism”: “an interdependent
antagonistic relationship in which opposing forces exhibit consideration and respect for
one another even as they continue to struggle.”
● How would this materialize? Kusaka admits that what he provides are only broad
prescriptions. Some of his suggestions include the avoidance of conclusive definitions of
right and wrong in order to oppose exclusivism. He also promotes mutual understanding
through the expansion of multiple “contact zones” to address the gap and
misrepresentations between the social classes.
● The intense and intimate contact of people from different social classes can dissolve
prejudices, disturb hierarchies, and destroy solid dichotomies to encourage fluidity of
interactions. Given that Kusaka only listed general prescriptions, this issue leads to more
challenges for both scholars and those who are involved in the practice of politics.
● There should be a clear articulation on how we are to achieve agreements amid
conflicting ideals. Without this, the demagogues, authoritarians, different pundits, and
unqualified experts would do the task for Filipinos.
● To start with, if there is a need to expand more “contact zones,” then it is important to
clear the issue regarding which of the social classes are capable and even responsible
to accomplish such a task? Should the masses climb up, or should the middle class
reach out? If the task at hand is to create mutual understanding among classes and
revive moral solidarity that was previously experienced during the first EDSA uprising,
who are in a position to sacrifice some of their comforts, extend their arms, and take
initiative to understand the other social classes?

Foreword:
● Sheds light to the polarized political landscape in the Philippines.
● Divide between good “us” and evil “them”
● Political relationships in the PH since 1986 to 2001
● Civil sphere (middle class)
● Mass sphere (urban poor)
● Moral politics refers to pro-poor and anti-oligarch narrative
● Duterte’s presidency develop debates on falsehood and truth, fanaticism and reason,
and democracy and authoritarianism.
● Middle class-reformist refers to reformist administration of President Benigno “Noynoy”
S. Aquino, III.
● Urban poor populist refers when there is extreme dichotomisation of “good people” and
criminalised “others” which can legitimate mass killings.
● Reformism involves direct media appeals and the claim "I will not steal from you." Two
other leading presidential candidates took a more "populist" stance, which also relies
more on the media than on clientelism but with the message "I will help you."
● Liberal reformist vs. Violent illiberalism.
● Middle class as agents of democratization.
● Books focus on interclass relations and its impact on democratization.

Politics of the poor

 ● The poor has critical view of Filipino society
● Protecting their homes from demolition
● Calculating alliances with NGOs
● Securing permits to earn livelihood on streets

The civic and mass sphere have conflicting and overlapping political views
● Both disdain elite politics, and want honesty and integrity
● However, middle class hates vote-buying; urban poor rationalize the practice.
● Different notion of ‘correctness’

PREFACE
State of Rebellion on Manila
● May 1, 2001
● The poor demonstrators besieged the presidential palace
● Four died, and 113 people were injured.
● We, Filipinos resisted harsh oppression and poverty for a freer and equal society.
● The civic sphere engaged in sophisticated discussion in English, within an airconditioned
room.
● The mass sphere spoke Tagalog about their desparate problems and difficult life in their
crowded slums and the streets.

Introduction
For a summation of research that analyzes democratization as a return to elite
democracy, see Quimpo.

According to Quimpo, theories of elite rule in the Philippines can be classified into three
categories. The first is “patron-client factional framework,” which focuses on the vertical
relationship between big landowners and the poor (Lande 1965; Agpalo 1972) and its
modernized versions (Machado 1971, 1974, among others). Second, “neocolonial or
dependency framework” focuses on collusion between the elite and the United States.
Proponents of this type of theory, which emerged during the Marcos era, include
Constantino (1978), who emphasizes the ongoing American domination of the
Philippines, and Hawes (1987), who highlights control of the state by the capitalist class.

Finally, after democratization, a “elite democracy or patrimonial framework” that focused

on the plundering of national resources by the elite evolved. It includes “rent capitalism”
(Hutchcroft 1998), in which the elite utilize “rent,” that is, the regulatory power of the
state over market competition, to amass capital; “bossism” (Sidel 1999), in which the
elite monopolizes state resources and employs violence and coercion to control the
masses; and the theory of “machine politics” (Kawanaka 2002), which efficiently
organizes the masses from above. For accounts of the historical development of elite
hegemony in the Philippines, see Simbulan (1965) and Anderson (1988).
3. “Class,” as I have used it here, refers not so much to productive relations as it does to
disparities in lifestyle, including education, language, accessed media, consumption
patterns, place of residence, and so on.

4. Words employed in the Philippines to rally together for the “nation” include the English
people and the Tagalog bayan (which can mean people, citizens, nation, homeland, or
hometown).

5. However, in a previous work, Huntington (1968), in noting that political participation

increased in developing countries in the late 1960s, argued that under an already fragile
political system, politics became increasingly destabilized due to the excessive demands
made by a middle class exploiting the weakening of traditional authority that
accompanied modernization.

6. For an account of the middle class that supported de-democratization in Thailand, see
Tamada (2008, 2014).

7. For representative sources, see Wui and Lopez (1997), Clarke (1998), Silliman and
Noble (1998: 13), Magadia (2003), and Serrano (2003). As Ferrer (1997a) and Serrano
(2003) point out, there are varying arguments and no consensus about the definition of
civil society in the Philippine as elsewhere. However, discussions of Philippine civil
society all share a paramount interest in the political participation of NGOs.

8. For example, NGOs have prioritized organizing the poor in places where there is a
strong potential for mass mobilization due to a high likelihood of large-scale forced
evictions (Pinches 2010: 303).

9. Granted, having been influenced by the theories of Freire (1968) on achieving social
equality through “interactive education,” members of Philippine NGOs pride themselves
on emphasizing dialogue with the poor. In practice, however, many mobilizations are led
by NGO strategies.

10. Laclau and Mouffe treat social phenomena as nonexistent outside of discourse. In
this book, however, I treat discursive space as coexistent with social space and attempt
to describe the relationship between discourses and social classes, social groups, social
structures and so on.

11. See Ross (1977). Recent rational-choice theory in particular introduces the viewpoint
that a preference for maximizing self-interest is not grounded in reality, and that an
actor’s identity and preferences are cultural constructs (Chai 1997; Torfing 2005: 4).

Constructivism critiques previous studies that treat institutions as externally formed and
static, introducing a perspective that analyzes the dynamic character of institutions
transformed by ideas and culture (Hay 2006; Schmidt 2008).
12. See Mercer (2002: 11) and Hedman (2005: 5).

13. Magadia (2003) also points out that an alliance of NGOs and people’s organizations
played an important role in the passage of three laws related to agrarian reform,
labor-management relations and urban land reform.

14. Although Hedman includes the US government in the dominant bloc, she describes it
as having lost much of its influence in the wake of democratization.

15. Kerkvliet (2005: 18) also supports Quimpo, declaring: “We need, I submit, to devote
more scholarly attention to understand the contested nature of democracy in the
Philippines”.

16. Linz and Stepan (1996: 7–8) also stress the importance to conceptualizations of civil
society of the role played by ordinary citizens, unaffiliated with organizations, when they
eventually do form large groups that transform power relations between the ruling
establishment and the opposition.

17. Whereas “slum” is a concept that connotes wretched living conditions, “squatters’
settlement” or “squat” connotes illegality vis-à-vis land ownership. In reality, however,
both entities frequently overlap, so I have not made any strict differentiation between
them.

18. Members of the impoverished classes tend to be hesitant to speak freely about
politics in front of recording equipment. By interviewing close friends and their
acquaintances, however, I was able to obtain relaxed responses.

19. I wish to thank Sandino Jose Manliclic, Galileo Garcia and Joseph dela Cruz
for handling the transcription of these tapes.

Chapter 1
1. Ileto (1999) criticizes elite democracy theory in terms of a critique of Orientalism,
arguing that American scholars have treated Philippine politics as a “negative other”
contrasted with the ideal of American democracy, predicated on a binary opposition of
“civilized citizens vs. uncivilized non-citizens.” While this book does address the negative
as well as positive aspects of Philippine politics, it shares Ileto’s perspective in critically
examining the effects of the “citizen vs. non-citizen” dichotomy.

2. See Constantino (1975) for an account of the formation of inequalities under Spanish
rule.
3. See Simbulan (1965) and Anderson (1988) for accounts of the formation of the
traditional elite.
4. See Constantino (1975).

5. One of the purposes of introducing an electoral system was to appease the elite and
cut it off from the national independence movement.

6. Abinales and Amoroso argue that antagonism and cooperation between social forces
and state leaders is the key perspective to understanding Philippine political history.

7. Another significant division in Philippine society is between Islam and Christianity. The
Muslim local elite secured their interests on the local level by joining in a clientelist
relationship with the Christian national elite, and did not seek to promote their religious
agenda on the national level. As a consequence, Muslim discontent manifested itself
outside the democratic system in the form of armed struggle.

8. The fact that the number or percentage of poor people is lower according
to government statistics than to the findings of surveys by private polling
organizations is attributed to the desire of the government to highlight the
positive results of its poverty measures (Berner 1997: 21–8).

9. Here, five social classes are identified according to the characteristics of

their residences (Bautista 2001: 1–2). A is the super-rich, primarily large
plantation owners and business tycoons. B is the wealthy class, which includes
government officials, successful doctors, lawyers and other professionals,
mid-level landowners and successful entrepreneurs. A and B residences use
quality building materials and are located in high-class subdivisions. C is the
middle class, whose residences are well maintained, contain quality furniture,
and tend to be located in subdivisions. D is the impoverished class,
with residences made of cheap materials and located in shabby, crowded
neighborhoods. Finally, E is the poorest class, with residences cobbled
together of makeshift materials and located in cramped quarters in the worst
areas of the urban slums.

10. Since many local and leftist NPOs do not register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and defunct organizations may remain registered, the
number of NPOs registered with the Commission provides a rough estimate
at best (Igarashi 2011: 280).

11. See Social Weather Stations (2007, April 16).

12. Sidel asserted that under the structural conditions of “primitive accumulation
of capital,” according to which resources are monopolized by the state, local
elites dominate the poor lacking resources of its own by gaining access to
these state resources through electoral positions. In response to this
argument, I pointed out that with the advance of economic globalization,
some local elites do not always depend upon state resources, and instead
reinforce their power base by recruiting private capital from Manila and
abroad (Kusaka 2013).

13. In most cases, candidates attempt to appeal to voters through simple images
suggesting that they will “oppose corruption” or “help the poor.” rather than
with specific economic policies promising redistribution or growth. This
may be due to the fact that anyone aspiring to the presidency would be hard
pressed to discard neoliberal economic policies in practice.

14. According to Kasuya (2008), prior to martial law, “presidential bandwagon”

behavior by candidates for the Senate or the House centered on the party
of the incumbent president. However, because the 1987 Constitution
prohibited presidential re-elections, the number of presidential candidates
with a chance of winning has grown, causing a dispersion of the bandwagon
effect and giving birth to a fluid multiparty system.

15. Parties that found their support base among the poor and called for social
and economic liberation, among them the Democratic Alliance and the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), were also formed. However, these
parties were outlawed and their members resorted to armed struggle, and
hence did not become part of the party system.

16. See Ateneo School of Governance and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2007).
17. As Kawanaka (2004) has noted, one of the structural conditions of the
post-democratization political process is that policies cannot be formed or
altered without a full consensus by three actors: the president, the Senate,
and the House. Antagonistic relations among these actors are defined by the
electoral system. The president and senators, who are elected by nationwide
constituencies, vie for support from the entire spectrum of society, while
members of the House, who are elected by local constituencies, are concerned
with funneling benefits to their home districts.

18. Fraser (1992: 125–6) evaluates the public sphere as an arena for the formation
and enactment of identities, and stresses the significance of the opportunity
to participate in the public sphere, speak in one’s own voice, and construct
and express one’s own cultural identity.

19. In his preface of the second edition of The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere, Habermas (1990), too, states that to prevent complete exclusion
from the civic sphere, it is important for marginalized social groups to form
their own “plebian public spheres,” which allows communication to be
practiced among multiple public spheres. However, he also views compromise
between civic and plebian spheres as possible and assumes that serious issues
of dominance, subordination or exclusion will not arise between them. The
preface of the second edition is not translated into English and I refer to the
Japanese translation.

20. Fraser (1992: 124) mentions the danger that social divisions may be
exacerbated through contestation among multiple public spheres, yet
optimistically argues that there is no long-term danger of this because
counter-publics possess the publicity to disseminate their own discourses in
order to gain support from outside.

21. There are also nationalists, albeit few in number, who use Tagalog for speech
and writing on abstract subjects.

22. Such criticism is often expressed in Tagalog by slang words like jologs, masa,
bakya, promdi and badoy. For definitions of these words see Garrido (2008:
449–52).

23. The mass sphere is characterized as a public sphere with its foundation in the
numerous intimate spheres.

24. The impression made on the listener varies depending on whether one
expresses a concept with a word derived from English, Spanish or a vernacular.
For example, the concept “teacher” may be expressed by the English teacher,
the English-derived titser, the Spanish maestro, or the Tagalog gulo. The
English word imparts an impression of urban sophistication; the Spanish,
that of a country hick. On the other hand, using Tagalog for a word such as
“teacher” that is normally expressed in English or Spanish sounds stuffy and
stridently nationalistic.

25. Other joking remarks include “I used up all my English” and “My English is
a water buffalo [i.e., very slow-paced].”

26. See Pinches (1996, 2010: 287–8). Behind the middle class’s aspirations of
modernity is national pride, manifested in the desire not to see the Philippines
fall even further behind other Asian countries that have achieved substantial
economic growth.

27. As Seki (2012) argues, the middle class is fearful of “falling,” i.e., losing social
status and the ability to secure its children’s future, under the current system.
Consequently, many members of the middle class feel deeply disillusioned by
Philippine politics, and have come to pin their hopes on emigration overseas.

28. See Pinches (1999), according to whom, ethnic-Chinese Filipinos have long
been dismissed with contempt as “money-grubbing penny-pinchers.” At least
in the civic sphere, however, the entrepreneurial ethos of ethnic-Chinese
Filipinos has recently come to be praised as contributing to Philippine growth.
Notes to pp. 40–43 275

29. Moral economy has also served to legitimize clientelism as a means by which
people of high social status guarantee the survival of those of low social
Status.

30. For example, education, well-built housing, sanitation and regular incomes
have also become elements of the demand for a right to a decent livelihood
(Kerkvliet 1990: 265–73).

31. For example, in poor rural or urban areas, it is common to observe such
situations in which poorer people ask a help for wealthier relatives or neighbors
appealing morality of mutual help but such request meet with a bitter remark
based on the idea that attributes the needy circumstance to the lack of selfreliance and
entrepreneurship.

32. In the mass sphere, one often hears people relate such personal experiences as
“Rich people never greet you when you pass them on the street” and “When
I went shopping, I was treated like a thief.”

33. Hollnsteiner (1970) posited that “shame” is something one is made conscious
of in the context of being unable to repay a favor bestowed, and that it sustains
the attitude and practice of repaying favors. However, as Pinches points out,
this understanding of shame is not appropriate in ignoring its function as an
impetus for resistance.

34. They are extremely sensitive to the way in which they are viewed by those
with high social status. As a foreigner living in a squatters’ settlement, I took
the utmost care to ensure I would not be considered “arrogant” (mayaban).

35. See Pinches (1991, 1992). For the poor, the worst type of humiliation is to
be treated not as a human equal, but like a “beast” (hayop), particularly by
those of high social status. This arouses intense anger. Conversely, the insult
“You’re a beast” (hayop ka) serves as a forceful expression of objection to
someone who denies the dignity of another.

36. Objects of intense empathy of this sort include Jose Rizal, who was executed
by the Spanish colonial government, Benigno Aquino Jr., who was assassinated
under the Marcos regime, and Flor Contemplacion, a housemaid working
overseas who, despite indications that the charges against her were false, was
executed in Singapore.
37. See Scott (1985) and Kerkvliet (1990) for discussions of the moral politics
of landowners and tenants in rural villages.

38. The concept of the contact zone was introduced by Pratt (1992) in her
rejection of the view of colonial rule as unilaterally dominating its periphery.
According to Pratt (ibid: 7–8), contact zone is “social spaces where disparate
cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical
relations of domination and subordination” or “the space in which peoples
geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other
and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion,
radical inequality, and intractable conflict.” Furthermore, “it invokes the space
and time where subjects previously separated by geography and history are co-present,
the point at which their trajectories now intersect. . . . A ‘contact’ perspective emphasizes
how subjects get constituted in and by their relations to each other.”

39. This book focuses on social movements as a representative of contact zone

because they have the most significant influence on the political process. In
fact, however, there is a broader diversity of deliberative practices taking place
in contact zones. For example, the taxis that ply the streets of Manila serve
as spaces where drivers from the impoverished class and passengers from the
middle class frequently engage in political discussions. Another example is
that, as I have argued elsewhere (Kusaka 2012), overseas Filipino workers in
Japan have fostered a new sense of intimate community through their daily
encounters and a practice of mutual help with people of other classes who
they would not have the opportunity to meet at home.

40. See Spivak (1988).

41. For example, Japan’s former Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi enjoyed
high approval ratings when he constructed a pro-reform “we” by criticizing
bureaucrats as “obstructive forces” who clung to their vested interests. Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe also garnered support during his first cabinet when he
promoted a “we Japanese” identity by taking a hardline stance against North
Korea.

42. According to Butler (1990), “subjection” by “interpellation” does not necessarily

succeed in creating a “subordinate subject,” and may instead give birth to
an agent with the power, however unstable, to speak out at the same time.
The interpellated subject is not unilaterally implanted with an identity that
fully conforms to the ruling hegemony, but retains the counter-hegemony to
negotiate with it.

43. Connolly (1991) criticizes fixed identities as suppressing the abundance of

human life and inviting the subordination or exclusion of the self or the
other. He further argues that living with contingency and “conflicts” in
identity generates agonistic respect—in other words, struggle with opponents
accompanied by respect. Recognizing that the opponent’s identity is also
characterized by contingency and conflicts makes it possible to respect them
and, the thinking goes, to construct a mutually dependent agonism in which
individuals interact with, resist and challenge their opponents while maintaining
that sense of respect.

44. According to Dryzek (2010: 15), “[m]eta-consensus can refer to agreement

on the legitimacy of contested values, on the validity of disputed judgments,
on the acceptability and structure of competing preferences, and on the
applicability of contested discourses.”

45. If we broadly define populism as politics based on antagonistic “we/they”

relations, then the four hegemonic discursive practices described in this book
could all be said to be variants of populism. To avoid confusion, however,
I will employ the concept of populism in the limited sense described here.
Notes to pp. 46–52 277

46. The civic sphere is dominated by a ternary antagonism among “the elite,”
“the citizenry” or the middle class, and “the masses,” while the mass sphere is
dominated by a binary antagonism between “the rich” and “the poor.” Moral
nationalism attempts to create a common enemy by encouraging antagonism
toward “the elite” in the civic sphere and toward “the rich” in the mass sphere,
thereby constructing the “people” that transcends class lines.

47. In this book, I adopt the discursive approaches of Laclau and Canovan
on populism. Laclau (1977: 172–3) states that “populism consists in the
presentation of popular-democratic interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic
complex with respect to the dominant ideology.” More forthrightly, he defines
populism as none other than a construction of “the people” based on a
chain of “equivalence” made of “empty signifiers” (Laclau 2005). According
to Canovan (1993: 3), “populism is “an appeal to ‘the people’ against both
the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the
Society.”

48. The concept of “the masses” as it applies to the mass sphere refers to the
poor people that make up the majority of the population; however, due to
its usage in the Communist movement, the term also has a confrontational
image. On the other hand, terms describing objects of mass enmity include
“big people” (malalaking tao), “bourgeois” (burgis), “elites” (elitista) and so
on. To keep terms simple in this book, I have used “the rich” (mayayaman)
as shorthand for all of these concepts.
49. Although communism is also an important hegemonic practice, I have not
addressed it in this book because there has been a noticeable decline in
the importance of its pure discourse. While the Communist Party of the
Philippines continued armed struggle after democratization, it allegedly also
founded legal party-list groups such as Bayan Muna, and NGOs under their
umbrella employ a discourse resembling civic inclusivism as they organize the
poor and place their priority on parliamentary struggle.
50. I did not consider the unlikely scenarios that civic exclusivism would colonize
the mass sphere or that populism would establish hegemony in the civic sphere.

Chapter 2
1. See Abinales and Amoroso (2005: 92–4).

2. See Agoncillo (1990: 93). The Philippine experience was different from that
of Mexico and other colonies in Latin America, where Spanish became the
lingua franca due to the large number of immigrants arriving from Spain and
their intermarriage with indigenous peoples. One reason for this difference was
that the greater distance from Spain and the relative lack of resources made
it infeasible for Spain to send large numbers of administrators and military
personnel to the Philippines.

3. As summarized by Rafael (2000: 21), quoting the Report of the Philippine

Commission (vol. 1, pp. 3–4), “benevolent assimilation” was motivated by the
278 Notes to pp. 52–56 rhetoric of “win[ning] the confidence, respect and affection of the
colonized,” according to which, “colonization entailed the cultivation of the ‘felicity and
perfection of the Philippine people’ through ‘uninterrupted devotion’ to those ‘noble
ideals which constitute the higher civilization of mankind.’”

4. Initially, American troops serving in the Philippine-American War who had

teaching credentials were enlisted to work as teachers in the Philippines. In
1901, 540 American teachers arrived in Manila aboard the USS Thomas. The
following year, their numbers were augmented, until a total of 1,074 Americans
were teaching in the Philippines.

5. Some 500 students went to the United States under a US governmentsponsored

scholarship program that lasted from 1903 to 1910. From 1910
to 1938, another 14,000 students went to the US under private funding.

6. See Constantino (1966) for a vigorous critique of English-language education,

which he argues caused Filipinos to lose the nationalist desire for independence,
uprooted them from their native culture, deprived them of the opportunity
for creative thinking in their vernacular language, and led them to tolerate
economic exploitation by other countries.
7. See Sibayan and Gonzalez (1996: 139).

8. See Uchiyama (2000) for an account of the discussion over national language
in the Constitutional Convention.

9. The Japanese government banned the use of English and approved Japanese
and Tagalog as official languages. It also adopted Tagalog as the language for
education other than in Japanese language classes, and encouraged the use of
Tagalog by government agencies.

10. One measure adopted to improve bilingual education is the experimental use
of “lingua franca education,” which incorporates the use of local common
languages into regional curriculums. However, this approach faces problems
such as a lack of instructors and materials.

11. According to Tupas (2007), those assigning priority to English asserted that
students’ English skills were on the decline, that Filipino workers needed to
be more competitive in the global labor market, and that Filipinos could
become nationalists without speaking the Filipino language. In fact, most
Filipinos do not strongly identify learning Filipino with nationalism, and
believe that one can fully identify as a Filipino without using the language.
Meanwhile, those assigning priority to Filipino asserted that failure to
do so was a violation of the 1987 Constitution’s stipulation of Filipino
as a primary “language of instruction in the educational system,” that
English was already being used in the classroom and did not need to be restipulated as
a language of education, and that people who had thoroughly
mastered a first language would find it easy to master a second. Bernardo
(2007: 14–9) criticizes this either-or “English vs. Filipino” dispute as overly
simplistic and advocates the active introduction of “Taglish,” a mix of the
two languages.
Notes to pp. 57–59 279

12. See Sibayan and Gonzalez (1996), Kobari (1999), and Nical, Smolicz and
Secombe (2004).

13. Sibayan and Gonzalez (1996: 163) classify Philippine English into
the following five categories: (1) English by individuals who are barely
literate; (2) English by overseas contract workers; (3) English by white-collar
workers; (4) English by the wealthy and middle classes; and (5) English
by intellectuals. Categories (1) through (3) constitute the vast majority of
the total.

14. From the Philippine Statistical Year Book for various years. In the 2000s, the
Philippine literacy rate and the primary education enrollment rate were both
about 95 per cent, and the secondary education enrollment rate was about
65 per cent; these are not considered to be low rates.

15. English is the primary language of instruction and research in higher education,
with the exception of a few fields such as Philippine literature. Nearly all
high-level intellectual activities rely on English.

16. Even those born into poor families can improve their social status by going
overseas to work. Educational background, however, is an important factor in
getting contract work abroad, with six out of ten overseas contract workers
having at least some university education (Suzuki 2007: 22).

17. For similar arguments, see Tollefson (1991), Sibayan and Gonzalez (1996),
and Hau and Tinio (2003).

18. According to Lippmann (1922), human beings are incapable of recognizing

complex real environments, but do recognize the “pseudo-environments”
created by the media and act accordingly. The information transmitted by
the media does not directly control people’s thoughts and actions, as the
erstwhile “bullet theory” would have it. Rather than rely entirely upon the
media, people form political views based on their own personal experiences
and exchanges of information through interpersonal networks, sometimes
adopting a critical interpretation of the media.

19. The “alternative press” as described here is the equivalent of a “watchdog”

that guards the interests of the general public against the powerful, while the
“dominant press” is equivalent to a “lapdog” of the powerful. See Frago (2006)
for a table that lists major print media since the Spanish colonial period based
on Teodoro’s categories.

20. See Rosario-Braid and Tuazon (1999: 294–5) and Ables (2003: 3–15) for
accounts of the media under Spanish rule.

21. An example would be Kalayaan, the newspaper of the secret society Katipunan.
For discussions of the discourses of revolutionary leaders of lower-class origin,
see, Ileto (1979: 75–114) and Ables (2003: 16–22).

22. See Coronel (1999: 7). To attract as many readers as possible, newspapers in
the 1920s often used a combination of Spanish, English, Tagalog and other
indigenous languages.

23. One underlying factor was that, for their international news coverage, these
media depended almost entirely on American wire services or the US Information
Agency, which provided information free of charge (Abaya 1968).
24. See Ofreneo (1984: 22–4, 41–52, 64–9).
25. See Frago (2006: 170–1) and Ofreneo (1984: 25).
26. See Ofreneo (1984: 73–5, 113–5).

27. One objective of the family-owned business groups in owning media was “rent
seeking” through which they influence trade and economic policies and other
business-regulating powers of the state to their advantage. Competition among
these groups was clearly reflected in editorials by the media they owned.

28. In 1968, newspapers published in Manila were four to six times more expensive
than those published in New York, even after taking price differentials into
account, and the average Filipino had to work for 20 to 22 days to earn
enough to buy one (Chowdhury 1968).

29. Articles in English-language newspapers were mostly written by journalists

who had received US-oriented education and training and could not write
in a native language (Ofreneo 1984: 133, 203).

30. In 1967, Metro Manila comprised about one-eighth of the nation’s population,
but consumed two-thirds of all newspapers and magazines published in the
Philippines. Whereas 11 newspapers and magazines per 100 people were
distributed in Metro Manila and environs, the ratio was only one per 1,000
people in rural areas (Abaya 1968). Also, the great majority of regional
newspapers were written in English or in a mixture of English and native
languages, a clear indication that they were only circulated among the local
elite (Ofreneo 1984: 129–33). The most successful of the native-language
magazines was the Tagalog weekly Liwayway, which was published by the
Roces family. The circulation of Liwayway grew from 20,000 in 1930 to
85,000 in the 1950s (Ables 2003: 26; Ofreneo 1984: 58–60).

31. See Robles and Tuazon (2007: 240–8).

32. See Rosario-Braid and Tuazon (1999: 301).

33. According to Coronel (1999), a relaxation of obstacles to citizenship and the

abolition of laws restricting certain economic activities to Filipinos paved the
way for the attainment of social legitimacy by ethnic-Chinese entrepreneurs,
who acquired newspapers in hopes of influencing politics.

34. According to Coronel (1999: 10–13), the Manila Bulletin represents the most
salient example of owner intervention; it is characterized by conservative
content that prioritizes relations with the administration in power at any
given time. Meanwhile, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, which originally earned
popularity as an anti-Marcos newspaper, is the most independent from the
government due to the editors’ adamant rejection of owner intervention, as well
as recognition by the executive team that the newspaper’s critical stance toward
the government contributes to sales. The Philippine Star avoids criticizing either
business or government and tends to support the interests of the ethnic-Chinese
entrepreneur Lucio Tan, said to be an indirect shareholder in the paper.

35. See D. Smith (2000: 121–2). As of 2002, English-language newspapers cost

15 pesos, while most tabloids cost 5 pesos.

36. Radio stations also continue to proliferate, growing from 539 stations in 1998
to 695 in 2005 (Robles and Tuazon 2007: 252).

37. After democratization, GMA began broadcasting talk shows in English that
hosted serious discussions on political and social problems. However, because
ABS-CBN’s Tagalog news programs had seized such a large viewer share,
GMA also switched to mass-oriented Tagalog programming (Rimban 1999:

50). Since self-production is far more costly than the purchase of syndicated
foreign programs, not all TV stations are capable of producing their own
Programming.

38. In February 2006, an incident occurred in which 30,000 poor people

waiting to appear on the first-anniversary show of Wowowee were crushed or
trampled in a stampede, leaving 78 dead and over 400 seriously or slightly
Injured.

39. ABS-CBN intentionally arranges for the participation of the poor in its
programs. One executive said in an interview, “Everybody wanted to speak
out, to be heard. Pagkakataon nang magsalita (It was time to talk) and feel
free.” (quoted in Rimban 1999: 49).

40. Legazpi initially sought to establish Cebu or Panay as the center of colonial
government, but ultimately chose Manila due to its vitality as a commercial
Hub.

41. The designated arrabales were Binondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, San Miguel,
Sanpaloc, Tondo, Paco de Dilao, and Ermita.

42. Burnham was a leading architect of the “City Beautiful Movement,” part of
the urban renewal trend that gained prestige in the US in the latter half of
the 19th century. He was active in developing plans for Chicago, Washington
and other cities.

43. In 1950, this commission was reorganized as the National Planning Commission
to take on regional development projects.

44. In 1972, the Metropolitan Mayors Coordinating Committee was established to

foster cooperation among local governments in dealing with urban problems
such as crime, traffic, flooding, fires and water shortages. However, this
effort failed to yield substantial results due to local government disputes over
jurisdiction and financial resources (Caoili 1988: 127–9).

45. One impetus for this move was the 1974 integration of local police departments
into a Metropolitan Police Force, which proved effective in improving public
safety and made the case for an integrated administrative structure more
persuasive (Caoili 1988: 142–52).

46. From 1960 to 1970, Manila’s population grew at an extremely high rate of
4.8 per cent. An annual natural increase of 100,000 was augmented by a
comparable number of migrants. Between 1960 and 2007, the population
of Manila grew from 2,462,488 to 11,553,427.
282 Notes to pp. 72–78

47. The formal sector of the city consists of the public sector and economic entities
that have established themselves as modern businesses. The informal sector,
broadly defined, consists of everything else.

48. See Culibao (1997). Bhowmik (2005: 2260) roughly estimates that there are
approximately 50,000 street vendors in Metro Manila.

49. Economic liberalization has been accompanied by a shift from regular to

contract employment that lasts for periods of six months or less. Because
most contract workers find their jobs through employment agents, they must
pay 10 to 15 per cent of their wages to the agent, reducing their income to
minimum-wage levels. The result is more low-level formal sector work for low
wages and under bad working conditions, with the distinction between that
and informal-sector work increasingly ambiguous.

50. See Velasco (2006: 112–3) for a description of this process.

51. For example, the Ayala Group contracted to build MRT-3, an elevated rail
line running through Makati along the EDSA highway.

52. For a description of the government’s policy toward squatters, see Karaos
(1993, 1995).
53. For the Miss Universe Pageant in 1974, 100,000 people were forcibly evicted;
for the IMF/World Bank annual meeting in 1976, 60,000 were evicted. In a
“Last Campaign” against squatters in 1982, 46,000 households were forcibly
relocated to Payatas, Quezon City and Bagong Silang, Caloocan City.
54. See Karaos (1993, 1995) for an account of the activities of ZOTO.
55. See Karaos et al. (1995) and Magadia (2003) for descriptions of the process
by which this was accomplished.

56. See Shatkin (2004: 2480). Problems associated with this program included
difficulty acquiring sites due to soaring land prices, problems finding sites for
relocation, difficulties in organizing residents, delays in repayment by peoples’
organizations, and opposition to the program by local governments (Berner
2000: 562).

57. Shatkin (2004) argues that under the influence of neoliberalism, which treats
the city as a space for maximizing profits through the circulation of capital
rather than as a space for residents, politicians and bureaucrats are intentionally
“forgetting” about the housing problems of squatters.

58. The name “Philcoa” is an acronym for the nearby Philippine Coconut Authority.

59. See Barangay Operations Center, Quezon City (n.d.), “Barangay Profile: Old
Capitol Site.”

60. In the 1980s, there were frequent conflicts between migrants from the Ilocos
region and those from the island of Samar, but inter-ethnic antagonism of this
sort has gradually subsided. With each succeeding generation in the slums,
intermarriage and ritual kinship expand networks of trust that supersede ethnic
Origins.

61. A peoples’ organization, the Barangay Old Capitol Site Neighborhood

Association, Inc. (BOCSNAI), was formed in Pechayan in 2003 with the
Notes to pp. 78–84 283
support of a church-related NGO, the Claret Urban Poor Apostolate (CUPA).
However, few residents are aware of the existence of the organization, and its
activities are far from conspicuous.

62. According to a 2008 survey conducted by the private market research firm
Synovate, newspaper circulations were 660,221 for the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 570,559 for the Philippine Star, and 518,184 for Manila Bulletin.
See Philippine Daily Inquirer (May 30, 2008).

Chapter 3
1. For accounts of People Power 1, see Lane (1990), Thompson (1995), and
Franco (2000: 199–254). For accounts of People Power 2 and 3, see Doronila
(2001), Doronila ed. (2001), Lande (2001) and Hedman (2005: 167–86).

2. Marcos stood out among politicians with his resume as someone who was not
from the traditional landowning elite, but rather, was a part of the new elite
who participated in guerrilla activities during World War II and obtained a
higher education after the war, as well as scoring at the top of the national
bar examination.

3. For descriptions of the process by which the authoritarian Marcos regime

collapsed and was succeeded by democratization, see Fujiwara (1988) and
Thompson (1995). There are also numerous accounts by journalists, as in M.
Mercado, ed. (1986).

4. Among the factors that enabled Marcos to declare martial law were his control
of the armed forces, which he had dramatically expanded while stacking the
command with associates from his home province, and the tacit approval of
the United States, which was concerned with containing Communism as part
of the Cold War and protecting its economic interests.

5. Business circles welcomed martial law because it gave them the opportunity
to freely bring in foreign capital without interference by the legislature, while
the middle class supported Marcos’s slogans of “national development” and
“economic development” (Fujiwara 1988: 50–5).

6. Marcos did in fact achieve successes in land reform and nationwide improvement
of the infrastructure. His objectives in land reform were to deprive rival elites
of their power base and to nip communism in the bud. However, landowners
employed various tactics to impede the implementation of land reform.
Meanwhile, many peasants who acquired land went into debt purchasing the
large quantities of fertilizer and pesticides required to grow high-yield varieties
of rice and had to relinquish their land. Moreover, this reform applied only
to cropland for rice and corn, not to the sugarcane and coconut plantations
owned by business cronies of Marcos.

7. The economic collapse occurred because Marcos not only lavished special
business privileges on his cronies, but also raided the national treasury to
cover their losses. Another contributing factor to the deterioration of public
finances was the continuous spending of huge sums of money on unproductive
284 Notes to pp. 84–89 public works projects by the Ministry of Human Settlements and
the Metro Manila Commission headed by Imelda Marcos.

8. As Fujiwara (1988: 48–56) points out, the CPP, which had engaged in struggle
against the dictatorship from the outset, had won over students and workers
in the cities and was expanding liberated zones in rural areas through armed
struggle. Non-communist social movements were also pursuing activities
aimed at restoring elections and a parliamentary system. After the second
oil crisis of 1979, the business community also began to raise objections to
the favorable treatment received by Marcos’s business cronies. When Marcos
reinstituted the legislature in 1978 in an effort to legitimize his regime both
domestically and abroad, the elite demanded the powers they had enjoyed
before martial law.

9. This indicates that the urban middle class led the protests. There were also
leftist-led demonstrations around the Mendiola Bridge near Malacañang
Palace.

10. Yellow became the symbolic color of the Aquino family in reference to the
American hit song Tie a Yellow Ribbon. In the song, a man released from
prison after many years is returning home, but first writes to his wife to ask
her to let him know if she is still waiting for him by tying a yellow ribbon
around “the old oak tree.” For the first year after her husband’s assassination,
Corazon Aquino wore black mourning clothes, but during the subsequent
election campaign she always wore yellow to symbolize her love for and fidelity
to her husband.

11. NAMFREL is a group that was organized by church and business leaders and
the US government to ensure the victory of Ramon Magsaysay in the 1953
presidential election over incumbent President Elpidio Quirino and to defeat
the Hukbalahap Rebellion (Hedman 2005: 44–87). It then went dormant
for some time, but was reorganized with the reinstitution of congressional
elections in 1984 by the business community and the church, which viewed
Marcos’s abuse of power and the rapid advance of the CPP as threats to be
addressed through “free and fair elections” (Ibid.: 88–115).

12. The Catholic Church had adopted an ambiguous position of “critical

collaboration” with the Marcos regime. Behind this stance was a schism over
what direction to take in response to calls for reform of the church’s role in
Philippine society in accordance with the Second Vatican Council of 1962–5.
Under the leadership of Cardinal Sin in the wake of the Aquino assassination,
moderates consolidated their power at the expense of radicals and pushed for
a policy of moderate reform that was both anti-Communist and anti-Marcos
(Miyawaki 2005: 29–31).

13. However, Brillantes (1992) notes that not all residents of the impoverished
Smokey Mountain district participated enthusiastically in People Power. This
disparity may originate in the difference between those who took to the streets
out of curiosity or because they were swept up in the festive atmosphere, and those who
stayed home because they feared for their own safety or could not afford the transport
cost.

14. For example, in campaign leaflets distributed by the Aquino campaign, Benigno
Aquino and residents of the squats were held in the same light as martyrs
killed by the Marcos regime (Pinches 1991: 184).

15. Fujiwara (1988: 69–72) posits that while People Power represented the formation
of a community of “civil society” or “the people” (bayan) that transcended
previous political forces, it simultaneously concealed class antagonisms.
Shimizu (1991: 217–8) further argues that the Catholic narrative made
possible a movement that swept up the poor as well as the middle class,
but paradoxically also made that movement politically flimsy. Citing field
research at the Luisita plantation and the memories inscribed in the
monument of People Power, Claudio (2013) substantiates his thesis that the
People Power narrative obscured class politics and exacerbated elite rule. In
contrast, Igarashi (2011: 126–201) asserts that a counter-hegemony formed
by “cause-oriented groups” during the democratization process exercised
a certain degree of influence on democratic institutions, and therefore that
democratization did not end up reflecting the inclinations of ruling class
conservatives exclusively.

16. Tolentino points out that in Estrada’s movies, “the masses do not speak or
they speak only in unison.”

17. “Erap” spelled backwards is pare, a term of familiarity meaning “buddy” or

“Pal.”

18. Estrada’s father was an engineer who graduated from the University of the
Philippines and had studied for a time in the US. His mother was a pianist
who once won a beauty contest. All nine of his siblings graduated from
University.

19. According to a biography of Estrada, he was expelled from Ateneo de Manila

High School for getting in a fight to protect a Filipino friend who was being
bullied by an American exchange student (Crisostomo 1999: 74–5). Tolentino
(2010: 75) suggests that this anecdote represents Estrada as a hero who sacrificed
his opportunity for higher education in order to defend Filipino honor.
20. In 1939, the Philippines was already fifth in the world in movie production
(Rosario-Braid and Tuazon 1999: 294). In the 1960s, increased advertising
revenues further invigorated the film industry, and even the poor flocked to
cinemas to see Tagalog films.

21. Quiapo, the scene of the story, is a working-class commercial district that
developed around the Quiapo Church. It is crowded with street vendors and
shoppers, and the air is full of the odors of fresh produce, human bodies,
sweat and raw garbage.
22. Quoted from a magazine of the period by Hedman (2001: 30).
23. Folklore regarding social bandits is not a product of tradition, but rather of
such modern upheavals as nation-state formation, colonialism and the expansion of
capitalism. The tale of the liberation of the mythological hero Bernardo
Caprio from his bonds had a significant impact on the worldview of people
who committed themselves to the Philippine Revolution (Ileto 1998: 1–27).
Makario Sakay, who was active in the Philippine Revolution and continued
to fight as a guerrilla against the Americans, was also viewed as a social
bandit (Ileto 1979: 161–208). In the chaotic period following World War II,
Nardong Putik (real name: Leonardo Manecio) survived frequent ambushes by
the police and US forces and was worshiped as a hero by farmers in Cavite
(Gealogo 2000). The movie actor Ramon Revilla Sr. played the role in 1972
and 1984 in two films titled Nardong Putik, and the appeal of his “bandit”
image helped him win election to the Senate in 1992.

24. Hedman (2001) also introduces Diligin Mo ng Hamog ang Uhaw na Lupa
(“Water the Thirsty Earth with Dew”), screened in 1975 while martial law
was in effect, in which Estrada played David, a savior of poor farmers. A
landowner who plans to develop the farmland into subdivisions orders his
private army to kill the leader of the protesting farmers. David becomes
their new leader, resisting the landowner’s harassment while leading the
impoverished farmers to new land. At the same time, David does not condone
the revolutionary guerrillas led by his older brother, but instead seeks land
reform through negotiation with the government. Tolentino (2010: 76–8)
suggests that the film is a form of collusion with the Marcos regime, which
professed to save the peasantry through land reform while cracking down on
Communism.

25. For accounts of the Estrada presidential campaign, see Crisostomo (1999:
174–208), Laquian and Laquian (1998: 83–184), and Salazar (2006:
145–58).

26. This campaign afforded young people the opportunity to view Estrada’s films
with people of their parents’ generation (Bautista 2001). Spearheading the
effort was Horacio Morales, who had launched the anti-Marcos movement as
a leader of the CPP-affiliated National Democratic Front (NDF), and after
democratization, headed the NGO Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement.
Other leftist/nationalist intellectuals such as Francisco Nemenzo and Randy
David also supported Estrada because they viewed him as a means of breaking
away from elite rule.

27. See the Philippine Star (1998, May 30) and Almario (1998, June 15).

28. According to exit polls by SWS, 48 per cent of the poorest class (E) and
38 per cent of the poor class (D) voted for Estrada (Mangahas 1998: 124;
Bautista 2001: 4).

29. Government of the Philippines Official Gazette, “Inaugural Address of

President Estrada (English Translation), June 30, 1998.” For the original
Tagalog version, see Government of the Philippines Official Gazette, “Inaugural
Address of President Estrada, June 30, 1998.” and Malaya and Malaya (2004:
283–95).

30. Not only in the Philippines, but also elsewhere, populism since 2000s has
diverged from the 1960s Latin American experience in its affinity for economic
liberalism over distributive policy (Weyland 2003).

31. For detailed accounts of the inner workings of the Estrada administration,
see Doronila (2001: 27–46) and Constantino-David (2001).

32. Singson was a member of the provincial elite with a reputation for shady
connections to the underworld. His explosive allegations are thought to have
been prompted by a falling out with Estrada over the distribution of profits
from jueteng.

33. See Social Weather Stations (1999). During the same period, support for
Estrada also fell from 27 per cent to 5 per cent among the poor (class D),
and from 43 per cent to 18 per cent among the very poor (class E); however,
his approval ratings still remained higher than his disapproval ratings.

34. In 1992, the CPP split into two factions: the “Re-Affirmed” (RA) faction,
which reaffirmed its commitment to the path of revolution and the
“Rejected” (RJ) faction, which rejected traditional Maoism and instead
prioritized parliamentary struggle. The RA faction continues to call itself the
Communist Party, with Bayan Muna participating in legislative politics as
its alleged legal arm. Sanlakas and Akbayan constitute the RJ faction. For a
discussion of Bayan Muna’s position regarding calls for Estrada’s resignation,
see Casino (2001). For a discussion of the stance of the business community,
see Luz (2001).

35. Behind the efforts to oust Estrada in the House of Representatives was
resistance to Estrada’s attempt to abolish “pork-barrel” budget allocations by
the representatives.

36. According to surveys by SWS, 47 per cent of those polled nationwide said
they followed the impeachment trial “all of the time” and 40 per cent “some
of the time.” In Manila, a total of 98 per cent followed the trials (Bautista
2001: 11–3).
37. Pro-Estrada Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta was caught by TV cameras dancing
for joy in the Senate chambers, earning her the derisive nickname “dancing
queen” in the civic sphere.

38. The EDSA Shrine and its statue of “Mary, Queen of Peace” were erected
on EDSA in the Ortigas district of Manila by the Catholic Church to
commemorate the triumph of People Power 1. The shrine subsequently
came to be viewed as a symbolic space bestowing moral legitimacy on antigovernment
demonstrations.

39. See Velasco (2004) for a description of the activities of Kompil II.
40. Arugay seems to treat “civil society” not as a domain, but as a physical entity
identified with a specific social movement. This conceptualization is also
frequently employed by leftists and NGO activists in the Philippines.

41. The text message “Wear black to mourn the death of democracy” circulated
via cell phones at this time.
42. See Bautista (2001: 14–5)

43. Iglesia ni Cristo cultivated a close relationship with Marcos so that the group’s
freedom of worship would not be threatened; after democratization, it
supported Estrada through mass voting. Meanwhile, Mike Velarde, leader of
El Shaddai, which boasted eight million members, served as Estrada’s spiritual
Advisor.

44. See the Philippine Star (2000, December 22).

45. See Bautista (2001: 26).
46. For a discussion of the role played by the military in this regime-change
drama, see Hernandez (2001).

47. For detailed accounts of the political process culminating in Estrada’s

resignation, see Doronila (2001), Lande (2001), San Juan (2001) and Coronel
(2001).
48. See Malaya and Malaya (2004: 305–8).
49. Bautista (2001: 7–14) argues that the poor who participated in People Power
2 may not have had the opportunity to obtain a public school education
but did receive an informal education through their activities as leftists or
members of Catholic lay groups, through which they acquired an awareness
that motivated them to seek social reform.
50. See Henderson (2001, 21 January). The essay is also quoted by (Bautista
2001: 26–7).

51. In response to demands from the Catholic Church, among others, the
Arroyo administration repealed the death penalty in June 2006.
52. According to an opinion survey by SWS, immediately after the change of
administrations, 60 per cent of the poor accepted the installation of Arroyo
as president (Bautista 2001: 28–30). This suggests that the subsequent arrest
of Estrada came as a tremendous shock to the poor and triggered People
Power 3. See Doronila (2001: 220–46) and Tordesillas and Hutchinson (2001:
245–52) for accounts of how People Power 3 unfolded.

53. These opposition leaders included Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce

Enrile, Gringo Honasan and Panfilo Lacson.
54. See Pinches (2010: 300).
55. Notwithstanding the Catholic Church’s presentation of a new vision of itself
as the “church of the poor” at the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines
in 1991, it was unable to acquire hegemony in the mass sphere.
56. The failure of the major TV stations to cover People Power 3 was said to
be due to fear that coverage would make the demonstrations grow larger.
In rebuttal, the TV stations claimed that they had been unable to provide
coverage because the demonstrators harassed their reporters and cameramen.
57. One observer said, “People Power 3 was bigger than People Power 2. People
Power 2 extended to White Plains Avenue, but in People Power 3, the crowds
spread all the way to Camp Aguinaldo.” (Joey, 37, male, employed at a foreign
corporation, February 15, 2009).

58. Estrada’s rise and fall was partly a reflection of rifts in the elite, business,
and religious sectors. First, many members of the counter-elite supported
Estrada, while the traditional elite tended to support Arroyo. Second,
mainstream business circles, including the Ayala conglomerate and the
Makati Business Club, supported both People Power 1 and 2, while business
magnates such as Eduardo Cojuangco and Lucio Tan, who had thrived under
the Marcos regime, provided financial support to Estrada in an effort to
regain the privileges they had lost under democratization. Finally, whereas
the Catholic Church had played an important role in People Power 1
and 2, the new religious groups Iglesia ni Cristo and El Shaddai supported
Estrada through prayer rallies and mass voting by their adherents among
the poor.

59. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (1998, May 11).

60. See Laquian and Laquian (2001: 249).
61. See Laquian and Laquian (1998: 220–2).
62. According to Carroll (2001: 247), Cardinal Sin believed that it was imperative
to directly and resolutely challenge a massive evil at the heart of Philippine
society, and that he must therefore use his social and moral capital to demand
the resignation of the president.
63. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2001, January 18). For a discussion of the
involvement of the Catholic Church in People Power 2, see Moreno (2006:
122–31).

64. See Miyawaki (2005). For example, pastoral letters by the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines used the word “moral” twice as often in the
1990s as in the 1970s or 1980s (Miyawaki 2006: 100, note 35).

65. The Erap jokes provided here were quoted by the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism (2001). Note, however, that Erap jokes were originally
used by Estrada during his election campaign to foster a sense of solidarity
with the poor through self-effacing humor. While he was a senator, Estrada
self-published ERAPtioin (Jurado and German 1994).

66. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2001, January 21).

67. Such assessments were to some degree a rebuttal to negative reactions from
overseas. As Abueva (2001: 84–5) reports, publications like Time, Newsweek
and the Far Eastern Economic Review gave negative coverage to People Power 2,
describing it as a “lynching” or a form of “mob rule” that ignored democratic
Institutions.

68. For example, at a political science lecture I attended at the graduate school
of the University of the Philippines in 2002, the instructor and students
praised the fact that former presidents of South Korea had been put on trial
for corruption.

69. The word “toothless” is used to ridicule the poor because few of them visit a
dentist regularly and hence many are missing a number of teeth.
70. Quoted by Schaffer (2008: 134).
290 Notes to pp. 108–18

71. Quoted by Schaffer (2008: 134) and by Tordesillas and Hutchinson (2001:
250). The original Tagalog text is as follows: “Tinatawagan lahat na dugyot
at mangmang, mga bungal at walang salawal. Patunayan nating wala tayong
utak—Pumunta tayo sa Edsa, please pass

72. Quoted by de Quiros (2001, April 30), who also cites the following jokes:
“All those who believe that Erap is innocent, please light a candle—and
burn your house down.” “[At EDSA] you can make a killing there if you
put up booths that offer dental and facial services.” “The rally at EDSA is
not going to grow as fast as EDSA 2 because the people there don’t know
how to ‘text.’”

73. Quoted by Doronila (2001: 240).

74. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2001, April 30).
75. Quoted by de Quiros (2001, April 30).
76. Quoted by Schaffer (2008: 134).
77. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2001, May 28).
78. See also de Quiros (2000, November 14).

79. See Balisacan (2001). Estrada’s lowering of fees for agricultural water use by
poor farmers also caused a funds shortage that disrupted agricultural policy
(Nozawa 2001). In addition, his promotion of cronies to important posts and
prioritizing of the interests of private developers threw his housing policies
for the urban poor into disarray (Constantino-David 2001).

80. Residents of Pechayan heard much about Estrada’s aid to the poor via gossip
and the media, but did not actually receive any goods themselves. Nevertheless,
they continued to support Estrada.

81. See Gutierrez (2001, May 2) and David (2001, July 29).
82. It must be noted that the Pasyon is interpreted differently in the civic and mass
spheres and hence defines the political process in different ways. In People
Power 1, the Pasyon worldview was exclusively linked to democratization in
the civic sphere, obscuring the issue of resolving inequalities. On the other
hand, the Philippine Revolution and People Power 3 initiated by the mass
sphere were accompanied by more destructive impulses against the current
ruling power structure itself.

83. Jueteng operations are informally systematized, and the job of bet collector
(kubrador) provides a valuable source of income to poor people without steady
employment.
84. However, there were some cases of spontaneous participation by unemployed
youth who had also participated in People Power 2 at the urging of activists
from Anak Bayan, a leftist youth group. They described the difference between
the two People Powers as follows: “I joined People Power 3 so that my house
wouldn’t be torn down. It was fun, but it was totally crazy and I couldn’t
avoid getting hurt. I supported People Power 3, but the people who came
to People Power 2 were nicer” (Boboy, 26, male, waterworks construction
worker, April 1, 2008).

Chapter 4
1. Among the cited means by which the elite controls the votes of the poor are
patron-client relations (Lande 1965), violence and coercion (Sidel 1999) and
organization and profit-sharing from above (Kawanaka 2002).

2. In 1998, a party-list election system was introduced whereby one-fifth of

the seats in the House of Representatives would be proportionally allotted
to representatives of marginalized social groups such as peasants, women and
indigenous communities. However, there is no indication that marginalized
social groups have gained any substantial benefit from this system.

3. See, for example, Aquino (1998).

4. See Chapter 1.

5. In 1955, movie actor Rogelio de la Rosa was elected to the Senate. Aspiring
to the presidency in the 1961 election, he starred in the film Dugo at Luha
(Blood and Tears), which portrayed poor people whose needs are ignored by
the government, but ultimately threw his support behind another presidential
candidate, Diosdado Macapagal (Hedman 2001: 20–1). This precedent
notwithstanding, entertainers seeking office during that period had to be
nominated by either the Nationalist or Liberal Party, and were not in a position
to run on their own. The present-day phenomenon of populism threatening
traditional politicians had yet to arrive.

6. According to Gloria (2004a), the traditional elite’s sense of crisis over celebrity
politicians spurred the passage of a law that banned political advertising, the
“Act Introducing Reforms in the Electoral System by Amending Certain Sections
of the Omnibus Election Code and for Other Purposes,” in 1987. This law
took effect in 1992, but failed to halt the entry of celebrities into politics. In
2001, the traditional elite switched to a strategy of utilizing the media, and
the law was subsequently repealed. As a result, campaign advertising surged
from the 2004 election on, and candidates began spending over half their
war chests on ads.

7. However, Ramos did not win on image alone; as Aquino’s designated successor,
he also utilized the state’s organizational and financial resources in his campaign
(Teehankee 2010: 126–7). Coming in second was Miriam Defensor Santiago,
who ran on an “anti-corruption” platform and won support among the youth
and urban middle class with her tough image. Ramon Mitra, who ran as the
unity candidate of the ruling Laban party, finished a disappointing fourth
despite the overwhelming advantage in organization and funding he enjoyed
through the support of most local elites.

8. Estrada’s PMP joined forces with the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC)
and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP or Laban) to form the coalition
Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (Struggle of the Patriotic Filipino
Masses), or LAMMP.

9. Jose de Venecia Jr., the candidate of the ruling Lakas party, came in a distant
second despite having access to abundant organizational and funding power as
Ramos’s designated heir apparent. In third place was Raul Roco, who had
an image of intellect and ability and earned support from the urban middle
class and youth, but lacked organizational strength and lost everywhere except
for in his home region of Bicol. These results demonstrate the difficulty of
winning elections solely on the basis of organizational and financial strength
on the one hand, or image and policy positions on the other.

10. When distributing food, Arroyo sought to ingratiate herself to the poor by
bringing social workers, doctors, dentists, comedians and action film stars with
her. She also tried to impress the poor by showing respect for Estrada through
such measures as building a home for him on the grounds of a hospital for
his house arrest.

11. KNP was composed of Estrada’s PMP, Laban (headed by Edgardo Angara),
and Partido ng Demokratiko Pilipino–Lakas ng Bayan (the Philippine
Democratic Party– People’s Power; PDP-Laban).

12. Poe’s relations with the media were soured by such incidents as his harsh
scolding of a female TV reporter, which drove her to tears, in front of a large
audience on his campaign tour. Also, despite the fierce attacks by the Arroyo
camp over his lack of skills, intellect and experience, Poe avoided negative
campaigning against Arroyo (Fonbuena 2004: 64).

13. According to results from an SWS survey, only 25 per cent of those surveyed
had actually heard Poe speak on TV, on radio or at rallies, while less than the
32 per cent had heard Arroyo. See de Castro (2004, Mar. 29).

14. KNP was only able to back 26 of its own candidates for 211 incumbent seats
in the House of Representatives, and only 12 candidates for 76 provincial
governorships (Teehankee 2010: 141).

15. Although the 1987 Constitution prohibited elected presidents from serving
more than one term, reelection of an incumbent was permitted if it took
place within four years of succession to the post to fill a vacancy left by
the previous president’s resignation, impeachment or death. Arroyo had
been promoted to president from vice president in 2001, and was therefore
allowed to run as an incumbent. K4 included the ruling Lakas-Christian
Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), the Liberal Party, the Nationalist Party,
and the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC).

16. Arroyo randomly issued presidential “promulgations” to transfer public

lands to their occupants, who were largely pro-Estrada squatters (Kiba
2010: 55–60). She also initiated a project providing employment and lowcost food to the
poor, known as Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (“Golden
Harvest for the People”)–Countrywide Assistance for Rural Employment
and Services, which forms the acronym GMA-CARES (GMA being Arroyo’s
initials). The phrase “GMA CARES” and Arroyo’s picture were painted on
mobile stores, known as Tindaha ni Gloria Labandera (Gloria the Laundress
Shops), that sold everyday necessities and food at low prices. Arroyo also
allocated a budget of six billion pesos to provide the poor with “Philhealth
Notes to pp. 125–28 293
cards” issued by the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth)
that guaranteed free treatment at public hospitals, and announced that the
cards, which bore Arroyo’s photo, would be distributed to five million poor
people by April 6, Arroyo’s birthday. Beginning in late 2003, Arroyo created
a large number of short-term jobs by hiring 250,000 people nationwide
through the Department of Public Works and Highways to work as street
sweepers. The sweepers wore blue shirts printed with the words Programang
Pangtrabaho ni Pangulong Gloria (Jobs Program of President Gloria), and
similarly worded billboards sprang up along roads throughout the country.
For an account of these activities, see Go (2004, Apr. 26) and Mable (2004,
Mar. 27).

17. Arroyo’s vice presidential candidate was Senator Noli de Castro, a former
newscaster also known by the nickname “Kabayan” (Countryman). His folksy
manner of speaking played a valuable role in Arroyo’s campaign.

18. See Velasquez (2002, Oct.–Dec.) for a description of Arroyo’s image strategy.
When she ran for the Senate in 1995, her campaign slogan was Nora Aunor
sa Senado (Nora Aunor for Senator), playing on her superficial resemblance
to the popular actress Nora Aunor (Crisostomo 2002: 18–9).

19. The presidential candidates were Arroyo, Poe, Senators Panfilo Lacson and
Raul Roco, and Eddie Villanueva, leader of the religious group Jesus Is Lord
Church.
20. See de Castro (2004, June 7).

21. According to exit polls by SWS, 40 per cent of the “poor” voted for Arroyo
and 32 per cent for Poe, while 43 per cent of the “very poor” voted for Arroyo
and 35 per cent for Poe. What the SWS data does not show, however, is that
support for Poe far surpassed support for Arroyo in Manila’s mass sphere. At one
polling place I observed in Pechayan, for example, Poe received approximately
three times as many votes as Arroyo.

22. One reason for Poe’s loss was the split of the poor vote between him and
Lacson, who earned support from the poor by spearheading criticism of
Arroyo. Though known for his aggressiveness as director-general of the
Philippine National Police under the Estrada administration, including
allegations of extrajudicial killings of gang members, he won the support
of taxi and jeepney drivers by cracking down on police who extorted bribes
from drivers.

23. Flaviano (2013) analyzed Manila’s 2013 mayoral election, in which incumbent
Alfred Lim was defeated by Estrada, from the perspective of image construction
and contestation: “The Cop vs. the Hoodlum.”

24. It is an accepted practice for candidates to send their own poll watchers to
polling places to prevent election rigging by rival candidates.

25. Vote gatherers also convey information about funerals, requests for assistance
and the like from poor voters to politicians. One vote gatherer described her
role as that of a “bridge” between residents and politicians and a “gatekeeper” selecting
residents to receive aid from the politicians (Cora, 50s, female,
housewife, Mar. 7, 2010). The larger a politician’s campaign war chest, the
more vote gatherers they can hire.

26. Pasay City Council candidate C, a former lawyer, served in the city council for
three consecutive terms, from 1992 to 2001. His father also served as a Pasay
City councilor during the Commonwealth era, from 1937 to 1945. Candidate
C’s son succeeded him in the Pasay City Council, serving three consecutive
terms from 2001. Because the 1987 Constitution prohibits election to more
than three consecutive terms, the son was unable to run for city councilor in
2010, so candidate C stood for election again.

27. Malabon City Council candidate P ran for the city council after serving three
terms as a barangay councilor.
28. As I will discuss in Chapter 6, Arroyo’s second term (from 2004 to 2010)
saw a succession of assassinations of peasant leaders and others affiliated with
the Bayan Muna. These were referred to as “political killings.”

29. To assuage the fears of the business community, of foreign investors, and of
the middle class, the Poe camp announced the recruitment of 11 economists
who supported economic liberalization as “brains”, but this gesture appeared
to have no effect. See Carandang (2004, Mar. 15).

30. According to Calimbahin (2010: 182–5), Jose S. Concepcion Jr., the

businessman who revived NAMFREL in 1983, donated large sums of money
to Arroyo. His son had also been appointed as a presidential advisor to
Arroyo.
31. Arroyo enjoyed the largest support, 31 per cent, among the rich and middle
class, while Roco won 19 per cent (Social Weather Stations 2004, 5 Apr.).
Roco was known as a reformist politician, but his bout with cancer decreased
his support. Considering this, it can be estimated that Arroyo received around
50 per cent of the rich and middle class vote.

32. However, as I mention in endnote 46, NAMFREL did not engage in election
monitoring activities in the 2010 election.
33. Some columnists publish their email address in the newspaper, enabling readers
to send in their views and reactions.
34. See Torre (2001, Apr. 11).
35. See the Philippine Star (2001, Apr. 26).
36. Details about this CD can be found on the Pagbabago@Pilipinas website
(Pagbabago@Pilipinas 2002).

37. See Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University (2005). Based
on this data, Aguilar (2005) argued that the poor treat elections as a form of
gambling like cockfighting and participate actively with the expectation that
they will get some share of the winnings if the candidate they bet on wins,
with the understanding that some electoral misconduct is inevitable and that
the social structure cannot be changed.

38. In national elections, it is impossible to make close contact with presidential

or senatorial candidates, so the poor base their judgments on the media.
Local elections, on the other hand, permit more direct interaction with the
candidates, so people evaluate them based on personal encounters, either
directly or indirectly through acquaintances or relatives.

39. In the elections for 12 open Senate seats, movie actor Cesar Montano came
in 18th, popular TV program host Vicente Sotto placed 19th, and another
movie actor, Richard Gomez, came in 25th; all lost. Then again, the popular
newscaster Loren Legarda won.

40. This was the sort of discourse employed by opposition parties to combat
the money and vote-getting machinery of the ruling party in elections prior
to martial law. In the presidential election of 1986, the Aquino camp used
this slogan to urge voters not to let themselves be co-opted by the powerful
Marcos machine: “Tanggapin ang pera, ilagay sa bulsa, pero Oposisyon
ang balota” (Take the money, put it in your pocket, but vote for the
Opposition) (Thompson 1995: 32).

41. Vote counting has been computerized since the 2010 general election in order
to prevent election rigging and improve efficiency.
42. According to a joint exit poll by SWS and ABS-CBN, voter turnout was
89 per cent for the 2001 synchronized election (which included posts
at all levels from president to city council) and 81 per cent for the 2004
election (Social Weather Stations 2001, May 14; 2004, May 18). These
are considerably high turnouts compared to those for Lower House
elections in Japan, which have ranged between 60 and 70 per cent since
the 1990s.

43. Names missing from voter lists prepared by Comelec are an issue in every
election. For example, in the 2004 election, about 2 per cent of voter names
were reportedly missing (Social Weather Stations 2004, May 18).

44. According to Ramon Casiple, director of the Institute for Political and Electoral
Reform, voter education began to be implemented after democratization.
He classifies voter education methods and content according to the groups
carrying it out as follows: morality-focused education by Catholic Churchrelated lay
groups such as the PPCRV; education of their members by NGOs;
education of students by existing educational institutions; and education
via TV commercials by media-owning conglomerates (from an interview on
February 19, 2010).

45. See Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (1992: Article 348).
46. In addition to the PPCRV, NAMFREL was also originally accredited as
an official “citizens’ arm” of Comelec. However, NAMFREL lost much of
its credibility when it was alleged to have manipulated early return reports
to Arroyo’s advantage in the 2004 presidential election (Calimbahin 2010:
182–5). Then, in the 2010 elections, Comelec revoked NAMFREL’s official
accreditation, citing questions about its neutrality and fairness.

47. See Public and Political Affairs Ministry, Diocese of Kalookan (2010). The
PPCRV offers two types of voter education: “technical education,” which
explains the electoral system and the voting process, and “moral education,”
which discusses the criteria for choosing “correct” candidates. Here I have
focused on the latter.

48. There is also a moral precept, particularly in the mass sphere, that members
of the same family should vote in solidarity for the same candidate; hence,
people do not necessarily consider it a virtue for individuals to vote
autonomously. Even so, they agree that the vote of the family unit should be
free from external coercion.

49. This is because most of the poor do not attend church every Sunday (Arthur, 30,
male, Public Affairs Ministry, Diocese of Malabon, airline company
employee, February 14, 2010).
Chapter 5
1. Whereas this framework places the state and society in contraposition,
Migdal (2001) later proposes a “state in society” approach that focuses on the
process by which the state and society transform one another.
2. One characteristic of newer forms of governance is service delivery through
networks upheld by trust and mutual adjustment between interdependent
public and private sectors (Rhodes 1996).
3. Bayat (2000: 56–7) argues that where Scott’s “everyday forms of resistance”
is defensive, “quiet encroachment” by the urban poor is offensive. However,
he does not restrict his view of the practices of the urban poor to quiet
encroachment. If the benefits obtained through quiet encroachment are
attacked by the state, the poor will respond with organized resistance.
Moreover, Bayat asserts that if the political opportunity structure is more
democratic, they may then seek to have their rights guaranteed by the state
through organized action.
4. Someone who “owns” a large plot of land and profits handsomely from renting
it out is referred to as a “professional squatter.”
5. They originally came from Bohol and lived in a squatter settlement in Cebu
but moved to Manila because their house was demolished while they were
visiting relatives in another city.
6. Because the Philippine National Police and local government security
personnel are not permitted to engage in policing activities on university
campuses, the University of the Philippines has its own security force.
7. According to Parnell, these networks came to be called syndicates after
democratization. In August 1987, President Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 137, which stipulated the transfer of 137 out of 440 hectares set aside
for the National Government Center to households that had been living on
the land since before democratization. At that time, only certain designated
peoples’ organizations were recognized as local representatives, in reaction
Notes to pp. 159–62 297
to which, a network of non-designated peoples’ organizations, accompanied
by associated state agencies and powerful individuals, launched a protest
movement. The Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor responded by
applying the label “syndicate” to networks opposed to the proclamation,
thus equating them with criminal groups. The residents themselves did not
use the term “syndicate,” but referred to a network by its leader’s or
organization’s name, or sometimes by the term “recalcitrant.”
8. See David (2003, July 6), Tandoc Jr. (2003, June 15), and Cruz (2003, June
17).
9. This loan system is referred to as “5-6” because vendors must typically repay
6,000 pesos for every 5,000 borrowed from a Bombay moneylender. The
repayment period is negotiable, but usually around one month. The lenders
make daily rounds on motorbikes collecting several hundred pesos from
each borrower. When vendors complete their repayment, they can renew the
5-6. For more detailed account of the Bombay credit system, see Kondo
(2003).
10. According a survey I conducted in August 2003, Association A in Quezon
City was paying 500 pesos per week to the market management office, the
security office and the MMDA; they were also making occasional payments of
100 to 200 pesos to the police. Association B in Caloocan City made weekly
payments of 2,500 pesos to the security office, 500 pesos to the traffic office,
and 500 pesos to the police.
11. It is not easy to determine how this money actually flows. However, in
local governments where mayors enjoy extensive authority over personnel
management, it is difficult to imagine the offices involved concealing such
amounts from the mayor. Street vendors and NGOs perceive that mayors at
least tacitly approve this practice.
12. Illy (1986) cites the example of Manila and Cross (1998), who defined the
relationship between street vendors and local officials in Mexico City as
reciprocal clientelism. However, they ignore the oppositional nature of the
bribery system in its encroachment upon the power of both the state and
the elite.
13. Scott (1969b: 325–9) discusses how bribery in the process of implementing
the law is an alternative means of interest representation by marginalized
people, who are constrained from wielding influence legislative processes.
14. Fernando majored in mechanical engineering at the Mapúa Institute of
Technology, which makes him a rarity among Philippine politicians, most of
whom attended law school.
15. He received awards from the Asian Institute of Management and the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation of Germany, among others.
16. See R. Mercado (1998: 14). To get squatters to relocate, Fernando pressed
them to form peoples’ organizations and participate in the Community
Mortgage Program, which enabled such organizations to purchase land with
298 Notes to pp. 162–67
low-interest loans. The designated relocation sites were the districts of Malanday
and Tumana in Marikina City.
17. See the Philippine Star (2002, June 14).
18. See the Philippine Star (2004, Sept. 7).
19. Quoted in Cagurangan (2003: 4). According to the Philippine Star (2004,
Sept. 7), the chief director of the National Capital Region (NCR) Police
Office also said, “If there are many shirtless men roaming around in a certain
community, there are also many criminals such as thieves, snatchers, and
robbers in that area.”
20. Fernando favored the color pink in all these projects, explaining that it “stood
for the aspiration of every Metro Manilan ‘to be in the pink of health’,”
according to the Philippine Star (2004, Jan. 1).
21. Quoted in Cagurangan (2003: 4).
22. Also banned was the practice of hitching a ride (sabit) on the back of a
jeepney.
23. See Jimenez-David (2002, Aug. 22). The “broken windows” theory is
associated with former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani III, who said
he subscribed to it.
24. Fernando’s targets for removal also included illegally parked vehicles,
roadside trees and barangay halls that occupied sidewalks. However, he
aimed his most persistent crackdown efforts at street vendors.
25. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2002, Oct. 13).
26. See the Manila Times (2003, Sept. 25).
27. See the Manila Bulletin (2003, May 24) and the Philippine Daily Inquirer
(2003, May 24). The Philippine Department of Health also frequently
issued warnings that the food sold by street vendors was unsanitary because
it was exposed to garbage and bacteria, and could cause food poisoning and
diarrhea. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2003, Oct. 31).
28. See Philippine Headline News Online (2003, May 10).
29. See MMDA Resolution 02-28.
30. Fernando explained that the tactic of pouring kerosene was a way to avoid
confrontation with the street vendors by making it unnecessary to confiscate
the merchandise and to negate rumors that the MMDA was selling confiscated
merchandise on the black market. See the Philippine Star (2002, Aug. 20;
2002, Nov. 12).
31. See the Philippine Star (2002, July 9).
32. The thoroughfares in question included C-5, which runs between Quezon
City and Parañaque City, and R-10 in the Tondo district of Manila.
33. The Arroyo administration implemented the Northrail Project linking Manila and
the Clark Special Economic Zone with capital from the Chinese government,
later from the Japanese ODA, and the Southrail Project linking Manila and
Laguna province with capital from the South Korean government. For details
on the activities of railside peoples’ organizations, see Velasco (2006).
Notes to pp. 167–73 299
34. See Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (2007: 4).
35. See Philippine NGO Coalition (n.d.: 81).
36. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2007, Sept. 5).
37. The site of this redevelopment project was 29.1 hectares of public land owned
by the National Housing Authority. Due to the large size of the project and
the presence of an active peoples’ organization in the district, it met with
stubborn resistance. Residents erected barricades and threw rocks at the
police and demolition teams. The National Housing Authority attempted to
relocate the residents to Rodriguez, a suburb in Rizal province, but few of
them obliged. In fact, residents destroyed the relocation office set up by the
Authority.
38. One reader responded to Doronila’s column by writing: “Old folks like me
who need to walk to exercise have no more sidewalks to walk safely on. I have
paid taxes all my life. Why not give me back the sidewalks which I helped
pay for?” See Sison (2002, Sept. 12).
39. The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, a powerful interest
group, declared that the removal of squatters was a crucial element of social
reform (Shatkin 2008: 398).
40. See, for example, the Manila Times (2003, Nov. 17) and Cruz (2002,
Apr. 15).
41. Ondoy caused severe flooding in Manila, resulting in at least 464 deaths and
some 100 million USD in physical damage.
42. At that time, the Philippine Star asked for readers’ views on whether the
government would remove riverside squatters to distant relocation sites. The
majority of respondents were of the opinion that the relocation of squatters
to other districts was absolutely imperative, but due to limited funds as
well as a lack of will by politicians seeking squatters’ votes, they thought it
was unlikely. However, there were expectations that if anyone could effect
a change, it would be Fernando, who was praised for his staunch political
will: “If Bayani Fernando becomes president, relocation will happen almost
immediately. Political will is direly needed and nobody comes close to BF.”
See the Philippine Star (2009, Nov. 3).
43. Quoted by Zenarosa (2002, Sept. 22).
44. See Cagurangan (2003: 4)
45. Cruz 2002, June 26.
46. See opinion letters section of the Philippine Star (2004, Jan. 1).
47. Quoted in Cagurangan (2003: 2).
48. When Congressman Augusto Syjuco expressed his support for street vendors
opposing the MMDA, the columnist Belinda Olivares-Cunanan (2002, Sept.
14) wrote, “[politicians like Syjuco are] grandstanding when they take the
side of the vendors against the rest of the citizens who have been greatly
inconvenienced by the loss of the sidewalks.”
49. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2005, May 20).
300 Notes to pp. 173–80
50. In 2002, when this occurred, cell phone use had not yet spread widely
among the poor, so it can be surmised that most people sending text messages
to the program were from the middle class.
51. Richard Gordon, who was chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
during the Ramos administration, introduced disciplinary governance to
Subic. Gordon served as senator from 2004 and ran for president in the
2010 election, with Fernando as his vice-presidential running mate, but lost
badly.
52. However, not all members of the middle class supported strict observance
of the law at all times. For example, one middle-class male acknowledged
that he had been stopped for traffic violations several times but was always
able to avoid punishment by paying a small bribe to street-level officials,
who expected it (Joey, 37, male, employed at a foreign corporation, 2009,
Feb. 15).
53. Fernando did attempt to open subdivision streets for general use in order to
reduce traffic congestion. However, he was unable to carry out this plan due
to the opposition of residents who feared losing the expensive security they
enjoyed in the subdivisions should the streets be opened.
54. However, the influence of this civic-sphere discourse on electoral politics was
limited. Fernando ran for vice president twice, in 2004 and 2010, but lost
badly both times. This was because his name recognition was low outside the
Manila area, and even in Manila, poor people who viewed him unfavorably
constituted the majority of the electorate.
55. The leftist organization Sanlakas provided numerous slogans for use in
demonstrations, but street vendors rarely employed them verbatim. For
example, Sanlakas used such epithets as “fascist,” “Hitler” and “human rights
violator” to criticize Fernando, but the street vendors tended to yell and write
slogans of their own choice that resonated with their lives.
56. These words were used in a demonstration held in January 2003 in front of
Quezon City Hall.
57. See Soon (2008) for a discussion of the concept of matuwid, connoting
righteousness and honesty, as it relates to the Catholic notion of purity within
the human heart (loob).
58. In the Philippines, the higher one’s social status, the easier it is to secure
a trial outcome to one’s advantage. As reasons for this, Lopez (1999) cites
difficulties for the poor in obtaining witnesses, the inability to communicate
their concerns to their attorneys due to insufficient legal knowledge, overworked
public attorneys, and the absence of judicial investigators in public attorneys’
offices.
59. See Bayat (1997, 2010: 19–26) for an account of the formation of informal
networks by the urban poor and the political significance of these networks,
citing the example of Tehran. For an account related to squatters’ settlements
in Manila, see Berner (1997), who asserts that a local “we” identity forms the
Notes to pp. 181–90 301
basis for localized resistance by the urban poor but at the same time hinders
supra-local solidarity and organized activity.
60. I told my compadres that I did not need to charge any lending interest (tubo),
but they demanded otherwise. Thus, I lent them capital of thousands of pesos
at the rate of 5–5.5, cheaper than 5–6 they would get from the Bombay
moneylenders. However, I subsequently learned that charging interest was
reasonable because one compadre abruptly returned his province before he
finished repayment.
61. Actually, Manila Mayor Lito Atienza and Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay had
already banned crackdowns by the MMDA in their cities, not because of the
MMVA’s petition, but rather because of a political rivalry with Fernando.
Atienza provided vendors with sales tables and permitted them to operate in
the Quiapo district on the condition that they paid 20 pesos a day to the
City of Manila and 20 pesos a day to a cooperative. Binay permitted night
vending along parts of Jupiter Street.
62. Fr. Robert Reyes conducted street masses in Philcoa on Christmas and
New Year’s Eve in 2002. When he sprinkled holy water on the street and
vendors, it was taken as a symbolic cleansing of the “impurities” that
had been unjustly attributed to the vendors and a restoration of their
wounded dignity.
63. According to an MMDA Operations Team member who spoke on condition
of anonymity at a fast food outlet in Monumento, Caloocan City, they
recognized that some of their colleagues were taking money from the vendors
and tacitly allowing street vending (2005, Aug. 26). However, MMDA
Undersecretary Cesar Lacuna stated that Fernando had attempted to prevent
bribery of personnel by prohibiting them from carrying cell phones and
informing them about crackdown sites only at the last minute (interview,
2009, July 3).
64. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2004, Mar. 18, 19).
65. See the Manila Times (2002, Oct. 1).
66. For details on the process of legislating the Urban Development and
Housing Act, see Gatpatan (1992), Tabora (1992), de Leon and Chaves
(1994), Karaos (1993), Karaos et al. (1995), Karaos (1998), Carroll (1998),
Van Naerssen (2003) and Magadia (2003).
67. The concept of urban land reform was first addressed in Presidential Decree
No. 1517, issued by Marcos in 1978. This decree prescribed the optimization
of urban land use for public welfare, but this went largely unrealized (Magadia
2003: 110).
68. The leading organizations were the Foundation for Development Alternatives,
the Institute on Church and Social Issues and PAKSA-LUPA.
69. When President Aquino set an order of priority for 20 bills, urban land reform
ranked 15th (Karaos et al. 1995: 37).
70. See Magadia (2003: 107).
302 Notes to pp. 190–92
71. In 1997, lobbying by NGOs led to the abolition of Marcos’s Presidential Decree
No. 772, which had criminalized squatters and legitimized forced evictions.
According to Karaos (1998), after democratization, the urban poor found it
easier to win concessions from the government through policy proposals on
specific issues submitted by a loose alliance of fragmented social movements,
rather than through confrontations with the government by a more solid
alliance.
72. See Chapter 2, “Friction between Two Urban Spaces,” for details on the
content of the Urban Development and Housing Act.
73. To expedite passage of the bill, the NGOs and peoples’ organizations lobbied
for items that would readily gain the endorsement of Congress, and therefore
shelved such items as restrictions on land ownership in cities and the introduction
of an innovative taxation system for land ownership.
74. See Shatkin (2004: 2480). For a discussion of problems with the Community
Mortgage Program, see Chapter 2, “Friction between Two Urban Spaces.”
75. The Social Reform Agenda was an anti-poverty agenda formulated
by the Ramos administration in 1994. It is noteworthy that the state
institutionalized the participation of NGOs and peoples’ organizations
to improve the framing and implementation of public policy through
cooperation (Magadia 2003: 156–75).
76. This committee was composed of representatives from the Department of
the Interior, the Philippine National Police, the Department of Trade and
Industry, the Department of Labor and Employment and the Informal Sector
Section of the Social Reform Council.
77. The leader of Ka-Tinig was Mercedes Ignacio-Nicolas. She had also worked
as an organizer of street vendors and pedicab drivers for the Parish Based
Labor Organization (PaBLO), and as representative of the informal sector on
the Social Reform Council. As a social activist, she is known by the name
Ka Dedeng.
78. From an interview with Celia (50s, female, leader of LRT-Monumento street
vendors’ organization; 2004, May 15).
79. The reason for this falling out was a confrontation with Estrada over
appointments to the National Anti-Poverty Commission, which was established
as a successor to the Social Reform Council. Commission members were to
consist of representatives elected from 11 basic sectors, including farmers,
fishermen, indigenous people, women and informal sector workers. However,
Estrada directly appointed his allies to the commission. Ka-Tinig and other
groups responded by filing a complaint against Estrada and others with the
Supreme Court (Katinig et al. v. President Joseph Estrada et al. 1999). From
this point on, relations between Ka-Tinig and the Estrada administration
were severed (from an interview with Ignacio Nicolas, 50s, female, Ka-Tinig
leader, 2005, Aug. 17).
Notes to pp. 192–98 303
80. At a meeting of the Inter-Agency Council convened on May 2, the day
after People Power 3, the chair, who was Secretary of the Department of the
Interior, conveyed President Arroyo’s wish to sign the implementing rules
and regulations within 15 days, and asked that they be finalized as quickly as
possible. At a meeting on May 8, the chair once again pressed for finalization,
declaring that issuing these rules and regulations was crucial to the stability of
the government. For details on the involvement of the Arroyo administration
in the rules and regulations for Executive Order No. 452, see Inter-Agency
Council 2001.
81. The sole exception was Quezon City, where the incumbent mayor,
Mel Mathay, enacted an ordinance in hopes of securing the street vendor
vote just before the mayoral election of 2000, when he was trailing former
congressman Feliciano Belmonte (from an interview with Evelyn, 60s,
female, former leader of a street vendors’ organization in Quezon City, 2005,
Sept. 28).
Chapter 6
1. According to Quimpo, a predatory regime is created by the conjunction of
two corrupt institutions: a presidency with broad powers over discretionary
spending and appointments and patrimonialistic political parties. Under a
predatory regime, the government’s system of checks and balances breaks
down, leading to the spread of corruption, the systematic plundering of
state resources and the conversion of public institutions into mechanisms for
plunder.
2. Thompson treats all of these political styles as forms of elite democracy.
3. Marcos had earlier constructed a pyramid that extended from himself at
the top to voters at the bottom, via local elites as intermediaries. Through
this pyramid, he controlled politics by distributing resources and imposing
punishments. According to Thompson, Arroyo successfully revived this system,
and for this reason, he categorizes her governance as “neo-traditionalist.”
4. See Malaya and Malaya (2004: 3058).
5. A recording of a telephone conversation between Arroyo and Comelec official
Virgilio Garcillano was divulged. Because Arroyo could be heard saying
“Hello, Garci” on the tape, this became known as the “Hello Garci” scandal.
Yet another scandal involved the alleged diversion of 728 million pesos that
had been earmarked for fertilizer purchases by the Department of Agriculture
to Arroyo’s campaign coffers.
6. Because the press conference where these resignations were announced took
place at the Hyatt Hotel, the 10 resigning officials were referred to as the
“Hyatt 10.”
7. The motion to impeach was rejected in a full session of the Lower House by
a vote of 173 to 32. Another impeachment motion was filed in 2007 in the
wake of the ZTE scandal, but this was also rejected.
304 Notes to pp. 198–209
8. Arroyo had become president in the first place due to allegations that Estrada
had taken protection money from jueteng operators. Consequently, she lost
what remained of her legitimacy when the same accusations were leveled
against members of her immediate family.

9. As a possible explanation for this rampant corruption at the presidential

level, Kawanaka (2006) cited an institutional change that enhanced the
president’s authority over resource distribution following democratization.
Previously, resources had been concentrated in the hands of the state, where
they were fought over by elite legislators. However, after democratization,
with the privatization of government enterprises and the growth of foreign
investment, private corporations that wished to get a share of this business
were compelled to compete with one another in cultivating close relations
with the president, who had the power to issue permits and licenses for
private capital. Kawanaka sees this as a factor in the increased occurrence of
presidential bribery.
10. Up until the end of July 2006, eight motions for impeachment were filed;
however, the House Judiciary Committee rejected them all.
11. David (2008, Feb. 23) wrote that under the Arroyo administration, “the justice
system has become a weapon to intimidate those who stand up to power, the
military and the police have become the private army of a gangster regime, the
Commission on Elections has become a haven for fixers who deliver fictitious
votes to the moneyed and the powerful, the government bureaucracy has been
turned into a halfway house for political lackeys, misfits, and the corrupt, and
the House of Representatives has become its hired cheering squad.”
12. The Magdalo group was led primarily by Philippine Military Academy graduates
of the class of 1995 who were members of elite units such as the Scout Rangers
of the Army and the Naval Special Operations Group. The group accused top
military commanders of taking bribes from equipment vendors and smuggling
weapons to anti-government Muslim forces and Arroyo of ordering terrorist
bombings in Mindanao to foment fear and prop up her regime, as well as
failing to pay wages to frontline troops.
13. However, the Catholic Church, which had lost a powerful leader with the
death of Cardinal Sin a month earlier, only asked for clarification of the
allegations without actively calling for Arroyo’s resignation.
14. See Doronila (2007, Feb. 23).
15. The 1987 Constitution prohibited the reelection of anyone who had served as
president for four years or more. Since Estrada had only served as president
for two and a half years, Comelec allowed him to run.
16. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2009, Aug. 8).
17. Of course, the Aquino family was not always a paragon of virtue. Before
his assassination, Benigno Aquino Jr. was seen as an exceedingly ambitious
elite politician. In addition, as Arillo (2000) points out, Corazon Aquino’s
administration was not entirely devoid of corruption. Noting that the Aquino
Notes to pp. 210–17 305
presidency was a period of excessive hiring of civil servants, Fujiwara (1990:
55–8) sees this as an indication that corruption had also been “democratized.”
18. This process can be referred to by the Gramscian concept “transformismo.”
19. For a detailed account of the Aquino campaign, see Rocamora (2010).
20. Translated from Tagalog.
21. Translated from Tagalog.
22. To be sure, Aquino campaign workers did not come away empty-handed.
I personally observed that they received items such as the latest cell phones
(in yellow) imprinted with a picture of the Aquino family.
23. This resulted in the peculiar phenomenon of the Marcos family and associates
of the Bayan Muna, which had suffered persecution as CPP under Marcos’s
martial law, collaborating to secure the election of Villar.
24. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2009, Nov. 30; 2009, Dec. 1) for a description
of Villar’s candidacy announcement and the circumstances in which it took
place.
25. According to a survey by AGB Nielsen, Villar’s radio and TV advertising
expenditures from February 9 to March 2, 2010 came to 120 million pesos,
compared with 88 million spent by Estrada and 87 million by Aquino. See
the Philippine Star (2010, Mar. 10).
26. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2009, Dec., 1a).
27. Villar also adopted orange as his campaign color, despite the fact that Estrada
had always used orange for that purpose. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer
(2009, Dec. 1b).
28. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2010, Mar. 31). In response, Aquino
announced a plan to redistribute the Luisita land among its tenants, and
declared that he would continue to live in his Manila residence instead of
moving into the presidential palace, thus making a point of his frugality.
For details on Aquino’s rejoinder, see the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2010,
Feb. 10; 2010, Apr. 15).
29. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2010, Mar. 29).
30. See the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2010, Mar. 30).
31. Among the allegations made public against Villar were that he got the
construction routes of major thoroughfares changed to inflate the price
of real estate he owned, and that he improperly pressured the Philippine
Stock Exchange into allowing him to sell stock he owned before the end of
its lock-up period in order to free up funds for his election campaign.
32. Senator Consuelo “Jamby” Madrigal criticized Villar at a forum held at De La
Salle University in remarks that were broadcast nationwide on the ABS-CBN
news.
33. See de Quiros (2010, Apr. 7).

34. On Mar. 30, 2010, Teodoro, the candidate of the ruling Lakas party, resigned
from his position as party chairman, complaining that President Arroyo was
not providing him with sufficient monetary and organizational assistance.
306 Notes to pp. 218–28
Local elites associated with Lakas also expressed frustration that they were
not receiving adequate campaign funds. These claims, that Arroyo was not
dispensing campaign money to her own party, fueled suspicions that she was
providing financial assistance to Villar.

35. Seizing on rumors that Aquino had suffered from severe depression as a
university student, Villar criticized him as lacking the stamina to serve
as president. Aquino responded by saying although he suffered a bout of
depression after his father had been murdered, he never sought any type of
medical attention. For details on Aquino’s rebuttal, see the Philippine Daily
Inquirer (2010, Jan. 11; 2010, Apr. 29).

36. Pro-Aquino bias was particularly apparent in ABS-CBN’s reportage. One

reason may be that the network’s owners, the Lopez family, shared similar
hardships with the Aquino family under the Marcos regime.
37. Although data on approval ratings by class in different regions of the country
could not be obtained, an examination of the elections since democratization
suggests the following trends. The urban sector civic sphere tends to abhor
populism and support moral nationalism. The urban middle class also tends
to support candidates espousing civic inclusivism or exclusivism as an
appealing alternative, but due to constraints on fiscal and organizational
power and limited name recognition, there are rarely any promising
candidates. The poor in the rural sector mass sphere, where clientelism holds
more sway, tend to vote for presidential candidates supported by the local
power elite. On the other hand, the poor in the urban sector mass sphere
enjoy greater voting freedom, and therefore tend to respond favorably to
populism.
38. See Doronila (2009, Sep. 16).
39. It was also frequently argued that even the island of Mindanao was peaceful
during the Estrada era. This impression was no doubt influenced by the
Estrada campaign’s condemnation of the massacre in Maguindanao province,
which occurred during the Arroyo administration. However, Estrada had in
fact launched a massive military operation against Muslim anti-government
forces on the island.
40. Senators and representatives were allowed to disburse 200 and 70 million
pesos, respectively, at their discretion.

41. Although Arroyo’s eligibility to run again was challenged, Benjamin Abalos,
an associate of Arroyo who was chairman of the Commission on Elections,
accepted her candidacy application, and the Supreme Court approved it under
the aegis of Chief Justice Corona. Arroyo also ran and won in the 2013
election, declaring her candidacy while under hospital arrest.

42. Gutierrez, a college classmate of Arroyo’s husband, served in several important

posts in the Arroyo administration. Corona was appointed Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court just one month before Arroyo stepped down from the
presidency. Under Corona, the Court issued a series of decisions unfavorable
Notes to pp. 229–50 307
to the Aquino family, notably one involving the agrarian reform of their
Luisita plantation.

43. Other charges included graft related to bidding by the Chinese ZTE
Corporation, misuse of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office funds and
corruption associated with ODA-funded bridge construction projects.
44. According to the Commission on Audit, pork-barrel expenditures under the
Arroyo administration from 2007 to 2009 came to 116 billion pesos, well
over the budgeted amount of 79.8 billion. Most of this funding was released
to congressmen in the Arroyo camp, with two-thirds of the expenditures
unaccounted for.

45. From 2011 to 2013, DAP disbursed 144.4 billion pesos out of a total allocation
of 167.1 billion.
46. Among these were the Sin Tax Reform Act, which raised cigarette and liquor
taxes, the Enhanced Basic Education Act of 2013, which extended the basic
education period by two years to conform to international standards, and the
National Health Insurance Act of 2013, which expanded the ranks of those
eligible for health insurance.
47. The program was allocated 12 billion pesos in the fiscal 2010 budget and
29 billion in fiscal 2011.
48. According to a 2011 report by the World Bank and the Australian Agency
for International Development, the annual income of beneficiaries rose
12.6 per cent and their poverty rate declined 6.2 per cent. However, there
has been no perceptible change in the nationwide poverty rate (Thompson
2013: 261–2).

49. In 2014, the population of the Philippines passed the 100 million mark.
50. Thirty University of the Philippines Economists (2012) Population, Poverty,
Politics and RH Bill, Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 28, 2012.
51. Kaka Bag-ao (2012), “Overwhelming Case for the RH Bill,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, Oct. 13, 2012.

Chapter 7
1. See Scott (1985) and Kerkvliet (1990).

2. See Karos (1998) and Kiba (2010) for fragmentation of the urban poor
caused by organizing the activities of opposing social movements. Another
outcome of civic inclusivism I witnessed several times and think as negative
is that the poor chose the seemingly disadvantageous option of refusing any
benefits presented by the government as compromise and thus adhered to a
hard-liner struggle to get nothing.

3. For example, Mill (1865) advocated the introduction of proportional

representation to ensure that educated intellectuals retained a certain degree
of influence in election politics. Mass society theory, which saw the
irrationality of the masses as a threat, came to be vigorously debated in the
20th century.
308 Notes to pp. 250–58
4. I referred to Fujiwara (1994) for this argument.
5. Although this book has focused on social movements as examples of contact
zones, opportunities for direct contact are by no means limited to social
movements, as I point out in Chapter 1.
6. In Nishio, Kusaka, and Yamaguchi (2015), we described how Japanese student
volunteers in work camps encountered Hansen’s Disease survivors in China
and rural villagers in the Philippines, developing strong emotional relationships
and admiration that dismantled collective categories and hierarchical orders
based on medical histories, nationality, and so on.

7. As for those who go to work overseas—as many as one Philippine citizen

out of ten—the new mutualities they cultivate while abroad may have the
potential to overcome the moral divisions between classes
BOOK: PATRONAGE DEMOCRACY IN
THE PHILIPPINES
About the Author:
About the Book:

Patronage
● Patronage is a divisible benefit that politicians distribute to individual voters, campaign
workers, or contributors in exchange for political support. Patronage involves the
exchange of public benefits for political support or party advantage.

Paul Hutchcroft
● refers patronage to a material resource while clientelism pertains to the personalistic
relationship of power.

James Scott
● outlined the parameters between patrons and clients as an exchange relationship “in
which an individual (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection
or benefits for his client. (clientelism is an exchange relationship)

Carl Landè
● was the first to sketch an idealized traditional version of rural patronage politics in Ph.
Dyadic ties : patron who dispensed material goods and services and dependent clients
who receive it.

Patron-client formed the basis of local factionalism.

Pre-martial law system with 2 party system was anchored by 2 factions in local areas.

Rise of the Machines

● Political machines are specialized organizations set up to mobilize and influence voter
outcomes through the dispensation of social, economic, or material benefits. Patronage
(jobs, services, favors, and money distributed to voters and supporters)
● Enter the brokers (mediator of patron and client)
● A political operator is usually tasked with carrying out both legitimate and illegitimate
special operations for political campaigns.

Patronage and the State

● Pork barrel as an instrument in patronage politics. (Credit claiming and political
machine building)
Clans & Dynasty
● Clans have been the building blocks of politics in the Philippines. Adaptive strategies has
enabled political clans to maintain their dominance in congressional and local politics.
● Rival political families
● Family as political unit is effective (as it establishes loyalty, alliance, and trust.

In redemocratization in 1986, political clans and dynasties continue to play an active role
in the Philippine politics.

Thin & Fat dynasty

● Populism strikes back
● Populist targets class. sometimes abused the ideology. Champion the poor
● In 2016, the return of a nationalist-populist
● Duterte the rise of populist public who are angered by hypocrisy of liberal reformism
● After Duterte, it is most likely that populist politics will continue especially in local level.

Chapter 1
Reciprocal exchange (Utang na loob in Filipinos)
Case study: 2nd District of Isabela

● The main point of this chapter proves the reciprocity as an intervening variable on how
local politicians maintain political control. Reciprocity as a cultural binding agent.
● In 2016, elections were greatly leveraged by Albano-Dy tandem. Dy Sr governor of
Isabela from 1971-1992. F. marcos was their patron. Faustino Dy Sr and Rodolfo Albano
started the alliance
● In 2004, Gracia Grace Padaca unseated Dy Jr as governor. (Only lasted for 2 terms and
replaced by Faustino Dy III.
● In 2010, resurgence of alliance between Albanos and Dys. Alliance continue from 2013
and 2016 elections. In 2016 they had different political parties but the alliance or tandem
is still intact.
● Patron client in politics: as long as the patron continues to deliver the goods and
services, the clients continue the debt cycle. (Repetitive indebtedness)

Longterm Strat
Ex: Educational assistance (appreciated by whole family) it is to build relationships with
scholar’s family and the scholar itself.

Medium Term Strat

● Ex: medical assistance, funeral support, and wedding contributors
● Card holders were priority at MAYOR ROBERTO LUNGAN
● Short term strat ex: vote buying

Limited transference of reciprocity

 ● Moral economy where peasant behavior is rooted in ensuring survival. When the political
family seems to unwillingly help services, the reciprocity of their supporters may stop.

CHAPTER 2: MANILA
● 2016 election Erap won as mayor (2k vote lead) vs Lim and Bagatsing
● Erap served two terms (ERAP, PARE)
● Erap para sa mahirap
● Political brokers and Brokerage
● Balance linkage with access to resources, thereby producing power
● Manila is divided by 6 congressional districts and 897 barangay

4 families dominated politics during post authoritarian (manage to build political machine
on a vast network of political brokers and campaign operators)
● The Atienzas
● The Bagatsings
● The Lacunas
● The Lopezes

5G’s in political campaign

● Gold
● Graphs
● Gmmicks
● Gags
● Groups

Entertainment style of campaigning rather than policy and platforms

In sum, the 2016 Manila mayoralty race, having been a very tight three-cornered fight, saw the
deployment of notable material and logistical resources (gold) to support an electoral campaign
strategy devel opment based on voter profiling and other information gathering and processing
technics (graphs) for knowledge-based decision making.

In strategy execution, the effectiveness of brokers may be seen in their abil ity to manage
networks (groups) bearing entertaining campaign narratives (gags and gimmicks) to arm their
candidate and thus have a fighting chance in the political battle. These elements are
meaningfully connected in the process of political brokerage.

Postscripts: Isko Rises Asenso Manileño

Chapter 3
Moral politics & patronage in Makati
● Binay as populist, Peña as reformist
● 2nd district of Makati (patronage and vote buying) cinema pass, health services, bday
cakes
 ● The reformist side asking for help to middle class but it wasn’t enough to win the race.
● Concept of moral capital as an important tool of a narrative justifying certain forms of
patronage while delegitimizing the opponent’s patronage.
● First district- high class
● 2nd district - underdeveloped infrastructure
● 2010 election- Roxas won in 1st District
● The rest voted for Binay
● In July 22 2014, first plunder case of Jejomar Binay and JunJun binay (overpriced
construction of city building 1.255 billion pesos.
● Ernesto allegedly bagman of Jejomar Binay broke his alliance due to (broken promises
of Binay to endorse him)

Moral Personas and Corruption

● Binay formed an informal relationship with the poor by (eating, jogging, and interacting
with them)
● In jejeomar binay’s first term: he gave a yellow card to senior citizens (a free medical
services grant ship)
● Peña’s burden was building his own legitimacy within Binay networks and territories in
such a limited span of time.
● Con. Nemesio Yabut Jr., acted as Mr Expose (paninira kay Peña at kay Karla)
● Biggest attack: was the deterioration of the local hospital, Ospital ng Makati.

Chapter 4
● Edgar Egay Erice in 2nd district of Caloocan.
● Outsider politicians have to rely on a skillful ability to mimic the social, economic, and
political
● Advantages possessed by political dynasties.
1. sustained deployment of incumbency patronage
2. gaining prominence in the national political arena
3. contracting social capital brokers
4. delicate balancing of political dynasties
● First district: subdivisions and resettlement area
● 2nd: highly urbanized central business district
● Asistio and Malonzo are twi warring ruling families in Caloocan.
● 2004- Erice battled a four way race for Mayor. Macario Asistio, Gigi Malonzo. Enriquw
Echiverri
● In 2010, Erice won as VM under LP (popularity of Pnoy during that time) Mayor Echiverri
also won in 2013
● 2016- he teamed up with Oca Malapitan and files an anti-dynasty bill in the 17th
congress
● Reelection in 2016 election is easier (due to influence and pork barrels)

Campaign Strategy- focused on his past achievements rather than focusing about his future
plans. (Maipakita na may nagagawa siya)
(House to house campaign)
● Erice aa LP’s political affairs has given him the NATIONAL SPOTLIGHT
● As such, Erice is a hybrid in Philippine local politics a traditional politician without a
dynastic pedigree who has a national political portfolio and governs through patronage
with the support of local ruling families.
● Erice displayed the power of Patronage in the Philippines. Not a policy-oriented
legislative (more on using pork barrels in building establishments near slum areas)

VISIBLE TO THE EYES OF PEOPLE

The advantage of incumbency patronage
● the power of sustained and iterated patronage
● past projects are reflection of his “better” leadership and therefore backlash to his
opponents “who are non-participative in the society” or “not helpful in the community”
● Brokers or liders established a “bridged” relationship between Erice and voters.

This chapter argues that the mechanism for this weak national-local linkage or inability of
local politicians to deliver votes for national politicians is the increasing dependence on
brokers.

Brokers play the role of supplementing politicians' social capital with their more extensive social
network. Instead of politicians directly interacting with voters, they contract brokers to perform
this function, as they are more embedded within a community's social fabric. As such, "new
men"-professional politicians like Erice have been able to mobilize votes without necessarily
having a social standing among the voters themselves. The use of these brokers replaced the
prestige possessed by long-entrenched dynasties.
However, there are limits to the ability of brokers to mobilize votes.
The brokers' social capital and extensive network are rooted in the community to which they
belong. Outside of their community, they have no mobilizing power.

BROKERS HAVE LIMITED POWER (MORE ON LOCAL POLITICS)

● Therefore the party system in the Philippines IS WEAK.
● WE can see the weak national-local linkage

Conclusion: New men require to have mobilize resources, access to office, or alliances to
political dynasties

Chapter 5 CamSur

Race of the Machines

● Luis Villafuerte Sr - head of the patriarch
● L-Ray Villafuerte - Son
● Migz Villafuerte - Grandson
 ● In 2009, L-Ray won as governor and established its OWN machineries and allies. (Luis
no longer controls his son nor his grandson)
● In 2013, luis vs his grandson for governor. Migz won the election (still the governor and
last term) The integration of LP at NP (for Migz) was a success during the 2016 election.
● L-ray and Migz had a stronger political machines (members were incumbent)

Machines are said to be the building block in Philippine politics.

● Strat: to use propaganda and money with h2h campaign (more of building informal
relationship to liders and voters)

Argument: the strength and reliability of a political machine are heavily dependent on
1. the extent of political power of its patron
2. the resource base of the machine (incumbency and easy access to resources)
3. the efficiency and reliability of the municipal and barangay level machine components

CamSur is the largest province in the Bicol Region and divided into 5 congressional
districts. Source of income is agriculture.
● Calabanga is the bigest town composed of 48 barangay.
● Naga City is chartered city as 2nd class city (commerce, industry, and education)

Third District
● Leni Robredo was the representative of the Third District who defeated Nelly Villafuerte,
wife of Luis Sr in 2013. Jesse Robredo was a nephew of Luis Sr.,
● Jesse Robredo started his career with his uncle’s endorsement as Naga City mayor
● Naga City became a model of good governance
● Luis Sr was appointed by Marcos in 1973 (KBL) and won as a governor. In 1983, he
resigned and fell out of favor with Marcos. Thus, he lost national power.

Held power in 1992 and served from 1995-2004

● In 2010, Luis Sr won as representative of 2nd district. L-Ray won his last term as
governor.
● To divide Cam Sur in HB 4820, Noli Fuentebella and Luis Sr were allied.
● Luis Sr., is somewhat mentor in local politics. Personal and clientelistic ties was
sustained.
● L-Ray strat was more instrumentalistic than personal. He provides political machine (use
of short-terms material inducements) (FUNDING PROJECTS, BUDGET FOR LOCAL
POLITICS)
● Migz gets the vote of the youth througb pick up lines, (pa cute)
● The strategy if VISIBILITY and Proximity is very important in order for new political
players to be introduced

H2H visit composed of

1. liders (local brokers)
2. permanent group of leaders and volunteers
 ● Campaign head is responsible for searchings barangay liders
● Survey to calculate the winnability
● Campaign in centro - accomplishments, policy, platforms
● Far-flung areas focus on entertainment

2 days before the election, strategies change. (Use of money)

In municipal level (liders and coordinators have a stronger relationship than higher positions)
Local politics in municipal level tend to be more “adaptive” to the behavior of its people.
(Strategies were based on what the people want to receive)

Chap 6 Enduring Kinship Networks

● Cebu as QC of the South
● Cebu as Counterpart of Manila
● Ranked 5th (city with biggest asset)

2016 elections:
● Tommy Osmeña regained the mayoral seat
● Margot Osmeña his wife, received the highest votes in council race.

How dynasty regained CONTROL of Cebu City in 2016 local elections.

● Bando Osmena is a kinship network
● Osmena - business, politics, are family affair
● 1990s “Ceboom” by Osmena

Tommy was able to secure a strong hold of command votes by exhaustively utilizing the BOPK,
a kinship rooted on the role of liders and their families in brokering. (A strong machine politics
and support of INC)

Mayor Mike Rama (accused of illegal fund from syndicates and accused of being drug addict)

Chapter 7
Cebu Province Clients as brokers
A town in 7th district of cebu: How local clients serve as power brokers to candidates in
higher offices.

The dominance of LP in Cebu Province

● The campaign organizational structures of LP and Cebu from provincial level down to
sitios and household were similar. All activities were planned and controlled with overall
coordinator (often the candidates below provincial level). Local liders usually are
barangay captains.
● Davide, Hilario III, Garcia Winston for Gov
8 towns of 7th District are mainly poor
● Dumanjug & Badian (3rd class municipality)
● Moalboal & Alegria (4th class municpality)
● Ronda, Alcantara, Malabuyoc, and ginatilian (5th class)

2019 gubernatorial election contested by Davide (LP) and Garcia (1Cebu)

● Davide won by a narrow margin over Garcia (47.79 and 46.03 percent)
● LP worked on local counterparts. (Incumbent mayors)

Concludes that: connections with local politicians Are important. (Dyadic relationship)
governor as patron (interdependence, reciprocity, and relationship)
● The job of a broker is to deliver VOTES to its boss.
● Dumanjug a bailiwick of Garcia
● The mayor of dumanjug (Efren Gica - LP) is an ally of Davide (who receives bulk of
funds by the provincial)
● Mayor Gica provided a 48.89 percent votes for Davide despite of bailiwick of Garcia in
this town.
● 2019 elections (PDP-laban and 1Cebu coalition was not effective to win the election)

This chapter studies the connection of clientelism and brokerage. Brokerage can be seen
within the framework of clientelism.

This chapter also observed that as brokerage gets more local, it tends to become more
clientelist. This is related to the other observation that certain ties are weak (i.e., shaping
non-clientelist brokerage), while others are strong (i.e., shaping clientelist brokerage).

Chapter 8 Iloilo Province:

The Linkage of National- Local Brokerage

Political clans still reign in local politics. In iloilo, each district is a bailiwick of a particular political
clan. They contour local dynamics. “Fat dynasties”
● Garin control 1st district
● Gorricetas 2nd district
● Defensor 3rd District
● Biron 4th district
● Tupas 5th district

The influence of a power broker that creates strong ties between national and local
politics. (This studies the importance of (not relying on political dynasties in local politics, and
therefore the survival of their families rely on strong political brokers). It will also study the role of
Sen. Franklin Drilon in facilitating linkages in national and local politics.
Iloilo is located in southeastern portion of Panay Island (bordered by Capiz and Jintotolo
Channel in north, Guimaras Strait in south, Panay gulf in east, and Antique in west.

Franklin Drilon- Politician after Martial law

3rd place in Bar exam, from UP Law
● became successful in his paralegal practices
● he was elected for 4 (six year terms in senate)
● he is known as the big man for having major positions in the senate
● his projects like Iloilo International Airport and convention were controversial
● but his projects made Iloilo a bailiwick of LP
● the political triumvirate (the fusion of Defensors, Garins, and Tupases for the
improvement of Iloilo)

Drilon, Defensor, and Tupas were graduates of UP College of Law and are members of
the Sigma Rho Fraternity
● fraternity connects them to big personalities
● fraternity provides network of support and patronage from fraternity alumni (traditional
kinship)
● LP suffered critical loses due to Duterte Administration
● Drilon’s power will be surely challenged.

Chapter 9 Bacolod City Machine Politics and INC Advantage

● Machine politics is importance due to weak party system in the Philippines.

Political dynasties and patronage coexist with political machines.
● Critical role of INC (bloc voting) in tightly contested 2016 congressional race in Bacolod
between Thaddeus Thaddy Sayson and Gregorio Gatsaya.
● Macahado 1974 claimed that political machines would replace political families due to
urbanization. (Argument not proven)

Political machines serve as patronage and campaign organizations

● Campaign need a lot of funds (or oil in a machine)
● Political machines should be well thought
● Political machines do not guarantee electoral victory (still important)
INC votes conversion rate is about 64 and 84 percent.
● Endorsement of inc: only jose avelino and cojuangco did not win the presidential election
● Yields 600k to 1M votes for senatorial candidates
● INC votes can spell the difference in tight presidential, senatorial, and local races.

● Bacolod, sugar capital with 61 barangays

● 3rd in BPO companies
● Grupo Progreso got most of endorsement of INC

Bing Leonardia won as mayor in 2016 elections

Greg Gatsaya won as representative
Saycon adapted mixed of traditional strategy

Kapihan town hall & house to house campaign

● he focused on his platforms and done projects in his speech
somewhat affected by Mayor Monico Puentevella graft case in 2006, after 9 years, the
Ombudsman imposed a 90-day suspension on the mayor.

Gatsaya (former radio reporter)

● Posters, tarpaulins
● campaign rallies
● paid advertisement in local newspapers

Both teams maintain a network of family, purok (ward) cluster, barangay liders (brokers).
● liders are expected to recruit members and produce votes
● Incumbency & INC votes made GP won in 2019 elections

Chapter 10
Lanao del Norte
Generational Shifts in Clan Politics
● The Dimaporos are long-standing political families
● provincial rep since 1978, strong ties with Marcos
● Still regain his seat in post-marcos
● with graft cases

Ali Dimaporo
● Patriarch, used violence, fraud, coercion to maintain the family’s political machines.the
2nd gen of Dimaporo is allied by Christian political nemesis, Quibranzas to maintain
“peace”.
● 3rd gen, Khalid Dimaporo (a narrative of a resilent and strong Christian-Muslim alliance
in the province.
● Abdullah Dimaporo attained American education (the use of patronage) ans maintain
the Maranao governance (at the same time initiating infrastructures)
● Ali’s rise to dominance can be traced to the defeat of Salvador Lluch in 1959 and 1961
gubernatorial elections.
● the marriage of Abdullah and Imelda (symbolizes peace between Dimaporos and
Quilbranza)

Karomoton (now Sultan Naga Dimaporo), a controversial place (registered voters

exceeded the total votes received)
● controversial that Dimaporos were allegedly using violence and coercion during election
day.
● Dimaporo was accused of dictatorship towards the pork barrel
 ● Limited budget for his political nemesis
● Lacson Lantud owned a private army (with bigger machines and guns than the army of
Lanao
● Eleanor Dimaporo Lantud (cousin of Abdullah), lost the 2016 gubernatorial election
and Imelda Dimaporo won.
● Pantao Ragat was raid (powerful guns and machines were confiscated inside the house
of Lantud)
● Lantud is also a powerful family (uses coercion and violence too)
● Khalid, eldest son of Abdullah, (is a progressive politician). He prioritized the
improvement of Lanao (in business and tourism)
● machine of networks, brokers, kin, religion
● importance of well built relationship among politicians and brokers
● importance of well built relationship between politicians and voters
● importance of elections in Philippine politics

COMELEC needs to address itd long-term institutional issues and build its capacity to make it a
leader among constitutional commissions in the region
COMELEC needs to monitor the spending of funds of politicians
COMELEC needs to improve their system towards the exchange positions, withdrawals
COMELEC needs to reform its system.