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Memory ecologies

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MSS0010.1177/1750698016645274Memory StudiesHoskins

Article

Memory Studies

Memory ecologies
2016, Vol. 9(3) 348­–357
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1750698016645274
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Andrew Hoskins
University of Glasgow, UK

Abstract
The individual and collective and also cultural domains have long constituted challenging boundaries for
the study of memory. These are often clearly demarcated between approaches drawn from the human
and the social sciences and also humanities, respectively. But recent work turns the enduring imagination
– the world view – of these domains on its head by treating memory as serving a link between both the
individual and collective past and future. Here, I employ some of the contributions from Schacter and
Welker’s Special Issue of Memory Studies on ‘Memory and Connection’ to offer an ‘expanded view’ of
memory that sees remembering and forgetting as the outcome of interactional trajectories of experience,
both emergent and predisposed.

Keywords
collective memory, connective memory, connective turn, individual memory, new memory ecology, nexus
analysis

Introduction
Memory is egocentric yet deeply social. Psychologists have seen memory as a fundamental condi-
tion of consciousness and unsurprisingly have constructed a variety of complex models of indi-
vidual remembering (Parkin, 1993: 3–25). Yet, memories also require distinct social frameworks,
patterned ways of framing the flow of remembered actions, images, sounds, smells, sensations and
impressions. Without social frameworks, memories would flicker like dreams without anchors in
the theatre of consciousness, in the paramount reality of everyday life (Schutz, 1962) (Boden and
Hoskins, 1995). This is a key faultline between the human and the social sciences and humanities
in memory studies: How can we account for memory without over-privileging or underplaying its
individual and social or cultural dimensions? Where does remembering and forgetting begin and
end: in the brain, the body, the group or in media?
A more productive way of formulating these questions is to look for memory as a link or con-
nection between the individual and the collective, rather than attempting to establish its location in
either domain. And this is precisely the task set by Daniel Schacter and Michael Welker in editing
this Special Issue of Memory Studies on ‘Memory and Connection’.1 And a principal way they and
their contributors achieve this is through offering fresh and exciting ways to illuminate memory as
a vehicle of connection between past and present.

Corresponding author:
Andrew Hoskins, College of Social Sciences, University of Glasgow, 66 Oakfield Avenue, Glasgow G12 8LS, UK.
Email: andrew.hoskins@glasgow.ac.uk
Hoskins 349

For me, this issue constitutes a major marker of a much broader ‘connective turn’ (Hoskins,
2011a, 2011b). In reflecting here on some of these contributions, I explore the value of ‘connectiv-
ity’ in aiding interdisciplinary advances in the field, consider some of its influences (acknowledged
or otherwise) and, finally, I offer ‘ecology’ as a holistic perspective for revealing and imagining
memory’s multiple connections and functions.

Movement
In sociology, John Urry (2000) set a new ‘agenda of mobility’ for this century in his Sociology
Beyond Societies. He interrogates how material transformations remaking the social include
‘diverse mobilities that, through multiple senses, imaginative travel, movements of images and
information, virtuality and physical movement, are materially reconstructing the ‘social as society’
into the ‘social as mobility’ (Urry, 2000: 2). And this more mobile or fluid conception of social
relations is increasingly influential in accounts of memory. Thus, the relatively fixed or fixable (in
time and/or space) concepts of ‘prosthetic’, ‘collective’ and ‘cultural’ memory, for example, are
being complicated by the ‘transcultural’ (Crownshaw, 2011), ‘transindividual’ (Stiegler, 2010),
‘travelling’ (Erll, 2011) and ‘multidirectional’ (Rothberg, 2009). Memory in these accounts (pre-
dominantly from the humanities) tends to treat memory as mobile, unsettled, emergent.
What then drives such mobilities? The unsettling of memory is part of an overarching trend
towards the greater connectivity of individuals and groups (with themselves as well as with each
other) in effect part of a living archive following the connective turn. This turn is the massively
increased abundance, pervasiveness and potential accessibility of digital technologies, devices and
media that shape an ongoing re-calibration of time, space (and place) and memory by individuals
and groups as they connect with, inhabit and constitute both dense and diffused social networks
(Hoskins, 2011b). And in these circumstances in which connectivity itself is a new interlocutor of
experience, as in the case of digital networks, the very categories of the individual and of the col-
lective and their relationship and boundaries are recast.
Even the sciences-of-the-mind increasingly search for cognition – the mental process of aware-
ness, perception, remembering – outside of the head, extended and distributed across social and
cultural worlds. The connective turn has busted human memory well and truly out of its containers
– mind, body, skin – while it seems to have pulled memory in-the-world closer to the self – social,
cultural, collective. But even aside from its digital drivers, connectivity helps us to imagine the
recasting of the individual and collective to bring focus on the multiple functions of memory. For
example, ‘connective memory’ (Hoskins, 2011a) is memory as emergent shaped as individuals and
groups encounter or interact with objects, interfaces and others, in an ongoing fashion.
This moves us away from memory as fixed, competitive and as a ‘zero-sum game’ (Olick, 2016;
Rothberg, 2009: 3) to more open and productive encounters. For example, Young (2016) sees the
breaking down of the distinction between the individual and the collective in the form of Germany’s
national ‘Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe’. Young was a member of the Berlin Senate
appointed commission that recommended Peter Eisenman’s design for a field of waving stelae as
the above ground element of this memorial. He explains,

Able to see over and around these pillars, visitors would have to find their way through this field of stelae, on
the one hand, even as they would never actually get lost in or overcome by the memorial act. In effect, they will
make and choose their own individual spaces for memory, even as they do so collectively. (Young, 2016)

Young highlights the memorial’s seemingly oppositional or contradictory visitor experiences: indi-
vidual/collective, lonely/belonging, noise/silence. These are effected by movement, both of the
350 Memory Studies 9(3)

visitor moving through the stelae and the ‘multiple and variegated sizes’ of the stelae, so ‘The land
sways and moves beneath these pillars so that each one is some 3 degrees off vertical: we would
not be reassured by such memory, but now disoriented by it’ (Young, 2016).
For Young (2016), then, there is co-existence between, and at times simultaneity of, individual
and collective experience in navigating the memorial, contrasting with the overbearing effects of
some monuments, which tend to dominate human scale. Thus, the ‘human-proportions’ of the wav-
ing stelae ‘put people on an even-footing with memory’. Achieving even-footedness with memory,
in Young’s terms, above, is not straightforward in relation to ideas of the individual and the collec-
tive. And I now turn to mention briefly some of these antagonisms of memory.

Mind the gap

The individual and the collective have long been seen in unequal relation to one another, or, at
least, that one needs the other. Durkheim (1915), for instance, argued that individual consciousness
was lacking when not part of the social force gathered in and of the present moment:

Without symbols, social sentiments could only have a precarious existence. Though very strong as long as
men are together and influence each other reciprocally, they exist only in the form of recollections after the
assembly has ended, and when left to themselves, these become feebler and feebler, for since the group is
no longer present and active, individual temperaments easily regain the upper hand. (p. 231)

Thus, the strength of the group bonding of Durkheim’s assembled, co-present collective con-
science diminishes in time with its diffusion. Furthermore, Ferrarotti (1990) argues, ‘memory is
not simply an individual question. It has a base, a link with the community. It is at bottom a
community experience. It involves the group, the collective unconscious, a stream of conscious-
ness which links everything’ (p. 30). It is easy to go on with examples of both individual and
collective-dominant models and studies of memory, but what can be clearly stated is that there
is little consensus within or across fields as to the definition and characteristics of collective
memory (Harris et al., 2008: 215).
And there is an increasing discomfort claimed by some of the leading theorists of collective
memory, even as they continue nonetheless to employ the term as pivotal to their work. For
instance, as Jeffrey Olick (2008) states, ‘I agree with the charge that collective memory over-
totalizes a variety of retrospective products, practices, and processes. Nevertheless … Because
of its general sensitizing powers, I use “collective memory” as the guiding concept for my own
work’ (p. 152). So, as Bill Niven (2008) observes, ‘while authors distance themselves from the
term “collective memory,” they still appear to operate within its parameters’ (p. 428). Barry
Schwartz (2008), for example, summarizes, ‘The welter of criticism, plainly, contains no con-
crete alternatives’, and he goes onto say that ‘The confusion … refers to the analysis, not the
reality, of collective memory’ (p. 307).
Elsewhere, collective memory is much more explicitly contested and rejected. For example, the
very influential historian of war, Jay Winter (2006), states, ‘The loose usage of the term “collective
memory” – framed to mean virtually anything at all – in every corner of the arts and humanities,
has persuaded me to abandon the term whenever possible’ (p. 4). Instead, Winter (2006) is effective
in his usage of ‘collective remembrance’ as ‘it points to time and place and above all, to evidence,
to traces enabling us to understand what groups of people try to do when they act in public to con-
jure up the past’ (p. 5). Thus, overall, collective memory has become somewhat ungrounded as a
concept suffering from its voluminous and sprawling application to describe and position an array
of alleged group rememberings and circumstances.
Hoskins 351

Some important guidance however has been provided by Jeffrey Olick (1999, 2008) and not
least through his influential distinction between collective and collected memories. Collected
memories, he suggests, are memories based on the individual, ‘the aggregated individual memories
of members of a group’ (Olick, 1999: 338), and collective memory presupposes that there is some-
thing that transcends the individual, the idea that ‘symbols and their systems of relations have a
degree of autonomy from the subjective perceptions of individuals’ (Olick, 1999: 341). Collective
memory is then more than the sum of its (individual) parts.
In response to these challenges and the trends in mobility and connectivity referred to above,
there is a growing body of work that does not accept the individual and the collective as separate
spheres, but rather attends to their interplay, interaction, interdependence and fusion, ‘offering new
comprehensive perspectives’ (Brockmeier, 2015: 200). For example, Merck et al. (2016), drawing
upon Hirst and Stone (2015) in seeing memory as constructive, reject the ‘bifurcation’ of the indi-
vidual and the collective. Rather, they argue,

Each recollection is built out of not only an internalized potential to remember, but also external factors,
including social factors. As a result, memories are not stored in the head, encoded in some yet understood
way in neurological tissue. Rather they grow out of the interactions between the internal and external.

All of this sounds entirely reasonable, but what is the evidence for a growing attention in memory
studies to individual and collective connectivity? And what is its empirical basis? And, on critiques
of collective memory, what constitutes, in Schwartz’s terms (above), ‘concrete alternatives’?

The connective future

In studies of memory, the future has long been expected, or at least what became the present was
‘built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organised past reactions or
experience’ (Bartlett, 1932: 213). And the significance of ‘schemata’ (after Bartlett) in the organi-
zation of this experience has been revived since the 1970s (Brown and Hoskins, 2010; Neisser,
2000 [1982]). This idea also has a formulation in sociology, viewing each moment as being lived
and experienced as what Garfinkel (1992) calls ‘another next first time’ (p. 186), namely, a recog-
nizable and sequentially placed new moment, a patterned new moment understood because of its
likeness to previous moments and because of its location in the joint unfolding of biography and
history (Boden and Hoskins, 1995). But there is something of a leap from making experience intel-
ligible through what Connerton (1989) calls ‘an organized body of expectations based on recollec-
tion’ (p. 6) to relating memory to imagining the future.
Yet, there is a growing body of work that calls for a refocusing of memory studies to rebalance its
past-oriented modus operandi to more fully account for the influence of the future as imagined,
desired and feared by individuals and groups, on how the past is remembered, interpreted and man-
aged and vice versa (Gutman et al., 2010: 1; Szpunar and Szpunar, 2015). And contributors to this
issue on memory and connection demonstrate that thinking about the future employs certain kinds of
memory in particular ways. MacLeod (2016) argues that although future-thinking involves both
semantic and episodic knowledge systems, because of the comparable uncertainty over what will
happen as to what has happened, the role for semantic memory in constructing the future is stronger.
Merck et al. (2016) bring their (psychological) empirical work on mental time travel to bear on
understandings of collective memory (two areas they claim are usually divided through their param-
eters of the individual and the collective). They observe that a great deal of collective memory schol-
arship draws on large communities, including the nation. Moving beyond this kind of collective
knowledge of national history and events,2 they focus on another kind of collective memory in the
352 Memory Studies 9(3)

form of scientific knowledge, namely, of climate change. And in a turn from traditional experimental
work that compares recollections and prospections to assess simulations of the future, Merck et al.
show by selectively shaping the exposure of participants to knowledge about climate change, this not
only shapes memories but also imaginings of the future of the world’s climate.
Their version of the collective (following Cuc et al., 2007) is ‘socially shared retrieval-induced
forgetting’ (SSRIF), whereby both rememberers and listeners suffer from the same pattern of selec-
tive forgetting. This collective work is often characterized by psychologists as ‘collaborative’ (see
Harris et al., 2011) and also here as ‘socially shared’. It does not have the same scale of the nation
or the community, but possesses a perhaps more intimate quality through the interaction between,
but perhaps not being transcendent of, its constituent members, and in this way sits somewhere
between Olick’s ‘collected’ and ‘collective’ distinction (above).
Of course, a major challenge for any claims as to the constituents and the force of collective
memory is in establishing any kind of consensus around the threshold for that collective. And it is
perhaps indicative of the conceptual and everyday power of the term ‘collective memory’ that a
number of psychologists are running with the term, rather than keeping with merely the shared, the
collaborative and the group. However, by shifting focus to both forgetting and the future, Merck
et al. contribute to this issue’s development of understandings of the shifting relations of memory
between the individual and others.
Conway et al. (2016) also bring forgetting and the future together in their ‘remembering-imag-
ining system’ (RIS). This they see as a form of extended consciousness wherein memories of the
recent past shape imaginings and expectations of the near future. They argue this functions as part
of a ‘goal system’ that through offering access to memories of recent events, expectations of the
future are plausibly imagined and current goal-related activities are tracked. Equally, if episodic
memory is impaired in some way, Conway et al. argue that this would also constrain capacity to
imagine future events that are ‘linked to “now”’ and thus plausible. Through the use of a ‘Mental
Time Travel Questionnaire’ for a patient (‘HCM’) who had lost the ability to form new episodic
memories, Conway et al. (2016) found that his future episodic simulations were highly implausi-
ble. Thus, they argue, ‘HCM is a patient not only stranded in the past but also in the future’.
Conway et al.’s idea of the RIS has some interesting corollaries in the social sciences and the
humanities in terms of the expanded present and its consequences. For example, the overburdening
of the present is seen to threaten the prospects of future. This is through the past made present that
proffers increasingly uncomfortable cohabitation with a series of ‘memory shocks’ (Hoskins, 2015;
Lowenthal, 2012). So, rather than the memory boom’s turn to the past, today increasingly there is
a turn on a past that is increasingly alien and unfathomable. In other words, the past has lost its
reassuring schema that once helped render the incoming present intelligible and manageable. And
this social impairment of memory (through overload and non-recognition in this case) distracts
from proper attention being given to care for the future.
Relatedly, the capacity to imagine future events that are ‘linked to “now”’and thus plausible in
Conway et al.’s terms (above) seems diminished at a societal level and beyond. There is said to be
a growing disjuncture between the effects present actions have on the future and the capacity to
imagine that future. For example, Adam and Groves (2007) argue,

Since the valorisation of speed is a central feature of the industrial way of life and its operational logic,
regard for the long-term future or concern for the wellbeing of future generations of humans and fellow
beings becomes a contradiction in terms. (p. 112)

They also state, ‘While our actions reach ever further into the future, our perspective and concern
continue to contract to the operational realm of the present’ (Adam and Groves, 2007: 111). And,
Hoskins 353

that operational realm of the present, I would add, is increasingly dominated by a significantly
unsettled past (Hoskins, 2015).
Perhaps the other side of Conway et al.’s notion of plausibility in making the imaginary move
through past-present-future is uncertainty. In studies of media, for example, ‘premediation’ is seen
as one strategy in attempting to bring the uncertainty and risk of the future under some kind of
control on the basis of the experience of the past. Grusin (2010: 4) for example, argues,

Premediation is not about getting the future right, but about proliferating multiple remediations of the
future both to maintain a low level of fear in the present and to prevent a recurrence of the kind of
tremendous media shock that the United States and much of the networked world experienced on 9/11. (cf.
Erll, 2008: 392–393)

And John Tulloch and I show that there was a kind of forgetting of the term ‘neoliberalism’ within
many parts of the British newspaper industry in the wake of the shock of the Global Financial
Crisis as part of a wider competitive reconfiguration of the discourses of neoliberalism when the
future of capitalism itself was seen at stake (Hoskins and Tulloch, 2016). At such times, the past
becomes overwrought through media and political deployment of the shock and uncertainty of the
recent past measured against resurrected ‘media templates’ (Hoskins, 2004; Kitzinger, 2000) of
earlier shocks deemed comparative, to arrest the future in one direction, or another. And it is pre-
cisely through the extended present of catastrophic events that different kinds of futures are opened
up – rendered ‘plausible’ – in Conway et al.’s terms (above). And it may be that the plausibility test
for an individual’s effective future imaginary (‘episodic future simulations’) being related to the
strength of its association with recent episodic memories (Schacter and Madore, 2016) could also
hold for the recent collective past and collective future imaginaries.

Ecologies of memory
One way to connect the individual and the collective is through affording greater attention to the
environment in which remembering and forgetting take place, as with Young’s example, above.
Fivush and Merill (2016) adopt this approach with autobiographical memories, showing how the
individual (at the centre) moves through different micro- and macro-systems or ‘ecologies’ over
time which provide multiple narratives around which identity and memory establish, develop
and cohere. For instance, they see the family as the core of a micro-system as the first and con-
tinuing principal ecology of development and this is embedded in the exo-system of ‘ecologies
that impinge on the child even if not directly experienced, such as the parent’s workplace’. And,
Fivush and Merill take the ‘outermost level’ as the macro-system ‘comprised of the cultural
constructs, social and economic conditions and history’. They stress the ‘permeable and dynami-
cally interacting’ character of these systems and the shared meaning constructed through indi-
viduals’ participation in them.
Fivush and Merill’s approach has similarities with Bartlett’s (1932) idea of the ‘organised set-
ting’ (p. 201) developed by Middleton and Brown (2005) who define it as ‘a complex of cognition
and emotion that is located within, and dependent on, the cultural and material particularities of
the local environment’ (p. 189). Middleton and Brown see remembering and forgetting as situated
activities where cultural settings, objects and discourses are interdependent with one another, in
effect imagining together the cultural/material approach of Young with the narrative focus of
Fivush and Merill.
Steven D Brown and I (2010) develop this work in our study of mediated commemorations in
which we identify the multiple forms, flows and iterations of the remembrances of the 2005 London
354 Memory Studies 9(3)

bombings as together constituting a ‘new memory ecology’. In other words, we advocate connect-
ing and working across the micro-, meso- and macro-levels (in Fivush and Merill’s terms) to illu-
minate the work of the ‘organised setting’ wherein persons must share schemata to achieve what
Bartlett (1932) called ‘cultural conventionalisation’, namely, the rendering intelligible of what is
unfamiliar through our existing frameworks of experience. And it is these schemata which are at
once personal, since they are the means of organizing experience, and collective, since they are
embedded in cultural settings and materials (Brown and Hoskins, 2010).
However, whereas Fivush and Merill’s (2016) model builds on Brofenbrenner’s (1979) ‘eco-
logical systems approach’ and McLean’s (2015) idea of ‘narrative ecologies’, Brown and I draw on
a long trajectory of work around the idea of ‘media ecology’.
‘Media ecology’ is a term that has been variously applied to highlight the impact of our interac-
tions with media, with others through media, and also increasingly the dynamic processes that
occur between media. Many associate the term itself with the late 1950s and 1960s work of
Marshall McLuhan, although it has a much longer history.3 ‘Media ecology’ is often traced to Neil
Postman in a 1970 edited volume High School 1980 that attempted to imagine the shape of
American secondary education a decade hence. Postman (1970) championed the teaching of media
ecology as an alternative to English in the future high school, namely, as ‘the study of media as
environments’, but also the ‘study [of] the interaction between people and their communications
technology’ (p. 161). For us, the study of the new memory ecology is founded upon similar princi-
ples of seeing the material and cultural environment in consort with cognition and emotion availed
through it to illuminate the emergence of remembering and forgetting (Brown and Hoskins, 2010).
But just as schemata of the mind predispose individual experience with a base-level of recol-
lected expectations, these recollections are also embedded in socio-cultural milieux that do not
float free of trajectories of experience and trajectories of memory. Tracing these connectivities in
and over time in the new memory ecology is a complex challenge. To this end, John Tulloch and I
(2016) in our exploration of the (re)ordering of the past by and through multiple connectivities of
times, actors, events in our study of the 2010–2011 Coroner’s Inquests into the 2005 London
bombings adapted Scollon and Scollon’s (2004) methodology of ‘nexus analysis’. This requires
‘the mapping of semiotic cycles of people, discourses, places, and mediational means involved in
the social actors we are studying’ (Scollon and Scollon 2004, viii; Hoskins and Tulloch 2016, 255).
Through our nexus analysis, we show how the memorial dynamics of the Coroner’s Inquests were
forged through the intersection of three elements of ‘social action’: the ‘discourses in place’ (the
set of immediate discourses relevant to the action of the person in that place at that time), the ‘inter-
action order’ (the various people and their social arrangement and unfolding dialogue in these
areas) and the ‘historical body’ of the actors (the multiple and sometimes conflicting aims and
experiences brought to that interaction).
And this model of nexus analysis shares some strikingly similar characteristics to Wang’s (2016)
cultural dynamic theory of autobiographical memory in seeing memory as emergent, embedded in
the shifting environment, yet also constrained by the historical body of the rememberers. For
Wang, autobiographical memory is not formed in isolation in the mind, but is ‘thoroughly contex-
tual’. Thus, ‘It can be viewed as an open system immersed in the cultural milieu where the indi-
vidual is in constant transaction with the environment’.
It is then through keeping the intersecting dimensions of the new memory ecology in play that
we can reveal the emergent articulations of remembering and forgetting, at once individual and
collective, rather than as siloed, static or set adrift. Making these connections across people, envi-
ronments and timescales requires an ‘expanded view’4 of remembering and forgetting, and con-
comitant bold forays into once alien disciplinary territories and new collaborations with those that
reside there. And, as I have argued, to realize connective memory is to invoke a world of
Hoskins 355

individuals and groups encountering and interacting with objects, interfaces and others, in a situ-
ated, ongoing and yet predisposed fashion.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes
1. This follows from a workshop sponsored by the Templeton Foundation held in June 2014.
2. For example, there are studies of individual and collective memory for public events abound and particu-
larly of surprising or shocking events said to form so-called ‘flashbulb memories’ (Hoskins, 2009).
3. For a comprehensive account of the history of competing versions of ‘media ecology’ and its theoretical
influences and uses, see Lance Strate (2006).
4. I borrow this concept from Steven D Brown and Paula Reavey (2015) who argue for an ‘expanded view’
of memory in the discipline of psychology, and my approach similarly emphasizes the value of focusing
on social and cultural interactions in strengthening interdisciplinary understandings of remembering and
forgetting.

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Author biography
Andrew Hoskins is interdisciplinary research professor in the College of Social Sciences at the University of
Glasgow. His research connects multiple aspects of emergent digital society – media, memory, conflict, secu-
rity and privacy – to explore holistically the interplay of contemporary media and memory ecologies. His
latest book (with John Tulloch) is Risk and Hyperconnectivity: Media and Memories of Neoliberalism (Oxford
University Press, 2016). He is founding Editor-in-Chief of Memory Studies. He holds an Arts and Humanities
Research Council (AHRC) Research Fellowship: ‘Memory and archival regimes: War diaries before and after
the connective turn’. This work interrogates the intersecting and contesting roles of individual and organiza-
tional memory of warfare through an original ethnography of Historical Branch (Army) in Whitehall (the
keepers of the official operational record of the British Army): http://archivesofwar.com

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