AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF TERRORISM IN

AFRICA: THE CASE OF ANSAR AL-SUNNA ARMED GROUP IN NORTHERN

MOZAMBIQUE
By

KENNETH KUNAKA

A FINAL YEAR PHD STUDENT WITH AFRICA UNIVERSITY, ZIMBABWE

Abstract

Terrorism has been used over the years as a strategy or means to express political, religious
or social grievances by aggrieved groups. This study analyses the concept of diffusion or
contagion as a major driver of the transnational spread of terrorism. The study analyses the
case of Ansar al-Sunna, operating in Cabo Delgado Province of Northern Mozambique,
with a view to establishing the potential for the diffusion of the terrorist insurgency beyond
Cabo Delgado. The study reviews similar terrorist insurgencies elsewhere in Africa which
subsequently spread or were replicated beyond the borders of countries of origin through
diffusion or contagion. Such cases include Boko Haram in West Africa, Al Shabaab in East
and Horn of Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islmic Maghreb (AQIM) and Allied Democratic Forces
in the Great Lakes region. The study concludes that the potential for diffusion of the group’s
operations beyond the Cabo Delgado Province remains omnipresent. This is given impetus
by the group’s alleged alliance with foreign fighters and affiliation to ISIS, which aims to
establish an Islamic caliphate in southern Africa. The study established that since the first
attack on Mocimboa da Pria District in October 2017, the activities of Ansar al-Sunna have
rapidly spread to other districts of Cabo Delgado Province and even beyond the border
across the Rovuma River into Tanzanian territory. This paper is based on a review of
literature from terrorism and counter-terrorism studies, insurgency studies, globalisation
studies and relevant mass media and Internet reports relating to the terrorist insurgency in
northern Mozambique.
Key Words: Cabo Delgado, Diffusion and Contagion, Insurgency, Terrorism,
Transnational.

INTRODUCTION

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With the end of the Cold War era in the early 1990s, the world is becoming more
interdependent, with conflict, crime and violence also becoming more international in their
scope, causes and impact (World Bank Group Policy Research Report, 2020:7). This is
reflected in the unfolding global conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the
Philippines, Nigeria, Somalia and the Republic of Yemen which accounted for 56 percent
of all terrorist attacks in the world and 74 percent of terrorism fatalities in 2017 (Ibid:20).
While civil wars, including terrorism, are by definition mostly armed conflicts within a
nation state, the conflicts are rarely, if ever, confined within the boundaries of a single
nation state (Forsberg, 2016:1; Li, 2015:1). Hence, with regards to their causes, conflicts
generally tend to be geographically clustered, with rebel groups moving back and forth
across porous borders, with cross-national networks of states and non-state actors being
engaged in trading arms for natural resources, and the effects of civil war being felt far
beyond the country in which it is fought.

Some of the spillover effects of transnational conflict include refugee inflows and
economic decline in neighbouring states and the attendant spread or contagion extension
of the actual conflict into neighbouring states. Graeme & Slobodien (2016:1) expand the
discourse on regional conflict diffusion to include five broad drivers, namely: weak states;
anticipated power shifts, both regional and domestic; porous borders; large refugee flows;
and the religiously-based non-state militant campaign against the state as an organising
principle of world politics.

Relatedly, Forsberg (2016) attributes the diffusion of conflict to three dimensions. Firstly,
that the causes of intra-state conflict are clustered; secondly, that an ongoing civil war spurs
additional conflict in a proximate location due to contagion; and thirdly, that conflicts are
connected within a region in terms of linkages between issues, actors, and motives. All
these criteria are generally partially or wholly applicable to the contemporary terrorist
insurgencies in the world, and the terrorist insurgency raging in Northern Mozambique
since 2017 is not an exception.

The prevalence of some or all of the afore-mentioned drivers in the continental and regional
context will therefore likely aid the diffusion or spread of conflict from one country to
another. In the case of the Middle East, these drivers have contributed to the rise of the

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Islamic State (IS), which has dominated the current terrorist insurgency in both Iraq and
Syria (Graeme & Slobodien (2016:7). The Syrian conflict has ignited a massive exodus of
Syrian, Libyan and Afghan refugee flows into Europe, while in the Middle East, refugees
have been a vehicle for diffusing conflict and challenging state resources (Ibid).

The current insurgency in Mozambique's Northern region has similarly attracted a plethora
of international actors, transcending national borders from as far afield as the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya and Tanzania, among others. The ripple negative
effects of the conflict are vivid in Mozambique, such as the mounting influx of refugees
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) overwhelming Pemba, the capital city of Cabo
Delgado Province, and the attendant humanitarian challenges of lack of food, shelter and
clothing.

While the initial attacks were confined to villages and districts within Cabo Delgado, the
escalation of the terrorist insurgency in 2019 saw the group attacking the village of Kitaya
in the Matwara region of the Republic of Tanzania, just across the Rovuma River bordering
Mozambique and Tanzania. This attack culminated in the deployment of Tanzanian troops
to the region to protect the country's border with Mozambique from insurgent attacks. This
paper explores how the theory of diffusion or contagion explains the potential for the
internal and transnational spread of the terrorist insurgency in northern Mozambique and
makes recommendations on possible mitigatory measures.

Terrorism Versus Insurgency

The two terms‘insurgency’ and ‘terrorism’ have sometimes been used interchangeably.
While these terms are generally contested in the sense that there is no agreed definition,
there is however, a clear distinction between them, particularly with regards to the mode
of operation or tactics, the objectives or motives of either terrorists or insurgents, as well
as their strategic or political intents (Jackson, 2011:19).

Various definitions have been proffered by different individuals, scholars and organisations
as they perceive terrorism (Young & Dugan, 2014). Terrorists generally promote illegal
acts of violence to harm or endanger the general population through instilling fear. The
Organisation of African Union (OAU), later to become the African Union (AU) in 2002,

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defined terrorism as "any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and
which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or
death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to
public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage" (AU
Report, 2016:13). In its Counter Terrorism Strategy (2015), the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) also adopted the AU definition of terrorism, with minor
additions. One distinct characteristic of terrorism is the indiscriminate use of violence
against the civilian population with the objective of causing fear and terror (Iyi, 2018:3).

Other scholars, such as Frisch (2011:2) and Yurtbay (2018:24) consider terrorism as a
strategy or tactic of insurgency rather than a separate organisational entity, defined by its
strategic choices, such as the targets attacked and the weapons and tactics used. Yet another
definition by Szayna et al (2017:36) delineates terrorism as an intentional act of violence
or threat of violence by a non-state actor. In their attempt to coerce the state through
violence against civilians, terrorists usually indirectly target state institutions (McConaghy,
2017:2). In synthesising the above definitions this paper will consider terrorism as the
deliberate use of violence by an individual or group against civilians to achieve a political
objective. This definition also takes cognisance of McConaghy’s assertion that a state party
can also be both a perpetrator as well as a target of terrorism.

An insurgency is considered to be such when a group of actors uses violence to contest the
sovereignty of an established regime, with the aim of effecting political change (Lammers
2017:1-2). It has also been defined as the organised use of subversion and violence to seize,
nullify or challenge political control of a region (Bunker, 2016:3). The above definitions
resonate well with the one by Frisch (2011:2) which states that ‘an insurgency relates to a
non-governmental organisation working to effect social and/or political change through
violent means against existing power structures and in a way that deliberately challenges
the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence’.

An insurgency is essentially characterised by two aspects: firstly that it is primarily

conducted within the borders of the insurgents' country and, secondly, an insurgency
develops when a certain part of society feels aggrieved towards the government, a foreign
power or another select part of society (Frisch, 2011:2). For the purpose of this essay,

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insurgency shall be defined as the use of violence and subversion by a non-state actor
within a defined geographical space to effect political change.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Diffusion and Contagion

The concept of diffusion in general emphasises that actors in one national context may be
influenced by actors in another state or states through the process of interdependence
(Gilardi, 2012). While the terms ‘diffusion’ and ‘contagion’ can be, and have been, used
interchangeably, Gilardi (2012) defines diffusion as a consequence of interdependence. He
adds that, ‘diffusion does not only occur at the international level, but can also take place
within countries, among a wide range of public and private actors and leads to the spread
of all kinds of things, from specific instruments, standards and institutions... to broad policy
models, ideational frameworks and institutional settings’ (Gilardi, 2012: 2-3).

Contagion, on the other hand, has been defined as a process whereby internal conflict in
one location influences the probability of another internal conflict erupting in a different
place at a later point in time (Forsberg 2016:5). Ertan and Bayar (2018) define contagion
as the process by which one group's actions provide inspiration and guidance, both strategic
and tactical, for groups elsewhere. Diffusion or contagion can be defined as the direct
spillover of conflict from one region to another, either within or across international
boundaries (Bara, 2018; LaFree & Xie, 2017; Fisunoglu, 2020). In the context of terrorism,
Neumayer and Plumper (2019:1) posit that, ‘if terror attacks from groups of one country
are followed by similar attacks on the same target from groups of other similar countries,
then this could be the consequence of contagion’. To support this assertion, Horowitz
(2010) argues that the external linkages and organisational capabilities facilitate a terrorist
organisation's ability to imitate or copy the innovation of others. These linkages and
capabilities, in the case of established terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and IS, manifest
in their ability to reach global audiences through modern communication networks, such
as the Internet, as well as use of global money transfer systems. These means and resources
enable the groups to recruit potential terrorists globally as well as to sponsor terrorist acts
without necessarily setting foot in the targeted countries (Findley et al, 2015). Through the

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process of diffusion, Crenshaw (2010) submits that terrorist groups develop and interact
with each other and may share strategies and tactics of violence.

In exploring the transnational diffusion of conflict, the paper will be guided by the three
conceptual dimensions proffered by (Forsberg 2016), namely; clustering, contagion and
connectedness. The first dimension is that civil wars are clustered in space due to shared
regional characteristics that make conflict more or less probable depending on geographical
location. The current insurgency in Cabo Delgado, while having underlying socio-political
underpinnings, is also religious-inspired, pitting Sufi against Salafi Islamic ideologies
(Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020 ). This makes it attractive for other like-minded groups from
within and outside Mozambique to join in support of the Ansar al-Sunna group. This could
explain the presence of some members of the group, especially in leadership positions,
coming from as far as Uganda and Tanzania, with support for the group also coming from
other Islamic-linked groups like IS, Al-Shabaab and ADF.

The second dimension is that the occurrence of civil war in one state may increase the risk
of civil war in neighbouring nations through the effects of contagion. In her analysis of
the spread of conflict, Forsberg (2016) affirms that such contagion may take place through
direct spillover of refugees and arms transfer or through more indirect processes of strategic
learning and inspiration. In the last dimension, civil wars in different countries may be
connected by shared grievances, collaboration between rebel groups, and emerging war
economies, resulting in intractable regional security complexes (Forsberg, 2016:1).

DIFFUSION OF TERRORISM IN THE WORLD AND IN AFRICA

Since the reign of terror in France between the period 1793 and 1794 during the French
Revolution when a series of massacres and numerous public executions took place,
terrorism has evolved over the years through four distinct phases or waves (Rapaport,
2004). These waves are the Anarchist Wave during the 1800s; the Anti-Colonial Wave,
during the 1920s; the New Left Wave, during the 1960s which was founded on radicalism
and nationalism; and the Religious Wave of modern terrorism, which is considered to be
currently underway and estimated to continue for the next twenty five years (AU Report,

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2015:14). This current wave is premised upon the world as living in the age of terror
founded on religious fundamentalism. The emergence of international terrorist groups such
as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State Group during this wave and their subsequent drive for
the establishment of Islamic caliphates in some regions of the world gives credence to the
designation of this wave as the religious wave. It is important to note that the current wave
is characterised by terrorist groups fighting for the establishment not only of Islamic law
in most areas of dominance, but also of Christian law, as in the case of the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA), which sought to rule Uganda according to the ten commandments of the
Bible.

While terrorism has been in existence for a long time, the 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers
of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the USA proved to the world that terrorism
had morphed into a ubiquitous global security threat. Globalisation and its attendant
technological developments have played into the hands of terrorist groups and facilitated
the transnational propagation of terrorist activities across nations, as geographical distances
and sovereign state borders are no longer obstacles. With regards to the global proliferation
of terrorist groups, Haynes (2012:2, in AU Report, 2016) asserts that globalisation
‘increases their ability to spread their message and to link up with like-minded groups
across international borders’ and that, ‘the overall result is that cross-border links between
various religious actors have recently multiplied, and, in many cases, so have their
international and transnational concerns’. Consequently, the contemporary global arena
is proliferated by transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, the LRA, Boko
Haram, Al-Shabaab, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Al-Murabitun, the Movement for
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
among others (AU, 2016).

The global diffusion of terrorism can be traced to the events that unfolded after the invasion
of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when the US placed a number of states,
including those not related to Afghanistan or the 9/11 attacks, on an “axis of evil” (Li,
2015:2). These states were deemed by then US President George W. Bush as foreign
governments that allegedly sponsored terrorism and sought weapons of mass destruction.
The states included Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Iraq was subsequently invaded by the

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United States of America in 2003 on the alleged basis of sponsoring terrorism and
possessing weapons of mass destruction.

As pointed out by Haberson (2013:3), the continued turmoil in Afghanistan has already
contributed to the civil war in Tajikistan, to authoritarianism in Uzbekistan, to growing
Russian aggressiveness prompted by fear of Islam along Russia’s southern frontier, and to
the dissemination of military skills for radical Islamists in South Asia and the Arab world.
Some groups like Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, Al Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram and
Al Nusra all started off as domestic terrorist groups with local grievances and largely
limiting their operations to their host-states bases. As the groups grew bigger and gained
more confidence in their operations, they subsequently linked up with more established
and better resourced groups like Al Qaeda and IS with global expansionist agendas and
thereupon began to project regional expansionist tendencies. Similarly, the Ansar al-Sunna
group in northern Mozambique has already given an indication of its strategic intent by
linking up with ISIS.

The threats and risks of intrastate violence and instability, particularly driven by terrorism
and violent extremism, and their subsequent propagation or diffusion across national
borders are a major global security concern, more so in Africa where there are a lot of
ungoverned spaces, porous borders and failed or failing states, which are fertile grounds
for the breeding and diffusion of terrorism. The environment offered by the Sambisa forest
of Nigeria, with its proximity to the border with Cameroon has facilitated the activities of
Boko Haram to quickly assume a transnational character as the group launched attacks into
neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Furthermore, the transnational activities of Boko
Haram have implications for the regional security and stability of the Lake Chad Basin
States as the conflict has displaced millions of people within the affected countries and also
resulted in a high influx of refugees in the Lake Chad Basin countries (Iyi and Strydom,
2018). Elsewhere there have been attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as well
as repeated attacks on civilians in both Kenya and Somalia attributed to Al Shabaab.

Iyi (2018:4) brings an interesting dimension to the discourse on the diffusion of terrorism
with the concept of ‘franchising’, in which internationally-established terrorist groups such
as Al Qaeda and IS are using their brand names to expand their global reach and spheres

8
of influence as a strategy to attract more followers and establish recruitment hubs through
affiliating emerging terrorist groups. By merely pledging allegiance to the bigger group,
the smaller groups are guaranteed of both funding and recognition. The acknowledgement
by IS for responsibility for some of the attacks in Mozambique gives a strong indication
that Ansar al-Sunna is now affiliated to the broader IS Group (2019; Bukarti &
Munasinghe, 2020).

DIFFUSION OF TERRORISM IN MOZAMBIQUE

The potential for the local and transnational diffusion of the prevailing terrorist insurgency
in Mozambique can best be understood through an analysis of the background to the current
conflict, the major group involved in the group as well as its links with other established
external extremist groups.

Background to the Situation in Northern Mozambique

Since attaining independence from colonialism in 1975, Mozambique has been embroiled
in a series of internal civil conflicts (Astill-Brown & Weimer, 2010), the latest being the
terrorist insurgency in the Northern province of Cabo Delgado. Pitting Islamic militants
trying to create an Islamic state/caliphate in the region and Mozambican Security Forces
backed by foreign private security contractors, the current conflict has been ongoing for
almost three years since 2017 (Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019). In the early stages of the
insurgency, civilians were the key targets of attacks by the Islamic and ISIS-affiliated
extremist militant group Ansar al-Sunna, a local jihadist group which has spearheaded the
insurgency in Cabo Delgado Province. In highlighting the underlying causes of the current
conflict in Northern Mozambique, Bonate (2018:1) attributes it to the following
grievances:

The discontentment of the Muslim youth is one of the main causes of the
phenomenon. Lack of employment, the ‘squeezing out’ of the local population from
their ancestral lands by big international conglomerates, and feelings of
marginalization, social exclusion, and hopelessness are all real problems that could
have prompted the violence. Other possible causes include the loss of revenues
from the artisanal mining and illegal trade in timber due to the tighter control by

9
 the state and private businesses. Disproportionate use of force by the police and
private security against young people involved in these activities, along with other
abuses, might have contributed as well.

Ansar al-Sunna follows a radical interpretation of Islamic fundamentalism (Habibe et al,

2018). It was allegedly founded by followers of the Kenyan radical Islamic cleric and Al-
Shabaab sympathizer, Aboud Rogo Mohammed, who is believed to have been the brains
behind the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings of the US Embassy in 1998 (Financial
Times, 2018). Following the death of Aboud Rogo Mohammed in 2012, some of his
followers moved south to Tanzania's Kibiti District in 2015 and established networks for
drug smuggling to support fighters and acquire weapons for terror operations (Africa
Center for Strategic Studies, 2016). They switched operations from Kibiti in Tanzania to
Cabo Delgado in Northern Mozambique, where the group is reported to have linked up
with the local insurgent groups.

Ansar Al-Sunna: The Face of Terrorism in Cabo Delgado

The history of Ansar Al-Sunna can be traced to 2015 when the group started as a religious
organisation in Mocimboa da Pria, one of the districts of Cabo Delgado Province (Agencia
de Informacao de Mocambique, 2018; Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020). The group was
founded by a group of young men, some of whom had studied abroad at Islamic schools in
Somalia or were connected to Salafi groups in Tanzania and Kenya. The original name of
the group was Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa (ASWJ), meaning ‘Adherents to the Tradition of
Prophet Mohammad and the Community’ and the group preached a puritanical version of
Islam (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020). The group introduced new teachings which were
contrary to the traditional Sufi teachings, which the majority of the Mozambican Muslims
follow. The group’s criticism of Sufis led to serious Sufi-Salafi tensions in Cabo Delgado,
with each side trying to justify and present its version of Islam as the correct interpretation
of Islam (Ibid).

The escalation of sectarian tensions resulted in ASWJ falling into dispute with the
government over its radical interpretation of Islam and characterisation of Sunni Muslims,
and more so when the group incorporated followers of Aboud Rogo Mohammed, the leader

10
of al-Hijira, a Kenyan group affiliated to al-Shabaab in Somalia (Bukarti & Munasinghe,
2020; West, 2018, p. 5). Rogo Mohammed, who was killed in an assassination in 2012, had
been put on the UN and US sanctions list for his links with al-Shabaab as well as for
fundraising and recruitment of Swahili-speaking fighters (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020).

After Rogo’s death the resultant clashes between his followers and Kenyan authorities led
to some of his supporters joining Al-Shabaab while others moved south into Tanzania and
subsequently reached Cabo Delgado to join ASWJ in 2016. With the continued fight
against Mozambican authorities and Sufi Muslims, the amalgamated group transformed
itself into Ansar al-Sunna, called for a declaration of Sharia law in the province and refused
to recognise Mozambican law on the grounds that it was un-Islamic (Bukarti &
Munasinghe, 2020). Similar to Boko Haram in Nigeria, the group has rejected state
institutions such as schools and hospitals, and has also refused to pay taxes as well as voting
in elections or sending children to state-run schools. The group has also declared its
intention to overthrow the Mozambican Government and replace it with a society that
adheres to Sharia law (Opperman, 2018).

Diffusion of Terrorism through Foreign Connections

Pirio et al (2018) postulate that Northern Mozambique’s new militant Islamic group raises
concerns about the impact of radical jihadist ideology, social and economic marginalization
of local Muslim communities and a heavy handedness in security response. They claim
that the leadership of the group seems to be motivated by foreign Jihadism, holding
common goals and priorities, such as creating an Islamic state after Sharia and shunning
the secular education system of government (Ali-Koor, 2016).

The link between Ansar al-Sunna and ISIS can be traced to April 2018 when 90 Al-Shabaab
members defected to ISIS and infiltrated Mozambique through the Islands of Zanzibar and
Tanzania (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020:7). Two months later ISIS claimed responsibility
for an attack in Mozambique and several more subsequent attacks. This connection with
ISIS has been evident through the growth of Ansar al-Sunna’s continued improvement in
strength, weaponry, violence and propaganda since the first attack in October 2017. The
acknowledgement by the IS Group of its involvement in the conflict in Cabo Delgado

11
(Long Wall Journal, 2019; Weiss, 2019) bears testimony to the potential for diffusion of
the operations of Ansar al-Sunna beyond Cabo Delgado Province.

The traditional media for the propagation of terrorism by terrorist groups has been through
the use of newspapers, pamphlets, books and manifestos, however, the mass media and
Internet have gained traction as vessels for the spread of terrorism internationally
(Chicoine, 2019; White, 2020). Chicoine (2019:1) confirms the ISIS’s use of Internet
platforms such as Twitter and YouTube to reach a wider global audience and its ability to
attract foreign recruits and inspire domestic acts of terrorism. While there has been no
evidence directly linking IS and Ansar al-Sunna, the rapid spread of the group’s operations
in most districts of Cabo Delgado since the first attack in October 2017 in Mocimboa da
Pria District, coupled with the increased sophistication in weaponry and the boldness of
the group to face the Mozambican Security Forces head-on in some operations, and the
willingness of the local youths to join the group point to the group’s possible support from
IS. Affiliation to ISIS allows Ansar al-Sunna to be recognised both regionally and
internationally as a viable Islamic actor, and guarantees the group of a constant supply of
funding to recruit and sustain their operations (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020).
Notwithstanding the IS link however, the Jihadist group could also be engaged in some
other subtle forms of propaganda or mobilisation for support, which is a subject for further
study.

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado is concentrated in districts bordering Tanzania, and

KiSwahili is one of the ‘lingua franca’ of the Jihadists, connecting them up the East African
coast and into Eastern DRC (Vines, 2020). This linkage has facilitated the rampant
movement of the insurgents across national borders, some of which are themselves porous
in some places. This in turn may facilitate the diffusion of the insurgency. The openness of
the Indian Ocean waters and the coastline of Cabo Delgado also provide ease of movement
between Mozambique and the border areas of Tanzania, which can facilitate the diffusion
of terrorist insurgency between the two countries.

MITIGATORY MEASURES

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The Government of Mozambique has been making efforts to contain the spread of the
terrorist isurgency in Cabo Delgado since its genesis in October 2017, albeit without
success. In June 2019, the Government of Mozambique also declared an alliance with the
Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO) in order to resolve the conflict in Cabo
Delgado by countering the recruitment efforts of the violent extremists (Bonate, 2019). In
her analysis of the situation in Cabo Delgado, Bonate points out that CISLAMO has always
been an interested party to the ongoing conflict, and is one of the institutions which the
insurgents are fighting against. Hence the chances for this effort to succeed are slim.

In 2018 the Government of Mozambique enacted a new law, the “Legal Regime for
Repression and Combating of Terrorism”, which provides for the punishment of anyone
found committing, planning or participating in terrorist acts, as well as for those who
provide or receive training for terrorist purposes. It also provides for the punishment of
those who travel or attempt to travel to join a terrorist organisation, as well as those who
assist in such travel (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020).

The country has incorporated the services of private security entities and also entered into
a number of bilateral and multilateral arrangements with state and non-state parties to
increase surveillance of its borders as well as assisting its Defence and Security Forces to
deal with the terrorist insurgency. Specifically Rwanda and SADC have deployed troops
to counter the terrorist insurgency, while the UN, AU, EU, USA, UK and Portugal have
pledged logistical support to Mozambique for the counter terrorism effort.

FINDINGS

The article came up with the following findings:

• The terrorist insurgency in Mozambique is a result of some underlying socio-

political grievances which the Government needs to understand and address so
that they do not impede international investment and development of the region.

• While the origin of the terrorist insurgency is internal in nature, it has been
influenced by external extremist elements (Bonate, 2018), most notably ISIS,

13
 whose involvement in Mozambique has contributed to the escalation of the
situation since its onset in 2017.

• The Mozambique Defence and Security Forces did not timeously call for
regional and international support as the initial attacks were considered criminal
offences rather than terrorist insurgency. Hence they were unable to effectively
deal with the insurgency before it could spread to most districts of Cabo
Delgado Province.

• The international community, particularly the UN, AU, SADC, the EU, USA,
and Rwanda, among others, have committed resources, both human and
material, to support Mozambique in dealing with the terrorist insurgency.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to curtail the potential escalation of the terrorist insurgency in northern

Mozambique and beyond borders, it is recommended that:

• The ongoing offensive operations by the Rwandan, SADC and Mozambican forces
should be well coordinated so that the activities of the terrorist insurgents are
neutralised in a holistic manner.

• With the pledged support from the international community, the Government of
Mozambique should capacitate its Defence and Security Forces so that they can be
able to relocate the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, as well as
protect the liberated zones after the withdrawal of the intervention forces.

• The Government of Mozambique should make a deliberate effort to address the

underlying grievances of the people of Cabo Delgado, particularly to do with
alleged issues of marginalisation, underdevelopment and religious differences.

• The SADC region should fully implement the Regional Counter Terrorism Strategy
of 2015 at regional and national levels to deal decisively with the emerging threat
of terrorism. In this regard the SADC Standby Force should be fully capacitated

14
 and deployable at short notice for counter terrorism and stabilisation operations in
SADC Member States, in coordination with other international partners.

CONCLUSION

The terrorist insurgency in Northern Mozambique has been ongoing since October 2017.
While the conflict is essentially an internal matter for Mozambique with regards to its
origin and underlying causes, a number of external players and influences have made the
situation more complex. The situation has since assumed extreme and transnational
proportions, with ISIS openly acknowledging its support for the local Islamist group, Ansar
al-Sunna. With the Defence and Security Forces of Mozambique evidently overwhelmed
by the situation, which has now spread to almost the entire province of Cabo Delgado, the
intervention by forces from Rwandan and SADC forces could not have come at a better
time. The involvement of ISIS and other external players complicates an already volatile
situation characterised by socio-political, economic and religious underpinnings. It should
also be noted that ISIS could be pursuing a strategic agenda to establish a safe haven or
caliphate in Southern Africa after its recent setbacks in Syria, and such an agenda could be
embedded in its sponsorship of Ansar al-Sunna. Hence the SADC community of States, in
collaboration with cooperating international partners, should unite to counter the emerging
threat of terrorism while it is still at its infancy and before it diffuses to the entire region.

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