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Respondent's Brief
2019 WL 7346763 • Jonathan OWENS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CITY OF OAKLAND'S DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT RENT …

Document Filings (6) Negative Treatment (0) History (2) Related Opinions/Dockets (1) Table of Authorities

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Original Image of 2019 WL 7346763 (PDF)

2019 WL 7346763 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.) (Appellate Brief)

Court of Appeal, First District, California, Notes
Division Three.
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Jonathan OWENS, Petitioner and Appellant, Check

v.
CITY OF OAKLAND'S DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT RENT ADJUSTMENT, Respondent,
Lauren BARGHOUT, Mark Steinberg, Ralph Gregory Johnson and
Emily Baron, Real Parties in Interest.
No. A157663.
December 20, 2019.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda Superior Court
Case No. RG18914638 Honorable Frank Roesch, Judge

Respondent's Brief

Barbara J. Parker, City Attorney, SBN 069722, Maria Bee, Chief Assistant City Attorney, SBN
167716, Jamilah A. Jefferson, Special Counsel, SBN 219027, Ubaldo Fernandez, Deputy City
Attorney, SBN 296112, One Frank H. Ogawa Plaza, 6th Floor, Oakland, California 94612,
Telephone: (510) 238-7040, Facsimile: (510) 238-6500, Email:
ufernandez@oaklandcityattorney.org, for respondent, City of Oakland.

*2 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 6
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 6

III. ARGUMENT 9
A. THE ACT DOES NOT PROVIDE A BLANKET EXEMPTION FOR SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES 9
1. The Act Does Not Exempt In All Instances Single-Family Homes And Their Individually 9
Rented Rooms From Local Rent Limitations
2. Subsequent Enactment of AB 1482 Indicates The Legislature Understands The 11
Exemption Does Not Apply to Single-Family Homes Where Rooms Are Rented Separately
to Unrelated Individuals
B. MS. BURGHOUT'S UNIT(S) IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE ACT'S EXEMPTION BECAUSE IT IS 13
NOT “ALIENABLE SEPARATE FROM THE TITLE” TO OTHER DWELLING UNITS

1. The Relevant “Dwelling or Unit” is The Room(s) Ms. Barghout Had “Sole Use” of And 13
For Which She Paid Rent
2. The Superior Court Properly Looked to Civil Code Section 1940(c) For the Meaning of 15
“Dwelling Unit” In The Context of Landlord-Tenant Law
3. The California Court of Appeals Has Ruled That Under Local Law, Renting Out 17
Individual Units Can Remove the “Single-family Dwelling” Designation
4. The Unit Appellant Rented to Ms. Barghout Is Not Separately Alienable From The 8
Other Units In the Structure
C. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE AUTHORITY 19

*3 1. Appellant's Reliance on The Oakland Planning Code and California Building Code 9
Definitions of “Dwelling Unit” Is Misguided 1
2. Appellant's Home Did Not Qualify for An Exemption From Oakland's Rent Adjustment 19
Ordinance At The Times Relevant to This Appeal
IV. CONCLUSION 20

*4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Chun v. Del Cid, (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 806 16, 17

County of San Bernardino v. City of San Bernardino, (1997) 15 Cal.4th 909 11, 13
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus, (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143 10

People v. Benson, (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24 8

Satele v. Superior Court, (2019) 7 Cal.5th 852 16

STATUTES

Civil Code Section 1940(c) 2, 14, 15, 20

Civil Code Section 1946.2(e)(5) 11
Civil Code Section 1946.2(e)(8) 11

Civil Code Section 1947.12(d)(5) 11

Civil Code Section 1954.52(a)(3)(A) passim
 Code of Civil Procedure Section 1858 10
Health & Safety Code Section 18901 18, 19
Health & Safety Code Section 18912 19

Health & Safety Code Section 18920 19

*5 Health & Safety Code, Section 18930 19
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES

Oakland Municipal Code (“O.M.C.”) Section 8.22.010 et seq. 6

Oakland Municipal Code (“O.M.C.”) Section 8.22.350.E 13
OTHER AUTHORITIES

10 Cal. Real Est. Section 34:246 (4th ed.) 9

Aeembly Bill 36 9
Assembly Bill 1482 2, 10, 19

*6 I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant seeks a determination from this Court that the individual bedrooms of his home,
which he rents out separately to three strangers, are exempt from Oakland's Rent Adjustment
Program Ordinance (the “Ordinance”), Oakland Municipal Code (“O.M.C.”) Section 8.22.010 et
seq. He argues the individual bedrooms are exempted from local rent limitations by a
provision of the Costa Hawkins Rental Housing Act (the “Act”) which allows an owner to set
rents in a “dwelling or unit” that is “alienable separate from the title to any other dwelling
unit.” Civil Code Section 1954.52(a)(3)(A). Appellant argues that this exemption applies to the
single-family home no matter what. In fact, Appellant is not eligible for the exemption
because the “dwellings or units” he has rented out are individual bedrooms that are not
“alienable separate from the title” to each other.

Appellant's exemption argument was rejected by the City of Oakland's Housing, Residential
Rent, and Relocation Board (the “Rent Board”) and again by the Alameda County Superior
Court. Respondent requests this Court similarly deny this argument on appeal. Appellant
may not consider his home three different units for the purposes of collecting rent, but only
one “separately alienable” unit in demanding an exemption from local rent limitations.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

*7 Appellant lives in a single-family home at 3420 Rubin Drive in Oakland, California.

Administrative Record (“AR”) 319. 1 He rented individual rooms in his single-family home to
three separate, unrelated tenants. AR 154:15-155:27. Including the room(s) that Appellant
uses for himself, there are a total of four separate sections in the single-family home. AR
154:15-155:27; 165:10-17.

In May 2016, one of Appellant's tenants, Real Party in Interest Lauren Barghout, filed a
tenant's petition with the City of Oakland's Rent Adjustment Program (“RAP”) alleging that
she had suffered a decrease in the housing services, and as such, her rent should be adjusted.
AR 319. The RAP scheduled a hearing in this matter for August 25, 2016. AR 310.

On August 5, 2016, only twenty days before the RAP hearing was to be held, Appellant filed a
verified complaint for unlawful detainer against Ms. Barghout. AR 280; Respondent's Request
for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Item 1. 2 The Complaint was clear as to the unit from which
Appellant sought to evict Ms. Barghout: “3420 Rubin Drive, Room A: NW Master Bedroom,
including bathroom & fenced patio & 3420 Rubin Drive, Room B: Downstairs Home Office.” Id.
The lease attached to this verified complaint similarly describes the premises and describes
Ms. Barghout as a housemate with “sole use of one or more rooms and shared use of
common areas (such as kitchen) in the residence.” RJN Exhibit 1 at 4.

The parties appeared for a RAP hearing on the tenant's petition on August 25, 2016. Appellant
argued the rooms rented by Ms. Barghout were not subject to the regulations of the
Ordinance because they were part of a single-family home that was “separately alienable
from the title of any other dwelling unit” and, therefore, exempted by the Act. AR 112: 17 -
113:18. The RAP hearing officer found that while the structure Ms. Barghout lived in was a
single-family home, “the owner [ ] chose [ ] to rent *8 rooms out separately to a number of
people, thereby transforming a single-unit dwelling into a multi-unit dwelling.” AR 146. As the
rooms rented separately by the tenants were not alienable from each other, the Act did not
exempt them. Id. Appellant appealed to the Rent Board arguing the Act's exemption applied
to the house because it was separately alienable, even if the individually rented rooms were
not. AR 95-98.

A panel of the Rent Board held an appeal hearing in August 2017. AR 68. During this hearing,
Appellant conceded that the Ms. Barghout's unit consisted only of a bedroom and an office,
that other units existed at the property, and that such units were not separately alienable
from each other. AR 75:23 - 77:13. The panel of the Rent Board voted to continue the matter
to be heard by the entire Rent Board. AR 88:9-26.

The matter came before the entire Rent Board on March 29, 2018. AR 41. At the hearing,
Appellant initially acknowledged that Ms. Barghout's unit was the portion of the home she
rented, before arguing that Ms. Barghout's unit was actually the entirety of the single-family
home. AR 45:18 - 47:3. In a unanimous decision, the Rent Board affirmed the hearing officer's
decision that Appellant rented his home as four separate dwelling units that were not
separately alienable from each other and, therefore, did not qualify for the Act's exemption.
AR 37. Instead, the bedrooms rented individually to Ms. Barghout were a “covered unit”
under the Ordinance and subject to its regulations. Id.

Appellant filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging the Rent Board's
determination. Alameda County Superior Court No. RG18914638; Clerk's Transcript (“CT”) 1-
16. Once more, he argued that the relevant unit to examine for exemption was the single-
family home, not the portion actually rented to Ms. Barghout. CT 91. Appellant further argued
the portions of the home he independently rented could not be considered separate
“dwellings units” because the individual *9 rooms did not meet the definition for a “dwelling
unit” in the California Building Code or the Oakland Planning Code. CT 102. The Superior
Court denied Appellant's arguments, finding that “For the purposes of landlord-tenant law,
“a dwelling or a unit” or a “dwelling unit” is not the entire property to which an owner holds
title; rather, it is any area understood to be committed to the habitation of a given tenant or
tenants to the exclusion of others... the relevant dwelling unit in question is not [Appellant's]
home but rather each of the rooms he rented to tenants. Those units are not exempt from
rent control as a condominium or single-family home.” CT 358. Appellant raises this
argument once more in this timely filed appeal.

III. ARGUMENT

A. THE ACT DOES NOT PROVIDE A BLANKET EXEMPTION FOR SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES.

The Act exempts from local rent ordinances a “dwelling or unit” which is “alienable separate
from the title to any other dwelling unit.” Civil Code Section 1954.52(a)(3)(A). The Act does
not define “dwelling,” “unit,” or “dwelling unit” in the context of the Act, nor has either party
cited to case law interpreting these statutes. However, the Act's language is clear and
unambiguous such that this Court need only interpret its plain meaning and not indulge in
statutory construction. See generally, People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 30.

1. The Act Does Not Exempt In All Instances Single-Family Homes And Their Individually
Rented Rooms From Local Rent Limitations.

The Act does not explicitly exempt from local rent restrictions single-family homes however
they are rented. In fact, the phrase “single-family home” does not appear anywhere in the
Act. Instead, the exemption applies to a “dwelling or a unit” which “is alienable separate from
the title *10 to any other dwelling unit.” Civil Code Section 1954.52(a)(3)(A). While single-
family homes can qualify for this exemption, it does not follow that all single-family homes
qualify for the exemption.

Appellant cites to a practice guide that makes clear the exemption does not apply to single-
family homes in all instances: “The definition of ‘separately alienable’ is somewhat technical
and set forth in the statute by reference to other provisions of law, but most single-family
detached dwellings on separate lots not containing a second dwelling unit... will qualify for
the exemption.” (emphasis added.) Miller and Starr, California Real Estate, 4th Edition;
Chapter 34 -Landlord and Tenant (10 Cal. Real Est. Section 34:246 (4th ed.) Appellant's
Request for Judicial Notice (“ARJN”) Item F. The treatise clearly recognizes that the Act itself
does not exempt single-family homes, and that situations exist where a structure designated
a single-family home does not qualify for the Act's exemption. Namely, the exemption does
not apply to a single-family home if it contains more than one dwelling unit.

Appellant also relies on a State Assembly Committee Report on Assembly Bill 36 to argue
single-family homes are always exempt from local rent limitations. Appellant writes: “In
discussing the phrase ‘alienable separate from the title to any other dwelling unit’, a State
Assembly Committee Report said that this provision exempts from rent control ‘single-family
homes.”’ Appellant's Opening Brief (“AOB”) at 13. In fact, the language of the report describes
the Act as exempting “single-family homes and other units, such as condominiums, that are
separate from the title to any other dwelling units.” (emphasis added) ARJN Item E. The report
makes clear that a single-family home rented as a unit can be exempt, so long as it is
separate from the title to any other dwelling unit.

Appellant asks that this Court rely on the “legislative history of the statute and the wider
historical circumstances of its enactment to ascertain *11 the legislative intent” of the
exemption. AOB at 13; citing to Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16
Cal.4th 1143,1152. However, Appellant fails to provide any indication of the legislature's
intent with respect to the exemption at the time of the Act's passage. In its place, Appellant
directs the Court to three legislative documents published more than twenty years after the
legislature passed the Act. ARJN Items E, C, D. Respondent separately objects to ARJN items
E, C, and D because these publications, prepared more than twenty years after the passage of
the act, are irrelevant as to the legislature's intent in passing the Act decades earlier.
Moreover, the publications discuss the Act very broadly and, at best, mention the specific
exemption only in passing. ARJN Items E, C, D.

Rather than reading the words “single-family homes in all instances” into the Act's exemption
language, this Court should “simply [ ] ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance
contained therein, not insert what has been omitted.” Code of Civil Procedure Section 1858.
In this case, this Court need only examine whether the rooms Ms. Barghout rented from
Appellant were separately alienable from other units at the property.

2. Subsequent Enactment of AB 1482 Indicates The Legislature Understands The

Exemption Does Not Apply to Single-Family Homes Where Rooms Are Rented Separately to
Unrelated Individuals.

The recently enacted Assembly Bill 1482 (Chiu) also clarifies that the legislature understands
there are situations in which a unit, despite forming part of a single-family home, does not
qualify for the Act's exemption. In AB 1482, the legislature established a rent cap on most
rental units in California. The bill also required landlords to have a valid just cause to evict
tenants from their homes.

Using virtually identical language as the Act's exemption at issue in this case, the legislature
exempted single-family homes and condominiums rented in their entirety from both the rent
cap and the just cause provisions. *12 See Civil Code § 1946.2(e)(8) (“Residential real
property that is alienable separate from the title to any other dwelling unit”) (just cause);
Civil Code § 1947.12(d)(5) (“Residential real property that is alienable separate from the title
to any other dwelling unit”) (rent cap). The legislature then made a separate exemption for
owners who rent out no more than two rooms in a single-family home that he or she also
occupies. See Civil Code Section 1946.2(e)(5) ( “[s]ingle-family owner-occupied residences,
including a residence in which the owner owner-occupant rents or leases no more than two
units or bedrooms...”).

The legislature's express exclusion of owner-occupied single-family homes with no more

than two tenants from the just cause protections, coupled with the choice not to do the same
for rent cap, leads to two important conclusions about the meaning and purpose of the
“separately alienable” exemption. First, the legislature understood the phrase “residential
real property that is alienable separate from the title to any other dwelling unit” to refer to
single-family homes when rented as a whole, and not to rooms within the home rented to
different tenancies. If the legislature understood the “separately alienable” exemption to
apply to individual rooms in single-family homes, there would have been no need to
specifically exempt an owner renting out two or fewer bedrooms. In this way, the legislature
drew a clear distinction between tenancies in rooming house situations and the rental of an
entire single-family home. The identical language in Costa-Hawkins at issue here should be
interpreted similarly. (See County of San Bernardino v. City of San Bernardino (1997) 15 Cal.4th
909, 926.) [“It is elementary that, absent indications to the contrary, ‘a word or phrase...
accorded a particular meaning in one part or portion of the law, should be accorded the
same meaning in other parts or portions of the law....’ [Citation.]”]

*13 Second, the legislature underscored the policy distinction between rent control and just
cause for eviction protections. Even though the close living quarters can justify allowing
owner occupants to evict tenants who share the same house without just cause, these policy
justifications do not extend to allow the owner an unlimited rent increase. Oakland has made
the similar policy choice to cover these rentals under rent stabilization while providing an
exemption from Just Cause. See O.M.C. 8.22.350.E (exempting owner occupant who shares
kitchen or bath facilities with tenants from Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance).

B. MS. BURGHOUT'S UNIT IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE ACT'S EXEMPTION BECAUSE IT IS NOT
“ALIENABLE SEPARATE FROM THE TITLE” TO OTHER DWELLING UNITS.

The exemption Appellant seeks to establish is the right to set a “rental rate” on a “dwelling or
unit” so long as it is “alienable separate from the title to any other dwelling unit.” Civil Code
Section 1954.52(a)(3)(A). The Act itself does not define the words “dwelling,” “unit,” or
“dwelling unit.” Respondent did not find case law clarifying the meaning of these words in
the specific context of the Act, nor has Appellant brought any to this Court's attention.
However, the plain meaning of the statute, Appellant's own representations in proceedings
below, and other statutes regarding landlord-tenant law support a finding that the “dwelling
or unit” to be examined for exemption is the rooms Ms. Barghout rented out - not the entirety
of the structure designated a single-family home.

1. The Relevant “Dwelling or Unit” is The Room(s) Ms. Barghout Had “Sole Use” of And For
Which She Paid Rent.

To determine what the “dwelling or unit” is in this case, this Court need only ask: over what
unit did the rental dispute arise? The entirety of the home? Or, the portion rented out to Ms.
Barghout as an individual unit? *14 Despite Appellant's arguments to the contrary, the
record is unambiguous on this point. Appellant rented to Ms. Barghout a unit consisting of
two bedrooms and access to common areas of the structure. AR 75:23 - 77:11. The lease
signed by Appellant describes Ms. Barghout as a “Housemate” with “sole use” of the
“premises” described as “Room A” “Room B” and “Room C.” RJN Item 1 at 4. The rent he
collected from Ms. Barghout was only for her unit, not for the entirety of the house. Id. at 6.
When Appellant sought to evict Ms. Barghout, he asked the court to terminate her
possession, not of the entirety of the home, but only of the rooms she occupied in exchange
for rent. Id. at 1; AR 280.

Appellant even used the existence of multiple units in the single-family home to establish an
exemption from Oakland's Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance. The Sixty-Day Notice of
Termination of Tenancy (the “Notice”) upon which he based his unlawful detainer complaint
clearly explained the existence of multiple “units” at the property: Ms. Barghout occupied a
“rental unit[ ] in a residential property where the owner occupies a unit in the same property
as his or her principal residence and regularly shares in the use of the kitchen or bath
facilities with the tenant[ ] of such unit [ ]” Id. at 12. Appellant's sworn allegations in the
verified complaint for unlawful detainer conceded the existence of at least two units at the
property - one the tenant possessed and for which the owner did not need just cause to evict
because of the second “unit,” which he occupied as his principle residence. Id.

Even during the first hearing before a panel of the Rent Board, Appellant conceded that Ms.
Barghout's unit consisted of only “one bedroom and an office,” that other units existed at the
property, and that none of the units on the property were separately alienable from each
other. AR 75:23-77:11.

*15 Appellant now seems to assert that the single-family home is the only dwelling unit at
the property because he “leased the entire household to each of the tenants... by allowing
them each access to the kitchen, bathrooms, all facilities.” Reporter's Transcript (“RT”), 4:4-
5:10. This argument is irreconcilable with the evidence in the record. How is it that for the
purposes of paying rent, evicting Ms. Barghout, and of obtaining an exemption from a local
just cause for eviction ordinance there are multiple units at the property, but that for
obtaining a Costa Hawkins exemption, only one unit exists? Respondent can only understand
this argument as an attempt to have it both ways, or, in the words of the Superior Court, as
“nonsense.” RT 7:19-8:5.

2. The Superior Court Properly Looked to Civil Code Section 1940(c) For the Meaning of
“Dwelling Unit” In The Context of Landlord-Tenant Law.

In absence of definitions for “dwelling,” “unit,” or “dwelling unit” in the Act, the Superior
Court looked for guidance in Chapter 2 of the Civil Code, entitled “Hiring of Real Property.”
“‘Dwelling unit’ means a structure or the part of a structure that is used as a home,
residence, or sleeping place by one person who maintains a household or by two or more
persons who maintain a common household.” [emphasis added.] Civil Code Section 1940(c).

The Civil Code recognizes a dwelling unit may consist only of “part of a structure,” such as the
individual bedrooms rented to Ms. Barghout in this case. And while the definition allows for
multiple persons to occupy a single ‘dwelling unit,” this only occurs if the occupants maintain
a “common household.” Id.
Here the record is clear that the Ms. Barghout, Appellant, and other tenants who separately
rented rooms at the home did not maintain a *16 “common household.” In fact, the lease
clearly created separate spaces of “sole use” and separate obligations for rent. RJN Item 1 at
4, 6.

Appellant does not appear to object to the Court's reliance on Civil Code Section 1940(c) in
interpreting “dwelling,” “unit,” or “dwelling unit” in the context the Act. Rather, Appellant
argues that because Section 1940(c) permits a “dwelling unit” to be occupied by “two or
more persons,” Appellant may rent individual rooms to separate individuals while still
considering the entirety of the home a single dwelling unit. AOB at 18. Appellant even argues
“There is no evidence in the record that the bedrooms of the RPI's was designed or occupied
as separate living quarters for one person or family”. Id. at 17.

This argument misconstrues the facts and depends on Appellant's critical omission of the
word “common” from the definition: “Civil Code Section 1940(c) defines dwelling unit as ‘a
structure or part of the structure that is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place by one
person who maintains a household or by two or more persons who maintain a [common]
household.’ [Emphasis added.]” AOB at 18. Returning the omitted word “common” defeats
Appellant's argument. There is no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the
unrelated tenants, who paid separate rents for separate rooms, and that Appellant, who
collected the rents, maintained a common household. In fact, evidence exists showing that
Ms. Barghout had “sole use” of the individual bedrooms that she rented, and that Appellant
represented in a complaint for unlawful detainer that multiple units existed at the property.
RJN Item 1 at 4, 5, 12.

The trial court properly relied on Civil Code Section 1940(c) in holding: “For purposes of
landlord-tenant law, ‘a dwelling or a unit’ or a ‘dwelling unit’ is not the entire property to
which an owner holds title; rather, it is any area understood to be committed to the
habitation of a given *17 tenant or tenants to the exclusion of others...The relevant dwelling
unit in question is not Owens's home but rather each of the rooms he rented to tenants.” CT
358. This Court should uphold the trial court's interpretation of the definition of “dwelling
unit” in order to accord the same meaning of “dwelling unit” throughout the Civil Code. See
generally, Satele v. Superior Court (2019) 7 Cal.5th 852, 859 (Holding that “It is elementary
that, absent indications to the contrary, ‘a word or phrase... accorded a particular meaning in
one part or portion of the law, should be accorded the same meaning in other parts or
portions of the law...’ [Citation.]”)

3. The California Court of Appeals Has Ruled That Under Local Law, Renting Out Individual
Units Can Remove the “Single-family Dwelling” Designation.

The California Court of Appeal recently held that a property did not qualify for a single-family
dwelling exemption from the Rent Stabilization Ordinance of the City of Los Angeles because
of its current configuration and use for occupancy, regardless of its original design and use.
Chun v. Del Cid (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 806, 811. Similar to the facts in the present case, the
property at issue in Chun was constructed as a single-family residence but was later rented as
individual rooms with the tenants having exclusive use of their bedrooms.

The Court of Appeal's decision noted that, “to be designed for occupancy by one family, the
group of nine bedrooms, at least two bathrooms, and the kitchen contained in the Property
must be designed to give the tenants common access to and use of not simply the kitchen,
but all living areas.” (emphasis added) Id. at 817. The decision went on to note that such
single-family use would require access to all bedrooms. Id. at 818. The Court of Appeals
rejected that the original design of the structure determines whether the collection of units
qualified as “single-family.” Id. *18 As in Chun, the tenants in this case each had “sole use” of
the bedrooms they rented and for which they paid rent.

Chun interpreted exemption language of the Rent Stabilization Ordinance of the City of Los
Angeles, which is admittedly different than the exemption language of the Act. See id. at 813.
However, the case provides support for Respondent's argument that a structure designated a
single-family home contains multiple units when individual rooms are rented separately to
unrelated individuals.

4. The Unit Appellant Rented to Miss Barghout Is Not Separately Alienable From The Other
Units In the Structure.

The bedrooms rented to Ms. Barghout are clearly not “alienable separate from the title” to
the bedrooms Appellant rents separately to two other, unrelated tenants. Appellant
conceded this in the proceedings below on at least three separate occasions and does not
appear to change his argument on appeal. RT 5:22-6:6; AR 75:23 - 77:11; AR 43:20-25.

Instead, Appellant confuses the issue by claiming the relevant “dwelling or unit” was not the
individual bedrooms Ms. Barghout occupied in exchange for rent, but the entirety of the
home - including a room occupied by himself, and two other rooms separately rented to two
additional unrelated tenants. As Respondent argues in the above section, Appellant's claim
ignores the language of the Act, defies common sense, and ignores facts in the record.

Respondent requests that this Court affirm the Superior Court's decision that “[t]he relevant
dwelling unit in question is not Owens's home but rather each of the rooms he rented to
tenants.” CT 358. As there is no dispute about whether these individual rooms rented to
tenants are separately alienable from each other, Respondent requests that this Court find
that these dwelling units do not qualify for the Act's exemption.

*19 C. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE AUTHORITY.

1. Appellant's Reliance on The Oakland Planning Code and California Building Code
Definitions of “Dwelling Unit” Is Misguided.

Appellant asks this Court to look to the California Building Code for guidance on the
definition of “dwelling” or “unit” or “dwelling unit” in the context of the Act. The Superior
Court found that the California Building Code and Oakland Planning Code were not “in pari
materia with the meaning under rent control ordinances” CT 358.
Respondent agrees with the Superior Court that looking to the California Building Code and
the Oakland Planning Code for guidance on the meaning of “dwelling” or “unit” or “dwelling
unit” in the context of the Act is not appropriate. For one, the California Building Codes are
not even located within the Civil Code. They are part of the California Code of Regulations
and published by the California Building Standards Commission (the “Commission”). The
Commission is neither part of the legislature nor is it concerned with landlord-tenant law.
Health & Safety Code, Sections 18901; 18912; 18920, 18930. For example, nowhere in the
California Building Codes are definitions for the words “tenant” “tenancy” “rent” or owner.
Even the enabling statutes these regulations are intended to implement are contained in
California's Health and Safety Code, a completely different code than the Civil Code of which
the Act is part. Health & Safety Code, Section 18901 et seq.

2. Appellant's Home Did Not Qualify for An Exemption From Oakland's Rent Adjustment
Ordinance At The Times Relevant to This Appeal.

Appellant argues that the premises at issue is “unquestionably exempt” from the Oakland
Rent Adjustment Ordinance pursuant to the *20 exemption provided by Oakland Municipal
Code (“OMC”) Section 8.22.030.A.8 for owner-occupied properties with three or fewer units.
AOB at 21. In arguing it was the City Council's intent to exempt all owner-occupied single-
family homes, Appellant fails to mention that the Ordinance in effect at the time exempted
not all owner-occupied properties, but those that were owner-occupied and contained three
or fewer units. Compare AOB at 21 with O.M.C. Section 8.22.030.A.8; .8; 010F. At the time Ms.
Barghout filed her petition in this case, the record is clear that four units existed within the
home. AR 154:15-155:27; 165:10-17. Thus, the property never qualified for an exemption from
the Oakland Rent Adjustment Ordinance.

Importantly, both the exemption for owner-occupied properties divided into up to three units
(Section 8.22.030.A.8) and its “Finding and purpose” (former Section 8.22.010.F) were
removed from the OMC by the Oakland City Council in June of 2019.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Act does not unconditionally exempt from local rent limitations single-family homes - it
does not even mention them. Instead, the Act exempts from local rent limitations “dwellings
or units” that are separately alienable from other units on the property. The legislature's
passage of AB 1482 recognizes this distinction.

The relevant unit to examine for exemption is the unit Ms. Barghout rented and of which she
had “sole use.” This unit is not separately alienable from the unit Appellant occupies, or from
the two other units he separately rented out to unrelated tenants. A plain reading of Civil
Code Section 1954.52(a)(3)(A) supports this interpretation of “dwelling or unit,” as does
Appellant's representations in the proceedings below. Such an *21 interpretation would also
be consistent with Civil Code Section 1940(c) 's definition of “dwelling unit.”

For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial
court's decision that the individual bedrooms Ms. Barghout rented from Appellant are not
 exempt from local rent limitations because they are not separately alienable from other units
at the property.

Footnotes

1 The Administrative Record from the Oakland Rent Adjustment Program has been lodged with the Court of
Appeal and is located at pages 86-87 of the Clerk's Transcript on Appeal. For clarity, any reference to facts
in the Administrative Record will be designated “AR.” Any other parts of the Clerk's Transcript will be
designated as “CT.”

2 Complaint for Unlawful Detainer. Alameda Superior Court Case No. RG16825863. Ms. Barghout submitted
a copy of the verified complaint for unlawful detainer as evidence for the August 25, 2016 Rent
Adjustment Hearing. While this document is part of the record beginning at AR 280, a copying error
resulted in the inclusion of only the odd numbered pages of the complaint and its attachments in the
bound record. In order to cite to the entirety of the documnets, Respondent has requested that this Court
take Judicial Notice of the entirety of this document.

End of Document © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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