We will take a chronological approach and start with Scott Pegg who in

1998 introduced the concept of de facto states into academic literature of

international relations. The most recent contributions include Caspersen and
Stansfield (2011), Caspersen (2012) and Isachenko (2012). We will give a
rather descriptive overview of different concepts that are in a later section
compared more thoroughly.

1.2.3.1. De facto states

The first and therefore somewhat pioneering work on de facto states was written
by Scott Pegg in 1998 and entitled ‘International Society and the De facto
State’. Pegg gave the first definition of a de facto state and introduced a theo-
retical framework in which to distinguish de facto states from other non-
sovereign entities. Pegg chose Northern Cyprus, Eritrea, Tamil Elam and
Somaliland as cases.
Pegg (1998) suggests several criteria that de facto states must fulfil. There
must be ‘organised political leadership which has risen to power through some
degree of indigenous capability’ (Pegg, 1998, p. 26). Pegg therefore excludes
puppet states from his definition; a de facto state is a product of a local
population. The notion of ‘some degree’ is a qualification made because of
empirical reality, as de facto states usually rely on some amount of external
help. The first part of the sentence, ‘organised political leadership,’ is a weaker
formulation than government, as Pegg (1998, p. 27) himself admits. Why he
uses the softer concept is however left unexplained. Comparing de facto states
to sovereign states, Pegg (1998, p. 47) concludes that most of the former fare
better in the government capabilities criteria than some of the latter.
Pegg adds to the government criteria other requirements found in the Monte-
video Convention, first providing government services to a given population in
a specific territory. With both categories – territory and population – de facto
states have significant problems of definition. Of course, there could be some
unclarified situations, but overall the sovereign states are not in a better
situation.
The forth condition set out in the Convention, capability to enter into
relations with other states, is somewhat softer for Pegg as he defines the de
facto state as perceiving this capability for itself. As Pegg (1998, p. 27) puts it,
it is an ‘opinion not necessarily shared by other states’.
Pegg also adds two additional conditions. The first of these is temporal: the
entity must have had this non-recognised status for a significant period of time.
What this time period could be is arbitrary. Pegg (1998, p. 32) argues, based on
empirical evidence, that one month, for example, is definitely too short. A life-
span of at least one year seems necessary, but Pegg himself is more strict and
establishes the threshold of two years.
An additional condition is the feature that distinguishes de facto states from
‘normal’ states: international recognition. Pegg (1998, p. 26) phrases its lack of

34
recognition as the state being ‘unable to achieve any degree of substantive
recognition’. This phrasing refers to the possibility that there could be some
degree of substantive recognition. Therefore Pegg does not exclude entities that
have received some international recognition and this shows in his case
selection. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has received some, albeit
solitary recognition, from Turkey and qualifies as a de facto state. Substantive
recognition means formal recognition by different actors, and Pegg (1998,
p. 38) has divided these into five categories in which an ‘entity would need
success in at least a majority’. The categories are: major powers, defined as
permanent UN Security Council members or great regional powers; parent
states (with an exception to recognition: there must be at least no opposition to
secession); neighbours; a majority in the UN General Assembly; and inter-
national organisations, both global and regional.
Pegg goes on to give ten theoretical dimensions of de facto states that should
make them more distinct in the international arena. Some of these dimensions
are especially useful in distinguishing de facto states from other actors or
situations like power vacuums, ‘random banditry’, puppet states, peaceful
secessionist movements, other non-sovereign entities and ‘premature recog-
nition of colonial liberation movements’ (Pegg, 1998, p. 29). The remaining
dimensions deal with preservation, goals, territorial justification and democratic
accountability.
According to Pegg, the difference with power vacuums or state-less
situations and riots, terrorism or random banditry lies in the capabilities of de
facto states. A power vacuum is a clear-cut distinction: the de facto state
possesses some governmental capabilities and thus is able to fill any possible
vacuum. A clear-cut distinction can also be made with respect to common
criminals as the de facto state is political in its aims. Pegg (1998) turns to
international law to differentiate the de facto state from political movements
like rebellions and finds the solution in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II), which apply to armed
groups exercising control over territory but do not apply to ‘situations of
internal disturbances and tensions’. Puppet states differ from de facto states in
the ‘more organic and symbiotic relationship with its population’ (Pegg, 1998,
p. 36). This is connected to the indigenous capability aspect. Peaceful seces-
sionist movements are accepted by the parent state and are negotiated with as
such, unlike de facto states, which are contested. Other non-sovereign entities
are probably more difficult to distinguish from de facto states. International
acceptance is the criterion that Pegg uses to exclude entities like Palestine and
Kurdish safe havens. Authors like Geldenhuys (2009) and Bahcheliet al (2004)
do include Palestine, however, so this theoretical dimension is probably most
contestable. Other possible types of entities include colonies and protectorates,
and they are accepted as such in the international system. Colonies bring us to
the last distinction: these are what Jackson (1990) calls quasi-states. When they
received recognition they were not in control of their territories and lacked

35
capabilities to be so. The process of decolonisation, however, legitimised their
quest for independence and they received substantial recognition.
Dov Lynch (2004) elaborates on Pegg’s definition and breaks it into judicial
and empirical notions. According to Lynch, in this definition the de facto state
lacks judicial statehood: it has no right to claim the territory. It does possess a
claim to empirical statehood. Following similar logic, Lynch divides the state’s
sovereignty into two notions – internal and external. Placing Pegg’s definition
in this analytical framework, he claims that de facto states enjoy full internal
sovereignty but lack external sovereignty. Their governments are supreme
authorities within their territories but there is an absence of formal recognition
(Lynch, 2004, p. 16).
In addition to that, Lynch compares four cases of de facto states in the
territory of the former Soviet Union with another conflict in the former
communist state. The civil war of Tadjikistan came to a solution, but conflicts
involving unrecognised entities are frozen. The main difference according to
Lynch is the objective of the respective movements. When Tadjik rebels wanted
to overthrow the government, then de facto states wanted to exit the former
parent state altogether. They have no interest in ruling in the former capital and
want to interact with the parent state on equal grounds: as sovereigns. There are
different drivers behind the continuing existence of de facto states and absolute
sovereignty is one of them. Lynch (2004) states that adherence to Montevideo
criteria and appealing to self-determination are the main sources of legitimacy
that can be derived from the existing legal framework to support claims to
sovereignty.
Barry Bartmann (2004) also uses the term de facto state and ties it to the
question of recognition. Like Lynch’s, his approach makes the distinction
between judicial and empirical statehood. There are cases where recognition is
‘persistently maintained in spite of conditions on the ground’ and other cases
where ‘recognition is stubbornly withheld even though the realities on the
ground themselves expose the legal fictions which the international community
supports in the defence of the principle of territorial integrity’ (Bartmann, 2004,
p. 12). Bartmann (2004, p. 13) goes so far as to call the international system
‘one of egregious double standards,’ with sub-Saharan Africa an extremely
glaring example of such behaviour where empirically non-viable states are kept
in the system because of legal recognition.
Judicial and empirical statehood are the main concepts of concern for
Bartmann and other authors in that volume. For Bartmann, juridical statehood is
the legal status of the state and is ‘reflected in the act of state recognition’
(Bartmann, 2004, p. 14). The other side of the coin is more complicated.
Bartmann analyses tensions between legality and legitimacy, and while the
latter is defined through the state’s capabilities to perform, moral terms are also
added. The capabilities of the state are conceptualised as survivability – the
state has to perform to some extent and non-performance can be seen as a
possibility of ‘succumb[ing] eventually to a more rational and capable political

36
 system’ (Bartmann, 2004, p. 15). In what Jackson (1990) calls the old
sovereignty regime, the non-performing states would have been devoured by
their more capable neighbours. The moral dimension deals with justification,
both in terms of internal and external support. The internal side is legitimacy in
the eyes of the respective people and the external side is to some extent based
on the internal. Overall, Bartmann (2004, p. 15) claims that legitimacy is the
‘conviction that a particular territorial community has the right to be constituted
as a state’ (emphasis original).
These concepts, legality and legitimacy, are however connected. As Bart-
mann (2004) puts it, as time progresses the recognised but underperforming
states of Africa might acquire legitimacy through their nation-building efforts
and unrecognised states would like to think that international recognition
cements their legitimacy in the eyes of their populations. The difference bet-
ween legality and legitimacy is the main defining feature of de facto states for
Bartmann. Unrecognised states are illegal in the eyes of other states and
international organisations, even though they might hold internal legitimacy, at
least among their respective populations. And they do possess some capabilities
which they use to perform tasks that are usually assumed from states.
Geldenhuys (2009) criticises this term, and that of ‘statelike entity,’ because
it indicates that no de jure recognition whatsoever must have been possessed by
de facto states, but this is not true in practice. There is quite substantial formal
recognition is some cases. However, as Geldenhuys himself declares, UN
membership should be the ultimate recognition and none of the de facto states
are UN members. Therefore, some de jure recognition should not be a problem
in terming these entities de facto states. Esewhere, the term ‘de facto state’ has
also been used by Caspersen (2009) and Berg and Toomla (2009), who also
emphasise recognition and empirical statehood.

1.2.3.2. Pseudo-states
Kolossov and O’Loughlin (1999) and Kolossov (2001) use the term ‘pseudo-
state’. They take a geopolitical approach and claim that there is a world-wide
belt of these entities around Eurasia. Their own example, Transniestria, is one
of these states. The existence of these states is supposed to be ‘one of the basic
and long-term features of the contemporary world geopolitical order’
(Kolossov, 2001, p. 87). They are located in a ‘civilisation clash belt from the
Balkans to Afghanistan, a zone of contact between empires’ (Kolossov &
O’Loughlin, 1999, p. 155). Pseudo states are ‘islands of ‘transitional’ or
‘incomplete’ statehood’ (Kolossov & O’Loughlin, 1999, p. 151) (Kolossov,
2001, p. 87). There are low levels of international recognition and these levels
vary. Conflict has been involved in the history of pseudo-states and current
instability might contribute to the break-out of more.
Kolossov and O’Loughlin also speak about quasi-states and take a different
approach to both Jackson (1990) and Kolstø (2006), whose concepts are

37
10
elaborated later. Their quasi-state is a criminal entity, essentially some sort of
‘parallel universe’ that can even exist in urban areas of Western states. These
quasi-states are governed or controlled by drug barons, for example. Pseudo-
states, on the other hand, are institutionalised entities that have declared their
independence, fulfil the empirical criteria of statehood but lack recognition by
the international community. Kolossov and O’Loughlin (1999) distinguish four
types of pseudo-states based on genesis and function. These include: state by
nationality; state that has come into being because of the collapse of an empire;
areas lacking control because of civil war or foreign invasion; and pirate states
based on criminal-terrorist activities. The latter seems to correspond to their
definition of quasi-states, but institutionalisation could be the difference. The
eventual aim of these ethno-territorial groups is international recognition that
can be shown through three criteria (Kolossov & O’Loughlin, 1999, p. 156):
‘membership in the UN, political sovereignty and economic autonomy; a
distinctive national culture that is both primary and primordial; political
development and separation over time’. These three criteria combine nation-
building with the quest for recognition and state-building. In Kolossov’s and
O’Loughlin’s approach these three are tied together.

1.2.3.3. Statelike entity

Charles King (2001) analyses Eurasian de facto states and makes two
arguments: that separatist entities of the early 1990s have become state-builders
a decade later; and that the conflicts associated with these entities are frozen
because both sides can benefit from the status quo. Therefore, King does not get
involved in conceptualising the phenomena, but rather places an emphasis on
state-building in four post-Soviet cases based on the end of civil war. However,
he gives a definition of what he considers to be a statelike entity in a footnote
(King, 2001, p. 525). He uses the common empirical-juridical dichotomy such
that a statelike entity is a political unit that must have a population and a
functioning government on a specific territory, but lack international
recognition. Or, as King (2001, p. 525) himself puts it, the entity is ‘without the
imprimatur of international recognition’. Even though the main name King
gives these units is statelike entity, he uses a variety of other terms like
unrecognised states (Title), de facto countries (p. 525) and even quasi-states (p.
528).
The next sentence of the aforementioned footnote is also interesting. He
claims that ‘in Eurasia the conceptual bar for statehood cannot be raised too
high, for many of the qualities that define relatively well functioning states in
central Europe do not exist farther east …’ (King, 2001, p. 525). This is quite an
honest appraisal of the situation and shows that conceptualising state or
statehood might not be the easiest of tasks. An example from King’s own
research shows the ambiguous empirical state of some of the statelike entities.

38
For example, in Nagorno-Karabakh ‘local authorities have been able to
construct something resembling a state, with its own foreign ministry (which
charges visitors $25 for visas), armed forces, police, and court system’ (p. 536);
but, on the other hand, King admits that ‘Karabakh is now more an autonomous
district of Armenia…’ (p. 542). For example, the Armenian currency is legal
tender in Karabakh. Therefore, it is complicated to conceptualise de facto states
and indeed the empirical bar should not be too high.

1.2.3.4. States-within-states
States-within-states is a term given to a wider range of entities than just de facto
states in a volume edited by Paul Kingston and Ian Spears. We will take a look
at three of the contributors.
Kingston (2004, p. 4) in the introductory chapter confirms the wider
approach by claiming that their ‘interest is more with ‘incipient’ rather than
full-blown political entities’. The aim of the volume is to take into account a
broader range of political authority; earlier definitions were stricter and left out
some of phenomena like Columbian state erosion or Lebanese militia cantons.
Therefore, only some of the cases might be defined as de facto states, as ‘most
of the states-within-states examined in this volume exhibit severe imbalances in
their institutional development’ (Kingston, 2004, p. 7). The overall emphasis is
on weak states and actors operating within their borders, rather than entities that
have independence as their ultimate goal. Most of the analysed units do not
possess the state’s qualities as defined by Weber, namely a legitimate monopoly
on the use of force within a certain territory.
Ian Spears (2004), in the same volume, disagrees to some extent. He finds
that states-within-states have enough territorial control and that they fulfil most
of the Weberian criteria for statehood. More importantly, Spears (2004, p. 16)
makes a distinction between quasi-states and states-within-states using the
juridical-empirical dichotomy. The quasi-state is defined in the manner of
Jackson (1990): they are juridical ‘shells’ with little or no empirical state within
the recognised framework. States-within-states are the opposite. They ‘have
imposed effective control over a territory within a larger state’ (Spears, 2004, p.
16). They have some institutional power to collect taxes and provide the
population with some services, but still remain what Spears calls ‘political
subunits’. They may be more viable than their parent state. As with some other
authors, Spears’ main distinction is that states-within-states are to some extent
efficient but lack recognition from the international community.
Spears (2004) also illustrates some empirical features that states-within-
states possess and their impact on the entities. War against the parent state is
common to every state-within-state and it is useful in creating a common
identity and reducing diversity. Revenue generation is dependent on external
patrons or illegal activities. There is also some economic contact with the

39
outside world. The revenue is used for fighting and also for building
infrastructure. Spears also provides us with some political objectives of states-
within-states and he lists five of them: protection against hostile government;
secession, autonomy or political power in the existing state; demonstration of its
capabilities to the outside world; generation of wealth for its leaders; and use as
a tool in conflict resolution.
In the case of the second objective, that of achieving secession or autonomy
or overthrowing the existing government of the parent state, Spears also
presents a temporal feature of states-within-states. Namely, he claims that
‘states-within-states are a fleeting or temporary phenomena’ (Spears, 2004, p.
28). The idea behind this is that they want to achieve some further status, such
as independence, and see themselves as a temporary solution towards a greater
end.
Pegg (2004, p. 36) admits that he and Spears ‘share broad areas of general
agreement with one another’. The main common theme is the juridical-empiri-
cal dichotomy that has been emphasised by both, and several other, authors.
However, there are differences and Pegg claims that two areas especially differ
substantially. The first of these areas is purpose or objective. While Spears cites
five different purposes, Pegg refers to only one – independence. This narrows
the potential universe of cases but adds to theoretical clarification. The goal of
achieving sovereignty separates politically motivated de facto states from other
entities that control some territory but are not recognised as governments. One
of Spears’ possible objectives, taking control of the existing state, is excluded
from Pegg’s approach. The de facto state exists only to achieve independence,
even though, in reality, it may accept other solutions like autonomy.
The second disagreement between Pegg and Spears is, according to the
former, ‘an enlargement or amplification of this first difference’ (Pegg, 2004,
p. 37). This is again a question of how wide or narrow the definition is, but in
this case it is about theoretical criteria rather than objectives. Spears, as cited
above, only uses a Weberian definition of statehood with a lack of international
relations. Pegg, as also cited above (Pegg, 1998), uses several criteria and ten
additional theoretical dimensions define his unit of analysis. This makes Pegg’s
definition narrower and does not include a wide array of cases, which can be
seen in Spears’ case.
Another concept of states-within-states has been developed by Pełczyńska-
Nałęczet al (2008, p. 371), who define them as ‘regions that formally recognize
the central government but in fact maintain a very high degree of
independence’. This approach contradicts that of Spears and Pegg mostly in the
conflict aspect. Pegg’s de facto state and Spears’ state-within-state are in
conflict with the central government and have different objectives with respect
to it. Furthermore, de facto states seek independence, but those who recognise
central government do not. Therefore, these entities cannot be considered as
having no juridical sovereignty, as they possess it within the domestic
framework of a particular state.

40
 1.2.3.5. Quasi-state
Quasi-state is the term introduced by Kolstø (2006) to identify what we call the
de facto state. However, to start with quasi states, we must first briefly explain
the more well-known use of the concept. Specifically, it is a mirror image of
Kolstø’s use which was developed by Robert Jackson. Jackson (1990) defines
quasi-states through his approach to sovereignty. They are territorial juris-
dictions which are supported by international law and material aid. They would
not survive without that support and in a more competitive international
environment would be devoured by stronger units. Jackson distinguishes
between old and new sovereignty regimes. The point at which the new replaced
the old was after World War II. The old sovereignty regime is characterised by
two aspects – plurality and empirical statehood. The rules of the old regime had
to correspond to the existing reality and, as there were many states in the world,
some of these rules were there to protect the plurality of states. Otherwise, the
situation might have ended in a world government. Those who participated in
the regime were sovereign states and their sovereignty roughly aligned with
empirical statehood (Jackson, 1990, p. 40). Governments had to provide the
populations within their territories with services and, most of all, internal and
external protection. In conclusion, then, the old sovereignty regime had rules for
independent states that, in turn, had to be strong enough to be considered part of
the regime.
The latter aspect, a strong enough state or empirical statehood, has been
abolished by the new sovereignty regime as a prerequisite for participation.
Jackson acknowledges that there are several levels or ‘divisions’ of sovereignty
in the contemporary world and that the new regime is mostly applicable to the
Third World. The new regime adds to the old one two ‘normative innovations:
self-determination of ex-colonies, and development entitlements of im-
poverished countries’ (Jackson, 1990, p. 40). These two new aspects mean that
international law and other states recognise the Third World countries as
sovereigns. They possess juridical sovereignty, however, this sovereignty is not
achieved through empirical existence but by the will of the stronger.
Decolonisation created states that are taken as such, but that are ineffective.
Many of them cannot provide their populations with ‘the advantages tradi-
tionally associated with independent statehood’ (Jackson, 1990, p. 21). One of
the reasons for this is their lack of state institutions and authorised domestic
power. Jackson points out that there have always been weak states, or rather
states that are less capable than others. But these states had to fight for their
survival, and many of the weak did not survive – a burden that has been
removed from today’s Third World. In a nutshell, Jackson’s (1990, p. 5) quasi-
states ‘appear to be juridical more than empirical entities’ and they are
‘creatures of non-competitive international norms’ (p. 26).
As one can observe, Jackson’s quasi-state does not fit with other entities
described in this section. Kolstø (2006) takes a different approach. The
juridical-empirical dichotomy is again at the centre of analysis, but Kolstø’s

41
11
conceptualisation of the term ‘quasi-state’ is exactly the opposite of Jackson’s:
it refers to an entity lacking external sovereignty. Kosltø admits that different
names, listing ‘de facto states’, ‘unrecognized states’, ‘para-states’ and ‘pseudo-
states’ (Kolstø, 2006, p. 725), have been given to these entities, but he sticks to
quasi-state for two reasons. First, Kolstø acknowledges similarities between his
and Jackson’s quasi-states, such as their being ‘on the margins of international
system of states and challeng[ing] basic assumptions of this system’ (2006, p.
725). Even though they lack different aspects of sovereignty, they can still be
viewed together because of their relevant position in the system. The second
reason, Kolstø believes, is that when achieving international recognition, the de
facto-type quasi-state becomes a rather non-performing-type of recognised
state. This terminological polysemy is quite confusing and to offer conceptual
clarity Kolstø (2006, p. 725) proposes that ‘Jacksonian-type quasi-states are
henceforth referred to as ‘failed states’ while the term quasi-states is reserved
for unrecognized states only’.
Kolstø goes further than just explaining quasi-states with juridical-empirical
sovereignty. He suggests three criteria that a quasi-state must fulfil: govern-
ment, seeking of independence and a temporal criterion. Government means
‘leadership control of (most of) the territory it lays claim to’ (Kolstø, 2006, pp.
725–726). As with de facto states, when their boundaries are challenged, then
the addition ‘most of’ seems reasonable. Seeking independence means that the
entities have sought but not received international recognition. States ‘wish[ing]
for but [being] denied a seat in the UN General Assembly’ (Kolstø, 2006, p.
725) indicates that UN membership is their ultimate goal. In this regard, Kolstø
takes a similar stand to Geldenhuys, whose position about the UN was
described above. The third criterion is the same as Pegg’s: the quasi-state has to
be in this empirical situation for no less than two years. This definition excludes
some of the cases analysed in this thesis from the list of quasi-states, mainly
because they have not proclaimed independence (e.g. Taiwan).
There is also a third way to conceptualise the quasi-state. Stanislawski
(2008) gives a wide definition of quasi-states in a Forum edited by him and
published in International Studies Review in 2008. He takes into account both
juridical and factual statehood. The former is defined as international re-
cognition and the latter as power in and control over their territory. They are
termed ‘as-if-states’ and ‘almost-states’ respectively. In Stanislawski’s (2008,
pp. 367–368) words, ‘as-if-states’ ‘are quasi-states that enjoy international re-
cognition and the rights and duties of states, but in effect, their internal power
and control is limited, or fragmented, or non-existent’, and ‘almost-states’ are
‘quasi-states that do not enjoy international recognition, but contrary to ‘as-if
states’ they are characterized by efficient internal control of their territories and
populations’. The third category that Stanislawski (2008) talks about is called
‘black spots’ where there is neither control of an existing government nor
entities that claim authority and seek international recognition. These are areas
where states have lost their control and ‘in which illicit organizations control

42
what has become a criminal enclave’ (Stanislawski, 2008, p. 368). The fourth
category is obvious; it is the normal, functioning state. There might be different
levels of control, or factual statehood, but if a government is doing well enough
then the state can be considered as such. Stanislawski (2008, p. 369) presents
these concepts as a two-by-two table where government control is graphed
against international recognition in the same manner as in this thesis.

1.2.3.6. Contested states

Deon Geldenhuys (2009, p. 1) uses the term ‘contested states’ to describe ten
entities and ascribes them the defining feature of ‘internationally disputed
nature of their purported statehood, manifested in their lack of de jure
recognition’. He acknowledges that the extent (and therefore the extent of the
lack) of this recognition varies among cases and therefore sets a benchmark of
UN membership as full recognition by the international community. Admitting
that in some cases the UN might even endorse ‘contested states’ right to
statehood’, they still have ‘no collective recognition of both their right to exist
as sovereign states and their actual existence as such’ (Geldenhuys, 2009, p. 1).
Taking into account the requirements of confirmed states that are set out in
the Montevideo Convention from 1933, Geldenhuys elaborates on the definition
of contested states. First, he claims that ‘all contested states have settled
populations’ (Geldenhuys, 2009, p. 23) with problems of popular support or
refugees. Second, territories of contested states have boundaries, as is the case
with every state, but these boundaries are disputed to the full extent. Their
territories are seen as part of existing states. Third, very much similar arguments
can be applied to governments: they are not recognised no matter how they
perform. Fourth, there is the desire and capabilities to enter into relations with
confirmed states (Geldenhuys (p. 13) treats this as a consequence rather than a
criterion of statehood) on behalf of the contested states, but these approaches
are rejected.
Though not mentioned in the Montevideo Convention, Geldenhuys adds
sovereignty and recognition to these four conditions. In the case of the former,
he distinguishes internal and external sovereignty (Geldenhuys, 2009, p. 14;
24). As for internal sovereignty, contested states have built constitutional
arrangements and institutions, even though they are contested by confirmed
states. The external sovereignty of contested states is limited, according to
Geldenhuys, because the origins of these entities are considered to constitute
violations of international law.
Recognition is mentioned in the Montevideo Convention: not as a criterion
for statehood, but rather as an acceptance of it by the recognising state (art 6).
However, recognition comprises the core of the definition of contested state.
Recognition leads to the ‘formal birth certificate of confirmed statehood,
namely full UN membership’ (Geldenhuys, 2009, p. 25).

43
 1.2.3.7. Non-recognised/Unrecognised states
Unrecognised (or non-recognised) states might be the most common and easily
understandable name given to de facto entities. The major problem with this
title is that at least some of the cases in point enjoy some formal recognition, a
few even quite substantial recognition.
Nina Caspersen (2012) uses the term ‘unrecognised states’ and offers a
definition that does not differ much from the one offered by Pegg above. There
are some additional aspects, though. Caspersen (2012, p. 11) presents five
aspects of the definition. First, there has to be de facto independence of the
entity, with the condition that it must control at least two-thirds of the territory it
has claimed. Second, there has to be on-going state-building and legitimisation
of the leadership. Third, there has to be a declaration of independence or, in its
absence, a clear aspiration for independence. Caspersen states an independence
referendum and independent currency as examples of this intent. Fourth is the
recognition aspect. Generally, there is none, but Caspersen allows the
recognition by a patron state and a ‘few other states of no great importance’.
However, she gives no exact threshold of what separates important states from
unimportant ones. Finally, there is a temporal clause that a de facto state has to
be existent for at least two years. Like Pegg’s, this threshold is arbitrary.
Caspersen does not approach the entities on a case-by-case basis but on the
basis of issues that are important to their existence. She ‘demonstrates how
important internal dynamics are for the development of these entities, but these
intra-communal dynamics also interact with the international system, internal
politics is shaped and constrained by external factors, including international
norms and practices’ (2012, p. 24). Cases she uses include Abkhazia, Chechnya,
Nagorno-Karabakh, TRNC, SrpskaKrajina, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Tamil
Eelam, Transnistria and Taiwan.
Caspersen does, however, provide a list of de facto states that have existed
since 1991. The list (2012, p. 12) includes 18 items (date in brackets indicates
the end of the entity’s de facto status): Abkhazia, Bougainville (1997),
Chechnya (1999), Eritrea (1993), Gagauzia (1994), Kurdistan (2004), Monte-
negro (2006), Nagorno-Karabakh, Republika Srpska (1995), Republika Srpska
Krajina (1995), Somaliland, South Ossetia, Tamil Eelam (2009), Transnistria,
and TRNC. Additionally, there are two borderline cases of Kosovo and Taiwan.
The unrecognised state has also been analysed by Caspersen and Stansfield
(2011). The criteria they provide are very similar to those of Caspersen,
although small differences exist. The first is temporal: they include cases prior
to 1991, which adds Biafra and Katanga to the list. Secondly, Caspersen and
Stansfield add Anjouan (from Comoros, 1997–2008) and East Timor (from
Indonesia, 1999–2002) to the list, although they actually existed after 1991.
Thirdly, the case of Iraqi Kurdistan is included as still existing (from 1991),
whereas Caspersen gives an end-date of 2004 to the entity’s de facto status.
Finally, Taiwan and Kosovo are included as borderline cases by Caspersen but
not as such by Caspersen and Stansfield. They also omit Palestine and Western

44
 Sahara from their list though some contributors to the volume have included
them, as the editors willingly admit (p. 5). Most contributions to Caspersen and
Stansfield (2011), unlike other edited volumes, are not case studies. The volume
is divided into three parts: Conceptualising unrecognised states; Interaction of
recognised and unrecognised states; and Conflict management and
unrecognised states. None of the chapters in these parts deal with only one case,
but on the other hand not all of them analyse all possible cases either.

1.2.3.8. Other concepts

In addition to the previous concepts, there are several others that have not
achieved as widespread use. Still, some of them are more elaborated and
discussed than others. We will start with Jacques deLisle (2002), who writes
about Taiwan’s status and presents possible scenarios concerning its sove-
reignty. The spectrum runs from one unitary Chinese state to that of two
independent states. Between these two extreme models (extreme in the case of
Taiwan-China relations, of course; conceptually, it is the same sovereignty, only
in the former case the two entities are one and in the latter case two states)
deLisle suggests several other options including a federal solution, confede-
ration and commonwealth. One of the scenarios is labelled ‘near-state’, or sui-
generis entity, and deLisle describes it as ‘fail[ing] to satisfy one of the
elements of statehood reflected in the 1933 Montevideo Convention’ (deLisle,
2002, p. 741). He adds that ‘[i]n some cases, the issue is the failure to satisfy
another implicit factor, that of claiming to be a state’ (deLisle, 2002, p. 741).
Even though an entity may lack only one of the Montevideo criteria, it is hard to
imagine such a case. Only the capacity to enter into relations with other states
could be the absent criterion, as territory and population usually go hand-in-
hand and the lack of government also means a lack of foreign relations.
However, the examples of Vatican and Palestine are noted.
As recognition is not among the elements included in the Montevideo
convention, lack of recognition cannot be one of the defining features of near-
states. We must agree with Geldenhuys’ (2009) critique that this concept
concerns the state’s factual qualities rather than its recognition. Near-states as
defined above would be deficient in both juridical and empirical sovereignty
and unsuitable for our research.
Montserrat Guibernau (1999, p. 1) refers to nations without states which
are ‘cultural communities sharing a common past, attached to a clearly
demarcated territory, and wishing to decide upon their political future which
lack a state of their own’. This definition differs from others in this thesis in an
important aspect of empirical statehood. They do not have juridical inde-
pendence, as with de facto states, but they also lack control over their territory.
They still strive towards independence but have not yet achieved it on the
empirical level. And their quest for self-determination may not even involve full
independence. As Guibernau puts it (1999, p. 2), self-determination is ‘some-

45
12
times understood as further autonomy within the state, though, in other cases it
involves the right to secession’. The aspect of common culture and identity is
central to the concept, rather than empirical but unrecognised statehood. The
argument is that the parent state is alien to a particular group who do not
identify themselves with the state and therefore have an explicit wish to rule
themselves. They have not achieved that wish and are more like secessionist
movements than unrecognised states.
The idea of areas of special sovereignty violates the concept of absolute
sovereignty. This concept has been theorised by Jackson (1990), as the old
sovereignty regime, and Holsti (2004, p. 114) who claims that ‘a state is either
sovereign or it is not’. Holsti does concede that there are anomalies in practice
and offers the examples of India as a founding member of the League of
Nations or Hong Kong as a founding member of the WTO. Holsti’s (2004,
p. 114) acceptance is limited to ‘deviation from standard practice, no more’. He
goes on to claim that ‘there is a standard practice, and that is that a polity cannot
participate in the great games of international politics unless it is sovereign’
(Holsti, 2004, p. 114).
Still, the term ‘area of special sovereignty’ indicates that this kind of status is
accepted and recognised in contemporary international relations. In contrast to
this perception, Geldenhuys (2009) refers to National Geographic’s Atlas of the
World where Somaliland is given that title. However, there are entities that can
be considered special and are recognised as such. The United States’ Depart-
ment of State factsheet ‘Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty’ (U.S.
Department of State, 2010) applies the ‘Special Administrative Region’ title to
Hong Kong and Macau. Therefore, areas of special sovereignty are arrange-
ments that are recognised as such and do not lack juridical sovereignty in the
way de facto states do.
Geldenhuys (2009) criticises the label ‘non-state actors’ for lacking
‘stateness’ and it is a criticism that is hard to argue with. The non-state actors
introduced to international relations theorising were international organisations
and transnational corporations rather than de facto entities with territory and
population. Buzan and Little (2000) play down the role of intergovernmental
organisations (IGOs), as they do not possess enough autonomous actor quality.
For them, the main non-state actors, or units, to be precise, as they are analysing
the international system, are firms and international non-governmental organi-
sations (INGOs) (Buzan & Little, 2000).
The book by Isachenko (2012) entitled The Making of Informal States. State-
building in Northern Cyprus and Transdniestria uses the term informal states
and analyses the two mentioned cases. Isachenko’s focus is on the state-
building efforts of the de facto entities. She uses figurational analysis to
understand developments in PMR and TRNC in the context of long-term
processes. The emphasis is on interdependence and networks. Isachenko starts
with conceptualising the state, continues with the history of the cases and ends

46
with state- and economy-building efforts and the position of the de facto entities
in the international arena.
While defining the informal state, she refers to definitions proposed by Pegg,
King, Lynch, Kingston and Spears and Geldenhuys, but persists with informal
states because of the state-building emphasis of her work. She argues that
informal, as opposed to something that is legal, official or established, suits her
focus. The entities she analyses (Transniestria and Northern Cyprus) use
informal practices in their state-building and also get involved in informal
diplomacy because of the existing rules and their unrecognised status
Elsewhere, proto-states refer to entities that existed before modern nation
states. In Southeast Asia, these kind of entities were ‘based primarily on control
of people rather than territory’ (Chong, 2009, p. 141). Proto-states are presented
as early, pre-state phenomena also by Rosenberg (2010). Bakke et al (2011) use
mostly the term de facto state but claim that they are ‘sometimes also referred to
as breakaway regions’. Hsiao (2011, p. 2) uses the term unrecognised
claimants to statehood (UCS), which are ‘political communities that meet
many of the criteria of a state according to international law, but whose claims
to statehood do not receive unequivocal recognition by existing states generally
or collective recognition by the international community as a whole’. The latter
is defined as full UN membership, which in turn can be achieved only after
recognition by the majority of states. Dent (2004) argues that the best title for
these entities would be sovereign land in a larger independent country. The
term ‘land’ is used because it is considered to be more inclusive than nation. As
the focus of his research is identity, the use of land is highly justified.

1.2.4. Comparison of different approaches

In the following section we will compare the different definitions of major
‘labels’ for de facto states. There are several similarities between different
approaches but also some notable differences. As we have referred to quite a
number of different terms by which de facto states have been described, we will
concentrate on only those more commonly used. As for the authors, some terms
are used by many, some by only one. The following concepts are analysed in
this section:
 De facto states (Pegg (1998); Lynch (2004); Bartmann (2004));
 Contested states (Geldenhuys (2009));
 Unrecognised states (Caspersen (2012);
 Quasi-states (Kolstø (2006));
 Pseudo-states (Kolossov and O’Loughlin (1999));
 States-within-states (Spears (2004));
 Statelike entities (King (2001)).

47
With seven definitions and nine main authors, one can identify eight different
criteria that are used in defining the de facto state. Even though they are not
used by all authors and there are some differences within these criteria, one can
distinguish the following:
 Territory;
 Population;
 Government;
 Capabilities for international relations;
 Absence of recognition;
 Legitimacy or some indigenous capacity for existing, popular support;
 Temporal criterion, some threshold in years that must be exceeded in de
facto states’ existence;
 Declaration of independence or some other statement of intent.

The differences (and similarities) between authors among these eight criteria are
shown in Figure 2:

Criteria for de facto statehood

Population
10
Declaration of independence Territory
5

Temporal criterion 0 Government

Indigenous Capability for international

capacity/legitimacy relations
Absence of recognition

Figure 2: Criteria for de facto statehood. Comparison of different authors.

On the right hand side of the radar chart, starting from the North and going
clockwise, there are criteria that correspond to the Montevideo Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States, Article 1. In the South, there is the absence of
international recognition. On the West there are additional criteria used by the
authors. As one can observe, the four Montevideo criteria and the absence of
recognition are well-represented with different authors, with all criteria scoring
nine on the chart. This means that all respective authors have used them in one
capacity or another. The differences will be explained shortly. The three
additional criteria, however, are not universally acknowledged by our pool of

48
 authors. Now we will take a look at each criterion separately, even though we
find them very closely connected.

Population
To function as a state, de facto entities must have people to rule over. As there
are no restrictions on how big or small a country should be (absurd possibilities
of, for example, two people are highly debatable of course), there is general
consensus among authors in this regard. The only requirement is that the
population should be permanently connected to the territory. As Geldenhuys
rightly points out, this does not rule out emigration. Population is an aggregate
not an individual level criterion.

Territory
Territory is another of the Montevideo criteria. Pegg (1998, p. 27) argues that
de facto states are ‘territorially-based and in the business of providing gover-
nance’. He also provides criteria for distinguishing de facto states from
emigration to emphasise the territorial nature of the entities. Unlike the
emigration of a population, de facto states want to take their territory with them.
Pegg also ties territory to the question of justification. To receive recognition, a
secessionist entity must show that it has the right to a particular territory.

Government
The next criterion is government and it is closely related to the previous two.
There is no point talking about government without population and territory,
with problems of the latter being debated more intensely among students of de
facto states. Therefore, the differences among authors as to what this means are
somewhat larger than with the previous criteria. There are two issues with
government. First, some authors have elaborated on the scope of territory that
needs to be under the control of the de facto state. The reason behind this is
practical, because several of these states do not control the whole territory they
have claimed. Caspersen for example gives a threshold of 2/3 of claimed
territory to be controlled, including the capital and key areas. In a volume co-
edited and a definition co-written with Stansfield, Caspersen substitutes the
two-thirds threshold with a wider notion of ‘most of the territory’. ‘Most of’ is a
term also used by Kolstø, but compared to its use by Caspersen, it is used more
softly and put into brackets rather than an exhibited part of the criterion. Kolstø
acknowledges the empirical reality that de facto states do not control all the
territory they have laid their claim to but gives a theoretical criterion of full
control.
Geldenhuys writes about borders that might be unstable. Spears takes a
similar position and admits that borders may shift in time. But neither of them
considers it to be a problem in defining the de facto state because it is not
limited to de facto states. Issues over the control of territory are common in
many parts of the Third World and arguably cases like Somalia do not even fit

49
13
the rather generous thresholds of capital and key areas. Additionally, there are
border issues between functioning and even powerful states. The Russo-
Japanese argument over the Kuril Islands might be an example.
The second issue is the range of the control. The limits of constitutional
arrangements and institutions as well as services the government provides are
quite open. Pegg, for example, argues for ‘organised political leadership’
instead of government. Kingston, in the same volume as Spears, acknowledges
imbalances in institutional development between the entities. Again, there are
differences in government among confirmed states, therefore the wider
thresholds seem reasonable. Caspersen analyses the concept of sovereignty and
concludes that while one aspect of it – authority – might be absolute, the other –
control – is not. She claims it to be relative and a matter of degree. Again, this is
not uniquely inherent to de facto states. Recognised states vary, and to a large
degree, in this matter.

Capacity for international relations

Related to government is the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The Montevideo Convention, however, does not specify what this capacity
exactly entails. To interpret this grammatically, one comes to the conclusion
that a state must have resources, both finances and people, to establish diplo-
matic connections with other states. In the case of de facto states, another
element comes into play: the possible partner. Most of the authors emphasise
that even though the de facto state possesses the capacity, recognised states do
not want to engage in relations with them. Pegg (1998, p. 26) puts it a little
differently, saying that the entity ‘views itself as capable of entering into
relations with other states’. As stated, technically it does not take much to enter
into international relations; therefore, one-sidedness is probably the only theo-
retical elaboration that can be offered concerning this criterion.

International recognition
The main difference between recognised and de facto states is the absence of
recognition in the latter case. The Montevideo Convention does not list re-
cognition as a qualification of a state, but rather as an acceptance by other
states. Article 6 states: ‘The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state
which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and
duties determined by international law’. This formulation is based on a decla-
rative rather than a constitutive approach to statehood and is therefore easily
applicable to de facto states.
The main difference between authors here concerns how much recognition is
tolerable for an entity still to be considered a de facto state. Theoretically, the
continuum goes from no recognition at all to full recognition by all existing
states. As in practice most de facto states enjoy some level of formal
recognition (the exceptions being Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and

50
Somaliland) and none have full recognition, the threshold must be somewhere
in between. And setting this threshold is a subject of much debate.
Geldenhuys expects the de facto state to have no recognition at all and
suggests his term ‘contested state’ is therefore better. However, he does not
propose a particular level of recognition at which the state is no longer a
contested one, but refers to full UN membership as the ultimate form of
recognition. This is a practical approach, because not all UN members enjoy
recognition by all other states. The People’s Republic of China, Israel, Cyprus,
Armenia and both Koreas are full members of the organisation but have limited
recognition, especially China and Israel. Others are not recognised by one or
two UN member states.
UN membership is arguably the widest possible threshold and is also shared
by Kolossov&O’Loughlin and Kolstø. The UN is the only global organisation
that deals with a wide array of issues and it is natural to associate its
membership with full recognition. There are in addition to the aforementioned
cases still some problems with this reasoning. First, UN membership is
voluntary. Even though most states are members, there have been entities that
have decided not to join the organisation though they were still fully confirmed
states. Switzerland, which joined the UN only a decade ago, is the best example.
Secondly, in practice a UN member does not have to be a sovereign state,
although at the moment all members are. The cases of the Ukrainian and Belo-
russian SSR’s and India are prime examples of this. The former two were
constituent republics of the Soviet Union, while the latter gained full inde-
pendence from the United Kingdom two years after admission to the organi-
sation. Thirdly, the UN itself does not recognise anybody; states do.
There is a way, though, in which UN membership is relevant for assessing
the level of recognition. Even though not clearly stated by the authors analysed,
UN membership can be seen as a fixed threshold on the degree of recognition at
two levels. The UN Charter, Article 4 (2) states that ‘The admission of any such
state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council’. The two
levels here are the General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (SC). The
GA level means that the majority of UN members must be in favour of a new
member. Article 18 (2) of the Charter states that for the admission of new
Members to the United Nations, a two-thirds majority of the members present
and voting must be achieved for a decision to be made. Although theoretically
this means that if one voting member state is present, its vote would be enough,
this is inconceivable in practice. This means, then, that (nearly) two-thirds of
the UN member states must vote for the new member’s admission and we can
assume that they have recognised the latter.
The second level is that of the SC, where the permanent members’ votes are
important. According to Article 27 (3), ‘an affirmative vote of nine members
including the concurring votes of the permanent member’ is necessary for non-
procedural decisions to be made. On the political level, this means that the

51
major powers must not be against the new member and we can assume that they
have recognised it. This means that a state can be considered a recognised or a
confirmed one when it has the recognition of two-thirds of UN member states
with no objections from the major powers.
Caspersen takes a different approach and limits the range of recognition to a
patron and small number of less powerful states for a state to be classified as
unrecognised. Or, as Caspersen puts it (p. 11) (in a passage already cited
above), a ‘few other states of no great importance’. There are two things to
analyse in this formulation. First, the importance of a patron and the criteria for
how to identify one are given in following chapters. In this context, Caspersen
makes an important point: no matter how powerful the patron might be, its
recognition should not affect the theoretical status of the unrecognised entity.
The other aspect of the criterion is vaguer, as Caspersen does not clarify what is
meant by ‘no great importance’. What makes a state important? Or, indeed, can
a state be important at all?
There is no overwhelming consensus on this matter in international relations
theory. Waltz’s neorealist approach considers powerful states to be important.
However, as Waltz considers only military power to be relevant, the question is
whether some militarily non-powerful states might also be important? Some
authors, usually labelled as liberal, think in terms of issue-areas. This can widen
the scope of important states along non-military lines so that, for example,
economic power could make a state important. As one can observe further in
this dissertation, an issue-area approach is also adopted here. The problem of
this approach might be where to draw the line: economy can be further
separated into sub-issue areas like oil or finance, for example.
Taking all this into consideration, one must conclude that Caspersen’s
definition is not the best mainly because of a lack of clarity which can lead to
inconsistency. An example here might be Kosovo. Caspersen is somewhat
cautious in her approach towards the entity and calls it a borderline case.
However, she and Stansfield list it as a ‘proper’ non-recognised state. Clarity
related questions here are twofold. First, are some of the states that have
recognised Kosovo important? They include the United States, the United
Kingdom and France, all permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Although there might be no questions about the US, being among the world’s
leading economies and nuclear powers, but not superpowers, are France and the
UK important? If the answer is affirmative, can Kosovo be considered an
unrecognised state? Therefore, Caspersen’s definition is less useful than the
threshold of UN membership, even though the latter appears to be unrelated to
recognition at first glance. Treating some cases as borderline adds depth to the
analysis, but sacrifices clarity.

Indigenous capacity or legitimacy

Coming to the West side of the graph, we do not see such consensus regarding
criteria as we do with those in the Montevideo Convention and the absence of

52
 recognition. As regards indigenous capacity or legitimacy, this criterion has
several ‘faces’ as the label would indicate. We can differentiate between two
approaches: top-down and bottom-up. The former means that the elites of the de
facto entity are involved in nation-building to create a common identity and to
legitimise their rule. The latter means that the state has indigenous support from
the start. On closer observation, these two approaches are not mutually exclu-
sive, therefore, they can be considered as a single criterion. The second diffe-
rentiation we can make is between state-building and legitimacy. Technically,
these can be two different phenomena but in reality they tend to go hand-in-
hand. These issues of connectedness are the reasons why we consider these two
as one criterion.
We have gone beyond differences within the criteria to differences of
whether some criteria should be used at all. The authors that favour the inclu-
sion of some indigenous capacity include Pegg, Caspersen, Spears and
Bartmann. Some of the others like Kolossov&O’Loughlin and King emphasise
the problem and analyse it quite thoroughly but do not include it in a definition.
So, what do the authors tell us about this criterion?
Pegg includes it to differentiate the de facto state from puppet states. South
Africa’s ‘Bantustans’ could be a prime example of unrecognised states that
were created by a parent state. Caspersen (p. 11) clearly emphasises the state-
building aspect and legitimacy. Her approach is also elite-centred, as it is the
government, or leadership to be precise, that is doing the institution-building
and trying to show its legitimacy. Internal aspects are an important part of
Caspersen’s analysis of de facto states, as she argues that ‘unrecognised states
cannot be reduced to their external dimension, however, and the success or
failure of their state-building efforts owes a lot to internal dynamics’ (p. 76).
She goes on to analyse different aspects of state-building that can contribute to
the de facto state’s efforts in state-building, like fighting between internal
forces, institution-building, and different obstacles that hinder these efforts.
Bartmann connects legitimacy and recognition. In his approach, legitimacy
involves both sides of the statehood ‘coin’: the internal side of capabilities and
the external side of a right to exist. Additionally, these sides develop each other.
On the one hand, legitimacy is viewed as a basis for statehood by the leaders of
the entities and, on the other, recognition of this statehood reinforces these
claims to legitimacy (p. 16).
Some authors do not include the legitimacy or state-building aspect in their
exact definition of what we call the de facto state, though it is still involved in
their analysis. Kolossov&O’Loughlin, in their geopolitical approach, emphasise
the identity aspect. For them, de facto state-building is closely related to or even
intertwined with identity and nation-building. Their case study – Transnistria –
is an example of civic nationalism emphasising the state rather than ethnic
origin, which is understandable as Transnistria is a multi-ethnic society. King
also emphasises state-building but does not include it in his definition. He calls
this state-building ‘surreptitious’, however. The idea behind this phrasing is that

53
14
there are several reasons why the conflicts that brought about the emergence of
de facto states have not been ended, but the real reason is the state-building
efforts of the elites in the entities. Spears also emphasises identity formation and
state-building without explicitly binding it to the definition. He states that ‘in
many cases, it is also possible to discern a social identification with the sub-
state’ (p. 22). In this case, it cannot logically be part of a definition because of
the quantifier ‘in many cases’. Definition must embrace all cases. Like
Kolossov&O’Loughlin, Spears views extending state power and identity as
‘similar and mutually reinforcing processes’ (p. 22)
Beyond the authors analysed in this section, there are of course works about
the legitimacy of unrecognised entities, with Daria Isachenko’s book The
Making of Informal States. State-building in Northern Cyprus and Transd-
niestria being the most recent and exhaustive example. As Isachenko focuses on
internal dynamics of the entities and does not give a definition of her term
‘informal states,’ she is not involved in the current analysis. She emphasises the
informality aspect of de facto states but builds on the authors discussed here.
Also, Berg (2012), Berg and Solvak (2011) and Berg and Toomla (2013) have
analysed survey data to establish the legitimacy of governments in different de
facto states.

Temporal criterion
This criterion has been listed also with a somewhat different meaning by Pegg,
Kolstø, Caspersen, and Lynch. As Lynch accepts Pegg’s definition without
much elaboration in this aspect, the former three authors have been added to the
chart.
Pegg, Caspersen and Kolstø all set the threshold at two years. There is no
theoretical justification for this but it is useful for considering empirical
evidence. Pegg quite freely admits to this and states that intuitively the
necessary minimum seems to be one year (p. 32). It takes some time to show the
credentials of a state, especially if the birth of this state is during warfare. One
just cannot empirically evaluate whether there is ‘enough’ government when the
state is, say, two months old. On the other hand, too high a threshold might
exclude cases that do merit academic study as de facto states. Pegg gives the
examples of Biafra and Krajina here. Both ceased to exist after three to four
years but were ‘substantial enough entities with large enough impact on inter-
national relations to merit serious academic study’ (p. 32). Caspersen and
Kolstø have followed in Pegg’s footsteps and set the threshold at two years.
There are also other ways to include time in the analysis of de facto states.
Kolossov (2001) takes a somewhat different approach to what might be called a
temporal criterion. He claims that de facto states are long-term features in the
contemporary world without setting any particular threshold. In fact, his
approach could be viewed as the opposite to that of the previous three authors.
While Pegg, Caspersen and Kolstø want to distinguish de facto states from
short-term power-holders, they somewhat assume that the lifespan of these

54
entities is short rather than long. To be ‘worthy’ of analysis as de facto states
they have to pass some early tests and survive. Kolossov, on the other hand,
assumes the long term presence of these entities.
Another author who uses time in a different way to Pegg, Caspersen and
Kolstø is Spears. He does share the notion that de facto states are not long term
phenomena, however. But instead of setting a threshold as part of his definition,
Spears considers them to be exactly the opposite – temporary. The reasoning
behind this is that the concept of ‘state-within-state’ that Spears uses is a bit
wider than the de facto/unrecognised/quasi state of the other authors. This in
turn leads to different goals of these states and independence might be just a
stepping stone to some other goal. Hence there is a temporal nature to the
entities.

Declaration of independence
The final criterion that has been mentioned in the literature is the declaration of
independence or, more broadly, the purpose of the de facto entity. The latter
notion may be more useful because not all units that could be considered de
facto states have explicitly declared their independence. Taiwan is a prime
example here. And it is also the case in the literature that authors have not
bound themselves with formal declaration. Altogether, four authors have
included this criterion: Pegg, Kolstø, Kolossov&O’Loughlin and Caspersen.
Starting with Pegg, he emphasises sovereignty as the only goal for the de
facto state. It ‘seeks sovereignty as full constitutional independence’ (p. 33).
Pegg suggests this criterion to distinguish de facto states from other territorial
units that have seceded from larger entities, but do not want independence.
These are mainly units in a federal state; Pegg provides Jura’s secession from
Berne Canton as an example. Also, this criterion differentiates de facto states
from units that do not want sovereignty and those that want to overthrow an
existing government.
Kolstø states quite explicitly that a de facto state ‘must have sought but not
achieved international recognition as an independent state’ (pp. 275–276) as one
of his three definitional criteria. He does not say that there must have been a
declaration of independence but the intent of the entity is made clear.
Kolossov&O’Loughlin say that institutionalised pseudo-states have ‘dec-
lared sovereignty’ (p. 155) but do not elaborate on how exactly this might have
happened. Their phrasing indicates some sort of formal declaration of
sovereignty.
Caspersen is more precise than the previous two authors. She states that
there should be either a declaration of independence or a demonstration of a
clear aspiration for it. She offers a list of examples that might fit into the latter
category. The list, however, is neither long nor exhaustive. It includes only a
referendum on independence and a separate currency with the notion of some
‘similar act that clearly signals separate statehood,’ leaving the list open. There
are some ambiguities with these possible demonstrations. First, Caspersen does

55
not state whether the referendum of independence was successful. Presumably it
was, but there are still questions about what constitutes success. These are
technical problems, however. The second ambiguity is the openness of the list
itself. What could these possible acts be? One could name statements by an
entity’s leaders or border checkpoints, for example.
One author who takes a different approach is Spears and he does so by
listing several goals that a ‘state-within-state’ could have. Being a stepping-
stone or a way-station, as he himself puts it, is mentioned in this section and
others further above. Once again, as this is not part of the definition, Spears is
omitted from the chart.
If only a formal declaration of independence were the criterion, then some
cases like Taiwan should be omitted from the list of de facto states. In this
sense, the additional elements listed by Caspersen are very useful. The problem
is what kind of actions constitute substitutes for the declaration. Pegg’s
distinction between de facto states and federal units that have territory,
population and government by emphasising the goal of sovereignty actually
overlaps with the Montevideo criterion of government itself. A government is
sovereign if there is no upper-level government above it. Therefore, the
additional criterion of the goal of sovereignty does not add much. Likewise with
Caspersen’s possible alternatives to a declaration. If an entity has a functioning
government that has effective control over a territory, that should be enough to
consider it as a state. Having its own currency, for example, is just a policy of
that government, as not having one might be. And, again, these are not unique
features of de facto states: Germany does not have a currency of its own.
The same applies to Pegg’s other distinctions between de facto states and
those entities that do not have sovereignty as their goal or want to overthrow an
existing government. Starting with the latter, the goal of overthrowing a
government could actually be a reason for a de facto state to emerge. Taiwan
could be an example here. The fact that there is another government controlling
a territory (also claimed by the de facto state) and the fact that it has inter-
national recognition do not make a de facto state exist any less.
Entities that do not want to be sovereign states, but have a functioning
government can also be classified as de facto states. Again, their existence is not
influenced by the fact that they themselves do not want to be in that particular
position. Human action can bring about unintended consequences and if a
political movement has ended up carrying out state functions, then at a
particular moment in time their original goal does not matter. If an entity
functions as a state even against its own will then it can be considered a de facto
state.
However, the absence or presence of a declaration of independence can be
useful in determining whether the de facto state is secessionist or not. If there is
a declaration, then we can say that there is a case of secession. By definition,
the declaration implies that there is a parent state from which independence is
declared. Without the parent state there is no need for declarations. The

56
 opposite does not apply though: there can still be secessionist cases in which
independence is not declared.

The working definition

Creating a working definition involves two aspects. First we take into account
our theoretical findings about statehood and sovereignty. The dichotomies
sovereignty – internal and external; empirical and judicial – are used in the
definition. Secondly, we take the consensus from authors discussed above.
These two aspects merge very well because the agreement between authors
corresponds to our earlier theoretical findings. Theory also allows us to leave
aside the components that different authors do not agree upon.
All of the conceptions that were described above deal with recognition and
empirical statehood and that will be taken as the basis for our working defi-
nition. The ‘level’ of being a state obviously differs between de facto states, as
it does between confirmed states. Therefore, we must admit that the judgement
of whether there is a functioning government controlling a territory is itself
arbitrary. An analysed de facto state must have some control over some
territory. Some control means that they are independent in their judgement. This
does not exclude external influences, but these are not uniquely reserved for de
facto states. Some territory means that it does not have to control the entire
territory it has claimed; at least some territory is enough. Obviously, this
territory must have some population living on it. The fourth Montevideo
criterion, capability for international relations, is assumed from the presence of
a functioning government. In a nutshell, de facto states must have empirical
sovereignty.
The other aspect of de facto statehood is international recognition. Again,
this aspect, or the absence of it, has been ever-present in the literature. Here we
will take UN membership as a threshold. As argued above, membership means
the acceptance of most of the states including all permanent members of the
Security Council. There is the issue here that some recognised states might not
want to be members of the organisation, but this claim does not hold
empirically.
If we take these two sides of the definition, the Montevideo criteria and the
absence of international recognition, we can show the positioning of de facto
states in relation to other possible actors. If we take the external side of
sovereignty shown in Table 1, and elaborate on the juridical and empirical
dimensions, then we can create Table 2 showing where de facto states are
positioned.

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15
Table 2: De facto states’ position according to the dimensions of external sovereignty

Juridical statehood
Yes No

Yes Confirmed states De facto states

Empirical
statehood
Secessionist movements,
No Quasi-states (Jackson)
Nations without a state

The de facto state is therefore a ‘state that fulfils all the criteria set in the
Montevideo Convention but lacks sufficient recognition from fellow states’.
The definition of the de facto state used in this thesis consists therefore of
two dimensions of statehood, juridical and empirical. The former is formal
recognition by other countries, with the threshold being enough recognition to
pass a vote for UN membership. The latter dimension is more arbitrary and is
decided on a case-by-case basis. On the internal side, the state does not have to
be on the level of industrialised countries; it has to provide some basic services
to the population. On the external side, it has to be independent from the parent
state from which it tries to secede. All states have some influences on their
autonomy and decision-making, but independence from the former ‘master’ is
crucial.
Other elements of definitions used by different authors have been dropped
for, in addition to not achieving consensus in the literature, different reasons
outlined below. Pegg’s, Caspersen’s and Kolstø’s temporal requirement of two
years of existence is important, but in this case unnecessary, because all empiri-
cal cases analysed have existed longer than that. And this thesis deals only with
present cases.
Even though we are using the declaratory theory to define a state, the
declaration of independence is not one of our criteria. This slight contradiction
is due to the fact that declaratory theory itself, as set out in the Montevideo
Convention, does not require a declaration of independence for an entity to be a
state. In our case, the declaration is useful in determining whether there has
been secession, but it does not determine whether a particular entity is a de facto
state. There can be de facto states that have not declared independence or even
lack the intention to become independent.
Indigenous support or legitimacy is also dropped from this analysis. The
main reason for this is that legitimacy in particular is again not a feature specific
to the de facto state. There are a number of confirmed states that are governed
by regimes that do not possess popular support or legitimacy and still are
considered as rulers of these countries. Furthermore, the legitimacy component
would be a part of the definition of a regime rather than a state. As for the latter,

58
the government that is sovereign, i.e. has no higher level government to
overrule its decisions, is sufficient.
This definition can be described as minimal in terms of including conditions.
There are several reasons for choosing this approach to the definition. First, as
mentioned also elsewhere in this dissertation, research of de facto states is a
rather new direction in international relations studies. This means that there is
no coherent theory to cover these entities and definitions differ significantly.
There is, as seen above, multiplicity of terms and concepts which is accompa-
nied by varieties in substance. Being a new subject of research, authors try to
leave their marks on the research by devising different conceptions. This is
mainly due to different angles the researchers approach the issue. Here we have
taken an approach to find the common grounds on what makes a de facto state
de facto. And a helpful tool is the accepted definition of state with additional
theoretical approaches to sovereignty.

1.3. Case selection

In this chapter, we take a closer look at cases. Each case is covered taking into
account three aspects that form the structure of the sections. First, we look
briefly at the history of the analysed entities with an emphasis on how they have
become de facto states. Secondly, we fit the cases into our working definition.
The five criteria we identified in section 1.2.4, ‘Comparison of different
approaches’ – territory, population, government, capacity for international rela-
tions, and the absence of recognition – are described. Most of the following is
encyclopaedic knowledge derived mostly from Britannica Online, CIA World
Factbook and Freedom House country reports. In some cases the historical
evolvement of de facto states has been described in more detail. Data used in
the analysis is not presented here and can be found in Table 5 (Section 2.4.1).

1.3.1. Abkhazia
The roots of Abkhazian independence date back to the 8th century when the
independent kingdom of Abkhazia was established. After periods of indepen-
dence and dependence, in 1864 the region was annexed by the Russian Empire
in which it remained until the October Revolution of 1917. The communist
rulers of Russia gave the region autonomous status in 1919 and the status
offederal republic in 1921. The latter did not last long, however, as later in the
same year Abkhazia was united with the Georgian SSR. In 1930s this
arrangement was overlooked and Abkhazia became an autonomous part of the
Georgian SSR. This lasted until the end of the Soviet Union.
The current de facto status of Abkhazia was achieved via war with Georgia.
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 all federal republics gained inde-
pendence (in addition to those which had already declared independence and

59