Prescription 2

"A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC

RULES ON EXPEDITED PROCEDURES
IN THE FIRST LEVEL COURTS
RULE II
GENERAL COMMON PROVISIONS
Section 1. Applicability of the regular rules. - The regular
procedure
prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to the cases covered
by these
Rules where no specific provision is found herein. It shall also
ap121y in a
sU12pletory manner even if there is a specific }.2rovision found
in these
Rules, but only in so far as not inconsistent. In case of
inconsistency, these
Rules shall prevail.
Sec. 2. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following
pleadings, motions,
or petitions shall not be allowed in cases governed by these
Rules:
(a) In civil cases, a motion to dismiss the complaint or the
statement of claim,
and in criminal cases, a motion to guash the complaint or
information,
except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter or failure
to comply with the reguirement of bnmngnt/ conciliation,
pursuant to Chapter
VII, Title t Book III of Republic Act No. 7160;

Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their

rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed
to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control, like the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies. Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of
Justice, 592 Phil. 286, 297 (2008)

[A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-948-MTJ.May 27, 2002]

CABELIC vs. JUDGE GERONIMO

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a

resolution of this Court dated 27 MAY 2002.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-948-MTJ(Loreto P. Cabelic vs.

Judge Isagani A. Geronimo, MTCC-Branch 2,
Antipolo City.)

In a Sworn Letter-Complaint dated June 16, 2000, Loreto P.

Cabelic charges respondent Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Antipolo City
with Gross Ignorance of the Law in relation to Criminal Case
No. 00-0329 for Slight Physical Injuries entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Neil Martinez".

Complainant Cabelic avers that he was manhandled by the

son of the owner of La Pacita Biscuit, his former employer in
 Antipolo City, hence he filed a criminal case for slight
physical injuries and grave coercion before the Prosecutor's
Office which referred the same to the barangay authorities of
Mambugan, Antipolo.No settlement was reached and the
barangay chairman returned the case to the Prosecutor's
Office.A criminal case for Slight Physical Injuries penalized
under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code was eventually
filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Antipolo,
Branch 2 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 00-
0329.The said case was assigned/raffled to respondent
Judge Isagani A. Geronimo .In the Order dated February 29,
2000, respondent judge dismissed the criminal case on the
ground of prescription.He was of the opinion that the crime
of slight physical injuries is a light offense which prescribes
in two months pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code.Thus, since the criminal case was filed only on
February 14, 2000, or more than sixty days from October 9,
1999, the date of the alleged incident, the case had
prescribed.Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the respondent judge's order but the same was
denied.Respondent judge stated that the filing of the criminal
action with the Office of the Public Prosecutor did not stop
the running of the period of prescription.Said order of denial
was no longer questioned before a higher court.

In this administrative case, herein complainant now charges

respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law.He is of the
view that the filing of the criminal case for slight physical
injuries with the Prosecutor's Office on November 3, 1999
tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

In his Comment, respondent judge explained that the

criminal case for slight physical injuries falls under the Rule
on Summary Procedure and therefore the interruption of the
prescriptive period under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure does not apply.

The Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the

instant administrative case.He opined that the filing of the
case with the Prosecutor's Office did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period as such filing is not filing
directly in court.The proceeding that would have interrupted
the period was the filing of the information with the MTCC of
Antipolo City, Rizal on February 14, 2000 citing the case of
Luz Zaldivia vs. Judge Andres Reyes. [1] cralaw He further
stated that even assuming that respondent judge erred in his
interpretation of the law, the matter is judicial in nature for
which an administrative complaint against him would not lie.

We agree with the recommendation of the Court

Administrator only insofar as the dismissal of the
instant case is concerned.We take exception to the
conclusion of the Court Administrator that "the
filing of the case with the prosecutor's office did
not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
as such filing is not filing directly in court" and that
the "judicial proceeding that would have
interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the MTCC of Antipolo City, Rizal,
which was done on 14 February 2000, after the
crime had already prescribed."

It should be noted that the criminal case filed with the

Prosecutor's Office was one for slight physical injuries which
carries with it the penalty of arresto menor under the
Revised Penal Code. [2] cralaw The penalty of arresto
menor, which has a duration of one day to thirty
days, [3] cralaw is a light penalty. [4] cralaw Being a light
offense, the crime of slight physical injuries prescribes in
 two months. [5] cralaw On this point, respondent judge was
correct.

The question now is whether the filing of the criminal action

with the Public Prosecutor's Office suspended or tolled the
running of the period of prescription.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that

the period of prescription shall be "interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information."Notably,
the said article does not distinguish whether the
complaint is filed for preliminary examination or
investigation only or for an action on the
merits.However, this Court, in the case of Reodica
vs. Court of Appeals [6] cralaw declared that the
filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's office
suspends the running of the statute of limitations
citing the cases of Francisco vs. Court of
Appeals [7] cralaw and People vs.
Cuaresma. [8] cralaw

In the Reodica case, it was further declared that Section

9 [9] cralaw of the Rule on Summary Procedure which
provides that in cases covered thereby, "the prosecution
commences by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC" cannot be taken to
mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the
filing of a complaint or information directly with said
court.This Court ruled therein that in case of conflict between
the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court
and the Revised Penal Code which is a substantive law, the
latter prevails.

The Zaldivia case cited by the Court Administrator is not

controlling.What was involved therein was a violation of a
municipal ordinance where the applicable law was not Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code but Act No. 3326 [10] cralaw as
amended.Hence, the Court, in said case, held that the period
of prescription was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Thus, on this score, it is clear that the respondent judge

erred in declaring that the crime of slight physical injuries
had prescribed and that the filing of the complaint before the
prosecutor's office did not toll or suspend the running of the
prescriptive period.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent judge

made an erroneous interpretation of the law, the
matter is judicial in nature.Well-entrenched is the
rule that a party's remedy, if prejudiced by the
orders of a judge given in the course of a trial, is
the proper reviewing court, and not with the Office
of the Court Administrator by means of an
administrative complaint. [11] cralaw

Moreover, an administrative complaint is not the

appropriate remedy for every act of a judge
deemed aberrant or irregular.The administrative
case cannot be used as a remedy to challenge the
assailed order or decision rendered by respondent
judge nor can it be used as a substitute for other
judicial remedies. [12] cralaw Administrative liability
for ignorance of the law does not necessarily arise
from the mere fact that a judge issued an order
that may be adjudged to be
erroneous. [13] cralaw He may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous
order or decision.The rule is settled that it is only
 when a judge acts fraudulently or with gross
ignorance that administrative sanctions are called
for. [14] cralaw The error or mistake must be gross
or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.In
the absence of proof to the contrary, an erroneous
order or decision is presumed to have been issued
in good faith. [15] cralaw

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Court Administrator,

this administrative case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED. (Gutierrez, J., on leave)

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y.
CARREON
Clerk of Court

Endnotes:
[1]
cralaw 211 SCRA 277 (1992).
[2]
cralaw Article 266, thereof.
[3]
cralaw Article 27, Revised Penal Code.
[4]
cralaw Article 25, ibid.
[5]
cralaw Article 90, ibid.
[6]
cralaw 292 SCRA 87 (1998).
[7]
cralaw 122 SCRA 538 (1983).
[8]
cralaw 172 SCRA 415 (1989).
[9]
cralaw Now Section 11 of the Revised Rule of
Summary Procedure which reads:

����������� SEC. 11.How commenced. - The

filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule
shall be either by complaint or information:Provided,
however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered
Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio.
[10]
cralaw "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin
to Run."Under Section 2 thereof, the period of
prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings
are instituted against the guilty party.
[11]
cralaw Nescito Hilario and Ma. Meriem Ursua vs. Hon.
Julian C. Ocampo, Executive Judge of MTC Naga City and
Presiding Judge of MTC Naga City, Branch 1, A.M. No.
MTJ-00-1305, December 3, 2001; Dionisio vs. Escano,
302 SCRA 411 (1999).
[12]
cralaw Fr. Michael Sinnot, Erlinda Pedrano Pingkian,
Rosita Pedrano-Lopez, Alfredo Pedrano, Antonio Pedrano,
Carino Pedrano, Corazon Mendoza, Virginia Baling-
Pesta�as vs. Judge Recaredo P. Barte, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur, A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1453, December 14, 2001; Santos vs. Orlino, 296 SCRA
101 (1998).
[13]
cralaw Guerrero vs. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88 (1998).
[14]
cralaw Re:Suspension of Clerk of Court Rogelio R.
Joboco, RTC Br. 16, Naval, Biliran, 294 SCRA 119 (1998).
[15]
cralaw Ramir Mina vs. Judge Rodolfo Gatdula, A.M.
No. MTJ-00-1264, February 4, 2002;
Canson vs. Garchitorena, 311 SCRA 268 (1999).

A.M. NO. MTJ-02-1402 December 4, 2002

ABRAHAM L. MENDOVA, complainant,
vs.
CRISANTO B. AFABLE, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
San Julian-Sulat, Eastern Samar, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In an affidavit-complaint dated July 1, 1999, Abraham L. Mendova
charged Judge Crisanto B. Afable of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
San Julian–Sulat, Eastern Samar, with ignorance of the law relative to
Criminal Case No. 2198-98, "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs.
Roberto Q. Palada, Accused," for slight physical injuries.
Complainant Mendova alleged in his affidavit-complaint that on
February 18, 1998 he filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman of
Poblacion San Julian, Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical
injuries against Robert Palada. Barangay Chairman Ronie D. Quintua, in
his Certification dated April 19, 1999,1 confirmed such fact. Pangkat
Chairman Eufemia L. Cabago also certified in an undated "Minutes In
Settling Disputes"2 that the case was set for hearing on March 16, 22
and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
On May 4, 1998, complainant filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of San Julian–Sulat, Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical
injuries against Palada, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2198-98. On
November 3, 1998, respondent judge rendered his Decision3 dismissing
the case on the ground of prescription, thus:
"Complaint in this case dated April 20, 1998 was filed with this Court on
May 4, 1998. The affidavits of complainant as well as prosecution
witness Melvin C. Quiloña were subscribed and sworn to before the
undersigned also on May 4, 1998.
"The alleged offense took place on February 15, 1998. From the date of
the commission of the alleged offense, more than two months have
elapsed.
"This is for slight physical injuries and is therefore a light offense.
"Under Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally
extinguished by presciption of the crime.
"Article 90 of the same Code provides that light offenses prescribe in
two months. This being a light offense, the same should be considered
as already having prescribed because the case against the accused was
filed after two months.
"LET, THEREFORE, this case be DISMISSED, the crime having already
prescribed.
"SO ORDERED." (emphasis added)
< align="justify"p>On July 7, 1999, complainant filed with the Office of
the Court Administrator an administrative complaint against
respondent judge. He alleged that in dismissing the case, respondent
judge showed his ignorance of the law when he did not apply the
provisions of Section 410(c) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local
Government Code of 1991), which state:
"Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. –
xxxxxxxxx
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. – While the dispute is
under mediation, conciliation or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for
offenses and causes of action under existing laws shall be interrupted
upon filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. The prescriptive
periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint
or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action
issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, That
such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the
complaint with the punong barangay." (emphasis added)
Complainant further alleged that respondent's conduct caused him
injury and grave injustice.
In his comment dated September 13, 1999, respondent admitted that
his Decision being assailed by complainant "was wrong." According to
him, "(w)hen I rendered the questioned decision, what entered my
mind was the rule on prescription as provided under the Revised Penal
Code. There was a mental lapse on my part caused by heavy workload,"
as he was likewise designated the Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC
Llorente-Hernani, Eastern Samar.4 He begged for kindness and
understanding, stating that he has been a trial judge for 10 years and
that this is the "first kind of mistake" he has ever committed.
In its Evaluation and Recommendation,5 the Office of the Court
Administrator, through Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño,
found respondent guilty as charged and recommended that he be
fined P3,000.00 with a warning that a commission of similar acts will be
dealt with more severely, thus:
"EVALUATION: It cannot be denied that respondent has been remiss in
the dispensation of his adjudicatory functions. The court has not been
wanting in its warnings that judges should endeavor to maintain at all
times the confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the
gavel of justice. Judges are required to observe due care in the
performance of their official duties. They are likewise charged with the
knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which
relate to the scope of their authority (Cuaresma vs. Aguilar, 226 SCRA
73). Further, a judge owes it to the public and the administration of
justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy.
He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the
administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants
that occupants of the bench can not justly be accused of a deficiency in
their grasp of legal principles (Libarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48)."
In a Resolution dated February 13, 2002, this Court ordered that this
case be docketed as an administrative matter and required the parties
to manifest, within 20 days from notice, whether they are submitting
the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed.
Both parties filed their respective manifestations that they are willing to
have the case so decided. In his manifestation, respondent judge made
the additional comment that the complainant did not allege bad faith
or malice on his (respondent’s) part in rendering the questioned
decision.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether respondent judge is liable
administratively for dismissing Criminal Case No. 2198-98 on the
ground of prescription.
It is axiomatic, as this Court has repeatedly stressed, that an
administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a
judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, or an
appeal. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge’s
challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed
against him at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable
for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his
position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible
in his judgment. It is only where the error is so gross, deliberate and
malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative
sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.6
What we said in Flores vs. Abesamis 7 is illuminating:
"As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against
errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise
of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities
which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation
or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of
procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a
motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against
error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character
(i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of
duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of
venue, as the case may be.
"Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion
of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of
other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether
of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available
judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have
spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
"Flores (complainant) resorted to administrative prosecution (or
institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the
specific modes of appeals or review provided by law from court
judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges’ orders had caused
him ‘undue injury.’ This is impermissible, as this Court has already more
than once ruled. Law and logic decree that ‘administrative or criminal
remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review
where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof’
(See In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417-418 [1987]; In Re:
Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 [1995]. Indeed, since judges must
be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and
dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and
functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently
of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the
scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally,
prosecution of a judge can be had only if ‘there be a final declaration by
a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly
unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and x x x also
evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence,
on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order’ or under
the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code (see In
Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, at pp. 464-465).
"x x x. In fine, Flores filed his administrative and criminal complaints
prematurely, before ascertainment of the existence of foundation
therefor; x x x." (emphasis added)
In the present case, we noticed from the records before us that the
complainant did not bother at all to file a motion for reconsideration of
respondent judge’s decision dismissing the criminal case. No reason
was advanced by complainant why he failed to do so. Thus, following
our settled pronouncements cited above, his instant administrative
complaint is premature.
According to complainant, Robert Palada committed the crime of slight
physical injuries on February 15, 1998. On February 18, 1998,
complainant filed his complaint with the Office of the Barangay
Chairman at Poblacion, San Julian, Eastern Samar. Pursuant to the
provisions of Section 410(c) of The Local Government Code of 1991,
quoted earlier, such filing interrupted the prescriptive period 8 and
started to run again upon receipt by the complainant of the
Certification to File Action issued by the Pangkat Secretary. Here,
records fail to show when complainant received the Barangay
Certification to File Action. The undated certification he submitted
merely states that the case was set for hearing before the barangay on
March 16, 22 and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement. When he filed on May 4, 1998 Criminal Case No. 2198-98
for slight physical injuries with respondent's court, until the dismissal of
the case on November 3, 1998, he still failed to present proof of his
receipt of the Barangay Certification to File Action. Clearly, he cannot
now fault respondent judge for dismissing the case on the ground of
prescription.
While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not be
considered ignorance of the law. If at all, it can only be an error of
judgment.
Finally, we noted that the complaint does not allege any bad faith or
malice on the part of respondent judge when he dismissed the criminal
case.
WHEREFORE, the present administrative complaint against Judge
Crisanto B. Afable is DISMISSED. He is reminded, however, that
henceforth, he should be more assiduous and circumspect in his judicial
calling.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Acting Chairman), Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ.,
concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.

Footnotes

1
Annex "A" of Mendova’s Affidavit-Complaint.
2
Annex "B," id.
3
Annex "C," id.
4
A copy of the designation dated January 6, 1998 issued by Executive
Judge Celso F. Lorenzo, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court, Borongan,
Eastern Samar, is attached to respondent Judge Afable’s Comment.
5
Rollo, at 19-20.
6
Santos vs. Orlino, 296 SCRA 101, 106-107 (1998); In Re: Joaquin T.
Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405, 407-408, 464-465 (1995); Rodrigo vs.
Quijano, 79 SCRA 10, 12 (1977); Dizon vs. De Borja, 37 SCRA 46, 52
(1971); Urbina vs. Maceren, 57 SCRA 403, 407 (1974).
7
275 SCRA 302, 316-317 (1997).
8
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses prescibe in
two months. Pursuant to Article 91 thereof, the period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended parties, etc.
The ruling of the judge in your case is incorrect. The filing of the
criminal action with the office of the public prosecutor stopped the
running of the period of prescription. In the case of Cabelic v. Judge
Geronimo, A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-948 (2002), the Supreme Court held
that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of
prescription shall be "interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information."

Notably, the said article does not distinguish whether the complaint is
filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action
on the merits. However, the court, in the case of Reodica vs. Court of
Appeals declared that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's
office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.
In the Reodica case, it was declared that Section 9 [9] of the Rule on
Summary Procedure which provides that in cases covered thereby, "the
prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC" cannot be taken to mean that
the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with said court.

The court ruled therein that in case of conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure promulgated by the Court and the Revised Penal
Code, which is a substantive law, the latter prevails.

Thus, it is clear that the judge erred in declaring that the crime of slight
physical injuries had prescribed and that the filing of the complaint
before the prosecutor's office did not toll or suspend the running of the
prescriptive period. I hope this has helped answer your query.
However, the Court clarified that for crimes falling under the Rules on
Summary Procedure and within the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Manila,
filing a complaint or information before the court effectively interrupts
the prescriptive period. This clarification was underscored by the
Court’s interpretation of relevant provisions in the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.CORPUS PASTOR CASE
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of
prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to
the accused.
Prior to 13 November 1988, the controlling doctrine was that it was
filing of the complaint or information in court, whether for preliminary
investigation or for trial, which interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period of offenses (People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, 499-501
[e.b., 1967]).
While the 1983 case of Francisco v. Court of Appeals,1 “broadened” the
scope of the Olarte ruling by holding that the filing of the complaint
with the prosecutor also tolls prescription, Francisco’s doctrinal force
was not recognized in Section 1, Rule 110 of the original 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which did not contain any provision on prescription.
The rejection of Francisco was further shown by Section 6(b), Rule 111
of the original 1985 Rules which provided that “[t]he pendency of a
petition for suspension of the criminal action still undergoing
preliminary investigation in the fiscal’s office shall interrupt the
prescriptive period for filing the corresponding complaint or
information.” Obviously, this provision would have been unnecessary if
the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor already suspended the
running of the prescriptive period.2 The reason why Francisco was not
adopted in the original 1985 Rules apparently was that Francisco was
rendered by a division and not by the full court.3
It was only on 13 November 1988, upon the effectivity of the 1988
Supreme Court resolutions amending the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, that the rule that the filing of the complaint with the proper
officer for preliminary investigation or with the prosecutor also
interrupts the running of the prescriptive period came into force. The
1988 amendments adopted the Francisco doctrine, which had been
rejected in the original 1985 Rules, by adding a last paragraph to
Section 1 of Rule 110 stating that “[i]n all cases, such institution
[including the filing of the complaint with the proper officer or with the
prosecutor] shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense
charged.” Consequently, the 1988 amendments also eliminated Section
6(b) of Rule 111.4
Interruption of prescription for violations of special laws and of
municipal and city ordinances; Zaldivia v. Reyes (1992)
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), involving the violation of a
municipal ordinance, the SC en banc held that the prescriptive period
was tolled only upon the filing of the criminal case in court. The
Supreme Court cited two reasons for its holding.
First. Violations of special laws and municipal and city ordinances are
governed by Act No. 3326 which provides in Section 2 that “the
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person.” The Court held that the “proceedings”
referred to in Section 2 are judicial proceedings.
Second. Violations of municipal and city ordinances are governed by
the Rule on Summary Procedure (RSP). Under Section 9 of the 1983
RSP, criminal cases are commenced by the filing of the complaint or
information in court and hence, it is only from such filing that the
prescriptive period is interrupted.5
Panaguiton v. DOJ (2008)
In Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA 549 (2008), a
prosecution for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the Supreme Court,
through its second division, held that the filing of the complaint with
the prosecutor’s office already tolled the running of the prescriptive
period even if the offense is for the violation of a special law. The
Supreme Court stated that the word “proceedings” in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326 by which prescription is interrupted should be deemed to
refer to proceedings both judicial or executive in character. It pointed
out that when Act No. 3326 was passed in 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the
peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and that the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of
the offense is halted. The ruling in Panaguiton was reiterated in People
v. Pangilinan, 672 SCRA 105 (2012).6
Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua (2013)
In Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua, 706 SCRA 724 (2013), which
involved the violation of a city ordinance, the Supreme Court held that
prescription was tolled only upon the filing of the information in court
and not upon the filing of the complaint with the office of the
prosecutor. Since the two-month prescriptive period for violations of
ordinances under Act No. 3326 had already expired when the
information was filed in court, the crime was extinguished by
prescription.
What is noteworthy about Jadewell is that it discounted
the Panaguiton ratio that the proceedings in Act No. 3326 which
interrupt prescription include executive or administrative
proceedings. Jadewell instead anchored its holding on the Zaldivia
ratio that the prescriptive period for violations of municipal and city
ordinances is tolled only upon the filing of the complaint or information
in court since such violations are governed by the RSP.
Republic v. Desierto (2023)
In Republic v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, 16 January 2023, the Court
stated that the prescriptive period for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 is
interrupted only upon the filing of the complaint or information in court
because B.P. 22 cases are governed by the RSP.7 The Court clarified
that Panaguiton should be limited to violations of B.P. 22 which were
committed before 15 April 2003. The Court noted that in Panaguiton,
the violation of B.P. 22 occurred in 1993 or before B.P. 22 cases were
included in the coverage of the RSP effective 15 April 2003.8
Corpus v. People (2023)
In Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 255740, 16 August 2023, the Court held
that the two-month prescriptive period for slight physical injuries is
interrupted only when the complaint or information is filed in court and
not when the complaint is filed with the prosecutor’s office because a
criminal case for slight physical injuries is governed by the RSP. 9
Summary
The rule is that the running of the prescriptive period for offenses is
interrupted upon the institution of the criminal action. Institution of the
criminal action refers not only to the filing of the complaint or
information in court but also to the filing of the complaint with the
proper officer for preliminary investigation or with the office of the
prosecutor (Section 1, Rule 110, Rules of Criminal Procedure). This rule
has been extended by Panaguiton to violations of special laws not
covered by the RSP.
The exception to the general rule is in a criminal case covered by the
RSP. In such a situation, the running of the prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.
-oOo-

1. 122 SCRA 438 (2nd Div., 1983). ↩︎

2. JOSE Y. FERIA, 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1. ↩︎
 3. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the Court sitting en banc (Sec. 2[3], Art. X,
1973 Constitution). ↩︎
4. JOSE Y. FERIA, 1988 AMENDMENTS TO THE 1985 RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1, 8-9. ↩︎
5. Section 9 of the 1983 RSP was reiterated in substance in the 1991
and 2022 RSP. ↩︎
6. My view is that Panaguiton and Pangilinan, which were rendered
by divisions, cannot reverse the doctrine laid down the Supreme
Court en banc in Zaldivia that the prescriptive period for criminal
cases involving violations of special laws is interrupted only upon
the filing of the case in court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987
Constitution). Nonetheless, Panaguiton has ossified into settled
doctrine and has been followed by the Court in several cases. ↩︎
7. While the statement is obiter, it is persuasive. Desierto,
like Jadewell, simply hews to the Zaldivia doctrine. ↩︎
8. A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC, effective 15 April 2003. ↩︎
9. In People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168641, 27 April 2007 (3rd Div.), it
was held that in a criminal case for slight physical injuries,
prescription is already interrupted upon the filing of the complaint
with the office of the prosecutor. T
Filing of Complaint in Office of Prosecutor Tolls Running of Prescription
Except Covered by Summary Procedure
In reversing the CA’s decision, We emphatically ruled that “(t)here is no
more distinction between cases under the RPC (Revised Penal Code)
and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of
the period of prescription” and reiterated that the period of
prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint before the
fiscal’s office for purposes of preliminary investigation against the
accused.

In the case at bar, it was clear that the filing of the complaint against
the respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 1, 2014
effectively tolled the running of the period of prescription. Thus, the
filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on March 21, 2017,
for unlawful acts allegedly committed on February 14, 2013 to March
20, 2014, is well within the three (3)-year prescriptive period of R.A. No.
7877. The court a quo’s reliance on the case of Jadewell v. Judge Nelson
Lidua, Sr.,[13] is misplaced. Jadewell presents a different factual milieu
as the issue involved therein was the prescriptive period for violation of
a city ordinance, unlike here as well as in the Pangilinan and other
above-mentioned related cases, where the issue refers to prescription
of actions pertaining to violation of a special law. For sure, Jadewell did
not abandon the doctrine in Pangilinan as the former even
acknowledged existing jurisprudence which holds that the filing of
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolls the running of the
prescriptive period.
/////// Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged
physical injuries, the offense for which she may be liable would only be
slight physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, considering that per the medical certificates 22 the injuries
sustained by the private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the
absence of complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries
incapacitated them for labor or would require medical attendance for
such period. The penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure." These penalties
are light under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and would
prescribe in two months pursuant to Article 90.
Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the
prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months
thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the
private respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati,
on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty
days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be
reached within the said period of suspension and, accordingly, a
certification to file action is issued, the private respondents would still
have fifty-six days within which to file their separate criminal
complaints for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis for the
invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in
paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.

G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MATEO A. LEE, JR.,

RESPONDENT.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing

of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged
is involved in an ordinance.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information
contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of
Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed
the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the
prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of
the Information. They had two months to file the Information and
institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the
Municipal Trial Court.

According to the Department of Justice – National Prosecutors Service

Manual for Prosecutors,

However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure,

the period of prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the
complaint or information in court.

G.R. No. 169588, October 07, 2013 – JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS

CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER AND AUTHORIZED
REPRESENTATIVE NORMA TAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE NELSON F.
LIDUA SR., PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH
3, BAGUIO CITY, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, “JOHN DOES”
AND “PETER DOES”,

To strengthen his cause, Justado cites Jadewell Parking Systems

Corporation v. Judge Lidua Sr. (Jadewell)[18] as basis that in cases
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
information before the courts can stop the running of the prescriptive
period. A review of the pronouncements in Jadewell, however, reveals
that the Court here in fact recognized that the provisions of the RPC
trumped those set in the Rules of Summary Procedure, viz:

From the abovementioned case, it is clear that in case of conflict

between the rules of procedure and a statute, the latter governs.
Particularly in this case, the running or stalling of the prescriptive
period is governed by the RPC, and not by the Summary Rules of
Procedure. In addition, it is noteworthy that in Jadewell, the offense
was a violation of an ordinance, whereas the present case deals with a
felony punishable by the RPC. Thus, the crime charged against Justado
had not prescribed because the filing of the complaint before the OCP
within the two-month period stalled the running of the prescriptive
period.

G.R. No. 219657, February 01, 2017 ]

ROBERTO M. JUSTADO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,

which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant
case, “the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a
prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in
Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be
commenced only by information.” However, this Section cannot be
taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the
filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of

substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not
allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in
case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated
by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

ISABELITA REODICA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES

Only the Filing of Information in Court of

Information for Cases Covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure Will Interrupt the
Prescriptive Period
It is worth noting that the offense in Panaguiton, i.e., violation of BP 22, was committed in
1993 when BP 22 was not yet covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. In
2003, the Supreme Court, through A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC, 167 amended the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure to include within its scope violations of BP 22. Thus, revisiting the
rule on the interruption of prescriptive period with respect to special laws and those offenses
covered by summary procedure is therefore in order.

Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure states that:

SECTION 11. How Commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope
of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and
of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the
court’s files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing,
the case may be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied)

Patently, the phrase “without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary

investigation” found in Sec. 9 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure is now deleted in
the above-quoted provision. Jadewell declared that “[a]s provided in the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the
crime charged is involved in an ordinance.” 168 Notably, the offense involved in Jadewell is
a violation of city ordinance which, as provided in the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, is commenced only by information except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio.

In other words, in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, prescriptive period is tolled
only by the filing of an Information in court and not by the commencement of a preliminary
investigation by the investigating body nor the institution of the complaint with the
investigating body. Other than Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, the criminal action
is commenced by filing a complaint or information before the court. In the same vein, the
running of the prescriptive period is interrupted by either the complaint or information filed
in court.

Hence, for special laws within the scope of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the
principle laid down in Zaldivia and Jadewell is controlling, i.e., violations of municipal or
city ordinance, and BP 22. Accordingly, the ruling in Panaguiton with respect to interruption
of prescription of BP 22 shall govern only those acts committed when BP 22 is not yet
covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, i.e., before the effectivity of A.M. No.
00-11-01-SC on April 15, 2003. Thus, for acts committed on April 15, 2003 onwards, the
filing of complaint or information in court shall interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period and not the institution of the preliminary investigation by investigating agencies or the
filing of a complaint before such investigating agencies. However, in Metropolitan Manila
and Chartered Cities, only the filing of Information in court shall toll the running of the
prescriptive period.
As to other special laws not covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, such as a
violation of RA 3019, the rule is that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution
of proceedings for preliminary investigation. Plainly, the ruling laid down
in Perez and Pangilinan, as well as the justification elucidated in Panaguiton, are relevant
and appropriate in the case at bar.

Republic v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, January 16, 2023

The accused cannot be convicted of an offense lesser than that charged if the lesser offense
had already prescribed at the time the information was filed. To hold otherwise would
be to sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of
accusing the defendant of the graver offense.

We are not unmindful of the rulings of this Court in Perez v. Sandiganbayan and People v.
Pangilinan when we declared that the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution
of the accused before the prosecutor’s office effectively interrupts the prescriptive period for
the subject offense.

Nonetheless, this Court clarified in the more recent case of Republic v. Desierto (Desierto)
that for crimes falling under the Rules of Summary Procedure and within the jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Manila, the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 of the RPC is
that which is filed in the proper court and not the complaint lodged by the offended party
before the prosecutor’s office:

Consequently, the ruling laid down in Desierto is relevant and appropriate in the case at bar,
in that the filing of the Complaint against Pastor did not toll the running of the prescriptive
period. From the reckoning point of November 25, 2017 until May 21, 2018 when the
prosecutor’s office filed the Information against Pastor, 177 days have already lapsed.
Clearly, the crime for which the petitioner was found guilty had already prescribed on the
basis of the absence of Information filed before the trial court.

All told, the MeTC committed reversible error in convicting Pastor of slight physical
injuries. It is plain that the case should have been dismissed as the light offense for which he
was found guilty had already been extinguished by prescription when the Information was
filed.

As a final note, despite the filing of the Complaint-Affidavit by Roberto on January 8, 2018
before the prosecutor’s office, it took the latter more than four months, or only on May 21,
2018, to file the Information before the MeTC. While this Court now acquits Pastor on the
basis thereof, there is truth in the precept we have laid down in Panaguiton that aggrieved
parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control, like the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

In this connection, the court exhorts prosecutors to diligently discharge their functions by
keeping in mind the prescriptive period of the crimes contained in the complaints lodged
before them, and on the basis thereof, timely file the necessary Information before the proper
court.

Pastor Corpus, Jr. y Belmoro Vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 255740. August 16, 2023

Related

Summary
In this note, I submit that the prescriptive period for the violation of a
special law is interrupted only when the complaint or information is
filed in court, pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court
en banc in Zaldivia v. Reyes (1992). The exception is a prosecution
for a violation of the Securities Regulation Code wherein prescription
is interrupted upon the filing of the complaint with the SEC or upon
investigation by the SEC, pursuant to the Court’s en banc ruling in
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation (2008).
In my previous post, I advanced the view that the prescriptive period
for the running of the prosecution of a BP 22 offense is interrupted only
when the complaint or information is filed in court, not when the
complaint is filed with the prosecutor’s office. My reason was that
since the coverage of the Rules on Summary Procedure was extended
to B.P. 22 cases on 15 April 2003, therefore Section 11 of the Rules,
which in effect provides that the running of the prescriptive period is
interrupted only upon the filing of the complaint or information, would
govern.
In this note, I advance another, more fundamental,
reason: Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, which purports to
overturn the doctrine laid down in Zaldivia v. Reyes that the
prescriptive period for violations of special laws is interrupted only
upon the filing of the complaint or information, actually did not.
Hence the Zaldivia doctrine should still be considered as the
controlling case law.
Law on Prescriptive Period re violations of Ordinances and Special
Laws
A vintage law, Act No. 3326 (1926), provides for the rules regarding
prescriptive periods for the violation of ordinances and special laws.
Section 2 of the law reads as follows:
“Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.
“The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.”
Zaldivia (1992)
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the accused was charged
with violating a municipal ordinance by quarrying without a permit on
11 May 1990 in Rodriguez, Rizal. A complaint was filed by the police
with the prosecutor’s office on 30 May 1990 but the corresponding
information was filed with the municipal trial court only on 2 October
1990. The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground of
prescription, pointing out that under Act No. 3326, violations penalized
by ordinances shall prescribe after two months from the commission
of the offense. The accused pointed out that the information was filed
in court after more than two months from its commission. The
prosecution on the other hand argued that the filing of the complaint
with the prosecutor’s office interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period pursuant to Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The Supreme Court en banc held that the crime had prescribed since
the information was filed in court only on 2 October 1990 or more than
two months from the commission of the offense on 11 May 1990.
The Court held that under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the period of
prescription shall be interrupted “when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty party” and that the proceedings referred to in
Section 2 thereof are “judicial proceedings.”
Although Zaldivia involved a violation of an ordinance, the holding
therein is applicable mutatis mutandis to violations of special laws
since Act No. 3326 covers “violations penalized by special acts and
municipal ordinances.”
Recognition of the Zaldivia doctrine is found in Section 1, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that “[t]he institution
of the criminal action [by the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor or other proper officer] shall interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period of the offense charged unless otherwise provided
in special laws.” (Italics supplied). It is clear from the wording of the
provision that in case of conflict between Section 1 of Rule 110 on one
hand, and a special law on the other, it is the latter which will prevail.
The reason for this is that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. (See Zaldivia v.
Reyes).
Panaguiton (2008)
However in Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA 549
(2008), a prosecution for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the Supreme
Court, through its second division, held that the filing of the complaint
with the prosecutor’s office already tolled the running of the
prescriptive period even if the offense is for the violation of a special
law. The Supreme Court held that the word “proceedings” in Section
2 of Act No. 3326 by which prescription is interrupted should be
deemed to refer to proceedings both judicial or executive in
character. It pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed in 1926,
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.”
On the assumption that it has doctrinal force, Panaguiton in effect
reversed the doctrine laid down by the Court en banc in Zaldivia. It
should be noted that in Zaldivia, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the
People, had also made the submission that “proceedings” in Section 2
should be deemed to include administrative proceedings but this view
was rejected by the Court. This shows that Panaguiton was not just
a modification but an outright reversal of the Zaldivia doctrine. The
decision in Panaguition however was laid down only by a division of
the Court. The question is: can a division of the Court effectively
reverse a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc?
Section 4(3), Article VIII of the Constitution is quite clear that the
answer is in the negative. It states “that no doctrine or principle laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.”
SEC v. Interport Resources Corporation (2008) did not modify or
reverse Zaldivia except insofar as violations of the SRC are concerned
In Panaguiton, the following “disquisition” was ascribed to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Interport Resources Corporation, 576 SCRA 354 (2008):
“While it may be observed that the term ‘judicial proceedings’ in Sec. 2
of Act No. 3326 appears before ‘investigation and punishment’ in the
old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become
the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term ‘proceedings’
should now be understood either executive or judicial in character:
executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it
refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind
of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.”
If Panaguiton may not be deemed to have reversed Zaldivia, may the
decision in SEC v. Interport Resources Corporation, which was
rendered en banc, be deemed to have overturned Zaldivia because of
the above disquisition?
The answer should still be in the negative. A perusal of Interport
Resources shows that the “disquisition” is not found anywhere in its
text. Instead it is found in a concurring opinion. It is axiomatic that
concurring or separate opinions do not form part of the decision itself
and do not have any doctrinal value or controlling force.
Interport Resources involved an investigation by the SEC against
certain corporate officers for the violation of the insider trading
provisions of the Revised Securities Act, re-enacted during the
pendency of the case as the Securities Regulation Code. Applying Act
No. 3326, the prescriptive period for insider trading would be 12
years. The respondents argued that their criminal liability had been
extinguished by prescription pursuant to Act No. 3326 since no
complaint or information was filed in court within the 12-year
prescriptive period.
The Court en banc held that the prosecution of offenses punishable
under the Securities Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a
complaint with the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the
SEC motu proprio pursuant to Section 53.1 of the Securities
Regulation Code. Hence the SEC investigation for insider trading
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. The ratio
decidendi of Interport Resources is therefore anchored on Section
53.1 of the SRC (not on any re-interpretation of Act 3326) and hence its
holding is limited to violations of the Securities Regulation Code or its
implementing rules and regulations. Nothing in Interport
Resources was intended to reverse the Zaldivia doctrine insofar as
violations of other special laws are concerned. In fact
the Zaldivia case was not even mentioned in Interport Resources.
Prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Intellectual
Property Code
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 (1997), and Sanrio
Company Ltd. v. Lim, 546 SCRA 303 (2008), which involve a
prosecution, respectively, for a violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the
Intellectual Property Code, the Supreme Court held that the running of
the prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of the complaint
with the Ombudsman (in Ingco) and with the Department of Justice
(in Sanrio). Both of these cases were cited by Panaguiton to
support its ruling. It is submitted however that the holdings in these
cases have no controlling force since like Panaguiton, these were
laid down only by a division and not by the full court. Hence the
holdings laid down therein cannot be deemed as having reversed or
modified the Zaldivia doctrine.
10. Q: What pleadings, motions, and petitions are prohibited by these Rules? A: The following pleadings,
motions or petitions shall not be allowed in cases governed by these Rules: (a) In civil cases, a motion to
dismiss the complaint or the statement of claim, and in criminal cases, a motion to quash the complaint
or information, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or failure to comply
with the requirement of barangay conciliation, pursuant to Chapter VII, Title I Book III of Republic Act
No. 7160; (b) Motion to hear and/or resolve affirmative defenses; (c) Motion for a bill of particulars; (d)
Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment on the merits, or for reopening of
proceedings; (e) Petition for relief from judgment; (f) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper; (g) Memoranda; (h) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court; (i) Motion to declare the defendant in default; (j)
Dilatory motions for postponement. Any motion for postponement shall be presumed dilatory unless
grounded on acts of God, force majeure, or physical inability of a counsel or witness to personally
appear in court, as supported by the requisite affidavit and medical proof; (k) Rejoinder; (l) Third-party
complaints; (m) Motion for and Complaint in Intervention; (n) Motion to admit late judicial affidavit/s,
position papers, or other evidence, except on the ground of force majeure or acts of God; (o) Motion for
judicial determination of probable cause in criminal cases. (Sec. 2, Rule II)///////