COpy

The ARMY HISTORIAN

A PUBLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

Numbel3 Washington, D.C. Spring 1984

The Center and Historical Analysis

Sccrttary Marsh, in his leiter of instruction of ing field ...ithin the government and, after a
MardI I. 1983, directed llla/Ihe Center of Military Vietnam·relato:d hiatus, in the acadmtic commu-
Hislory give incrtascd pnonly to the preparation of nlly. Many Amty agencies are inffilved in one way
hislorical studies in suppon of Army Slaff planning Or anOlher in studies and analyses. Several of
and mission execution. ActuaJly, the Center has these, induding the Stratep: Studies Institute at
IorlJ! assUieG the Army in applying hislOrY to staff Ihe Army War College and Ihe Combino:d Alms
plannini. It has dollC 1lO by creating. through re- Combat De>'CIopmelll Celller at FOrT leaven-
search. "'Tilin" rdermcc: ser.ice, and archival WOrTh, h3"c been idef11iflCd as regularly doing
/IClivilies, a hislorical data ~ upon wtUch OIher studies Ihat draw extemivdy on historical infor-
Anny agencies could draw for their own work. The mation or approach probl<:ms from a historical
Center has also comribuled through its suppOrt of point of ,lew_ This expanding use of historical
military IJi5IOI}' educalion, ~ prospective data within the Army parallels a broader trend
Army leaders \0 w;e ttislorical infomwion and Ihroughout our society. An irICTeasing number of
modes of thinkin, as Ihq' conFront lhe problems of g~mmental and private institutions are flllding
00",""",,. historical infonn3tion and historical methods of
Now, ho~, the ~mer is required LO go analym useful in a "aric1y o f practical ways. The
~nd Ihe gcneraJ. more or less traditional, §el'\l- chall<:nge for the Cenler of Military History is 10
ices;1 has formerly pm~. The new gooI for lhe bring ils skills to !:>ear more effectively and respon-
Cenler is 10 de>iCMC more of ils dfons spmrtcaUy sively on currCIlI and fUlUre Army concerns.
to the prcpanuion of historical studies focused For the presenl, owing to a gap between objec-
dircclly upon cum:nl Army activities, proble-nu, lives and rtSOurccs made available. the Cenler
and policy issues. must perform this task by regrouping its existing
Historical studies and analyses can ~ primarily personnel resources. To this end, the Center has
narrative accounts of Tt:<:eI\l Army o~ions; formed a IlCW Research and Analysis Division con-
th.-y (an present the historical background of a sisting of three branches. Two of these, the Refer-
panicular policy or organizalional issue in its de-
velopment over time and in the context of other
events: and they can review pas! effOrTS to deal
"ilh fecurrem problems. To qualify as analyses.
ho"'c>"CT, the studies must go beyond a chronolog-
ical recital of facts to draw conclusions from the
infomJ;'Uion, on th~ factors. for exampl<:. mati"ai-
Ing a panicular decision, or the reasons for the
olllcorne of a policy. Conclusions of this type may
mult from the deliberate testing of hypotheses
against C\'idence uocovered in research. or they
may ~ in the COIH'St of preparing a strai.&l\t-
forward historical namuive,
As defense issues become ever more compl<:x
and take a central place in national policy debates.
national >tcUrity studies are once again an expand-
tne:e and Staff SUppOrI BrancM. m: transfm Editor's Journal
from Otlm" divisions. The Analysis Branch is a new
emation. Tht; Centn is staCrlll& this lattn brandl, As. we come OUI .... h our third quarterly issue,
the ~.., of its analym effort, in pan by mOVlA, TM AmlY }/it/()nIIII has found its place in I~ lit-
pn$OlI/ld ~ into it lIS they beoomr VIICIUlI, nature. Comment from the AnnY'1 senior leader-
and in pan by templnrily detailin& hislorians 10 it ship has been ~g, subsc:riplion requests
from Othn subd;.'i$ion$ for panicular shon-tenn have come in by the hundreds, ~uau for back
projcocU appropriate to thrir special Kills. This issuu keep romina in, and llWIy approvina lettm
method. has been empk))'\'(I to staff the cumnt h.avc: ani.'ed. We Ire grateful, and m: tT}'inj 10
Grmada study and sevmlI Othn on.JOing proj- oontinue a quality. useful produa. This issue In-
au. While: &dtin, the maximum results from the dude$ aniclcs 00 the \1St of military history in the
rt:SOUr0e5 cumntly l..aiLIbk, Ihe Q1!ln hopes not field, and major p~ on the SllIe of tile.., and
to be ~vin, ..ith such stopgap measures two or on strat. IhOUght and readinp. Tht; dislribution
three )'QB from now. We envaa,e prow:lm& the list ha$ been put into shape. and WI: m: Iryin, to
Army in historlcal analysis whal the Congressional keep track of our military subscribers' chartge$ o f
Budld Off~ pro\'idcs Conarm m fISCal and bud- dUlY station_
w:tary anaIym: J)'SItmalicaDy ~, tuncly AD those Laudatory letten WI: rctelvc:d prc5CIlt us
aJ'1d informalive: analytical studies meetin& rutmlt ",ilh a problem, however We hid hoped 10 be
and fUlun:: plannilll ncros. As the eon"essitMlJi runmlll • cornmt:nllll)' and ~ tc:aion by
BOOF! Offo«'s $Iudies do not p.o:empl the deci- now to feature our readers' Te§pOnse. Bul we
sions of C~ and its committees. so the don't wanl 10 pul I~her • series of "n::alIy en·
Centn's Sludies will not aJtempl to pn::mIpI the joyed your pubbCalion," "dou', a wonderful
Army $Iaff planners. The Centn ..ill not recom· job" letters, You've:.s«rt Ihis $Or1 of Icttm-to-the-
mend decisions. but thJ'OU&h objectnl: eq)k:wiolu editor coIull\ll often mouth. Don', FI us "TOIl(.
and analyses of .. hal has happened before can We Io'l: setting th05le accotadd; WI: juS! n«d
pOint out the 5trtllllhs and weak~ of aIlmlll- somethin& I bit mon:: substantial for an ad\anaI!
tive poIicie$ of the !)MI. coIull\ll. liking is not ~ qrecin,. We ac-
In a major departure from previou:; praclic<, tually hope not cvtr')'Ol1C ..ill agree witll alI lhat is
the Cenln will be inRialln, .studies on ill 0"", ex- See Jo uml l . p. 6
aminut, issues, for aample, posed m the frve-year
Anny bOOF! prOjections or otherwise ickntiflCd ..
of potenlial future importana' 10 the Army. Tht; Tht! ARMY HISTORIAN
SludlCS m: intended to I'GUIl in hlSlonca/
~ suitable for evn1tual publiation and,
71w A""" Hirtorl.r .. I quancr1y Pl'bIi<;aI"",
of ,tIC U.....d SUlCI Army CcnIer or Militlr)'
iIIl(I!I"Ie cases, wide distribution. liist",),. Opimot15 exprmc:d in th:" pubti::auon
We Jl\O\'e into thIS new fieLd of endeavor a~ do IlOl .....,...arty rrlIca tile official policy of the
of both potenllal pilfalls and OppOrtunilies. Ctnttt of MiliII.y History, the l)epanmmt of the
AnIIysu inllOlvc:d in tile policy process (~ hI$- Anny. t"" Deparuntttl of Dd'cnJf:, 01'
~.e$ G<Mmrnntt l'IIc rtprOdllClion of 111m
t""Unitod
loricaI) mu:;t, as mu:;t other professionals. mam-
tam tlleu oornmitmmt 10 sound metl\odolocY and
'e. od_OOOII Pl'1pO!C$;" rncou1"lll<d,
independent judgment on the basis of e-.idrnce in Chi(! of MWioq HI$t(>ry
the fEe of those $«kina IUppOrI for their p05i- s... Om. .......,... Kinnard. USA (Ret.)
tioru in romplu policy deb.ll.e$. The reoord of
hislory is rdkd with inslan<:tS of the misuK of his-
Iorical cvKknoe and anaIosY, often wilh ch$astrous
aJfI5C(jucnccs. HIStory I) nO! I .!O\ITOe of fIXed \f~&Ji/("
lesions ,*"ed in Slone that can be applied me- IInIcJe Dilt. . . KIrdcasrlc
chanically 10 c;urrem AlUalIOIU. IMead, we
I onda Calk., Anhu. S. Iludyman, lind John W.
conllnuaUy learn new Ihrnas from history 1$ WI: Ebbert; &Mi!lod .. tI>c prodllClion of thiJ ......
aU. diffcm!l qUCSIions of higory, and ~
the Ies.son$ Ire neither expected nor .. t1ccmc:. It 1'0 ..,1ne;ribe" romment. Of~, write Manq·
wi/J be the taU. of Cenler hislotians to do whit l1'li ~. 71w Amr,. Hirton.., U.s. Army
Ctnttt or MuM)' History, Pulaill IkIidina.
they can to provide the Army wilh sound, n::kvuIt
20 Masa;huselll A...... ~, NW. WlShinaton DC
historlcal anaI)'K$ for its poli<;y-rnakin, pt,. ism.
We .. claw.1t the chalImtt- "'''
2 7JI.c ARMY HlSTOIlfAN
 CHIEF'S BULLETIN

Army Hi510rian St:rles November 20, 1947, and is signed Dwight D.

Eiserlhower. Its admonition SliD governs our ap-
The Director's Ad,'lsory Board for The Army proach 10 ~h, writing, and publicalion in
Hislorian~~ IItId ils firS! lIICCfing in FclIruary.
Readers ",ill re.:all that the series CfIC(lrnpassc$ a
"""".
As Yo'<: initi31e analytical Sludies similar 10 those 1
have mentioned, we arc looking ahead at a number
I'CVision of the ROTC military history Ies!, the
publicatK)l1 of other works, sucli a$ one being of historical subject pos.sibilities, such as the Army
done at Ihe U.S. Military Academy on Ihe ~Ia­ contribution to join! dOCtrine since Vietnam. My
tionship betW«11 ~y and military h.istory, panicipation in the Deputy Oticf of Staff for
Ihe publiealion of d~ manuscripts for- Operations and Plans' periodic din:ctors' meetings
warded from Ihe field. the repriming of military
gives me a firsthand view of the types of Sludies
claWes. and a ~akers series featuring weU- the Army ",ill be needing to deal with a vanny of
known academics from OI~ """n(~. The board issues in tile years ahead.
members wac in general agreement on a variety of
issues. The new VCTSion of the Anny ROTC text, National Museu m
Americwr Military HmO/')', lI'ill be half as long as While we have awaited the passage of the Joint
Ihe earlier aiition and have double the illust ra- Resolution of Congress on the establishment of
tions, ,,"11 a ijvdy and readable lext. Pedagogical the National Museum of the U.S. Army, now
expens, ,"ttmtn undergraduate I~. will be caught up in the nonnallcgjslative rush, then: have
broughT inlo [he process on an advisory basis. not beer! major ilIC1i>ilies on the mU5CUm in recent
Whal is n~ed is someth.ing t/tal will PUI tilt SlU- months. Once the resolution is passed (and no
dent in Ihe boo!s of the historical soldier. Like problems are exptdtd in its passage), GenmJ
other Center publicalions. a good ROTC ttXl must E.C. Meyer, President of the Board of Dim:1ors
be impartial and illCOrporaIe lilt west hislOricaI of the Anny Historical Foundation, will be nam-
criticism, fa,wable or OIhnwi$e. Reprinting OU\- ing people to serve on his board and beginning his
of-print military cla5sics ..ill pre:sal! particular campaign for corpornte fmancial suppan. In-
chalkngcs and oppOnunilics. Involved an: eopy_ cludtd on the Board of Directors will be a key
ngh\ laws, what Iypes of books to be reprinled, position of executive ~ pre$ident, a pan- o r full-
and fuilions with bookSi ores \lJId distributors, The time employee of the Foundation. TlIe architects
board suggested a number of ~kely tilles. for Ihis st age of the planning, in coordination wilh
the Co<ps of EnginttrS. arc: nearing completion of
Special Siudies their site Sludy. The primary sile remains one adja-
In addition to our main line publications, we 11K CC1lltO Arlington National Qmetery. I am now in
engaged in a number of special studies. The Calter the process of CSlablishinJI a GS-15 pOSition 10
has undataken, for e:xamplc, a Sludy of the use 10 head the Calter's National Museum aaivities. TlIe
which military history has ~ put in the educa- person occup}ing this position will not be part of
lion of Army offta1"$. An(l(her major Sludy, this any Calter division Or branch, and will in all prob-
under way in the SliD-forming Analysis Branch of abilit y repon direct ly to me.
the Research and Analysis Division. will explore
~ connected with rcsear<:hing Vietnam hiSlory.
Research Assodates
Do:signed for publication and scholarly use, il will We arc: also establishing a RC$eaKh Associaies
be bibliographical to a degree, and will examine progrnm at the Calter, providing an oppon unit y
source coJleaions, their locations, breadths, and for military and civilian scholars o n $lIbbaticals or
conditionl placed on their use. Then: ",in also be a foundation grants to "'"OTk at the Center for a~.
soection on the speciaJ problems of research on The subj«"\s of research undertaken and subse-
Vietnam. quent pUblication must ha~ a bearing on the field
Our attitude on tile availability \lJId use of of military history. Ahhough we cannot provide
source malaiaJ is in line with a directive to tile typing assistance. "'~ can provide a typewriter,
din:ctors and chiefs of Army staff \lJId speciaJ staff tOiCther wilh moSI other forms of support. Pros-
divisions, that there be "no rcservaI.ions as to pecli'~ candidates for the Research Associates
wllnher or IlOI the cvidmce of history places the pragram may express their interest by writing to
Army in a favorable lig.ht." The dirMive is dated me hen: al Ih~ Calter.

J
THE COMMANDER AND MILITARY HISTORY

Answers Ab o ut Additional Skill Indi cat or 5X

Doft.ld r. Sh...

AddlliOOal skiU indicalor ~x is • ~ 1M J. "' hat arc 1M Anny's IIftdli and IPlIItf ...11Ioft.
Army uses 10 dmote an offur's havinS ~ I ZIllions ror 1M SX!
certain Ievd of opntist in the fodd of history. R«juircd Autllorizcd
'fho:rl, has bftn considerable c:oncm\ among those 12 1)
COL
~ I~ mdlCllor about how II i$ used, and
18
considerable confusion amons commanders and
LTC
"
",."
MAJ ))
gaff§ about how 10 reqUCSI 1M !CTVica of those
..110 hold it. In COflvenaliorui ...ith kllO\loialpble
rt'preselliative'j of Ih~ Combat Sludie$ Instil ule,
CPT
LT "0 0
lhe U.S. Army W~ CoIIeat. tilt Caller of Mili· T~'" 110
tary HISIOfy,lhc U.S. Military Aeadm1y's 1Xpan- The His",.,.. Dt-partment at Wesl Point and Ihe
~nl of Hillary, and the Army's Military Per- Tramln, and Oonrinc' Command conll'ol about
sonnd Ccmn (M1LPERCEN). [ toU&hl hard, I\lI1('Iy perrent of the assgn.cd ~X·,.
nu~and·bolts ilIlswm 10 the IOOSI frequently
asked qu~ions on ~X. The a/UWttS ammllJy ar- 4. 110" B 1M SX ~ In . . . .mmlJ!
rr.'ed at folio ...: 5X is a AiD indicator. not an ~t dlC'
tator The pnmary flSSignment devi0e5 remain the
1. W hat dot:'! Jddillonal skil Indicalor SX rrp- specially code and the KU)fldary sp«iaIty iden-
l'e'ltftl? tinef. From here tM puh bBnches. When a p0si-
Although there are 5JeVt1'3I ways in ... lIich the SX tion callitIJ for lhe SX addiltOnal skiD indicator has
.....y ~ awankd. lhe to!lUllOIltSI is for the offlm" b«n aUllIoriud on an orpnizaIion'l manpower
10 haYe m:er."Cd a .,.aciualc ~. M.A . or document and. ITlO$I imponant. has been ,'ali-
Ph.O., In hislory. MO$I of Ihe Army's graduate dated by Ihe Army Education R«juiranmlS
~ hQlckrs in hislory ha,~ ~~o:d thml in Board as requirin, gradUalC educalion , the
~ion for tachm, DSIiJIITlmIS in the Army's pcnonnd syStem and the 5X mantw:r arc
Departmml of Hislory at W$ Point, although obligated to produce the asset mjulrcd. If a rom·
I~ ut a number of 5X's wtuch ha..e been mander or IIWIaF1' wants and nmis a uniformed

-.
...lII"IIcd as result of individual education and hislorian. but the space mto which he ...·aIU$IO put
Sludy no! sp(msored by tile AITI1Y, and service Ihal person has nOi been ,·a!idaled by the AM y
Education R«juimnml$ Board, he can request
the p1!Iduate historian but the syStem is not
2. Whal Is 1M Ann) 'I (\Imnt SX in~etIlOIY?
obl.t&ated to ~Ild with a gradUalc-cduau.ed
offlCl:r. Funber. the COIl\I"IIIIIlde must use the 5X

'""
COL
LTC in the "trailer" pan of the pcr$Oflnd request; it
MAl 191 cannot ~ indicau:d in Ihe primary pan of the ~
CPT 1>1 Q\ICSI doo:umcnl. Board vabdalion is auciaI here.
LT 17 Ht1'Ne\"t'r much a commander may want and nted
a QualiflCd uniformed historian. if he does not
T~. .7> ha>c. validated po5iIlOO. he will not ~ I 5X.
Ikfon: No,nnber 198J, there were only about The usc of the !lpCciahy code and secondary
119 dnigna/ed 5X·s. A MILP[RCEN reoordI spa"iflh)' idcntiflCl' as the primary assianmmt de-
cheo;lt. hgo,r,.~", inWcatcd thll a much laraer VlCU may be chan&inJ. A study group is Iookin,
number ....ere actuaD} ebgible for the award of the inlO ... helher or nOllhe SX should predominate in
addinonal skiU indicator. The ''''"ard actions were bnnch lI'IlIlWerW .signment$, panicularty fit the
made by letter late in 1983 and rewltcd 11\ 1M .:ur· lieutenant roIuml and ooIood Icvcts. If Illis ~
rail fIiICt Ic>d. is unplernc:nted, a oommandcr would be able to

4 7JI~ ARMY HlSTORJAN

ask for a lieutenant rolond Of rolonel and have lhe Jackson in M ILPERCEN, who can be reached at
SX addilional skill indicatOf p~omiruue over the AUTOVON 221-&lS2 or 8151. He is very knowl·
primary and se<:Ondary specialty indicators. Soch a edgeable on the additional skill indicator and will
change would, of ooum, simplify IC'Iting an offi- be most helpful.
<:er with the d~ historical skills at the appro- There is gmeral agreement by both producers
priate grade.
and users of SX's Ihal the system works. Some
S. A~ o~ who .wn~ft'JI'dltln SX lOUrs hur1 line lUning is being considered. but commanders
bd~ !ldrdion boants1 who undCTSIand the requirement 10 validale a uni·
formed historian posillon can usc the CUrrtnl
OffICers who ~'e in 5X and remain qualif.ed
<)'Stem 10 IC'I the 3S$dS they need. Holders of the
in their speciallies do _n, OffICers who serve in
SX, onne they understand how the system works
repetitive SX assignments instead of IIet'\'ioi wilh
and the imp(manoe of maintaining their sp«iahy
troopS or in OIher key specialty~nted 3.!$ign-
qUalifICations...,U find Ihat lhis additional skiD
menu do nOl do so 1',eU, This is true in Other lypeS
identiflet' can lead to rewarding 3.!$ignments and
of 5IX(:ia1 as.<;ignments and is not unique to SX.
broadened carttrs.
The ~ here is 10 mainlain a strong specially
qualifICation statuS as )"OU Som'e SX tours.
6. Whom should ome..-!! M ntad ..itll qU$lons
on SX!
CoItJMI Shaw 1$ dU'N/(Jf oj 1M U.S. Army Mill/IllY
The point of contact for 5X is Capt. Rid HiSlOry IMllult {It C/NIW, &>n«ks. Pno,.syl",,,,iQ.

The Integrated Military History Program

at the U.S. Army War College
Thom •• f. 11 ..1,

Wh(n the Anny's Ad Hoc Committee on the and theoretical subjects laught aI the War Collegc.
Study of Mililary History looked althe U.S. Army This year's War CoIIcge st udents benefit from Ihe
War College in 1971. Ihe College was using such a resulting integraled program in military history.
"sort seU" approach 10 the Sludy of military To est ablish the new program, the War CoIIoegt
history thai the subject could nOl be identified created two new faculty positions. Profcs.sor Jay
among the many lopics being offered, Historical Luvaas became the new profes.sor of military
examples and ~asc &l udies were scallere<! history. His Anny colleague is Colonel Harold
throughOUI the ~urriculum. but there was no Nelson. who has laught history at Ihe U.S.
systemalic historical program. Carlisle Banacks Military Aeademy and the Command and General
had tmnc:ndous historical assets, Vl1th the profes- Slaff College. These tWO new faculty members
sional staff and vast ~ollectlon of the Military wo rk with Ihe offlCn1 who dC>'l'Iop the curriculum
History Institute, its oral histOl')' program. and. to determine ~as in which history is needed.
begmnmg in 1972, its visiting profosor of military They then develop historical materials .... hich fill
histo!,),. Faculty experts in military history added these needs and result in a rational development of
elective courses in the early 1970s and made exten- kC'Y historical topics. Lecturers and seminar in-
si"f use of history in the Evolution of Military Slructors are drawn from throughout the Car\i$Ie
Strategy segment of the COre curriculum. Thai core Barracks comm unity. The Military History In-
curriculum, however, centered on currenl Army stitute is an impor1ant source. but the academic
prob~ and the CUrrtnl inlC1'llalional 5CCf>C and departments, St rategic: Studies InSiitule, Center
seemed to offer fink opponunity for military for Land Warf~, and the student body aU make
hiSlory insiruction. contributions. Classroom in$lructlon is supple·
The sitUalion cllan.g.ed in 1982 with the ~reation mented by a wide variccy of voluntary activities.
of a suC'OC!.')ful pilot program that convinced cur- The academic year's classroom "course"
rieulum plannen that military history inSlruction, centers on the U.S. expenmce since 1861. wilh an
planned and taughl by pro fessional historians. excursion into broader fields to suppon the
could effectively tic tOlC'lher many of the practical students' reading of ClaU5e'o01t~'S On War. Major

5
10pics inclu<k I~ lIuman dJmmsion of combat. aUon,ilIc. Soulh Mountain. and O(her Civil War
the IImory of U.S. 51n1ltIY, problems of coalition b.Ulerorilh This procnun, LII conjullClion with lhe
warfm, cj,iJ..mifuary relations, lhe It$ory of the dawoom insIruClion, has been rmwtably sue·
JOlin Cl1~fs of Staff. and CiI$(' 511,1(bes in World aufullxca1I5c • puIS offJem in louch ....,.h tiM:lr
War II opmu.ions and ampaI&Il pIanrung. In all, profeWonal TOOlS and II~ lhem a more: pro-
51uden(l r«a~ about fony lloull of military Ius- found undcnlandm, of Inn.smice lradilions.
lory in Ille con: curriculum. ",nlllhc bulk cooom· While "'e tah ~at priJc in the inlcgntOld
InIled in Ihe early phases of lhe course so that they rruJ,lary hIStory program at the U.S. Ann)' War
wiU lIa~ tile necessary tool$ and background for Colk-w:, ",e kno", thcn: is room for improvement.
later in§lruClion. "J"hc« ar~ gaps In Ihe cUml'u!"m thai we ha"e nO(
Many studenls 5IIpplcmenl Illis in5lruClion ",ilh )'tI mled, and we continUOusly faa tonJpl"ILII&
eiel:tI~ COUI'K$ in the sprin,. TM smak course of- demands for time. Most of lhe improvcmmlS in
fem! in 1972 has grown 10 nearly a~, so that our prop;un will bI: III 11K' voluntary acti,illa.
loo;by', 51udcnt is vinuaUy _red of rtndina a b«au~ our Sludcnt~, ...itll their differin&
course that rltS lIis 1IC'eds. All of these coorses an: badgrottnds and needs. are IlUracted to ""d·
modeled on graduate 5(;I\00I courses, ""lh w~kly daigrItd coones. $taff ridn. leaun: PfOlf1UTlS,
thr~·hour .seminar nta'llIIJI) IhrouahoUl the tW- and individual $tudy opponuntlies. We ~ for·
w~k span of the course and heavy emphastS on tunate to bI: able: to conlemplate impro_ed
student n::scarch, ",Titing, and lIIlerac!ion. OIher rC'iponse to thelf R«ds WIthin budgetary con·
studatlS >'OIumccr for military study proj«1S in 51raints bccau~ our qaff and Lhe rich tC$OU~ of
hislory. MOSt of these resemble rcscarch tutoria1s. the \lwlary HlloIory In'ililute aDo", W; 10 pcrf«1
PUUIIl& the studwt in do;sc c;ontact ....,.h a faculty tlK' prop;un ""thoul ~.obIiUlin& Il ~ed
mrntber "'ith speaaI upmlSC and d~",mg on lhe: depan.mcnl 01" hirina adduional f.."'\Ib.)_
u/Uqut hislOocal coII«tion ill the Milit3J)' History Of coone, in dt\i&run& this program and con·
Instllut e. OIher study projects include 0f1II hIStory templaun~ futun: ',"rru>"emmts "'"e ~ motivated
debrierlllJl) of senior offooers, sponsortd jointly by by the d<:-ii~ to IfIlprow tlK' CTltue leamllli expc.
Ihe War Colkgc and the Military HIStory ln5tiIUIC. rime.:. not just the 'Iwdy of hlSlory. Whl'lhcr we
The rrtOsI popular voluntary activities use bal- consider instruclion in kadermip, stralegy. opera·
ller.dds as claMroorru. When the Army War Col· lional pLannllll, dcfm'>C' polJi:y fomulation, or an)'
Iqo: moved to Carh.Jc: BlfTacks ftom Lea,cn. of the m)riad !iUbjC'Cts taught aI the War Co\kge,
wonh III 1%1. trw, IlC"A (.;ommana.anl imfIlII(hately "'c arc conrldenl thai tlK' mtqn1ed 5100y of
mJlSlllUIOId Irw, Gctt)"Sbtir, tnp lhai had bern a military history u ....... a WIIk culTiculum ~
hilhlight of the pn:-\\ orId .... ar II cum:utum. The mcnt is resuhlllg 111 the desarOld IfIlpro..·cmnus.
C"intysbur& boo1llA and tour is 51iU I popular
autumn ~·CTlt. and il hl5 now been !iUpplememed \/Iljuf ~ II..., " (0",,,,,,,,d..111 oj I~ L.S.
by more demanding stiff ridC$IO Anloeram, Chan· Army W" C~ iN CIIrl.w &Imrks, ~"'I."""""IIl.

)ourna l From p. 2
5Iid III thIS pubt.calJon, and Ihat ",ill let lIS
iOtnC f'Ubltshlng OltI ..ln ,n 7"Mlnn.r HUi()riqn, and
~now thetr considomd reasons. Similarly, we hope: r~ 10 our in'·HallOn 10 aulhors has Ixm
wc'n bI: hcarin& !IOIIlC!hlll& on our rtadcn· cxpe-
nma: 1IPPIYin& some: of 11K' mlblary history ta:h·
aood "e rnRind .oou1d-bI: COI1LribulOll
arc IooLIIlglO f'U~ articles Qn mililary hlSlOf)',
t'" "'1:

niqllCS and ideas our ilfI.da C\proi. Perhaps the If' "'nhng, tea.:hUIJ, and appliclttion. and not na:·
inclusion III our last i>wc of a r.ing:le-purpO$e sub- C<.'oiiIlI)- nuJ.uarv hlMorical pie..'C!; on batlles and the
scnplion form inhiblttd ,n.<kplh commenl ..... e li~e_
",cloomc thOUghtful ob!icfvations and hope for Imitation may bI: the hights! form of praiK. bUI
50rllC plcasandv di$putalious te<pOllSC. for a publj,:ation welt as our's u's rqmnu of our
We have col1SKlertd IJOUll bl:yond our siJnecn- "'ork l.a!iI IMlIC'S picoe on lo&isIital n:adinp has
~ f()Otl8l. SQmI:Ihuli "'c ">u1d h~,c dooe ...i1h I"1«n 01 will bI: repnnLfd ItI II leaR four map
this ~, bUI ha,c dc\:ided hJ uwntalll our pm- J"umals "'e kf"lO" of, and "'e mcou,.. the pubJi.
C"fIt pili: ien&th "'hilt "c h...b.nd OUt re\i()U''-Clo QfIOll 01 OIIr ani<:1n elsc>\here. An II1taaled
for futun: iswc:s. A ""'" pmod~ 5hou>.l an to robl(l[" ....,m onl~ notify U$ of an intenllon to
!Itt point ",h<:s-e ;1 l< ''''0 i<o,<uC'> ."'cad of ,tsclf In rcr.inl, and run t~ anicle wtlh b)'1ine and IItribu.
preparatIOn bl:fore it attempl~ wSiamed c-.pan. tK>1I to The Arm' }{<SI~n.
sion. We ha_e had many e~I'I=ions of inLert$l III

, TIl. AHMY HISTOI/IAN

 PERSPECTIVE
Three Faces of Military History
... ~ C.U.Iroo.

nw AI7IIJ' Historitlft CIDnI~_ 11m iu Ieria of IIJtSl comributionl oa the.-e of

miIiI.-y history. Dr. C'aIaMn....-.. John F. M"hiwwl Prof...". of MiIiury
Hillory • the U.S. Army CommInd and Geneta Staff CoIear durin& the
19S2.-&l aaiu'&)'ea', and ... "'embc. " rtbc ~ ofHillory, Univenily
,,(Oda..._.

Our pas! 1$ a profession has CUI &rQOVtI aIofll Europe appeared o ver thirty yean:a,G, has pIa)"ftl
which we and our suocesson will c:onlinuc to • role in shaping 001" views of An&Io-American
lraytj . The rLnl Ihina lilac strikes anyone Iookina strategy arguably second o nly to thai of o,lIrchiD
at the hig:ory of miliI.,-y history is tlud it is OM of himsdf. o,lIrchiU, of count, aIIo falb into the
1M oIdesI forms of hiaoric:al wrilina. ~ calqOr)' of influential popular historians.. till im-
histonans of d?TS; ,I antiquity wroIe mostly.rout pact on popular pc.ccpdons of Inc period from
..... , as did the. ~ and annalists of the 1933 to I94S would require Ul ~ xminar to
medieval world. 1lw: same mi&hl ~ Yid of ludf. TIle rta500 both WiImoI: and o,urdtiD. were
d . ,I and mcdimd liIaw:ure FfienIIy. In the 50 influential "'.. or oou.noc: thai, hrca .... the,
modmI era the impact of the Enliahlmmml and publi5hed arty, the, provided the raw material for
the ~ dornUwv::c: oCthe ~ of ",,,,,til had a seneration of textbooks and leaura, neither
an inlerestina; effect UpOI'I this klnJ 1I_ lilion of eva- revised as freqlltllliy as they OU&l"lI CO be. We
writUlI military his«lI'Y for ,mnaI COIISIJmp!ion. have: only to look at tada)". be$! seDer !bu, book
Military lIistory broke into Ilmll: components duro club sdtcIions, or the neks o f paperbacks arrayal
inillilc' nlrltleemh century, and those three sepa- in supcnnarkeu and druplores to fond confuma·
rate parU oonlinUC their isoiattd, vay o Ften tion of the durable appeal of pOpUlar military
mu!uaUy $lI$pic:ioI.ls, ~rnccs today. TIley are the history, ran&ina; all the way from vny good work,
popular, the ~, and the official flllCC$ of Uke Kcepn's Six Armies ill NonntJIfdy, to the
miliIuy history. drQdflil paperback quicklef; whote authors
substitute a fMilit)' of inYerition for (Jddity to
r~.
Th~ Popullr FlCe Popular military hislOf)' h.M lately expanded
into a new dimauion, &I tdnision " dramatically
As we all kl'lOW.
not leas! ""calise John K«aan recreates" (and in the plOOt:Si bopdessly warps)
"- rtmaindcd us in the openint; chaptrr of his ~hinl: from the CMl War thfOll&h World War
maaniranl work, nt.t F(I(t oj &tl~, one of the II. This is not 10 say thai popular treatmenlS can-
bc:st.~ historical5ludies ohhe nineteenth em- not be good: Kcqan is proof of thai. Nor is it to
tury was Edward Cralsy's FI/I_ ~ &dlles say thar. film cannot as.sist the unOerscandina of
of 1M World, published in 1839. Creasy's PUIpOK war in eras past, as witness the SBC (!1m
>ow of course nOi merely 10 entertain, bUI 10 in· "Cullodm," or OphuCs' powerful "The Sorrow
511'UC1. (H~ was, after aD, a Victorian.) From and the Pity." AU tOO oftm, however, this type of
CIury'I day to the presenl, the Sfravn of popular military histOlJ is merdy CIltMainment, at best.
histot)' in che Ena\ish.-speaking work! has flowed Some of this is of COtirIC the flult of the prores-
Sf/Oni if not always dear. Much of ii, o f COlIne, 5ional historians, of us. Trained in iJlIduace
c.rries no ~ic "-r.sa, bul iI simply meanl 10 sthooIs ","hose racultle5 oftm lake &I ~tk interest
infonn, CIllmain, and earn the author, hi"lteents or
in the qualil), their students' writilla as thq do
and publishm • !111ft or Ies5 honesI doIlIr or in the not imi;pU(1Ca/It quation of how history can
pOUnd . Bill it iI footish to dismiss, as 1TWl)' best be tauaht, we leave the fldd open to iho5Je
aadernic: historians ~ all 100 prone to do, this ...-too would meeI the demand. TIle demand is cer-
nllIl"e pre or writina wilh • conltmptUO\lS cwl of tainly therr. ()rw, of the curious facu of litis plIcir.;
the tip. Crssy _ not the Ies5 inillltlltial for being age is its appnitc for war stories. POpular military
thomu&hl)' &mall'\lr (and onm oompldely histOlJ wiD be with us for Ilona time, piIIa&in& (or

-".In our own time the work of the Australian

journalist o,~er WiImoI, WOO5e Sl"'"~ for
ianoring) the work of acadmIic and official
historians alike. [ would like to think of it as I
, hallcngc 10 liS, a , hallmac to write good, clear,

7
.,;u"'~ narralM prose for those, and t~ an a ba)'OflCts" htS\OI")·-tllac beml, of COUtW, the' tcr·
101 of than, ",no ""3111 to rnd it ntOf}' of those dreaded quasi·m)1hoc f.gu1lS, the
rcti~ colonels. One of the first landmark books
Th~ Aca demic Face
to talec the "'"iII"·and·socicty awroach ""'" JoI\n U.
About tM time that Creasy was wriI~ his Ncr. W"" and Uuman Pro,reJS. which a.aminc:d
boo~, the procc5S "''&5 bcpnmns that, for beller or the econonuc IIIlpacl of war and found il negative.
wor5t, produced today's hlStolical prof~n. Wilham McNeIU'$ inunen~ly stimulating new
Germanic in oripn (like ofrlCial hIStory, the book. TM Pu~'1 oj Po .."" is in dnCC1 line of
~ 51aff s)"$Iml, and a number of other descenl from Ncrs. C'o"ftl though Mc:NciD dra...,
aspMs of our IioUbjCCl), u _ wdk:stablashed III §("KnC "cry dlfferenl oonclusions. Other examples
the EnglL!.h·spealeing world by the end of Ille nine-- of IhlS approach. bolh veT)' warmly rtccwlld by
t«l1th ernlury. BUI 5Omc1hing curious happened ~. are ~hc:hael Walar's JUSl QJld UfljUSl
10 lhe hIStorical pmf~ on its "''''yacros& lhe WI&';J and Paul FusseU'! T1w (ifPQI Will" find Mod-
En&IM channel: the Sludy of war atld mibtary III· "" M~mory.
Slilutions dropped OVCfboard. There _ no This approach 10 Ifltqvalln8 the Sludy of YoW
British (or American) Delbruck. The prevailing into the hislonc:aI mainstream tuu n<M been
hberal (in the Victorian ~) b~ of the' late "'1I.hoon ~. TIle wmt to ""hich the
ninclmllh erntury IMgdy ..count for this. WaI", mnctCC1lth-«rllllry assumpuon that sud! hlStOf)' IS
at leas! major war bctwct'n IIIdustrWized nations, rIQ\ .cal history WMves. however. can only be lip-
Wall, 50 evtTYOtIC \hou&lu, mcreasmaly unlikely pr~wlld by SCH1"IeOT1<." who tuu.sat on facuky cur·
and. as a subjea for study, distMlcful. The history riculum mlC"Yo ."OmmiItCCS, or perhaps by art)"OnC
of war and military iflSmutions could therefOR: be .... 1\0 has noced the allJlutk of the Ammcan
Icfllo joumaliSls and rtli~ colonels. an allitudt HISlOrocal A$5OCiation and Ihc lIditoriai policies of
which. wmcwhat attenuated, still IioUrvival "'hen I I~ hou~ organ, ~ AnJ('11("Qn HUlon(fl/ R~v~ ....
ftItcred graduate IIChool t"'"CIlIy yan qo. After The rclat"c ~ of some academic t~mmtl
aD, • pHI deal of historical researdI is $parked by of mililary hllolOl)' carnes .. IIh II some real pr0b-
COtItmlpor2ry conctmS, as the explosion of "'"Of" lem,. Ikcau~ many academic histOrians of war
on women's history over the last fift«l1 yurs illU$- and mibtary !n'illtUlions an oollCmtraling on the
trates. If prior to ]9]4 war _ thoulht I fadin& links bc:t"'«n Iliac areaJ and other. pre5lImably
relic of a past left bdlind (cxctpI III bml&hted cor· Iarier and ~ signiftcanl questions. th.ey oftm
nm of the ""Ofld) by a IIW"Ch of prOjrcss. aner do noc inle<nl Ih~l~ In Ih~ <kIails of how
1918 it was aU too r«enl and painful I manory. I IhUlP .. ork. of .. hat actually happened. Reviotw·
think it is no coU\cjcM,~ thai §("KnC of the mQSI in· on, M<NeiU'~ Puf';JiJ/ oj Po"," in TM N~'" York
1IO\"3IIYC "'"Of" done by BmlSh historians In the in· Rn·..·... oJ Books, Jobn Kecpn made pit\:iscly thl$
lefWaI")'UI"S dealt ""th the eighteenth emtu!)·. Yet pOint NOt long aao I helld one of my colleagues
during the interwar >"tars I few historians. like at rOIl Leavcnwonh, ",he", I was. v\siUllg pro-
Marc Bloch. bqan to d.uttt auftllion to ho".. "cry fC560r at the Combat Studies Instul,lte. ranark that
funcbmmtal "'"CIe the ""If' in which war and a c:a1ain "'"Or\ "''''"85II't tactical moulh," and my
military institutions affected the devdopmrnl of milld Ilashed bao:k to I oonvcrsatlOn aboul a man·
$(l(~y. u~riP\ wbmil!ed for l,In1vcnity press publicaJ.ion
The ",hole5ale lR,oI\"ftToenl of a ,enmu.oon of of "'hich one of m) unl'"CIUy tiSOCiaIcs $lid, "'It's
historians in the "'"llr dlon IJI Bntam and the nothing but tacto." Bm 1"10 ~ historians.
Unitlld Staleslx1"'"=t 1939 and I~S funhcrro lhe at Icasl none I know. &fllle (hal knowledp; of the:
process of tr~atina mibtary hi!itory a:;; one nUI~ and boiLS of pO~IO somehow makes a
hi:!l:oricaI specialty I1IlOIlI many. rather lhan as poIIIic;.;d histOrian las credIble. Here 11 one area
5OITIethin& noc quote n::sp«Iablc. BUI the fOrtl,l!ICS "'~ ~ military lusiorians can Icam a
of acIdCTnic mibtllr)' hi:!l:Of}' ~ World Will" II &.real deal flom Ihe offICIal mililary hlstoncal
have laken MIme inlcreslinillums. For one Ihing. commullitl·
its praclitionm have often been intcrestlld in it as V. h.atc\-W I\S cun"tnt problems and shortoom-
5OITIet1llng thai. affCC1ed ~. eoonorruc or in· U1p. hoYo-e>"CI, uni'"CIloily-ba!;ed mU..ary histOf)'
tdlcaual hiSlOf}'. rather tllan as a subject of study hb. I h<:~ .... c, .. rea.onably bnght futu",. For one
in in o"'n righl. To 50nlC Ulent thi!. approach. d.e Lilma.. Ihi, p:nerwion of !itu!lenls seems to h.ave.
"WN atld Sociny" approach, ha.o. been the pm Ut"'~ mU:fest Wl Inc IioUbjC(t. Why thlii should be
0( academic tC$pC!ClabtIW~. a "'ay in ...tudt 11K ua.e" "'0<111 ,...,n,idcnng for a 1I101'lC:llt. Sonx
academic militat)' hlSlO/'UU dJffcrtntiate what ",udml~, Of CO'.'N:, ll~c lhe technoloaY of war or
th.eydo from "dnlm and tnlmpct" OT "bullies and Ihe IIImuuac: 01 ullifomu. but I be~ that the

8
 basic ~.uon is prtrisdy their Lark of pn$Onal ron- linucd 10 do so in boIh thilt country and lhe T$ of
t*" ... lIh somnhinj that lhey pn-cl'i'o1: will. in the Engtish·speaitinj world. Its boundarle5, how·
\'Vious "'1IY'>. bulk large in Ihrir lives. Be Ihis 1$ it ever. ha'o1: 510..1y widened until it has come to sup-
ma)', Ihr riel of stooelll inlerest means Ih.at ~ ply a great. deal more than I*"ical and operational
is ahoa)'! a aood enrollmenl for a ~uc:ted dnail. ~ official hislories of the 1914-IS war of-
courx. (;i,'en thr pressures to wllicll tiberal artS fered aImoSI nothinj on SlratCl)'. Those COYering
IkpanmmtJ an 'Wbj«t t~ days. chairmen and 19l9-4S, in boIh B,..airt and the United Stales. not
dean$ look with rejoir:mg upon a rourx that can only CO\-ered SlralCJ)' but \oPSI.ics, military
puD in a hundred or more SludnitS. IO"CTIlmem, and mud! more besides. The Cenler
There are ~ larger rno;ons than mere <kpart. of Military Hislory's proj«ted 5Cries of volunte$
ITI¢nta! survival for Ihe growin& acctpIancc of on Vietnam ..ill includt one: on the rok and im-
military history. and tll= reasons aIJow ITI¢ to tnd pat:! of the press. the necessity for ..'hich tells us an
my remarks on the academic: face of miliUlrY enormous amount aboul the ~hangin& nature of
hiSlor)' on a moderalely clletrful n(l(e. Thtrt is a ..'at in a democratic society, Talcen 1000her, the
1I'0"';n& ~ition of the faa Ihal tlK ~beraI ans OUtput of the Cenler, the Combal. Studies In·
Ikpanmmts of coIIqcs and uni~til$ faa I Slitule. and the Army War CoUcac, 1$ ...'dll$thcir
81CaI chaDmtt and OppOrtunity in QOnlribu1ina 10 ~u;'"llknt.l in the OIher senioes, rq>rC$mtS an ClI-
1M ~ edl.Q(ion of ow underp'aduales. ~ crcise in the Sludy and ..."filin, of military history
number of Sludmts majorin& in history is Ie!.5 siI· unique: in !COpe and voIu~ of publication.
niflCant lhan 1M number we can altract or per. The ..-alut of offtcial history 10 lhe sm-ices a.. I
!.WIde 10 take a pack.,: of inlffrdated rouna Ihinl, obvious-nOl only a IXlicaI, operational,
thillll'e ti'lcm a!iC1l§c of 1M paoiI and traditions of and logistical m;ord, bUI an ;nsututional ~
our Ci\,tinlion. 1$ ...-eU 1$ a grasp of how .soc1C'l1CS 1$ ...d, perhaps fulmlinS the rok of the sJa"'C who
and InMilUIlOns cllangc- over IUTIIe. Conn..;" Ihe rode in lriumphal march UI the chariot bdtind the
preparallOli for it, and 1M rtSO/ution or avoidance Roman general, ... hispennl It reminder of frailty
of II i~ part of lhal Slory, and win lit far inlo the and monahly. liS value to Ihe larger hislorical
fUlure. FunhcmlO~. Ihe Army's d«ision 10 en- communily is equally &1e.a1. The U.S. Army in
rourage Ihe fulrillrrlC1l1 of ROTC mililary hiscory World War II scrits of volumes, the gr«n books,
objCC11"e5 ... he\'lC'oer pOSSible Ihrough history became basic references and pOints of departure
dcpanmml COlIna hl$ giYal uni~y_baicd t for future hislotiam. As the late Arthur Marder
hi510rians the dIant:t to pia) an important role in demonstrated so efffC\i\"dy in his magisttrial series
the bI$o(: educahon of appro.wnaldy cighly·n..'t on lhe Ro~-al Na..y in World War I, off.:ial
peKt1It of nd1 rears induc:tion of lIN' second hl$loOes cannot be lhe futa! word on their subject.
licutmanll. If "ie 111 UllM'f'Slty titpartmmts can No history of ttnI e-"nI" can ever Ix futal $imply
eqUip future CJlt«nS and offurs ...-jth IIIOK x- bcause each ~ion bnnas lIN' PtISp«I~ to
cul1lle and JOphisticated perceptions of lhe impaa lIS contanplation of lhe pasc. BUI official
of war and military mSlitulions UpOll our pasc,_ histQrWH lay the foundatton for ..'ha:l will follow.
....tlllt.a ..'t rlOI only ~ wen professionally but will Their acnss 10 docummts, fCiCarch and ...ming
h:t.\'e in tM prOCeSS made a signifICant rontribution time umrammeled by faculty oommillees and
10 the nwntenancc of an educated cilizenry. a c1amorou§ undergraduates, lIS well 1$ their
democl1llic .socj(1y's Sill ... qUQ non. freedom from publCihCTll' presM1TCS 10 make the
Christmas book marktt, aU combine 10 pul than
The Offldal Face
in a posilion no acadcnuc hIStorian can ever hope
If I ha..-e u ....ed unt~ last the third, Ot offICIal. 10 h3"~ (and no ..nter of pOp history could en·
face o f mibtary htSlOry, II is nOl becau§C I value II dure). For allthcst rea5OI1$ I pcnonally hope lhat
Ie\Ii but bcguse I fed a great.tt d!fr~ about lhe Cenler's volumes on Vietnam reach the public
dOCu!i>llll it. Popular hIStory I lnow bcause I in tune 10 pm-"nI1 the Ic&cnd. m)1h . and ILaJf-
ather use It or Iry to combat liS innumce on tNlhs s-..1rlin& about lhal SlJbj«t from hardening
MOOmI$, and my profcWorull home is In the Iat- intO orthodoxy mshnned forevcr 111 textbooks. aD
dnnit: hislorical oommurnty. Bul lhe: ...wld of om- \00 oflen monumenlS of inaoruracy cle-.-erly dis-
eta! history is ont Ihal. unt~ =mtry, I vjcy,'ed guised I!i m-caIed Truth.
from the outSO(k The unique positlOtl of ofrlClal historians brin&s
Ofrtaally spomorcd hi51onc:al Sludy of war and it~ problems. BrigadlCT' General Sir James Ed,
military inSlitutiom hl$ had, in one sm-;e, a more monds, the pnncipal author of Ihe British World
st!'a1&hlfor....ard CaK'Cl" Ihan ilS ocademlc rou~n. War I Western Front volurr\CS, llJlIduaUy found
Born 10 iC ..... e a hl&hly specifIC n«d, it hl$ con- him.o;elf dra"l1 inlO Ihe pOSItion of defending

9
Douglas Hail against what lloyd Georse and f"",hle$ of till: mlbtlU'}' lustorian '" an academic:
CbwchiU .... er~ wo)'in& III thcir ~. Sana in· dcpartmem. One way to emphWc the ''ttY COIl-
silk til(: machine: briIlp til(: danger of becomina an siderable amount that ....~ IlII hav.: in comroon,
ad'lOCllle for llus or that pas! policy or pmonaJny, I"IIIher than aocmtuale differences that arise front
or aIIrnwinly fmdmg ocle5df in a po5itlOll wherr diff«enl rircumSUlnttS, is 10 prOmOte Iht most
om ~ loki "here IS cunene docmJ1e, validate il vi&OJOu~ possible t~changc of views. ~ Army's
historically," a dangerous situation for historian visitin& chairs in military history, togcthCT with
and in§lilulion alike. And this brings me to I poinl I~ of the ocher stT'\~, art a major contribu-
lila! is 001 only. prC:Snl1 \!OflI;ImI but, in lilY view tion 10 Ihis. So ....ould be: an effort to.,:t ICIIdcrnic
II Ieau, of &teal 5i&nifllClllCr for Iii(: fUILIJ'e. miliIary historians and official hi§lorians tott'llm-
JU§! lI$ many of his univtT5ity brtlhml h.av.: In pmodic symposia. The >~ suo;mful na>lII
doubu aboul 1M acaderru<: military histonan, the symposium held ~ l"'O)'ears at AnnapolU; and
academic military hl§lonan in tum is aU tOO oflen its counterpart at Colorado Springs come to mmd.
!CqlIicaI about the viability of Iinkinj the adjectiv.: The Center of M~ilary History's V~nam sympo-
"offICial" ...ilh the noun "histOl')'." To this some $Ium is an ~!UU11p1e of tht exchanpo of _ on a
o ffICial hl$loriaru will 0IXlISi0nalIy 1'('10" in "'"OId!; particular issut. PCThap$ till: Cenler could arranre
that lTIi&hl bee: M1nunariud Ihus: "If you ~ncw similar mcdinp In a more smeraI and pmodio:
..'Ila! we lnow, you'd lnow how "'TOIII you IK, ..... y. The more members of till: communi!) of
bul we cart'l leU you what ...-e lnow," ~ prob- milillU'}' historian$ kno ... one anothCT and one
Imts and pressurcs of WIlt"'& history as servanlS o f another's work, the scrongcr Iht disc1pl~ of
pemmml art both rcal and ~at. lI$ art the dif· milillU'}' history ...ill b\:,

AT THE CENTER

K«I;m T a lk J ohnson Ch;lir

ProfCMOl" Joh n Kerpn, Senior Lettum- III War Or. Graham A, CQSm;ts of the CmICT'S
SIlKIJe5 31 lhe lI.o~'II Milnary Acadmly at Sand· Soolllcw AsIa Branch Iw been namo:d Ibrald
hUf$I and author of T1w F~ of &mlt and Six Keilh Johnson Profewx of Military Ihstory II the
AmI/a In Nomwnd)', spoh 1Il April bee:fore a U.S . Army Ml~tlU'}' History Institute in Carlisle,
gathering of uneer staff and guests on lhe Brilish PCflMylvania. Dr Cosmas. aulhor of An Army
experience '" mi~tlU'}' history educatIOn. lI is talk for Enlpll"e: TM Umltd Slales Army In Iitt Span_
"'7Ii Iii(: fll'St in ~ Army Historian Spc:akrn' i.sIt Amtnwn Wur and ochn works. came 10 the
Series. a pI'OII'3m ftaturUl, wdl-known academies Cmler'S historical staff front 1111: MII'U"IC Corps'
from ocher ooumncs Dr , K«pn is currmtly I Ih,.ory and Mu!latfm Dt>lsion III 1m. HIS ....ard
'isotmg fetlo ..., II Prin..:l:lon Uni"et'$Ily, mark! Ihe first lunc • ao'l,'t1l1T1Cf1t hl$l()l'W1 has
been named to Ihe John§Oll chlW". Dr. Cosrnas
B~ lI Presenl atl o n takr<i up his rI(' .... p!XIth .. July, and will ,"urn to
In Mardi , W~1i.un G. Bell, a CmtCT historian the Center in July 19115.
and aUlharily 00 the American West, made I en-
SeRlllion 10 the CmICT of 1"'"Cllt~1 linuted edi-
Bry.nt ~ctllre
lion prints front his pcnooal ooDec:!ion The
pnnls, ....hich ha\'e bce:oome part o f 1111: Anny Art Dr . William Cullen Bryan l J[ prtKflted an il·
CoilectJOO, rtpl"l'Senl Ihe ""orh of Fn:derick lustrated lectur~ entitled, "WCSI Point , Cradle of
Remington, Charles Shr~l, Frank Tenney Ille tl udson River School of Painling, .. 10 tilt staff
John§Oll, Frantis lIeIugureau, and ocher paintrn and guests of 1111: Center in FebrulU'}'. Dr. Bryant,
o f frOlllier Ihcma. Mr BdI ,""ed 01'1 Man:h 10 a ~I of Ike- poet of Ihe S;I/TIC name, is
.fter h;I>'in& rompIcIed 0_ forty yean In JO"eI1" author 01 a nUtflN of ... orb on Bryant's hr~ and
ment ~, aImosI IMeC' Ikcadcs of wtudt were "''Or\., >C\C1"lII "1, ... h deal ..."h his innucncc on
"uh lhe Center. A~m

TIt, ARMY HISTORlAN

PROfESSIONAL READING

Ten Important Books

SfraJegic T1lOlIghl

7Jtr Army Hi'iIO""" romin~ heK in.mes of bibliograpbieal <'S15IIys on various

aspec!5 of ntilnary hiSlO<)' "-;111 an cQmina(ion of (ttl cL1ssics on SlI'8ltgy.

Thcr~ an: almost as many definitions of suategy an anny in Ihe r!Cld. in other words, is military
as there lIave been writers on strategy. By lhe strategy; operations involve actually putting the
eighteenth ~n!Ury. lhe original Greek strrlll'gia, or anny in tile Held. Mililary operalions are tile link
JI'!'lcraWlip, had COrm' 10 ~ calkd Ihe ~~ of between military strategy and military locli€$, the
military nxwemelll OUt of cannon shO!. ClausewilZ body of ideas for actual engagement. (Lid~U Hart
defined Slralcgy as "the an of the mlplo)1Tlml of drew the line betw«n military strate&)' and tactics
battles as a means 10 gain the object of war," and at actual fighting. and Mahan plao:d it at "con -
von Moltke Ihe Elder vieoA-"ed il Wi "Ihe practical tact." Other thinken on tile topic: have $Ought to
adaptation of tile means placed al the gmcral's differenliate betweoert tM various levels of military
disposal W Ihe 3uaimnenl of Ihe objm in view," Slralegy. opcralions, and tactics with SUl.:h 00II-
In Ihe pas! cnl1ury. the lcnn has been used freely «pts as "grand lactics" and "opcralional
withOUI SlIict definition. and there has been a stralcgy. ") Readers withOUI a command of these
lendcl10' 10 inlfflllingie concepts of policy and distinctions bt'1wten $Irate&)' and Ihe other aspects
snaltg)' and of $Iraleg)' and tactics. A ro:«"lll pro- of national security affairs will rUld themselves
liferation of books pUrpOning co be strategic in sinking in a """Iter of words as they approach the
emphasis has added 10 Ihe confusion. The inclu- literalUrt' on this subject.
sion of the word "swuegy" in a title does not Reading time is a sharply limited commodilY.
nettMaJily mean Il1al the ....ork has anything to do and the reading of a serious book is always a ma_
"';111 $I,alegy. Whm "Tilers speak of Slral~gy, they jor undenaking. Bernard Brodie recognizro this in
often mean $Offit'1hing quite different. Lackinl in ~ng the following queslion: "Is the reading of
the Iiterau,lrt' m clear distinctions bt'1"'"«11 policy, this book at this time wonh mort to me than Ihe
strateg)'. mililary strategy, operation$, and tactics. reading of any OIher works thiLl I could read atlhe
Readen would Ix better ~ were: thm: an same time?" Readers could begin with the collec-
agtW oonccptual frnmework of tile comPOM11tS tion of CMa~ ediled by Edward M . Earle. Mok~rs
of national security affairs they oould II$e 10 win- oj Mod~", Sirotegy: MilillUy Thought jrom
now ou! the chaff from the grain <U they read on Mochiawlli 10 Hitkr (Prinmon : Prinmon
strategy. Uni'~IY Press. 1943). a book nOi since surpassed
Beginning at the hi£hest level of national !Itt\I- by a work of its type, now being revised. The
rity affairs there is policy, quite simply the CJ!pl'C$- foUo",;ng works by original thinkers o ffer a repre-
sinn of a nat ion's or a coalition of nations' goom in scntali\'C sampling of the ITIO$l impOrtant cont,;-
relation 10 a.her nations or groups in peaoe or war. butions to the lilerallJrt.
SlrTlII.'gy is a p/(m for using the aggregate of ana- I. Sun TlU. T1rt An of w",. TnsmLued by Samuel
lion's or coaIition's power-political. economic, 8. Griffith. london: Ollford Univmity Pr=,
J)Sy.:hologicai. and military-to ochie<.'e. in peaoe
or war, the ends of policy. (This level has often 2. "'3
Machiavdli, Nio:oIo. ArT of W",. Rev. ed. of tbe
bent called "grand strategy.") Mililruy strolegy is
Ellis Farruworth ,rans. Indianapolis.; Babbs-
McrriD, I%S.
bUI one componenl of strategy. Ihat involving l. Jomini. Antoine H(11ri. ~ An of w",.
anned forces. and oonstilules a plan 10 dC'ploy and Trarulated by G.H. MendeU . Philaddphia'
appl)' a nation's or coaIilion's military instrument Lippincott. t862.
,n Ihe funherancc: of policy. Military OperotiollS 4. Oa,"",,'iLl, Carl >'00. On W",. Edited and
,ramJated by MX:hael Howard and Pt1et' parft .
are the actual usc of lhe military compollCTIt. when
Princeton: Princeton Uni\'Cflily Pr=. t976.
the military strategy is put into opcralion, much as S. Mahan. AUm:I ~. TM 1'lfIwtl~ of Sta
diplomacy is the operational aspect of the exlernal Po~ Upon Hil'1(1fy. J6IJ()...178J. lIosIon:
poblical compollCTII of stralegy. The plan 10 put lillI<. IIrown, tOO.

"
6. Doolin, Gullio. 17w Command oj 1M A.... stndq)' "'" frustndo:d by the fDm$ of a man who
T"",!Ja(ed by Dioo Fman. I'Ic:w Y(K"k: was profoundly mfluenced by Sun Tw: Mao Tse.
Coward M..--C:aan. 1942. (Rrpnllled by lhe Of· tIInl. In lhe West, ahhough a summary of Th~ Art
flCl: Ilf AU" fmtt HISI(K)'. Wallllngl<MI. J98l.1 0/ War had betn tr3J1$lalo:d inlO French in 1m,
7. Wd<kIl fUn. ~ II StllOl'V l.c>ndcMo' Fobn a: Sun Tzu "lIS bt1~ lnDV>"I\ PerhUflS exposurc til his
Fabc-r. J~
8 Mao TK--Iul\i ("tao ~. Sftn:rtd MWIOTY lhou&hl COUld havc COITCCled the obs<:urity. 10
Knrongs IlJ M/JO T.'WIII Pd.,,: FI>mII' most, of CaU_llt'S ideas. Liddell Han had
~Prn.\.I%6 a1uady formulaled hIS nl;\JOf $ll'3legio:: prmc:iples
9. ll<auf.... And~. An Inlfod"mon 10 S"lII'V. b)' lhe: tlllX he enCOlJn1ered Sun Tzu's ....ork in
Tnwlalc<I by R. H. Barry. l.ondoo: Fabtr dr.
1927 and found that il l111rIored his O"lllhougJilS
Fabc-r. 1\l6j_
10 8r00.b:. Brmard, SI"rv-'" ,''' MiJrW AI'", 2nd on Ihe indirCCl approach in stl'3ltl)' and laCIIC!. In
cd. Prinmlln: I>rirn'too UniYffSllY Pms. Arncric<I, the essa)'~ in Ml1k~ 0/ Modem Srrrll-
tV'. pubhsho:d almost 1,,'0 ~ars after Pearl
""
That Sun Tzu "'TOle hIS Art 0/ Wor in lhe
Harbor. made no mention of Sun Tzu. After the.
~iII'1IIlCC of Griffilh'~ e,.o;eUenl lran$lar:ion from
fllunh o;emury D.C. docs nOl dimmish the flesh- Ihe Chillr..c in 1963, ho"evCf, TIwo An 0/ Wor
ness of his irU&&h' mto the principles of $Ual~. became p.vt of Amman staff coIqe rCOldint
Amonllhll\kcn o f Ihe pas! (lCThUflS only Cause· listl, and has ~ m.ainlaino:d a place of
"'liZ is comparable:, and t:va1 Ihal ~ccmh­ pronullClltt_
ctnlUry lummary i!; man: druo:d lhan Sun Tzu, The period duril\i "h",h Sun Tzu "'role ....as
Mhou&h Causewitz wroIe mon: lhan IWO lhou- one: Ul "hoch feudal ,,-arran in ChUla, condUcted
sand years later. Unlike I1'IOSI of the el.aMical Cr«k aceordin, 10 a ,eneraUy a.:CCpled code and oflen
and Roman "'TUeT'S of ~inJ Wc:stl."m "'it h f~' usu..lncs. "as ,hanllnl into confbcu
upmerICC, Sun Tzu dKi nOl write "'lih a primary bet,,~n con!o:ripled antl~ C'lnplo)'ing ~
inlere§! in the dabonlion of invol,'o:d stratejll:ll\S num~ of troops ;uuI ft'fociou~ 'lokncc. The
or 111 superfICial and lransitory techniques. He de. fifle-enlh4.-emury hal) in "hieh Machiavelli "TOle
vc:1opo:d instead a s)"5lmlal.ic traliK on stral~ 10 "''as lhe' '\Cell<" of almost bloodlc:s$ campal&J\i he_
gu.x rulm and ....erals. For $lralq)' and mililary Iw~n nl<:rccnary forces_ Machia,'elli was oon·
$lraltl)'. the thlJt«n ~ e:o;.sa)'l III TM An 0/ Imll'lOOUS of lhe combat.mlS 111 batlles sum as
",or an far more useful lhan the wntings of a thai at 7..a,gonar.l. "here "none "as k~1ed e~­
Thucydidcs or a Caesar int Lodo>;""O dqh Obiw. and he 10000her "'llh
MO<2I Jlr=glh anoJ IfIl<1l«tuaJ r"""hy, Sun Tzu 1"'0 of hlS men "as lhrown from hi5 horse and sur·
be);e~. "'ne decisive: in "ar. If a straiti)' applied focato:d in the mud."' War "''as 100 ,'aluablc a
thc:so,o properly. "ar could be ",-a,ed "lIh eenam.y mtlhod of statecraft iO to ~ "awo:d.
of SU~. In lmpielllentini his strll~, the victor "Iachia,'elli lias betn • ..ned 11M: flt5l modem
frustralo:d hl$ mnny's plans and broke up hi!; mihlaJ')' thmker, and hIS Artt' della GUi'r1rl becanI<:
a1liallces. erc:alo:d clc:a,'lI#S in hi!; OPponrrll'S a militaJ')' classIC m the WN. The: focus of its aI·
rankl. nunuml subversjon, and broualn aU ~­ lenllon .. nOI on mililary 51rategy alone. but olllhe
sources sIIon of main forec to bear 10 isolale and nalun: of ... ar _ HIS ,-omribulion to strllleg)' "'as 111
~ hLm, breakmg hIS wiD 10 resist "To hIS recogn'tlon Ihill "ar i5 a br.tndl of pabllCS, and
subdue lhe cr\CI11y withom fighting;' Sun Tzu his ,j,c,. lh;lt a ciliu-n anny I"rthers .. st;lte'~ policy
hdd, "'is lhe ~ of r,i;iD," Only "'hen Ihcsoe betler than d~ a mer~nary artilY. Ik !lied to do
Il1C1hods fwlcd 10 o>~rrome lhe enemy "''as thm: for militM) aff;ur; in Jus AfT 0/ War "hat he did
recotIlY 10 am'Ie'd fortt, "'lIh a vie¥. Iowan:! for .:inl arfai ... in TIw- PnnC"r and DlSIroI<rses.
achieVIng vic!ory in Ihe shMest p<KSible: nnW: and M;>o;hJa,elli u~ a diaJoau.e bet,,'CCI\ Ihree Floren-
• the Ic:a<.t poMible: CO>l VI ha and CUM. une anstOCral~ to I"'~nt Ihe Roman III111Je$ oflhr
Sun T~u'$ leao::hinjp wen: arC3lly influential m Rc-pubJi.: and early fmpm: .... powwn& lhe bcsJ
J~ mililary Ihoupl1 Ihroudt World Will II. PDI-"bk: nuJilaJ') orpnil.ation, He "'as nOl the f\J$l
bUl nOJ .. much in J3p;t1\= rruhlary practice. Rffi~e thll1~'" to cor>ecm hllllSClf "ilh
"They ignoml his prllCCpts more of1m lhan lhey m~ltan mallm, of COUnt, but he was the first 10
followed lhem Pearl Harbor, a1th()\ldt a 100al rai..: Ihe \ubj«l to a Ic:>d from ",hieh tlw:omical
stralfP; tlJJlfflo, produ.:ed onJ) a mommlar) mili anal)'iis of "'" ,ould 1"'0JI".:s.s. C1aUse"'il~ "ould
tary achanlaae and, ,n cT)">l.illizu1g Ihe "iU 0 1 the bter agr~ ""111 \\;lChi;J.'elli on 1m Ilalian', basic
Ammc:an P«lPIc:, "''as aI "ariancc: "'~Ih Sun T .-u'~ p('inl of (!.qw:1l'.--lhe nct"d 10 subordinalC any
emphasis on Ihe fundamcmal unpan.ancc of anal) 'ID "fnlq:y to a '-vrra.... concept of the
IIlOI"lIc: in war. In Ollna, .an inflexible: Jap;uw:sc: n;lture o f "ar,

n~ ARoIIY HfSJVRJAN
 Antoine Hrnti Jonuni's Art of Will'" rould hi'll: =dImt COmpanjon _ys by Howard, Paret: ,
bm1 ..Tinm by Napoleon had he takm the tm. and Brodie, and I. read"" JUide by Brodie, wiD
But Napoicon left no treali$e So:Uinll down his u$htt the K1'ious reader intO an intdleaual world
stllUepc roncqllS aside from his tent "ma."<irm." far beyond the elichCs that are all that many know
and thex ..-ere.auaD)' "'Tinm by someone else. II of C'btuse..lt,t', work
was left for Jornuti, I 5 ..1S5 atnetaI ...·ho sm'td on Until the ad~mt of the nuclear a,e, Amrrica's
Napoleon's and Nq's staITs, to distiD the doc- sianiflcant contributions to warfan: wert IarFfy in
trines of military stralegy from the Emperor's the f",1ds of tactics and t~hnology, rathtt than
campa&p. Jomini introduced the chan!cleris- $Iratc&y. Alfn!d Tha~ Mahan "'1$ ptThapS the
tically modem, $)'$lnnalic Sludy of ..... in the only stralepc thtotist of intem.ll.ionaI $latun: pro-
fonn it has ro:t~ 1:\'0:< sintt, He abo p •..: the dlKl:d in nmetec-nth<mtury America. Ukc
rullClet:ruh et:IUUry I working definition of military Jommi, Adnural Mahan bclie>l:d that Slr.llc&y
51ra1Ci)' by upandll'lll ;t beyond its limited muS! make ils chief objeo:ti\'e the organi«d forces
ti&hcOltrlth«nlllry ~min& to sianify "Ihe an of of the enemy. Ik)Und I'\a.-a! theory and history,
bru\&l'1lllhe 11nIe5t pan of the f()l'a:S of an army Mahan 's I'lflum« ofSN Po __ hdpni ~ the
110 beaTl upon lhe Ifllpanant POll'lt of the theato:< imperial poIic1e:$ of Gmnany and Japan, con·
of "oar, or of a WOe of operalions." Jomini's ftnn<:d An'e.... pOlicy, and helped W1 the United
wmi~ had an unponant mnumce upon States on an imperial course of its own in the
American mililary thoughl Illrouah and beyond Caribbt-an and the PacifIC.
1M C"il War, II u!o:d 10 ~ said lhal Civil War As the command of the ~ was fundammtallo
Jenmtls went into iMllle "lth sword in on.e hand Mahan's thought, command of the air was fun-
and copy of Jomini in the Olliff. damental to Douhet's. As an Italian anillcry of-
C'Llusevolt1., the JPaflI of ninettenth<enlUry stra- fom in 1909, Douhet bepn thinkina seriously
tegIC thou&hl. had I profound dfea upon Euro- about the impact of at.n:T1IfI upon ....arfan:. ~
pean rruldary thlllkinil throu&h WoOd War II, odca$ he first published in 1921 as Commtmd oftM
While Jomini aimed 10 uplain I r.u.ional mtthod Air ..-ere I reat:tion 10 the II'Iterminable devastation
for "'mnlllil banlc!;, C1allSelOltZ dcl~ed intO the o f a war fought from flJ(ed pOOtiollS, especially the
ba$i(: ruuurc of war, "II was my amb~ion," he bloody stalemate Oft the Austro-Italian front.
"Toto:. "to ..Tite a book thai ""OII1d not be fOl'JOl· Much as ·'tank thinkers" of the 1920i and 19JOs
1m afttt 1""0 or th= )'C3f$, and thai pOSSibly 5OU.&httO ~ dd"m$I\'c lines and btin& aboul a
m'lllll be pICked up mort than once by those .. ho quick dtruion, Douhet sou$ht to jump over lines
rrughl ~ ;nt(fC$\td in the subjea.'· Unfonunately, to cities, indu51rial centers, and marshaUi", areas.
he SlIt.'t'«ded beyond his wildest ima&ininas. The /isled Enahsh tramLatlOrl, not an especially
Oau_lt1. is lno ..-n of by all, bul few kll(J"" aood one but the only one 1.-aiJaNe. is an ex-
ClaUltlOlt1., Ho: held that ....'N IS an act of VIOImoe panded '"Cf$IOn under the IItle of his ori&inaIl921
to 1\. utmO$! bounds," and that the aut! of warfart essay. Land forces ,,'tTe relegated to defensive
is tile Ikstruction of tile entttIy', armed forces, Sut roles only, and the air arm Wa$ seen a$the sole o f·
he qualified thIS by sa);", that "tile poIitic:al ob- fmY\..: arm. on.e ,,'hich .."OU1d shatter civilian
jea ... the 0fi&tnaI mtM;'l: of tile "''N, should ~ morale and btealt the mm1y nation's ..lUto n:sist.
tile 51andard for determinin.& Ihe 11m of the The fll'lal edition included an essay on '"The War
nul,tW')' force and abo the amount of eITon to ~ of 19-," '" ..'hlCh German air forces defeated
made" In Olliff words, military strategy 5hould france and Beiliui'll ..ithln a few days.
only btin& fOl'l% to beaT to funhcr the policy " is ~ qllCSlion of Dou.het'li inllumtt Oft subse-
doi&ned to impimlmt, and policy should not ~ qumt Slralqic thinkinll has bcm hotly ~ed by
made subservimt to military S!llUegy. Clausevol\J;" Kholars. Cenamly he had an effed upon German
d,sciples, hOwel'Cf, clu", to his vivid leadinll pre"'ar thll'lkll'l& ami fed British and fn:nch fcan
phl'tie5 and nti5scd (Of disrqardcd) his qualifyinJ of mao;sj,'c air attllCks qainst civilian targets. It
clau'iCS. In ptlDllin& lhe ..-ar dttt the failure of the flIIIY be I nustake 10 hold, as some historians ha'll:,
Schbeffen Plan to Khic>..: a quick victory in 1914, th. bo:au~ a fun EII&Iish IramLation did not ap-
th~ Germans discarded ClauiCWit1.'s ITIO$I ba$ic pear unt~ ]~2, Oouhet had ~ule Of no inll~
idea that the pobtical md muS! nOl ~ dominaled in the Enlllish·spcaJ;inllwor\d. A translation of his
by the military obja:tl'll:. But hIS "'ntllli Imt "stlf 192] essay was 1"aiJable at the U.S. Army's Air
10 $UCh misintrrpmalion by expoundin& his Stnicr T.aical School as carly as 192J, and ex·
theory in I ....y tOO .~f1ICt and involved for most tracts of his work ..-ere cimalated there in the eu1y
concrete· minded soldlttS to follow. 0.. WIlT is not 19.1Oi. Douhet's idea of the absolute n«USity for
easy IIOUlII, but the edition Listed, which in!:ludes an air ann as a sepanue and independent foroe Wa$
~ wllOSt' tllTle would come Hill conuibution was fadures 10 _ IIIe e)[\cm to .... h1Ch Ihc:se ba5ic:
in sU'alq;y and mi1itary Slralq)', and he IIC'Cd IlOl stJlllcp: principles apply.
~ aIvollys been correa un ~lC$to!lave becn Mao Tst-Iu!l& bdon&s chronolop:ally III tillS

-.-
.flCalll. Intkcd, World WI1 \I would prove poinl. His principal ....orks on problmls of war and
almost all of hili spcoflC I'~ions to ha~e been Slrateg)' "en:: ",linen in the ble 19305, afler LKideD
Ilan had produr;«ltlle main body of his stralegic
Basil H LiddeD Hart ...-as IlOl a smcrai; lie fOR: and tacticalthcooes. Mao formubled his strategic
only to the rank of captain in the British army. Sui idc:l5 in the nul!cu of the protlXlcd Otlnesc CIvil
German GcneraIs Guderian and Romrnd boih and Sino-Japane!C Wars. His basic advitc on
caJkd thnnsclves hill pupils. l.idddI Han had the mibtary stT3\egy was that ... hen Slrongc:r, a forte
frusullIion of 5C'cing his ideas i&nored in his own must allack with fuD strenglh and brinllthe \\'ar to
country, but enthusiaSli.:ally embraced in other a quick solution. But when ",taker, a force must
countries, panicularty by mcmia of Britain. It avoid dccisr.'e ~tlc and wtar doYon the CfIC'fIly's
"''35 a fruslIlIIion he sham! wilh other Bntish ... i11 to ...in throuah the employmctu of aD the
miliIary thinkers and ~fOl'TTllrni, particularly o;tllllegic components, not Just military means. II
J .F.C. Fullct. In the intmo¥ )UIS. LiddcU Han "'as a strategy used ...,th success by Ihe Amerit:a.u
"''as kno..n princIpally lIS a leadinl exponent of the qainst th~ Hnush in 1180-81 and. to American
use of tank and air poWCT. li~e Doohet's, LiddeU tha,erin, by America" foes laiC!'. The ~ text
Han's idQos \'i~ a TUCtion 10 the W3$1e and in· of Mao's works contllnS word ·for·... ord citllllDll$
dcci5i,'mft!! of Slalic ...lIrfare in Worid WI1 I, in from Sun T:cu , and Mao UL fXl 'IUIl'IS up that
his cz;c the t!8Fly of the Sornme in 1916. The master SlratcgiSl'S tcac:hin~ in the dcfmition he
hallmark of his Slralcp: thmkml is Ihe "indirect Jives to guerrilla tactics: "avoidinl Slrenglh and
approach," a melhod he found cl05dy ~latcd to strikinl at ... cakncss." Mao's strategy and IlIICIa
aD problmls of the innutnCC of mind upon art embodied in his four Weans: I) When the
nund-the ITI()Sl influnuial factor in hu/'IWI cnern~ adVlUlCcs, we retreat: 2) ...·hen the enemy
histOl')'. ''The mdirect approach," wrote LiddeD halts, "''e har~: Jj ...1lcn the enemy seeks to aVOId
han, "is as fundamenlalto lhe realm of pobta as b;\ltlc. "'e ;\Ita.:l, 4) .... hen tile enemy retreal$. ""C
to the ~a1m of st~ ." The same is true in lactics, pursue. Mao's mi~tary Kkas and Ihl)l;e of his inter·
mifuary SlralCl)', and SlralCIY. IIoTilw,.:. pretcrs in partICUlar siluatioll$, lOCh as GcnmlI
LidddI Han's imrnerw: bfetune bibJiovaphy is Ciap, ha,'e had an in<:aIcul:lblc effm upon the
distilled iJI his Sitrllrgy. in ... hi.:h he traces the sue· course of ...ur\d hlRory. Iff ill the rare example: of
(le§$ of lhe indirect approach (or railu~ throoah a $Ira1cp: thmlC!' ... hose id_ hal'c been dMdy
ignonna the pnncipk) from the Gr«k war1 and 5I.lC'CC5Sfully fo\lov.'Cd.
through World War II. The cmphasi$ is on mili· Among the litsl 10 suff.... the conscquenets of
tary SlratCIY. but his chapten on stralegic thcory Mao's stratqil: lhought asslduOU5ly applied wcrr
and the IarJCf form o f §lratCIY t karly otJlhnc 1M the hcrv.:h_ Gtncrai Andn: Beauf~ ...ilncacd II
links bct"'llrn polic), SlraltJY. mi1iIary $l.IlIICIY, doR hand his country's defcal and OOtUpaliool 11'1
and lacta. He saw lhe urn of SlralCIY in the di5- 1940 and the los. of Frrn<:h lndochma, and he
rove!}' and I'icrcing of the Of)!X/SinIlOvemmmt's COlTll1'l:tnded french forces for the Suez inl"""""'"
Athillc5' heel. and of mililary strategy in Ihe tion in 19S6. a nulitary success but Slrategic and
pmctralion of a think in lhe opposing forte's ar· policy dcfe:u Be wrott his inrrodu<'flOll 11'1 1963,
mor. To stnke ...ith 1M stlOllteSt cffm, ~ must shool) alter the Fn:n.:h abandonment of AJceria.
strike at weakness. UddcU Han's "OOIlC'mtlllled Beauln: sa,. in C\'eT)' defeat ~ ovcnidinS 0001'
~ of strategy" boils down to eilhl COIItUc mon f:lClor. In cxh alS/:, the ...inner had a strategy
maxirm. ~ p05nive and t ...'O ~til'e: \) Adjust and the 105cr did oot Beaufre saw himsdf livinl in
your end to your mearu;; 2) keep your obJ«t a pmod in ",hich was unfoidinlOI'lC oflhe grcal.est
always in nund; 3) thOO!lC Ihe line (or CCI\JBe) of upheavals in human hl$lory ~ntt the f..n of ROI1'lI:':
Ica$t upmllion: 4) o.pIo.. the ~ of Ica$t he pont~~'Cd ... OrkI poIitu as a start confronta·
~; ~) take a hnc of operac1Of1 wlud! offro tion bct"'llrn a ruthless East. powW", a stralCIY,
a1to:rn;\lM objl'ail'e~. 6) cn~re thll both pLon:)r)d and a Wcst WIthout one. For aIIlhat., he carries his
dispositions arc lIc~b1c aIkl ad~abk' 10 tircum· ~ader on a faKinatina intellectual journey wilh
stanc:es; 7) do not throw your "'("411 into a stroke flI3Ihnnati.:.ll progression, sharply dl1llwina 1M
whils!. your OppOnent IS Oll~: 8) do IlOl ~ lines bct"CIm "olKy, §ll1IIltEY, and opnlIIlORS. He
an all.:1; aIont the same I":e (or m the: ~ form) '\01'" lI"ey-, a.' a tlllle pla)'Cd in two keys:: "direct
aft .... ~ hill fl1led. On<: nom! D(,1y look III thIS cen· <tBlegy," in "'' ' ,,1'1force is the essential factor;
tury's m05I <peCI.IIICUW "11m.,..,. SU<XC5SC'I and and "lI1dJm;! 'II11II1r:gy." in whICh fom: rcc'Cd~ in.

" 111, ARMY IfISTORJAN

to the ba<:kamund and its place is taken by made tile defmi!i~ stalement for noclear' deter-
psychology and piannintl. 'IlIete is no fuuiness of rCI\CI:. He saw in Ihe frightening potential of
thought h~, although American re.ders may noclear' arms a need to stan from 5CraIch with
ha~ diffICUlty with his Cartesian approach. The oompletcly fK'W str.degil: ideas, to fashion a logical
\anguagt' and logic arc typically Gallic, even in stTlllegy acoording to the ~uimnents o f the time.
translation. For Brodie, effective defense against nuclear at-
The "greal def~ <kbate" on strategy in the tack was practically impossible, and he ruled 001
19505 inllQlved questions of massi~ retaliation preventive and pIllCITlptive war. M8$$i~ Ittalia-
ve= f1exibk response and baIaN;ed forces lI$ 0p- tion was justified in case of an attack on NATO
posed to dependence upOn nuclear detemnt, with countries or the United Sillies, but was foolish in
attending QUestions such lIS whether noc~ war ~nse 10 local aagressIon. Brodie saw the only
was conceivable and whether nuclear WQpOnS feasible stllllegy as one o f deterrmce. Debated by
oould be used short of alI-(lUt war. John L. Gad- stllllegil: thinken ever since its publication,
dis, in his Slfllltgin of Conlainmi'nt: A Crilirol Brodie's work remains a point of tkpanu", for all
Apprairal of PostIlVr Americwr NalionuJ S«urily subsequent thought on nuelear' stral.egy, and ar·
PoI~y (london: Oxford Uni-my Press, 1982), rived at conclusions to which stral.egists continue
su~ the ~Iulion of nalional stllllegy dur- 10 return.
ing this period. The dcbaJ.e was IlCVCI' more than Specialists "in find ~t from this list works
u:mporariJy resolved; it is resurr«1ed whenever they regard as indispensable to any collection of
defense budgets become light. str.d~ dassics, and non-speciali5ts may be in-
Brodie's Strategy in 1M MISSile Age is listed h~ timidated by its weight. Readers who btgin with a
nO! because of his positions in the debates and cona:ptual framework on the distinctions between
sub-debates. positions which ha~ boen in and out the compOnentS of national $e(:urity affail'$ will
of fashion since the publication of the flJ'Sl edition find the reading of bUI OIle of these books alone
of the book in 1959. but because no one has ap- more valuable than any number of textbooks, Iec-
proach<:d his stlUure as the pr«minent Ammcan lures or, for that: malter, bib1iographical essays
seminal thinker on strategy in the pOstwar era. In distilling the thoughls of the masters.
his landmark study, the most important book on
American strategy to appear in its decade, Brodie B.D.H .

D Plus 40 Years

This June 6 marks the fortieth anniversary of BrNko ut and PursuLt. by Martin Blumeruon.
D-Day, the beginning of the Allied drive across (1961,748 pp.)
western EurQpe. Part of the cighly-odd volumes of
The opmuions of the rll'St U.S. Anny from Juty
Ihe Cenler of Military HiS\OfY's U.S. Army in t thf"OUlll Scpt~mbcr to. 11144. and of the Third
World War IJ series. the foUo....-ing six books ",. U.S. Anny f.om A"3WI t th"",p. AUiUSI 31,
count European Thea1er events of I944-4S from t944. ~ rcooumed. Covered all' the "batlle of
the Normandy LandinjlS to V-E Day with accu- the h~OVo1." the Mollam oounterauack, the
racy and gnat detail. Period photos illustrate the reduction of Bma. and the libtralion of P..... ,
with the action rndinlt II the Siegfried Lint: and
texts. and maps pinpoint troop movements.
the Meuse Rivet".
Cross-OIannei AUlICk, by Gordon A. Harrison.
(1%1 [reprinted 1971), SI9 pp.) The W mQllC Campaign, by H.M. Cok. (19S0,
657 pp.)
This "otliume coven the prellXIe to the June 6 as-
!auk. lhe prcplralioos and dncuWoru of Slnllqy The campaign ..... in L.onainc from St-pI<mbcr
on bock lhe Allied and Gmnan sides from 194t t throoP. Dcambcr 18. 1944, is <kWkd, with the
to 11144, and dcs<:ribes the oombIu openuions of focus on the tactical opmuions of the Third Ar_
lhe FItS! U.S. Army in Nonnandy from D-Day to my and iu subordinale units. The L.onainc cam-
July I, t944. paip is treated as a "common campai&:n" in the

15
 nm.ary hislory <:<Iuca11Of1 of olran, and lh .. The I ,..... Offcn";'f, b) O:uks B. MacDonald.
work has been pul 10 much u$I: .... ..,fcrm..~ in (197.1. ~J2 pp,)
Armykhooh,
TM Slrtfritod t.- Campaitn t>y <"'IIar~ R
n.. "'.... '" "bool io ond.. roIo of III<
,\n~'",,,,, MI'... h,... Thud, ~h. Ninlh,
MacDonald. (196:1 , 670 PPJ ...J 10 , Ir/u(f cuent. hftM11h-.....ich tom·
rn~ 11>0 ~ ;on<! moA """","ul military
This voIu..., ld1s lh1' 110<)' of the fiN and "'mlh f",<lC 1he liMed Su.« tw fWf PIlI in lhe todd
U.s. ~ from lhe rlN """'~ ot lhe~. rhe rok of AIb<d amuos- l Lf$! c...tiin, F"n
man bordn 0<1 Stptlltbtt I I 10 111.1 timnan h~..m. and l>e.:onJ Bmllh-io rtCOIInI<:<I in 1IlI1.
rounltoOff..,y..., III lhe ArOmn.::tO .... llI:<:enlbd r....... dct.ooIlo puI lhe ,ok <.>f AmtrW IfTfUeS
16, I~. The rroUC" OOl of N.;hn\ and lhe ~I} In 11""""""', .,." III<: \t<>r)" uf 'a:1io:af air fon:e.
rl;llllllll in 1he Hutngno ~"""" ~ <k-o;nbo:d, and In <UI'l>O" ot lhe pound 1'001"',
a !«lion ~ <1<-',01<:<1 IoJ the Optl";I[o;)", "f the F"1n1
Allied ~ Anny in ()p<, ... _ \I"AAt I' Reader. interNed In 3<."'qulIlI1g any of lhesoe books
GAIlllO< in HoIand ,""""I.! lC\luN ordmn, II1Torm:uion from the
The Ardomne: Rauw of Iht 8u~. Iw 10,1 C<>Ie, Supenmcndcnl of Docull1ent'. Go'"C1lInlml Prim-
(1965. 7SO pp.) "'I Ollia, V. a..hlnglOn. IX 2(W02. For a com-
pkl~ ~" of CCnter pub\k;31ions a~ailablc for pur-
The Gmnan .."int.. "" 'm...,rr........ I,,,,,,
JUmp. 'h ....'C. "ril~ Adrrun~raI"·c Support Branch. U.S.
off on Da:ernbOf If). 111+1. u... ~ AIIo:d ~
~ n:ady 10 dln'wwl( the 001"" III thnr ...,. III
o\nn) ("O:Oler "r
\lJIll;uy HisI,"Y, Pulaski Biliiding
eu1)' January 1945 "cmm:d, (Onman pIan • .ond Room -12::4, 20 M~hu\Cm Avo:oue, NW,
AlliN ..,..,ion art tk;..-nt>m III lkIali \\ ,~hinglon. IX' 2OJ 14

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IIU1-CLASli .. AI.
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" _'ON DC >ell<
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