38

24TH MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION.

OPERATION DESERT STORM
AFTER ACTION REPORT

• ELMO
1111.11.111111111
AFZP-GTB 17 JUNE 1991

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD /

DESERT STORM

1. ATTACHED IS AFTER ACTION REPORT AS REQESTED IN XVIII

AIRBORNE CORPS MSG, SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD / STORM, DTD 291330.Z MAY 91.
2. IAW XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS MSG, SUBJECT: RESPONSE ON
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE, DTD 100700 Z MAY 91, THE
CONTENTS OF THIS AAR HAVE BEEN REVIEWED. THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE CONTENTS IS DOWNGRADED TO
UNCLASSIFIED.
3. POC IS MAJ MOORER, AV 870-5516.

04J44-
ROBBY A. NOONE DANIEL F
MAJ GS MAJ GS
DEPUTY G2 ASST G3 OPS
 74TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZE))
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD / OPERATION DESERT STORM
AFTER ACTION REPORT

TABLE a CONTENTS

fECTTON BACKGROUND
OPERATIONS OVERVIEW TAB A
"INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT" AND
TWO MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED
(Note: Fixed to XVIII ABN Corps 102100 Mar 91) TAB B
COMMANDING GENERAL'S CONCLUSIONS FOR
OPERATION DESERT STORM TAB C
•
TASK ORGANIZATION BY PHASE TAB D

$ECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TAB E
GI TAB F
G2 TAB G
G3 TAB H
G4 TAB I
GS TAB J
FSE TAB K
ADE TAB L
ADADO TAB M
ADSO TAB N
DIV aim TAB 0
PMO TAB P
DIV SURG TAB Q
ALO TAB R

pECTION III: DES= STORK QPERATION ORDER TAB S

24TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)

MG BARRY R. McCAFFREY
COMMANDING GENERAL
FIRST TO FIGHT
 1 24TH ID(M) ATTACK PURPOSE

JAS PART OF XVIII ABN CORPS, STRIKE SWIFTLY ANA DECISIVELY

300KM DEEP INTO THE ENEMY'S REAR AND PLANKS TO 'BLOCK THE
EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY AND PREVENT THE ESCAPE OF 500,000
ENEMY SOLDIERS IN KUWAIT.

ION ORDER, CONTINUE THE ATTACK EAST TOWARD BASRAH TO

COMPLETE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE RGFC.

31.1DE 01
MAR 41
FIRST TO FIGHT
 AT TAC K C
--seemozonsammmilism.am.minew

i241500 FEB: CROSSED THE LINE OF DEPARTURE

1250300-252150 FEB: ATTACKED TO SEIZE OBJ BROWN, OBJ GREY,

AND OBJ RED

1281400-270430 FEB: ATTACK INTO THE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

TO SEIZE BP #101, BP #102, AND BP #103

1270600-271000 FEB: ATTACK TO SEIZE JALIBAH AIR BASE

1271300-280800 FEB: ATTACK TOWARD BASRAH

1271330-271715 FEB: XVIII ABN CORPS CHANGED DIV LEFT

BOUNDARY TO ALLOW RAID ON TALLIL AIR BASE

i280800 FEB: PRESIDENTIAL CEASE FIRE

1020630-021500 MAR: BATTLE OF RUMAYLAH

SLIDE IA
14 MAR 91
.-11. FIRST TO FIGHT
AL COLT * LINE OF DEPARTURE
G-DAY (241500 -TEES 91)

k
 PL SIPPER

EOPIVE,ATES RIVE

PL R1'

PL CHARCTIEE

iZOR

ntspl_ISE ROHR
R
 TALKING POINTS

✓ ATTACKED ACROSS LD ON 241500(L) FEB 91 (0700 EASTERN

STANDARD TIME) ALONG COMBAT TRAILS XRAY AND YANKEE WITH
THREE BRIGADES ABREAST (197TH BDE DIV LEFT ZONE, 1ST BIDE
IN DIV CENTER ZONE, AND 2ND BDE IN DIV RIGHT ZONE)

✓ AVN BDE ELEMENT CONDUCTED AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IN CONCERT

WITH 2-4 CAV ELEMENTS FORWARD OF 197TH BIDE AND 2ND BIDE.
D/4 CAV OPCON TO 197TH BDE. 2-4 CAV(-) OPCON TO 2ND BDE.
CONFIRMED COMBAT TRAILS XRAY AND YANKEE IN DIV ZONE AND
SOUGHT TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ENEMY FORCE

✓ AT PL COLT (45 KM FROM LD), TRANSITIONED TO TWO BDE ABREAST

ATTACK. 197TH BDE TRAILED BY FOB #1 (FOCUS ON CL III, V) IN
DIV LEFT ZONE. 2ND BDE FOLLOWED BY 212TH FA BDE AND 1ST BDE
IN DIV RIGHT ZONE).

✓ OPPOSED BY ISOLATED POCKETS OF ENEMY RESISTANCE. SUSPECTED

ELEMENTS OF IRAQI 26TH OR 35T,I-1 INFANTRY DIVISIONS.

81.10E #3A
14MAR 91
AT TACK TO PL LION
ter..,....

a•
 TALKING POINTS

✓ ATTACKED ACROSS LD ON 241500(L) FEB 91 (0700 EASTERN

STANDARD TIME) ALONG COMBAT TRAILS XRAY AND YANKEE WITH
THREE BRIGADES ABREAST (197TH BDE DIV LEFT ZONE, 1ST BDE
IN DIV CENTER ZONE, AND 2ND BDE IN DIV RIGHT ZONE)

✓ AVN BDE ELEMENT CONDUCTED AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IN CONCERT

WITH 2-4 CAV ELEMENTS FORWARD OF 197TH BDE AND 2ND BDE,
D/4 CAV OPCON TO 197TH BDE. 2-4 CAV(-) OPCON TO 2ND ROE.
CONFIRMED COMBAT TRAILS XRAY AND YANKEE IN DIV ZONE AND
SOUGHT TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ENEMY FORCE

✓ AT PL COLT (45 KM FROM LD), TRANSITIONED TO TWO ROE ABREAST

ATTACK. 197TH BIDE TRAILED BY FOB #1 (FOCUS ON CL III, V) IN
DIV LEFT ZONE. 2ND BDE FOLLOWED BY 212TH FA BDE AND 1ST ROE
IN DIV RIGHT ZONE).

✓ OPPOSED BY ISOLATED POCKETS OF ENEMY RESISTANCE. SUSPECTED

ELEMENTS OF IRAQI 26TH OR 35TH INFANTRY DIVISIONS.

SLIDE #3A
14 MAR 91
AT TACK TO PL LION
MIME
MIL
 PL RIPPER ATTACK TO OBJ BROWN, OBJ GREY,
AND OBJ RED (250300 - 252160 FEB 91)
EuprmArea RIVE

NASIRIVAH .
TO AL KUFAN

PL. VIKING
AL

••
XF.ACE NT,

JAI IBAH
PL JET

• PI. VIKING
PI (US)
SMASH
Pl. JET

R AM

•• ...... -•

Pi RAM

Pl. CHARGER

Pl. RAZOR

SLIDE X4
14 MAI? 91 TAPLINE ROAD
 TALKING POINTSi

✓(250300-250700 FEB) FOLLOWING CAS AND ARTILLERY FIRES,

197TH BDE ATTACKED TOWARD OBJ BROWN, CLEARED AO HAMMER, AND
ESTABLISHED BLOCKING POSITIONS TO THE EAST AND WEST
ORIENTED ALONG PRIMARY EAST- WEST ROAD (CORPS MSR
VIRGINIA)

✓{251300-251500 FEB) FOLLOWING ARTILLERY FIRES AGAINST ENEMY

EARLY WARNING RADAR SITE, 2ND BDE ATTACKED TOWARD OBJ GREY,
CLEARED AO VANGUARD, AND ESTABLISHED BLOCKING POSITIONS TO
THE EAST. CAPTURED 300 PRISONERS

✓(251450-252150 FEB) FOLLOWING SEIZURE OF OBJ GREY AND OBJ

BROWN, 1ST BOB ATTACKED THROUGH 'AO STEWART TOWARD OBJ RED,
CLEARED AO LIBERTY, AND ESTABLISHED BLOCKING POSITIONS EAST
AND NORTH

✓ 2-4 CAV FOLLOWED 1ST BDE THROUGH AO STEWART AND ESTABLISHED

SCREEN ON DIV LEFT FLANK ALONG PL. VIKING BY 261400 FEB

✓AVN BDE PRIORITY OF OH-58D SUPPORT WAS TO 2ND BDE AND THEN
TO 1ST BDE

✓FOB #1 (CL III, V) OPERATIONAL UNTIL OBJ GREY, OBJ BROWN,

AND OBJ RED SECURED. DSA #2 ESTABLISHED IN AO VANGUARD
(INTEGRATED FOB #1). SERVED AS DIV'S PRIMARY LOGISTICS
BASE FOR THE ATTACK INTO THE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

✓OPPOSED BY ISOLATED POCKETS OF ENEMY RESISTANCE. SUSPECTED

ELEMENTS OF IRAQI 26TH AND 35TH INFANTRY DIVISIONS

SLIDE N4A
14 MAR 91
ATTACK TO ODJS BROWN, GREY, AND RED
•
4/ ATTACK li4TO TV1E EUPRPPLT ES
(BP 00i, SP 002. ARC. Sp #103)
(281,401) - 2.70430,FES Si)

Pl. POPPER
i
ElJPIAPINISB POVB PILL

1,. TO Al. %1f FAH

PL ‘1110,146
WO 14 13e
ge'S/L
0
C ~SALIRAO'
CA PI?

361

PL RAM

PL GHAILIISP,

pL RAZOR

BILFIsh
A

115M AR 95
 TALKING POINTS

'ABSENCE OF DELIBERATE LOGISTICS OR OPERATIONAL PAUSE ON OBJ

GREY, OBJ BROWN, AND OBJ RED

"RAPID REFUEL OPERATION FOLLOWED BY IMMEDIATE TRANSITION TO

ATTACK INTO THE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

"(261400-270110 FEB) MAIN ATTACK CONDUCTED BY 1ST BOB TO

SEIZE BP #102. ESTABLISHED AO WOLF. BLOCKED LOC FROM THE
EAST ORIENTING FIRES IN EA V22. COUNTERBATTERY ARTILLERY
FIRED 261400-261900 FEB

1(261400-262000 FEB) 2ND BOB ATTACKED TO SEIZE BP #103.

ESTABLISHED AO FOX AND PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK TO
THE EAST VIC BP # 104

1(251810-260817 FEB) 197TH BOB REPOSITIONED FROM OBJ BROWN

TO ATTACK POSITION KELLY. (261400-270430 FEB) ATTACKED TO
SEIZE BP #101 AND ESTABLISH AO COUGAR. BLOCKED LOC FROM
THE WEST AND NORTH ORIENTING FIRES INTO EA V21 TOWARD
TALLIL AIR BASE

12-4 CAV SCREENED DIV WEST (REAR) FLANK

JRAPID MOMENTUM OF ATTACK CAUSED LOGISTICS EFFORT TO BYPASS

DSA #3. DSA #4 ESTABLISHED VICINITY BP #102 TO SUPPORT
CONTINUATION OF ATTACK EAST TOWARD BASRAH

%/HEAVIEST RESISTANCE ENCOUNTERED SINCE THE START OF THE

GROUND ATTACK. OPPOSED BY THE IRAQI 47TH AND 49TH INFANTRY
DIVISIONS, RGFC NEBUCHADNEZZAR INFANTRY DIVISION, AND
THE 26TH COMMANDO BRIGADE. NUMEROUS ENGAGEMENTS AGAINST
SLIDE #5A FORTIFIED ESCARPMENTS AND BUNKERS. 6 IRAQI ARTILLERY
14 man 91 BATTALIONS DESTROYED
ATTACK 70 BA #01. BP #102, ANO BP #103
Alb FIGHT
 ATTACK TO TALLIL AND JALIBAH
AIR BASES (270600-271715 FEB Bt)
EUPHRATES RIVE
xx
....................
TO AL KUFAII ........
AO EACILg .
................

PL CHARGER

PL RAZOR

suDE Na
14 MAR 91 ITAPLINE ROAD
 TALKING POINTS

IRAPID REFUEL OPERATION FOLLOWED BY IMMED

IATE TRANSITION TO
CONTINUE THE ATTACK EAST THROUGH THE EUPH
RATES RIVER VALLEY
TOWARD BASRAH

1(270600 FEB) 1ST BDE CONDUCTED FIXING

ATTACK FROM BP
#102 AGAINST JALIBAH AIR BASE

1(262400-270200 FEB) 2ND BDE ATTACKED FROM

BP #103 TO SEIZE
BP #104. (270600-271000 FEB) FOLLOWING ARTIL
LERY PREP FROM
0500-0600 HOURS, CONDUCTED DIV MAIN ATTA
CK FROM JALIBAH AIR
BASE'S SOUTHERN FLANK. SUPPORTED BY 212TH
FA BDE - 5
ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

1197TH ODE PROTECTED DIV WEST FLANK. (27133

0-27/715 FEB)
FOLLOWING 28 CAS SORTIE ATTACK AND ARTIL
LERY FIRES,
CONDUCTED ATTACK FROM BP #101 TO TALLIL
AIR BASE TO
DESTROY ENEMY AIRCRAFT, ARMORED VEHIC
LES, AND ADA

12-4 CAV MAINTAINED SCREEN OF DIV'S LEFT

(WEST) FLANK

1(270600 FEB) 3RD ACR (OPCON TO 24TH

10(M)) ATTACKED EAST
FROM OBJ RED TO SCREEN THE DIV'S RIGHT
(SOUTHERN) FLANK AND
MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH U.S. VII CORPS

'HEAVY RESISTANCE CONTINUED AS THE DIVISI

ON FACED THE
IRAQI 47TH AND 49TH INFANTRY DIVISIONS, RGFC
NEBUCHADNEZZAR
INFANTRY DIVISION, AND THE 28TH COMMANDO
BRIGADE. BATTLE
RESULTED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF (2)
LARGE IRAQI ARTILLERY
AND AIR FORCE MUNITIONS COMPLEXES; (25)
FIXED AND ROTARY
WING AIRCRAFT; (300+) ARMORED AND WHEE
LED VEHICLES; (100+)
ARTILLERY GUNS; AND THE CAPTURE OF (4,600
WERE WELL FED, UNIFORMED, HAD AMPL +) PRISONERS WHO
suDE saA E WATER AND AMMUNITION,
14 MAS AND EMPLOYED EQUIPMENT IN MINT CONDITION
AT TACK TO JALISAhl -AND TALLIL AIR
SASES
FIRST TO FIGHT 11/1■•■••
A h.
 (271300-zuutsuu rco
um INIONNOINININNIMIXMINMENOWNIMMItair---

AL BASRAH
ii5a9ful

PL
KNIFE

SLED #7
14 mAn 91
 P°11\1-71

/RAPID CONSOLIDATION AND REFUEL

OPERATIONS ON JALIBAH
MR BASE FOLLOWED BY IMMEDIAT
E TRANSITION TO CONTINUE THE
ATTACK EAST TOWARD BASRAH. DSA
#5 ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT
OPERATION

1(271300 FEB) DIV ATTACKED WITH

1ST BDE ON THE LEFT (NORTH)
FLANK, 2ND BDE FOLLOWED IN THE
CENTER, AND 3RD ACR (OPCON)
IN THE RIGHT (SOUTH) FLANK. ATTA
CK ORIENTED ALONG HIGHWAY
8 (MAIN ENEMY LINE OF COMMUN
ICATION). REACHED PL AXE EtY
271706 FEB

12-4 CAV ATTACKED FROM AO SAB

ER AND OCCUPIED TACTICAL
ASSEMBLY AREA BEHIND 1ST BDE
(NORTHERN ZONE) AT 271400 FEB

1197TH BDE ATTACKED FROM TALL

IL AIR BASE AND OCCUPIED
TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREA BEHIND
2ND BDE (CENTER ZONE) AT
272200 FES

IMASSIVE ARTILLERY PREFATORY

FIRES FROM 271800 - 280530 FEB
BY 9 1/3 U.S. ARTILLERY BATTALIONS
(DIVARTY, 212TH FA BDE,
18TH FA EDE) AND 24TH ID(M) AH-6
4 APACHE BATTALION. FORCED
HAMMURABI DIVISION TO WITHDRA
W

JATTACKS RESULTED IN SYSTEMATIC

EVAPORATION OF RGFC
DIVISIONS. MAJORITY OF RGFC TRU
CKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES
DESTROYED ALONG WITH (6) ARTILLE
RY BATTALIONS

IATTACK ZONE PROBABLE IRAQI THE

ATER LOGISTICS SITE. LARGE
MUNITIONS COMPLEX SEIZED (OVE
R 1,300 BUNKERS OF ARTILLERY,
500-1,000 LB AIR FORCE BOMBS,
AND OTHER MUNITIONS). .
SLIDE #7A
14
AT TA
MAR
R To
C BASRA
il*I•■•■■•■••••11.671
,1•MIMOOMMINI,
NM10.0..M.MMINIMM.E.M1
 (c2oeao - o2115oo
-astiLarrimr mislowellasulmammat

1200/ 4 NENty vatitcLus.

Natal ROT ENOAIICD

;SOO) TRUCKS
00) ARMORED VEHICLES

X—
SA ..............
................... .2'
crel- z. 090
JAL]BAI 12001 TRUCX2
X 140)%6RMOREO vErticua
„.... AL SA RAH
c.197
013,1 ORANQE

2
X
3ACR ........
T-72 •TAiliCa - 011,RET0

PL AXE LC)

PL
KNIFE PL - PL CRUSH
VICTORY

SLIDZ #8
14 mAII
KUWAIT
 1280800 FEB 91 PRESIDENTIAL
ID(M) 50KM WEST OF THE CALL FOR CEASE FIRE FOUND 24TH
CITY OF BASRAI4 ALONG
AL KNIFE
!HASTY DEFENSES ESTABL
PL CRUSH - LIMIT OF ADVISHED ALONG PL VICTORY (5KM WEST OF
ANCE). DIV SECUHITY ZON
TO PL CRUSH E EXTENDED
/PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOL
LOWING CALL FOR CEASE
BY TREMENDOUS RESTRA FIRE WAS MARKED
INT
HELICOPTERS AND 200 TRU . (020800 MAR) SIX IRAQI ATTACK
OF THE CAUSEWAY. NOT CKS WE RE OBSERVED BY AVN BCE
ENGAGED SINCE THEY POS NORTH
TO THE FORCE ED NO THREAT

BangSagalaradii-anithA ti-12.MardiAt
1(0630 HOURS) 1ST EIDE
TAS
MOVEMENT APPROACHING K FORCE DETECTED LARGE ENEMY
DIV SECURITY ZONE
/(0615 HOURS) 2-7 INF ENG
AGED BY IRAQI SAGGER
MISSILE FIRE IN THE VIC ,
INITY OF THE RUMAYLAH T-72, AND RPG
OIL FIELD
/ESCAPE ATTEMPT BY COM
POSITE RGFC DIVISION-S
COMPOSED OF REMNANTS IZE
RGFC INF DIVs OF RGFC HAMMURABI ARM D FORCE
ORED AND OTHER
!1ST BCE TF ORCHESTRA
TED
THREE BN TANK/MECH TAS COMBINED ARMS ATTACK EMPLOYING
K FORCES. THREE AH-84
COMPANIES. TWO AIR CAV APACHE
ALRY TROOPS. AND FIVE
BATTALIONS (INCLUDED ARTILLERY
MLRS AND 8')
• (0920-0940 HOURS): ART
ILL
• (0947 HOURS): APACHE AND ERY FIRED
• (1045 HOURS): COU CAVALRY SQUADRON ATT
NTERATTACK BY TF 4-84 ACK
ARMOR
/USAF A-10 CLOSE AIR SUP
PORT ON-STATION BUT NOT
FOLLOW-ON ENEMY FOR EMPLOYED
VEHICLES; 40 ARMORED CES NOT COMMITTED. (200 ENEMY WHEELED
VEHICLES)
!BATTLE RESULTS IN DES
VEHICLES (INCL 23 T-7 TRUCTION OF (187) ENEMY ARMORED
2s, 7 T-55s, & 85 APC
ARTILLERY GUNS; (400) s); (34)
TRU
SLIDE' A'FI A (9) MULTIPLE ROCKET LAU CKS AND OTHER WHEELED VEHICLES'
i4 MAII 81 OVER 100 PRISONERS NCH ER SYS TEMS; AND THE CAPTUR
8ATTLE OF RUMAYLAII E OF
 POST-CEASE FIN_ OPERATIONS 00-
(2 MARCH - 12 MARCH 91)
co"

/FOCUS:
• FORCE PROTECTION (HASTY DEFENSE AND RECONNAISSANCE)
• REAR AREA CLEARING AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS
• DESTRUCTION OF MASSIVE NUMBER OF CAPTURED OR BYPASSED
ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
• WITHDRAWAL OF 24TH ID(M) FORCES BEGAN 8 MAR 91. REPLACED
BY 1ST CAV DIV
• 2-4 CAV AND DIV ASSLT CP LAST OUT. TF 3-15 INF AND APACHE
BN PROTECT REFUEL SITE VIC OBJ PURPLE (RUN BY DIV TAC CP)

IONE DAY OF EliEMY_EOUIPMENT DESTRUCTION PPgRATIONS RESULTED

IN_DESTRUCTION OF;
• (34) TANKS (T-55 AND T-72)
• (224) TRUCKS
• (41) ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
• (43)- ARTILLERY GUNS
• (319) ANTI-TANK GUNS
• (27) AIR DEFENSE GUNS
• (150) AMMUNITION BUNKERS AND CACHES
• (158) PRISONERS CAPTURED

ICIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

• (1,140+) DISPLACED CIVILIANS (MAJORITY WOMEN AND
CHILDREN) FELL UNDER 24TH ID(M) CARE
• PROVIDED FOOD, WATER, SHELTER, AND MEDICAL CARE
- (120,000+) MRE MEALS
- (2,500) GALLONS OF POTABLE WATER
— (550) CASES OF BOTTLED WATER
SUCIE ele9 (1,000) BLANKETS
IA MAF1 91
11••■•■•••••••■••• • FIRST TO FIGHT
 /CUMULATIVE ESTIMATE OF IRAQI SQA:
• (363+) TANKS AND APCs
• (314+) ARTILLERY GUNS AND MORTARS
• (2074) LARGE AAA GUNS
• (1,2780 TRUCKS
• (19) FROG MISSILES
• (22) MRLB
• (525) PIECES OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT
• (25) ROTARY AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT
• (5,000.) PRISONERS .
✓1.341.6.11.Q.U_RLAMIANUIL=allialas
• (720,00D) MEALS
• (424.000) GALLONS OF SULK WATER
• (1.875,000) GALLONS OF DIESEL
• (700.000) GALLONS OF JET-Al
• (43,000) GALLONS OF MOGAS

/A13.1.1.1.1.1.8LAMAUILLILON EXPENDITURE:
• (2.803) 156MM ARTILLERY
• (620) 8- ARTILLERY
• (623) MLFIS PODS
• (6) ATAL,MS

/AVIATIQB—AMMU.N1 T rola EXPUMITURE;

• (154) HELLFIRE
• (6.800) 30MM
• (29) TOW
• (1,800) 20MM
• (841) 2.75* ROCKETS
/50,000 LBS OF MAIL DELIVERED WITHIN 2 HOURS OF CEASE
FIRE
DI (L S/13511ALTIU:
• (B) KILLED IN ACTION
• (38) WOUNDED IN ACTION •
SLIDE :10 • (5) NON-BATTLE INJURIES
14 MAR 91
FIRST To PlONT
 ambrasik•

211TH ID(M) CO.,3LUSIONS

1_752

✓ TACTICS VALIDATED ARMY'S AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRIN

E
BATTLE
• 02 ABLE TO KEEP PACE WITH EXPLOSIVE PACE OF
(DIV ASSLT CP, DIV TAC CP, DIV MAIN CP, DIV REAR CP,
FOUR SIGNAL NODES)
COMBAT
• LOGISTICS MOVED 370 KILOMETERS IN 100 HOURS OF

✓PROVED THAT OUR DOCTRINE IS SOUND, AND IS CLEARLY

UNDERSTOOD BY LEADERS AT ALL LEVELS.
• CONTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER AND NODES
BY DIV
• ENORMOUS PRE-BATTLE MAPEX AND REHEARSAL TRAINING
BATTLE STAFF, BDE/BN BATTLE STAFFS, LOGISTIC S, AND
COMMUNICATIONS

✓EXAMPLE OF POWER OF AIRLAND TEAM (ARTILLERY/APACHES KEY)

• 26,000 SOLDIERS, 1,800 ARMORED VEHICLES, AND 6,800
WHEELED VEHICLES ATTACKED FARTHER AND FASTER THAN ANY
OTHER MECHANIZED FORCE IN MILITARY HISTORY (212TH FA
BDE, 36TH ENG GROUP, AND 171ST CSG ATTACHED}
• SHOCK ACTION AND VIOLENCE DESTROYED ENEMY WILL TO FIGHT
WITH MINIMAL U.S. CASUALTIES

✓UNDERLINES IMPORTANCE OF USCENTCOM XVIII ABN CORPS

INDIRECT APPROACH
• ATTACKED WEAKNESS WITH STRENGTH
• EXECUTED WITH SPEED AND VIOLENCE
• DECENTRALIZED
• MASSED ARTILLERY AND ARMY AVIATION FIREPOWER
• EMPLOYED SOPHISTICATED RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
SLIDE #11
OPERATIONS
14 MAR 91
FIRST TO FIGHT
 Department of the Army
Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
Basrah Plain, Euphrates River Valley, Iraq
APO New York 09315

10 March 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR CDR, XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS, ATTN: G-3 (PLANS)

SUBJECT: OPERATION DESERT STORM -- Initial Impressions Report

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this report is to submit initial impressions of

OPERATION DESERT STORM from the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
perspective.

2. REFERENCE:

A. XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS MESSAGE 070800Z Mar 91, Subject: XVIII Abn
Corps After Action Review (AARI.

B. XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS MESSAGE 080500Z Mar 91, Subject: XVIII Abn
Corns After Action Review Reporting Requirements.

3. INITIAL IMPRESSIONS:

A. DOCTRINE

The tactics used during OPERATION DESERT STORM validated the Army's
AirLand Battle Doctrine. The doctrine is sound, applicable on any battlefield, and
easily understood by leaders. OPERATION DESERT STORM may be studied in
the years ahead as a model of and standard for joint combined arms operations.
For the Army, in particular, the Operation will serve as a textbook application of
land power. The philosophy of attacking weaknesses versus strengths,
executed with both speed and violence, proved the key to success for the 24th
Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team.

B. TRAINING

. 1) FSE and FIST teams should be permanently attached to maneuver units.

Integration of fire support elements into brigade, battalion, and company combat

• teams during six months of continuous task force operations resulted in well
synchronized fire support planning and execution during the offensive operation.

1
 2) The National Training Center provides an excellent means of training for
combat in the desert. DESERT STORM raised several areas where additional
emphasis is required:

- Massed artillery fires by battalions versus piecemealed by batteries;

- C3 over greatly extended distances, and;

- Exercise entire DISCOM versus only one FSB to stress the logistics
and DISCOM internal C2 systems.

C. OPERATIONS

DESERT STORM validated the Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI), formerly

known as E-Force. The concept calls for the addition of an engineer regiment to
the heavy division. Commander, 36th Engineer Group, served as the Division
Engineer. One combat engineer battalion was assigned to each maneuver
brigade - 5th Eng Bn (1st Bde); 3rd Eng Bn (2nd Bde); 299th Eng Bn (197th Bde).
During the rapid attack to the Euphrates, the battalions performed the critical
task of identifying, marking, and improving over 500 kilometers of combat trails
through the Division attack zone.

D. EQUIPMENT

1) GPS and LORAN navigation devices are absolutely essential for land
navigation in the desert environment. DESERT STORM confirmed the
requirement for vehicles to be fielded with an integrated position locating system.
24th ID(M) has fielded LORAN to platoon level and GPS to company level. Of the
two systems, GPS proved more accurate overall.

2) Wheeled vehicles such as CUCVs, 5,000 gallon tankers, 2 1/2 trucks,

and S&Ps had difficulty negotiating over rough desert terrain. These vehicles -
proved to be inadequate and were not able to keep up with the forward combat
units in the rapid offensive operations that characterized DESERT STORM.
HMMWVs and HMMETS (both fuel and cargo varieties) should replace these and
other forms of less mobile wheeled vehicles.

3) Brigade forward support battalions (FSBs) must be 100% mobile and

self-deployable. In order to accomplish this, each FSB should be equipped with
at least ten heavy equipment transporters (HETs) to carry material handling
equipment (MHE); and ten M-931.A2 tractors with M-872 trailers.

2
 4) The M-1 ABRAMS family of tanks is too heavy to be safely towed for
extended distances by the M-88A1 Recovery Vehicle. The M-88A1 is under
powered and is of limited use during fast-paced offensive operations. They must
be operated in pairs to safely tow the M-1A1 tank which greatly reduces
recovery asset availability and increases recovery time.

5) 24th ID(M)'s 350 kilometer attack deep to the enemy's flanks and rear
quickly over extended the Division's FM (Secure) and FM RETRANS capabilities.
The rapid momentum of attack made PCM multichannel communications
unfeasible. Single channel TACSAT became the primary and most reliable
means of communications while the Division was on-the-move. Fielding of
additional single channel TACSAT systems (minimum of three per MSC) would
greatly enhance command and control capabilties over extended distances.

6) 25 M-9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) were fielded to 24th 1D(M) a

few days before the attack. DESERT STORM was the first time ACEs were
utilized in combat. The system performed well during all phases of the operation.

7) AVLBs proved the fastest and most efficient method to cross most
obstacles. A substantial improvement would be made if the AVLB's aging
chassis was replaced with an M-1 tank chassis variant.

8) A command and control variant of the M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle is

required to meet the C2 challenges of rapid AirLand Battle operations. The
current M-577 family of vehicles does not offer maneuverability that is
compatible with. that of the M-1 Tank and M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle.

E. LEADERSHIP

OPERATION DESERT STORM validated the Army's non-commissioned

officer and officer professional development programs. Our NCO and officer
leadership know their business, their soldiers, and how to effectively employ their
combat systems and equipment.

3
 AFTER ACTION COMMENT

1. OBSERVATION: The Engineer "E-Force" concept greatly enhances a

mechanized division's combat and combat support capabilities.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Concept calls for the addition of an engineer regiment to the heavy

division. RE-Force" designation has been replaced by Engineer_Bestructure
Initiative (ERI).

b. 24th 10(M) combat operations validated ERI concept. Cdr, 36th Engineer
Group served as Division Engineer. Three combat engineer battalions integrated
Into infantry brigade combat teams - 5th Eng Bn (1st Bde); 3rd Eng Bn (2nd
Bde); 299th Eng Bn (197th Bde). Engineer battalion commander served as the
Brigade Engineer. Organization enabled efficient identification, marking, and
improvement of over 500 kilometers of combat trails in the Division's attack
zone.

3. LESSON LEARNED: The ER! concept is valid and has tremendous application
for sustained desert operations, both in the defense and offense, across the
entire spectrum of engineer priorities - survivability, mobility, and
countermobility.

4. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

a. That ERI be implemented within 24th ID(M) as soon as possible. This is

especially important given the Division's critical role as the only mechanized and
armored member of the XVIII Airborne Corps rapid deployment force;

b. That implementation include mechanized versus wheeled combat engineer

battalions; and

c. That consideration be given for the addition of a combat support

equipment (CSE) company under Division control for assigned GS engineer
missions such as road repair and maintenance.

5. COMMENTS: (Source: Engineer Officer Bulletin, Jan 91, "$on of E-Force,"

pages 9-10)

a. ERI concept supported by rigorous analysis, numerous NTC rotations, and

REFORCER '90 experience.

b. This fiscal year, USAREUR will reorganize one division with a second
reorganization next year. Korea wilt reorganize in 1992.
 AFTER ACTION COMMENT

1. OBSERVATION: 24th ID(M) has limited single channel tactical satellite

(TACSAT) systems to exercise command and control during rapid combat
operations over extremely extended distances.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. 24th ID(M)'s 350 kilometer attack deep into the enemy's flanks and rear
quickly over-extended the Division's FM(Secure) and FM RETRANS capabilities.
The rapid momentum of attack made PCM multichannel communications
unfeasible. Single channel TACSAT became the primary and most reliable
means of communications while the Division was on-the-move. The system
served as a single operations and intelligence, admin/log, and command net.

b. Forced reliance on ground-based, line-of-sight multichannel.systems is not

an acceptable alternative.

c. The Division has identified requirements for 26 single channel TACSAT

systems. Only ten are currently on hand.

3. LESSON LEARNED: During extended and rapid offensive operations, single

channel TACSAT rapidly evolves into the only reliable means of command,
control, and communications.

4. RECOMMENDED ACTION: That additional (16) TACSAT systems be

authorized for the Division.

5. COMMENTS: Satellite accessibility is a related issue. Suggest that it may

be worth "borrowing" satellite access from outside strategic users during future
contingency operations. Unrestricted satellite access is essential the next time
we have to cross the LD.
 -

24TH ID(M) CONCLUSIONS 11

✓TACTICS VALIDATED ARMY'S AIRLAND, BATTLE DOCTRINE

• C2 ABLE TO KEEP PACE WITH EXPLOSIVE PACE OF BATTLE
(DIV ASSLT CP, DIV TAC CP, DIV MAIN CP, DIV REAR CP,
FOUR SIGNAL NODES)
• LOGISTICS MOVED 370 KILOMETERS IN - 100 HOURS OF COMBAT

✓PROVED QUA QQOTRINE IS SOUND. AND IS CLEABLY

UNDERSTOOD BY LEADERS AT ALL LEVELS
• CONTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER AND NCOES
• ENORMOUS PRE-BATTLE MAPEX AND REHEARSAL TRAINING BY DIV
BATTLE STAFF, BDE/BN BATTLE STAFFS, LOGISTICS, AND
COMMUNICATIONS
✓IINDEI3LINES IMPORTANCE OF USCENTCOM - XVIII ABN CORPS
INDIRECT APPROACH
• ATTACKED WEAKNESS WITH STRENGTH
• EXECUTED WITH SPEED AND VIOLENCE
• DECENTRALIZED
• MASSED ARTILLERY AND ARMY AVIATION FIREPOWER
• EMPLOYED SOPHISTICATED RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
OPERATIONS
✓RECONFIGURE DIVISIONAL CAVALRY;
• THREE GROUND TROOPS WITH ARMORED RECON VEHICLES
• AVIATION TROOP (SIMILIAR TO H-SERIES TOE DELTA TROOP)
(0-4 COMMANDER/ATTACHED TO AVIATION BRIGADE)
,/RELOOK HI-IC IN TANK AND MECH INF BN -- RECONFIGURE TANK AND
MECH INF BN TO INCLUDE CSC COMPANY
✓HEAVY DIVISION MUST TRAIN WITH A DESIGNATED, HABITUALLY
ASSOCIATED, REINFORCING ARTILLERY BRIGADE
✓ MORTAR PLATOON NEEDS EXTENDED RANGE/FIREPOWER OF SIX 120MM
MORTARS
✓ NEED A COMMON TANK AND MECH HEAVY BATTALION BASE
SLIDE #12
6 APR 91
FIRST TO FIGHT
 24TH ID(M) CONCLUSIONSi
{CONTINUED)

✓LIGHT INFANTRY BDE ATTACHED TO A' HEAVY DIVISION PROVID

ES
ENORMOUS COMBAT LEVERAGE
✓SCOUT VEHICLE NEEDS TO BE A TRACKED, LIGHT ARMOR
ED VEHICLE
(BRADLEY)
✓NEED TO REPLACE M-88A1 WITH A VARIANT THAT CAN
RECOVER
M-1A1 TANK
✓DIVISION MUST RETAIN DIVISION ARTILLERY AND AVIATION
BRIGADE
✓DIVISION ARTILLERY SHOULD INCLUDE AN MLRS BATTALION VICE
MLRS BATTERY
✓NEED A COMMAND VARIANT OF THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE
✓DIVISION/BRIGADE/BATTALION REQUIRE POSITION LOCATING
REFERENCE SYSTEM (PLAS), EACH PRINCIPAL COMBAT SYSTEM/
VEHICLE NEEDS A GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (CAPS)
✓HEMMT AND HMMWV ARE REQUIRED FOR TACTICAL MOBILIT
Y OF BDE
COMBAT TEAM
✓INFANTRY 25MM/TOW IIA/MK 19 -- OVERWHELMING LETHAL
ITY
✓ACE PROVED VERSATILE AND DEPENDABLE GIVEN ADEQUATE
NET
TRAINING FOR OPERATORS
✓RETAIN FOUR MANEUVER COMPANIES IN TANK AND MECH INF DNS
✓UPGRADE ITV TO M-115A3 CHASSIS CAPABILITY
✓STAFF SERGEANT LEADERSHIP (BRADLEY/ABRAMS FIGHTING SYSTEM
S)
-- KEY TO KILLING POWER AND MAINTENANCE
✓MASSING OF INDIRECT FIRES KEY TO THE MANEUVER BATTLE
✓COMMANDERS MUST LEAD FROM UP FRONT -- TAC CP/SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS
✓ROLE OF ARMY AVIATION IN C2 AND LOGISTICS VITAL
SLIDE #1a
6 APR 81
24TH 1D(M) TASK ORGANIZATION-PHASE I

1STIIDE DIVARTY
2-7 IN 0-333 FA (TAB)(GS)
3-7 IN 4/HHC(S)/197 ADA(DS)
4-64 AR DET/343/24 SIG
1-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
5 EN(-)(DS) 212TH FA BDE (R DIVARTY)
813 EN 2-17 FA (155,5P)
A/1-5 ADA(-) 2-18 FA (203,SP)
3-91 CHEM CO (DECON) 3-27 FA (MRS)
1/24 MP CO C/25 FA (TABHATCHD)
1/13/24 SIG C/5-62 ADA
24 FSB (DS) 11101 CM CO (DECON)
TACP (DS)
AVN BIA
20 BON 1-24 AVN
3-15 IN 3-24 AVN
1-64 AR C/1-58 AVN (ATC)(OPCON)
3-63 AR(-) 4/HHB/1-5 ADA(DS)
3-41 FA (155,SP)(DS) DET/3/8/24 SIG
3 EN(-)(DS) TACP (DS)
B15 EN
A/299 EN DISCOM
8/1-5 ADA(-}(DS) 724 MS8
2/8124 SI0 E/3 EN(-)
1191 CHEM CO (OECON) 2/41C/1-5 ADA (DS)
TM A/124 MI(DS) 4/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
2124 MP CO 2/4/A/1-5 ADA (DS)
•4 X GSR TMS 91 CHEM CO (-)
224 FSB (DS) 327 CHEM CO (DECON)
TACP (DS) 2/A/24 $10

197 BDE DIV TROOPS

1-18 IN TF CAV 24 MP CO(-)
2-18 IN 2-4 CAV DIV BAND
2-69 AR 13-4 CAV 211 MP CO(ATCH) '
4-41 FA (155,SPXDS) 013-69 AR 24 SIG (-)
299 EN(-)(DS) A/13 FA (MLRS)(DS) 124 MI (-)
72 EN CO A/3 EN TM A1519 MI
C/1-5 ADA(-)(DS) 5/91 CHEM CO (SMOKE) QM PIT
3/4/A/1-5 ADA 7/25 CHEM (RECON-F0)(1 DET/3/13/24 SIG
4 X GSR TMS C/124 MI (DS) 519 PSC
DECON PLT1197THBDE 4 X GSR TMS 24 PSC
DET/10T1-E MTN SIG LOG TM/724 MSB 422 CA CO
197 MP PLT 114/811-5 ADA 2 TM/360 CA EDE
197 FSB (DS) 2/4/13/1-5 ADA DET/300 POSTAL CO
TACP (OS) 36 EN GP (OS) HHC, 241D(M)
362 CSE CO ASSAULT CP
1715T CSG 264 MOB CO DTAC
260TH POL DET/3/8/24 SIG OMAIN
341 MAINT 1-5 ADA (-) DR EAR
548 S&S DET/3/13/24 SIG
24Th ID(M) TASK ORGANIZATION-PHASE 11

1ST BDR pIVARTY

2.7 IN G-333 FA (TA8)(GS)
3.7 IN 4/HHC(S)/197 ADA(DS)
4-64 AR DET/3/13/24 SIG
1-41 FA 1355,SPROS)
5 EN(-}(DS} 312TH FA BDE (Ft DIVARTY)
9/3 EN (FORCE FA HQ, 20 80E)
362 CSE CO 2-17 FA (I5S.SP)
A/1.5 ADAM 2-18 FA (203.SP)
3-91 CHEM CO (DECON) 3-27 FA (MLRS)
1/24 MP CO Cf25 FA (TAB)(ATCHD)
1/8/24 SIG Cd5-62 ADA
24 FSB (DS) 1/101 CM CO (DECON)
PSYOPS TM
TACP (DS)
AVN BDE
3D Bog 1.24 AVN
3-151N 3-24 AVN
1.64 AR C/1-58 AVN 1ATCHOPCON)
3-69 AR(-) 4/HH8/1-5 ADA(DS)
3-41 FA (155,SP)(DS) DET/3/8/24 SIG
3 EN(-1(0S) TACP (DS)
9/5 EN
A/299 EN pISoOM
B/1.5 ADAW(DS) 724 MSB
2/8/24 SIG E13 EN(-)
1/91 CHEM CO iDECON) 2/4/C/1.5 ADA (DS)
TM A/124 MUDS) 4/4/C/1.5 ADA (DS)
2124 MP CO 2/4/A/1-6 ADA (DS)
4 X GSR TMS 327 CHEM CO.(DECON)
224 FSB (DS) 2/A/24 SIG
PSYOPS TM
TACP (DS)

X97 BDE DIV TROOPS

1-18 IN TF CAV 24 MP CO(-)
2-18 IN 2-4 CAV DIV BAND
2.69 AR 0-4 CAV 211 MP CO(ATC1-)
4-41 FA (155.SP)(DS) 0/3-69 AR 24 SIG (-)
299 EN(-)(DS) A/13 FA (MI./M)(OS) 124 MI (-I
72 EN CO A/3 EN TM A/519 MI
C11-5 ADA(-)(DS) 5/91 CHEM CO (SMOKE) QFIX PLT
3/4/A11-S ADA 7/26 CHEM (RECON-FOX) DET/3/B/24 SIG
4 X GSR TMS 0/124 MI (OS) 519 PSC
DECON PLT/197TH EIDE 4 X GSR TMS 24 PSC
OE /10TH MTN SIG LOG TM/724 MSB 422 CA CO
197 !VP PLT 1/4/8/1-5 ADA 2 TM/360 CA BDE
t97 FSB (OS) 2/418/1-5 ADA DET/300 POSTAL CO
TACP (OS) 36 EN GP (DS) PSYOPS DET
362 CSE CO HHC. 241D(M)
171ST 0S0 264 MGB CO ASSAULT CP
280Th POL. DET/3/13/24 SIG DTAC
341 MAINT 1-5 ADA (-) DMAIN
54S S&S OET/3/8/24 SIG DREAR

■•I
24TH 10(M) TASK ORGANIZATION-PHASE III

1ST BDE DIVARTY

2-7 IN G-333 FA ITABXGS)
3-7 IN 4/HHC(5)1197 ADA(DS)
4-64 AR CET/3/8/24 SIG
1-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
5 ENNIDS) 212TH FA BDE (R DIVARTYI
8/3 EN (FORCE FA Ha, 2D BDE)
TM C/124 MI (DS) 2-17 FA (155,SP)
A/1-S ADA(-) 2-18 FA (203,SP)
3-91 CHEM CO (DECON) 3-27 FA (MLRS)
5-91 CHEM CO (SMOKE) C/25 FA (TABHATCHD)
1/24 MP CO C/5-62 ADA
1/8/24 SIG 11101 CM CO (DECON)
24 FSB (DS)
PSYOPS TM
TACP (D8)
AVN BIDE
2D BDE 1-24 AVN
3-15 IN 3-24 AVN
1-64 AR TF AIR CAV
3-89 AR(-) C/1-58 AVN (ATC)(OPCON)
2-4 CAV(-) 4/1-11-18/1-5 ADA(DS)
3-41 FA (155,SP)(OS) CET/3/8/24 SIG
3 EN(-)(DS) TACP (DS)
B/5 EN
A/299 EN DISCOM
B/1-5 ADA(-)(DS) 724 MSB
2/B/24 SIG E13 EN(-)
1/91 CHEM CO (DECON) 2/4/0/1-5 ADA (OS)
TM A/124 MI(DS) 4/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
2/24 MP CO 2/4/A/1-5 ADA (DS)
4 X GSR TMS 327 CHEM CO (DECON)
224 FSB (DS) 2/A124 SIG
PSYOPS TM
TACP (DS)

197 WE DIV TROOPS

1-18 IN 36 EN GP (DS) 24 MP CO(-)
2-18 IN 362 CSE CO DIV BAND
2-69 AR 264 MOB CO 211 MP CO(ATCH)
D/4 CAV DET/3/8/24 SIG DET/300 POSTAL CO
4-41 FA (155,SP)(DS) 1-5 ADA(-) PSYOPS DET
299 EN(-)(DS) DET/3/8/24 SIG HHC, 241D(M)
72 EN CO 124 MI I-) ASSAULT CP
cn-s ADA(-)(DS) TM A/519 M DTAC
3/4/A/1-5 ADA OFIX PLT WAIN
4 X GSR TMS CET/3/8/24 SIG DREAR
DECON PLT/197TH BDE 24 SIG (-)
DET/10TH MTN SIG 519 PSC
197 MP PLT 24 PSC
197 FSB (DS) 422 CA CO
TACP (DS) 2 TM/360 CA BDE

171ST CSG

260 POL
341 MAINT
548 S&S
 24Th IDIMI TASK ORGANIZATION.PHASE1V.V1

1ST aog pIVARTY

A/13 FA IMLRSHGS)
2.7 IN G-333 FA ITAB)(GS)
3.7 IN 4/HHC(S)1197 ADA(OS)
4-64 AR DU/303/24 SIG
1-41 FA (155.0S)
6 arc-Nos) g12TH FA BDE (5 O(VARTYL 196TH FA OD4 (PH V-VU
8/3 EN
A/1-6 ADA(•) 2-17 FA (156.SP) 1.201 FA (155,SP)
3-91 CHEM CO IDECON) 2-18 FA (203.SP) 1-623 FA (203.SP)
1124 MP CO 3-27 FA (MLRS) 1-181 FA (203.SP)
1/9/24 SIG C125 FA (TAB)CATCHD)
24 FSB IDS) C/5-62 ADA
PSYOPS TM 11101 CM CO (DECON)
TACP (OS)
rik.tp0
1-24 AVN
pro EDE 3-24 AVN
3.16 IN TF AIR CAV
1-64 AR C/1.58 AVN (ATC)(OPCON)
3.69 AR(-I 4/HH811.6 ADAMS)
3-41 FA (165,SP)(DS) DET/3/8/24 SIG
3 EN(-)(DS) TACP IDS)
B/8 EN
A/299 EN prSCOM
1311.6 AOA(•)(DS) 724 MSB
203124 SIG E/3 EN(•)
1191 CHEM CO (DECON) 2/4/C/1.5 ADA (DS)
TM A/124 MUDS) 414/C/1.5 ADA (OS)
2/24 MP CO 2/4/A/1.5 ADA (DS)
4 X GSR TMS 327 CHEM CO (DECON)
224 FSB (OS) 2/A/24 STG
PSYOPS TM
TACP 105)

197 BDE ply TROOPS

1-18 IN TF CAV 24 MP CO(-)
2-18 IN 2-4 CAV DIV BAND
2-69 AR D•4 CAV 211 MP CO(ATCH)
4-41 FA (165,SP)(05) 0/3-69 AR 24 SIG (4
299 ENI-)(DS) A/3 EN 124 MI (4
72 ILN CO LOG TM/724 MSB TM A1519 MI
C/1.6 ADA(-)(OS) 1/4/9/1-6 ADA CFO( PLT
3/4/A/1-6 ADA 2/4/13/1-6 ADA DET/3/13/24 SIG
4 X GSR TMS 619 PSC 81 CHEM CO(-)
DECON PLT/197TH BDE 24 PSC PSYOPS DET
DET/10TH MTN SIG 422 CA CO WC, 241D(M)
197 MP PIT 2 TM/360 CA BDE ASSAULT CP
197 Fsa (OS) DET/300 POSTAL CO OTAC
PSYoPs TM 38 EN GP (DS) DMAIN
TACP (DS) 382 CSE CO DREAR
171ST 090 264 MOB CO
260TH POL DET/3/13/24 910
341 MAINT 1-6 ADA (4
548 S&S °ET/303/24 SIG
 FQB OFFICIAL-USE ONLY

Department of the Army

Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
Fort Stewart, Georgia 31313
8 June 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: OPERATION DESERT STORM After Action Review -

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to provide an
Executive Summary of lessons learned by the 24th Infantry
Division Combat Team during OPERATION DESERT STORM.
2. SUMMARY OP AFTER ACTION COMMENTS ORGANIZED INTO SECTIONS
CORRESPONDING TO THE PRINCIPAL AND SPECIAL STAPP:
A. Gl
1) OBSERVATION: There is an absolute necessity for
trained door gunners on all utility helicopters.
Door gunner personnel should be provided to the
aviation brigades on a long term- (six to twelve
months) attached basis.
2) OBSERVATION: Transportation support is
absolutely the weakest link for personnel support
functions. Serious consideration must be given
to rebuilding TO&E documents to upgrade organic
transportation capability for personnel units.
3) OBSERVATION: Casualty and personnel strength
accountability reporting were slow and incomplete
during the battle. This could be improved by
having a personnel representative in brigade and
separate battalion TOC's to monitor current
operations and provide critical personnel
reports.
4) OBSERVATION: The plans for mortuary affairs /
graves registration were developed late causing
slow implementation. SOP's for GRREG must be
maintained and a GRREG platoon should be attached
to the division during wartime.
5) OBSERVATION: Individual brigade trial counsels
deployed with their respective brigades providing
timely advice to commanders and soldiers. This
practice should continue.
6) OBSERVATION: Soldiers continued to need legal
assistance in the form of wills, powers of
attorney, and in other areas after deployment.
Legal services must continue to be provided at
all times and locations when soldiers are
deployed.
7) OBSERVATION: Brigade chaplains must be able to
perform independently to provide religious
support during battle. The division chaplain was
out of touch with the brigade chaplains until
nine days after crossing the line of departure.
8) OBSERVATION: Soldiers must be additionally
"hardenedn to death and dying. Many reacted with
what appeared to be symptoms of mild battle
fatigue especially when faced with civilian
deaths on the battlefield. Integration into
combat lifesaver programs might help.
9) OBSERVATION: Vehicles should be available to all
unit ministry teams. Without transportation,
teams are restricted to unit trains or ALOCfs.
10) OBSERVATION: No bugler was available for field
memorial services during pauses in the battle.
Requests for a bugler were often denied due to
nonavailability of instruments. A taped version
of TAPS should be available.
11) OBSERVATION: The application of the risk
management process contributed significantly
toward reduction of accidents during OPERATION
DESERT STORM. A high state of safety awareness
coupled with a strong command influence resulted
in an outstanding safety record during the
operation.
12) OBSERVATION: Wartime accident reporting and
record keeping requirements are not addressed
adequately in AR 385-40, Accident Reporting and
Records. Accident reporting by-the-book creates
an extremely heavy administrative burden.
Telephonic versus written reporting for accidents
of "minor" nature greatly helped reduce the load.
13) OBSERVATION: Eight news media representatives
are too many for a Division PAO to support given
the needs peculiar to each news agency. Size of
combat media pools should be limited to five
personnel from three agencies (TV crew - 3,
'writer, and photographer).
14) OBSERVATION: In offensive operations, PAO
broadcasters and journalists should be provided
to the maneuver brigades with remaining PAO staff
following the forward-most division command post.
During the attack, division level coverage was
absent until the DMAIN displaced from Saudi
Arabia into Iraq on 4 March.
15) OBSERVATION: The operation of the postal support
system was inadequate. Postal units must deploy
earlier in the unit flow; they must train for
deployment missions; and they must train in
handling large quantities of mail.
16) OBSERVATION: The operation of the morale,
recreation, and welfare system was inadequate.
MWR personnel should be deployed earlier for
extended deployments. Additionally, MWR
personnel need to develop a written plan to be
used during deployments.
17) OBSERVATION: Casualty reporting was slow during
combat operations. Communications must improve
as well as the procedures used to report
casualties on the battlefield.
18) OBSERVATION: Units did not complete casualty
feeder cards to standard. However, the use of
recruiting and retention Nco's to help monitor
patient affairs in hospitals greatly 'contributed
to the success of casualty reporting.
 19) OBSERVATION: There must be a coordinated GRREG
SOP among all levels of command at division level
and higher prior to deployment. This SOP must
take into account the great operational distances
encountered during OPERATION DESERT STORM.

B. G2

1) OBSERVATION: OPERATION DESERT STORM highlighted

several areas where changes in IEW equipment are
warranted. These changes include: replacing the
M1015 carrier, redesigning direction finding
equipment, and procuring a RPV for use at
division level.
2) OBSERVATION: The corps intelligence collection
plan did not cover the entire battle and project
out the follow-on missions. Collection planning
must include contingency operations.
3) OBSERVATION: The division needs more support
from corps in obtaining timely photo coverage of
the area of operation / area of interest prior to
combat operations. Corps and/or division sh6uld
have direct contact with the flight mission
manager to obtain all of the data on the mission
flown and the resulting imagery.
4) OBSERVATION: Topographic supplies were not
available for the support of the terrain team
attached to the division. 30th Engineer
Battalion (Topographic) should be the point of
contact for supplies for the terrain teams.
5) OBSERVATION: The division intelligence system
does not currently have a capability to rapidly
restore record traffic communications upon
displacement. The Tactical High Mobility
Terminal (THMT) may be the solution.
6) OBSERVATION: Echelons Above Corps (EAC) .imaging
assets were not used effectively. Limited EAC
assets should be more equitably split between
strategic and tactical targets. Additionally,
better quality imagery is needed.
 7) OBSERVATION: The rapid pace of the attack often
outdistanced the division 0/I net. The 0/I net
should be established on a separate TACSAT or AM
net for offensive operations.
8) OBSERVATION: The quality of aerial photography
at the user level was extremely poor. Our system
is capable of better quality in a more timely
manner. Maneuver commanders deserve these
products.
9) OBSERVATION: The IEW maintenance system is not
in the Army standard maintenance system. This
must be fixed. Additionally, we should eliminate
the GS IEW maintenance detatchments and change
the function of the battalion organic maintenance
capability to DS / GS. Lastly, the LRU
replacement concept should be eliminated and the
33T repairmen allowed to troubleshoot.
10) OBSERVATION: IEW systems could not interface
with each other and are designed without
consideration of other systems in the division.
The Army must ensure that when an IEW system is
developed, it can interface with other systems.

11) OBSERVATION: The LRSD MTO&E was inadequate for .

desert operations. A new MTO&E should include
more officers, warrant officers, and NCO's to
function effectively in the mid to high intensity
conflict.

C. G3
1) OBSERVATION: Friendly vehicle identification is
extremely difficult through thermal sights at
medium to long range. An IFF device is needed
which would link both attack aircraft and
fighting vehicles such as tanks and IFV's.

•
2) OBSERVATION: The Airspace Command and Control
System was all but non-existant in a fast paced
environment. Eliminate it and use the available
equipment to more adequately resource divisional
aviation brigades.
3) OBSERVATION: Simple control measures developed
by the division and brigades enhanced attack
helicopter employment. When terrain features are
not available, grid lines are a very effective
means of controlling assets on the battlefield.
4) OBSERVATION: Consistently, initial HELLFIRE
engagements caused confusion in enemy formations.
The Army should maximize the use of long-range
precision munitions.
5) OBSERVATION, The TO&E for infantry, armor and
field artillery battalions does not reflect the
combined• arms concept. It should be changed to
reflect how we fight: combined arms with
balanced or heavy task forces.
6) OBSERVATION: Several wheel mounted TOC's lacked
the mobility and survivability to support the
division. TOC's should operate from a variant of
the Bradley Fighting Vehicle or a command vehicle
that can keep up with the fast pace of maneuver
brigades.
7) OBSERVATION: Current drafts of the mechanized
infantry / armored division TO&E do not include
aviation units. The next series of TO&E must
include an organic aviation brigade resourced to
fully participate in Airland Battle Future
doctrine.
8) OBSERVATION: The number of general support
aircraft in the mechanized infantry / armored
division proved inadequate. The TO&E should
include one company of UH-1H aircraft and one
company of OH-58C aircraft for general support
purposes.
9) OBSERVATION: The aviation brigade requires more
command and control consoles. Distribution
needed is a total of four: division commander's
aircraft, division air CP, aviation brigade air
CP, and one for back-up/maintenance.
10) OBSERVATION: The orders production process must
be automated. The Army should use the technology
that is available to maintain/increase our edge
in the command and control arena.
21) OBSERVATION: Navigating in the desert without a
Global Positioning System (GPS) is virtually
impossible. Every combat system, tactical
vehicle, and aircraft should be equipped with a
GPS, compass, and an odometer that reads in
kilometers.
12) OBSERVATION: If sufficient space can be made
available, the G-3 (Air) should work in the G-3
(Opns) van. This will streamline taskings for
aircraft and other air missions. Current system
has several people involved in the same taskers
resulting in confusion.
13) OBSERVATION: The Assistant Division Aviation
Office (ADAO) section requires three positions:
one major with a captain and lieutenant for
assistants. This would facilitate 24-hour
coverage and interface with other majors on the
division staff.
14) OBSERVATION: One brigade in the 24 ID used a
standard brigade Vee formation for movement
throughout OPERATION DESERT STORM. This
formation and an accompanying simple,
rehearsed battle drill worked well.
15) OBSERVATION: Brigades were required to position
as many as four artillery battalions in their
sector requiring detailed land management. The
process of clearing land with a maneuver task
force in order to forward position FA assets was
an essential, but unpracticed, task within
brigade operations.
16) OBSERVATION: Given the vast distances that
brigades were required to travel, the normal
"leapfrog" technique of jumping the brigade TOC
and TAC could not keep up with the battle. A
reconfiguration of the inside of the M577 command
tracks in order to provide command and control on
the move eliminated this problem.
D. G4
1) OBSERVATION: The artillery and aviation brigades
must have a forward support battalion that
replicates the function performed by its maneuver
brigade countrpart but tailored to the aviation
or field artillery mission.
2) OBSERVATION: The number of heavy equipment
transports in a heavy division is completely
inadequate and should be increased to meet the
needs of transporting a large number of heavy
vehicles.
3) OBSERVATION: The efficiency of forward support
battalions could be increased with some changes
in organization and equipment. Currently, they
are too lean.
4) OBSERVATION: For every logistics challenge,
doctrine provided the answer. Within the
, boundaries of doctrine, many methods were
41

improvised to meet the needs of the division.

"Improvisation" is a necessity on the modern
battlefield.
5) OBSERVATION: The TIMMY needs a spare tire and
tools to change a tire to handle the vast
distances and rough terrain that units must cover
on the modern battlefield.
6) OBSERVATION: The 9mm pistol magazine jams easily
and needs a stronger spring.
7) OBSERVATION: CUCVIS, S&P'S, and 5000 gallon
tankers were unable to keep up with the maneuver
forces off-road. Off-road mobility must be
improved.
8) OBSERVATION: The direct support (backup)
relationship between a corps support group and a
division causes friction between COSCOM and
DISCOM. A better solution might be to OPCON the
CSG or place it in a "REINFORCE" role.

din
9) OBSERVATION: Throughput logistics operations to
sustain the division's rapid advance was the
exception, not the rule. Movement priorities on
MSR's must be established and ruthlessly
enforced and better communication and
transportation assets must be applied.
10) OBSERVATION: The use of JP-1 resulted in damage
to multi-fuel engine fuel pumps and filter
systems. Units should use only DF-1 and DF-2
fuels in multi-fuel engines if possible.
11) OBSERVATION: The Alpha and Charlie companies of
the military intelligence battalion do not have
the required organization to support themselves
when deployed. They should be reorganized to
give them the capability to resupply themselves
from the support battalion.
12) OBSERVATION: The brigade support area was unable
to maintain supporting distance with the maneuver
battalions. As a result, all fuel and cargo
HEMTT's were placed in the combat trains. Units
must maintain the flexibility to adapt Army
doctrine to changing missions and scenarios.
13) OBSERVATION: The Army's field feeding system is
broken. We must fix it now to provide better
rations on extended deployments.
14) OBSERVATION: The close relationship exhibited
between the DISCOM and the corps support group
should become doctrinal. The resultant stability
will enhance the familiarity between supported
and supporter.
15) OBSERVATION: Corps support battalions must have
the ability to communicate and move like the
maneuver elements they support. This is a
necessity to provide support in a timely manner.
16) OBSERVATION: There is no logical configuration
of the corps support battalions in order to allow
them to provide multifunctional support.
Transportation and service asset shortages must
be rectified.
 I
17) OBSERVATION: The use of combat service support
battalion task forces was critical to the success
of the service support operation. That and the
decision to provide logistical support far
forward ensured that classes III and V arrived as
required.
18) OBSERVATION: The breakdown of the transport
ship, Antares, with 100% of DISCOM equipment
placed an unnecessary strain on the logistics
system. DISCOM's assets should be interspersed
among the brigade's equipment. This is
especially true for HET's and lowboys.
19) OBSERVATION: Wartime maintenance reporting
requirements were not followed. As they stand,
reporting formats are cumbersome and unnecessary.
Some local regulations governing reporting must
be revised to alleviate this problem.
20) OBSERVATION: Long distances for resupply in Iraq
put a heavy strain on division / COSCOM
transportation assets. More assets are needed.
MSB and FSB's assets must be augmented with more
HET's, lowboy's, and fueler and cargo HEMTT's.
21) OBSERVATION: Units and staff sections deployed
without a basic load of publications and other
required documents. This caused delays and
ommissions in the logistical effort. Units
should maintain a deployment library in a
separate box with load plans and this box made a
part of the publications inspection.
22) OBSERVATION: Material Handling Equipment (MHE)
authorized by TO&E is inadequate to perform the
mission. The TO&E for the MSB and FSB's should
be changed to increase the number of forklifts
authorized.
23) OBSERVATION: Ship load plans were developed at
home station but were not followed. These plans
that are thought out in peacetime must be given
adequate consideration in crisis situations.
Critical pieces of equipment were left behind
that should have been transported on ships
departing early in the sequence.
E. G5

1) OBSERVATION: The reserve civil affairs company

did not have the necessary communication
equipment to maintain operational nets. Reserve
units should verify communication capabilities at
the mobilization site
2) OBSERVATION: The manning of the civil affairs
company should be reduced at the division level.
All civil affairs companies should remain under
the command and control of corps. Teams should
be attached to divisions.

F. PSE
1) OBSERVATION: There are too many vehicles in the
HHB and TAB of the division artillery. The Army
should study the consolidation of these two-
elements in the division artillery.
2) OBSERVATION: There is a lack of fuel and
ammunition haul capability and mobility in field
artillery battalions. The HEMTT was a winner on
this battlefield and should be provided to the
artillery separate battery fuel sections.

3) OBSERVATION: Counterbattery radars lack mobility

and are difficult to maintain. They need to be
mounted on HEMTT-type vehicles to increase the
mobility. The Army must develop a combat PLL and
the maintenance expertise to adequately support
radar operations.

4) OBSERVATION: The reliability of the Position and

Azimuth System was not good and repairs were
difficult. A study is required to determine what
makes PADS so fragile for field duty. The down
time is too excessive.
5) OBSERVATION: The TACFIRE shelter does not have
good cross country mobility in the desert. one
means of fixing this was to mount the shelter on
a HEMTT. TACFIRE mobility must be improved.
6) OBSERVATION: There is insufficient general
support artillery in the heavy division. The
TO&E for the division artillery should be
Updated.
7) OBSERVATION; The TO&E of the MRS battery needs
to be updated to include a maintenance tech and a
medical vehicle. This will improve the
flexibiltiy of the MLRS battery.
8) OBSERVATION: The initial Fire Support
Coordination Line along the line of departure
hindered fire planning for division cross-border
reconnaissance operations. The manuever force
should have greater control of the placement and
shifting of the FSCL.
9) OBSERVATION: Cross boundary fires should be
coordinated at the lowest possible level. This
avoids the inevitable delays when calling for
fire and having to coordiante through corps and
division channels during the battle.
10) OBSERVATION: Current communications equipment
and TACFIRE are not capable of providing adequate
support over long distances. TACFIRE provided
fire support coordination once units stopped to
conduct deliberate attacks. Most fire support
coordination was accomplished by PCM or through
thp division TACSAT. Division fire support
agencies need their own long-range communications
system (TACSAT or AM secure).

11) OBSERVATION: Too much dependence is placed on

civilian contractors for maintenance of the Q-37
radar and the Meteorological Data System (MDS).
This and a lack of a combat PLL and trained
mechanics made these systems difficult to
maintain during OPERATION DESERT STORM.
12) OBSERVATION: The M548 ammunition carrier is
incapable of supporting sustained, fast-moving
artillery operations. It should be replaced with
the CATV or HEMTT.
13) OBSERVATION: The Global Positioning System (GPS)
was invaluable to artillery operations in a
desert environment. It can satisfy the hasty
survey needs of artillery units. Until the
position locating system for the FISTV is
fielded, all key elements should be provided the
GPS.
14) OBSERVATION: DIVARTY / artillery battalions do
not have enough fuel tankers for sustained refuel
operations. Three additional HEMTT tankers
should be added to the TO&E of the DS battalions
and one to the TO&E of a DIVARTY HHB.
15) OBSERVATION: Mounted on the M113 chassis, the
FISTV is too slow to support mechanized maneuver
forces. It should be mounted on a tracked
chassis such as the M2 that can move as fast as
modern tanks and Bradleys.
16) OBSERVATION: There were no M109 floats in
theater. If losses had been severe, artillery
combat power could have decreased significantly
while new equipment was enroute. M109 floats
should accompany deploying units.
17) OBSERVATION: Night vision goggles are not
available in sufficient quantities for drivers
and assistant drivers in artillery units.
Sufficient numbers should be added to TO&E.
18) OBSERVATION: Comunications equipment currently
available in brigade and division FSEFS is
inadequate. Maneuver nets are heavily used and
hard to access. Therefore, a capable long-range
communications system should be issued to brigade
and division fire support elements.
 19) OBSERVATION: The speed of the brigades during
the attack prevented the traditional "leap
frogging" of the artillery. A solution was for
the DS battalion to travel in a formation with
three firing batteries abreast. Each firing
battery traveled in a wedge which facilitated
hasty missions.
20) OBSERVATION: During OPERATION DESERT STORM,
targets were generally task force developed -
hasty fires on targets of opportunity. In this
case, the NTC solution of top down fire planning
may not always apply especially in fast moving
operations over vast distances.
21) OBSERVATION: There are too many different combat
tracked vehicles in a M109 direct support
battalion. A better solution is to have vehicles
with the same chassis such as the CATV and
command post vehicle.
22) OBSERVATION: In areas where improved
conventional munitions were used, many more
undetonated munitions were found than were
expected. ICM areas should either be placed off
limits or a timer must be placed in ICM bomblets.

G. ASSISTANT DIVISION ENGINEER

1) OBSERVATION: Most engineer equipment performed
extremely well during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.
However, the Army needs an off-road capable HET,
some redesign of the ACE, and a relook at the CEV
and AVLB.
2) OBSERVATION: The E-force concept is valid and
has tremendous application for sustained desert
operations across the entire spectrum of engineer
priorities. It greatly enhances a mechanized
division's combat and combat support
capabilities.

4
3) OBSERVATION: Engineer equipment was a low
priority on the divisional deployment list. Once
combat heavy engineer assets arrived in country,
road networks rapidly improved and logistics
systems became much more effective. Road upgrade
and maintenance equipment should be available
early to help build the logistics network.

4) OBSERVATION: Combat trails need to be clearly

marked to allow units to follow during day and
night operations. All units should incorporate
as SOP the system used by 24 ID for marking
combat trails.
5) OBSERVATION: Under the Engineer Restructure
Initiative, the engineer regiment requires a
baseline unit similar to a combat support
equipment company (CSE) with the capability to
"rapidly emplace dust pallatives and road surface
treatments.
6) OBSERVATION: Engineer staff representatives are
required at the brigades, DTAC, DMAIN, and DREAR.
In this operation, the ADE at DMAIN could not
adequately respond to requirements at each of the
divisional C2 nodes.
7) OBSERVATION: The marking, clearing, and
improving of over 500 km of combat trails allowed
the 24 ID to move further and faster than any
other heavy division in history. Breachinig
capabilities moved forward with the maneuver
units.
OBSERVATION: Problems in countermobility during
OPERATION DESERT STORM were few but could have
been significant. Problem areas included GEMSS,
availability of class IV and V, and haul assets
for these items.
9) OBSERVATION: 24 ID experienced no shortcomings
in survivability during this operation, Dozer
assets were available. M9 ACE, however, should
work in teams.
H. ASSISTANT DIVISION AIR DEFENSE OFFICER
1) OBSERVATION: Divisions need improved air attack
early warning capability and access to real-time
early warning information. This requires
additional AM radio assets and a dedicated early
warning downlink.
2) OBSERVATION: Using a standardized Manual Shorad
Control System (MSCS) that "stacked" MSCS
matrices was a simple solution to the problem of
having a theater larger than the normal 200 km•X
200 km grid area. This technique should be the
standard.
3) OBSERVATION: Local air attack warning alarms are
not available. The Army should research, test,
and purchase sirens for use by command posts
throughout the division.
4) OBSERVATION: Brigades are normally supported by
a dedicated ADA battery during FTX's and NTC
rotations. This is not how we fight. We must
train with a variety of ADA slices which more
accurately represents- asset availability in
combat.
5) OBSERVATION: Air defense artillery liason
officers are useful at each brigade to provide
the brigade commander advice on ADA doctrine,
capabilities and limitations, airspace
information, and early warning.

I. ASSISTANT DIVISION SIGNAL OFFICER

1) OBSERVATION: The extreme heat of the Saudi
Arabian and Iraqi deserts had a detrimental
effect on the functioning of some signal
equipment to include the AN/TTC-41 switchboard
and the AN/GRC-106 radio.

A
2) OBSERVATION: Division multichannel nodes were
unable to keep pace with offensive operations.
During the battle, single channel TACSAT was the
primary command and control communications link
for the division.
3) OBSERVATION: Adequate assets were not available
for requesting and controlling MEDEVAC aircraft.
Recommend that they be co-located with the
maneuver brigade command and control elements for
better communications and quicker response.
4) OBSERVATION: Combat service support units must
be equipped with redundant communications systems
capable of operating over extended distances.
DISCOM relied on PCM multichannel to coordinate
with COSCOM and the forward support battalions.
In fast moving offensive operations over extended
distances, communication was not always reliable.
5) OBSERVATION: Division AM secure communications
needs revamping. Only one Parkhill device is
available in each brigade and separate battalion.
The effect of this was overreliance on single
channel TACSAT. Sufficient AM radios must be
available to have an adequate AM secure net.
6) OBSERVATION: The DMAIN Assistant Division
Aviation Office (ADAO) lacks the proper
communications equipment. Multichannel is a good
system but not always reliable for timely
information flow. An FM secure is good for short
distances. A VHF system is preferrable due to
extended range capability. Current hand-held
radios are not adequate.
7) OBSERVATION: A medical communications net should
be a permanent part of the division SOP and
officially established through signal channels.
Battalion aid stations and medical companies
should have both AM and FM radio systems to
properly monitor and request MEDEVACS.