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A coup or not a coup : that is the question in Zimbabwe

Article · April 2018

DOI: 10.31920/2056-5658/2018/v5n1a1

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 Journal of African Foreign Affairs (JoAFA)
 Indexed at: EBSCO, ProQuest, J-Gate and Sabinet
 Accredited by IBSS

Volume 5, Number 1, April 2018

pp 5-24

A Coup or not a Coup: That is the Question in

Zimbabwe
Lucky E. Asuelime
Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Humanities
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
Mobile: +27 83 501 9538
E-mail: lucky4real14@gmail.com
…………………………………………………………………………………

Abstract

The November 2017 military intervention in Zimbabwe attracted global

attention. The intervention culminated in the resignation of long-time leader,
President Robert Mugabe, and his replacement by his former vice president,
Emmerson Mnangagwa. Internally, the military action was received with
approval, while externally, the international society called for calm while tacitly
accepting the intervention which normally is contrary to regional and
international norms. This paper argues that the so-called military intervention in
Zimbabwe was a coup. The paper notes that the international community
welcomed the new dispensation in Zimbabwe based on their vested interests
and not international relations and security norms and ethics. The conclusions
were made from data collected from a keen following of events on various
media, academic articles and interactions with Zimbabweans.

Keywords: Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, Coup d’état, Military Intervention, SADC,

Operation Restore Legacy

Introduction

On 14 November 2017, Zimbabwe and the world was hit with reports
that heavy military equipment have been moved and placed in strategic
areas in Harare, the nation‟s capital. The report, which was first broken
5
 A Coup or not a Coup…

on social media, speculated on the possibilities of a military coup. Before

this, the Zimbabwean Defence Forces (ZDF) had been a servant of
civilian ruling political class, which critics might view as ZANU-PF rule
since 1980. The ZDF leadership had on many occasions declared their
respect and loyalty to then-President Mugabe and ZANU-PF which had
helped Mugabe successfully defy all internal and external machinations to
oust him from power (Asuelimeand Simura, 2013). Mugabe had over
time become an important institution respected by the military
establishment which recognised him as the Commander-in-Chief with
the powers to appoint and remove the top military leadership.
All these changed on the night of 15 November 2017, when Major-
General Sibusiso Busi Moyo went on Zimbabwe Broadcasting
Corporation (ZBC) to give a speech that went thus:

We wish to assure our nation, His Excellency, the president of the

republic ofZimbabwe and commander in chief of the Zimbabwe
Defence Forces, comrade R G Mugabeand his family, are safe and
sound and their security is guaranteed.We are only targeting criminals
around him who are committing crimes that are causingsocial and
economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice.

The speech was an announcement of a coup, described as a military

intervention in sanitised and couched language. From then on, events
moved quickly and peaked with the resignation of Mugabe who elected
to avoid the humiliation a parliamentary impeachment would have
caused for a man considered a liberation icon in Zimbabwe and Africa in
general. Mugabe‟s staying presence had been dependent on the narrative
that while there are positive gains from the history of interaction with
Europe and the United States, the interaction between Africa and
Europe brought more harm to the African and super benefits to the
European. To continue in this will be a disservice to Zimbabwe‟s
economy particularly in the age of decolonization. He bemoaned the rise
of neo-colonialism from the debris of the demising European empires in
Zimbabwe( Simuraand Asuelime, 2015; Asuelime and Simura, 2013).
Mugabe‟s resignation opened the door for the return of his former
ally-turned-opponent, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa, from exile in
South Africa as the president-designate and as the national president
after his inauguration on 24 November 2017. The new president seems
to favour the ideals (however self-serving it has been for Mugabe) of an

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Lucky E. Asuelime/JoAFA, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2018, pp 5-24

African Monroe Doctrine (AMD) 1 , which while calling for the Euro-
American world to limit its interference with Zimbabwe, is not a call for
African isolation.
There have been discussions and debates on what really transpired in
Zimbabwe. The primary question, both within and outside of Zimbabwe,
has been whether the actions of the military can be accepted as „military
constitutionalism‟, or simply another coup in the long line of coups that
have been undertaken by different African militaries since
decolonisation. This article deliberates on these issues and ask why the
actions of the military in Zimbabwe did not receive outright
condemnation as done to other unconstitutional changes of governments
on the continent.

Contextualising the Zimbabwean Coup

There have been varied opinions on what happened in Zimbabwe during

the dusk of 2017. Those who sought a middle ground have preferred to
simply call it a military intervention. Externally, regional countries and
bodies seem also to have failed to define the manner in which power was
transferred between legitimacy and illegitimacy. What should be noted
from the outset is that the ZDF command was well aware of the regional
rules governing military coups and illegitimate leadership. There have
been many examples in the region and across Africa from which the
leadership learnt on the pitfalls of a crude military takeover of the
government. Hence, the military in its execution of its operation dubbed
„Operation Restore Legacy‟, it tried its best to keep the legitimacy
garment very visible. This was done by, among other things, having
Mugabe inform the nation that what the military did, did not constitute a
coup2 and that he is still in charge as the president and commander-in-
chief.

1 The doctrine of „African solutions to African problems,‟ was propounded by African

leaders at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. The
doctrine is hereby equated to the declaration by the USA president James Monroe in
1812, popularly known as the Monroe Doctrine. The declaration by African leaders
was a form of an African Monroe Doctrine (AMD)
2 On 19 November 2017, the then President, flanked by the members of the
Uniformed forces and his negotiating team gave a national address in which he stated
that, “The operation (Restore Legacy which was undertaken by the military force Mugabe to resign)
I have alluded to did not amount to a threat to our well-cherished constitutional order, nor was it a
challenge to my authority as head of state and government, not even as commander in chief of the
7
 A Coup or not a Coup…

However, to decide on if a coup or not, there is a need to provide

general and traditional definitions of coup. Merriam-Webster (2017)
online dictionary defines a coup as, “A sudden decisive exercise of force
in politics; especially: the violent overthrow or alteration of an existing
government by a small group,” while the Cambridge Dictionary (online),
defines the same as, “sudden defeat of a government through illegal force
by a small group, often a military one.” The common themes in both
cited definitions are that a coup is an overthrow of the government by
military elements; it could be the whole or a part of the military; it
happens in a short instance of time and as noted by the Merriam-
Webster dictionary, in some cases it is violent. However, there are cases
of what have been termed „bloodless coups‟ or „peaceful coups‟. Bearing
this in mind, can we then argue that bloodless coups are because they are
not violent?
With the passage of time, military personnel and command structures
learnt of some elements that make coups unpalatable to the public.
These elements include violence which in most cases also lead to the
death of innocent civilians. However, in all cases, military leaders seek
the support of the citizens in order to legitimise their illegal act. The
majority of the coups in Africa were justified in the name of the people
who had been subject to mal-governance by a few from the political
class. Wiking (1983, 71) notes that:

In the case of practically every military coup, the new rulers, in the
immediate aftermath of the takeover, usually offer an explanation of
why they considered it necessary to overthrow the previous regime and
to assume political responsibility themselves. This first explanation…
need not necessarily be true, but it must be understandable and

Zimbabwean Defence Forces. To the man, the commend element remained respectful and comported
themselves with diktats and mores of constitutionalism. True, a few incidents may have occurred here
and there but they are being corrected. I am happy that throughout the short period the pillars of state
remained functional. Even happier for me and arising from today’s meeting is a strong sense of
collegiality and comradeship now binding the various arms of our security establishment”
(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5099041/Mugabe-s-rambling-20-minute-
speech-full.html). The speech was crafted in such a manner that it would give
legitimacy to the coup that was underway during the time when the speech was given.
It was later revealed by former spokesperson of Mugabe, George Charamba, that
Mugabe was given scary scenarios to force him to resign by the military command
element, one of which was the unleashing of the mob on Mugabe‟s private residence
and a fate similar to the one that was faced by former Libyan leader, Muammar
Ghadafi (see Mananavire, 2018).
8
Lucky E. Asuelime/JoAFA, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2018, pp 5-24

acceptable to the population and must therefore bear some relation to

reality. Furthermore, the formulation of this declaration may be
significant for the manner in which the population reacts to the change
of power.

Hence, many coups are justified on real and important issues to the
society that included the rampant corruption in government, political
incompetence and tribalism and regionalism among other worst reasons
that could be given.
Perhaps one of the best conceptualisation would be from
Encyclopaedia Britannica (online), which states that:

Coup d‟état, also called Coup, the sudden, violent overthrow of an

existing government by a small group. The chief prerequisite for a coup
is control of all or part of the armed forces, the police, and other
military elements. Unlike a revolution, which is usually achieved by
large numbers of people working for basic social, economic, and
political change, a coup is a change in power from the top that merely
results in the abrupt replacement of leading government personnel. A
coup rarely alters a nation‟s fundamental social and economic policies,
nor does it significantly redistribute power among competing political
groups.

Given the concise but in-depth framework given by Encyclopaedia

Britannica, the Zimbabwean situation is analysed here using the different
issue elements given. Operation Restore Legacy was commanded from
the top by the ZDF. The military had begun giving signals of a takeover
when it had became apparent that Mugabe was eliminating people who
were against the subtle ambitions of his wife, Grace Mugabe. The
military and some members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War
Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) interpreted the purges in the ruling
party as a purge of people with liberation war credentials hence the
assertion of power by a faction that was popularised as the Generation
40 (G-40) faction whose prominent figures included Saviour
Kasukuwere, Professor Jonathan Moyo and Patrick Zhuwawo, nephew
to Robert Mugabe. It was then that the Commander of the Defence
Forces, General Constantino Guveya Chiwenga, issued a statement that,
as part of the team that fought the war, the ZDF would not stand aside
when things take turns they considered wrong. The statements by
Chiwenga came to pass when the military moved in and took over

9
 A Coup or not a Coup…

control of the government in the aftermath of the dismissal of the then

Vice President Emerson Mnangagwa.
The question which then follows is how the events should be
described. Was it a coup or was the army upholding its constitutional
mandate like it said it was (VOA Zimbabwe Service, 2017), its apologists
(Munyoro, 2017) and the Zimbabwe High Court ruling of 24 November
2017.3 Those who have argued that the military intervention was not a
coup but a proper legal “military constitutionalism” (Munyoro, 2017) do
so on the basis that the military neither suspended the constitution nor
did they depose the president and the government to declare themselves
in power. There are partial truths in the argument given that many
commentators based their arguments on information from the military or
public rumours which could not be confirmed. A lot of window dressing
was also at play not only for the local audience but also for the regional
and international community given that the coup plotters knew the
regional and international consequences of a crude coup. That the
former president was allowed to officiate at a state university graduation
ceremony on 17 November 2017and that the military commanders
saluted in front of cameras cannot be taken as evidence that their
mobilisation was not against his rule (Mackintosh, 2017). This is negated
by the fact that after communicating with Mugabe, South African
President and then SADC chairperson, Jacob Zuma, informed the world
that the former president was fine but under house arrest (Agerholm,
2017). Further to the Zuma revelation that the president was under
house arrest, information regarding the negotiations that was revealed by
Mugabe‟s former spokesperson, George Charamba, point to a leader
who was under siege, cut out from the world and being informed of a
fierce scenario. Charamba said the military generals, based at the then

3 On 24 November 2017, the High Court Judge, Justice George Chiweshe ruled that,
“Whereupon after reading documents filed of record and hearing counsel, it is
declared that: The actions of the second respondent (ZDF) in intervening to stop the
take-over of first respondent‟s (Mugabe) constitutional functions by those around
him are constitutionally permissible and lawful in terms of section 212 of the
Constitution of Zimbabwe in that; (a) they arrest first respondent‟s abdication of
constitutional function, and (b) they ensure that non-elected officials do not exercise
executive functions which can only be exercised by elected constitutional
functionaries.” The case had been brought to the Court by Joseph EvurathSibanda
and Leonard Chikomba, who, through their lawyer Advocate ThabaniMpofu, argued
that the actions of the military was lawful given that Mugabe had abrogated his
control of the government and nation to his wife, Grace, who was an unelected
citizen.
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Lucky E. Asuelime/JoAFA, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2018, pp 5-24

King George the sixth (KG VI) Barrack, had informed the president of
different scenarios based on the choices available to him. The
consequences included humiliation and death if he refuses to accede to
their demand for his resignation (Mananavire, 2018). There are no legal
provisions that allow any army to detain the president or remove him
from power or ask him to leave office as that alone constitutes a coup or
an attempted coup, respectively.
The question can be answered by referring to the Zimbabwe national
constitution, as well as political ethics governing civil-military relations.
The Zimbabwe constitution (Chapter 11: 212) mandates the ZDF to
“protect Zimbabwe, its people, its national security and interests and its
territorial integrity and to uphold this Constitution.” Section 213 of the
same constitution, which deals with deployment of the forces, stipulates
that only the president, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the
Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), has the powers to deploy the forces
and “to determine the operational use of the Defence Forces”.
From a constitutional point of view, the actions by the soldiers were
unconstitutional. Given that such actions were directed at the national
president and part of his government, the action clearly becomes a coup.
Zimbabwean political and legal analyst, Alex Magaisa, quoted by
Nomahlubi Jordaan (2017), argued that:

It‟s a coup in all but name. You can describe a frog by many terms but
it remains a frog. This is a coup. The military has taken over and they
are only doing so in order to be able to sell the current political
arrangement to the various sectors within the region. They know that a
coup will not be accepted in the region. They know that it is very
difficult to sell‚ so they are trying to dress this in a manner that looks
decent‚ but it is a coup.

Facts on the ground prove that while it was not declared, the military,
for the period in which the operation was underway, was in control. The
movements of the president and any other important issues, including
public policing duties, military checkpoints on highways and the famous
march of 18 November 2017 were directed by and involved the military.
For one then to deny that there was a coup will simply be political
semantics.
In as much as the military and those in support of the coup
attempted to refer to the constitution to justify their actions, a further
reading of the constitution would prove how unconstitutional the actions
11
 A Coup or not a Coup…

of the military were given that the military intervened in matters

pertaining to a political party, ZANU PF. The former Commander of the
Defence Forces, General Chiwenga, had on many occasions declared
that the military was part of ZANU-PF and at one point President,
Emmerson Mnangagwa, introduced General Chiwenga as a political
commissar at a ZANU-PF rally in the Midlands Province (Mhlanga and
Mushava, 2015). These actions, including the coup which had political
party connotations, contravened Section 211 (3) which stipulates that the
Defence Forces must be non-partisan. By attending rallies of a political
party and intervening in internal ZANU-PF politics, the military
command failed to uphold the constitution hence the military had no
moral standing to justify their actions with the constitution they had
already trampled.
In the execution of the coup, the military justified its actions with the
political, social and economic hardships that they said, if unpacified,
would degenerate into a crisis (Mpofu, 2017: 4). However, as noted
earlier, in most cases, coup plotters justify their actions by tapping into
the emotions of the public at the time. While the public grievances may
be true and unfolding in the country, the important question to ask is
whether the actions were influenced by the grievances or that the
grievances are used simply as pretext for the usurpation of power.
The socio-economic crisis in Zimbabwe reached a peak in 2008.
Drawing parallels with the 2008 conflict gets interesting when weighed
against the justification of the coup on “a degenerating political, social
and economic situation”.4In 2008, Zimbabwe broke most of the worst
economics and financial records of a nation not at war with virtually
empty shops and worthless bank notes. However, in that instance, the
military is alleged to have supported Mugabe and urged him to soldier on
after having suffered his first electoral defeat. The military is alleged to
have taken over the campaign for ZANU-PF and unleashed a reign of
terror that succeeded in causing the electoral leader in the first round of
the elections and MDC-T leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, to pull out of the
presidential run off fearing for his and his supporters‟ lives (Crisis in
Zimbabwe Coalition, 2011; Glendinning, Jones and Agencies, 2008).
Thus, the argument that the military was concerned about the social and
economic situation in 2017 should be viewed with suspicion. As put
forward by Wiking (1983), military coups are undertaken to satisfy the
political and economic interests of the coup plotters, with the public

4 Statement credited to Major General Moyo in 2017

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Lucky E. Asuelime/JoAFA, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2018, pp 5-24

grievances only being exploited to legitimise and sanitise the process as

was the case with roping people into a public march on 18 November
2017, which the security apparatus had denied to activist groups and the
opposition.

External Response

The international response to the coup in Zimbabwe was defined by the

manner in which the coup had been undertaken, the relationship
between different countries, the then President as well as the manner in
which the Zimbabweans had responded to the coup. Zimbabwe under
Mugabe had gone under a long spell of economic decline that left even
some of his local admirers doubtful about the possibility of any
economic resurgence under his stewardship. Many Zimbabweans had
become economic refugees in the region and beyond and reduced to
chattels even though many of them boasted of respectable educational
and professional qualifications. Out of an estimated population of 15
million, an estimated 3 million constitute global economic refugees in
different countries in Africa and beyond from unofficial estimates.
Internally, the number of unemployed graduates continued to swell with
each graduating season (annually) and internal unemployment was
informally estimated at more than 80 percent (The Financial Gazette,
2014), while the health services had fallen to such levels that the
president, government ministers and the rich chose treatment in the Far
East or South Africa. These statistics made a mockery of Mugabe‟s own
legacy of the expansion of education and health services until nearly the
end of the second decade of his rule.
Internationally, the former president had made enemies in the West
by leading a land reform that was against western terms and neo-liberal
principles and seen broadly in the west as racial. The process was seen as
a destabilising move that could become contagious in the region where
colonial imbalances on land is a topical issue. The situation was worsened
by Mugabe‟s public rants and challenges to western hegemony in Africa
in particular and the world in general. The Chinese, who were regarded
by Mugabe as his all-weather friends, were also rumoured to have grown
sceptical about the security of their investment under Mugabe (Chidza
and Nyangani, 2017).
The majority of the citizens seemed to be against any form of
external intervention in the transitional coup process. The aggregate of

13
 A Coup or not a Coup…

the sentiment was for SADC and the African Union to leave Zimbabwe
to handle its own issue as this was the case for years. The AU, which
emerged with the goal of responding effectively to the problems of
contemporary Africa, would be sceptical about intervening in a popular
movement (Nnaeme and Asuelime, 2015). Also, the reaction of SADC is
of note. SADC had been at the centre of dealing with the Zimbabwean
crisis and was saddled with the job of creating a Government of National
unity (GNU) in 2009 and babysit the fragile government until the 2013
general elections in South Africa. The coup took place at a time when
South Africa was the chair of the regional body and President Jacob
Zuma issued a statement that called for calm and urged the government
and the military to resolve their differences amicably as a coup is against
SADC and AU rules. After the statement, Zuma despatched a delegation
to meet with the military and Mugabe in Harare, after which the team
travelled to Angola to brief the Angolan President and SADC Organ on
Politics‚ Defence and Security chair, Joao Lourenco‚ on the
developments in Harare (Osborne, 2017). The actions of the SADC, in
retrospect, seem more like lip-service while Zuma‟s statement sounded
like a reminder to the army to act with SADC and AU rules in mind.
Hence, on the eve of the coup, all odds were stacked against Mugabe.
The manner in which the SADC responded to the events in Harare,
contrast sharply with the manner in which it responded to other regional
conflicts like the Lesotho crises. In the Lesotho crises of 2014 and 2017,
SADC swiftly responded to the coup attempts. The heads of state and
governments converged and came up with a roadmap to restore the rule
of law. However, on the Zimbabwean case, the region failed to officially
declare the event a coup and waited for the Zimbabwe Defence Forces,
the main actors in the process, to give the organisation defining terms,
hence the use of the term „military intervention‟.
At continental level, the AU, led by the chairperson, Alpha Conde,
noted that what was happening in Harare bore resemblance to a coup
and ordered the military to immediately restore constitutional order
(News24, 2017a). The call might be seen from an ethical perspective as a
reflection of the true events that were unfolding in Harare and the
chairperson‟s call was in line with AU rules. The African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance of January 2007 condemns the
unconstitutional change of power especially the ones in which there is
the use of the armed forces as it undermines the trust in civilian
democratic institutions. Article 3 (10) stipulates that, “State Parties shall
implement this Charter in accordance with the following principles: …
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Lucky E. Asuelime/JoAFA, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2018, pp 5-24

Condemnation and total rejection of unconstitutional changes

ofgovernment.” This Article is buttressed by Article 14 (2 & 3) states
that:

State Parties shall take legislative and regulatory measures to ensure that
those who attempt to remove an elected government
throughunconstitutional means are dealt with in accordance with the
law. (3) State Parties shall cooperate with each other to ensure that
those whoattempt to remove an elected government through
unconstitutional meansare dealt with in accordance with the law.

The AU was, therefore, expected, by its rules, to have taken punitive

measures that would send a clear message that it does not countenance
any changes of government that involve the military arm-twisting the
civilian leadership. However, the organ failed to act and in search of the
reasons for the failure, two things can be noted. These are the lack of a
defined guideline on responding to unconstitutional change of
governments and the failure to synchronize the organization‟s and
member states‟ interests. Dersso (2016, 4) points out that:

Arguably the most critical is the inadequate or lack of definition and

poor formulation of the five instances that constitute UCG
(Unconstitutional Change of Government). The second major
shortcoming relates to when constitutional order is said to have been
restored. The lack of consistency in practice by the AU on this issue
causes significant confusion when it comes to implementing the UCG
norm.

In the Zimbabwean case, most member states found themselves

failing to define the unfolding situation given that the military created a
façade of a constitutional intervention, which was however a clear coup.
When Mugabe resigned and Mnangagwa took over, there was need for
the body to have asked if the constitutional order had been truly restored
given the military intervention, or call for the holding of free and fair
elections as the benchmark for reverting to a legitimate constitutional
order.
Secondly, there has been a lack of harmony between the interests of
the AU as a continental body and that of its member-states. This lack of
interests has led to contradictory policy directions on matters of
continental interests. One of the cases which should be noted is the

15
 A Coup or not a Coup…

Libyan case of 2011 in which the organisation had agreed to mediate in a

dialogue between the Gadhafi regime and the rebels‟ leadership.
However, having taken such a policy, African countries at the UN
Security Council, namely Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa, voted in
favour of a western-driven military intervention, an act that automatically
neutralised the agreed efforts at the AU. In the Zimbabwean case, while
the AU as represented by its chairperson, had declared the events a coup,
countries like Botswana and Ivory Coast were tacitly encouraging the
military to push Mugabe out by calling on Mugabe to resign (Shaban,
2017). At the end, like in most crisis situations, the AU became a
spectator, rather than a key player in the push for constitutional order.
Globally, there was, at best, a deafening silence against the coup save
for calls for calm and resolving matters peacefully as said by Farhan Haq,
the spokesperson of the United Nations (UN) Secretary General,
Antonio Guterres (Njikizana, 2017). There are, however, two most
important responses which are worth discussing. These are the British
and Chinese responses. The British government is important as the
former colonial master which influences how the West deals with
Zimbabwe. This can simply be illustrated by the fact that when
Zimbabwe had a bilateral tussle with Britain on the land question,
Western capitals followed in British steps to punish the Zimbabwean
government. Mugabe once alleged that former French president, Jacques
Chirac, informed him that the European Union had taken a hard stance
against Zimbabwe at the instigation of Britain (Machivenyika, 2011). The
historical ties between Zimbabwe and Britain cannot be wished away,
hence the importance of Britain‟s reaction to the events in Harare.
Just like Britain, China and Zimbabwe have a long history. The
history dates back to the 1970s when the Peoples Republic of China
assisted Zimbabwe with military equipment and training in its the fight
against colonial rule. While the relations took a freeze at independence as
Zimbabwe chose to align with the west and its former colonial master, it
was revived in the post-2000 era when Zimbabwe suffered Western
isolation due to diplomatic and land reform tiffs with Britain. China
became both an economic and political pillar for Zimbabwe‟s survival in
a world that had turned hostile as exemplified by financial support5 as

5 The Chinese government is reported to have extended more than US$ 5 Billion to
Zimbabwe in aid, loans and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). When the Chinese
President, Xi Jinping, visited Africa in 2015 he promised US$ 4 Billion from the US$
60 Billion reserved for all the 54 African countries to Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe is
among the top three Chinese investment destinations in Africa (Chung, 2016;
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Lucky E. Asuelime/JoAFA, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2018, pp 5-24

well as China‟s use of its veto power together with Russia against a
British sponsored UNSC Zimbabwe sanctions draft resolution in 2008.
The response by Britain was one that showed the world how politics
of interests can eclipse ethical issues in international relations. In the
unfolding event, Britain called for calm, but did not condemn the actions
of the soldiers. British Foreign Minister, Boris Johnson, issued a
statement saying, “I think the most important point to make is that
everybody wants to see a stable and successful Zimbabwe. I think we are
really appealing for everybody to refrain from violence. That's the crucial
thing” (News24, 2017b).Johnson was quoted by the media stating that:

Today, in one of Africa's most fertile countries, many are close to

starvation; the image that people in Britain have of Zimbabwe is not of
the Victoria Falls or spectacular wildlife, but stolen farms and the
bandaged victims of the regime's brutality. And now this disturbing
story of plunder and misrule has reached what may be a turning point.
All that we have ever wanted is for Zimbabweans to be masters of their
own fate, as expressed through free elections. The path to a legitimate
government now lies open. I hope that Zimbabwean politicians will
take this opportunity, remembering that their country has so many
strengths that even Mugabe has failed to tarnish it irreparably. Britton
(2017).

The statement exposed the fact that Britain was still miffed that
Mugabe undertook a land reform policy which was triggered by Britain‟s
refusal to honour its independence agreement promises and treaties as
exemplified by Britain‟s then Secretary of State for International
Development, Clare Short‟s letter to Zimbabwe‟s former Minister of
Agriculture and Lands, Kumbirai Kangai, in November 1997 (New
African, 2007, 69).
Whilst the British government viewed Mugabe and ZANU-PF as
illegitimate, under international law, Mugabe was the recognised
president of Zimbabwe who came to power through a recognised way of
choosing governments and leaders under the Zimbabwean constitution
and supporting laws. The acts of Britain of seeking to impose leaders of
their choice in Zimbabwe was therefore unethical. Equally, celebrating a

Xinsong, 2016). However, this amount is from what is known. There has been closer
cooperation between the Chinese and the Zimbabwe military especially in diamond
mining and other areas of the economy whose investment portfolios have not been
open to the public.
17
 A Coup or not a Coup…

coup at the cost of constitutional changes to government exposed the

British as an unethical superpower whose interests come ahead of ethics
in its conduct of international affairs.
The actions by the British gives a déjà vu as in the case of the
Matabeleland disturbances popularly known in the vernacular Shona as
„Gukurahundi‟ (meaning the first rains that clears the chaff on rock,
mountain and hill tops), though from opposite angles. Cameron (2017)
argues that the British political leadership, both the Labour and the
Conservatives, turned a blind eye to atrocities that were perpetrated by
Mugabe between 1983 and 1987. The British went on to sell Mugabe
military hardware as well as give the Zimbabwean government aid with
full knowledge of the atrocities. Because the British wanted to keep
Mugabe in the British orbit and stop Zimbabwe from falling under
Russian influence as feared by Lord Christopher Soames; nobody in
London or Harare cared about the alleged atrocities because Nkomo was
perceived to be against British interest and Mugabe was playing ball
(Mlilo, 2015). The issue of Gukurahundi therefore become only topical
in the post 2000 era when Mugabe was now repossessing the land from
the whites in Zimbabwe. Hence, actions of the British regarding
Zimbabwe have never been guided by ethics and principles as the British
government purports to the world.
China‟s foreign ministry‟s spokesperson, Geng Shuang, during a
press briefing on November 15, simply said China was following the
unfolding situation in Harare as a friendly country and added that,
“Zimbabwe‟s peace, stability, and development serve the fundamental
interests of the country itself and other regional countries. It is also the
common wish of the international community. We hope that Zimbabwe
could properly handle its internal affairs (Gao, 2017). This response
sounds too cold for a country that has deep political and economic ties
with Zimbabwe. It could be because of this response that a number of
writers and journalists like Ben Westcott and Steve George, Peter Apps
and Shrenik Rao questioned the role of the Chinese in the Zimbabwe
coup.
Central to the events is the visit that was paid by Chiwenga to China
a few days before the coup (Rao, 2017; Masondo, 2017; Rogers, 2017).
China has always maintained a principle of not intervening in the internal
affairs of its allies. However, given its interests in Zimbabwe, it is not out
of logic for one to conclude that the Chinese had been informed and
given guarantees to support the take over as long as the take-over does
not threaten their investments in the country (Masondo, 2017). The
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Lucky E. Asuelime/JoAFA, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2018, pp 5-24

Chinese are different from the Western powers in the sense that they
have never projected themselves as a moral nation that runs its foreign
policy on established international ethics. Their response, based on their
interests is therefore in line with their international policy.

Conclusion

The realm of international relations is one guided by immoral morality.

The talk of ethics and rules have only been used or argued for when they
are in line with the interests of the players at the time. In respect to
coups, illegitimate leadership and even war, the legitimacy of these has
been defined and conceptualised in terms of the viewing lenses. In the
Libyan insurgency, the American administration talked of „democratic
rebels‟ as they sought to legitimise the subversion of the Ghadafi regime,
while the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi-led coup was outrightly denied as the
acceptance of the coup would have come with legal obligations for them
(USA) to sanction one of their key allies in the Middle East and North
Africa. In light of these international realities, the paper attempted to put
up a narrative that the international response to the military coup in
Zimbabwe was driven by various interests most of which converged on
the international disapproval of the continued leadership of Zimbabwe
by Robert Mugabe.
I argued against the narrative that what happened in Zimbabwe at
the end of 2017 was something else other than a coup. In normal cases, it
would have attracted some form of sanctioning from various regional
and international organisations which Zimbabwe is a member of.
However, the popularity of the coup seems to have provided for some
form of legitimacy for the action leading to the change of government.
South Africa and other SADC member-states might have also lost
patience with Mugabe due to his arrogance and sticking to the tired
doctrine of non-intervention when his policies had strained their
economies by pushing hundreds of thousands of economic refugees into
their nations. South Africa had been struggling with the question of
Zimbabwean refugees and had to issue special permits for Zimbabwean
migrant workers, having noted the difficulties they faced at home,
relations with Zimbabwe and the need to control them internally.
The AU took a lame duck approach. In most of the crises in Africa,
the AU has been accused of either not taking action or doing too little
too late. During the 2011 Libyan crisis, it was its late appraoch which

19
 A Coup or not a Coup…

opened a vacuum for NATO intervention, while in the 2015 Burundi

crisis, it totally failed to deal with the crisis to save lives and the political
situation (Bedzigui and Alusala, 2016). The same was exhibited in
Zimbabwe. Had the situation degenerated into a full-fledged military
conflict, the AU would have another recorded failure.
Internationally, the West viewed Mugabe as a pariah who supported
the occupation of large-scale commercial farms that were dominated by a
handful of powerful whites, by the ZANU-PF supporters and the
veterans of the second liberation struggle. A façade of human rights
violations including the resurrection of the „Gukurahundi‟ issue was
raised and used to justify some set of sanctions whose definition has
remained contested. Suffice to say that this history influenced the
response of the West on the coup against Mugabe.
From the Eastern bloc, China had grown to be the major partner of
Zimbabwe. The Asian giant had invested a lot of money as noted in the
paper and extended hundreds of millions to Zimbabwe in aid and loans.
Mugabe‟s age was seen as a threaten to the safety of all these investment.
The situation was not helped by Mugabe‟s refusal to anoint a successor
or at least resign and allow the party to rejuvenate itself. The takeover by
the military and installation of Mnangagwa could have been the best
thing to happen given that the Zimbabwean opposition political parties
that could have filled a vacuum had ZANU PF failed to manage its
succession politics is aligned to the West and neo-liberal in nature. The
Zimbabwean military has had good relations with the Chinese and as
noted, at the eve of the coup Chiwenga had been in China where he
might have briefed them of a possibility of a coup.
The sum total point to a situation where Mugabe had overstayed in
power to such an extent that he was now surviving on the benevolence
of security apparatuses. Internally, he had presided over the demise of
one of the strongest economies in Africa which led many, including
some members of his party, to despise him. Externally, the West saw him
as a threat to western domination as he taught the gospel of neo pan-
Africanism, while China could not trust him to guarantee the safety of its
investment in Zimbabwe. Hence, when the only institution that could
guarantee his safety turned against him, Mugabe found little friends to
mourn his exit without even questioning the manner in which he was
deposed. In the end, it was a coup in camouflage but not as many saw it
so.

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Lucky E. Asuelime/JoAFA, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2018, pp 5-24

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