Aviation Security Insights
Aviation Security Insights
WINTER 2023
#77
Capacity-building
SECURING OUR SKIES: programmes in Europe
and around the world
the continuing and changing Aviation security
importance of aviation security technology: supporting
future resilience
We explore how aviation security could change in the near future, with a focus
on new technologies and innovations that are being developed to keep
passengers and crew safe, including the open architecture in airport security
equipment and the roadmap to the ECAC Common Evaluation Process (CEP)
of security equipment. We also take a closer look at specific security issues,
“
such as lapses in certification and re-certification, as well as the challenges
in staffing and skills, which could hamper the recovery of aviation if not
addressed effectively. Effective and
In addition to discussing the latest developments in aviation security, we also
efficiently applied
take a closer look at best practices in designing and delivering capacity- security measures
building activities, and also learn from the experiences of different countries
around the world, such as Cyprus, Rwanda and the United Arab Emirates. will be an important
We also examine the main outcomes of the 41st ICAO Assembly on aviation
part of enabling
security and facilitation, and discuss the EU-funded and ECAC-implemented the continued and
CASE II Project and its multilateral capacity-building activities addressed to
Partner States in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, aimed at improving the level sustainable
of effective implementation of security measures on the ground through
technical support on-site.
regrowth of the
sector.”
Finally, I would like to thank all the contributors to this edition of ECAC News,
and I invite you to discover the interesting topics being addressed here. I hope
that the insights and information shared will increase awareness and
understanding of the importance of aviation security and inspire readers to
take an active role in keeping our skies secure for all.
ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future I3
It’s time for a change
Dimitrov
© Boyan
When covert testing, are we measuring
compliance or vulnerability?
Those readers familiar with aviation security regu- To take a process example, I look to risk assess-
lation will know that information sharing is a key ment (threat assessment is not included in this
element enshrined in ICAO standards, ECAC policy example, being the purview of police and intelli-
recommendations, as well as national and inter- gence services for the most part). Risk assessment
national law. When we think of security intelligence, is the role of an appropriate authority and is
for example, in the case of a specific threat, we ex- the way the modern aviation industry conducts
pect that the police and appropriate authorities the business in both safety and security management
world over have a means of sharing that informa- systems. Risk assessment starts with the identifi-
tion with each other. cation of the risk or hazard. It elaborates methods
of attack. At this stage, this information should be
“ However, when it comes to system performance largely common to all, nuanced perhaps by some
this information is not shared uniformly, and I local factors. The next stage is the evaluation of
Reliable question whether globally it is measured uniformly. the mitigation, much of which is common – same
In effect, if a State or airport puts in a measure that access control, same screening. Again, there should
evidence-based results in a significant improvement in detection or be no reason this cannot be shared and compared.
otherwise, we would like them to volunteer that Then we look to effectiveness of the mitigation or
and risk-informed information in order to (a) know it exists, (b) share vulnerability and here is where I see a gap in our
knowledge. How do we measure the effectiveness
decision making it with others, and (c) provide the learning oppor-
of the mitigation or vulnerability let alone compare
tunity that improves the system overall. Don’t we
it? Are we measuring compliance or vulnerability?
is not only an all have the same objective? We expect intelligence
to be shared but what might the system look like if
objective, it is the we could expect that routine performance informa- When it comes to risk assessment, often – and
tion is shared? If we do not share how and what we rightly so – the information is considered security-
only way to measure, comparison is difficult if not impossible sensitive and classified. While that is a legitimate
and learning opportunities are limited. position, it hampers the ability to share information
work together and if there is one thing I know from my experience
in aviation security, it is that information is a trad-
For automatic explosive detection systems equip-
effectively.” ment, we know, from the lists of equipment meeting
able commodity. And then we get to risk appetite,
which will be different as States experience differ-
national and international detection standards,
ent levels of threat. However, this is not shared or
that there are a limited number of manufacturers.
compared. Why is that? Perhaps this limitation is
For example, does one airport have better perform-
understandable in terms of public communication,
ing equipment than another when it is the same
but why is it also true amongst aviation security
manufacturer and model? What is an appropriate
policymakers and experts?
measure for their operational performance? Are we
measuring it and if yes, are we sharing this
I contend that we need to devalue the informal
information not only at the State level but on a
networks through which information is traded and
regional level? We know that security detection
establish formal mechanisms at the system level,
equipment is specialised, but not all States have the
where information becomes knowledge, and where
same capability in terms of testing and validating knowledge becomes wisdom giving real insights to
equipment. Thus, we rely heavily on sharing this system performance.
information before it appears on “lists”. Why does
that information sharing stop once equipment is in
operation?
4 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future
It’s time for a change
ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future I5
Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future
6 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future
Current challenges and future development of aviation security – a perspective from Rwanda
© rawpixel
building
Rwanda has streamlined its equipment and sys-
tems procurement process by considering technol-
ogy assessment to ensure that equipment acquired
is of current technology, can be available on the Effective oversight performance
market, and addresses the existing threats to the
aviation industry. We put in place security equip- The efficiency and effectiveness of aviation secur-
ment/systems that are effective in screening pas- ity officers is and remains instrumental in improv-
sengers, their baggage and cargo in an expeditious ing Rwanda’s performance during the ICAO
manner and without unnecessarily inconvenienc- Universal Security Audit Programme - Continuous
ing passengers to the greatest extent possible. Fur- Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA), where the ICAO
thermore, in the security design of the new airports Council President awarded Rwanda for improving
and alterations to existing facilities at international its performance from a low score of 67.3% in 2010
airports, Rwanda ensures that the architectural and to 86% effective implementation of aviation secur-
infrastructure-related requirements necessary for ity oversight performance.
the optimum implementation of aviation security
measures are integrated. These improvements not only led to an increase in
the aforementioned score, but were also part and
In the course of Rwanda’s aviation development parcel of the activities that led to attaining the
journey, the main pillar has been building the inter- requirements for the United States Federal Aviation
nal capacity of our AVSEC and safety oversight per- Administration’s (FAA) International Aviation Safety
sonnel, cognizant of the fact that effective security Assessment (IASA) Category 1 status following a
and facilitation cannot be achieved without proper thorough review of our progress in improving safety
training. Rwanda has embarked on training its op- oversight processes. Safety oversight assessments
erational and oversight personnel in accordance are conducted back-to-back with the aviation
with the requirements of the National Civil Aviation security operations and oversight. The registered
Security Training Program and Rwanda Civil Avi- achievements are to a great extent due to the
ation Regulations (RCARS). abundance of political will from our government
and partly as a result of our partnerships with
international organisations such as ECAC, which
has assisted in providing workshops and training
Effective aviation security is focused on Best Practices for National Auditors
(BPNA1) under the EU-funded and ECAC-imple-
anchored on a bedrock of timely mented CASE Project in 2019, and the extended
testing and certification of security equipment con-
intelligence information, tested ducted in 2022 under the subsequent CASE II Pro-
ject. This is expected to propel Rwanda to new
procedures, appropriate heights in implementing international Standards
and Recommended Practices (SARPs).
technological infrastructure, and
motivated and well-trained
security personnel.
ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future I7
Current challenges and future development of aviation security – a perspective from Rwanda
© KrulUA
Resilience against aviation threats cation of systems and information to alter the de-
sired dissemination of information; and ensuring
The aviation industry must recognise the changed the availability of relevant information by prevent-
threat spectrum where cyber threats and insider ing disruption of services and productivity.
threat stand out prominently and as some of the
most elusive – harder to detect and prevent than Conclusion
traditional external threats. For example, a cheap
wireless hardware will expose aeronautical com- There is a need to provide unique insights into
munications systems to a wide range of threats. We means to enhance the resilience of aviation secur-
Silas Udahemuka should appreciate and support ICAO’s initiative in ity operations moving forward, including through
is Bureau president of establishing and forming a study group on cyber illustrating ways to foster innovation that is effi-
the African Civil Aviation security, and many other regulators who have cient and effective, from the human, operational
Commission and a already developed or are now working on cyber innovations and financial perspectives.
member of the board security-relevant regulations, such as EASA.
of directors of the East As the aviation sector becomes digitised and
African Community – increasingly reliant on automation and therefore
To ensure effective continuity and sustained civil
Civil Aviation Safety and
aviation operations, it is imperative to manage becoming attractive to cyber attacks by both na-
Security Oversight
Agency, which is a evolving threats such as cyber security, which tion-State actors and terrorists, it is imperative that
Regional Safety necessitates adopting cyber security measures cyber security protection mechanisms for aviation
Oversight Organisation and procedures. Rwanda has instituted cyber se- communication technologies be considered as a
(RSOO). He currently curity measures, such as an awareness campaign requirement in the course of their design or specifi-
serves as the director that is conducted through our National Cyber cation document and development.
general of the Rwanda Security Authority (NCSA) in collaboration with
Civil Aviation Authority. Most often, civil aviation authorities and the indus-
other stakeholders and partners, to educate the
Before being appointed
staff, operators and the public about cyber security try at large focus their efforts on mere compliance
to the position of director
general in 2014, best practices and their rights to personal data pro- with existing ICAO SARPs, Annexes to the Chicago
Mr Udahemuka tection and privacy. Convention and national regulations that normally
deputised the director take a long time to evolve, rather than accompany-
general in the same Rwanda civil aviation also, through the director ing this compliance while continuously looking to
organisation and was general’s directives, requires all air services oper- the future to anticipate those vulnerabilities and
responsible for airports ators to identify their critical information and data potential threats that could diminish and under-
management and mine our required preparedness.
to be protected, put in place measures for their pro-
operations, a position
tection and – should the need arise for their dis-
he served in for seven
years. He joined the Civil posal – put in place measures for secure disposal. As civil aviation is so critical to the functioning of
Aviation Authority in Such measures are subjected to oversight to ensure global economies, both in developed and devel-
January 2007. that effective implementation is realised. oping countries, and as aviation-related safety and
security incidents have such an enormous impact
The Rwandan aviation industry’s resilience against on the media, especially with new technologies that
cyber security is based on three principles: ensuring enable rapid spread of information and mis-
confidentiality of data and information by prevent- information, it is likely to remain an attractive tar-
ing unauthorised disclosure of systems and get for attackers who want to cause maximum
information; preventing the unauthorised modifi- disruption.
8 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future
Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future
© ilixe48
Layoffs of a noteworthy number of competent staff The system was mainly based on temporary/sea-
were a major part of the crisis, but they weren’t the sonal jobs; a lot of people were not dedicated aviation
only factor. Other reasons fueled the crisis, and it industry workers but were employed in the sector
would be beneficial to identify them and try to find for some extra money. This affected mainly holiday
ways of solving the problem – or at least minimis- destinations in countries that base their economy
ing its impact. on tourism. The quality of staff and aviation-oriented
personnel may have been an issue in the past, but
The pandemic’s effects on operations and the it has now become more important than ever.
resulting travel restrictions imposed by all States
resulted in job cuts. Because of decisions taken by Operators and entities knew recovery was on the
most operators and entities during the pandemic, way but they were unable to plan ahead, mainly
people lost faith in the aviation sector. They simply due to insufficient data. As a result, it was simply
don’t want to come back to work in aviation. They impossible to project developments. Recovery from
found jobs in other sectors with better wages and the pandemic and the lifting of travel restrictions
working conditions and less stressful, and they are were very swift, faster than industry could predict
not willing to return to what they had before. The and cope with.
ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future I9
Challenges in staffing, and skills issues in aviation
Possible solutions
(short, medium, long term)
The response time for enhanced background
checks must definitely be improved. We need to
talk to all relevant national authorities, bodies or
agencies to reach a satisfactory agreement on
what is a reasonable amount of time to screen
© henkeova
New regulations entered into force on 31 December Enhanced background checks performed by other
2021 that mandated enhanced background checks States on the principle of mutual recognition and
for all staff before they gained access to security- based on a Memorandum of Understanding should
restricted airport areas. These security checks also be accepted, where possible. The European
required the additional gathering of any intelli- Commission has already issued information stat-
gence or other information that national authorities ing that this is accepted provided it is confirmed by
“
might consider relevant to the suitability of a pros- the local appropriate authority.
pective employee. The involvement of several na-
If all involved tional/foreign authorities resulted in a process that Pending the completion of the enhanced back-
was too slow, and it could take from 30 days (for ground check, escorting persons could be a partial
work together, nationals) to 60 days (for European citizens) – or solution to the problem; the number of persons
even more – to be completed. under supervision (until the enhanced background
operators and check is completed) should be limited to those who
This was also exacerbated by the inclusion of a new can be effectively monitored and not be based, for
entities will be able regulation requiring screeners and persons per- example, on a certain percentage per airport or
forming access control, surveillance and patrols at area of operation.
to satisfactorily airports not to be trained until completion of the en-
hanced background check. These delays made Operators and entities should try to properly man-
operate with the many people seek employment elsewhere because age flights and traffic and predict, as far as poss-
they would simply not wait until they were secur- ible, their needs, react early and ensure that the
minimum ity-cleared, trained and then undergo additional details of new employees are submitted to auth-
disruption to on-the-job training and certification before they orities as early as possible.
were given a contract. It was simply too long!
operations. Staff should be willing to work flexible hours and
The percentage of non-nationals undergoing en- accept to work overtime when needed. Operators
We owe that to hanced background checks caused more delays in and entities should also seek to move staff from
obtaining security clearances because national one airport to another, based on actual needs and
our customers: the authorities needed to contact foreign government hours of operation, where possible.
authorities for information.
passengers!” Training before completion of enhanced back-
Complexity of regulations – it is difficult for anyone, ground checks for several categories of staff once
especially a screener, to reach a satisfactory level they have undergone the standard background
of information in a short period of time in order to check. They could then possibly perform their on-
be able to implement satisfactorily the required the-job training under supervision. This, however,
standards. Qualified personnel with skills and a does not apply to screeners and those performing
high level of education turned to other sectors for access control, surveillance, and patrols at the air-
employment; the aviation sector was left mainly ports; once they undergo their standard back-
with staff with limited skills, low educational level, ground check, they could attend training including
and seniors, as they have difficulty finding work in only information that is available publicly, until the
other sectors. enhanced background check is completed.
10 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future
Challenges in staffing, and skills issues in aviation
Another possible solution is to allow those Risks associated with the proposals
screeners waiting for enhanced background checks
to be completed to work in areas where airport The implementation of some of these proposals
identification cards are not required, e.g. prepara- may also lead to some weaknesses in the security
tion of passengers, where they can be quickly system.
trained and deployed in front of the screening
checkpoints. There should be consideration for potential security
threats to aviation posed by issues relating to the
The appropriate authority should reconsider the recruitment, training and deployment of new avi- Recently retired head
possibility for those operating outside the security- ation staff. In addition, carrying out quick security of aviation security,
restricted areas to undergo a standard background checks on individuals may lead to mistakes that Charalambos
check, as far as possible, based on national rules could potentially be exploited by terrorists. Another Souroullas, joined the
risk, given the quality of staff employed nowadays, Department of Civil
and on a risk assessment, in order to ease the work
is whether standards will be satisfactorily imple- Aviation in Cyprus in
done by the national authorities. 1988. He served as an
mented.
airport officer and
Operators and entities should try to attract quality supervisor at the island
staff by offering better working conditions, career Appropriate authorities’ and operators’/ nation’s two airports,
incentives and rewards for productivity. They entities’ responsibilities responsible, among
should also conduct information campaigns to pro- others, for ground
It is clear that appropriate authorities should be support equipment and
mote the aviation sector; it is crucial to create a involved and assist operators and entities in ma- operation/safety
most favourable working environment to attract naging their operations, as far as possible; working training. He joined
new talents. They should continue to employ exist- together is the only way to reach the best possible aviation security in 2003
ing staff during low season, even if staff is not solution to the problem. Monitoring of all operations and served as Larnaca
really needed. This would allow them to have staff has to be continuous and intensified by all appro- Airport security manager,
available, ready for work with the appropriate priate authorities, operators and entities to ensure national auditor and
security clearance, when needed. Governments head of aviation security.
there will be no drawbacks to the implementation He has a diploma in
should also be involved, especially in staff reten- of the aforementioned proposals.
tion, by providing financial aid to operators and en- mechanical engineering
from the National
tities. If staff are made redundant, every effort One could ask whether the proposed measures will Polytechnic School of
should be made to ensure they will be back next solve the problem of staff shortages. They may or Athens, a Diplôme
season. may not, but – in my opinion – they will mitigate d’Études Approfondies in
the problem. If all involved work together, operators Mécanique des Fluides
Good packages to qualified staff who left should be and entities will be able to satisfactorily operate and a Diplôme de Doctorat
proposed, in order to bring them back: they are in Énergétique from the
with the minimum disruption to operations.
qualified, trained and ready for deployment! École Centrale des Arts et
Manufactures (Paris).
We owe that to our customers: the passengers!
Automation and new equipment to enable staff to
carry out as little manual work as possible, staff
that can be used where they are needed most,
should be promoted.
© ICAO
Security and facilitation outcomes
of the 41st ICAO Assembly
Every triennial session of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Assembly is a key time for international aviation and all
its stakeholders. The 41st Session of the ICAO Assembly was held between 27 September and 7 October 2022 and reunited more than
2500 delegates from 184 Member States and 57 Observer delegations. Two and a half years after the beginning of the COVID-19
pandemic, the organisation of this hybrid event in the midst of the recovery of air transport was significant for many stakeholders, and
ICAO was ready for this critical Assembly and the discussions that took place. The international situation in 2022, in particular the
climate emergency, added to the importance of the meeting for all States and organisations participating in the discussions.
With so much at stake, the 41st ICAO Assembly could not be anything but impactful.
12 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future
Security and facilitation outcomes of the 41st ICAO Assembly
is competent, motivated, and well-trained to in- measures and actions to achieve the objectives of
crease the efficiency of aviation security measures the Aviation Cybersecurity Strategy’s seven pillars.
implemented and in fine to mitigate risks posed to
civil aviation. Robust and adapted training should The Assembly reaffirmed that the upcoming 2023-
be implemented, as well as a strong, positive se- 2025 triennium will be devoted to implementing
curity culture. This work has progressed as a result technical work founded on the new governance
of the shared achievements of the ICAO Year of structure for cyber security in ICAO. This structure
Security Culture (YOSC) that took place in 2021 but is based on two panels of experts: the Cybersecur-
will require a continued strategic approach to ity Panel reporting to the Council’s Aviation Security
human factors and practical actions to promote Committee, and the Trust Framework Panel of the
security awareness and optimal security behaviour
by all entities and individuals at all levels.
ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future I 13
Security and facilitation outcomes of the 41st ICAO Assembly
Answering the needs expressed during this Assem- several other global and regional initiatives were
bly, the 2023-2025 triennium will see the first ICAO established to enhance effective airspace risk
global and coordinated regional outreach activities management. However, considerable work remains
to promote a coordinated and cross-cutting ap- to further improve the safety and security of civil
proach to cyber security in civil aviation. aviation operations over or near conflict zones. As
such, in 2022 the ICAO Secretariat initiated a review
To protect air transport efficiently and sustainably, of the Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Oper-
during this Assembly States reaffirmed ICAO’s glo- ations Over or Near Conflict Zones (Doc 10084).
bal leadership role in aviation security and sup-
ported raising the profile of aviation security within In conclusion, this ICAO Assembly was rich in ex-
the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coor- changes on the current global priorities and on
dination Compact framework, including through continuing to ensure an effective response to the
Sylvain Lefoyer has the provision of expertise to assist the Compact, the current and future security threats weighing on
been deputy director, UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the UN an air transport sector in full reconstruction and
aviation security and Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) constant evolution. It was also key to reaffirming
facilitation in the Air in the implementation of the United Nations Global Member States’ need for civil aviation cyber secur-
Transport Bureau of ICAO Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant United ity, and defining the strategic directions of the
since 2017. He leads Nations Security Council resolutions. global technical framework for cyber security. In
teams in charge of
this respect, the 41st Session of the Assembly was
developing policies,
Standards and The Assembly also discussed developments relat- pivotal in allowing the entire global aviation com-
Recommended Practices ing to the risks posed to civil aviation by conflict munity to define together the future of aviation
(SARPs), conducting zones. In addition to the “Safer Skies Initiative”, security and cyber security for civil aviation.
audits and delivering
assistance and capacity
building in the areas of
aviation security, cyber
security, border security,
and facilitation.
Before ICAO, Sylvain’s
career spans 25 years in
the French ministry of
transports, covering
transport safety and
security in maritime
navigation, ground
transportation and air
navigation. He holds a
master’s degree in
electronics from Paris
University and a master’s
degree in public
management from École
des Ponts ParisTech.
© sdecoret
14 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Aviation security: challenges today, and solutions for the future
Capacity-building
programmes in Europe
and around the world
16 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world
Best practices in designing and delivering capacity-building activities
For the first time, ECAC organised an online work- experience of the participants and fosters the
shop on security culture in April 2021. It is worth integration of new and improved competencies
noting that the virtual workshop comprised several into their previous experience.
virtual activities and discussions in separate virtual • Implement – This phase focuses on delivery of
rooms. Such an interaction was very much appreci- the activity. After finalising the material, the Sec-
ated by the participants and significantly con- retariat organises the pilot activity to evaluate it,
tributed to achieving the objectives. including the content and quality of the material,
classroom and practical activities, pace and tim-
Various videoconferencing tools may be used to ing, etc. Participants’ and instructors’ feedback
conduct such activities. Their capabilities and limi- is crucial in the validation process. When deliver-
tations (such as establishing breakout rooms) ing training courses, both in person and online,
should be considered when selecting the most ap- the Secretariat limits the number of people in a
propriate tool. Particular attention should be paid training room (usually up to eight). This is a fac-
to security features and protection of security-sen- tor that contributes to the effectiveness of the
sitive information. Consideration should also be training process. It ensures that all participants
given to the preparation phase of an online activity, can be actively involved in the process, including
“
including preparing the training schedule, setting discussions and practical activities. Another
up the training sessions, briefing trainees and ac- good practice is the participation as instructors
cessing the training content. The optimal structure THE APPROACH or moderators of “external” security experts from
is to deliver only one two-to-three-hour session per BEING APPLIED BY ECAC Member States with specific expertise in
day, with a few short breaks. various capacity-building activities. This con-
THE SECRETARIAT tributes to sharing of knowledge, experience and
Ensure effectiveness best practices among ECAC Member States, as
CONTAINS well as to the professional development of these
When designing a new capacity-building activity, experts.
it is key to ensure that the activity will be effective,
i.e. it will produce a necessary effect on the audi-
5 PHASES. • Evaluate – This phase aims to evaluate the
effectiveness of the activity and improve the ma-
ence. It is therefore important to apply a systematic terial, activities and/or instructor’s performance,
”
approach to designing the capacity-building activ- as appropriate. Participants’ and instructors’
ities. Such an approach should emphasise the im- feedback on the activity is one of the key sources
portance of clearly defining the learning objectives of information being used by the Secretariat to
and performance criteria to measure whether the evaluate the activity. For that purpose, detailed
objectives have been achieved. The approach being feedback forms are developed and used to
applied by the Secretariat contains five phases: evaluate achievement of the objectives, overall
• Analyse – The required tasks and competencies, organisation and conduct of the course, quality
i.e. knowledge, skills and abilities, are determined of the material and activities, as well as the in-
and learning objectives are formulated. It is im- structors’ performance. All feedback forms are
portant to clearly define a target audience for the carefully analysed by the Secretariat. The results
activity to ensure that the people participating in of the analysis serve as a basis for continuous
a training course or a workshop will be able to review and improvement of the capacity-build-
apply the acquired knowledge and skills (e.g. na- ing activities.
tional auditors, persons involved in certification
of security equipment, risk assessors).
• Design – A blueprint for the activity is estab-
lished, including relevant instructional units
(modules) and learning objectives for each mod- Analyse
ule/lesson.
• Develop – The blueprint is put into practice: a
PowerPoint presentation for each module is
prepared together with relevant handouts (if
needed). It is crucial that after its validation, the
activity will be delivered by various instructors in
a consistent way. Therefore, detailed speaking Evaluate Design
notes are prepped by the Secretariat for each
module. As good practice, different training
methods are combined, such as theoretical train-
ing, group discussions, individual and group
table-top activities (for example, review and
assessment of various security scenarios) and
practical exercises (at an airport, facilities of a
regulated agent…). Attention should be paid to Implement Develop
the practical aspects of the activity. It is impor-
tant that the activity deals with practical issues
and challenges, activates prior knowledge and
ECAC NEWS #77 I Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world I 17
Best practices in designing and delivering capacity-building activities
What is an act
of unlawful interference
against civil aviation?
Aviation Security
Basic Training – activity
18 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world
Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world
ECAC NEWS #77 I Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world I 19
CASE II: Capacity building during the COVID crisis
The first thing CASE II did was to adapt its approach Some of the problems created by the pandemic
to delivery to meet the circumstances. Recruitment were irreversible, and could not be dealt with simply
of the project team was slowed down, there being by a return to old ways. Levels of activity had
no purpose to recruiting experts to travel across the remained low in the face of uncertainty and false
world delivering training activities when travel was dawns, and continuity with the activities of the first
“
Some of the
in effect impossible. A number of activities were
developed specifically to be delivered online, with
some new thinking about what could and could not
CASE project had been lost in many cases, either
through the passage of time or as a result of per-
sonnel being transferred to other duties to deal with
problems created be achieved in the face of travel restrictions, and the consequences of the pandemic. There was not
how best to harness the improvements in videocon- the slightest possibility of the project being able to
by the pandemic ferencing platforms that became available as deliver the scale of activities originally planned: not
working methods everywhere changed in the face simply because of the time already lost, but be-
were irreversible, of the pandemic. cause the fear of disruption through resumption
of travel restrictions led to a cautious approach
and could not be The project learned a number of things from this among some in committing to activities. In particu-
experience. Some foundational training activities lar, the persistence of travel restrictions on routes
dealt with simply were quite suitable for online delivery, as they con- in the Asia-Pacific region creates continuing prac-
sisted of giving a theoretical grounding that could tical issues.
by a return to old be delivered almost as well in the virtual classroom
as in person. Online activities could be organised The project aims to rise to this challenge. It has a
ways. ” quickly and at low cost, with no physical limit to the new project manager and has recruited new team
numbers of participants. Large regional workshops members to deliver in-person activities and to
could be organised online, with simultaneous manage the financial and administrative arrange-
breakout sessions and interpretation into multiple ments around the necessary travel. It is delivering
languages, using technology that was now avail- training on-site on a bilateral basis, but also using
able to all. large regional workshops with ECAC’s sister re-
gional organisations to renew contacts with several
However, this approach had its limitations. To take Partner States at once. It has adapted some of its
an example: in delivering capacity building on activities to take account of the discontinuity, for
landside security, modules on the essential con- instance by combining new training with a “re-
cepts and theoretical approaches to risk assess- fresher” of training delivered before the pandemic.
ment could indeed be delivered online. But given It is negotiating with the European Union (and with
Mark Rodmell joined the different physical environments in airports the support of the sister regional organisations) a
ECAC in December 2020 around the world, on-site work was still needed to one-year no-cost extension to the project to enable
as the deputy executive turn this theoretical grounding into practical skills. it to deliver a volume of activities along the lines
secretary. In this role, he The difficulties experienced by people in all areas originally planned. And it is now extending its ac-
manages and oversees of business in maintaining focus and effectiveness tivities to Asia with training activities being planned
the efficient and effective in long online meetings were amplified in trying to in three central Asian countries and a regional
delivery of the ECAC work
deliver outcome-based training in virtual settings. workshop in Asia Pacific as a start to work in this
programme in all
domains of activity of
region.
the organisation. He There were some benefits from the experience. New
prepares policy advice approaches to combining online and on-site activ- At the end of 2022, 62 activities had been delivered
and strategic options for ity were taken in delivery of activities related to, for with the participation of 60 Partner States and
the executive secretary instance, covert and overt testing, and it is hoped 20 hosting countries. But as well as delivering the
and for senior level that these will enable more flexible and lower-cost activities planned, the project continues to learn
meetings, and promotes means of delivering capacity building in the future. from the difficulties experienced in its early stages.
ECAC activity in
But the resumption of travel, and the ability to We hope this experience will provide lessons that
international forums.
deliver activities in the way originally planned, pro- will have importance for other capacity-building
He also acts as the
project director for the vided a great sense of relief to the project as it programmes across aviation domains. If so, then
CASE II Project. geared itself up to another set of changes to its perhaps, in spite of early setbacks, the project’s leg-
working methods. acy may go even beyond its original vision.
20 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world
Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world
ECAC NEWS #77 I Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world I 21
The CASE II experience: implementing an interregional workshop
Workshop session,
Marrakesh,
5-7 September 2022
• keys and challenges for regulators and industry Indeed, capacity building – and interregional work-
to improve emerging technology and processes, shops in particular – in aviation security can have
and to implement fully integrated and smart avi- a positive impact on aviation safety and security.
ation security systems; This kind of workshop provides a platform for coun-
• how to discover and mitigate cyber security in tries to exchanges ideas, share best practices and
“
Finally, capacity
the general context of civil aviation;
• cyber threats and risks in air navigation systems,
particularly the necessity for, and best practices
in, capacity-building training for airport staff to
lessons learned in aviation security, as well as to
develop strategies to address common challenges.
It also helps to build relationships between coun-
tries and regions, which can lead to increased co-
building and increase readiness and vigilance against cyber operation and collaboration in the field of aviation
regional workshops threats. security. Additionally, these workshops can help to
raise awareness of the importance of aviation
can help to ensure Simultaneous interpretation in Arabic, English and security and can provide a forum for countries to
French was available to ensure all the attendees discuss and develop strategies to address emerg-
that countries have could understand. ing threats.
the necessary The content (drafting the agenda, search for and Finally, capacity building and regional workshops
deployment of moderator and speakers, distribu- can help to ensure that countries have the necess-
resources and tion of the outcomes) and all the logistics, including ary resources and expertise to effectively imple-
on-site, were managed by the CASE II Project team, ment aviation security measures and be better
expertise to effec- ACAO and AFCAC. prepared to respond to threats and mitigate risks.
tively implement In addition to presentations, the workshop included From the project’s perspective, this interregional
breakout sessions, Q&A sessions and tours de table workshop was a great opportunity to strengthen
aviation security to ensure interactivity. regional networks and to engage in discussions
measures and be
better prepared to
respond to threats
and mitigate
risks.”
Side meeting
of co-organiser
representatives
(Moroccan Ministry
of Transport, ACAO,
AFCAC, ECAC and TSA)
22 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world
The CASE II experience: implementing an interregional workshop
with potential new Partner States, as their desig- Given the feedback received from the participants,
nated participants turned out to be the relevant of- this first tripartite collaboration for CASE II was Hanan Achahboun
ficials to talk to about possible capacity-building a success and a solid foundation for future joined the ECAC CASE II
Project as project
activities to be received or hosted by their respect- collaboration. Other interregional and regional
manager on 1 June 2022.
ive countries. This is notably the case for Gabon, workshops are scheduled for the remaining imple- She holds a master’s
Madagascar, Tunisia and the UAE. mentation period of the CASE II Project, responding degree in political
to an increasing demand from Partner States to sciences and has
This partnership also helped to leverage resources have more workshops on specific topics related to 10 years of experience
and expertise and is an effective way to achieve aviation security. in project management
greater impact and results. both at national and
international levels, with
a focus on international
technical cooperation in
the security and defence
sector for the past five
View from a partner years. Hanan will be
responsible for leading,
managing and
The CASE II Project is assisting AFCAC Member States in achieving effective coordinating the project.
aviation security outcomes and sustainable implementation. The project has
assisted 94% of the AFCAC Member States – which is an absolute record – sup-
porting the continent in ensuring compliance with international conventions,
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and providing guidance
material related to aviation security to enhance its aviation security capabilities.
The project’s coordination with AFCAC is leading to successful implementation
of the activities in line with States’ real needs. This will enhance aviation se-
curity and operations and ensure effective implementation issues identified
during Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) audits and other evalu-
ations are addressed in accordance with the ICAO Global Aviation Security
Plan's aspirational targets and the Windhoek Declaration and Targets.
ECAC NEWS #77 I Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world I 23
Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world
“
In that sense, the CASE II Project courses have
a direct impact on the people carrying out
in the project when I was selected to participate in
delivering the Best Practices for Covert Testing
course in Banjul, Gambia, from 17 to 20 January
2022. At that time, this presented a great challenge
for me as I had no experience delivering courses in
English and under such different conditions from
oversight, developing security requirements, or those I was used to. Through this course I felt my
even applying security measures.” confidence grow, and in part thanks to my col-
league Jae Tonkin, who was extraordinarily sup-
portive.
24 I ECAC NEWS #77 I Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world
My experience as a CASE II Project secondee
ECAC NEWS #77 I Capacity-building programmes in Europe and around the world I 25
Aviation security
technology:
supporting future
resilience
Introduction
Since the events of 11 September 2001 in the United The purpose of this article is to highlight the role
States, aviation security has become one of the technology plays in civil aviation security oper-
most important issues today confronting civil avi- ations. The International Civil Aviation Organization
ation operations globally. This particular event has (ICAO) (1), a specialised agency of the United Nations
radically enlarged the boundaries of civil aviation (UN), has been revising and revisiting threats to civil
in general and aviation security in particular. The aviation operations from time to time. In doing so,
post 9/11 scenario necessitated the deployment of it has developed a mechanism whereby threat to
state-of-the-art airport security systems in terms civil aviation security is examined and updated/
of technology, equipment and personnel. This was revised on a regular basis. This is done by means HAMAD SALEM AL MUHAIRI
important and essential to regain trust in civil avi- of revising the “ICAO Risk Context Statement” (2). The Assistant Director General,
ation, as well as to increase the confidence of the enormous growth experienced by civil aviation be- Aviation Security Affairs Sector,
travelling public. fore the COVID-19 pandemic is well known. In order General Civil Aviation Authority of
to aid and assist the growth of civil aviation oper- the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
It is a known fact that the main accountability of ations globally, it is prudent to employ appropriate
the civil aviation industry is to protect civil aviation aviation security measures and technology that
operations against terrorism and other acts of un- will facilitate and sustain its growth.
lawful interference. This was, indeed, a difficult
mandate since it had to delicately balance aviation
security and facilitation requirements.
Some of the areas of importance as well as sensi- (iii) use of biometrics in detecting possible offenders
tivity that come to mind are as follows: and easing the processing of passengers and
(i) security screening of passengers and staff; staff through an aviation security screening
(ii) easing out crowding or congestion at security checkpoint, etc.
checkpoint by developing and using new tech-
nology; Some examples of the above are as follows:
(iii) reducing the number of false alarms at screen- (i) Passenger screening technologies: The in-
ing checkpoints; crease in threat to aviation security from non-
(iv) deployment of explosive detection technology metallic weapons and explosives has led to
for screening passengers and staff at passen- research in the development of new screening
ger and staff screening checkpoints;
technologies in respect of passengers, which
(v) possibility of introducing artificial intelligence
includes techniques for detecting chemical
(AI) for aviation security purposes; etc.
traces and imaging methods that can be seen
“
There is a critical
Even the ICAO Global Aviation Security Plan, also
known as GASeP, encourages ICAO Member States
to give priority to, and incorporate, innovation and
through clothing.
(ii) A system to profile a passenger: Some airlines
have quite often been targeted by terrorists.
One such airline has developed a detailed pro-
requirement technology for the development of aviation secur-
filing programme that requires inspecting all
ity. One of the five priority outcomes of ICAO’s
types of baggage as well as interviewing all
to consider GASeP is to improve technological resources and
passengers face to face by security personnel.
foster innovation. Under this plan, ICAO Member
investment in States are advised and encouraged to promote This airline makes it a point to identify passen-
innovative techniques and technologies. (3) gers who could be a threat to its security rather
technology for than to detect prohibited items that could be
Issues related to aviation security are very peculiar used to hijack or destroy an aircraft.
aviation security in nature and need to evolve on a regular basis to (iii) Imaging technologies: There are quite a few
deter/desist terrorists from committing acts of un- technologies available that can detect metallic
purposes along lawful interference, and to use technology to facili- as well as non-metallic weapons, explosives
tate the movement of passengers at an airport with and their component parts. This technology in-
with other minimum difficulty, delay and disruption. Hence, volves no physical contact with the passenger
there is a critical requirement to consider invest- and can be used for screening passengers,
prevalent ment in technology for aviation security purposes staff, visitors, etc.
along with other prevalent processes and proce-
processes and dures that are already in place.
(iv) Millimeter-wave imaging technology: This
technology operates as a range radar system;
procedures that This combination of using state-of-the-art technol-
the system directs a narrow beam of milli-
meter wavelength energy at a target and
are already in ogy along with the relevant measures and proce-
detects the reflected rays. The beam is exam-
dures required to safeguard civil aviation processes
ined from head to toe of a passenger or staff
place.” against acts of unlawful interference can simplify
member to produce an image of the subject.
and facilitate the development of a multilayered
and robust aviation security system. This tool uses low-energy, low-intensity x-rays
revealed from the subject to produce an image.
This article seeks to review the importance of tech- Images generated by this technology are then
nology in protecting civil aviation from acts of construed to identify the presence of matter
unlawful interference, with special reference to the both metallic and non-metallic that may be
following: concealed under the clothing of a passenger or
(i) use of technology for screening passengers, a staff member.
staff, cargo, catering and other items carried (v) Technology to detect trace emitted by explos-
on board an aircraft and to reduce the rate of ives: This technology is also known as trace
false alarms; detection technology. This is done by chemical
(ii) methods to increase aviation security screen- identification of explosive material or vapour
ing capacity; containing explosive material.
© rawpixel
developed by Abu Dhabi Airports in collaboration
with a company in order to streamline various air-
port processes such as, but not limited to, check-in
operations, passenger arrival and departure times,
etc. In this trial, selected passengers travelling with
Etihad Airways were notified about the optimal
time to arrive at the airport, thus saving them time
and allowing aviation security personnel and other
operational personnel at Abu Dhabi Airport enough
time to undertake their aviation security and
General Commander for Ports Affairs at Dubai operational responsibilities effectively and effi-
Police, “Airport security technology is a key part of ciently. This process was also meant to basically
airport management and operation. Dubai Airport minimise queuing and ensure social distancing at
places it at the top of their priorities to provide a the airport. (7)
safe and smooth travel experience for more than
Hamad Salem Al seven million passengers who use it every month.”
Muhairi is the assistant Conclusion
director general, Aviation He also stated that “While airports and airlines were
Security Affairs Sector in looking for new ways to simplify the travel experi- Air transport is an important player in the world
the General Civil Aviation ence and enhance passenger reception and bag- today. It will not be out of place to state that without
Authority of the United
Arab Emirates (UAE). gage handling, smart technologies and solutions the air transport industry, rapid economic growth
He has 23 years of such as biometrics and automated checkpoints and development may not be possible. The air
experience in the field of have already begun to redefine the airport experi- transport industry is one of the enablers of busi-
civil aviation security,
facilitation and the safe
ence around the world. Dubai Airport has no limits ness and development. Air transport has enabled
transport of dangerous to invest in deploying the best technology to the world to become a global village. It facilitates
goods by air. enhance and ensure a safe and comfortable travel the integration of the global economy and provides
He is a member of the experience for its passengers. Dubai is moving vital connectivity at all levels, such as national, re-
ICAO Aviation Security towards more innovation in smart solutions to gional or international. This aviation industry facili-
Panel and the Dangerous
Goods Panels, vice keep pace with rising numbers of airport passen- tates and helps to generate trade, commerce and
chairperson of the ICAO gers.” (6) tourism. It also provides, as well as assists in, the
AVSEC Panel, and creation of employment opportunities across the
rapporteur of the ICAO
Study Group – Aviation Along similar lines, Abu Dhabi International Airport, globe.
Security Incident which is the second major airport in the UAE, has
Reporting (SG-ASIR), tried a new system based on artificial intelligence. Modern and large airports across the globe that
ICAO AVSEC Panel Task This trial was undertaken in an effort to optimise handle substantial passenger and cargo volumes
Force on Assessing the
Enhancement of various processes and facilitate social distancing require modern and state-of-the-art technology,
Compliance with Annex at the airport. The trial was needed because of the aviation security systems, processes and proce-
17 (TF-AEC17), and the COVID-19 pandemic. This system, also known as dures, as well as well-trained and better-equipped
ICAO Aviation Security
Panel Task Force of the the new enhanced “Smart Travel” system, was aviation security personnel.
Governance Handbook
(TF-GH).
As part of his
responsibilities, he is in
charge of providing
aviation security
safeguards, measures Reference list
and procedures at all
international and (1) https://www.icao.int/Pages/default.aspx
domestic civil airports (2) https://www.icao.int/SAM/Documents/AVSEC-FAL-RG3/1.6%20Risk%20Context%20Statement%20Juan.pdf
within the UAE in order to (3) https://www.icao.int/Security/Documents/GLOBAL%20AVIATION%20SECURITY%20PLAN%20EN.pdf
safeguard civil aviation
operations against acts (4) https://www.nap.edu/download/10344
of unlawful interference. (5) Kruszka, L., Kló sak, M. and Muzolf, P. (2019) Critical infrastructure protection: best practices and innovative methods
of protection. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
(6) https://www.theairportshow.com/en-gb/industry-insights/emerging-technologies-helping-airports-tackle-
increasing-security-threats.html
(7) https://www.airport-technology.com/news/abu-dhabi-airport-ai-technology-social-distancing/
Historically, security equipment and associated Despite these benefits, there are also some chal-
software did not follow the principles of open archi- lenges to using open architecture in security equip- SÉBASTIEN COLMANT
tecture, limiting the interoperability with other sys- ment. Defining the technical aspects (e.g. image
tems. For many years, this has not been considered Head of Aviation Security,
format), and solving the liability and intellectual
as an issue; security equipment was mostly de- ACI EUROPE
property questions are some of the elements that
ployed following a standalone approach and there have to be addressed. To do so, there is a need for
was little request from end users to improve con- a coordinated approach involving the entire avi-
nectivity and communication between security so- ation security ecosystem.
lutions. Also, the variety of equipment deployed to
enforce security was relatively limited, most of the Coordinated steps forward
checkpoints being equipped with single-view x-ray
coupled to roller beds, walk-through metal detec- To promote the introduction of open architecture in
tors and some explosive trace detection systems. airport security systems, leading regulators and
“
However, over the last ten years the variety of airport operators from around the globe published
equipment available for deployment has signifi- a paper in July 2020 (1) describing, through broad Original
cantly increased and there have been requests to guidelines, how airport security systems can share
move away from the traditional approach and to data and how airports can work with partners to equipment
interconnect equipment through open architecture provide a path towards open architecture. This
principles. paper created a lot of interest but it was not self-
manufacturers
sufficient, and it was rapidly identified that airports, have been closely
There are several benefits with such approach. First regulators, manufacturers and solution providers
and foremost, open architecture allows for greater had to collaborate in an organised manner to de- involved in the
interoperability between different security tech- liver the open architecture objectives.
nologies, which can make it easier to manage and process and
maintain a comprehensive security system. This is Throughout 2021 and 2022, there has been a
especially useful in large or complex security sys- massive effort from aviation security stakeholders specific recom-
tems, where it may be necessary to integrate a to develop the elements that were included in the
wide range of security technologies and devices. paper mentioned above, identify solutions, and mendations have
understand the challenges faced by the different
Another benefit of open architecture is that it allows parties. Original equipment manufacturers have been identified.”
for greater flexibility in the deployment and man- been closely involved in the process and specific
agement of security equipment. With open archi- recommendations have been identified in the fol-
tecture, it is easier to add or remove components or lowing fields:
technologies as needed, without having to com- • Technical standards
pletely replace the entire system. This can save • Testing and certification
time and reduce cost, and can also allow for the • Commercial, liability and intellectual property.
system to be more easily customised to meet the
specific needs of a particular end user or environ- These recommendations should be published in
ment. the near future in a new version of the open archi-
tecture document and will support the deployment (1) Open Architecture
In addition to these benefits, open architecture can of solutions directly benefiting from the open archi- for Airport Security Systems
also help to ensure that security equipment is more tecture principles. (aci-europe.org)
© pumpyvector
Next steps – delivering benefits and their inclusion in management tools developed
to fit airport operational needs.
Given the scope of open architecture and the var- Another expected benefit is the ability to easily pull
iety of security equipment which could benefit from images from screening equipment and to include
its principles, it is not possible to develop a compre- them in incident reports or in alarm resolution pro-
hensive list of use cases; however, some of them cesses shared with airport management and/or
are prioritised by airports and should find their authorities. For example, explosive ordnance dis-
place in their operational environment in the posal teams could receive in real time images from
“
coming years. screening equipment to start their risk assessment
as early as possible.
Authorities will FULLY CENTRALISED IMAGE PROCESSING
Whilst some airports have successfully imple- MONITORING AND MAINTENANCE
have to identify mented centralised image processing (2) (CIP), Whilst computerised maintenance management
the concept has some limitations. It is currently dif- systems (CMMS) are widely available, security
how testing and ficult to process simultaneously images produced equipment is often integrated in vendor-specific
by screening equipment from different manufac- monitoring systems limiting the ability for airports
certification of turers or that are from different types (conventional to run their maintenance process efficiently and ef-
x-ray, CT). This means that airports are limited in fectively.
security equipment their ability to take the full benefits of CIP. For Open architecture principles will support the inte-
example, when two terminals are equipped with
should evolve.” different fleets of screening equipment, airports are
gration of security equipment in the airport CMMS
to further improve the maintenance process and
unable to distribute images to a common viewing availability of compliant security equipment.
platform.
USER MANAGEMENT
With a common image format, it will be possible to Managing user rights and privileges on security
centralise images produced by any screening equipment can be a challenging task as these data
equipment. Combined with an ability to transfer im- are often registered and maintained on separate
ages in real time, this will enable airports to review databases for each type of security equipment.
images from any system and from any location to Keeping these multiple databases updated is re-
maximise operational benefits. This could be a source intensive as airports must enforce elements
major step forward for airport groups that are op- such as expiry dates, certification/training status
erating multiple airports as it would greatly facili- for each and every security officer on all the equip-
(2) Centralised image processing
is a concept where images
tate their ability to centralise screening operations ment that they are supposed to use.
generated by screening
across their airports to improve efficiency and
equipment are networked. facilitate oversight, training and consistency of the Open architecture will enable a single master da-
It enables to review images security output. tabase to be built, which could be synchronised
with more flexibility, moving with the local user databases of the different se-
away from the legacy CONOPS DATA SHARING curity equipment to reduce the overall adminis-
where a security officer is Current security equipment limit the ability for air- trative workload and limit human errors leading to
deployed for every screening ports to build a comprehensive situation awareness potential non-compliancy (e.g. a security officer
equipment. With CIP, airports as data are not easily available for inclusion in allowed to use a screening equipment without
have the ability to improve the dashboards or reports. having been recertified). It could also facilitate the
efficiency level of their Interoperable security equipment will facilitate implementation of a single sign-on process to im-
operations. automated data collection across the operations prove the security officer experience.
The ECAC Common Evaluation Process (CEP) of security equipment is the laboratory testing programme
interview
established by ECAC Member States to assess security equipment against ECAC/EU performance
standards and provide a common reference for national administrations to certify/approve the security
equipment deployed at airports under their responsibility.
with The aims of the CEP are to evaluate the technical performance of security equipment in an objective and
standardised manner across the different national test centres participating in the process, and to
provide ECAC Member States with reliable information on equipment performance against adopted
technical standards.
ECAC NEWS: First of all, thank you for By following this approach, no matter which test
having accepted to talk to us about the centre has tested the equipment, we are assured
CEP process and its achievements over that if a piece of equipment has passed the testing
the last years. You have been the chair process, it meets the standard it was tested
of the CEP Management Group for one against. As such, Member States have the knowl-
year now. We would appreciate having edge that the equipment will be able to detect the
ALASTAIR MCINTOSH your views on the process, and es- threats they are interested in at their airports. With
pecially what you think it brings to the this rigorous testing approach, they can then ap-
Head of Research, Analysis
Member States of ECAC. prove it for use at the airports in their countries.
and Development (RAD),
Department for Transport, What difference would it make for ECAC
ALASTAIR: I think it is probably worth a bit of
United Kingdom framing first. The CEP’s mission is to provide assu- Member States if the CEP didn’t exist?
rance that the capabilities of aviation security
equipment meet adopted technical standards. To Prior to the CEP, it was up to national authorities
do that, there are a number of test centres within within the Member States – and separately of
the CEP that test equipment against Common Test- course to ECAC – to undertake testing of aviation
ing Methodologies, which have been developed security equipment themselves. To do that it
and agreed by experts from across numerous ECAC requires having a test centre, technical experts,
Member States. access to the threat materials you are concerned
© phonlamai
ting authorities (1) of the CEP have taken on this
burden. If the CEP didn’t exist, it would be up to na-
tional authorities to find the funding and to set up
that capability.
So in a system where the CEP doesn’t What do you think is the added value
exist, we would see a fragmentation of of the CEP to the manufacturer? They
testing across Europe?
participate, they send their equipment
to the CEP centres, they pay for tests to
Any State can undertake national testing. This is
be performed. But what do they get out
what we did in the UK before 2009, and where
of the CEP?
possible we would make use of national testing
undertaken in other countries. For example, we
“
The CEP is
I would ask “what is the common ground between
might have made use of results from the French
test centre – STAC. We would review any test results all the stakeholders of the CEP?”. And really, it is the
they had undertaken, and either we would be desire to ensure that aviation is safe and secure. the largest
happy with the approach and testing undertaken,
approving the equipment for use in the UK, or we For Member States it is about deploying equipment evaluation
might decide that we needed to do some extra tests that has capabilities to detect the threats they are
at our own test centre before we could give appro- concerned about. programme for
val.
For manufacturers, it’s about developing equip- aviation security
But this results in a situation where you could have ment which can detect those threats. But to do that,
very different approved equipment lists across they need a process they can come to with their
equipment in the
equipment; they can get it tested, knowing the test-
Europe and ECAC’s 44 Member States. This means
ing is rigorous, and they can receive feedback so if
world, covering
that not only could Member States not know how
effective the security is in countries where flights they don’t pass the evaluation process they can 44 ECAC Member
are departing for their country, but it also produces then reapply having made changes.
a very confused market for the manufacturers, States.”
where there may be different requirements across This what the CEP provides. Going through the CEP
every Member State. they can be sent to a number of test centres – we
have capacity in France, Germany, the Netherlands,
The CEP brings a unified standard testing ap- Spain and the United Kingdom. Their equipment is
proach. This means that across our 44 Member then tested against the Common Testing Method-
States and within Europe (because since October ology so it doesn’t matter where it is tested. And if
2020 CEP-approved equipment is automatically the testing is passed, they ultimately receive the
eligible for EU approval and the EU stamp) there is stamp of endorsement that their equipment meets
a common approach. And that is the key part. It not the required standard. It is worth mentioning that it
only saves money but ensures the threats we are is still up to the national authorities to decide if they
concerned about are addressed, and gives a stable wish to approve that equipment to be deployed.
market for manufacturers and their future devel-
opments. The CEP is the largest evaluation programme for
aviation security equipment in the world, covering (1) France, Germany,
44 ECAC Member States. We also know that outside the Netherlands, Spain and
of ECAC, a number of non-ECAC Member States also the United Kingdom
“
move with the times. Standards and testing meth-
non-European States as a reference for odologies have changed over time to address new
We currently their own procurement procedures. We threats. And bringing online those six other cat-
have seen this quite a lot in some coun- egories of equipment shows we take into account
have nearly 700 tries where the procurement documen- the market as well.
tation says that equipment on the ECAC
configurations on list – and no other – can be deployed. Two new categories of equipment are
So it is also a recognition of the value going to be deployed. They have been
the CEP equipment of the CEP for the wider international approved now and will be tested this
community. year. Can you tell us a bit more about
list that meet that?
I agree. The other aspect is that, in addition to the
ECAC/EU CEP, we also have the ECAC Technical Task Force We have two new categories of equipment: explos-
performance (TTF). We rely on the TTF, comprising multiple ive vapour detection (EVD) and APIDS (Automated
Member States’ technical experts, to develop the Prohibited Item Detection Systems). Testing for both
standards.” Common Testing Methodologies our test centres are coming online this year, with APIDS testing
use. This means that those outside ECAC know starting in the next few months in the UK.
there has been rigorous technical assessment, dis-
cussion and decision making to come up with not APIDS is really interesting because we are looking
only how we test equipment but the standards they at being able to do more with the equipment that is
need to achieve. deployed at airports – use of artificial intelligence,
machine learning, better algorithms. We are also
The CEP was created almost 15 years looking at new standards for explosive detection
ago, in 2009. You’ve mentioned a lot systems for cabin baggage (EDSCB) – the new
about its added value but if you had to standard C4 – and how all of these link together.
summarise the top three main achiev-
ements of the CEP, what would they be? Another big focus for us over the next few years is
to ensure the CEP is reliable. We have to sustain the
I would go back to the comment “what if the CEP process and by that, I mean we have to move with
didn’t exist?”. We brought together what were frag- the times, bring in new categories of equipment,
mented testing regimes in national authorities and look at how we do testing so we can ensure the
within ECAC. Since 2009, we have moved from ex- outputs of the CEP are reliable.
If you would like more information on the CEP, visit the ECAC website:
https://www.ecac-ceac.org/activities/security/common-evaluation-process-cep-of-security-equipment
“
We would like
meeting your needs, it is difficult for us to know that
without feedback. We are thankful to the ECAC
Security Forum chair, Carla Pinto, for making time
on the Security Forum agenda where GMTF can up-
sion programme, ensuring Member States have the
latest and best information available for aviation
security harmonisation in the region. We are also
ensuring that innovation remains at the heart of
to promote more date and report on its work. However, we need more our thinking and approach with at least 20% of
questions from the Security Forum and ideally papers addressing guidance material on new topics
engagement more contributors within the GMTF to ensure gui- not previously available.
dance is not dominated by any particular interest
with GMTF.” group or biased towards a level of implementation This work is only possible with the great team that
applicable only to the few. is the GMTF. Our leadership partnership – Ireland,
Türkiye and the ECAC Secretariat – together with
We know from experience that if one of us has a the committed professionals that engage whole-
problem, we all have that problem. The GMTF is heartedly with a demanding work programme,
working to ensure that if we know how to address and turn up to support each other – is ECAC har-
that problem, we should all know how to address monisation in practice. In today’s aviation security
that problem. Everyone’s voice and experience environment, it is that togetherness that is most
matters – finding a way to ensure it is heard and needed – all of us focused on the core objective of
available is key to our future success. safeguarding civil aviation from acts of unlawful
interference.
Eleanor Travers leads the Aviation Security Division in the Irish Aviation Authority, which is the appropriate authority in Ireland for the
purposes of EC Regulation 300/2008. Eleanor has worked in aviation throughout her career, initially in airport operations and latterly in
aviation security. She worked at international level with ECAC in Paris before returning to Dublin to work for the authority. The authority's
Aviation Security Division is responsible for processing approvals, conducting compliance monitoring, certifying personnel and coordinating
aviation security matters with more than 400 regulated entities.
She is currently chair of ECAC’s Guidance Material Task Force and is committed to promoting information and experience exchanges that
improve the effectiveness of the national and global aviation security system.
Directors General of
Civil Aviation gather for
their 159th meeting.
CHARLOTTE LUND joined the ECAC CASE II Project team as an aviation security specialist on 1 October
2022. She holds degrees in communications and marketing and has 16 years of experience in aviation
security at Copenhagen Airport with a focus on regulations, training and education. Before joining ECAC,
Charlotte held a security specialist position for the Danish National Police.
KLEJDA DERVISHAJ joined the ECAC CASE II Project team in October 2022 as a
financial and administrative assistant after several years of professional experi-
ence in Albania in relevant roles in a financial institution and an international
services company.
ANGELA LYNCH joined the ECAC Secretariat on 1 December 2022 as a policy coordinator covering econ-
omics, facilitation, legal issues and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) after six years at the United Kingdom
Civil Aviation Authority in its Strategy and Policy Department. Prior to that, Angela worked on international
financial services policy and inward investment. At the UK CAA she developed experience of the aviation
sector from a regulatory perspective, working most recently in innovation policy covering developments
in electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft and advanced air mobility operations.
MARCH
8-9 I 52nd meeting of the Training Task Force (TrTF/52), online
9 I 3rd ECAC Workshop on Sustainable Aviation Fuels (ENV-SAF-WKSHP/3), online
9 I 55th meeting of the Facilitation Sub-Group on Immigration (FAL-IMMIGRAT-SG/55), online
23 I 8th meeting of the Network of Chief Economists (NCE/8), Paris
23 I 59th meeting of the European Aviation and Environment Working Group (EAEG/59), online
24 I 15th meeting of the Economic Working Group (ECO/15), Paris
29 I 17th Familiarisation webinar on basic knowledge on aviation and the environment
(ENV-FAMWEB/17), online
30 I 46th meeting of the Legal Task Force (LEGTF/46), online
APRIL
calendar
MAY
11-12 I 53rd meeting of the Training Task Force (TrTF/53), Zurich/hybrid
17 I 19th Familiarisation webinar on basic knowledge on aviation and the environment
(ENV-FAMWEB/19), online
23 I 160th meeting of Directors General of Civil Aviation (DGCA/160), Paris
Editorial
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