UnDERSTANDING AND DEVELOPING COMBAT POWER

by

Huba WASS de CZEGE

Colonel, Infantry
10 February 1984

1\11\\1
t''''' (r-:'" rr I EA\ENWGRi:l, ~.-;
. . ~('\ .. -1'•... ~ J I .....

n"
\)'u
T"
I cl
J lQQcl
vVJ

PO RcCiS([;l----­
....

UNDERSTANDING AND DEVELOPING COMBAT POWER

by

Huba WASS de CZEGE

Colonel, Infantry

10 February 1984
 ABSTRACT

The author i.dentifies a need to take a hard look at the analytical methorls
now used in the Army relating to force structuring, doctrine development,
materiel deve Io p.nen t and tactical analysis. He shows t ha t decisions in the
above area depend upon an understanding of the key concept "combat power" and
the combat power development process. He contends that much of current
analytical methodology, including computer assisted simulations :Jnd
mathematical ORS!\. techniques, does not adequately deal with the phenomenon of
land combat. Many of the key variables on the battlefield are unqu:lntifiable
and thus mathematical models run the risk of biasing results in favor of the
purely mechanical aspects of warfare. The author develops an analytical
framework foro under.standing combat power and the process of generating it to
win battles whicl\ borrows methodology from the social sciences. It relates
all army functions and describes how these relate to the development of combat
power. It allows the decislonmaker to recognize the variables lIe can control
in a given sltuation and the trade offs available to him.

This analytieal framewor.k has applicability for: the teaehi.ng of tactIcs

and operatlo'1s; the evaluatIon of unit readIness; the development of force
structures; the identification of materiel and resource needs; and the
develo~nent of d0ctrLnes and future concepts.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
Abstract i
Uses of the Analytical Framework 1
The Need for a New Approach 1
Teaching of Tactical Analysis 3
Teach~ng the Interrelatedness of Army Functions 3
Assessing Unit Readiness 3
Force Development and Force Design 4
Materiel and Combat Development 4
Development of Fighting Concepts and Doctrine 4
Conclusion 4
The Nature of the Next Battlefield 5
The Outcome of Battle 8
The Essence of Combat Power 8
Maneuver 8
Firepower 9
Protection 9
Leadership 10
Summary 10
The Analytical Framework 11
Figure I--The Relative Combat Power Model 11
Figure 2--The Combat Power Model 13
Developing and Applying Combat Power--A Macro View 16
Figure 3--The Process of Developing Combat Power 18
Firepower Effect 19
Volume of Fire 19
Lethality of Munitions 20
Accuracy of Fires 20
Target Acquisition 20
Flexibility of Employment 21
,Maneuver Effect 22
Unit Mobility 22
Tactical Analysis 23
Management of Resources 24
Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) 25
Protection Effect 25
Concealment 26
Exposure Limitation 27
Damage Limi tation 28
Leadership Effect 30
Technical Proficiency 31
Understanding of Unit Capabilities 31
Analytical Skills 32
Communication Skills 32
Dedication, Committment, and Moral Force 32
Understanding of Battle Effects 33
Degrading Enemy Leadership 33
Appendix A: The Firepower Effect Model 35
Appendix B: The Maneuver Effect Model 40
Appendix C: The SurVivability Effect Model 45
 UNDERSTANDING AND DEVELOPING COMBAT POWER

by Huba WASS de CZEGE, COL, IN

Use of the Analytical Framework

One of the mast innovative military thinkers of our time, Mao Tse-tung,
insists that "To become both wise and courageous one must acquire a method, a
method to· be employed in learning as well as in applying what has been
learned." Clausewitz would agree. This paper develops one such method. The
analytical framework developed in this paper incorporates all of the variables
traditionally considered important to decisions on the battlefield. These
variables have been related as they affect battlefield outcomes. This model
provides a guide to "how to think" J and not necessarily "what to think" about
many of the problems confronting the US Army today. The primary purpose of
this analytical framework is to teach military judgment to US Army officers.
It facilitates a broad understanding of the interrelatedness of the functions
performed during the preparation for and conduct of war. It can be used to
assess readiness and to identify important training, materiel and force
structure requirements. It can also be used to identify necessary changes in
fighting concepts and doctrine. We can take little comfort in the thought
t~at Russian analytical processes with regard to combat may be much the same
~s ours. We know that the Soviets tend toward broad applications of ORSA
derived combat decision aids. This may be more than adequate for them. The
side with the preponderance of military capability can afford to waste a good
deal of it. No commander, no matter how brilliant, has managed to utilize all
of his capability, since to do so would require a super-human analytical
ability and a great deal of luck. The successful ones tend to waste far less.
In a war with Russia we cannot afford to waste capabilities. If we can bring
our capabilities to bear fully, the enemy loses his apparent preponderance.

The Need for a New Approach

Many of the analytical tools we now use to make decisions hinge on

assessments of combat power and are much more crude than most officers
realize. In same cases the analysis of combat power has become a cliche
ridden exercise. In others there is a tendency to attribute more to the
results of wargames and computer assisted simulations than they warrant simply
because they are cloaked in an aura of scientific legitimacy. In practice US
Army officers often tend either to rely on intuition and experience to place
values on factors contributing to the combat power of opposing sides, or they
engage in a deceptively simple counting exercise in which they count things-­
direct fire weapons, maneuver units and, in some cases. supporting artillery
tubes.

The problems with the first method, the "gut feeling of the senior
commander" approach, is that a wide range of possible conclusions can flow
from such loosely structured and unscientific analysis. In former wars we
were able to identify and promote commanders who were intuitively successful
at this--those whose intuition and experience led to more "correct"
conclusions than not--and we relieved or reassigned those who were nat. This
may have proved satisfactory enough in a less complex and slower paced past,
but we now face a new environment on the battlefield to which the collective

1
 ..

experience and "intuition of our leadership does not fully apply and we may
risk making more mistakes than we can afford in a short and violent war
against a numerically superior foe.

The second mp.thod--the weapons/unitR counting method--involves an attempt

to be more objective and scientific. The logic of such a method appears sound
on the surface. One only needs to determine the force or "combat power"
ratios involved and draw some inference as to the probability of success of a
given operation. The danger with this type of analysis is that it can lead to
simplistic and fatalistic thinking based on judgments about only the
quantifiable aspects of the battlefield. The 1976 version of FM 100-5
introduced the US Army to numerical force ratio guidelines for combat. It
state~ that nne can reasonably be assured of a successful attack if the ratio
of opposing forces is 6 to 1. Likewise a successful defense can be expected
if the ratio of .:Ittacking forces to defending is 3 to 1 or less. One should
recognize several problems with such analytical methods.

o First, how does one compare the opposing forces, and what does one
include in that comparison, because forces are seldom equivalent and the
environmental variables are seldom neutral?

o Second, what does one do when the ratios are less favorable than the
guidelines? Simplistic methods of analysis cause one to ignore techniques
that enhance capabilities except as an afterthought. For instance, deception,
electronic warfare, barrier planning and other combat power multipliers may
only be consider~d and integrated after the plan of actio!l is actually
determined. They are then applied only to hedge one's bets!

o Third, these simplistic methods of analysis caUl;e unrealistic

distinctions to be made between force elements which contribute directly to
combat power and those which do not. Most discussions of tooth-to-tai1 ratios
hinge on such arhitrary distinctions. Since units contribute to combat power
in different ways there is no clear theoretical line of demarcatIon between
"tooth" and "tail." For instance, in counting elements which contribute to
combat power, we may focus on forces such as infantry, armor, artillery, air
defense and aerial weapons platforms which actually deliver munitions against
the enemy, and Ignore the fact that the trajectories of those munitions are
actually the last leg of a long delivery system. Therefore, it makes little
sense to compare gross numbers of tanks and artillery tubes on both sides in
determining force ratios without considering the potential volume of the flow
of ammunition to those guns.

o Fourth, the objective counting method of analysis leads to fatalistic

attitudes about the outcome of impending battle. While mechanical factors are
very important, a number of intangible factors often predominate. Napoleon
was fond of saying, "God favors the large battalions," but historians can also
point to many battles which were not won by the "largest battalions."
Napoleon was also quoted as saying that "the moral Is to the physical as three
is to one.

o Finally, the nature of modern battle can be unfathomably complex. A

more encompassing analytical approach is required to deal with this added
complexity.

2
 Since the author believes that neither of the above described approaches
to analysis of combat are sufficient for a clear and rigorous understanding of
combat power in a modern context, an alternative approach 1s developed in the
succeeding pages.

Teaching of Tactical Analysis. Tactical analysis as it is practiced today

lacks a rigorous methodology and language. The teaching of tactical analysis
has devolyed to an overly simplistic level in many of our service schools. It
is often limited to a mechanical selection of a main attack force, the
objectives of main and supporting attacks, and the routes to those objectives
based on a few simple decision rules. Students are often taught little more.
Many important factors are left out of the analysis and conflicting courses of
action can often be equally well supported by such rules. Some viable courses
of action are never considered. This analytical framework may be used to
teach principles and their application by examining short-comings and
successes of historical cases. Students can then apply the methodology to
original tactical situationso Drilling students in the use of the analytical
framework will cause them to learn to apply it instinctively when they are
confronted with a "real world" situation later. This method of analysis
supplements but does not replace the military decisionmaking process or the
"wargaming" methodology developed by the Department of Tactics at CGSC to
analyze courses of action.

Teaching the Interrelatedness of Army Functions. Sometime in the career of an

officer he must gain an understanding of how the various military functions
interrelate and contribute to combat power. This analytical framework relates
complex and diverse functions in the preparation for and conduct of war.

Assessing Unit Readiness. Devices such as the ARTEP, AGI, and the Unit
Readiness Reporting System can only focus on a limited number of variables and
are useful as shorthand indices of real readiness. A hardheaded application
of the analytical framework developed in this paper can identify additional
strengths and problem areas and can help establish priorities for training,
materiel readiness, and personnel management.

Force Development and Force Design. This analytical framework also prOVides
the force developer with a more complete frame of reference than some of the
, simulation techniques employed in current analysis. Analysis dependent on
simulations (wargames) based on quantitative models down play or ignore the
unquantifiable and over emphasize the most direct mechanical aspects of combat
power--weapons capabilities and mobility. While these mechanical aspects of
combat are important they must be considered in context. The analytical
framework developed here can be used to supplement and enrich the results of
purely quantitative analysis by providing the broader context and thus it can
enhance the analytical rigor of military judgment. In the force design and
development fields, the problem is often one of communicating a "gut feeling"
about a proposed action to others. This analytical framework also provides
the language and the frame of reference for cogent communications.

Materiel and Combat Development. Many items are brought into the inventory
piecemeal under the current system and relevant trade-offs are difficult to
identify. The materiel needs of the Army are derived directly from a need to
increase its combat power in some way. Perceptions of need most often arise

3
from two other sources. One stems from the deployment or development of a
particular weapon system by the threat force. The other stems from a desire
to employ the latest technological advance in some way. Both of these sources
tend to graft syf{tems into the materiel structure of the Army in "an unbalanced
way. An application of the proposed analytical methodology wouid identify
needs in relation to combat power payoffs within cost constraints.

Development of Fighting Concepts and Doctrine. Many of our decisions in this

area are based 011 military judgments which rely on "gut feeling" and
necessarily simplistic simulations. While such judgments may be correct,
better doctrine could result from a rigorous examination and articulation of.
those "gut feelings" and by interpreting the results of simulations within a
broader systemic framework. This analytical framework can aid the development
of concepts and doctrine in two ways. First, it can be used to assess current
doctrine in light of new developments to insure that it serves to guide
actions in such a way as to maximize combat power. Second, it can serve as a
vehicle for communicating the need for any necessary changes thus identified.

Conclusion. In order to achieve this high level of Iltilization we must seek

better analytical techniques. We cannot rely exclusively on the intuition of
those fortunate individuals who have it, even if we could somehow identify
them; and it is dangerous to teach a simplistic "by the numbers" method to
those who can't rely on their deep intuitive understanding of the battlefield.
if in our attempt to become more scientific we rely only on more sophisticated
quantitative techniques our sense of the real vor Ld will become skewed.

The Nature of the Next Batt1efleld

The US Army may find itself at war in any o f a number of places and in a
wide variety of Rituations •. It may fight opponents whose military
capabilities coul.d vary from highly modern mechanized forces of. the t-larsaw
Pact to similarly organized Soviet clients in the l1iddle East or northeast
Asia to lighter. 'olell equipped forces in other parts of the world.

The US Army lllUSt have forces trained and equipped to fight in a variety of
locations around the world. Battle in central Europe against forces of the
Warsaw pact or against modern mechanized forces in the Middle East or
northeast Asia is the most demanding mission the Army could be assigned.
However, it may be more likely that US Army forces will be deployed to other
parts of the world. Therefore, the US Army retains substantial capabilities
in its airborne, airmobile, and infantry divisions for operations in other
theaters of the war against other types of forces.

Karl von C'laus ewl t z once stated that in war even simple things are
difficult, that I:he "friction" of combat makes even simple plans har.d to
effect. This has never been more accurate than today when the potential
destruction of nuclear-chemical weapons is superimposed on an alr.eady complex
and lethal cQnve~tlonal battle.

The Army must be prepared to fight its battles at the end of long,
expensive, vulnerable lines of communications and must anticipate combat
against forces armed with ultra modern weapons, deployed in greater numbers,
and supported f r om near by supply sources. The support required for the highly

4
 sophisticated equipment of the force, high attrition rates, high consumption
rates of ammunition, fuel, and other supplies, increased vulnerability of rear
support areas on the nuclear-chemical-conventional battlefield, an austere

I logistical tail, and the high tempo of combat operations combine to complicate
the problem of sustaining the force in combat. The Army's operations with the
Air Force and the Navy must be thoroughly integrated if we are to succeed
under such conditions.

In the areas of greatest strategic concern--Europe, the Mideast, and

Northwest Asia--military forces likely to be adversaries use tactics and
organizations patterned after, and equipment supplied by or patterned after,
that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is possible therefore, to
visualize what the Army should anticipate in the modern AirLand Battle.

o The modern battlefield will be dense, with large quantities of high

quality combat systems whose range and lethality surpass anything in previous
experience.

a The air space over the battlefield will be crowded with high quality
aerial combat, aerial surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition and air
defense systems and weapons designed to deny enemy use of battlefield air
space.

o The battle, especially in the area where the battle outcome is

decided, is likely to be intense, quick and deadly. So much so, that it will
be difficult to determine what is going on. This intensity, density and
lethality of battle is quite likely to make command control of engaged forces
extremely difficult.

o Such an environment will also place a premium on leadership and unit

cohesion. The stress on soldiers and units is likely to be as great or
greater than any experienced in history.

o At the same time, communications systems which provide command control

will be the target of intense, highly sophisticated and extremely effective
electronic warfare operations. At the very time when battle demands better
and more effective command control, we can expect modern countermeasures to
make command control more fragile than ever before and less effective than
demanded by the battle environment.

I o The number and variety of modern weapons are such that no single
system can be expected to fight successfully much less to win. The presence
of all branches and services is demanded more than ever before and their
integration into close knit, highly effective battle teams is essential to
survival and victory.

o The spread of high quality combat gear into the military forces. of
many nations makes it quite likely that no significant qualitative advantage
can be expected by one or the other of the antagonists in modern battle. At
the same time, US forces should expect that they will have to fight
outnumbered, even taking into account real or potential allies.

5
 o The present and growing capability of many nations to employ chemical
and nuclear weapons and the apparent willingness of several nBtions to use
them, make it imperative that US forces plan from the outset to fight on an
integrated conventional-chemical-nuclear battlefield. Given an enemy with
such capabilitieR, US forces must conduct operations from tlte outset as if
already in a nuclear/chemical environment. First use, and especially surprise
use, of nuclear/chemical weapons by the enemy, must not allow him to win. Our
own doctrine for the use of nuclear and chemical weapons must be clearly
designed to achieve the best possible tactical results.

o Thre~t doctrine emph:lsizes the principle of mass and seeks victory

through the relentless prosecution of offensive operations. If nuclear and
chemical weapons are required to insure success or maintain progress, they
will be used. The Soviets recognize that the employment of nuclear or
chemical weapons will alter tBctics, force requirements and rates of advance.
Their basic doctrine assumes the use of these weapons and they are now
equipped, armed, and trained to fight on the nuclear and chemical battlefield.

o The effe~ts of nucle.<lr, chemical and electronic warfare whether used

singly or in comhination, change the operational environment. Nuclear l<leapons
produce Lmmed Lat e and long-term effects. They will cause tree blow down,
urban destruction, wild fires and contamination. Nuclear radiation penetrates
protective materials and contaminates supplies, logistics facilities,
equipment, terrain and sources of food and water. Chemical weapons also
produce prompt .<lnd long-term effects. They create obstacles by contamination
of terrain and deny the use of equipment and supplies. However, the
effectiveness of chemical agents can be reduced by using protective equipment
and shelters. Though the extent of the physical obstacles can be readily
determined, chemical or radiological contamination is invisible and thus
requires the use of special detection devices to define the nature, intensity,
and magnitude of the contamination.

o In tile past, some units have experienced sizable losses In personnel

and equipment, bllt the losses usually occurred over a protracted period. On
the next battlefield such losses are likely to occur instantaneously from the
effects of blast thermal radiation and nuclear radiation. Troops surviving
initial exposure to chemical agents or mid levels of r.<ldlatlon can function
for hours or days but then become casualties. The psychological ef.fects of
both nuclear and chemical weapons are likely to be severe and may very well
cause mass panic and confusion among untrained and improperly equipped troops.

o The destructive capacity of chemical or nuclear weapons and the

psychological impact of their use will dramatically effect the contr.ol of
forces. \-le can expect command posts to be prime tar.gets for nuclear or
chemical attack. The electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear deton.<ltion can
damage all unprotected electronic components, both communicR.tions and
noncommunLca t Lous equipment. In units, control will be d Lf f LcuI t with
soldiers wearing protective gear and leaders experiencing difficulty in
getting around, recognizing their soldiers and communicating. TIlere exists a
high likelihood that units will be isolated by enemy maneuver, fires or
electronic warfare. Such battle places a premium on leadership .<lnd unit

6
cohesion to counteract the psychological strains of battle. Commanders at all
levels will be required to decide between dispersion to increase survivability
and the loss of control created by the dispersion.

This complex environment requires that US Army officers understand more

than a few simple decision rules such as our traditional nine principles of
war. They are a mere starting point. We must also understand the dynamics
which underly their application. The principles of war provide sound guidance
about what ~ should do--they are one sided. We must -understand the two sided
nature of war.

The Outcome of Campaigns, Battles and Engagements

The outcome of campaigns, battles, and engagements in such an

environment--one in which even the simple things become difficult--is
determined by the relative combat power of the adversaries at the point of
decision. Such relative combat power is not determined by crude comparisons
of the potential strength and resources of the protagonists in terms of force
ratios. Although numbers are important, relative combat power is determined
in the main by the manner in which such potential strength and resources are
brought to bear against the enemy. This conversion of potential to power is
largely a function of the intangible factors which have historically
differentiated armies. State of training, motivation, quality of leadership,
and firmness of purpose are among these intangible attributes which
distinguish winning armies.

If war is permitted to become a series of mindless processes, once set

into motion, then the side with the greatest potential strength will win. The
great captains of history--Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus,
Fredrick, Napoleon and others--had the ability to upset simple force ratios.
The key to their success was the ability to gain the most from their
capabilities while their adversaries did not. The impacts of the
nonquantifiable aspects of combat power are undeniably as decisive today as
ever when physical factors are not overwhelmingly out of balance.

The Essence of Combat Power

Combat power is always relative, never an absolute, and has meaning only
as it compares to that of the enemy. Combat power is defined as that property
of combat action which influences the outcome of battle. It has meaning only
in a relative sense--relative to that of the enemy--and has meaning only at
the time and place where battle outcomes are determined. Prior to battle
there exists only capability. Leaders and the forces of their environment, to
include the actions of the enemy, transform this capability into combat power.
Superior combat power has been generated on the battlefield by superior
leaders and superior units against forces vastly superior by any objective
criteria. The appropriate combination of maneuver, firepower, and protection
by a skillful leader within a sound operational plan will turn combat
potential into actual combat power. Superior combat power applied at the
decisive place and time decides the battle.

7
Haneuve r , Haneuve r l s the dynam.Lc element of combat. It l s achLeved by
concentrating forces in critical areas to gain and to use the advantages of
surprise, psychological shock, position, and momentum to leverage available
combat capabilities and thereby create a decisive relative adllantage vis-a-Ilis
an opponent on the battlefield. It may be the movement of forces to achieve a
position on the l>attlefield from which to destroy or threaten destruction of
the enemy. It's effect can be to throw the enemy off balance by uncovering or
taking advantage of a weakness in dispositions, by unhinging his coordination,
by invalidating his planned or current actions, by capitalizing on his
unreadiness to cnl1nter our actions, or any combination of these.

It is the ef.f.ects thus created which contribute to combat power. Hobility

or movement in and of themselves do not create this effect although relative
mobility or rel.qtive movement are enabling capabilities. These other factors,
and the capabilities which contribute to them, are also important to create
maneuver effects: knowledge of the enemy and terrain generated by gtudy of
the enemy, reconuaissance and other intelligence activities; effective command
and control of subordinate forces; flexible operational practices; sound
organization; and reliable logistical support.

Firepower. Firepower provides the enabling, violent, destructive force

essential to realizing the effects of maneuver. It is the means of
suppressing the ~nemy's fires, neutralizing his tactical forces, and
destroying his ability to fight. This is done by killing, wounding, or
paralyzing the enemy's soldlers and by damaging the materiel and installations
necessary for his continued combat effectiveness. At the tactical and
operational levels of war firepower is delivered by personal arms, crew-served
direct fire weapons, mortars, artillery cannons and missiles, air defense guns
and missiles, attack helicopters, Air Force and Navy aircraft, and Naval
gunfire bombardment.

Again it is I:he effect of firepower which contributes to combat power and

not its unapplied or misapplied potential. It is the accuracy and volume of
fires, the lethality of munitions and the flexible employment of weapons
systems which comb t ne to create this effect. Therefore, efficient and
effective t a rg e t-iacqu LsLt Lou systems, viable and ef Eec t Lve commaud and
control, a steady supply of the right munitions and the tactical and
operational mobLl.lty necessary to place weapons within range of critical
targets are necessary ingredients of this element of combat power.

Protection. Protection is the shielding of the fighting potential of the

force so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. Protection
has two components. The first includes all actions to counter the enemy's
firepower and maneuver by making soldiers, systems, and units diFfi.cult to
locate, to strike, or to destroy. Among these actions are security,
dispersion, cover, camouflage, deception, suppression, and mobiltty. These
actions routinely include the reinforcement and concealment of fighting
positions, command posts, and support facilities. The second component
includes actions to keep soldiers healthy, to maintain their fighting morale,
and to diminish the impact of severe weather. It also means keeping equipment
in repair and supplies from he coming lost. As in the other elements of combat

8
power, the effects of protection contribute to combat power. These effects
are measured by the fighting potential available at the moment of decisive
combat.

Leadership. This is the component upon which all others depend. Leadership
provides purpose, direction, and motivation in combat •. Leaders function
through personal interaction with their men and through command and control
systems a~d facilities. The primary function of leadership in battle is to
inspire and to motivate soldiers to do difficult things in trying
circumstances. While leadership requirements differ from squad to echelons
above corps, leaders must be men of character; they must know and understand
soldiers and the physical tools of battle; and they must act with courage and
conviction. Leaders must understand how to control and to integrate fire,
maneuver, and protection effects. In short, it is the overall effect the
leader creates on the battlefield vis-a-vis the enemy through proper
application of his potential maneuver, firepower, and protection capabilities
which generates relative combat power.

Prior to battle, leaders set the pre-conditions which make winning

possible. Superior combat power has its roots in proper preparation.
Preparation includes many matters of long-term concern to the Army at the
highest levels--force design, equipment design, procurement resources,
doctrinal development, and the training and education of soldiers and their
leaders, to name only a few. The tactical commander on the battlefield has a
more immediate perspective. To him, preparation involves logistic readiness
and motivation. It means continuous planning and training to the moment of,
and even during. active combat. It means training throughout campaigns
because every endeavor causes the unit to learn either good or bad habits.
Commanders and leaders at all echelons must demand excellence under all
conditions and must strive to make it habitual.

Summary. The outcome of battle is determined by the relative combat power of

the antagonists. And this Is determined by the following complex variables:
the effect of firepower placed on the enemy (firepower effects), the effect of
maneuver (maneuver effects), the effect of protection of forces (protection
effects) and the effect of combat leadership (leadership effects) on both
sides. The outcome of battle is, therefore, determined by a two-sided
equation. The object of combat actions and preparation prior to combat then
is to affect the value of both sides of this equation. The leader who strives
to win must operate on both sides of this equation--he must maximize the
effects of his own capabilities and must degrade those of the enemy
sufficiently to achieve a superior relative combat power. Leaders are given
certain capabilities to shoot, move and achieve protection on the battlefield.
What they do with those capabilities results in firepower effect, maneuver
effect, and protection effect. The actions which leaders take either increase
or decrease their own capabilities or those of the enemy in some way. What
these actions may be, and what is included in the four basic variables
identified above will be made plain in later sections. Some of these actions,
such as training, planning, coordinating, deceiving, etc, may be a factor in
more than one of the above variables.

9
The Analytical Framework. Any t Lme one attempts to describe as pe c t s of the
real world in a cornpr ehens Lve model, one runs the risk of leaving something
out. But since human minds "ire not capable of dealing simultaneously with rtll
variables which «cns t t tute reality, simplified models are absolutely essential
to any rigorous thinking. Such models define and make explicit the
relationships between the most pertinent 'variables. This analytical fr.amework
is based on !'l\\ch a model. The figure below represents the simple logic of the
basic analytical. model previously described in words above.

THE RELATIVE COMBAT POWER HODEL

L - friendly Leide r sh Lp effect L - enemy leadership effect

f e
F - friendly fir.epower effect F - enemy firepower effect
f e
M - friendly maneuver effect M - enemy maneuver effect
f e
P - friendly protection effect P - enemy protection effect
f e
D - enemy deg r ad Lng of friendly D - friendly degrading of enemy
e f
firepower, maneuver and firepower, maneuver and
protection effects protection effects

Figure 1

In simple au.l unembellished terms the equation s t a t es that the outcome of

battle depends upon the difference in comhat power of the antagon Ls t s . It
further states that combat power is the r'~S111t of what leaders do with the
firepower, maneuver, and protection capabi Lt t Les of their units. It ,311::;0
states that combat power is affected by the efforts on the part of the
antagonists to degrade the combat capabilities of the other whill~ attempting
to minimize the effects of such action 011 their own combat capabilities.

Each of the terms in the above equation is a complex function of many

variables. Certain aspects of each of those terms are quantifiable, but many
aspects u.l.t Lmat.e l.y might not be. It is not the sort of equation which lends
itself to solution by computers in order to determine with confidence the
outcome of a potential battle situation. Many of the v:lriable anvects of the
terms remain unknown until the moment of their impact on the brtttiefieid
decision. The b~lance of this section will be devoted to developlng further
the system of analysis presented thus far.

Figure 2 is an attempt to expand one side of the relative coiaba t; power

equation. It is not as detailed as this model can become. In this model, the
four basic variables constitute the first level of abstraction of the model.
They are de t e rml ned by a set of 18 more specific variables which constitute
the second level of abstraction. Those 18 are again determined by abollt 64
more specific vrtl-iables which constitute the third level of abstraction. At
this level of resolution of the model some of these variables may become
"givens" or conRtants which cannot be changed by the leader. A commander or
staff officer with a specific unit in mind could, and woulrl,i.f he were

10
employing this method of analysis, go to a fourth and fifth or even sixth
level in order to examine his situation and courses of action. He would do
this in order to identify every variable over which he had control. The
leader's task then is to examine his variables in terms of his ability to
affect them and to choose the course of action which in his judgment maximizes
his combat power. This is generally the thought process leaders might
intuitively follow given enough appropriate experience,

11
 THE COMBAT POWER MODEL

COMBAT POWER IS A FUNCTION OF:

1. FIREPOWER EFFECT: (which is a function of)

VOLUME OF FIRE: (which is a function of)

Number of delivery means
Supply capability
Rate of fire of weapons systems

LETHALITY OF MUNITIONS:
Design characteristics
Explosive energy

ACCURACY OF FIRES:
Weapon and munition design characteristics
Crew proficiency
Terrain effects
Visibility

TARGET ACQUISITION:
Inte11iaence and intelligence analysis
Location and functioning of observers and sensors
Transmission of target data

FLEXIBILITY OF EMPLOYMENT:
Weapons ranges
Mobility
Signature effects
Fire control systems
Tactical employment doctrine

2. MANEUVER EFFECT:

UNIT MOBILITY:
Physical fitness and health of individuals
Unit teamwork and esprit
Unit equipment capabilities
Unit equipment maintenance
Unit mobility skills

TACTICAL ANALYSIS:
Intelligence and knowledge of enemy tactics
Understanding of terrain effects
Understanding of own unit capabilities

MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES:
Equipment utilization
Supplies utilization
Personnel utilization
Time utilization
Utilization of energies of subordinates

12
 .....

CO~1ANDt CONTROL AND COtlliUNICATIONS:

Span of control
SOP's and doctrine
Staff efficiency
Communications efficiency

3. PROTECTION ~FFECT:

CONCEALMENT:
Camouflage
Stealth
Equipment design
Counter enemy intelligence acquisition means

EXPOSURE LIMITATION:
Minimize potential target size
Minimize potential target exposure time
Complicate potential target tracking.

DAMAGE LIMITATION:
Individual protective equipment design and use
Use of natural cover
Use of artificial cover (incl field fortifications)
Combat vehicle design
Medical treatment and evacuation system
Combat equipment canibalization and repair
Alternate command and control arrangements
Providing personnel and materiel replacements
Misc. efforts to maintain continued combat effectiveness of units

4. LEADERSHIP EFFECT:

TECHNICAL PROFICIENCY:
Training
Experience

UNDERSTANDING OF UNIT CAPABILITIES:

Training
Experience

ANALYTICAL SKILLS:
Selection
Training
Experience

CO~lUNICATION SKILLS:
Selection
Training
 DEDICATION, COHMITTHENT, AND HORAL FORCE:
Selection
Motivation
Training

UNDERSTANDING OF BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS:

Combat experience
Trai.ning

Figure 2

This analytical framework lends itself more to learning about combat and
its dynamics than to be used as a quick reference gimmick on the battlefield.
It is designed to assist the leader (or his staff officers) in asking the
right questions about what to do to win. It does not tell him whether he will
win. It helps to portray the relationship between actions and the ends of
those actions in the maximizing of relative combat power. This analytical
model helps the leader in relating building blocks to the structure of combat
power in a coherent way and insures that all of the important building blocks
are in place. In considering each of the variables in the third column of
Figure 2 (third level of abstraction) the leader can ask three questions.
First, what can be done here to maximize or fully apply my combat power?
Second, what actions can I take to degrade the enemy's capability in this
area? And third, what actions must I take to counter the enemy's ability to
degrade my capability in this area?

Time is most often the determining factor as to what are "variables" and
what are "givens." The variables diminish in number rapidly as one approaches
H-hour, but are never reduced to zero. The value of some variables may also
fluctuate with time as the enemy takes unforeseen actions to affect them or
other environmental factors intrude.
\

The level of command also helps to determine the number of "variables."

To the National Command Authority, over a long time frame, all of the elements
at the third level of abstraction may be variable. They may be a function of
resourc~s and inclination based on risk analysis tradeoffs.

14
Developing and Applying Combat Power--A Macro View. Applied combat power can
be understood as the end product of a lengthy process. This process involves
many people from the National Command Authority level to the rifleman in the
infantry squad. At the highest levels, at what has been termed as the macro
force development level, decisions are made on force levels and types through
a process involving the funding of specific programs. These programs relate
to specific functions such as General Purpose Forces, Strategic Forces,
Research and Development and others. At the Department of the Army level,
these program decisions are translated into numbers and types of units,
manning levels, personnel management programs and policies, purchases of
specific,numbers and types of equipment, and various programs designed to
sustain the Army in peace and war, keep it equipped, manned and housed. Major
Army Commands are further charged with contributing to comhat power
development within certain functions. The Department of the Army Readiness
Command (DARCOM) is charged with procuring, developing, and servicing the
materiel needs of the Army. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is charged
with the formal training of Army personnel, the design of Army organizations
and the development of a common body of knowledge, procedures, and techniques
relating to how Army units fight. Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the forward
deployed commands are charged with maintaining the readiness of the major
units assigned to them by Department of the Army. The hypothetical unit
depicted in figure 3 is a subordinate combat unit of either FORSCOM or one of
the forward deployed commands. It may be anything from a corps to a squad.
the figure relates the development of combat power to roles and time frames.
This unit is structured with certain elements and capabilities depicted as
firepower "givens," maneuver effect "givens," and protection effect "givens."
The various inputs to this structure come from the R&D community, DARCOM,
Department of the Army force planners and developers, Major Command force
developers, TRADOC (in the form of doctrine, trained personnel, TOE's, etc)
and certain combat service support elements from within the parent major
command or unit. As one progresses from left to right in the figure, the unit
leader prepares his unit for combat beginning years or months before M-Day.
He affects the inherent capabilities of his unit by training and organizing
it, planning for possible employment in combat after M-Day, and maintaining
his equipment within his constraints. Just prior to D-Day he begins focusing
his unit's capabilities on his assigned battlefield task by detailed planning,
coordination, rehearsals, last minute training and other preparations. At a
hypothetical lI-Hour his unit begins to execute the combat mission. He
supervises and controls his unit's efforts in combat in order to direct all
efforts toward the accomplishment of the mission. However, seldom will all of
his capabilities be directed at mission accomplishment. There will always be
some wasted effort due to what Clausewitz calls the "friction of war." The
results of battle will be determined not only by numbers of men or weapons,
but by the amount of combat power he manages to focus on the enemy relative to
that which the enemy manages to focus on his unit. Thus the leader who brings
the most in capabilities to the battlefield may not necessarily be the victor.

The following sections will further amplify the model by discussing the
four basic combat power determining variables in greater detail.

15
Firepower Ef fect

The effectiv~ness of munitions actually used to attack. the enemy is

. dependent upnn :l complex set of variables: the volume of munitions, the
lethallty or enc h munition, the accuracy of delivery means, t a rgn t ac qu l s Lt Lou
capability, :\1111 the flexibility of employment 0 f delivery sys terns. Each 0 f
these is further a function of many more particular variables.

Volume of Fire. Volume of fire in a given situation is a function of the

number of weqpon~, wh Lch can be brought to bear effectively, the availability
of suitable ammunition, and the rate of fire.

Volume of: f l r e is first a function of the number of delivery means lo1hich

are employed, LQ., the number of tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, anti-tank
weapons, macl\inp~uns, rifles, etc. This is both a function of absolute
numbers and of pDsltioning relative to the enemy. That portion of the total
which can eff.ecti.vely engage the enemy at the time and place of decision is
what counts.

Volume of fire can also he thought of as being a functi.on of the

effectiveness of the supply system in a very broad sense. One could begin hy
examining the number of rounds carried in the basic load and the unit's
a.ssociated fire discipline (the ability to make that basic load count). Then
one can examine nvad Lab Le supply rates (ASRs), the flow of ammunition from the
ASP, the flow within the theater to the ASP, the flow into the theater, and
finally production and stockage rates. For the squad leader, anything beyond
maintaining and ~onserving his basic load is a "given," but not so for the
Corps commander who can also affect the flow of ammunition into a particular
division by shifting assets from one area to another, or can preposition
ammunition stocks. At the national level, the number of rounds of. a
particular type ~lich can be purchased may also be a function of. the cost of
each individual round. We must be sure that each increment of additional
capability or qua l Lt y is worth the foregone opportunity to buy more of a
cheaper and less sophisticated munition.

Volume of fil-e can also be a func t Lon of the rate of fire of the weapons
systems. In a n~rruw sense, this can sbnply mean the number of rounds per
minute a particular weapon is capable of firing within a short time frame. In
a broader sense, rate of fire considerations can include time required to put
a weapons system Lnto action, out of action, and travel time to a new
location, UR well as a sustained rate of fire in any given position. This
broader conception of "rate of fire" is most useful for the combat leader.
Weapons desiiJll characteristics determine this "rate of fire" to some varying
degree, but crew proficiency can determine a large part of it. While weapons
design characteristics are a "given" to most combat leaders, crew prof.lclency
can be improved oy many time proven ways, such as training, maintaining
strength levels, physical conditioning to enhance endurance, motivation,
keeping proficient crews together longer, etc.

Volume of fire generated by either side can be degraded by various

battlefield actions. The number of delivery means can be reduced or
neutralized through counter-battery flres, suppression, normal battlefield
attrition, and r.l'~ep interdiction by air. The flow of supplies can be affected

16
by sabotage, interdiction, and clogged lines of communications. The rate of
fire may be degraded by suppression and other actions which would affect crew
proficiency and the will to fight.

Lethality of MunItions. For the combat leader, the lethality of munitions is

fixed except when he has a choice among different types of ammunition, then he
must choose and have on hand the right munition, for the task. The lethality
of the munition or its ability to do damage on impact, is a function of its
design, i:e., bursting radius, penetrating power, ballistics, and amount of
explosive energy. There is little which can be done to degrade the enemy in
this area unless one takes the type of actions later described under
"protection effect."

Accuracy of Fires. Accuracy of fires, or the ability to hit a target once it

has been identifLed, is an important variable in all possible scenarios. It
is a function of weapon and munition design characteristics, crew proficiency,
terrain effects, and visibility. The latter three are the variables most
combat leaders must concern themselves with. Crew proficiency can often be a
function of individual skills, aptitudes, training, ability to estimate
ranges, small unit cohesiveness and leadership, morale, and physical
condition. Terrain effects include the effects of fields of fire, terrain
masking of targets, site (elevation), and range to target. Visibility can
often be a function of more than light conditions, fog and smoke, but can also
6e a function of the availability of infrared and light intensification
equipment.

The most profitable area for degrading enemy accuracy in an engagement is

to focus on crew proficiency and visibility. Enemy crew proficiency can be
degraded by the use of chemical agents, the psychological effect of combat
shock and surprise, and suppressive fires, and by creating additional fatigue
in crew members through constant pressure and harassment. The visibility can
be degraded by using fog, smoke and darkness to mask movement, by using
decoying techniques to draw his fires, and by employing movement techniques
which minimize target exposure.

Target Acquisition. Target acquisition capability can be a simple variable

depending upon visibility and observation techniques, as at squad level, or it
can depend upon the workings of a complex system as in air defense or
counterbattery fire. At any level, it depends upon intelligence and analysis
to determine where the search for targets should begin. Then it depends upon
placing human observers (reconnaissance elements, forward observers, or
observation posts) or mechanical sensors (radars or unattended ground sensors)
so as to maximize the probability that targets will be observed. Finally, it
depends upon analysis and transmission of information to the weapons system.
While this process can be very simple in the case of the machine gunner, it
can be quite complex in the case of the Hawk missile.

Some of the most obvious means to degrade target acquisition are the use
of smoke, darkness and fog to conceal movement (as well as using terrain for
the same purpose), deception to cause the enemy to focus his attention away
from planned movements, electronic measures to counter his mechanical sensors
as well as to degrade the transmission of target information and fires and
maneuver forces to disrupt or sever bis communications systems.

17
Flexibility of Employment. Finally, firepower effect is also a function of
the flexibi 1 tty of empLoymen t of weapons system. Such f l ex Lbt l t t y would
include the ~bilLtj to concentr~te fires of the right kind over a wide area In
the desired amoUllts and at the right time. This then would depend upon weapon
ranges, mobility, fire control systems, tactical doctrine for employment of a
weapon sys t ens and coordination of changes in priorities. weapon signature
effects, and var.iety of munitions available. The greater the range of a
weapon system thq greater the area in which fires can be massed, shifted and
massed again. This is particularly true for indirect fire weapons wher.e line
of sight from we:1pon to target is not a concern. Flexibility is enhanced when
the weapon sys t em can move rapidly from one firing position to the next. This
is the great adv~ntage of self-propelled artillery over towed artillery. Well
conceived fi re enntrol systems also enhance f Lex Lhl.1ity by insuring the
engagement of priority targets by firing elements and by providing for a means
to control and mass f.tres on the battlefield. Adherence to sound tactical
doctrine insures that weapons systems are employed in such a way that their
function and capAbility is understood by all interested parties and that their
full capabili.tieq can then be exercised. Weapons signature effects often
reduce the f Lexl bLl Lt y of a weapons system since they mus t e Lthe r be
frequently relocated, or sited so as to make detection after firing difficult.
Weapons systems -rr e also made more flexible by providing them wl th a variety
of ammunition wh Lch can be used for a wide range of purposes.

The flexibility of employment of enemy weapons systems CA.n be hampered by

reducing mohLlity tlrough tile use of artifici~l and natural barrIers and by
degrading fire cURtt)l systems at critical times through tl\e use of electronic
warfare techniques a; well as by well coordinated suppression tactics.

Maneuver Effect

Effective tactic 1 maneuver consi8ts of the ability to engage the enemy or

avoid engagement in such a way as to maximize the effects of frl.endly
firepower and minimize the effects of enemy firepower--in effect skew the
firepower balancp in ones favor. Effective operational level lIlanuever
consists of the ability to position forces In sucl\ a way as to tip the local
combat power. ba Lnnce in ones favor. The threat of firepower capab t Ltty i.n
such a position llIay even negate the need for its use. It is thus a function
of unit mobility, effective tactical analysis, effective management of
resources, and effective command, control, communications.

Unit Hobility. (Jilit mobility at the tactical level Ls further. dependent upon
physical fitness and health of individuals, unit teamwork and esprit, 11I1lt
equipment capA.billties, unit equipment maintenance, and unit mobility skills.
While the fir.st two are faLrly obvious, and their importance well recognized,
the latter three need clarification. Unit equipment capabilities are
determined by the quantity and type of equipment assigned and the prevelant
conditions of weather and terrain. (By type we refer here to the mobility
design characterLstlcs of the equipment.) The state of repair of equipment is
a function both Qf equipment design and the system of eql1ipment maintenance
and must be considered from both the preventive and the corrective
perspective. Heehanical failure rates can be reduced, and hence unit mobility
enhanced, if eqlllpment is durable and simple to malntain, Bnd if good
preventive m.i Ln te nauce practices are adhered to (r.equires discipline and

18
training). Given any mechanical failure rate, unit mobility is enhanced if
the maintenance system froID organizational levels to depot level functions
efficiently.

A factor which bridges both equipment capabilities and equipment states of

repair is the availability and flow of consumables such as class III (POL) and
class IX (spare parts) supplies primarily, and class VIr (major end items),
secondari~y. Any stoppages in this flow effects unit mobility, maneuver
effect, and ultimately combat power.

Another very important aspect of unit mobility, and one which is always a
variable for the combat leader, is the state of a unit's mobility skills, or,
in other words, a measure of a unit's ability to properly move from point A to
point B. This is mostly a function of training and unit SOPs. These skills
are of paramount importance on the modern battlefield and include road
marching, occupying assembly areas, map reading, foot mobility, air mobility,
and many other related skills.

Enemy tactical unit mobility can be degraded by various actions. Physical

and mental fatigue, which affect unit team work and esprit, can be generated
by constant harassment and the pressures of prolonged combat. Physical
fitness and health can be affected by chemical attacks, and poor sanitation or
preventive medicine. Unit team work and esprit can also be affected by
gsychological warfare. Unit and equipment mobility is most directly affected
by the proper use of barriers and obstacles, but it can also be affected by
any action which affects the flow of consumables, or the maintenance system,
at any point.

Unit mobility at the operational level is a much more complex quality.

Operational mobility is defined here as the ability to move large combat
formations such as brigades, regiments, divisions, and corps to accomplish
operational level manuevers over large distances within a theater. The
challenge is in arriving at the designated point in space and time prepared to
accomplish the mission. Patton's ninety degree reorientation of his Third US
Army in response to the Battle of the Bulge is a superb example of both how to
do this well and the difficulty of such an undertaking. Maintaining combined
arms cooperation, sustaining the force logistically, and movement control are
the principle planning and execution challenges.

Tactical and Operational Analysis. In order to be effective, a unit must not

only be able to displace rapidly, but must also move to the right location
prepared for the correct action. This is dependent upon proper analysis by
unit staffs and leaders or the ability to "read" the battlefield. "Reading"
the battlefield in turn requires that the unit staffs and commanders know a
few key things about the enemy, understand the effects of terrain for himself
and the enemy, and understand the full range of his own unit's current
capabilities and how they apply to the situation. Knowledge of the enemy
depends upon his using all available intelligence resources, and understanding
enemy tactics, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. At operational levels of
command knowing the tendencies of the opposing operational level commanders
also becomes important. The intelligence the commander requires must be in a
form which he can use and this requires proper processing. The entire
intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination process must be geared to

19
provide the comm.mde r s , at as many levels as possible, information upon which
to make decisions. This requires good flows of intelligence up, down, and
laterally. Lacklng all the datR the commander would like to have, he must be
able to makp. int~lli8ent guesses about the most likely enemy Rction through a
thorough knowl.edge of the enemy's operational doctrine, tact Lcs , and
inclinations.

Unit 1eader.s Rnd staffs must also understand the full cRpabilities of the
units they command in order to avoid the assignmen-t of miss ions which are
either above a unit's capabilities, or do not utili7.e the Full range of the
unit's capabllitLes, resulting in overextended or wasted capRbilities.

A proper appreciation of terrain is also an important Factor in tRctical

and operational nnalysis. Analysis of terrain differs greatly from squad to
corps level, but successful commanders never forget what I.s important from
either a tank tur re t or a f oxho Le , Terrain appreciation by commaruler s is
strictly a function of exposure to it either in the military school system or
with units, but Ls best achieved by a heavy dosage of both.

The leader mllst also have accurate information on, and a cle-'lc
understanding of, his own capabilities and how these apply to his current
situation. This must include an awareness of his personnel strength stRtus
,!nd his soldiers' level of experience and training. In addition, he must he
aware of his weRpons sys t ems status as weLl, as that of his other key l t ems of
equipment. Finally, he must be aware of the situations of adjacent units and
that of his higher command. Availability of this information is all a
function of effir.lent inforlO~tion flows predicated on sound reportina
procedures and good comraun Lca't ions.

Effective t ac t Lca L and operational .ma Lys Ls by the enemy is made more
difficult by focnsing actions in two ar~as. First, the enemy must be denied
as much information as possible about friendly units. This can be done by
employing efFective security measures, deception, degrading his intelligence
acquisition capability and by speed of operations which makes information
largely irrelevant when it arrives. This aim can also be furthered by
deviating from common practkes when this is possible. Second, the enemy must
be denied ac~urate information about his own units. This can be done by
timely jamming of his radio nets or by providing him false infonnation about
his subordinates through imitative deception on his co~nand nets.

Management oE Resources. Moving a unit on the battlefield also requires

efficient resouree management at all levels. The resources he must manage
include equipment, supplies, personnel, time, and the energies of his
subordinates. He must manane these resources so that the most important tasks
are addressed first, and so that he maintains a reserve for the unexpected.
How this applies to the resources mentioned above might be clear for all but
the last one, th~ energLes of his subordinates. All units are capable of
extraordinary effort for a limited duration. This capability can be a
significantly us~ful reserve and must be nurtured by cepe~ted extension and
periods of respite. It can be dulled by either too prolonged extension or by
never demanding i. t . Another important aspect of "people" management; is
developing the ahility to focus the efforts of all members of a unit on
priority tasks. A clear "focus of main effort" must be e9tablished to provide

20
an orientation for all members of a unit. This may well also depend on what
is normally placed under the heading of "leadership" or such other intangibles
as levels of training, esprit d'corps, and good SOPs.

The abilIty to successfully manage resources can be degraded if the leader

is affected by physical and mental fatigue or if his ability to make good
management decisions is hampered because decisions must be made very rapidly.
This can happen if the leader is overtaxed through prolonged combat or
surprised"by an immediately threatening development. The ability to focus the
efforts of subordinates is impaired by reduced morale, discipline and physical
well-being of subordinates, or if the credibility of the commander is
questioned. Continued harrassment, fatigue, and psychological warfare can
create this effect.

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I). Finally, the success

of tactical maneuver also depends heavily upon effective C3I. This requires
that one exand.ne spans of control, relevant SOPs and doctrine, staff
organizations and the common thread which ties these together, communications.
Span of control is normally understood in terms of the number of subordinate
elements which must be controlled, but this term should be understood to
include all of the things which specifically require a commander's attention
during a critical moment. This expanded form of the span of control must be
manageable. During the heat of battle, a company commander currently must
control three line platoons, a mortar section, and anti-tank section with
possible additional elements attached, indirect fires through his forward
observer, possible helicopter gunship support or close air support, and
medical evacuation, while trying to sense possible changes in the enemy
situation and other environmental factors. It takes a good man to do this
well, and such a good man requires a lot of help in the way of training and
trained personnel. If he does poorly, then a great deal of potential combat
capability is wasted.

Control Ls facilitated by sound doctrine and unit SOPs since they

facilitate communications about, and coordination of, desired actions. Both
are somewhat akin to a football team's play book, except that a unit in combat
must deal with a far wider array of variables.

Staff organizations must be designed to facilitate the decision process

and not retard it. A commander can receive input from only a limited number
of people and this limited number of people must be organized to reflect
consideration of all the important variables in any given situation.

Adequate communications to facilitate a rapid flow of information and

directions 1s a requisite for effective command and control. While
communications is an important underlying factor for other determinants of
combat power, it is here that it makes the greatest impact. On the modern,
fast paced, battlefield, communications must be assured through redundancy of
modes, proper planning, discipline in its use, and intensive training of
communicators. The less said the better.

C3I functions can be degraded by various means. A commander's span of

control can be exceeded by giving him more to worry about than he can handle.
Command posts can be attrited after their electronic signatures have been

21
detected. And c-unmunLca t Lons can be rendered ineffective by the use of
electronic wRrfar~, and suppression. False information can be pro~ided by
various meanR. '[he key to degradina C31 functions Is proper timing. Little
is achieved Hhen the period of degradation passes beforp- ad~!'lntage is taken of
it.

Protection Effect

The unlt wht.-h mLnLmf ae s its attrit Lon on the W3Y to and on the
battlefield has rlone a great deal toward maximizing its combatpower.

Shield ins tIll-' fighting po t en t La L of the force so that it Ls not dissipated

-bef ore it can be app l t.ed at the dec Ls Lve time and place consists of two
components. The first Lnc Lude s all actions to counter. the enemy's f Lr epowe r
and maneuver effects by making soldiers, systems and units difficult to
locate, to strike, or to destroy. The second component Lncludes actions to
protect soldiers, systems and unIts from the deleterious effects of non-combat
causes.

When assessing protection directly related to combat, one can focus on

personnel protection, equipment protection, and unit protection in both a
passive and ac t t ve sense. The key determi.nants of survivability 01\ the
battlefield are concealment to avoid being detected, exposure limitation to
a:void being hit a f t e r detection, and damage limitation to mLnIml ze the effects
of enemy "hIts."

A simple examp Le can illustrate the importance of protectlon on the modern

battlefield. If. one assumes that Company A is called upon to conduct a high
risk delay f r om rhr ee successive positions before the enemy main attack and
that it does well to limit CAsualties to 25 percent on each position, then it
will have bep-n attrltted to 70 men from a beginning strength of 165. If that
same 165 man company can Llrn Lt its attrition to 10 percent on each position,
then it would stl.ll be an effective unit of l2l men and ne:lrly one third of
its combat power wou Ld be saved to fight again. In the r emaLnde r of this
section, we ~Till focus on the factors which must be considered In limiting
attrition on the ha t t Lef LeLd.

Concealment. WhHe there are some key similarities in the pr.ocedures one must
use to preclude the detection of personnel, equipment and unit~, there are
some important differences in techniques and emphasis.

Personnel concealment is enhanced by proper use of camouflage and ste:-llth.

Camouflage is not as easily :lchieved as is often portrayed. It requires
thought in plannLng and discipline in execution, and the requirement~ of
either the offenRe or the defense must be considered. Stealth is often
difficult to achieve when the majority of our recruits come from a city
environment. For the offense, soldiers must be taught to move quietly. In
the defense, they must be taught to practice good light and noise discipline.

The conc ea Iment; of equ Lpme nt; is not only a function of camouflage and
stealth, but al~0 one of equipment design. Equipment crews must be taught to
continually be aware of possible observation. They must also be disciplined
to continually think about the use of natural and artificial CAmouflage. This

22
can become a burden to them during frequent displacements. It is often
difficult to practice stealth, given the characteristics of some of our
tactical equipment, but crews must be tau8ht to minimize engine operation and
the movement of equipment which requires the use of artificial light or the
generating of equipment noise. When movement is necessary terrain can be used
to dissipate noise and other battlefield noises can be used to mask it.

The concealment tasks of units are much more complex. A unit must counter
the intelligence acquisition efforts of the enemy by visual, aural,
photographic and electronic means. This requires a very broad effort at
higher echelons and a much narrower at squad, platoon and company level. At
higher levels one must be concerned with enemy agents, command post and other
electronic emitter signatures, use of enemy ground and airborne radar, ground
sensors, and aerial reconnaissance. In addition to the foregoing, units may
use:

a electronic warfare to counter enemy collection efforts,

o deception to divert the attention of enemy collection efforts,

o and counterespionage programs to eliminate enemy agents.

At company level, noise and light discipline, camouflage control, and proper
use of natural cover and concealment remain most important.

Degrading the enemy's ability to conceal his personnel, equipment and

units depends on friendly intelligence efforts and the speed of our
operations. Locating the enemy in order to engage him before he expects to be
engaged should be of prime importance to any commander at any level. All
acquisition means, from platoon OPs to the most sophisticated intelligence
acquisition means, should be geared to the task of locating the enemy and
monitoring his movement so that the battle may be fought on terms least
advantageous to him. To the extent that we keep the enemy moving and reacting
to our initiatives we make his concealment tasks more difficult.

Exposure Limitation. Exposure limitation includes all of those actions taken

to make personnel, equipment and units a more difficult target once they have
been detected. In other words, the focus here should be on complicating the
enemy gunner's "target servicing" problem. In general, this can be done by
making the target as small as possible, by minimizing exposure time, and by
making a target difficult to track.

For the individual soldier in the attack this means that he must move
quickly between covered positions while keeping a low silhouette, carefully
plan his next move, and avoid being predictable in his movements. The same
applies to the tactical vehicle crew. Equipment design characteristics may
playa large role in exposure limitation. For instance a slnall, maneuverable,
quick tank, which does not need to stop to fire, is less likely to be hit than
a lumbering behemoth. A tactical vehicle must also be designed to be able to
use covering terrain in order to limit exposure. This is particularly
important on the modern battlefield where the accuracy and penetration of
weaponry has progressed to such a state that armor plating alone can no longer
assure protection.

23
 Exposure Illnltatlnn Eor units also includes more complex se~urity measures
to make itself least vulnerable in terms of posture dispositions, or
orientation (bo th ment.a l, and physical) to unexpected contact with the enemy.
These measures include the use of. specific formations and dispositions during
movemeut , local s ecur I t y measures, detect ion devices and other intelligence
gathering means ~nd mutually supporting dispositions among elements. Larger
units employ sub--elements to conduct security operations speclf lea 11y designed
to limit the expo sure of the parent unit. The armored, cavalry regiment
habitually performs this function for the corps in its various screening,
covering, or protect missions.

Important on the modern battlefield Is the other side of this cotn--making

the enemy an eas le r target. At the micro level this means making the "target
servicing" prob Lem of the fdendly gunner more manageable. In the defense
this means un Lng barriers and obstacles to cause the enemy to advance more
slowly and in a more predictable Eashion, causing him to be canali~ed and
exposed. Ambush techniques are designed to take advantage of an enemy in an
exposed state with a short hIlt violent attack before he can react to protect
himself. In the attack of enemy-held positions, the enemy soldier should be
caused to fire prematurely or to otherwise give away his position and expose
himself. Thls c~n be achieved by deceptive maneuver, reconnaissance by fire,
and the shock effect of a rapidly moving and well-coordinated maRsed attack.

At the macro, or unit level, the focus should be on defe.'ltt[\~ the enemy's
security meaRure~ to limit l\is reaction time. Deception is used to confuse or
disorient the enemy long enough to delay his reaction or to cause an immediate
and inappropriat~ reaction which increases his exposure. Complementary to
this would be to strip away his intelligence acquisition means (e.g., jamming
his t'''ldars acrOSR his entire front or to defeat the communications needed to
provide warni.ng). Still another approach is to hinder his reaction by jamming
his command nets at the point when decisions need to be passed to
subordinates t thns prolonging confusion.

Damage Limitation. Once individuals, tactical equipment crews, and units

become targets oue must take actions to limit the potent La L damage which may
be inflicted uPO\[ them commensurate with the probability that they will be
hit. In other wlIrds t the focus must be to limit the damage which can be
caused by giving attention first to the targets most likely to be hit, and of
t.he se , priority nus t be given to those of greatest tactical Lmpo r t ance ,

For the Boidler who is likely to become a target t t1lls means that he must
have protective equipment which will lim.i.t damage to his vital parts and which
has a high likelihood of being worn. The helmet and flak jacket are important
items and should be designed using the latest technology and a bAlanced '
trade-off between protection and comfort. In the increasingly machine
intensive combat; environment t the individual soldiers protection can be
critical. Protection, given any protective gear t is naturally enhanced if
individuals use the equipment. Higher usage levels can be achieved by
establishing gon(l unit SOPs and discipline in carryi.ng them out. The
protection the helmet and, especially, the flak jacket, provide, must be
balanced agatnst the fatigue which such devices i.nduce if used during
strenuous activity. (Tired soldiers are carelesR soldiers, and c"lreless
soldiers lead reLat.i.vely short lives.) This rationale also applies to other

24
personal equipment, such as protective masks and clothing, boots, cold weather
clothing, and other equipment designed to protect the soldier from
environmental hazards. Often environmental hazards account for more attrition
than the enemy.

Attention must also be given to 'the individual soldier's ability to use

natural and artificial cover. During the rushes in the attack, the soldier
must be taught to seek natural cover, which provides more than concealment.
During the defense he must be capable of digging in quickly and effectively.
His ability to dig in is a function both of his training and the equipment he
is issued for that purpose. Consideration can be given to supplementing his
entrenching tool with sufficient pioneer tools. The entrenching tool should
only be relied upon to prepare hasty positions when additional pioneer tools
cannot be transported to the soldier. Individual protection is also enhanced
when field fortification materiel is applied to construction of adequate
overhead cover. The individual soldier's ability to occupy and improve a
position rapidly can add considerably to the relative combat power of the
unit.

The factors which contribute to damage limitation for combat vehicles, and
other equipment, include both design characteristics and the actions of a crew
to enhance the survival of its piece of machinery. Tank designers have long
abandoned the idea of making tanks invincible. Modern technology favors the
penetrating projectile, therefore there is a limit to the ~nount of protection
which one can reasonably expect from a combat vehicle hull without having it
detract from speed and agility. Due to this situation, crews must use natural
and artificial cover to limit damage after exhausting concealment and exposure
limiting possibilities. Tactical vehicles maximize their survivability in
static positions by using hull defilade and rear slope positions. Firing
positions prepared using engineer support or the organic capabilities of units
can add a great amount to combat power.

Units on the conventional-chemical-nuclear battlefield must e1nphasize

measures to minimize attrition or the effects of attrition during battle. At
higher echelons this includes: managing the use of men and materiel in the
construction of field fortifications before and during battle; managing the
medical treatment and evacuation system; minimizing combat stress of units
through rotation schemes; managing the evacuation, canibalization and repair
of combat equipment; providing for alternate command and control facilities;
conducting operations to help sub-units disengage or to relieve encircled
forces; providing for replacements of men and materiel; and taking other
measures to insure the continued combat effectiveness of the overall force
both physically and psychologically. At cOlnpany level, similar actions, but
narrower in scope, would be important, such as: managing the use the natural
and artificial cover; insuring life saving treatment and evacuation of
casualties without impairing the unit mission; maintaining control of
subelements and individuals in the heat of battle; maXimizing evacuation of
damaged equipment; conducting operations and coordinating fires for the
disengagement of decisively engaged subordinate units; and other actions
designed specifically to maintain the morale, integrity, and cohesion of the
unit.

25
 The ability 'J) do damage to the enemy is greatly enhanced I.E the enemy is
denied the oppo r r.un i t y to take protective actions a t the individual, c rew and
unit level. Conntant pressllre and harassment crertted by the speed and
ferocity of nul:' -ipe r a t Lona can have this effect on LndLv ldua l s , crews and
units. In the fll'!:;-tck of enemy positions, any means by wh Lch the morale of the
enemy soldier. call be aftected will reduce his survivahi1ity. If he is dazed,
isolated, dtRorg~ui~ed and induced to leave his positions he will sllffer
increased at t r t t '.on . Thought should be given to canaLl.z l ng the egg r e s s from
his pos Lt Lons so ;1S to take maximum advantage of his d Lso r gan Lza t Lon,
Finally, the use of any means by which enemy command al111 cout r o l is disrupted
leading to ullcoordinated actlon during the cl:'llclal moments of hiR attack or
defense will f ur r.he r aid in h is destruction.

Leadership Effect

The most irnp'lJ:'tant, and often least understood, element of combat power is
the effect of Le.uler shtp , Given the same parameters, good leaders can
generate many ti.llles more combat power than mediocre ones. Leadership is the
element, which when combined with the effects of firepower, maneuver, and
protection, becomes combat power. The leader at any echelon is entrusted with
a certain set of capabilities or "givens" which he can't change. At the level
of the National C0ffimand Authority and over a long time horizon, there al:'e
relatively few "gIvens," whIle at squad level there are many. HhatelTer the
situation, there are usually mo rr "variables" than "f tvens ," In other words,
there are many opportunities fol:' the commander to de'e10p and amplify his
unit's capabilities to generate laximum firepower ef ects, maneulTer effects,
and protectlon effects given his particular situatio t. And there will also be
many o ppo r t un.l t Lns for Lncreas Ln ~ his unit's re La t Lv s couba t power by
degrading enemy combat power. ane reducing hls own vulnerability to enemy
actions aimerl at degrading his Iwn battlefield capatL1itles. The combat
leader thus can have an impact IJn both s Ld e s of the relative combat power
equation.

In order for that impact to be decisive, the leader mtlst posr,ess certain
abilities and qunlities appropriate to his level.

o He mus t he technically proficient in certain job specific basic

skills.

o He Itll1stllso have a thorough understandillS of the full r'inge of his

own unit's capabilities and those of units which support him.

o He must possess judglilent and certain appropriate ana Ly t t ca L sk l l.l.s ,

o He must he dedicated to his profession and commltted to accomplishing

his assigned tasks.

o He must he able to ex:ert moral force in the execution of his mission.

In other words, lie mus t be able to transmit commitment, dedication, and a
sense of mission to his subordinates.

26
 o He must possess certain communication skills which allow him to issue
understandable instructions and receive the information he needs to make
effective decisions.

o Finally, he must have a feeling for the effects of combat on himself,

his soldiers, and the impact these may have on the execution of his assigned
mission.

Technical· Proficiency. The basic skills which a leader must possess to be

effective include the knowledge and understanding of relevant doctrine and
procedures which have been developed for the efficient and smooth functioning
of his unit, and the ability to apply them. He must know the skills required
of many of his key subordinates. He must know and understand the capabilities
and limitations of the equipment assigned to his unit. Some of these skills
are learned at service schools and others come through experience. This
experience can be gained only through an immersion in an environment where the
applicable skills are exercised.

Understanding of Unit Capabilities. Leaders must understand the full range of

the capabilities at their disposal at any point in time. They must understand
how to maximize combat power by maximizing the variables over which they have
control. This implies that they have a firm understanding of what the
variables are in their specific situation. While units are preparing ,for
battle, the leader has a wide range of variables he can affect. Maximizing
combat power output on the battlefield depends upon preparation before battle.
The leader must be able to properly order his preparation so that he first
addresses those variables which will provide the greatest payoff on the
battlefield. Such things as materiel readiness, training, and morale become
"givens" when the unit is actually committed to combat. Good leaders know
their units' weaknesses and strengths and plan their actions accordingly. The
experience of some officers is too narrowly focused ror them to gain a full
understanding of the capabilities of higher level units and of the support
available outside their own units. The service school system is designed to
broaden this understanding.

Analytical Skills. Leaders must possess sound military judgement and must
master the appropriate tools of analysis to make sound effective decisions.
We cannot always expect them to make the best decisions. In short, they must
know how to think about their profession. As leaders advance in rank, they
must be taught to cope with more complex problems. One traditional approach
to this is trial and error, learning through experience. Experience helps to
build a data base in the individual's mind from which to generalize. As
decisions become more complex or parameters change, the natural tendency is to
simplify problems and to view them in relation to some past lesson. This
often results in eliminating some real options simply because they are either
not perceived at all, or are not perceived as being viable and thus they"are
never even considered in the decision. This phenomenon can result in missed
opportunities. As the officer progresses to field grade rank, he must be
taught to supplement his experience with analytical tbought processes which
will help him make better judgments. The attempt in the Army to address this
problem has resulted in the development of substantial levels of expertise in
Operations Resear.ch and Systems Analysis (ORSA) techniques. While such
analytical techniques are very useful in determining relationships among sets

27
of variables ~yhl,~h are easily quantifiable, they are blunt Lns t rumeut s for
understanding very complex sets of variables which are dLff LcuLt; or Lmpo s s LbLe
to quantify. While they can establish valid relationships between easily
quantifiable vari.ables, the application of sucl\ techniques to situations in
which the unquan t l f LabLas se em to playa large part must be tempered with a
systematic ::lnaly-::is which does not depend upon assigning number values to
variables. Analytical techniques have long been employed in the "soft"
sciences, .where many variables are not quantifiable, and the one being
developed here Ls an adaptatLon of such "soft" science methodologies. Officer
education should include both mathematical and non-mathematical analytical
techniques.

Communicatioll Sk i Ll.s , Leaders at all levels mus t be adept at t\yo-\l1ay

coramunLca t Lous , An o f f Lce r ml.ght; be technically and analytically proficient
but unless he call issue comprehensible instructions and receive information
from subord Lna t e-i and superiors alike, he cannot command effectively. This
requirement has been recognIzed traditionally as an important prerequl~lte for
effective Leade r shLp but has not been pur sued until recently as an important
element in leadership development. The traditional emphasis has been only on
the issuance of c Lea r ins t ruc t Lons . In the modern environment, lolhere the
leader is depend~"t upon information flows from subordinates, it is equally
important that h- rlevelop an ability to listen and an atmosphere which is
conducive to the flow of accurate information to him from his subordinates.

Dedication, Commtnent, and lIorll Force. It is nIt enou!jh that the leader. be
technically prof cient, understand the capabiliti·!s he can exercise, be able
to analyze compl(l{ problems, aId communicate effEctively, he must also have
the lnner drive lJ apply these abilities to a gil en task. Professional
dedication, comm i. ':ment and mo r sL force are key i l the development of combat;
power, and a~e a :unction of felection and motivltion. Professional
dedication insure: that all dry to day tasks are performed in a highly
competent maImer. Commitment insures that the given combat mission is carried
out to the best ability of the individual. And moral force is the quality in
the commander. which transmits the same dedication and commitment to his
subordinates. ThLs quality is of particular importance during the d i f Eicul t
moments of combat. In this regard FH 100-5, Operations (1982) is to the point
"The primary funr:tion of leadership is to inspire and motivate soldiers to do
difficult things in trying circumstances.

Understanding of Rattle Effects. Finally, and most important, the leader must
be able to anticLpate and minimize the normal confusion of battle. In the
18th century, Marshall de Saxe wrote that "the soldier's courage must be
reborn daily." A Leader, he said, will insure this "by his dispositions, his
positions, and those traits of genius that characterize great captains •••• It
is of all tile e l.emen t s 0 f war the one that is most necessary tlJ !i cudy ;" This
includes the ab l1.1ty to anticipate battlefield problems in the command and
control of his OHn unit and to take any necessary action. He should also be
able to anticlp;\le and take advantage of enemy mistakes. He should have a
good feel for the combined eEf.ects of firepower maneuver and protection on the
battlefield ilnd be able to anticipate its effects on his own troops and those
of the enemy. B1ttles :ire not always won by the commander who brings the most
in capabilities to the battlefield. Very often they are won by the commander
who can make the II\OSt effect ive use of what he has.

28
Degrading Enemy Leadership. Clausewitz reminds us that ~arfare is essentially
a clash of wills bet~een opposing commanders. He and other terrorists also
tell us that victory stems from defeating the opposing commander's plan. Thus
our actions should aim at defeating the resolve and judgement of the opposing
commander. By Rp.izing the initiative we can make his plan irrelevant and
cause him to react to us.

No ma~ter how capable the individual, his mind can handle only so many
decisions in a given time frame. If he is fatigued, his mind Is less
efficient. Anything which can be done to either increase the number of
decisions that the enemy leader must make or to induce fatigue will make him
less effective. Many capable units have become ineffective due to the
breakdown of the leadership structure. The objective should be to cause the
leader or his staff to make mistakes. This can be accomplished by the speed
of our operations and by continued relentless pressure on enemy units. A good
plan which is perceived to threaten several enemy objectives simultaneously
serves this purpose. It causes reaction in several directions, or not at _all,
overloads analytical capability, and causes coordination to fail until too
late. This was the key to the success of German "blitzkrieg" and Patton's
rapid advance in France. Effective electronic warfare or harassment of
command posts are additional supplementary or complementary techniques.

Simple surprise is often considered the most reliable and tilme proven
rechnique for causing a sudden overload of the leader's decisionmaking
apparatus. But surprise without follow-up is useless. Often suprise is
difficult to achieve and when achieved it is difficult to exploit the narrow
time window of enemy vulnerability. Deception schemes designed to achieve
surprise must be convincing and the false impressions which these schemes mean
to convey must be perceived by the intended decisionmaker. The normal
friction of combat may block or distort the transmission of these intended
false messages. Often speed and shock effect are more reliable, effective and
economical.

29
 FIREPOWER EFFECT MOUEL

Example actions of leaders to:

FIREPOWER EFFECT is a function of: Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

1. VOLUME OF FIRE

A. Number of Delivery Means Change TOEs Cause eaergy to

Concentrate/Mass disperse, or affect
forces ability to
"synchronize," also:

(1) Artillery pieces .. Counter battery

(2) Tanks . Attritlon

(3) Machineguns . Attrition

(4) Etc .
B. Supply Capability Effectiveness Disruption of supply
in directing system, inducing
supplies where misallocations,
needed and misroutings, and
economy of use, waste, or cause
,also: attrition, also:

(1) Basic Load and Fire Change SOP! Harassment

Discipline Training

(2) ASR

(3) Organic Transport Change TOEs Interdiction

(4) Flo..., from ASP Increase trans­ Interdiction

port

(5) Flow to ASP Reallocate Interdiction

assets

(6) Flow to Theater Increase Interdiction

availability

(7) Production and Increase both Sabotage

Stockage Rate

C. Rate of Vire Enhancing Suppresion, shock

capability of action, surprise,
systems to disruption of
maintain combined arms,
prolonged high cooperation
rates of fire.

30
 Example actions of leade~~to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

Specifically

(1) Sustained rate of fire Redesign

(~) Into action-Out of Redesign

action time

(3) Crew proficiency Training/ Suppression

Selection

2. LETHALITY OF MUNITIONS Having available Degrading the enemy's

the best munition abil i ty to have
for the given available the best
task. munition for the given
task.

A. Design Characteristics

(1) Bursting Radius

(2) Penetrating Power

(3) Ballistics, etc

B. Explosive Energy

(1) Amount of Explosive

(2) Type of Explosive

C. Proper Selection and

Distribution of
Available Munitions

3. ACCURACY OF FIRES Enhancing Degrading enemy

probability probability of
of getting getting rounds on
rounds on target. Also:
target. Also:

A. \-leapon and Munition Use of advanced inhibiting

technologies development/acquisition
of advanced technologies.
Design Characteristics

B. Crew Proficiency Suppression

31
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

(1) Indlvidual skills and Training/ Harassment

aptitudes Selection

(2) Crew training P.O. Training Shock effect

(3) Range estimation and P.O. Training Surprise

site selection

(4) Crew cohesiveness Decrease Surprise

turbulence

(5) Physical condition Preventive Chemical warfare

medicine, P.T.

C. Terrain Effects Using terrain to Degrading ability to

best advantage use terrain to best
advantage

(1) Fields of fire Training, tools Deny time to improve,

to improve, time deny best terrain

(2) Terrain masking Training deny terrain,

channelize

(3) Site (elevation) Training

(4) Range to target Training, use of Surprise and speed

range finders, of own operations
map reading to deny time to adjust.

D. Visibility

(1) Light conditions Training Use smoke, sun direction

to enemy front

(2) Fog and smoke Training Decoying

(3) Use of night vision Equipping/ use night vision

devices Training device blinding effects.

4. TARGET ACQUISITION Enhancing Denying ability of

ability to enemy to find the
find the right right targets.
targets.

A. Intelligence and Analysis Develop and Deception, EW

practice
sound analytical
techniques, develop
the best systems,

32
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

provide appropriate
training.

(1) Sensor System design Use advanced Deny use of advanced

technologies technologies

(2) Qualified personnel Training t

Experience

(3) Analytical systems Temp1ating Speed of operations

techniques t etc

(4) Information Processing Enhance ability Inundate with

to sort key information t
information deception, decoy
from trivial

B. Location and functioning Placing Degrading the enemies

observers and ability to placet
sensors where observers t and
they can observe sensors
and report on to observe critical
critical target targets
information.
Depends on training t
analysis t and
mobility.

C. Transmission of target data EW

(1) Communication means Planning t Disruption

Redesign

(2) Qualified personnel Training Suppression t shock t

disorientation

(3) SOPs for prioritizing Refine SOPs and

transmission of target train t discipline
data soldiers in their
use

5. FLEXIBILITY OF EMPLOYMENT

A. Weapons Ranges Redesign

B. Weapons System Mobility

33
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own . Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

(1) Fire-displace-fire Redesign/ Interdiction

time Training

(2) Cross country vs. Redesign/ Obstacles

road bound Re-equip

(3) Speed Redesign, SOPs, Counterbattery,

training suppression

C. Weapons Signature Effects Spotting SOPs,

Battle drills

(1) Design characteristics

(2) Site selection Training Disruption, surprise

D. Fire Control Systems

(1) Local Training Suppression

(2) Remote Organization/ EW

Training

E. Tactical Doctrine Update, training

F. Variety of Munitions Basic load Interdiction,

composition, sabotage
availability in
system

34
 MANEUVER EFFECT MODEL

Example actions of leaders to:

MANEUVER EF~'~:CT Ls a func tion of: Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

1. UNIT fvI0BILITY

A. Physical Stamina

(1) Physical fitness Physical Harassment

training

(2) Health Preventive Chemical

medicine warfare

B. Unit Tealnwork and Esprit

(1 ) Morale Stimulating Psy-War

(2) Group Cohesiveness common ex­ isolation,

periences, harassment
discipline

C. Equipment Capabilities

(1 ) Design characteristics Upgrade design OBSTACLES

specs

(2) Supply of POL Planning, in­ Interdiction

crease trans­
port capability

D. Equipment Maintenance

(1) Preventive Training Harassment

discipline

(2) Corrective Disciplined use Interdiction

of system, etc

E. Mobility Skills

(1) Road marching Training Interdiction

(2) Land navigation Training Harassment, Disruptions,

Disorientation

(3) Foot mobility, etc Training Threat of chemical

equipping contamination, fatigue

35
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

2. TACTICAL and OPERATIONAL

ANALYSIS

A. Knowledge of Enemy

(i) Intelligence gathering Training Deception

security OPSEC

(2) Intelligence processing Training Deception,

organizing surprise

(3) KnowLedge of enemy doc­ Training Innovation, avoid

trine, tactics, and patterns
vulnerabilities

B. Understanding of Terrain and

Terrain Effects

(1) Map reconnaissance and Training Attrit leaders,

analysis deny key terrain

(2) Recogni:ing and util·z­ Training Surprise

izing f .elds of fire
and ter 'ain masking

(3) Trafficlbility analysis Training Create surprise obstacle~

(4) Visual ~econnaissance Training suppression,

effectiveness speedy operations

C. Understanding Own Capabili­

ties

(1) Personnel Situation/ Instituting EtJ, disruption,

Capabilities effective re­ speedy operations,
porting isolate units

(2) Equipment Situation/ SOPs EW, disruption,

Capabilities & commo-re­ disception
dundency/
discipline

(3) Situation of Adjacent Commo/coord­ EW, disruption/

and Higher Units/Hqs ination SOPs speed of operations

3. MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES

36
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

A. Equipment Use

(1) Management of item use/ Planning Compress enemy

missions reaction time

(2) Managem.ent of required Planning Interdiction,

consumables disruption, speedy
operations

B. Use of Supplies

(1) Provisions for distri­ Planning Interdiction,

bution sabotage

(2) Provisions for conser­ Planning Speed of

vation operations

(3) Provisions for re­ Planning Speed of

supply. operations

(4) Accounting SOPs Speed of operations

C. Use of Personnel

(1) Job to skill matching . Minimize MOS Speed of operations

mismatch/
cross train

(2) Distribution planning Prioritize needs Speed of operations

(3) Accounting Reports SOPs Speed of operations

(4) Developing flexibil­ Crosstraining Speed of operations

ity

(5) Provisions for replace­ Planning Speed of operations

ments handling

D. Use of Time

(1) Prioritize tasks Planning Speed of operations

(2) Integration of tasks Planning Speed of operations

(3) Supervision of task Jr. leader Speed of operations,

per.formance training Suppression, harrassment,
induce fatigue in leaders

37
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

E. Use of Er~rgies of Sub­

ordinates

(1) Understanding and use Training which Harassment, induce

of "surge capability" 1s physically prolonged stress
concept and mentally
challenging
followed by
periods of
relaxation,
discipline

(2) Focusing effects of Organization & Psy-War, speed of

subordinates training operations

4. CONI1AND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNI­

CATIONS

A. Span of Gantrol Leadership Surprise, EW,

training isolation, overwhelm,
threaten multiple
objectives

(1) No. of subordinate Organization

units

(2) No. of supporting/ Task organiza­

attached units tion

(3) No. of situation Anticipate, Speed of operations

vari.ables maintain and
update estimate
of situation
continuously

B. SOPs and Doctrine

(1) Quality Evaluate &

(a) Applicability update as needed
(b) Simplicity
( c) Flexibility

(2) Application Training Harassment, speed of

operations to induce
mistakes/misjudgement

C. Staff Efficiency Harassment, speed of

operations

38
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

(1) Staff organization Update doctrine, Destroy CPs

put people in
right jobs

(?) Staff effectiveness Training, create Speed of operations

"High Performing to cause
Staff" effectiveness breakdown,
surprise

D. Adequate Communications Electronic

Warfare

(1) Systems design Redesign, re­

equip

(2) Employment of systems

(a) Redundancy Planning Destroy emitters
(b) Siting of emitters Planning/ Suppression
training
(c) Operator profici­ Training Suppression,
ency surprise
(d) Discipline in use Training S~rprise, speed of
operations

39
 PROTECTION EFFECT MODEL

Example actions of leaders to:

PROTECTION EFFECT is a function of: Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

1• CONCEAU1ENT

A. Personnel Concealment

(1) Use of camouflage Training Speed of operations

(2) Use of stealth Training Use of sensors

(a) Light and noise Training, Harrass, Fatigue

discipline supervision, Leaders, cause
discipline, disciple breakdown,
morale morale failure

(b) Hovement tech­ Training, Speedy Operations

niques discipline

B. Equipment Concealment

(1) Deslgn characteristics Reexamine

specifications

(2) Use of camouflage Training Use of high

discipline technology sensors

(a) Natural Training, Speed of Operations

discipline,
time

(b) Artificial Speed of Operations

(3) St eaLt.h Training, Use of high

discipline, technology sensors,
time speed of operations

(a) Use of terrain

and vegetation
for concealment

(b) Noise discipline "

(c) Light discipline

C. Unit Concealment All intelligence

activities, speed of
operations

40
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:
( 1) Camouflage cont ro 1 SOPs Supervision "
leader training,
discipline

(~) Electronic counter­ Planning,

measures Training SOPs,
OPSEC, Discipline
(3) Counterintelligence Planning. OPSEC
activities Training,
Reporting,
Organizing

(a) Counterespionage Increase efforts OPSEC

(b) Passive measures Dispersion High Tech sensors and
good analysis
(c) Deception Planning Discriminating
intelligence analysis
2.. EXPOSURE LIMITATION

A. Personnel Exposure Limi­

tation

(1) Movement techniques Training Obstacles, Speed of

discipline operations
(2) Fire control Training Recon by fire, speed
discipline of operations
(3) Unit cohesion Maintain chain Psy war, s~eed of
of command, operations, isolate
"fall-out one" units
training, unit
espirit
B. Equipment Exposure Limita­
tion

(1) Design characteristics Re-examine re­

quired specifi­
cations

(a) Silhouette

41
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

(b) Speed and mobility Obstacles

(2) MOV~1Uent techniques Training

discipline

(a) Overwatch tech­ Suppression and smoke

niques

(b) Use of terrain Speed of Operations

cover

(3) Selection of positions Training

(a) Hull defilade

(b) Rear slope

c. Unit Exposure Limitation

(1) Passive

(a) Dispersion Training High technology

discipline intelligence and
targeting, speed of
operations

(b) Use of specific

formations Training Deceptive maneuver
and ambushing techni­
ques

(c) Local security Training Smoke and shock

and mutual sup­ discipline effect
port among sub­
elements

(2) Active

(a) Security opera­ Training, SOPs Deception

tions of sub­
elements

(b) Surveillance pro­ Planning, SOPs Deception, EW

grams (ECM)

(3) Maintaining unit co­ Promote espirt, Speed of operations,

hesion train leaders psy war

42
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

(4) Preventive medicine Leader supervision,

discipline, sanitation
discipline, innoculation
programs

3. DAMAGE LUlITATION

A. Limiting Personnel Casu­ Constant

alties pressure and
harassment

(1) Protective equip­

ment (fires)

(a) Design Re-examine spe­

cifications

(b) Use Training, Speed of operations

Discipline,
Supervision

(2) Protective equip­

ment (environmental)

(a) Design Re-examine Find countering

specifications means and techniques

(b) Use Training Surprise, speed of

discipline operations

(3) Use of natural cover Training Speed of operations

(4 ) Use of field fortifi­ Isolation, psy­

cations war, shock effect,
speed of operations

(a) Availability of Supplement

tools

(b) Availability of Provide

materials

(c) Construction doc­ Re-examine

trine/SOPs

(d) Construction Training,

skills Discipline,
Supervision

43
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:

(5) Maintaining unit Provide for lsolate units, defeat

cohesion mutual support piecemeal

B. Limiting Equipment Damage

(1) Design characteristics Re-examine Learn, disseminate

specifications and exploit
vulnerabilities

(2) Crew actions Constant pressure

and harassment, speed of
operations

(a) Use of natural Training,

cover Discipline

(b) Use of artifi­ Increase engi­

cial cover near support,
Discipline,
Training

C. Limiting Unit Attrition/

Damage

(1) Management and use of Planning, Interdiction,

artificial cover Supervision Speed of Operations

(a) Construction means Planning,

availabili ty stockpile,
monitor,
maintain

(b) Construction mate­

rial availability

(2) Management of medical Planning Speed of operations

treatment and evacua­ supervision
tion system discipline

(3) Managing evacuation Planning Interdiction, Speed

cannibalization and re­ training of operations
pair of combat equip­
ment

(4) Providing replacements Planning, Interdiction, Speed

of men and materiel Reconstitution of Operations
SOPs

44
 Example actions of leaders to:
Amplify own Degrade enemy
combat power by: combat power by:
(5) Conduct operations to Training, Speed of Operations
help sub-elements dis­ SOPs, Provide
engage mutual support

(?) Maintaining control of Training EW, Psy-war

sub-elements in heat discipline surprise, Speed
of battle communications of Operations
(7) Other actions to Training Psy-war,
maLutaf,n morale, discipline surprise, Speed
and integrity of of Operations
units

45