Caraballo v. Republic G.R. No.

L-15080, 25 April 1962

In a verified petition filed on 26 September 1958 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Ricardo R.
Caraballo, an American citizen enlisted in the United States Air Force as staff sergeant detailed in Clark
Field, Angeles, Pampanga, where he and his wife Graciela G. Caraballo live, alleges that he and his wife
have no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, natural children by legal fiction or any
other descendant; that with his wife's written consent (Exhibit C) he desires to adopt as his child Norma
Lee Caber, a five-day old natural daughter of Mercedes J. Caber begotten by an unknown father, who
gave her consent to the adoption in a sworn statement (Exhibit B); that since the day following her birth
Norma Lee Caber has been reared and cared for by him and his wife who have developed love and
affection for her; that he never has been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; that
financially and morally he is able to support, bring up and educate the child; and prays that after notice,
publication and hearing Norma Lee Caber be declared his child for all intents and purposes, free from
any obligation of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother Mercedes J. Caber (Sp.
Proc. No. 1391).

On 26 September 1958 the Court ordered the verified petition filed by Ricardo R. Caraballo to be
published and was published in the Daily Mirror once a week for three consecutive weeks setting the
petition for hearing on 18 October 1958 (Exhibit A). As at the hearing nobody appeared to object to the
petition for adoption, petitioner's counsel prayed for an order of default, which was entered against all
interested parties, except the Solicitor General or Provincial Fiscal who, according to the Court must
appear in adoption cases.

On 27 October 1958 the Provincial and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga moved for the dismissal
of the petition for adoption on the ground that it states no cause of action and that the petitioner, being
a non-resident alien, is not qualified to adopt.

On 28 October 1958 the Court granted the petitioner ten days within which to file an answer to the
motion to dismiss and submit a memorandum of authorities, and the fiscal the same number of days to
reply.

On 3 November 1958 the petitioner filed an answer or objection to the motion to dismiss, to which on
14 November the Provincial Fiscal replied.

On 17 November 1958 the Court denied the motion to dismiss.

On 12 December 1958 the petitioner moved that the case be set for hearing. On 15 December 1958 the
Court set the petition for hearing on 22 December 1958 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

After hearing, the Court found the following:

... Petitioner is 32 years old while the child sought to be adopted is three months old, having
been born on September 20, 1958 (Exhibit E). The petitioner has been residing at Clark Air Base
for the last 25 months. He has had the child, Norma Lee Caber, in his household as a daughter
since the day following that of her birth and has developed a fondness for her and intends to
bring her up and educate her as his own to the best of his ability. He has never had any children,
 either with his wife, Graciela G. Caraballo, with whom he has been married for 12 years, or with
any other woman.

He is a staff sergeant in the United States Air Force and receives approximately $465.00 a
month, including allowances. He expects to retire as a master sergeant after 6 years and 3
months, and as such, he would receive a monthly pension of about $175.00 to $190.00 for the
rest of his life. He has an allotment check made out to a bank for $84.00 a month. He has two
insurance policies with an aggregate value of P15,000.00 and has a savings of $6,000.00 to
$7,000.00 which he has been accumulating for the last 15 to 20 years. After retirement, he
intends to settle down permanently in the Philippines where he will engage in the tourist
business by putting up a hotel. 1äwphï1.ñët

It also appears that petitioner has never been convicted of any crime whatsoever and rendered
a decree as follows: .

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court believes that it would be to the best interest of the child to
be placed under the care and custody of petitioner who is materially and morally able to
educate and bring her up properly and adequately, and, therefore, adjudges that henceforth
Norma Lee Caber shall be, for all legitimate intents and purposes, the child of Ricardo R.
Caraballo and shall be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with
respect to her natural mother, Mercedes Caber, and that her surname shall be changed to that
of petitioner, and pursuant to Article 346 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, this decision shall
be recorded in the local civil registry of Angeles, Pampanga, and the name and surname of the
said minor shall thereafter be Norma Lee Caraballo.

xxx xxx xxx

The point to determine is whether under the law the petitioner is a person qualified to adopt. The
Government contends that he is not, invoking the provisions of article 335 of the Civil Code. The article
provides: .

The following cannot adopt —

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children
by legal fiction;

(2) The guardian, with respect to the ward, before the final approval of his accounts;

(3) A married person, without the consent of the other spouse;

(4) Non-resident aliens;

(5) Resident aliens with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken
diplomatic relations;

(6) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, when the penalty
imposed was six months' imprisonment or more.
A person is deemed a resident of a place in a country or state where he has his abode and lives there
permanently. It is a place chosen by him freely and voluntarily, although he may later on change his
mind and live elsewhere. A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently and to
which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. A sojourn
such as a tourist though actually present at a place of his free choice cannot be deemed a resident of
that place. A foreigner who has a business or interest therein or property located in a country or state
and goes and stays in that country or state to look after his business or property or to check up the
manner or way his business or property is being conducted or run by his manager but does not intend to
remain in the country indefinitely cannot be deemed a resident of such country. Actual or physical
presence or stay of a person in a place, not of his free and voluntary choice and without intent to remain
there indefinitely, does not make him a resident of the place. Looking after the welfare of a minor to be
adopted the law has surrounded him with safeguards to achieve and insure such welfare. It cannot be
gainsaid that an adopted minor may be removed from the country by the adopter, who is not a resident
of the Philippines, and placed beyond the reach and protection of the country of his birth.

Ricardo R. Caraballo, the petitioner, an American citizen who now lives in Clark Field, municipality of
Angeles, province of Pampanga, Republic of the Philippines, because of his assignment as staff sergeant
in the United States Air Force — his stay in the Philippines then being temporary — is a non-resident
alien who, pursuant to clause 4 of the above quoted article of the Civil Code, is disqualified to adopt a
child in the Philippines.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the petition dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengson III v. HRET G.R. No. 142480, 7 May 2001

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-
born citizen."1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. 2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States.
As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission
in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in,
the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto,
 with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said
foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of
rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance
incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign
country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of
his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the
service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his
civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x
x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998
elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its
resolution dated April 27, 2000.6

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following
grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of
such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the
fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
 3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost
h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire
the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he
was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-
born citizen thereof.9

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act
No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications 12 and
none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court
is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has
dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation
of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.14

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress.15

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed
by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire
Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and none of the disqualification mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry
of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person
desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court,
and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original. 25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces
of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630,
which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The
said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz
is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,
or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform
an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term
"natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen
birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17,
1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those
"naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at
birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also
had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-
born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed
by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. 29 The Court's
jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the absence thereof, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to
substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a
petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. 31 There is no such showing
of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. G.R. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the
Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage
the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent
had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court
below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of
the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court
acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise
its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead
with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have
given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in
the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they
had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and
that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between
petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community
property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case
is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility
in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As
explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336
W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on
my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as
to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that
the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint
filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Dacasin v. Dacasin G.R. No. 168785, 5 February 2010

Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born
on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th
Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. 3 In its ruling, the
Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody
of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.

On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement4 ) for the joint
custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes
arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
"relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.

In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to
enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole
custody over Stephanie.

Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the
Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s motion and dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit
considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order
awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner
following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code 6 prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction.7

Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the
case.

In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of
respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the Agreement to justify its
enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms
of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is independent of the divorce
decree obtained by respondent.

The Issue

The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and
enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.

The Ruling of the Court

The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is
void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and
call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.

Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction

to Enforce Contracts

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.9 An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the
Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. 10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner
went to the right court.

Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do
so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is
unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and
sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s suit seeks the
enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on
joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called "retained
jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action

The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law.

In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the
minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the
beginning."13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine
substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody
stipulations.14

At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1)
Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and
respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law 15 (under the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother
is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration,19 subject only to a narrow exception not
alleged to obtain here.20 ) Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes
Philippine law.

The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the
mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when
spouses live together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under
the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law
suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses.
Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the
separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code
on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a
mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a
communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed
compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213.22

It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial
custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provision’s
enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to
sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents.
This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert
a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of
age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her."23 This ignores the
legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age."24
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the other
(father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of
custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated parents.25 However, these are
objections which question the law’s wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air
and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness
or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as
granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the
regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of
disagreements.1avvphi1

Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration,
lasting only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law
gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody
regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from
entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement
by asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back to ambit
of the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on
respondent sole custody of Stephanie.

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained
abroad.28 There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse)
is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

xxxx

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis
supplied)

We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by
the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because
he no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the complaints under Philippine procedural
rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the
alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of
who obtained the divorce.

The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding

Justify Remand

Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we
remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody. Stephanie is now nearly
15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime
under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings –
the best interest of the child.30 As the question of custody is already before the trial court and the child’s
parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of
swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s jurisdiction,
submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court
render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody
proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s best interest. 31

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

SO ORDERED.

Republic v. Bayog-Saito G.R. No. 247292, 17 August 2022

The Antecedents

Helen, a Filipino citizen, and Toru, a Japanese national, were married on August 30, 1999 in Pasay City,
Metro Manila.[8] They did not have any children nor did they have conjugal properties. [9] Due to
differences in culture and nationality, their marriage did not last. After years of living separately, Toru
asked Helen to sign the divorce notification papers; Helen acquiesced. [10] Toru submitted the divorce
documents to Takashi Yamaguchi (Mayor Takashi), Mayor of Minami-ku, Yokohama City.[11] The Notice
of Divorce accepted as shown by the authenticated Japanese-language "Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce Notification" and its English translation duly authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA).[12]

After the divorce notification was accepted, the divorce was recorded in the family registry of Toru,[13] as
reflected in the authenticated copy of his Family Register (in Japanese) and the English translation
(Certificate Pertaining to all Facts) duly authenticated by the DFA. [14] Thereafter, based on the two (2)
documents, Kengo Fukasawa (Vice Consul Kengo), Vice Consul of the Japanese Embassy in the
Philippines, issued a Divorce Certificate which was then authenticated by the DFA. [15] The Divorce
Certificate[16] reads as follows:

Cert. No. IB13-07817-3

DIVORCE CERTIFICATE

Name : HELEN ASDOLO BAYOG

Date of Birth : DECEMBER 19, 1965

Nationality : FILIPINO

Name of Spouse : TORU SAITO

Date of Marriage : AUGUST 30, 1999

Date of Divorce : OCTOBER 16, 2012

This is to certify that the above statement has been made on the basis of the Official Family Register
issued by Head of Minami ku, Yokohama City, Kanagawa Pref., Japan on November 14, 2013. This
certificate is issued for the purpose of the process of Notification of Foreign Divorce in the Republic of
the Philippines.[17]
On June 30, 2014, Helen filed a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce decree [18] with the RTC,
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 5105. She also sought the declaration of severance of the marital bond
between her and Toru to give her the legal capacity to remarry in accordance with the right granted to
her under Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). [19]

In an Order[20] dated August 19, 2014, the RTC found the petition sufficient in form and substance.
During the hearing, Helen submitted and presented the following documents to support her petition: (1)
Certificate of Marriage;[21] (2) Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce Notification (Notification of Divorce)
dated October 16, 2012, issued by Mayor Takashi, and duly authenticated by the DFA;[22] (3) Duly
Authenticated Family Register (Certificate Pertaining to all Facts) of Toru, issued by Mayor Takashi, and
duly authenticated by the DFA, showing that the parties were divorced on October 16, 2012;[23] (4)
Divorce Certificate of Helen and Toru issued by Vice Consul Kengo, and duly authenticated by the
DFA;[24] and (5) the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code of Japan. [25]

The Ruling of the RTC

Based on the evidence presented, the RTC in its Decision,[26] judicially recognized the divorce decree
issued to the parties in Japan and the legal capacity of Helen to remarry in accordance with the
provisions of Article 26, second paragraph of the Family Code. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court judicially recognizes the Divorce Decree issued to Toru
Saito and Helen Bayog Saito terminating and giving the Petitioner legal capacity to remarry. The City Civil
Registrar of Pasay City is ordered to register the Divorce Decree in the record of marriage of Toru Saito
and Helen Bayog Saito.

Let [a] copy of this decision be furnished to the City Civil Registrar of Tarlac City, Pasay City[,] the Office
of the Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Tarlac, the petitioner and her counsel and
to the National Statistic[s] Office[,] Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.[27]
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration [28] from
the aforementioned Decision asserting that respondent failed to satisfy the requirements under Article
26 of the Family Code.[29] The RTC denied the motion in its Resolution.[30] It ratiocinated that the
Japanese spouse, as a consequence of the divorce validly obtained abroad, had been capacitated by his
national law to remarry, and that "[t]o deny the Filipino spouse the recognition of her divorce from her
alien spouse would be to perpetrate a grave injustice."[31]

Petitioner, through the OSG, interposed an appeal[32] to the CA asserting that absolute divorce is against
public policy and cannot be recognized in the Philippines. [33] The OSG asserted that Helen, who remains
to be a Filipino citizen, cannot jointly seek a divorce decree with her husband even if such is allowed in
the country of the latter.[34]

The Ruling of the CA

In its Decision,[35] the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.[36] The CA noted that the
divorce decree was initiated by Toru and Helen's participation in obtaining the divorce decree was
merely to accept the divorce notification by affixing her signature on the documents presented to
her.[37] It held that if a foreign spouse validly initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce
from the Filipino spouse and becomes successful in securing an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines
recognizes such absolute divorce after it has been proven by evidence. It further found that the Divorce
Certificate, the Notification of Divorce, the record of the family register of Toru, and the duly
authenticated pertinent laws of Japan, are enough to prove the fact of divorce. [38]

Thus, the CA saw no reason why the legal effects of the foreign divorce decree should not be applicable
to Helen.[39]

Petitioner sought reconsideration[40] of the decision, but the CA denied it in its Resolution. [41]

Hence, the petition.[42]

The OSG insists that Helen failed to satisfy the requirements under paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code. It argues that the provisions of the Family Code prohibit absolute divorce and only provide for
legal separation or relative divorce; that purportedly, the policy prevents the recognition of absolute
divorce decrees involving Filipino citizens, even if these were obtained from jurisdictions that had
legalized absolute divorces; that the exception provided in paragraph 2, Article 26 is narrow and
intended only to address the unfair situation that results when a foreign national obtains a divorce
decree against a Filipino citizen, and thus, leaving the latter stuck in a marriage without a spouse; and
that because the foreign divorce decree was obtained jointly by respondent and her foreign spouse, the
divorce does not fall within the contemplation of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code.[43]
As further explained by the OSG, the divorce decree sought to be recognized was grounded on the
mutual agreement of the parties. Because the divorce decree was neither initiated nor obtained solely
by respondent's Japanese spouse, it did not comply with the second requirement under paragraph 2,
Article 26. Respondent, who remains to be a Filipino citizen, cannot seek jointly with her husband a
divorce decree even if such is allowed in the country of the latter. A divorce decree jointly obtained by
respondent and her Japanese husband, although valid under Japanese law and capacitating her
Japanese spouse to remarry, will not be accorded recognition under Philippine laws for the simple
reason that it runs against paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and Articles 15[44] and 17[45] of the
New Civil Code.[46]

In her Comment/Opposition,[47] respondent alleges that she did not initiate the divorce proceedings
against her former husband. She asserts that it was her Japanese husband who filed the divorce
notification and that she merely accepted the divorce by signing the papers. [48] She further avers that
she did not jointly seek the divorce decree with her husband; granting that she initiated the divorce
proceedings, this does not bar her from seeking the judicial recognition of a foreign divorce as provided
by Article 26 of the Family Code. [49]

Petitioner filed a Reply[50] reiterating its position that the divorce proceedings were initiated jointly by
respondent and her Japanese spouse; and considering that the divorce decree sought to be recognized
in the case is grounded on the mutual agreement of the parties, it should not be recognized in the
Philippines even if it is allowed under the laws of Japan. [51]

The Issue

Did the CA err in affirming the RTC's decision granting the petition for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce of Helen and Toru and the declaration of Helen's capacity to remarry?

The Court's Ruling

The Court denies the petition.

A foreign decree of divorce may be

recognized in the Philippines
although the divorce decree was
jointly obtained by the spouses
abroad.

Divorce is the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage. [52] There are two
types of divorce: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage; and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[53] Under
Philippine law, absolute divorce is not allowed. Pursuant to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens
are covered by the prohibition against absolute divorce. [54] The prohibition against severance of
marriages through the mode of divorce is rooted in the constitutional policy aimed at protecting the
inviolability of the institution of marriage. [55]
While Philippine law does not allow absolute divorce, a divorce obtained abroad by a foreign spouse
may nevertheless be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The pertinent provision, Article 26 of the Family Code states:

Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Article 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki v. Marinay[56] explains the nature of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, thus:

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws
allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. x x x[57]
The provision gives Philippine courts the authority "to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage."[58] It bestows upon the Filipino spouse "a substantive right to have his or her marriage
considered dissolved, granting him or her the capacity to remarry."[59]

In the present case, petitioner opposes the recognition of the foreign divorce decree on the ground that
it was purportedly obtained by Helen jointly with her Japanese spouse, Toru. Petitioner avers that
respondent cannot file and obtain a divorce decree jointly with her foreigner spouse because she is
incapacitated to do such act under our national law. According to petitioner, the provision under
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code only applies when the divorce decree was initiated or
obtained solely by the foreign spouse. Petitioner submits that because the divorce decree sought to be
recognized is grounded on mutual agreement of the parties, the provision under paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code does not apply.[60]

Petitioner's contention is bereft of merit.

In the landmark case of Republic of the Philippines v. Manalo[61] (Manalo), the Court en banc clarified the
scope of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code to even cover instances where the divorce decree is
obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.[62] In subsequent cases, the Court noted that the prohibition
against Filipinos participating in divorce proceedings will not protect our own nationals.[63] Thus, the
Court held that it does not matter if it is the Filipino spouse who acquired the decree of divorce abroad.
The Court hereby quotes the pertinent portion of its ruling explaining the application of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code, thus:

x x x Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound
by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature
is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. x x x

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. x x x

x x x x

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a.foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not; a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in "like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)[64]
Significantly, in the recent case of Galapon v. Republic,[65] (Galapon) the Court clarified that pursuant
to the majority ruling in Manalo, paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code applies to mixed
marriages where the divorce decree is: (1) obtained by the foreign spouse; (2) obtained jointly by the
Filipino and foreign spouse; and (3) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. [66]

Here, the divorce was initiated by Toru who asked Helen to sign the divorce notification papers; she
agreed by affixing her signature on the documents. [67] In effect, the parties are considered to have
obtained divorce by agreement when they mutually agreed to the divorce, which is allowed in Japan.
After the acceptance of the divorce notification, the marriage of respondent and Toru has been
dissolved as far as the Japanese laws are concerned and Toru is then capacitated to remarry. Pursuant
to the Court's ruling in Manalo and Galapon, even though respondent jointly filed the divorce
notification papers with her husband, the divorce decree obtained by the parties may be recognized in
our jurisdiction. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that the legal effects of the foreign divorce decree
of the parties may be recognized in our jurisdiction.[68]

In the process of judicial recognition of foreign divorce decree, the rules provide that before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by the court, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Specifically, for Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may
be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of Court.[69]

In the case, the pieces of evidence presented by Helen — which consist of the Divorce Certificate, the
Notification of Divorce, the Acceptance thereof, the record of the family register of Toru, all of which
are duly authenticated, as well as the duly authenticated pertinent laws of Japan [70] — are sufficient to
prove that in fact, the parties have validly obtained a divorce under the laws of Japan.
 In the case of Racho v. Tanaka,[71] the Court found that the Japanese law on divorce was duly proven
by the presentation of a copy of the English version of the Civil Code of Japan translated under the
authorization of the Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee. [72] Here, the Court
similarly finds that Helen duly proved the pertinent laws of Japan pertaining to divorce through the
submission to the trial court of a copy of the English version of the Civil Code of Japan [73] translated
under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and the Codes of Translation Committee. [74]

Verily, the fact of the divorce of Helen and Toru, as well as the Japanese law on divorce, had been
sufficiently and satisfactorily proven by Helen. Hence, the Court finds that the CA was correct in
affirming the RTC's grant of the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce decree of
respondent and her Japanese husband. More importantly, the dissolution of their marriage under the
laws of Japan, has capacitated her former husband, Toru, to remarry, and in fact, he has already
remarried.[75] Hence, the Court finds no reason to deprive Helen of her legal capacity to remarry under
our national laws.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 28, 2018 and Resolution
dated April 30, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 108057 are hereby AFFIRMED. The
foreign divorce decree between Helen Bayog and Toru Saito is hereby judicially recognized pursuant
to paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code, and Helen Bayog is hereby declared capacitated to
remarry. The Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasay City is hereby ordered to annotate the Divorce
Certificate dated October 16, 2012 on the record of marriage of Toru Saito and Helen Bayog.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasay City, Office of the
Civil Registrar of Tarlac City, and the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office of Quezon
City (now Philippine Statistics Authority).

SO ORDERED.

Johansen v. Office of the Civil Registrar General G.R. No. 256951, 29 November 2021

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Marietta Pangilinan Johansen (petitioner)
assailing the Decision2 dated January 14, 2021 and the Order3 dated April 5, 2021 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 84, in Special Proceedings No. 73-M-2019, entitled "In Re:
Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Divorce." The RTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

On June 12, 2015, petitioner, a Filipino citizen, and Knul Johansen (Knul), a Norwegian national,
married in Norway per the Report of Marriage No. 2016-5780051 of the Embassy/Consulate of the
Philippines in Oslo. The spouses lived together in Norway until 2017 when they separated due to marital
problems. Knul obtained a divorce decree against petitioner under Chapter 4 of the Norwegian Marriage
Act. A Final Decree of Divorce dated November 30, 2018 was issued by the Counter Governor of Oslo
and Akershusner and Katsuyuki duly authenticated by the Vice Consul of the Embassy of the
Philippines.4 Thereafter, on April 25, 2019, petitioner filed a verified Petition for Recognition of Foreign
Judgment of Divorce in the RTC. She asked the RTC, inter alia, to order the Office of the Civil Registrar
General (OCRG) and/or Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to annotate the Decree of Divorce on the
Report of Marriage. She attached the following in her petition: (1) PSA copy of the Report of Marriage
between her and Knul; (2) original copy of the Decree of Divorce, with translation duly authenticated by
Vice Consul of the Embassy of the Philippines in Oslo, Norway; and (3) duly authenticated copy of the
Norwegian Marriage Legislation, Act No. 47 of 4 July 1991 Relating to Marriage.5

On May 10, 2019, the RTC declared the petition sufficient in form and substance. It ordered
petitioner to furnish a copy of the petition to the OCRG, Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, Civil Registrar
of San Miguel, Bulacan, and the Philippine Statistic Authority (PSA). The petition was published in a
newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks and was also posted in the Bulacan
Provincial Capitol, San Miguel Municipal Hall, and in the Bulletin Board of RTC Branch 84, Malolos City.
On June 28, 2019, the RTC noted the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General and the latter's
authorization for the Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor to appear in the case.6

On September 26, 2019, the RTC heard the petition for compliance with jurisdictional requirements.
On December 5, 2019, petitioner presented evidence in support of her petition before the branch clerk
of the RTC. She made a formal offer of testimonial and documentary evidence on December 13, 2019,
which the RTC all admitted. The State, the PSA, and the Civil Registrar of San Miguel Bulacan did not
present any evidence and did not make any objections on the petition. Hence, the case was submitted
for decision on October 19, 2020.7

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated January 14, 2021, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that
the case is being filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court since petitioner asked the court to direct the
OCRG and/or DFA to annotate the Decree of Divorce in the Report of Marriage. Under Rule 108, the
venue of the petition is at the place where the record may be found. Venue under this rule is
jurisdictional. The Report of Marriage in this case is found in the DFA or the OCRG, hence venue and/or
jurisdiction falls with the RTC of either Pasig City or Quezon City,8 and not in the RTC of Malolos City,
Bulacan.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order dated April 5, 2021. The RTC
hastened to add that petitioner prayed not only for the recognition of foreign judgment under Rule 39,
Section 48(b) but also for the correction of entry in the civil registry under Rule 108, so with the addition
of that prayer, the petition became a special proceeding where venue is jurisdictional in nature.9

Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present appeal before Us.

Arguments of Petitioner

Petitioner faulted the RTC for declaring that venue in a special proceeding is jurisdictional after it has
ruled on the sufficiency of the form and substance of the petition and admitted all evidence which
proved compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, without any opposition from the State on
either the petition or venue of the case. Citing case law, petitioner claimed that venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, hence may be waived. She alleged that she filed the case in the RTC of Malolos because it
is convenient and accessible to her as she is a resident of Sibul, San Miguel, Bulacan. The RTC, in
dismissing the case, is in effect ordering her to refile the petition and go through the same process of
publication and notice to the public, which is prejudicial and unjust to her. The same would also defeat
the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues.10

Issue

The issue in this case is whether the RTC erred in ruling that venue under Rule108 of the Rules of
Court is jurisdictional.

Ruling of the Court

We deny the petition.

At the outset, the petition before Us is directly filed from the Decision of the RTC. Under Rule 41,
Section 2(c) of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, an appeal by certiorari shall be taken to this Court
where only questions of law are involved. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the
law is on a certain set of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts. The test of whether the question is one of law or fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising it. Rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. If no review is necessary, the
question is one of law. Otherwise, it is a question of fact. Here, the issue of whether the venue stated in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is jurisdictional, is one of law. Petitioner correctly filed the appeal before
Us.

Recognition of foreign decree of divorce versus

cancellation or correction of civil status

The RTC held that the petition for recognition of foreign divorce decree filed by petitioner is governed
by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court since it included a prayer for the correction of her civil status. The RTC
is partly correct.

Case law teaches that the court's recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry.11 The two differs as to their nature and governing rules
and procedures. A recognition of a foreign judgment is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. 12 A foreign judgment relating to marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country is governed by the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to wit:

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Petitioner needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under Rule 39, Section 48(b)13 in relation to
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 2514 of the Rules of Court.15 On the contrary, cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry is governed by Article 412 of the Civil Code, which states that "[n]o entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order." Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 by providing a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 states the jurisdictional and procedural requirements
that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry.16

The differences between an action for recognition of foreign judgment and a cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry do not preclude the joining of both causes of actions in one
judicial proceeding. We clarified this in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,17 to wit:

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.18 (Emphasis supplied)

We further elaborated in Fujiki v. Marinay19 that since recognition of a foreign judgment or final
order only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.20 A foreign
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right between the parties. Upon its recognition, the right
becomes conclusive, and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in
the civil registry.21 Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy and simplification, parties-in-interest
who seek not only to have a foreign decree of divorce recognized in the country but also to cancel or
correct their civil status in the local civil registry must file a petition under Rule 108 in relation to Rule 39
of the Rules of Court for correction/cancellation of entry in the civil registry coupled with judicial
recognition of foreign judgment.

Thus, the petition of petitioner in the RTC is governed not only by Rule 108 but also by Rule 39 as to
the matter pertaining to the recognition of foreign divorce decree.

Venue in Rule 108 is jurisdictional.

Rule 108 is a special proceeding or a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a right, or a particular
fact. It creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person's life which are recorded by the State pursuant to
the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage, which the State has an interest in recording.22 The specific requirements for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are found in Section 1 and 3 of Rules 108, viz.:

Section 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court
of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
 xxxx

Section 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied)

In Fox v. Philippine Statistics Authority,23 We declared that Rule 108 pertains to a special proceeding,
hence the specific provisions stated therein, particularly on venue, must be observed in order to vest the
court with jurisdiction. There, We sustained the Davao RTC's motu proprio dismissal of the petition for
correction of entry under Rule 108 for lack of jurisdiction upon a finding that the Report of Birth of
petitioner's daughter was registered in the PSA of Manila. Hence, the petition for correction must be
filed in the RTC of Manila and not in Davao. We also underscored that the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in the petition for which no final determination of the case can be reached.

Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of

Rule 108.

It is undisputed that the petition filed in the RTC sought two reliefs, namely: (1) recognition of foreign
decree of divorce and the corresponding (2) change or correction of entry in the civil register. Hence,
petitioner must not only establish the foreign judgment as a fact in accordance with the Rules on
Evidence but must also comply with the specific requirements of Rule 108. This, petitioner failed to do.

Per the Decision of the RTC, the Report of Marriage in this case is found either in the DFA or the
OCRG, that is, in Pasay City or Quezon City, respectively. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 108, the petition
must be filed in the RTC where the corresponding civil registry is located. However, petitioner filed the
case in the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan because it is convenient for her as she is residing in San Miguel,
Bulacan. Thus, venue was improperly laid. More, the local civil registrar of Pasay (in case the Report of
Marriage is with the DFA) was not impleaded. The RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan has no authority to order
the civil registrar of Pasay or Quezon City to correct the civil status of petitioner.

In fine, considering the foregoing defects in the petition, the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan did not err
in dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the dismissal is without prejudice to the refiling of
the petition in the proper court, with full compliance to the specific requirements of Rule 108. Foremost,
petitioner must ascertain where her Report of Marriage was recorded to know which RTC has
jurisdiction over the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 14, 2021 and the Order dated April
5, 2021 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 84, in Special Proceedings No. 73-M-
2019 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate actions.

SO ORDERED.