ARTILLERY

STRONG
Modernizing the Field Artillery
for the 21st Century

Boyd L. Dastrup, Ph.D.

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Cover image: The US Army Field Artillery branch insignia features two
crossed field guns.
 Artillery Strong
Modernizing the Field Artillery for the 21st Century

Boyd L. Dastrup

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

An imprint of The Army University Press

 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Dastrup, Boyd L., author. | Combat Studies Institute

(U.S.). Press, publisher. | U.S. Army Field Artillery School.
Title: Artillery strong : modernizing the field artillery for the
21st century / Boyd L. Dastrup.
Other titles: Operation Desert Storm and beyond | Modernizing
the field artillery for the 21st century
Description: 1st edition. | Fort Leavenworth, Kansas : Combat
Studies Institute Press, [2018] | “US Army Field Artillery School
Fort Sill, Oklahoma.” | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018007419 (print) | LCCN 2018008403
(ebook) | ISBN 9781940804255 | ISBN 9781940804255
Subjects: LCSH: Artillery, Field and mountain--United States-
-History--20th century. | Artillery, Field and mountain--United
States--History--21st century. | United States. Army. Field Artillery-
-History.
Classification: LCC UA32 (ebook) | LCC UA32 .D375 2018
(print) | DDC 358.1/2820973--dc23 | SUDOC D 110.2:AR 7
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018007419

2018

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a wide

variety of military topics. The views expressed in this CSI
Press publication are those of the author(s) and not necessar-
ily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of
Defense. A full list of digital CSI Press publications is avail-
able at http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/lde/csi/pubs.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an offi-
cial publication of the CSI Press. It is prohibited to use the CSI’s official seal on
any republication without the express written permission of the Director of CSI.

Editor
Diane R. Walker

ii
 Preface

As the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat declined late in the 1980s
and as the risk of low-intensity regional crises was simultaneously
increasing, the United States dispatched military forces into South-
west Asia. This effort as part of Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm was in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August
1990—to prevent further Iraqi aggression and protect American in-
terests in the region. Operation Desert Storm validated the modern-
ization of the Army’s heavy forces during the preceding two decades
and simultaneously confirmed known field artillery deficiencies that
needed to be corrected through further modernization to meet future
military threats.
The deficiencies highlighted by the Gulf War as well as the
end of the Cold War and the escalating risk of regional crises gen-
erated interest in developing a strategically deployable and digi-
tized Army able to fight across the spectrum of conflict anywhere
in the world. Although the United States reduced both military
spending and its military force and shifted funding from military
to domestic programs following the demise of the Soviet threat in
the 1990s, the Army and the Field Artillery still modernized their
weapons and equipment.
As this modernization effort began producing substantive re-
sults, General Eric K. Shinseki, who became the Chief of Staff of
the Army in June 1999, introduced his Transformation of the Army
vision. Critical of the Army’s existing force structure as revealed by
the difficulty of the 1999 Task Force Hawk deployment to Kosovo,
General Shinseki pushed to improve the Army’s strategic mobility
by equipping it with systems that possessed the robustness of Cold
War heavy systems and the strategic deployability of light systems.
Shinseki’s Transformation of the Army represented an explicit break
with the ongoing modernization endeavor and its stress on light and
heavy forces. It moved modernization in an entirely new direction
with an emphasis on creating medium forces with the strategic mo-
bility of the light forces and the staying power of the heavy forces
while acquiring appropriate weapons and equipment. This effort
continued under Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoo-

iii
maker, who adopted modularization, created brigade combat teams,
and further developed new weapons and equipment.
General Schoomaker’s modularization effort gave the Army
the ability to deploy rapidly without creating temporary organiza-
tions and dramatically restructured the Army and the Field Artil-
lery. However, the Global War on Terrorism during the first years
of the 21st Century accelerated introduction of new field artillery
systems and equipment; sped up the precision munition revolution;
and transformed field artillery target acquisition, weapon platforms,
support, and command and control. This study tells the story of the
US Army’s Field Artillery from the Gulf War of 1991 through the
first two decades of the 21st Century.
This study originated as the US Army Field Artillery School
published Operation Desert Storm and Beyond: Modernizing the
Field Artillery in 2005. The 2005 edition covered field artillery de-
velopments during the 1990s. Major General (Retired) Fred F. Mar-
ty and Lieutenant General (Retired) David P. Valcourt, former US
Army Field Artillery School Commandants, read the 2005 edition
draft manuscript and made insightful comments. John Yager, who
was on the ground floor for many of the combat developments as
part of the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Sill, also
provided solid comments regarding the 2005 draft manuscript.
With the passage of time, I decided to expand Operation Desert
Storm and Beyond: Modernizing the Field Artillery by adding new
material and retitling it as Artillery Strong: Modernizing the Field
Artillery for the 21st Century. I revised chapters one and two from
the original edition and wrote three additional chapters that examine
developments since 1999 as well as an epilogue. Major General (Re-
tired) David C. Ralston, former Assistant Commandant and Comman-
dant of the US Army Field Artillery School, and Colonel (Retired)
Frank J. Siltman, former Director of the Directorate of Training and
Doctrine in the US Army Field Artillery School and current Director
of Fort Sill’s Museum Directorate, read all five chapters of the Artil-
lery Strong draft manuscript and made invaluable suggestions to im-
prove the narrative. Both had firsthand experience with the dynamic
changes in the Field Artillery during the latter 1990s as well as the

iv
first years of the 21st Century. I also acknowledge Ken Gott’s staff
on the Research and Books Team at the Combat Studies Institute for
their perceptive comments and recommendations for changes. Dr.
Don Wright and Diane Walker did excellent work with editing the
narrative. Any errors in fact are mine.

Boyd L. Dastrup, Ph.D.

US Army Field Artillery School
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

v
 Contents page

Preface ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� iii

Chapter 1​​: The Collision of Armed Forces �������������������������������������1
The Short War �����������������������������������������������������������������������������1
Confronting the Deficiencies ����������������������������������������������������18
Chapter 2: A New but Still Dangerous World �������������������������������31
A New World, Budget Reductions, and Restructuring �������������31
Modernizing Field Artillery Systems ����������������������������������������37
New Doctrine for a New Age ����������������������������������������������������49
Louisiana Maneuvers, Battle Laboratories, & Force XXI ��������55
The Digital Puzzle ���������������������������������������������������������������������63
The Army After Next ����������������������������������������������������������������69
Chapter 3: Transforming the Force �����������������������������������������������93
The Beginnings �������������������������������������������������������������������������93
Changing of the Guard ������������������������������������������������������������110
Systems for Transformation ����������������������������������������������������118
Chapter 4: A New Century and the War on Terrorism ����������������145
Global War on Terrorism and the Field Artillery ��������������������146
Time of Reflection ������������������������������������������������������������������159
The Insurgency and the Field Artillery �����������������������������������167
Chapter 5: More Modernization �������������������������������������������������203
Lethal and Nonlethal Targeting �����������������������������������������������203
Munitions, Platforms, and Command and Control �����������������220
Force Structure and Doctrine ��������������������������������������������������234
Epilogue: Into the Future ������������������������������������������������������������257
Glossary ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������267
Select Bibliography ���������������������������������������������������������������������271
About the Author �������������������������������������������������������������������������283

vii
 Figures page

Figure 1: Operation Desert Storm map.�������������������������������������������7

Figure 2: M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. �������������45
Figure 3: Crusader self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer.����������97
Figure 4: M109A6 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer.��������109
Figure 5: Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon.������������������������������������������126
Figure 6: Operation Iraqi Freedom map.�������������������������������������149
Figure 7: Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicle.��������������164
Figure 8: M777 towed 155-millimeter howitzer. ������������������������170
Figure 9: AN/TPQ-50 countermortar radar.���������������������������������205
Figure10: M1117 Armored Security Vehicle.������������������������������209
Figure 11: Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder.���������������211
Figure 12: M119A2 towed 105-millimeter howitzer.������������������226
Figure 13: M109 Paladin Integrated Management howitzer.�������229
Figure 14: M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System.����������������233

ix
 Chapter 1 ​​

The Collision of Armed Forces

In the 1970s, the US Army began an extensive modernization

endeavor focused on preparing it for combat against the numerically
superior and well-equipped Soviet-led Warsaw Pact threat. Just as
that effort reached fruition, Iraqi military forces invaded Kuwait in
1990. The unanticipated invasion led to Operation Desert Shield of
1990 and Operation Desert Storm of 1991. For the Field Artillery,
Operation Desert Storm tested the effectiveness of the moderniza-
tion effort that was underway.

The Short War

Following the Iraqi invasion, the United States and United Na-
tions initiated Operation Desert Shield in August 1990 to defend
Saudi Arabia from a potential Iraqi attack. Over a period of seven
months, the Army deployed more than 500,000 active and reserve
component Soldiers with their equipment and weapons to South-
west Asia as part of a massive Coalition military buildup. When
Saddam Hussein failed to withdraw his forces from Kuwait by the
15 January 1991 deadline established by President George H. Bush
and supported by Congress and the United Nations, US-led Coali-
tion forces from 36 nations launched Operation Desert Storm on 17
January 1991 to drive Iraqi military forces out of Kuwait. That day,
eight AH-64 Apache attack helicopters of the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion (Air Assault) destroyed two Iraqi radar facilities with Hellfire
laser-guided missiles to permit allied bombers to penetrate Iraqi air
space more easily. The attack was the first in an impressive air cam-
paign that lasted through 23 February 1991 and systematically crip-
pled Iraqi war-making capabilities by demolishing critical targets
and neutralizing Republican Guard units and other ground units.1
While the January and February 1991 air campaign was shap-
ing the battlefield for the ground war to follow, Coalition ground
forces prepared for combat. Over a period of three weeks beginning
on 17 January 1991, the Army shifted two corps and approximately

1
65,000 armored and support vehicles from defensive positions in
eastern Saudi Arabia to a forward assembly area west of Hafar al
Batin. This massive buildup effectively positioned the Army for
an aggressive offensive against Iraqi military forces that were ar-
rayed on the battlefield in three distinct echelons along the Soviet
model. The first echelon consisted of 15 poorly trained, ill-disci-
plined, ineptly led, and eclectically equipped infantry divisions that
stretched from the Persian Gulf Coast about 200 miles inland. Be-
hind these infantry divisions stood the second echelon of six regular
armored divisions equipped with second-line Soviet armament and
Third World systems. Their mission was to conduct division-level
counterattacks against any allied penetration. Forming the greatest
threat, Republican Guard units composed the third echelon. Origi-
nally an elite palace guard of two brigades, the Republican Guards
had grown to 28 combat brigades by 1990 and possessed the most
modern equipment of the Iraqi ground forces. Deployed well to the
north, the Guard units were situated to serve as a strategic counter-
attack force and could be quickly withdrawn to Iraq if necessary to
prevent their destruction.2
Throughout the air campaign and the shifting of forces, the
Field Artillery played a key role in protecting friendly aircraft from
hostile air missile defense sites. Two days after the air war began
on 15 January 1991, A Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery
Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Maples
was moving westward along a busy two-lane Tapline Road—not an-
ticipating any combat action on its way to its tactical assembly area
as part of the US VII Corps movement. Around 1620 hours that day,
the battery received a fire mission to destroy a surface-to-air missile
site in Kuwait in support of B-52 bombing raids. First the Soldiers
completed essential coordination with the Army and Air Force to
ensure no friendly aircraft would be in the flight path of an Army
Tactical Missile System, a long-range field artillery missile. Then at
0042 hours on 18 January 1991, the battery launched two missiles
that destroyed the surface-to-air missile site. Later that day, the same
battery fired six more missiles to neutralize other surface-to-air mis-
sile sites. Besides supporting B-52 raids, these missions made A
Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment the first US VII
Corps unit to fire in anger since World War II.3

2
 Over the next month, Army field artillery participated in other
combat actions to pave the way for the ground war. Field artillery
units conducted numerous “shoot and scoot” raids to neutralize or
destroy surface-to-surface or surface-to-air missile sites and reduce
the risk to friendly forces. The US VII Corps and US XVIII Air-
borne Corps frequently moved field artillery units into hostile terri-
tory where they could easily range high-payoff targets. Upon reach-
ing hostile territory, the designated firing batteries would unleash a
few salvos and then immediately change positions to avoid enemy
field artillery fire. Meanwhile, a “silent battery” would remain ready
to deliver fires on any enemy field artillery that dared to engage
the raiding force. If such fire was not required, the “silent battery”
would fire at the high-payoff target and depart quickly. When it be-
came evident that Iraqi field artillery could not find them, the raiding
batteries stayed in position and even closed their range to deliver
killing fires on enemy forward positions, field artillery emplace-
ments, command posts, air defense facilities, and supply depots.4
On 13 February 1991, B and C Batteries, 1st Battalion, 27th
Field Artillery Regiment—a Multiple Launch Rocket System unit
assigned to the 42d Field Artillery Brigade that supported the 1st
Cavalry, 1st Infantry (Mechanized), and 3d Armored Divisions dur-
ing Operation Desert Storm—and A Battery, 21st Field Artillery
Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System), 1st Cavalry Division
participated in a field artillery raid under the control of the 1st Cav-
alry Division Artillery. The three Multiple Launch Rocket System
batteries lit up the night sky when they fired rockets on targets that
had been generated from US VII Corps and 1st Cavalry Division
intelligence and targeting assets. At ranges of 21 to 30 kilometers,
they engaged 24 targets with almost 300 rockets in less than five
minutes.5 This action, in the words of one US VII Corps command-
er, gave the batteries “valuable experience firing under combat con-
ditions” and prepared them for ground combat action to follow.6
After completing preparations that included field artillery raids
and cross-border patrols into no-man’s land, the ground war opened
on 24 February 1991. That day, American and Allied ground forces
attacked along a line that stretched from the Persian Gulf westward
about 300 miles into the desert with the major thrusts coming on the

3
flanks and a feint in the center. On the extreme left flank of the line,
the US XVIII Airborne Corps—composed of the 6th French Light
Division, 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault), 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 24th Infantry Divi-
sion (Mechanized) and commanded by Lieutenant General Gary E.
Luck—invaded deep into Iraq to isolate the enemy and prevent re-
inforcements. They reached the Euphrates River Valley within days
after the offensive started. Deployed on the right of the US XVIII
Airborne Corps, the US VII Corps—consisting of the 1st Armored
Division, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3d Armored Division, 1st
Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 1st British Armoured Divi-
sion and led by Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks Jr.—ex-
ecuted a massive wheeling maneuver north and east to encircle Iraqi
forces and moved into a blocking position on 27 February 1991
along the highway connecting Al Basrah and Kuwait City. In the
meantime, the Joint Forces Command North composed of Egyp-
tian, Syrian, and Saudi Arabian military forces on the right of US
VII Corps and in the center of the Allied line pushed beyond the
Kuwaiti-Saudi border barriers toward Wadi al Batin to deceive the
enemy into believing that a frontal assault was underway and then
turned eastward. To the right of the Joint Forces Command North
on the extreme Allied right flank stood the US Marines Central
Command and the Joint Forces Command East respectively. As the
Allies threatened amphibious landings along the coast, the 1st Bri-
gade (Tiger) from the Army’s 2d Armored Division, the 1st and 2d
Marine Divisions of the US Marines Central Command, and Saudi
forces from the Joint Forces Command East crossed the eastern part
of Kuwait’s southern border and drove toward Kuwait City. Within
100 hours of the initial 24 February 1991 attacks, Allied ground
forces employed aggressive combined arms operations; they routed
Iraqi military forces and liberated Kuwait, causing the Coalition to
halt all offensive operations on 28 February 1991 and end the war.7
Although it was a short war, Operation Desert Storm tested the
Army’s modernization effort. The Persian Gulf War revealed that
doctrine, organization, training, leadership, and materiel designed
during the 1970s and 1980s for combat against Soviet and Warsaw
Pact military forces produced a competent and well-equipped army.8

4
 In July 1991 just a few months after the Gulf War ended, the
Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, addressed Field Ar-
tillery modernization. In a report to the Director of the Center of
Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, school officials
recounted the effectiveness of field artillery doctrine, organiza-
tion, training, leadership, and materiel during combat operations.9
Despite significantly higher numbers of Iraqi field artillery pieces,
many of which had superior ranges to American field artillery, the
Army’s field artillery system of systems (target acquisition; com-
mand, control, communications, and computers; support and sus-
tainment; and weapons and munitions) furnished overpowering fire
superiority with massed fires (converging fires from many field artil-
lery pieces, generally one or more battalions of 24 field pieces each,
on a single target to inflict as much damage as possible). Such fires
destroyed the enemy’s target acquisition capabilities, silenced en-
emy indirect fire systems (field artillery and mortars) through coun-
terfire (field artillery fires delivered to suppress enemy field artillery
or mortars to prevent them from interfering with the movement of
friendly forces), and provided timely close support (field artillery
fires designed to engage enemy forces, generally infantry or armor,
blocking the advance of friendly forces) to maneuver commanders
to allow them to move their forces with minimum disruption from
enemy direct fires. Massed fires also cleared routes for friendly air-
craft by engaging known and suspected air defense artillery sites.10
According to the Field Artillery School, Operation Desert Storm
clearly underscored the value of the massed fires doctrine. In an April
1991 Field Artillery article, Colonel David A. Rolston, who com-
manded the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) artillery for two
years, evaluated the impact of massed fires on enemy troops and
equipment. Rolston, who gave up command of the artillery unit in
December 1990 to become Field Artillery School Deputy Assistant
Commandant, wrote, “Training prior to the deployment and the op-
eration itself reinforced that the Army should not dilute fire support
by ‘nickel and diming’ the effort with fires on small and relatively
insignificant targets. Hit the high-payoff targets with massed fires.”11
Brigadier General (Retired) Paul F. Pearson, who served in
various key positions in the Field Artillery School in the 1970s, and

5
General (Retired) Glenn K. Otis, the former Commanding General of
the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, concurred with Colo-
nel Rolston’s incisive assessment. General Pearson and General Otis
wrote that the massive use of field artillery fires paved the way for the
rapid victory.12 They noted that the Americans and Allies employed
field artillery fire support “in Desert Storm to the maximum in order
to minimize the number of effective enemy units that our Soldiers in
tanks and infantry fighting vehicles had to take on at close range.”13
In after action reports, maneuver commanders expressed simi-
lar thoughts about massed fires. In a 15 May 1991 letter to the Com-
mandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Raphael J.
Hallada (1987–1991), about the US VII Corps’ 24 February 1991
breaching operation, the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry
Division, Major General Thomas G. Rhame, related:
The performance of the Field Artillery in combat has
caused all of us to remember what we had perhaps forgot-
ten, namely its incredible destructive power and shock ef-
fect. The preparation fires I witnessed prior to our assault
on the breachline were the most incredible sight I have
seen in 27 years of service. The firepower generated by
my DIVARTY [division artillery], the 42d, 75th and 142d
FA [Field Artillery] Bdes [brigades] and the artillery of
the 1st British Armoured Division was truly awesome.14

General Rhame’s comments about the impact of massed fires

were understandable. Notwithstanding the 1983 Urgent Fury against
the insurgents in Grenada and 1989 Just Cause in Panama against
Manuel Noriega and his followers, the Army’s last extensive fight-
ing experience came in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s. Dur-
ing that effort, fire support was generally decentralized at the bat-
tery level. To furnish fires for a particular maneuver unit’s area of
operations and provide the maximum area coverage, the Army often
located a battery with its supported infantry battalion on a fire base
within range of another fire base for mutual fire support. With few
exceptions, this dispersed battlefield organization precluded mass-
ing fire on a target from a battalion of three batteries let alone di-
vision artillery. Given this combat experience and the inability to

6
 Ahvaz
As Samawah
Iraq Iran

Tigres River
 An Nasiriyah
TALLIL

Ash Shabakah

AS SALMAN

Al Basrah
JALIBAH
Desert Storm.15
AL BASRAH WEST
As Salman Khomamshahr
 Az Zubayr 
  Abadan
Ar Rumaylah
Oil Field

SAFWAN
 Al Busayyah Umm Qasr

Ar Rawdalayn

Oil Field

Sabiriyah
Oil Field Bubiyan
French Island
6th Light Division
3d Armored
Cavalry Regiment
Kuwait
RAFHA

82d Airborne Division KUWAIT CITY

Al Jahrah
Coalition
Forces As Salimayah

Al Ahmadi
101st Airborne Division
Al Burqan
24th Infantry Division Oil Field
XVIII ABN CORPS
Coalition Persian
Operation DESERT STORM 2d Armored Forces
Cavalry Regiment 1st Infantry AHMAD AL JABER
Arab Forces
24–28 February 1991 Division Gulf
1st Brigade
Allied Advance, Phase 1 JOINT FORCES 2d Armored Division
ARMY CENTRAL U.K. 1st Armoured
Division COMMAND NORTH Al Wafrah
Allied Advance, Phase 2 COMMAND
1st Armored 
Division
1st Cavalry
Allied Advance, Phase 3 Division
2d Marine
Division  Ra’s al Khaji
3d Armored Arab Forces
Allied Advance, Phase 4 Division  Hafar al Batin 1st Marine
Unit positions approximate Division
AL QAYSUMAH JOINT FORCES
ELEVATION IN FEET MARINE CENTRAL COMMAND EAST
VII CORPS
COMMAND
0 500 1000 1500 2000 and Above Al Mish’ab
0 40

miles
54th Special Forces KING KHALID MILITARY CITY
Saudi Arabia
Airfield Roadblock Group (Airborne)

Figure 1: Operation Desert Storm map. Source: US Army Center of Military History.
play of massed fires came from the Commander of the US VII Corps
Perhaps, the strongest endorsement about this impressive dis-
or really understood the influence of massed fires until Operation
Training Centers, General Rhame and few Army officers witnessed
replicate massed fires in peacetime training exercises at the Combat

7
Artillery, Brigadier General Creighton Abrams Jr., and the Com-
mander of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Colonel
Michael L. Dodson. On 24 February 1991 in support of the US VII
Corps assault, General Abrams allocated the 42d, 75th, and 142d
Field Artillery Brigades, two division artilleries, and 10 Multiple
Launch Rocket System batteries to create a Soviet-style attack at the
breach area. General Abrams positioned approximately 22 artillery
pieces for each kilometer of the attack zone. Prior to the attack, more
than 350 field artillery pieces fired 11,000 rounds and 414 Multiple
Launch Rocket System rockets in a field artillery preparation that
lasted 30 minutes. Besides crushing Iraqi morale, this massed fire
destroyed 50 tanks, 139 armored personnel carriers, and 152 field
artillery pieces.16 Accurate and deadly massed field artillery fires
crushed the enemy, destroyed its will to fight, and permitted the 1st
Infantry Division (Mechanized) to roll virtually unopposed through
the breach area.17 As the assault force moved forward to conduct the
breach, there was no break in field artillery fire between the prepara-
tion and the fires in support of the movement.18
Colonel Dodson added his thoughts on the shock of massed
fires that day. He reflected in a 25 March 1991 memorandum to the
Commanding General of the US VII Corps, General Frederick M.
Franks Jr.: “This is likely the first time in military history that an
artillery preparation for a deliberate breaching operation has been
so comprehensive that not one Soldier lost his life during the op-
eration.”19 After noting the mass and speed of his division’s field
artillery actions throughout the brief war and the breaching opera-
tion in particular, Colonel Dodson addressed the significance of fire
support. He pointed out: “Following our artillery fires, not a single
round of [enemy] artillery counterfire was received,” an indication
that friendly field artillery did not have to worry about counterfire
because enemy field artillery had been neutralized.20
As 1st Armored Division Artillery representatives also ob-
served after the war, massed fires against enemy indirect fire sys-
tems and close support of friendly maneuver forces reflected the US
VII Corps commander’s intent. In numerous warfighter seminars
and training exercises conducted prior to the war, commanders em-
phasized firepower’s key role in defeating the enemy. “Pound them

8
to jelly with fire support and then roll over them with maneuver”
formed the core of their thinking.21 Command post exercises drilled
battering the objective with fire support from air interdiction, close
air support, attack helicopters, and field artillery then following up
with aggressive maneuver assaults.22
Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps artillery also provided a
compelling example of massed fires. After relative inactivity over-
night, the corps renewed its attack early in the morning of 25 Febru-
ary 1991. The 18th Field Artillery Brigade and the 6th Battalion, 27th
Field Artillery Regiment fired 10 brigade volleys on a series of en-
emy targets, including field artillery. “The brilliant MLRS [Multiple
Launch Rocket System] fires lit the sky and invigorated our Soldiers
as much as it disheartened the enemy,” reported Lieutenant Colonel
Patrick C. Sweeney, the corps artillery operations officer.23 This firing
broke the spirit of the enemy resistance. When asked why they surren-
dered, interrogated Iraqi prisoners of war pled, “No more rockets.”24
One captured enemy officer also related the effect of the day’s
massed fires. He stated that moments after his battery fired a mis-
sion, Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions rained down
on his position, destroying most of his weapons and killing two
thirds of his soldiers. He added that the remainder of his soldiers
immediately deserted their guns.25
One day later on 26 February 1991, the 42d Field Artillery
Brigade commanded by Colonel Morris J. Boyd delivered mass-
ing fires in the VII Corps sector. “The advance continued at a brisk
pace through the day meeting with only scattered, generally unco-
ordinated resistance,” Colonel Boyd and Captain Randy Mitchell,
an assistant operations officer for the brigade, wrote.26 At dusk the
situation abruptly changed. The 3d Armored Division, the 2d Ar-
mored Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Infantry Division (Mecha-
nized) smashed headlong into elements of three Iraqi armored
units. “In a furious night battle that followed, the Brigade found its
assets heavily committed,” Colonel Boyd and Captain Mitchell re-
ported.27 The brigade’s 3rd Battalion, 20th Field Artillery Regiment
and the 2nd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment massed fires
from their M109A2A3 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzers in
support of the M109A2A3s of the 2d Battalion, 82d Field Artil-

9
lery Regiment, the 4th Battalion, 82d Field Artillery Regiment, and
2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery Regiment of the 3d Armored Divi-
sion. Meanwhile the brigade’s 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery
Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System) provided rocket fires
in a general support role. By dawn of 27 February 1991, the triple
punch of close air, accurate and timely massed field artillery fires,
and aggressive maneuver had broken the back of the Iraqi forces in
the US VII Corps sector.28
In an after action report of the 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery
Regiment of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade commanded by Colo-
nel Floyd T. Banks and attached to the US XVIII Airborne Corps,
leaders expressed comparable thoughts about massed fire later that
day. On the evening of 27 February 1991, the 2d Battalion, 18th
Field Artillery Regiment; the 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regi-
ment of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade; and the 3d Battalion, 27th
Field Artillery Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
artillery received an emergency fire mission from the division’s lead
brigade that was receiving incoming fire from the Hammurabi Re-
publican Guard Force Command. The three field artillery battalions
massed fires and crushed enemy resistance.29
The 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery Regiment operations of-
ficer, Captain Alfred K. Grey II, furnished an even more descriptive
account of that particular fight. As his unit was moving north in sup-
port of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the division’s lead
elements began receiving incoming fire from the Hammurabi Repub-
lican Guards, forcing the division to respond. “We were the first unit
in the 212th Brigade. . .to engage the target,” Captain Grey recalled.30
“Within 2 minutes and 10 seconds, we occupied hasty firing positions
and fired our first volley. Our fires, massed with 2/17 FA [Field Artil-
lery] and 3/27 FA [Field Artillery] on enemy armor and infantry posi-
tions caused mass casualties and a collapse of enemy resistance.”31
Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets, eight-inch howitzer rounds,
and 155-millimeter howitzer rounds wiped out the enemy forces.32
Field Artillery articles written by other Operation Desert Storm
participants reached the same conclusion about massed fires. Major
Mark S. Jensen of the 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment
of the 42d Field Artillery Brigade said that his battalion repeatedly
massed Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets on enemy forma-

10
tions in support of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Infantry Divi-
sion (Mechanized), or the 3d Armored Division to defeat the enemy
decisively during the course of the ground war.33 Major Kenneth P.
Graves of the US XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery described how the
1st Battalion, 201st Field Artillery Regiment of the West Virginia
Army National Guard; the 1st Battalion, 181st Field Artillery Regi-
ment of the Tennessee Army National Guard; and the 1st Battal-
ion, 623d Field Artillery Regiment of the Kentucky Army National
Guard also reaffirmed the value of massed fires.34 In the October
1991 Field Artillery, Major Graves noted that the 18th and 212th
Field Artillery Brigades and the 24th Infantry Division Artillery
massed nine battalions in the early morning hours of the final day
of the war in preparation to destroy the Hammurabi RGFC [Repub-
lic Guard Force Command] Armored Division.35 In light of these
critiques and others, the Field Artillery School confidently briefed
senior field artillery officers at a training seminar after the war “that
massed fires are devastating.”36
As field artillery officers explained in after action reports,
massed fires provided effective counterfire and close support in Op-
eration Desert Storm in accordance with accepted doctrine. Fire sup-
port doctrine was developed by Major General David E. Ott while he
was serving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School from
1973 to 1976 and codified in Field Manual 6-20, Fire Support in
Combined Arms Operations (1976), as a vital part of the moderniza-
tion effort to make the Army more effective in a high-intensity war
in Europe. The approach gave a single individual the authority to
manage all field artillery fires in a corps. The force commander had
the prerogative to employ corps and division artillery in the more
important battle—counterfire or close support—depending upon the
circumstances. The new fire support doctrine centralized command
and control of field artillery fires more than previously, permitted
field artillery resources to be directed more effectively against the
gravest threat, and ended the confusing practice of dividing coun-
terbattery work among the corps, the division, and even the direct
support battalion. Equally as important, Field Manual 6-20 stressed
the importance of massed fires to defeat the enemy.37
In the October 1991 Field Artillery, the Commandant of the
Field Artillery School, Major General Fred F. Marty (1991–1993),

11
discussed his observations about the effectiveness of counterfire in
the Gulf War. He noted that Firefinder radars developed in the 1970s
and fielded in the 1980s rapidly identified enemy targets and sent the
data digitally or verbally to the guns. Then units used cannon and
Multiple Launch Rocket System assets to silence Iraqi artillery by
delivering “convincing” fires.38
Others made similar assessments about counterfire. A 1st Ar-
mored Division Artillery field artillery officer related, “In particular,
we relied on the MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System] as the
primary counterfire weapon system and in this role we were able to
effectively silence all enemy artillery that fired at us.”39 A 24th In-
fantry Division (Mechanized) field artillery officer likewise reported
that artillery gunnery “synchronized [the] delivery of fires and ef-
fectively denied the enemy the freedom to maneuver while protect-
ing the Victory Division’s capability to do so [with counterfire].”40
Colonel Boyd and Captain Mitchell of the 42d Field Artillery Bri-
gade assigned to US XVIII Airborne Corps indicated Iraqis referred
to the field artillery rocket barrages as “iron rain.”41
The 42d Field Artillery Brigade intelligence officer also of-
fered comments about the 26 February 1991 battle, during which
the 3d Armored Division destroyed the Tawakalna Mech division
and the 42d Field Artillery fired to suppress or destroy at least 60
tubes of enemy artillery.42 He noted that the AH-64s received little
response from Iraqi antiaircraft artillery or air defense artillery. The
intelligence officer concluded, “The absence of enemy artillery. .
.throughout the war indicates the effectiveness of US artillery. . . .
Friendly direct fire units were never hampered by enemy artillery
throughout the war.”43
Similarly, Colonel Garrett D. Bourne, Commander of the 210th
Field Artillery Brigade attached to US VII Corps, wrote that the Mul-
tiple Launch Rocket System “proved to be indispensable in engag-
ing the enemy out to great distances, allowing the maneuver units to
become decisively engaged.”44 Along the same lines, 1st Armored
Division Artillery leaders commented that the Multiple Launch
Rocket System “performed superlatively” in its first combat test and
added that they used it “as the primary counterfire weapon system
and in this role we were able to effectively silence all enemy artillery
that fired against us.”45 Fighting as part of US VII Corps, the divi-

12
sion’s field artillery fired a 15-minute preparation of 192 Multiple
Launch Rocket System rockets and 720 155-millimeter rounds on
24 targets during the 26 February 1991 battle. When US VII Corps
subsequently attacked, 1st Armored Division Artillery and other
field artillery units repeatedly shifted fires to engage enemy field
artillery to permit the maneuver forces to advance. During one two-
hour counterfire engagement on the afternoon of 27 February 1991,
the 1st Armored Division’s field artillery fired 288 rockets and 480
eight-inch rounds at 21 enemy field artillery positions. On average,
American counterfire engaged enemy field artillery of the Medinah
Division of the Republican Guard Army within six minutes after the
enemy guns were acquired by a Firefinder Q-36 or Q-37 radar that
day. Battle damage assessment after the war credited field artillery
units with destroying 70 enemy field artillery tubes or their crews
during this particular counterfire fight.46
In the meantime, the 3d Armored Division’s field artillery and
reinforcing field artillery repeatedly provided counterfire on 26 Feb-
ruary 1991. Supporting the 3d Armored Division’s second brigade,
the 4th Battalion, 82d Field Artillery Regiment and the 3d Battalion,
20th Field Artillery Regiment of the 42d Field Artillery Brigade en-
gaged enemy bunker complexes early in the evening to permit the
maneuver arms to continue their advance with minimal resistance.
Later, a Q-36 radar acquired active enemy indirect fire systems that
the division’s field artillery subsequently destroyed by counterfire.
Shortly after this action, a Q-36 radar located more enemy field artil-
lery; then three 42d Field Artillery Brigade battalions—the 2d Bat-
talion 3d Field Artillery, 2d Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, and 1st-
27th Field Artillery, massed fires to silence the enemy artillery.”47
Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, Commanding General of
the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), referred to 212th Field
Artillery Brigade efforts and the unit’s after action report during
a 31 March 1992 briefing to the Field Artillery Conference at the
Field Artillery School. He underscored the overriding significance
of counterfire on the ground war: “First priority of FA [field artil-
lery] is to win the counterfire battle.”48
After reviewing after action reports, the Field Artillery School
concurred with Major General McCaffrey and the 212th Field Ar-
tillery Brigade’s conclusions about the efficacy of counterfire. In

13
a supportive appraisal of counterfire doctrine, the school noted,
“The most important lesson here is that an aggressive proactive CB
[counterbattery] policy pays tremendous dividends.”49 The school
then noted, “The Firefinder family of radars was invaluable in de-
tecting targets [indirect fire systems] and adjusting fire onto hostile
positions [field artillery].”50
While counterfire was decisive, efforts to shift massed fires
around the battlefield also played a pivotal role in furnishing close
support to the maneuver arms and reinforcing the fire support team’s
importance for coordinating close air support, naval gunfire, mor-
tars, and field artillery for the maneuver commander. If it func-
tioned as intended, the fire support team—a concept developed in
the 1970s—would provide the maneuver commander with close fire
support when and where he needed it. Along with counterfire, pro-
active and responsive close support would permit friendly maneuver
forces to make contact with less effective enemy forces.51
Many field artillery officers observed firsthand the effect of
close support. In a draft article on the 2d Armored Cavalry Regi-
ment’s operations during the war, Major John Klemencic and Cap-
tain John Thomson discussed their unit’s fire support as part of the
US VII Corps’ offensive. From 24 to 26 February 1991, the regi-
ment’s field artillery repeatedly shifted massed fires to strike dis-
mounted Iraqi infantry and field artillery that had been acquired by
Q-37 radars. During the Battle of 73 Easting on 26 February 1991,
for example, the 6th Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment of the
210th Field Artillery Brigade shot more than 700 rounds at enemy
targets in a direct support role to the 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cav-
alry Regiment. Reflecting on its overall combat action in the Gulf,
the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s unit history applauded friendly
field artillery for furnishing responsive and effective close support.52
On the morning of 26 February 1991, the 1st Armored Division
under US VII Corps experienced the same kind of close fire sup-
port. The division approached Al Busayyah and then turned toward
the Medinah Division of the Republican Guards situated about 100
kilometers to the east. As the division closed within 50 kilometers
of the Medinah’s main position, the division’s intelligence (G-2) of-
ficer identified an enemy blocking position and sent the information

14
to the division’s field artillery, which struck it with Multiple Launch
Rocket System rockets. The same intelligence officer later picked up
a second blocking position approximately 15 kilometers beyond the
first. Again, the division’s field artillery bombarded the enemy with
rockets. Specifically, the 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regi-
ment in support of the 1st Armored Division recorded in an after
action report about numerous massing fires on 26 and 27 Febru-
ary 1991 to support the maneuver forces. With support from 8-inch
and 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzers and massed rocket
fires—called “Firestrike” by the battalion—the division attacked 65
armored vehicles on 27 February 1991; they neutralized about 50
percent of them according to Apache helicopters that assaulted the
vehicles afterward and saw 25 to 30 burning.53
The 3d Battalion, 20th Field Artillery Regiment of the 42d
Field Artillery Brigade described comparable action on 26 February
1991. After linking up with the 3d Armored Division and receiving a
reinforcing mission to support the division’s 4th Battalion, 82d Field
Artillery Regiment, the 3d Battalion moved east toward Iraqi posi-
tions. After making contact with the enemy, the division stopped and
called for field artillery fires. In support of the division’s field artil-
lery, the 3d Battalion opened up fire from its self-propelled 155-mil-
limeter howitzers. Following this attack of more than 1,000 rounds,
close air support from A-10s and attack helicopters hit the enemy.54
As might be expected, other field artillery officers furnished sim-
ilar appraisals about the effectiveness of close support. The 2d Battal-
ion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment of the 42d Field Artillery Brigade
recounted providing many battalion massed fires on the evening of 26
February 1991 in support of the 3d Armored Division in the US VII
Corps sector. Following the war, the 2d Battalion recorded:
The battle raged throughout the evening and night with
direct fire engagements, attack helicopters, CAS [close air
support] and artillery raining steel on the Tawakalna. HE
[high explosive shell] and white phosphorous proved par-
ticularly effective in the neutralization and destruction of
the bunker complexes and associated ammunition caches
as attested by the spectacular secondary explosions.55

15
 In a report to the division G-3 (operations), the Commander of
the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Colonel Ronald E.
Townsend, wrote about his experience with close support. He noted:
Throughout the entire operation, artillery fire was timely,
accurate, and lethal. . . . This is a tribute to the Soldiers on
the gun line, forward observers, and fire direction centers.
The artillery gunnery chain synchronized delivery of fires
and effectively denied the enemy freedom to maneuver
while protecting the Victory Division’s [24th Infantry Di-
vision (Mechanized)] capability to. . .[maneuver].56

On 17 June 1991, the 210th Field Artillery Brigade dispatched

a memorandum to General Hallada about the unit’s combat actions.
“Never before was this [the effectiveness of close support] more
evident than in Iraq and Kuwait as the brigade provided accurate
and timely fires to the maneuver forces,” the brigade reported.57
Along the same lines the 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regi-
ment (Multiple Launch Rocket System) in the 75th Field Artillery
Brigade attached to the US VII Corps wrote:
The dawn of this day [28 February 1991] saw our. . .bri-
gade unleash it’s (sic) full combat power in a final prep to
destroy remaining Iraqi units. . . . We had in effect set up
a firing assembly line. SPLLs [Multiple Launch Rocket
System Self-Propelled Loader/Launchers] would fire,
drive up to new rocket pods, reload, and go right back out
to fire again. This ritual was performed over and over.58

From the unit’s perspective, rocket and cannon fires furnished effec-
tive close support and helped destroy the Iraqi army.59
Upon succeeding Major General Hallada as the Commandant
of the Field Artillery School in July 1991, Major General Marty de-
scribed the contribution of close support in an October 1991 Field
Artillery article:
Massed artillery fires provided the maneuver commander
combat power at the time and place he needed it. This
gave him overwhelming fire superiority and allowed him
to maneuver to exploit the effects of fire.60

16
 As indicated by combat action during Operation Desert Storm,
convincing massed fires in the form of counterfire and close sup-
port silenced Iraqi artillery, helped to destroy the enemy’s will to
fight, allowed the friendly maneuver forces to maintain the rapid
pace of their attack, and saved friendly lives.61 To accomplish this,
active Army, Army reserve component, and Marine field artillery
units fired more than 57,000 rounds. Of these they shot almost 6,000
rockets and 32 Army Tactical Missile System missiles; the rest were
105-millimeter, 155-millimeter, and eight-inch rounds.62 Reflecting
upon this contribution from a maneuver commander’s perspective,
Major General McCaffrey wrote, “All of us appreciate the tremen-
dous contribution of the artillery. Our enormous success was due, in
large part to the artillery. The success of your counterfire limited our
casualties.”63 On another occasion on 31 March 1992, McCaffrey
said, “Field Artillery is the dominant combat force on the battle-
field. Commanders must understand how to plan, synchronize, and
deliver its firepower.”64
Although General McCaffrey and other Army officers praised
the field artillery for its impressive performance in Desert Storm, the
210th Field Artillery Brigade wisely cautioned against unabashed
exuberance. In a 17 June 1991 memorandum to Major General Hal-
lada, the unit recorded:
The success of the 210th FA [Field Artillery] BDE [bri-
gade] in this war was phenomenal. The Soldiers were jus-
tifiably proud of their accomplishments. But let’s not for-
get that combined arms tactics and doctrine really won the
war. . . . Outstanding fire support execution was the cul-
mination of strenuous training with the maneuver unit.65

As counterfire and close support with massed fires suggested

during Operation Desert Storm, the Army’s field artillery had fun-
damentally sound doctrine and performed well. By integrating tar-
get acquisition systems; command, control, communications, and
computer systems; support and sustainment systems; and munitions
and weapon systems, the units silenced enemy indirect fire systems
and permitted the maneuver arms to advance relatively unscathed
by enemy indirect and direct fires. Such performance in Operation

17
Desert Storm validated fire support doctrine in Field Manual 6-20,
Fire Support for Combined Arms Operations (1983), which was the
field artillery’s capstone “how-to-fight” manual and the basic refer-
ence for fire support planning and coordination.

Confronting the Deficiencies

Although it highlighted existing strengths with fire support
doctrine, Operation Desert Storm concurrently reinforced pre-war
concerns held by many field artillery officers regarding equipment
and weapon deficiencies that had not been eliminated through mod-
ernization. Many field artillery systems lacked the speed, mobility,
and ranges required for the modern battlefield.
Of the major field artillery systems, the M981 Fire Support
Team Vehicle adopted in the 1970s received the most scathing criti-
cism from field artillery officers and Soldiers. During the Gulf War,
the M981 validated pre-war apprehension because it was not suf-
ficiently mobile to stay abreast of the faster M1 Abrams tank and
M2 Bradley fighting vehicle. In their draft article about fire sup-
port during Operation Desert Storm, Major Klemencic and Captain
Thomson described the M981 as “slow and unreliable.”66 They not-
ed that the [2d Armored Cavalry] Regimental Commander and the
Squadron Commander were cognizant of this problem and stressed
not leaving the field artillery officers and Soldiers who rode in the
slower vehicles; they were the eyes of the field artillery battalions
with their ability to locate targets. In view of this, commanders had
to consider the vehicle’s limitations as they planned operations or
potentially do without effective and responsive fire support.
The 1st Armored Division Artillery addressed the same issue
and reached the same conclusion on 2 July 1991. It commented that
the vehicle “is based on the old M113 family of vehicles and is not
suitable for keeping up with the current M1 Abrams and M2/3 Bradley
fleet of maneuver vehicles. . . . In the future, we need a fire support
vehicle that can move as fast as the maneuver units it supports.”67
Along the same line, the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery wrote
about its experience with the vehicle during the war. It explained,
“During Desert Shield training and actual combat operations, the
FISTV could not physically keep up with the sleeker M1 and M2

18
even when they slowed down their pace significantly.”68 The of-
fensive orientation of Operation Desert Storm built around AirLand
Battle’s doctrine of speed and maneuver clearly reinforced the
obsolescence of the vehicle and the need for a Bradley-based fire
support team vehicle advocated as early as 1976–77 by the former
Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Donald
R. Keith (1976–77).69
Likewise, the war demonstrated the limited mobility of the AN/
TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars, often called Firefinder radars and
introduced in the 1970s; the Tactical Fire Direction System adopted
in the 1970s; the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer fielded in
the late 1970s and early 1980s and used by the Army and the Marine
Corps; and the M109A2/A3 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer
introduced in the 1970s. Mounted on old five-ton trucks, Firefinder
radars that had been designed to locate Soviet and Warsaw Pact in-
direct fires systems and the Tactical Fire Direction System that had
been developed to compute gunnery solutions were not constructed
for rapid movement and had difficulties keeping up with the maneu-
ver arms. To overcome this critical limitation, some field artillery
units loaded their Tactical Fire Direction System shelters, Firefinder
radar shelters, and generators on Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical
Trucks to give them better cross country mobility and more speed.
Also, in some instances, M109A2/A3 units could not support task
forces because they could not stay abreast of the faster maneuver
forces, while the M198 was slow to displace.70
The range inferiority of the Army’s field artillery in relation
to Iraqi field artillery also alarmed many field artillery officers and
Soldiers. Although the Multiple Launch Rocket System performed
well in its first combat test and was accurate and lethal, the sys-
tem lacked sufficient range.71 In fact, Colonel Vollney B. Corn Jr.,
who commanded the 1st Armored Division Artillery during Opera-
tion Desert Storm, and Captain Richard A. Lacquemont, who was
the assistant operations officer for the 1st Armored Division during
Operation Desert Storm, outlined the consequences of the system’s
30-kilometer range. Four Iraqi cannon systems and two multiple
rocket launcher systems had longer ranges than the Multiple Launch
Rocket System. “In the hands of a better trained and more intelligent

19
foe, these [Iraqi] systems could have made it extremely difficult for
us in the counterartillery battle,” they related in an October 1991
Field Artillery article.72
In June 1991, the 210th Field Artillery Brigade made a similar
observation about the Multiple Launch Rocket System. It reported,
“During the VII (US) Corps’ offensive covering force operations, 2
ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment] air scouts often identified high
payoff targets at ranges beyond the current MLRS [Multiple Launch
Rocket System] range. These targets were often engaged by CAS/AI
[close air support/air interdiction] or helicopters when sorties were
available and weather permitted.”73 In view of this example and
their experiences with the Multiple Launch Rocket System, com-
manders from the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, the 1st Armored
Division Artillery, the 210th Field Artillery Brigade, and Multiple
Launch Rocket System units recommended extending the system’s
range from 30 kilometers to 50 kilometers to provide critical stand-
off capabilities and stay abreast of likely improvements in interna-
tional field artillery rocket systems. With a range of 23 kilometers,
the M109A2/A3 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer was also
outranged by conventional and extended-range munitions fired by
Iraqi cannon artillery. To eliminate this stark imbalance, future can-
nons required ranges of 40 kilometers with conventional munitions
and 50 kilometers with extended-range munitions. Without rocket
and cannon field artillery systems with longer ranges than the en-
emy’s indirect fire systems, standoff capabilities would be sacrificed
and counterfire would be seriously compromised.74
Besides recognizing the requirement for longer ranges, another
significant Operation Desert Storm lesson focused on the need for
more field artillery in the division and corps. Given the importance
of the Multiple Launch Rocket System, a battery of nine Multiple
Launch Rocket System M270 launchers in the division could be
overworked if not simply overwhelmed by the demands of support-
ing the entire division and could not depend upon having the corps
artillery’s Multiple Launch Rocket System battalion available when
it was needed. To eliminate this problem, some field artillery officers
with Gulf War combat experience favored equipping division artil-
lery with a battalion of 27 M270 launchers to replace the battery of

20
nine launchers. This would increase firepower, permit rotating fire
missions among a greater number of launchers, and allow conduct-
ing maintenance and resting the crew.75
In addition to increasing the number of M270 launchers in the
division, some field artillery commanders wanted more cannon ar-
tillery in the division. The commander of the 1st Infantry Division
Artillery, Colonel Dodson, advocated making two additional cannon
battalions organic to the division. This would give the division com-
mander five cannon battalions (120 cannons) and sufficient fire sup-
port to conduct “most operations without further augmentation.”76
Field artillery officers with experience at the corps also es-
poused more cannon artillery as the commander of the 42d Field Ar-
tillery Brigade, Colonel Boyd, urged. In an insightful memorandum
he wrote, “We can make up for a shortage of artillery by focusing
what you do have at the right place and right time, but it isn’t easy.”77
More field artillery would make providing fire support easier.78
Although the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition
was the overwhelming munition of choice for commanders and was
devastatingly effective, its dud rate raised serious concerns.79 During
the war, unexploded Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition
bomblets from cannon and rocket systems formed hazardous mine-
fields. Especially in soft sand, they created a significant battlefield
hazard for friendly maneuver forces to negotiate. For example, a Mul-
tiple Launch Rocket System fire mission of 12 rockets, each contain-
ing 644 bomblets with an allowable dud rate of 2.5 percent, would
produce a minefield of about 200 armed and deadly destructive mu-
nitions. Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition dud mine-
fields hindered movement, compelled maneuver forces to alter their
routes, and led to some injuries and deaths to friendly forces.80 In an
after action report, Colonel Boyd and Captain Mitchell explained the
conundrum. “DPICM [Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Muni-
tion] showed itself to be a ‘two-edge sword.’ While this munition was
very effective against enemy targets, there were at times large num-
bers of unexploded ‘bomblets’ left littering the area that maneuver
(and subsequently support units) had to cross,” they noted.81
Operation Desert Storm revealed another significant field ar-
tillery deficiency. Wire communications tied existing field artillery

21
systems together to limit their freedom of movement. Based upon
the growing significance of smart, precision, and wide-area muni-
tions that would increase the vulnerability of all combat systems
throughout the battlefield, future field artillery systems required the
ability to operate autonomously and move freely without being teth-
ered to wire communications. Shoot and scoot capabilities, emerg-
ing with Multiple Launch Rocket System M270 launcher, were re-
quired for all field artillery weapons systems.82
Another technological problem also shed light on a limita-
tion of the Total Army concept and its implementation. Prior to the
war, Army National Guard field artillery units lacked the Tactical
Fire Direction System for computing technical and tactical gunnery
problems and had to rely on manual methods that were slow and
subject to human error. Captain Richard A. Needham and Major
Russell Graves of the 142d Field Artillery Brigade of the Arkansas
Army National Guard explained after the war:
Until mobilization, the brigade had strictly manual TOCs
[tactical operational centers]. Rotation to the National
Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, with the
1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 3d Armored
Cavalry Regiment (ACR) had uncovered a serious flaw in
the Army’s Total Force concept. Manual TOCs don’t have
a place in the digital realm. Heavy TACFIRE [Tactical Fire
Direction System]-equipped units don’t have the time or
assets to interface with manual TOCs.83

To be sure, Captain Needham and Major Graves touched on an

important issue. Some of the modernization of the 1970s and 1980s
had not yet reached the reserve components as part of the Total Army
concept. In this particular instance, Army National Guard field artil-
lery units still employed manual technical and tactical fire direction
methods on the eve of Operation Desert Storm and searched franti-
cally for Light Tactical Fire Direction Systems before deploying to
the Gulf to give them automated fire direction capabilities and the
ability to function as a team with active component field artillery
units equipped with the Tactical Fire Direction System. Even though
the contractor found sufficient numbers of the Light Tactical Fire

22
Direction System to equip Army National Guard field artillery units,
the rushed fielding schedules hindered proper training.84
Despite this critical deficiency, Operation Desert Storm sub-
stantiated 1970s and 1980s modernization efforts that were de-
signed to counter the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat. Combat opera-
tions validated AirLand Battle fire support doctrine outlined in Field
Manual 6-20. During the short war, field artillery units repeatedly
provided effective and responsive massed fires to neutralize enemy
indirect fire systems and facilitate the maneuver arms’ attack, while
the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the Army Tactical Missile
System unequivocally demonstrated their ability to provide effec-
tive fire support.
Combat operations also underscored critical deficiencies. The
Firefinder radars, the M981 Fire Support Team Vehicle for the fire
support observer team, the Tactical Fire Direction System for com-
puting gunnery problems, the M198 howitzer, and the M109A2/A3
howitzer lacked the speed to stay abreast of maneuver arm vehicles,
while many Iraqi cannon and rocket systems outranged their Ameri-
can counterparts; and the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional
Munition’s dud rate left impassable mine fields. Although these
shortcomings did not detract from the Field Artillery’s overall solid
performance against the Iraqi military forces, the branch had to re-
place these obsolete systems with modern ones to ensure effective
counterfire and close support to stay abreast of the capabilities of
foreign field artillery systems. Failure to modernize would compro-
mise providing effective fire support on the future battlefield.

23
 NOTES
1. For extensive discussion on the modernization of the 1970s and
1980s, see Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to be Done: General Wil-
liam E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations (Fort Leav-
enworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, 1988); John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand
Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe,
VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Historical Office, 1984);
John L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s
Army (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 1997); Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. The Whirl-
wind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army,
1995), Robert H. Scales Jr., ed., Certain Victory: United States Army in the
Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993),
and Boyd L. Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973–1991 (Fort
Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, 1994, reprinted by
the U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003); Norman Friedman, Des-
ert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1991), 36–40, 108, 169–96, 214–36; H.O. Malone, ed., TRADOC Support
to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Preliminary Study (Fort
Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, 1992), 7–8; Department
of the Army (DA), Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991,
24. Thirty-six nations participated in the Coalition by committing ground,
air, or naval forces. Of the 36 nations, the Arab allies (Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and United Arab Emirates), the United Kingdom, France, and the United
States contributed the most military forces. Turkey moved about 125,000
forces along its borders to deter a possible Iraqi attack. See “Forces Com-
mitted,” Military Review, September 1991, 80–81, for details on the com-
position of the Coalition forces.
2. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 2003,
3, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC); Robert H. Scales
Jr., Firepower in Limited War, rev.ed., (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995),
246–56; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 24.
3. Report from A Btry, 6-27 FA, Persian Gulf War, October 1990–
April 1991, 2, HRDC; Memorandum for Major General Raphael J. Hal-
lada, “Diamond Brigade Desert Storm Comments and Results,” 23 May
1991, HRDC; Scales, Firepower in Limited War, 260
4. Schubert and Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War, 164–65.
5. Major Mark S. Jensen, “MLRS in Operation Desert Storm,” Field
Artillery, August 1991, 30–33; Memorandum for Commander 42nd Field
Artillery Brigade, “Battalion History,” 17 March 1991, HRDC; Report,
“42nd Field Artillery Brigade Battle History,” undated, HRDC; Memoran-

24
dum, “1-27 FA Operations in South West Asia,” 5 June 1991, 14, HRDC;
Report, “Focusing Combat Power: The Role of the FA Brigade,” 24 March
1991, HRDC; Report, “Jayhawk,” undated, 5, HRDC.
6. Report, “Jayhawk,” undated, 5, HRDC.
7. Friedman, Desert Victory, 108, 169–96, 214–36; Malone, ed.,
TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 7–8;
Schubert and Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War, 166–67, 173–205; DA,
Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 24–25.
8. Scales, ed., Certain Victory, 382–84; Malone, ed., TRADOC Sup-
port to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 67; Schubert and
Kraus, ed., The Whirlwind War, 201–05.
9. Memorandum for Director of Center for Army Lessons Learned
(CALL), Fort Leavenworth, KS, “Operation Desert Storm Emerging Ob-
servations,” 10 July 1991, HRDC; Briefing, “Desert Storm Emerging Re-
sults,” undated, HRDC.
10. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 9; “Operation
Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 1–2. See Creighton W. Abrams,
“The Gulf War and European Artillery,” Journal of the Royal Artillery,
Autumn 2001, 41–44, for insights from a former field artillery commander
in Operation Desert Storm about combat operations.
11. Colonel David Rolston, “Victory Artillery in Operation Desert
Shield,” Field Artillery, April 1991, 4.
12. Brigadier General (Retired) Paul F. Pearson and General (Re-
tired) Glenn K. Otis, “Desert Storm Fire Support: Classic AirLand Battle
Operations,” Landpower Essay Series, AUSA Institute of Land Warfare,
June 1991, HRDC.
13. Pearson and Otis, “Desert Storm Fire Support.”
14. Memorandum for Major General Raphael J. Hallada, Comman-
dant, USAFAS, “Operation Desert Storm Thoughts,” 15 May 1991, HRDC.
15. Memorandum for Major General Raphael J. Hallada, “Opera-
tion Desert Storm Thoughts;” Major General David E. Ott, Field Artillery:
1954–1973 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1975), 38–49.
16. Scales, ed., Certain Victory, 226.
17. Memorandum for Major General Raphael J. Hallada, “Diamond
Brigade Desert Storm Comments and Results,” 13; Captain Richard A.
Needham and Major Russell Graves, “100 Hours with Light TACFIRE,”
Field Artillery, October 1991, 30–33.
18. Memorandum for Commanding General, VII Corps Artillery, no
subject, 25 March 1991, HRDC.
19. Memorandum for Commanding General, VII Corps Artillery.
20. Memorandum for Commanding General, VII Corps Artillery.
21. Memorandum with Appendices for Director, Fire Support and
Combined Arms Operations Department (FSCAOD), “USAFAS Histori-
cal Document,” 2 July 1991, Appendix 1, HRDC.
22. “USAFAS Historical Document,” Appendix 1.

25
 23. Memorandum for Record, “Chronicle of XVIII Airborne Corps
Artillery Activity during Operation Desert Storm,” 2 May 1991, 9, HRDC.
24. “Chronicle of XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery Activity during
Operation Desert Storm,” 9.
25. “Chronicle of XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery Activity during
Operation Desert Storm,” 9.
26. Report, “Focusing Combat Power,” 13 April 1991, 8, HRDC.
27. “Focusing Combat Power,” 8.
28. “Focusing Combat Power,” 8.
29. Memorandum for Commander, 212th Field Artillery Brigade,
“Chronicle of 2-18 FA Activity during Operation Desert Storm,” 17 June
1991, part of Memorandum for G3, III Corps Artillery, “USAFAS Histori-
cal Document,” 20 June 1991, HRDC.
30. “Chronicle of 2-18 FA Activity during Operation Desert Storm.”
31. “Chronicle of 2-18 FA Activity during Operation Desert Storm.”
32. “Chronicle of 2-18 FA Activity during Operation Desert Storm.”
33. Jensen, “MLRS in Operation Desert Storm,” 30–34.
34. Major Kenneth P. Graves, “Steel Rain – XVIII Airborne Corps
Artillery in Desert Storm,” Field Artillery, October 1991, 49–56; “Field
Artillery Commanders,” Field Artillery, December 1991, 29–32.
35. Graves, “Steel Rain,” 52.
36. “Desert Storm Emerging Results.”
37. Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, 4–5.
38. Major General Fred F. Marty, “FA on Target in the Storm,” Field
Artillery, October 1991, 1.
39. “USAFAS Historical Document.”
40. Memorandum for GS, 24th ID (M), “Historical Narrative of the
24 Divarty Actions in Operation Desert Storm,” undated, HRDC.
41. Report, “42nd Field Artillery Brigade: Operation Desert Storm,”
13 April 1991, 8, HRDC.
42. Memorandum for Record, “Thoughts on Desert Storm: Doctrine,
Tactics, and Techniques,” 20 April 1991, HRDC.
43. “Thoughts on Desert Storm: Doctrine, Tactics, and Techniques.”
44. Memorandum for VII (U.S.) Corps Artillery, G-3 Operations,
“Summary of Significant Events for the 210th Field Artillery Brigade dur-
ing Operation Desert Storm, 17 January 1991 to 10 March 1991,” 1 April
1991, HRDC.
45. Memorandum for Director, FSCAOD, “USAFAS Historical
Document.”
46. Memorandum with Appendices for Director, FSCAOD, “USA-
FAS Historical Document,” Appendix 1.
47. 3d Armored Division Artillery, “Historical Summary, Opera-
tion Desert Storm, Phases III, IV, and V (24–28 February 1991),” HRDC;
Memorandum for Director, FSCAOD, USAFAS, “USAFAS Historical
Document,” 15 July 1991, HRDC.

26
 48. Briefing, “Operation Desert Storm, Looking to the Future,” 31
March 1992, HRDC.
49. Report, “Artillery Lessons of the Gulf War,” undated, HRDC.
50. Report, “The Rattle in the Storm,” undated, in Memorandum for
Director, FSCAOD, USAFAS, 15 July 1991, HRDC.
51. Briefing, “Operation Desert Storm, Looking to the Future;” Das-
trup, Modernizing the King of Battle, 6–7.
52. Major John Klemencic and Captain John Thomson, “Fire Sup-
port for the Corps Covering Force: A Desert Storm Perspective,” undated,
draft article, 4–11, HRDC; Report, “Second Armored Cavalry Regiment,
1990–1991,” 1–6, HRDC; Memorandum with Enclosure for Command-
er, “210th Field Artillery Brigade’s Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and
Lessons Learned,” 17 June 1991, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “His-
torical Narrative of 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s Role in
the Campaign to Liberate Kuwait, 23–28 February 1991,” 3 March 1991,
HRDC.
53. Memorandum, “USAFAS Historical Document;” Memorandum
for 42 FA Brigade, “4-27 FA Battle Report, 24 Feb–04 Mar 91,” in Memo-
randum for Director, FSCAOD, USAFAS, 15 July 1991, HRDC.
54. Report, “The Rattle in the Storm;” Memorandum for Director,
FSCAOD, USAFAS, 15 July 1991, HRDC.
55. Report, “Combat Historical Summary,” undated, HRDC.
56. Memorandum for G3, 24th Infantry Division, “Historical Narra-
tive of 24 DivArty Actions in Operation Desert Storm,” undated, HRDC.
57. Memorandum for Commander, USAFAS, “210th Field Artil-
lery Brigade’s Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons Learned.” 17
June 1991, HRDC.
58. Report, “A/6-27 FA Persian Gulf War, Oct 90–Apr 91,” undated,
14, HRDC.
59. “A/6-27 FA Persian Gulf War, Oct 90–Apr 91,” 14.
60. Marty, “FA on Target in the Storm,” 1.
61. USAFAS, “Field Artillery Desert Facts,” 2, HRDC.
62. Memorandum with Enclosures for Commandant USAFAS,
“Desert Storm Rounds Fired,” 20 August 1991, HRDC.
63. USAFAS, “Field Artillery Desert Facts,” 3.
64. Briefing, “Operation Desert Storm, Looking to the Future.”
65. Memorandum with Enclosure for Commander, USAFAS, “210th
Field Artillery Brigade’s Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons
Learned.”
66. Klemencic and Thomson, “Fire Support for the Corps Covering
Force,” undated, 6, HRDC.
67. Memorandum with Enclosures for Director, FSCAOD, USA-
FAS, “USAFAS Historical Document,” 2 July 1991, Appendix 5, HRDC.
68. Memorandum with Enclosures for Brigadier General Franks,
Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, “USAFAS Historical Document,” 27

27
June 1991, Enclosure 2, HRDC; Memorandum with Enclosures for Com-
mandant, USAFAS, “1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons
Learned.” Note: Both documents have the quote.
69. Memorandum with Enclosures for Brigadier General Franks, As-
sistant Commandant, USAFAS, “USAFAS Historical Document,” Enclo-
sure 2; “1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned;”
Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, 7–8.
70. Email with Attachment, “ Manuscript Review,” 35–36; Report,
“3rd Armored Division Artillery After Action Review Comments,” un-
dated, HRDC; Memorandum for Commanding General, XVIII Airborne
Corps, “Operation Desert Storm After Action Report,” 22 March 1991,
HRDC; “1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned;”
Report, “Desert Shield/Storm Lessons Learned,” undated, HRDC; Memo-
randum for OIC, Weapon Systems Combat Performance Team, Army Ma-
terial Command Forward, “Summary of Trends, Observations and Soldier
Recommendations on Weapon Systems Combat Performance,” 1 May
1991, ODS MPRI File Box, 33, HRDC.
71. Colonel Vollney B. Corn Jr., and Captain Richard A. Lacque-
mont, “Silver Bullets,” Field Artillery, October 1991, 10.
72. Corn and Lacquemont, “Silver Bullets,” 11.
73. Memorandum for Commander, USAFAS, “210th FA Brigade’s
Desert Shield/Storm Chronology and Lessons Learned., 17 June 1991,
HRDC.
74. Memorandum for OIC, Weapon Systems Combat Performance
Assessment Team, Army Material Command Forward, “Summary of
Trends, Observations and Soldier Recommendations on Weapon Systems
Combat Performance,” 36; “210th FA Brigade’s Desert Shield/Storm
Chronology and Lessons Learned;” “USAFAS Historical Document;”
“1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned;” Corn and
Lacquemont, “Silver Bullets,” 11–12.
75. Corn and Lacquemont, “Silver Bullets,” 12; Brigadier General
Howard J. von Kaenel, former 82nd Airborne Division Artillery Com-
mander, interview by author, 28 and 31 August 1992, HRDC; Memoran-
dum for Commandant, “ 1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Les-
sons Learned.”
76. Memorandum for Commandant, USAFAS, “Artillery for the
Heavy Division,” 5 September 1991, HRDC.
77. Memorandum for Record, “Thoughts on Desert Storm: Doctrine,
Tactics, and Techniques,” 20 April 1991, HRDC.
78. “Thoughts on Desert Storm.”
79. Memorandum for Commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mech-
anized), “AAR Comments, Operation Desert Storm,” 15 March 1991,
HRDC; Report, “ Artillery Lessons of the Gulf War.”
80. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 40; Report, “42nd
Field Artillery Brigade Desert Shield/Storms Lessons Learned,” undated,

28
HRDC; Memorandum with Enclosures for Director FSCAOD, “USAFAS
Historical Report,” 2 July 1991, Appendix 8, HRDC.
81. Report, “Focusing Combat Power,” 13 April 1991, 6, HRDC.
82. Letter with Attachment, author to Major General Fred Marty, 10
September 2003, 41, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Re-
view,” 41; John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold
War (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, 1996), 65.
83. Needham and Graves, “100 Hours with Light TACFIRE,” 30–31.
84. Needham and Graves, “100 Hours with Light TACFIRE,” 30–
31; Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 42.

29
 Chapter 2

A New but Still Dangerous World

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany,

and the 1989–1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union demolished
the cornerstone of American foreign policy of deterring Soviet and
Warsaw Pact military aggression in Europe, negated the need for
stationing a large military force in Europe, and undermined the ratio-
nale for maintaining a large military establishment to provide for US
national security. This abrupt conclusion of the Cold War prompted
Congress to reduce the US military’s size and budget and prodded
the US military to develop a new strategy during the 1990s to reflect
the emerging international political environment. For the Army and
the Field Artillery, power projection meant rewriting doctrine and
introducing deployable weapon systems and equipment to comple-
ment those with less strategic mobility. Meanwhile the emerging
budget reality required restructuring to accommodate shrinking end
strength and funding. Simultaneously, the Army faced the impera-
tive to implement lessons from Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. Working together, the end of the Cold War, Operation Desert
Shield, and Operation Desert Storm caused the Army and the Field
Artillery to restructure their forces and embark on a vast program to
modernize their light and heavy forces.

A New World, Budget Reductions, and Restructuring

The post-Cold War world of the 1990s posed a dilemma for the
Army. For the first time in five decades, the United States lacked a
viable threat, meaning the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, to stimu-
late defense spending. Such circumstances motivated Congress to
renew its determination to shrink the size of the military that Opera-
tion Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm of 1990–1991 had
temporarily derailed. After the Gulf War and the end of the Cold
War, Congress picked up where it left off in 1990. Legislators started
aggressively reducing the military’s budget again and began shift-
ing money from military to domestic programs to achieve a peace

31
dividend. This led to a massive reduction to the Army’s budget and
mammoth force structure and personnel cuts. From five corps, 18
active component divisions, and 10 reserve component (Army Na-
tional Guard and Army Reserve) divisions in 1989, the Army’s force
structure shrunk over a period of eight years to four corps, 10 active
divisions, and eight Army National Guard divisions. Simultaneous-
ly, the Army trimmed its personnel strength in Europe from 215,000
to 65,000 Soldiers and closed more than 700 installations in the
continental United States and overseas. Voluntary early transition,
voluntary separation incentives, special separation benefits, reduc-
tion-in-force actions, selective early retirement, and other programs
meanwhile dropped the active Army’s personnel strength from
770,000 to 480,000 and its reserve component personnel strength
from 770,000 to 560,000 by 1999. The effort also included drastical-
ly decreasing the Army’s civilian workforce from 403,000 in 1989
to 225,000 in 1999 through reduction-in-force actions and voluntary
early retirement authority. At the completion of the downsizing, the
active Army and its reserve components were the smallest that they
had been since 1941 on the eve of World War II.1
For the Field Artillery, the downsizing also had a striking im-
pact. In 1989, the Regular Army and its reserve components had a
total of 218 field artillery battalions and 38 batteries, including bat-
teries in armored cavalry regiments. While the Regular Army had
96 battalions, the Guard had 105 and the Army Reserve had 17. By
the end of the 1990s, 141 field artillery battalions and 22 batteries
remained—12 in the active component and 10 in the Guard. The ac-
tive Army had 50 battalions, and the Guard had 91 battalions. The
restructuring left the Army Reserve without any field artillery by
1996 and decreased the field artillery in the active component by 42
percent and in the reserve component by 36 percent.2
To adjust to the enormous reductions, the Army reallocated its
combat, combat support, and combat service support units among
its active and reserve components to achieve better balance and re-
tain its fighting capabilities during the 1990s and into the near fu-
ture. In 1990, the Army National Guard provided 44 percent of the
combat forces, 31 percent of the combat support, and 25 percent of
the combat service support; the Army Reserve had 53 percent of the

32
combat support and combat service support as well as a small por-
tion of combat forces; and the active Army made up the rest.3
Based on 1993 recommendations from a comprehensive “bot-
tom-up review,” Secretary of Defense Les Aspin subsequently initi-
ated far-reaching reforms that restructured the Army. Over a period
of years, the reforms realigned the preponderance of the Army’s
reserve component combat capabilities in the Army National Guard
and moved the bulk of the combat support and combat service sup-
port to the Army Reserve. Beginning in 1994 and continuing into
1997, approximately 50 combat units moved from the Army Re-
serve to the Army National Guard, while more than 100 reserve
component combat support and combat service support units shift-
ed from the Army National Guard to the Army Reserve. By the time
the revamping was completed in 1997, the Army National Guard
provided 55 percent of the combat units, 46 percent of the combat
support, and 25 percent of the combat service support while main-
taining its state and civil missions. The Army Reserve shifted to
primarily a support force with 20 percent of the combat support,
47 percent of the combat service support, and one percent of the
combat units. The active component filled in remaining combat,
combat support, and combat service support. With the restructur-
ing, the Army’s reserve components took on a more prominent role
in national defense. Because of its severely decreased size, the ac-
tive Army was more dependent—lacking the capability to sustain
the demand for peacekeeping missions and routine deployments
without being augmented.4
As might be expected, the Field Artillery felt the impact of this
sweeping restructuring and downsizing. Moving to ensure respon-
sive and effective fire support, the Army Science Board of November
1995 examined the Army National Guard’s general support and direct
support field artillery missions to determine if they should be modi-
fied. During Operation Desert Storm, the 142d Field Artillery Brigade
of the Arkansas Army National Guard, the 196th Field Artillery Bri-
gade of the Tennessee Army National Guard, and other Army Na-
tional Guard field artillery units furnished effective general support
after a short pre-deployment training period and could maintain their
proficiency with this mission during their 39 days of annual training.

33
Because direct support was more complicated, Soldiers would have
difficulty achieving competence within the allotted annual training
time. Such circumstances prompted the Army Science Board to pro-
pose abolishing the reserve component’s direct support field artillery
mission but retaining its general support field artillery mission.5
Recognizing the validity of the recommendation, the Army re-
ordered its field artillery missions. By the end of the decade, the Army
National Guard retained 63 percent of the Army’s general support
field artillery while the active component assumed the remaining
general support as well as all direct support artillery responsibilities.
Also, because much of the general support field artillery transferred
to the Army National Guard, one of two field artillery brigades with
a general support mission in the heavy forces was in the Guard in
2000. In the light forces, three cannon battalions and one Multiple
Launch Rocket System battalion of the XVIII Airborne Corps pro-
vided general support field artillery for all four light divisions (the
10th Mountain Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 82d Air-
borne Division, and the 101st Airborne Division), two light separate
brigades, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.6
To carry out the reorganized missions, the Army needed to re-
arm the Guard’s field artillery. Since the Soviet Union was no longer
a credible nuclear-capable enemy and the Cold War had ended, the
Army no longer required the M110 eight-inch self-propelled how-
itzer’s conventional and nuclear warheads in the Army of Excel-
lence’s corps artillery. Additionally, the Gulf War demonstrated that
the M110 lacked the speed to keep up with fast-moving Abrams
tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, was manpower in-
tensive, and had low survivability. With these reasons in mind, the
Army decided in 1992 to replace it with the Multiple Launch Rocket
System M270 launcher by converting active component and Guard
M110 units into Multiple Launch Rocket System units. Major Gen-
eral Fred F. Marty, Commandant of the Field Artillery School from
1991 to 1993, explained the change in a 1992 Field Artillery article
on the state of the branch. He noted that a Multiple Launch Rocket
System battalion provided up to 40 percent more firepower than an
eight-inch howitzer battalion and required significantly fewer per-
sonnel. In an era of decreasing personnel, a weapon system with a

34
smaller crew was crucial. Equally important, the Multiple Launch
Rocket System M270 launcher was fast enough to stay abreast of
the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle in combat.7
Twelve years later in 2004, the Army changed the last Guard
unit from the M110 to the Multiple Launch Rocket System M270
launcher when the Field Artillery School finished training the Col-
orado Army National Guard on the rocket system. Following this
conversion, the Field Artillery had no nuclear capabilities for the
first time since 1953 when it fired Atomic Annie at Frenchman’s
Flats, Nevada, and then fielded the more modern field artillery sys-
tem to the active component and Guard operational units.8
To satisfy Army National Guard requirements, the Army re-
duced the number of M109A6 (Paladin) 155-millimeter self-pro-
pelled howitzers in the Army of Excellence heavy division that it
formed during the 1980s to counter the Soviet and Warsaw Pact
threat. The Army of Excellence heavy division had three battalions
of M109A6s (72) for direct support and nine Multiple Launch Rock-
et System M270 launchers for general support. Because of plans
to introduce the futuristic Crusader self-propelled 155-millimeter
howitzer, the precision Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition, the
M270A1 launcher, and the Multiple Launch Rocket System Smart
Tactical Rocket with its unprecedented lethality, the Army trimmed
the number of Paladins in the heavy division to 54. By decreasing
the number of howitzers, the Army abandoned the Army of Excel-
lence cannon battalion of three eight-howitzer batteries (3x8 force
structure) based on 1978 Legal Mix V Study recommendations for
a cannon battalion of three six-howitzer batteries (3x6 force struc-
ture). This freed up Paladins for the Guard and personnel to form
more Multiple Launch Rocket System batteries for general support
in the heavy division. In 2003 following seven years of work, the
Army completed transferring the extra Paladins gained by con-
verting to the 3x6 force structure in the active force to the Army
National Guard. Paladins replaced obsolete M109A2/A3 self-pro-
pelled 155-millimeter howitzers and some M109A5 self-propelled
155-millimeter howitzers to give the Guard a modern fleet of self-
propelled howitzers to complement its Multiple Launch Rocket Sys-
tem M270 launchers.9

35
 To compensate for the loss of 155-millimeter self-propelled
howitzers in the active and reserve components, the Army increased
the number of M270 launchers in the Army of Excellence active
heavy division. Recognizing the need for more field artillery fire-
power based on lessons learned from the Gulf War, the Field Ar-
tillery School submitted a plan to the Chief of Staff of the Army,
General Gordon R. Sullivan, in the summer of 1992 to double the
number of M270 launchers in the heavy division to 18 by creat-
ing a battalion of two batteries of nine launchers each (2x9 force
structure). General Sullivan approved the concept, but funding and
manpower constraints prevented implementation.10
Prompted by the 1993 Legal Mix VII Study and the November
1995 Army Science Board Study that reinforced the requirement for
more firepower and the availability of funding, the Army announced
a major Multiple Launch Rocket System force structure initiative
in June 1996. Beginning in 2000, the Army planned to add a sec-
ond rocket battery in the heavy division to increase the number of
launchers from nine to 18 and form a two-battery Multiple Launch
Rocket System battalion.11
Even before the new organization could be implemented, the
Army revamped the heavy division’s rocket resources again, creat-
ing a battalion of three batteries of six launchers each (3x6 force
structure). This action made rocket batteries leaner while reducing
the size of the battery’s battlefield footprint and logistical require-
ments, but retained the same number of launchers in the battalion
to preserve firepower. Downsizing decreased the number of field
artillery cannons in the heavy division, but new systems such as
the M270A1 launcher and Paladin offset the reduction and greatly
enhanced lethality to ensure responsive and effective fire support in
the heavy division.12
Similarly, the Army overhauled its aging M198 towed 155-mil-
limeter howitzer units in the active and reserve component light di-
visions. It reduced the number of M198s in the battalion from 24
to 18 by converting from the 3x8 force structure to the 3x6 force
structure. This freed up M198s to replace the worst M198 guns and
permitted the Army to send those cannons to the depots.13

36
 Unquestionably, the end of the Cold War and Operation Des-
ert Storm caused serious personnel reductions and drove significant
force structure changes in the Field Artillery. Through force restruc-
turing, the Army shifted the Guard’s direct support mission to the
active component while giving the Guard a portion of the general
support mission—a role that Guard units had performed ably dur-
ing the war in contrast to inadequate direct support mission perfor-
mance. Additionally, the Army eliminated field artillery in the Army
Reserve. This reorganization tied the active component and Army
National Guard field artillery units more tightly together than they
had ever been. Without the two Guard field artillery brigades that
provided general support for each active component field artillery
brigade, the active component’s field artillery would have difficul-
ties providing fire support when it went to war. As part of transfer-
ring more responsibility to the Guard, the active component reduced
the number of Paladins in the heavy division and modernized the re-
serve component—equipping it with excess Paladins created by the
downsizing and replacing the aging, slow, nuclear-capable M110
with Multiple Launch Rocket System M270 launchers. Restruc-
turing effectively terminated Field Artillery nuclear capabilities in
place since 1953 in favor of conventional firepower and simultane-
ously created a symbiotic relationship between the active compo-
nent and the Guard.

Modernizing Field Artillery Systems

The Army’s ability to dominate the future battlefield with a
deployable force rested on equipping personnel with appropriate
weapons and equipment, applying fire support lessons learned from
Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, and imple-
menting serious modernization. Existing fire support system of
systems—target acquisition; weapons and munitions; command,
control, and communications; and support—had been designed for
fighting in Europe against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
They also supported the heavy forces with some recognition of the
light forces’ requirements. To be a key player in power projection
and complement new field artillery systems for the heavy forces,

37
the Field Artillery School faced the imperative to introduce new or
modernized systems with strategic deployability.
In 1993, the school fully acknowledged the dilemma posed by
current fire support systems. In a January 1993 report, the Army and
the Field Artillery School concluded:
While today’s fire support systems are impressive, the
requirement to keep pace in a changing world requires
that we modernize continually. It is a given that the future
field artillery force will be smaller. For it to remain effec-
tive, it must be more lethal with better systems and muni-
tions, more survivable, and more deployable [than Cold
War era systems].14

To accomplish this, the Field Artillery had to eliminate defi-

ciencies identified during Operation Desert Shield and Operation
Desert Storm while leveraging information technologies. Confront-
ed by constrained budgets and an uncertain threat, the Field Artil-
lery School announced a two-pronged approach in January 1993. It
planned to improve existing serviceable platforms and systems by
applying information-age technologies and develop totally new sys-
tems if existing systems could not be upgraded sufficiently to meet
future needs. If modernization were done competently, it would
create a power-projection force capable of winning an information-
age war, conducting precision fires, and dominating the maneuver
battle.15 The school judiciously explained in 1993, “The future bat-
tlefield will place new demands on the fire support system. The re-
quirement to achieve land force dominance with minimum losses
places increasing emphasis on the use of fires to defeat the enemy.”16
From the Field Artillery’s perspective, the requirement to con-
duct precision fires placed a conspicuous onus on target acquisi-
tion systems. They needed to locate targets with greater accuracy
at greater ranges than ever before. Introduced in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the AN/TPQ-37 mortar locating radar and the AN/
TPQ-36 artillery locating radar were too large and heavy and used
1970s technology. Future target acquisition systems would require
increased strategic mobility and ranges, among other critical capa-
bilities, to stay abreast of the changing battlefield.17

38
 Anticipating the increased emphasis on strategic deployability,
Major General Raphael J. Hallada, Commandant of the Field Artil-
lery School from 1987 to 1991, pushed to place the Q-36 radar on a
trailer to improve strategic mobility for the heavy and light forces.
Adopting General Hallada’s recommendation, the Army fielded the
Q-36 Version Seven in 1994 then subsequently enhanced the system
with electronic upgrades. In 1999, the Army started fielding the new
Q-36 Version Eight suitable for the digitized battlefield required by
the Force XXI campaign plan.18
Then as an interim solution until an enhanced AN/TPQ-47
could be fielded, the Army initiated action in 1990 to improve the
Q-37 to locate rockets and field artillery at longer ranges. The Army’s
intention was to field the Q-47 early in the first decade of the 21st
Century that would provide better tactical and strategic mobility,
improve accuracy, double the detection range to 60 kilometers with
cannon artillery, furnish targeting capabilities of 100 kilometers for
rocket artillery and 300 kilometers for missile artillery, satisfy the
requirements for the digitized battlefield and AirLand Operations,
and replace all Q-37s. However, technological and software prob-
lems with the Q-47 radar forced the Army to stop developmental
work in 2004 and continue using an enhanced Q-37.19
As the Army and Field Artillery worked to modernize the Q-36
and Q-37 and develop an ill-fated Q-47 for detecting threat indirect
fire systems and long-range precision strike capabilities, they also
confronted the requirement to improve target acquisition for close
support (field artillery fires designed to engage enemy infantry or
armor that blocked advancing friendly forces) to the maneuver arms.
After funding became available and the Cavalry and Infantry re-
ceived their Bradley fighting vehicles, the Field Artillery replaced
the aging and slow M981 with the Bradley A2 vehicle that maneuver
arms had used in Operation Desert Storm. To make the Operation
Desert Storm Bradley A2 suitable for fire support missions, the Army
added a fire support mission package and started fielding the new
version in the 1990s as the M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle.20
Because digitization or the employment of digital computers
for command and control were inherent in Force XXI, the Army
modernized the M7 Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle even more.

39
In 1995, the Army upgraded it to the M7A1 to furnish information
superiority and defeat the projected threat in the 21st Century. As
part of continuing modernization efforts, the Army added a digitized
fire support mission package and changed the name to the A3 Brad-
ley Fire Support Team Vehicle in 1999.21
In the meantime, the Army worked to improve the lasing ca-
pabilities of the combat observation lasing team in the heavy and
light forces by taking steps to replace its M981 vehicle. Designed
for heavy and mechanized forces, the M981 presented a unique
signature in the light forces and stood out because they used High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles as their scout vehicles.
To eliminate this striking discrepancy, the Army adopted the M707
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle with a fire support
mission package for the light forces. Initially known as the Striker,
it became the Knight after 2002 to avoid confusion with the Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams being formed at the time. This system pro-
vided precision targeting capabilities for the heavy and light forces
and had unprecedented mobility, flexibility, and stealth. In 2001, the
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment received the first Knight vehicles for
its combat observation lasing team. By the beginning of the 21st
Century, the Field Artillery’s target acquisition systems fielded or
being developed were capable of fighting on the digitized battlefield
and more strategically deployable for a force projection army than
their predecessors.22
To add precision capabilities to the Knight and the A3 Bradley
Fire Support Team vehicle, field artillery officers and Soldiers—of-
ten called fire supporters—initially employed the Ground/Vehicular
Laser Locator Designator to lase targets. However, the 107-pound
system used early in the 1990s reduced the mobility of light fire
support teams, did not meet their needs, and was not man-portable.
In 1993 to 1994, the Field Artillery School responded to the need
for a man-portable system to designate targets for the light forces
by developing the requirement for the Lightweight Laser Designa-
tor Rangefinder to replace the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Des-
ignator. Combining technological advances in position/navigation,
thermal sights, and laser development, the lightweight system was a
compact, man-portable system designed for dismounted light forces

40
or mounted operations on a Bradley fire support vehicle. Fielding
began in 2004.23
Modernizing the Army’s cannon artillery moved forward at the
same time as the Field Artillery adopted the Lightweight Laser Des-
ignator Rangefinder.24 After seven years of development and testing,
the Army started fielding the M109A6 self-propelled 155-millime-
ter howitzer, commonly called the Paladin, in mid-1993. With its
advanced technology, the Paladin possessed the capability to oper-
ate autonomously in dispersed operations, receive a fire mission,
compute firing data, select and take up its firing position, automati-
cally unlock and point its cannon, and fire and move out without
any external technical assistance. Such characteristics permitted fir-
ing the first round from the move in less than 60 seconds and gave
the system a “shoot-and-scoot” capability to protect the crew from
hostile counterbattery fire. The Paladin was more responsive than
the M109A2/A3, which took up to 11 minutes to respond to call to
fire while on the move. The Paladin also had a maximum speed of
35 miles-per-hour to give it the ability to keep up with the Abrams
tank and Bradley infantry fighting vehicle and had secure digital
and voice communications. Such revolutionary advances made it
superior to older M109s.25
The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Maxwell R. Thur-
man, a field artillery officer with close ties to the Field Artillery
School, realized that while the Paladin was effective, it represented
an interim solution. In November 1984, he directed the Army to
begin work on the next-generation Advanced Field Artillery System
self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer that would take advantage
of quantum technological advances to improve availability, range,
rate of fire, ammunition lethality, and battlefield mobility. However,
a few years passed before serious developmental work started on the
new system, which was designated as the Crusader in 1994.26
The Crusader would be a world-class cannon system capable
of fighting on a digitized battlefield, would close the range gap be-
tween American and foreign systems, and would provide the mo-
bility and survivability needed to keep pace with fast-moving ma-
neuver operations, among other capabilities. Despite the anticipated
gains, it faced critical challenges from detractors as it was being

41
developed. Beginning early in 1995 and continuing over the next
several years, opponents questioned the rationale for the howitzer.
They urged adopting the German PzH2000 155-millimeter self-pro-
pelled howitzer already in production both because it was a viable
alternative and would be a cost-saving measure in an era of declin-
ing Army budgets. Although the PzH2000 was a sound system, the
Undersecretary of Defense Dr. Paul G. Kaminiski repeatedly high-
lighted throughout 1996 that the German howitzer failed to satisfy
the required criteria; he resisted adopting it and found support from
an unexpected source.27 In 1996–1997, the Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) reviewed the Crusader program to determine
its status and the availability of viable alternatives. The GAO con-
cluded in a 6 June 1997 report: “No existing artillery system met all
of the Crusader requirements.”28
Armed with this solid endorsement, the Army continued work
on Crusader and its resupply vehicle.29 Besides being suited to the
digitized battlefield of the 21st Century, the 55-ton Crusader would
operate completely autonomously, fire up to 10 rounds a minute at
ranges in excess of 40 kilometers, and travel at speeds of more than
48 kilometers per hour cross country and 67 kilometers per hour
on a hard surface road. The Crusader would be accompanied by a
45-ton resupply vehicle to keep the howitzer supplied with ammuni-
tion, fuel, and other supplies in forward positions so that it would
not have to be pulled out of combat to rearm, refuel, and resupply.
When it was fielded early in the 21st Century, the Crusader would
dwarf the Paladin’s rate of fire of four rounds a minute and cross
country speed of 35 kilometers per hour and speed of 56 kilometers
per hour on hard surface roads. Moreover, a single Crusader would
cover the same area as four Paladins, while two Crusaders would
engage targets at the same rate as a six-howitzer Paladin battery.30
As discussed earlier, the United States shifted its national de-
fense priorities from forward-deployed forces in Europe to force
projection from the continental United States at the end of the Cold
War early in the 1990s. In keeping with this priority shift, the Army
recognized the need to modernize its towed field artillery to comple-
ment the Crusader that was designed for a European-style, force-
on-force battlefield. Through most of the 1980s, the M198 towed
155-millimeter howitzer satisfied the Army. The howitzer had a

42
range of 30 kilometers and weighed 15,000 pounds, making it the
lightest towed 155-millimeter howitzer in the world. By the eve of
Operation Desert Storm, the Army required a lighter, more mobile
155-millimeter towed howitzer. In response, the Army completed a
plan in January 1991 for a lightweight towed 155-millimeter how-
itzer, called the Advanced Towed Cannon System, to replace the
aging and heavy M198.31
A couple years later in May 1993, the Marine Corps approved
developing a lightweight 155-millimeter towed howitzer to provide
close and long-range fire support. At the time the Marine Corps em-
ployed the obsolete M101 towed 105-millimeter howitzer as a con-
tingency weapon because the M198 was too heavy.32
Recognizing the Army’s requirement for a new lightweight
towed 155-millimeter howitzer and the growing focus on power pro-
jection from the continental United States, the Army and the Ma-
rine Corps signed a memorandum of agreement in October 1993 to
develop the XM777, with a maximum weight of 9,000 pounds and
capable of firing rocket-assisted projectiles to a range of 30 kilome-
ters. A joint Army-Marine Corps program managed by the Joint Pro-
gram Management Office at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, existed
in 1995 to manage developing the XM777. However, there was one
basic difference between the two services’ howitzers. Because the
Marine Corps had an immediate requirement for a towed 155-mil-
limeter howitzer to replace the M198 and the M101 105-millimeter
towed howitzer, it opted to field a howitzer without digital capabili-
ties and to add them later. In comparison, the Army planned to devel-
op a fully digitized lightweight 155-millimeter towed howitzer; and
this meant that the Marine Corps’ howitzer would be fielded first.33
More than anything else, the Towed Artillery Digitization
package that was scheduled to be added to the Army’s XM777 dis-
tinguished it from the M198. As the Army explained, the digitiza-
tion package would give the howitzer onboard advanced fire control
capabilities like those associated with self-propelled howitzers such
as the Paladin M109A6 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer and
the futuristic Crusader 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzer under
development. It also would eliminate the need for external survey,
aiming circles, aiming posts, and collimators. Capabilities, such as
self-locating and orienting, onboard firing data computation, easy-

43
to-read electronic sights, digital communications, and improved di-
rect fire sight, would also make the Army version of the XM777
superior to the M198. Additionally, the Towed Artillery Digitization
package that was an automated fire direction system would be com-
patible with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System that the
Field Artillery employed as its command and control system.34
To distinguish the Army howitzer from the Marine Corps how-
itzer, the Joint Management Program Office designated the Army
version as the XM777E1. With the emergence of the XM777E1, two
XM777 programs coexisted—the XM777 type classified in 2003 as
the M777 with onboard conventional optical fire control capabilities
for the Marine Corps and the Army howitzer with onboard automat-
ed fire control capabilities type classified as the M777E1 in 2003.35
In the meantime, the Army continued making improvements
to other weapons. Largely through the efforts of personnel at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, the 82d Airborne Division obtained fund-
ing in 1998 for the Light Artillery System Improvement Program to
provide needed changes to the M119 towed 105-millimeter howitzer
to make it more maintainable and more operationally suitable. The
original M119A1, which was towed by a High Mobility Multipur-
pose Wheeled Vehicle, was type classified in 1985. In 1998, the Army
made Block I improvements and then additional Block II upgrades in
2002. Because of the aggregate differences, the Army designated the
modified howitzer as the M119A2 on 15 February 2005.36
Power projection and Operation Desert Storm also highlighted
the need to introduce the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and
modernize the Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket and Army
Tactical Missile System, a long-range field artillery missile. During
the early 1980s, the 9th Infantry Division documented the require-
ment for a light multiple rocket launcher for the light forces, but the
Army and the Field Artillery School instead continued focusing on
the heavy forces. As the Cold War began waning at the end of the
1980s, interest grew in projecting contingency forces to respond to
worldwide crises. Similarly, Army and the Field Artillery School at-
titudes about a light deployable multiple rocket launcher to support
the light forces moved from indifference to enthusiasm.37

44
 Understanding the inherent limitations of tactical air support,
naval gunfire, attack helicopters, and corps artillery as well as the
need for mobile counterfire (field artillery fires delivered to suppress
enemy field artillery or mortars to prevent them from interfering
with the movement of friendly forces) for light forces, the Field Ar-
tillery School finally acknowledged the need for the High Mobil-
ity Artillery Rocket System; the Multiple Launch Rocket System
M270 launcher’s weight restricted its strategic mobility.38 In a 10
April 1990 letter to General John W. Foss, Commanding General
of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, General Hallada
wrote, “I intend to develop a requirement by this July [1990] for a
light weight MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System], wheeled or
tracked, that is deployable on a C130, but. . .retains the munitions
flexibility of the current system [M270 launcher].”39
Events in Southwest Asia reinforced General Hallada’s vision
for a lighter multiple rocket launcher and pressured the Army to
fund the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. In Operation Des-
ert Shield of 1990, the Army flew M270 launchers from Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to provide long-range

Figure 2: M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System.

Source: US Army photo by Sergeant Brian Glass.

45
fires for the initial units in theater. This was costly in terms of the
number of aircraft required. Equally important, the launchers did
not arrive with the initial forces, leaving them with 105-millimeter
towed artillery for fire support. “Had fighting begun immediately,
the corps would have had no long range rocket artillery fires,” the
XVIII Airborne Corps observed in a September 1991 message to
Forces Command after Operation Desert Storm concluded.40 Giv-
en the strategic mobility limitations of the M270, long-range fire
support would be tenuous in future anticipated power projection
missions without the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. Op-
eration Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm seemed to pres-
age the future where armed forces would be deployed to distant
hotspots, especially with the end of the Cold War, and the need for
deployable field artillery.41
Although budget cuts made it challenging to find funds through
most of the 1990s, the Army and the Field Artillery School pushed
acquisition forward. After the successful mid-1998 Rapid Force
Projection Initiative Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstra-
tion with four High Mobility Artillery Rocket System prototypes at
Fort Bragg, Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Gentry and Major Cul-
len G. Barabato of the 3d Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment
of the XVIII Airborne Corps wrote, “HIMARS [High Mobility Ar-
tillery Rocket System] is a significant leap forward in fire support
for early entry and light forces. Light force commanders who must
deploy to undeveloped areas soon will have the firepower normally
associated with heavier forces with the fielding of HIMARS early
in the twenty-first century.”42 The commanding general of the XVIII
Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General William F. Kernan, expressed
similar thoughts in an interview: “HIMARS is paramount to our
success and survivability.”43
The need to deploy for worldwide contingency operations grew
more significant as the 20th Century drew to a close and the require-
ment for lightweight, mobile firepower grew exponentially. Enhanced
firepower for light forces would improve survivability. The High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System M142 launcher with its digital ca-
pabilities would furnish the requisite firepower and would shoot six
rockets. In view of this, the Army approved an accelerated develop-

46
mental program with the goal of equipping the first unit with the High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System M142 launcher by 2005.44
Meanwhile, two critical factors encouraged modernizing the
M270 launcher. Early in 1990, the Army realized that the M270
was growing obsolete; its electronic parts were becoming more ex-
pensive and difficult to obtain by the 21st Century. To combat the
growing obsolescence, the Army initiated the improved fire control
systems program in 1992 to replace existing electronic systems and
provide the growth potential for future munitions. Operation Desert
Storm also demonstrated the need for a more responsive and surviv-
able M270 to engage highly mobile targets, such as mobile rocket
launchers. This led to the improved launcher mechanical system pro-
gram in 1995 to decrease the launcher’s aiming and loading time.45
For a couple of years, the modifications existed as two separate
programs. As a result of its integrated test program initiative, the
Army combined the two programs in 1997 to produce the M270A1
launcher for the digitized battlefield then fielded it early in the 21st
Century. The M270A1 would shoot the entire family of Multiple
Launch Rocket System munitions, including the Extended-Range
Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket, the Guided Multiple
Launch Rocket System rocket, and the Unitary Multiple Launch
Rocket System rocket with its three different fuse capabilities. The
proximity fuse capability would permit a large air burst over the tar-
get, while the point-detonating fuse capability would reduce the size
of the burst to minimize collateral damage, a serious concern during
the Gulf War. The time-delay fuse capability would allow the rocket
to penetrate certain types of structures or targets and then detonate.46
As the Army worked to modernize the M270 launcher, it took
action to improve its Army Tactical Missile System missile, eventu-
ally known as Army Tactical Missile System I. Based on their 1991
experience in Operation Desert Storm, commanders, their staffs, and
users visualized the need for a longer-range Army Tactical Missile
System missile. Some insisted that the current range was inadequate
and restricted the number of targets that could be engaged. With en-
gineering changes, the system could achieve at least twice the range
of the current, battle-tested Army Tactical Missile System I and give
commanders more flexibility to attack deep targets; compensate for

47
availability shortfalls with tactical air caused by other priorities,
weather, and darkness; and attack targets more quickly than tactical
air.47 In 1994, the Army designated the improved system as Army
Tactical Missile System IA. It would have a range of 70 to 300 ki-
lometers plus a Global Positioning System navigational system to
give the Field Artillery a long-range precision missile. The Army
Tactical Missile System I and IA both saw extensive action during
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.48
Meanwhile, the Army launched work on the Army Tactical
Missile System II and IIA that would have longer ranges than the
Army Tactical Missile Systems I and IA and soon coupled the Army
Tactical Missile System IIA with the Brilliant Anti-armor submuni-
tion, a precision munition intended to engage and destroy armored
forces. When budget reductions ended development of the Tri-Ser-
vice Standoff Missile in 1993, the Army decided to use the Army
Tactical Missile System IIA to carry the submunition.49 Although
the original justification for the submunition disappeared with the
end of the Cold War, the Army explained in 1994:
The greatest potential threat to US Forces is that posed
by armored and motorized forces. These highly mobile
armored maneuver forces, supported by armed helicop-
ters, are expected to pursue battlefield objectives using
numerical force superiority, speed, and penetration.50

The Army also noted its inability to attack armored vehicles and
surface-to-surface missile launchers beyond the range of close
combat weapons and the urgent need for an autonomous, terminal
homing submunition to defeat moving and stationary targets in the
second echelon of the threat array. Upon fielding in the 21st Cen-
tury, Block IIA with the Brilliant Anti-armor submunition would
address those needs.51
To tie field artillery weapons, munitions, and sensors togeth-
er, the Field Artillery meanwhile replaced the 1970s Tactical Fire
Direction System with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
System. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System was a
network of computer stations that processed and exchanged infor-
mation from the forward observer to the fire support element (field
artillery cannons, rockets, and missiles; mortars; close air support;

48
naval gunfire; and attack helicopters). It automatically processed
fire requests, generated multiple tactical fire solutions, monitored
mission execution, and supported the creation and distribution of
fire support plans. The Field Artillery introduced the system’s soft-
ware in incremental versions. Each was built on the previous to get
it to the field sooner rather than waiting for the objective software to
be completed. Fielded between 1996 and 2002, the Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System and its software offered unparalleled
automated capabilities to process information rapidly and accu-
rately and was a critical element of the Army Battlefield Command
System—a digital command, control, communication, computers,
and intelligence system of computers. To transmit and receive fire
support messages, forward observers and fire support teams used
the Pocket-Size Forward Entry Device with a laser range finder to
locate a target accurately. The Lightweight Tactical Data System,
known as the Centaur, served as a lightweight backup for the Ad-
vanced Field Artillery Tactical System and computed technical fire
direction data for cannon units.52
As indicated by field artillery systems during the last decade
of the 20th Century and the first years of the 21st Century, the Field
Artillery took a balanced approach to modernization. With power
projection in mind, the Field Artillery started developing the M777
and the High Mobility Artillery Rockets Systems. These light and
strategically mobile systems were suitable for power projection. At
the same time, the Field Artillery did not neglect its heavy forces—
adopting the Paladin and the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle and
initiating development on the Crusader.
Although weapons, munitions, and equipment efforts were
important, digitization formed the heart of modernization efforts.
The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System not only promised to
enhance responsiveness by reducing the amount of time to process
information from the forward observer to the firing unit but also
signaled a move into the digital age.

New Doctrine for a New Age

The same European political events that drove concurrent
downsizing and restructuring and simultaneous modernization of

49
field artillery systems persuaded the Army to rewrite its fighting
doctrine. Based on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks dur-
ing the early 1980s and the growing political fragmentation in East-
ern Europe, AirLand Battle-Future studies from 1987 to 1990 out-
lined an umbrella concept for fighting throughout the world. They
included a heavy concept for fighting in Europe, with an emphasis
on deep, destructive fires and a linear front. Subsequent political
events soon rendered the AirLand Battle-Future studies obsolete.
The November 1990 Conventional Forces Reduction Treaty spelled
an end to the applicability of the studies and to large military forces
in Europe by bringing a termination to the Warsaw Pact and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization military buildup. As a result of the
treaty, smaller military forces would defend the same amount of
territory that larger armies had guarded in the past. This abolished
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s continuous strategic front
against the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat and created gaps between
its units. The subsequent end of the Cold War in 1991 set in motion
even more reductions in troop numbers in Europe and the impera-
tive to reexamine Army doctrine.53
Understanding the necessity of adapting to changing political
conditions and the emerging battlefield, General Foss and the Chief
of Staff of the Army, General Carl E. Vuono, concurred about the
urgent need to revise Army doctrine to reflect future international
conditions. They simultaneously pushed to abandon AirLand Battle
doctrine designed for fighting an echeloned threat on a linear front
and the deep battle to attrit the enemy’s follow-on forces for a new
warfighting doctrine. In February 1991, General Foss explained in
his warfighting concept that long-range intelligence systems would
detect enemy forces and that long-range precision fires from fire
support systems would cover the gaps created by the smaller forces,
destroy the enemy force on the non-linear battlefield, and set the
conditions for decisive operations.54
Subsequently in March 1991, General Vuono endorsed General
Foss’s basic concept and directed the US Army Training and Doc-
trine Command to formulate new doctrine for the post-Cold War
world. General Vuono also reaffirmed the necessity to incorporate
lessons learned from the recent Gulf War. Additionally, he empha-

50
sized force projection to regional hotspots as a vital aspect of the
new doctrine with the end of the Cold War and its attending massive
forward-deployment of troops in Europe. This led to extensive and
heated discussions throughout the Army, conferences, and the Au-
gust 1991 publication of US Army Training and Doctrine Command
Pamphlet 525-5, AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution
of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond.55
US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5,
AirLand Operations, co-signed by the US Air Force Tactical Air
Command Commanding General, expounded an overarching idea
of future Army operations and provided a basis for the development
of joint operations and doctrine. Although AirLand Operations sig-
naled a continuation of AirLand Battle doctrine, the pamphlet also
suggested a significant new orientation. Reflecting lessons from
the recent Gulf War, it emphasized depth and simultaneous attack
throughout the depth of the battlespace that permitted no sanctu-
ary for the enemy to hide; non-linear maneuver warfare; decisive
army operations as part of a joint, combined, and interagency team;
and power projection on short notice.56 As envisioned by General
Foss and other high-ranking Army officers, long-range operational
fires from the country’s different military branches would destroy
the enemy and minimize friendly casualties. Following this, tactical
fires from air-, land-, or sea-based delivery systems would support
maneuver forces attacks on enemy flanks and rear to avoid frontal
assaults with their attending battle of attrition.57
Following the publication of 525-5, the US Army Training and
Doctrine Command shifted its attention to rewriting Field Manual
100-5, Operations, with the intention of incorporating AirLand Op-
erations into it. This would make AirLand Operations doctrine and
not just a concept for fighting. When he became the US Army Train-
ing and Doctrine Command Commanding General on 23 August
1991, General Frederick M. Franks Jr. temporarily suspended work
on the field manual to focus on doctrinal problems that had emerged
during Operation Desert Storm. Based on his experience in the Gulf,
he identified five battlefield dynamics of early entry and lethality,
depth and simultaneous attack, battlespace, command and control
(subsequently renamed battle command), and combat service sup-

51
port that required attention and incorporation into doctrine. For
the Field Artillery School, depth and simultaneous attack loomed
especially critical because the Field Artillery would be the major
contributor. As the school and the US Army Training and Doctrine
Command defined in August 1991, depth and simultaneous attack
meant the simultaneous application of combat power throughout the
depth of the battlefield. To execute depth and simultaneous attack,
the school envisioned employing joint precision strikes at the en-
emy’s centers of gravity and critical functions.58
Using his battlefield dynamics as a foundation for revising
Army doctrine, General Franks restarted work on Field Manual 100-
5, Operations, later in 1991 with the goal of internalizing the lessons
of the Gulf War throughout the Army. He tasked the School of Ad-
vanced Military Studies at the US Army Command and General Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to assume the lead with the US
Army Training and Doctrine Command’s service schools providing
input as required. The School of Advanced Military Studies produced
a draft Field Manual 100-5, Operations, by mid-1992 and distributed
it to the service schools for comments. Major General Fred F. Marty,
who was Field Artillery School Commandant from 1991 to 1993,
criticized the draft in July 1992 as being too timid. He said that the
manual required “hard-hitting language” to attract people’s attention
and sell the Army’s position on joint precision strike and joint preci-
sion interdiction.59 Subsequently in the fall of 1992, the Field Artil-
lery School explained in terse wording that the examination of depth
and simultaneous attack was incomplete. The Army had to explain
why the deep battle was critical and how to fight the deep battle.
Also, the manual had to point out the Army’s ability to conduct preci-
sion interdiction as well as depth and simultaneous attack.60
Based on this critique, a team of writers in the school rewrote
much of Field Manual 100-5 on its own initiative and submitted it
with General Marty’s support to the School of Advanced Military
Studies for review. Among other things, the school stressed the fire-
power and maneuver relationship, the lethality required for early
deployers, and the importance of depth and simultaneous attack. In
1993, the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory that
was created in 1992 at Fort Sill as part of General Franks’ battle

52
laboratory program broadened the initial definition of depth and si-
multaneous attack. It clarified that depth and simultaneous attack
was the simultaneous application of combat power against an en-
emy throughout the depth of the battlefield. Depth and simultaneous
attack would place all critical functions at risk and accelerate defeat
by overwhelming the enemy with continuous, all-weather, simulta-
neous application of joint fires across the battlefield and by forcing
the enemy commander to react to multiple threats rather than focus-
ing on any single threat.61
Much to the Field Artillery School’s delight, General Franks ac-
cepted this definition, concurred with the school’s recommendations
and revisions, and directed the School for Advanced Military Studies
to rewrite the Field Manual 100-5 preliminary draft for staffing early
in 1993. Although depth and simultaneous attack was the heart of
the new battle dynamics, the draft manual still noted the potential of
fighting outnumbered, which reflected previous 1970s and 1980s doc-
trine and demonstrated the difficulty of breaking with the past. Even
so, General Franks believed that depth and simultaneous attack would
prevent the enemy from finding a sanctuary or safety because com-
bat power would be applied throughout the depth of the battlespace
simultaneously and would stun and then rapidly defeat the enemy.62
On 14 June 1993, the Army’s 218th birthday, the Army pub-
lished Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1993), as the fourth edition
of the field manual. Previous editions were published in 1976, 1982,
and 1986. The new edition recognized worldwide changes since
the end of the Cold War; the increased importance of peacekeep-
ing, disaster assistance, and nation building; the imperative of joint
US operations and combined operations with foreign allies; and the
emerging information age. Additionally, the field manual defined
the Army’s doctrine for defending the nation, addressed multiple
threats, emphasized depth and simultaneous attack, and discussed
the Army’s role as a power-projection force to reflect the necessity
of deploying forces rapidly and effectively throughout the world as
required. Just as important, the new field manual recast doctrine in
the strategic and joint context by devoting chapters to joint opera-
tions and combined operations; it also introduced and described
full-dimensional operations.63

53
 From the Field Artillery School’s perspective, Field Manual
100-5, Operations (1993), took advantage of American fire support
superiority and equally as important modified the role of corps artil-
lery. Employing AirLand Battle fire support doctrine that had been
codified in Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1982 and 1986), the
corps commander retained some of his field artillery assets and al-
located the rest of his cannons and M270 launchers that could shoot
the Army Tactical Missile System missile and the Multiple Launcher
Rocket System rocket to support the division’s 3 field artillery bat-
talions of 72 cannons and 9 Multiple Launch Rocket System launch-
ers. With the help of corps artillery, division artillery provided coun-
terfire and close support to the maneuver arms.64
Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1993), changed the role of
corps artillery. As part of a joint forces command, the corps com-
mander would retain control of his Multiple Launch Rocket System
and Army Tactical Missile System assets and assign them to attack
specific targets with overwhelming firepower to hold all enemy func-
tions at risk as part of the stress on depth and simultaneous attack.
Conducted by the corps commander, long-range operational preci-
sion fires from rockets and missiles as well as indirect fire systems
under development would be the major killers on the battlefield. They
would disrupt, delay, degrade, or divert enemy capabilities and set the
conditions for future battles. Once the long-range, operational, preci-
sion fires from rockets and missiles had sufficiently destroyed the en-
emy, the division’s direct and general support artillery would support
the maneuver forces as they attacked the flanks and rear and then de-
liver the final blows with assistance from corps artillery as needed.65
Unlike AirLand Battle with its Europe orientation, Field Man-
ual 100-5, Operations (1993), manifested the end of the Cold War
and the beginning of a new era. Rejecting the long-held emphasis on
defending Europe from a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack, AirLand Op-
erations’ force projection focus underscored the need for versatile,
deployable, strategically mobile, and lethal active and reserve forces
that could respond rapidly to a crisis anyplace in the world. By do-
ing this, AirLand Operations reflected a critical lesson coming out
of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. The Army
had to be prepared to fight anywhere in the world at a moment’s no-
tice—placing paramount emphasis on deployability and readiness.

54
Louisiana Maneuvers, Battle Laboratories, & Force XXI
As it was writing Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1993), doc-
trine that was the first major 1990s reform effort and would be ap-
plicable to the present and foreseeable international environment,
the Army initiated a second major effort to modernize its fighting
forces. In 1992, it organized the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers Task
Force to help guide the Army into the 21st Century. Subsequently,
the US Army Training and Doctrine Command established its battle
laboratory program to complement and support the Modern Louisi-
ana Maneuvers and conduct experiments using computers and field
exercises. Two years later in 1994, the Army launched the Force
XXI campaign plan with three axes of effort (modernization of the
institutional Army, modernization of the operational forces under
the Joint Venture rubric, and digitization of the force by expanding
dependence on computers). Working together, the Modern Louisi-
ana Maneuvers, the battle laboratories, and the Force XXI campaign
plan created an aggressive and ambitious endeavor to move the
Army from an Industrial-Age force to a deployable, Information-
Age force with the ability to dominate the 21st Century battlefield.
Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, rec-
ognized that the Army of Excellence of the 1980s was obsolete in
the post-Cold War world as well as the need to go beyond rewrit-
ing doctrine. Thus he officially chartered and funded the Modern
Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force on 22 May 1992 at the US Army
Training and Doctrine Command. Inspired by the 1941 Louisiana
Maneuvers that General George C. Marshall and Lieutenant General
Lesley J. McNair developed to help prepare the Army for World War
II, Sullivan wanted to organize and conduct the Modern Louisiana
Maneuvers process to manage change, identify ideas for resolution,
establish consensus among senior leaders, and serve as a headquar-
ters for experimentation and change. Led by Brigadier General
Tommy Franks, the task force was stood up and collocated with the
US Army Training and Doctrine Command. By the end of 1992, the
task force—essentially a think tank that brainstormed new ideas—
identified more than 200 issues for further study and refinement and
presented the top 20 to the four-star generals who comprised the
Modern Louisiana Maneuvers Board of Directors. Among other
recommendations, task force members strongly encouraged exploit-

55
ing digital information technologies to move the Army into the 21st
Century and enhance situational awareness and lethality. Over the
next four years the task force continued to explore various ideas to
modernize the Army and employed the US Army Training and Doc-
trine Command’s battle laboratory initiative as needed.66 It ceased
operations in 1996 after organizing the Force XXI effort in 1994.
Created in May 1992 by the commanding general of US Army
Training and Doctrine Command, General Frederick M. Franks Jr.,
the battle laboratory program helped define capabilities, identify re-
quirements, and determine priorities for a power projection army
of the future. The program also supported the Modern Louisiana
Maneuvers process of modernizing the Army for the 21st Century
battlefield. The battle laboratory program consisted of six battle
laboratories (Battle Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Depth
and Simultaneous Attack at Fort Sill; Mounted Battle Space at Fort
Knox, Kentucky; Dismounted Battle Space at Fort Benning, Geor-
gia; Combat Service Support at Fort Lee, Virginia; and Early En-
try Lethality and Survivability at Fort Monroe, Virginia). The battle
laboratories took advantage of simulations and computers that rep-
licated reality to conduct their experiments and investigations into
new concepts, emerging technologies, and procedures to determine
the priorities and requirements for a power projection army. Through
advanced concept technology demonstrations that identified and ex-
hibited the military utility of emerging concepts and technologies as
well as advanced technology demonstrations that showed the matu-
rity and potential of advanced technologies for military operations,
the battle laboratories energetically pursued a far-reaching agenda to
help modernize the Army. Together, the Modern Louisiana Maneu-
vers and the battle laboratories promoted extensive change to move
the Army into the 21st Century in the face of declining budgets.67
As it addressed capabilities vital for the future and fostered
sweeping change, the battle laboratory concept unquestionably rep-
resented a significant break with the Cold War era threat-driven de-
cision-making and combat developments process. Acknowledging
this, General Franks mentioned:
Current methods of determining requirements and setting
priorities cannot keep pace, will not allow us to meet the

56
 budget challenges, will not allow us to maintain the edge.
. . . Battlelabs are an initiative analyzing capabilities and
requirements rather than depending on concepts based on
analysis and comparison against a firm threat, like we had
in the Cold War. We can’t depend on Cold War. . .pro-
cesses to determine priorities.68

In seeking to increase battlefield effectiveness by optimizing

technology, the battle laboratory program focused its energies on
needed capabilities and not a specific threat as General Franks not-
ed. Before any concept or equipment was tested in the field, the bat-
tle laboratories analyzed it. Outlining the process, Colonel William
Hubbard, the Director of the Battle Lab Integration and Technology
Directorate at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, ex-
plained that the battle laboratories would send the concept or tech-
nology through simulation then bring it back again, tweak it, send it
back through again to get a near optimum solution, and then test it in
rigorous field exercises.69 This methodology saved money without
sacrificing quality.70
Fort Sill’s Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory
(renamed the Fires Battle Laboratory in 2006) focused on improv-
ing fire support.71 The laboratory examined fire support concepts,
analyzed new fire support technologies, conducted simulations that
replicated reality, and participated in advanced concept technology
and advanced technology demonstrations in support of the Field Ar-
tillery School, the battle laboratory endeavor, and the Modern Loui-
siana Maneuvers process.72
Two demonstrations were key to this effort. In October 1992
within a couple months of being stood up, the Depth and Simultane-
ous Attack Battle Laboratory participated in a precision strike dem-
onstration at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, where
Apache helicopters conducted a deep attack against targets out to
150 kilometers. To support the attack, a live-fire mission with an
Army Tactical Missile System suppressed enemy air defenses and
validated the Automatic Target Handoff System. The system linked
Air Force sensors with Army firing systems to reduce the time be-
tween locating the target and engaging it. Later in the year, the labo-
ratory took part in Operation Desert Capture at the National Train-

57
ing Center, Fort Irwin, California, where the Joint Surveillance and
Attack Radar System (an Air Force airborne command and control
system) Ground Station Module was linked to the Tactical Fire Di-
rection System at Fort Sill for improved command and control and
field artillery deep attack capabilities; the demonstration reaffirmed
the ability to join Air Force sensors and Army indirect fire systems.73
The growing emphasis on deep attack (precision strike) op-
erations during these exercises revealed the need for a specialized
planning, coordination, and execution cell at the corps level and led
to the organization of the Deep Operations Coordination Cell. As
an extension of the corps fire support element, the cell would be
responsible to the corps fire support coordinator for conducting all
deep attack operations. The existing fire support element would re-
tain its current functions but would not have the burden of planning
and conducting deep attack/precision strike missions.74
During this 1992 to 1994 period, the Modern Louisiana Ma-
neuvers process and the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab-
oratory were examining ways to modernize the Army through com-
puter simulations and field exercises as well as examining emerging
technologies. Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated
a comprehensive review of national defense strategy, force structure
modernization in March 1993 in response to the end of the Cold War
and the emergence of a new world order. As Secretary Aspin called
it, the Bottom-Up Review moved the military’s attention away from
the Soviet threat to regional threats; it viewed Iraq’s 1990 invasion
of Kuwait as an example of the new world order that would require
American attention in the future. With this in mind, the Bottom-Up
Review published in October 1993 defined the strategy of power
projection, the forces, and the budget required to move into the 21st
Century with its perceived regional threats.75
The Bottom-Up Review’s focus on worldwide challenges
prompted the Army to launch the Force XXI campaign plan de-
veloped by the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers task force. Build-
ing on the work of the battle laboratories, the campaign outlined
making significant force structure changes, integrating advanced
information technology (computers) more fully through its forces,
and transforming operational units so that they could deploy more

58
rapidly, would be more combat capable, and could dominate future
battlefields with real-time situational awareness.76
The Force XXI campaign plan outlined three axes of modern-
ization. The Joint Venture axis would redesign the operational Army
through battle laboratory conceptual testing by employing advanced
concept technology demonstrations and advanced technology dem-
onstrations, advanced warfighting experiments with an experimen-
tal force, and digitization of command and control systems. A sec-
ond axis outlined revamping the institutional Army that generated
and sustained the operational Army. Led by the Army Digitization
Office that would integrate all digitization efforts, the third axis set
out to acquire digital information technology for the operational and
institutional Army.77
On 8 March 1994, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon
R. Sullivan, directed beginning the Force XXI campaign plan. Writ-
ing in the May 1994 Army, he explained:
Today, we are at the threshold of a new era, and we must
proceed into it decisively. The industrial age is being su-
perseded by the information age—the third wave—hard
on the heels of the agrarian and industrial eras [first and
second waves]. Our present Army is well configured to
fight and win in the. . .industrial age, and we can handle
agrarian-age forces as well. We have begun to move into
the third-wave warfare, to evolve a new force for a new
century—Force XXI.78

General Sullivan noted that the Army needed to adapt to the

Information Age without any hesitation. It had to take advantage of
the computer so that its operational forces could function at even
greater performance levels in speed, space, and time and also break
free of old concepts. The Force XXI initiative proposed to design a
force projection Army for the 21st Century through Joint Venture
that would leverage the power of people, information, and tech-
nology to win the nation’s wars and be a reality by 2010, although
planned reforms would continue after that date.79
According to General Sullivan, doctrine served as the Force
XXI’s engine of change. Within a year after publishing Field Manu-

59
al 100-5, Operations (1993)—with its emphasis on providing oper-
ational, long-range fires, countering multiple threats, and projecting
power from the continental United States—the US Army Train-
ing and Doctrine Command published a revised Pamphlet 525-5,
Force XXI Operations, on 1 August 1994. The new pamphlet built
on Field Manual 100-5 (1993), which provided a short lead on the
future, and allowed the Army to move forward in its thinking. Pam-
phlet 525-5 (1994) represented a continuation of change, continuity
with the past, and growth that would enable the Army to remain a
relevant, strategic force capable of decisive victory in the 21st Cen-
tury with a high degree of strategic mobility. Besides explaining the
importance of modularity to the future Army, the pamphlet outlined
a future vision, provided an intellectual foundation for Force XXI,
and furnished a vision of future conflict for the US Army Training
and Doctrine Command’s Task Force XXI, its battle laboratories,
doctrine writers, combat developers, and trainers.80
Using the August pamphlet as a foundation, the US Army
Training and Doctrine Command rewrote doctrine as tasked by
the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer, who
had served as Deputy Assistant Commandant of the Field Artil-
lery School in the 1980s. On 25 October 1995, the Commanding
General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, General
William W. Hartzog, published a program directive that charged the
School of Advanced Military Studies at the US Army Command
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to develop
Force XXI doctrine. He explained that the new doctrine should
build on the existing field manual and integrate peace operations,
humanitarian assistance operations, power projection operations,
and military operations short of general war into the body of op-
erational doctrine. At the same time, General Hartzog emphasized
the joint, interagency, and combined aspects of war as well as the
incorporation of information technology at all levels of command
more than his predecessors had done. In 1997, the school produced
a final draft of the new field manual that reflected General Hartzog’s
desired orientation. However, debates throughout the Army over
terms and content continued into 1999 and forced a major rewrite to
be completed that year. The Army redesignated Field Manual 100-5

60
as Field Manual 3.0, Operations, in 2000 to keep it parallel with the
joint force publications numbering system then approved it on 14
June 2001 as official doctrine.81
Force XXI doctrine meanwhile compelled the Field Artillery
School to revise fire support doctrine to keep it current with Field
Manual 3.0.82 At the time, the Field Artillery was platform-based
and possessed state-of-the-art howitzers and rocket launchers that
shot “conventional, dumb, large amounts of ammunitions out onto
the battlefield in support of maneuver forces.”83 Major General Leo
J. Baxter, who was Commandant of the Field Artillery School from
1997 to 1999, explained late in 1998 that the Field Artillery was in
the process of shifting from a platform-based force to a munitions-
based force. This required the branch to move from managing weap-
on systems to directing fires effects by ensuring that they would be
delivered at the right place and right time. Smart or brilliant muni-
tions with increased ranges and lethality would give the Field Artil-
lery precision and enhanced terminal effects on the target, making
the location of the platform less important. Essentially, General Bax-
ter envisioned “effects-based fires.”84 One field artillery officer com-
mented as the school started writing fire support doctrine in March
1999: “Current digital operations are just the old way of executing
fire support operations, but now we sometimes plan and execute
with computers. . . . We have refined and digitized. . .[fire support];
but, at its base, it has changed little since the early 20th Century”
because it is still platform-based.85 Along with General Baxter, he
called for completely revamping fire support doctrine to exploit the
emerging information technology and precision munitions. Similar
to General Baxter, he advocated effects-based operations with their
emphasis on precision munitions as the preferred solution and urged
abandoning platform-based operations.86
With this concept of munitions-based or effects-based opera-
tions that represented a radical departure from platform-based oper-
ations, the ground commander would no longer focus on the source
of the supporting fires. Historically, the Field Artillery positioned
firing platforms close to supported maneuver units and exercised
centralized command and control through the fire direction center.
Rather than concentrating on the source of fires as field artillery of-

61
ficers and Soldiers had done traditionally, the maneuver commander
would focus on the effects required to accomplish the mission. The
maneuver commander would describe the effects required and the
effects coordination center would deliver them. The effects coordi-
nation cell concept was evolving in 1998 and 1999, with the Depth
and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory testing it as part of its
Future Fires Command and Control Concept Evaluation Program in
the fall of 1999. However, the Field Artillery School foresaw that it
would most likely be at the brigade and above echelons to integrate
effects delivery systems and organizations.87
Under Major General Toney Stricklin, who succeeded Major
General Baxter in 1999 to 2001, effects-based fires and effects fur-
ther evolved. Upon arriving at the school in August 1999, General
Stricklin outlined his concept of the effects coordination cell. The
cell needed to be applicable for today’s Army to gain acceptance
but lacked critical tools to function as envisioned. Implementing
the full vision would require communications systems with greater
bandwidth and more robust, firing platforms that had the ability to
do more technical work than existing systems. In view of this, Gen-
eral Stricklin scaled back the Effects Coordination Cell’s functions
and renamed it the Fires Effects Coordination Cell. This signified
an evolution from the fire support element, was designed to gain
wider acceptance throughout the Army, and signaled the shift from
platform-based fires to effects-based fires.88
Besides providing the same functions as the fire support ele-
ment at brigade and above echelons, the cell incorporated new ones.
Upon becoming operational early in the 21st Century, the cell fur-
nished deep operations that were formerly provided by the Deep
Operations Coordination Cell at the corps and provided close sup-
port by controlling cannon, rocket, attack aviation, and close air
support lethal effects. Just as important, the cell managed nonlethal
effects, such as electronic warfare, civil affairs, information opera-
tions, and psychological operations. These last functions previously
were beyond the purview of the fire support element at the battalion
and the brigade; this broadened the scope of fire support functions
beyond the traditional focus on lethal fires to the consideration of
nonlethal effects.89

62
 In 2000, the Army formed its first Fires Effects Coordination
Cell based on successful 1999 and 2000 testing in the Future Fires
Command and Control Concept Evaluation Program and advanced
warfare experiments. The first Initial Brigade Combat Team included
a Fires Effects Coordination Cell that was more capable than the fire
support element that it replaced by having the capability to provide
lethal and nonlethal effects.90 The team was organized at Fort Lewis,
Washington, as part of the Transformation of the Army under Chief
of Staff, General Eric Shinseki. As Colonel Jerry C. Hill and Major
Carl R. Trout of Fort Sill explained late in 2000, “The addition of the
nonlethal effects cell, with its diverse composition, is. . .significant. .
. . It includes information operations, electronic attack, psychological
operations (PSYOP), civil affairs, and legal assistance.”91 Continuing,
they pointed out, “It also includes a tactical intelligence officer who
is a key contributor to nonlethal targets. The FECC [Fires Effects Co-
ordination Cell] has links to the common ground station (CGS) and
all-source analysis system (ASAS). It is designed to exploit sensor
technology and leverage organic, joint, and national assets.”92
By creating the Fires Effects Coordination Cell with its effects-
based orientation, the Field Artillery took a concrete step to move
from platform-based fires and integrating nonlethal effects as a ca-
pability. As effects-based fires indicated, the Field Artillery entered
a new age of fire support where effects were becoming more im-
portant than the firing platform and the ability to furnish nonlethal
effects was growing more critical.

The Digital Puzzle

Work continued to explore new technological and organiza-
tional solutions that would improve lethality and responsiveness and
complement the writing of new doctrine as a Joint Venture priority,
as well as developing the Fire Effects Coordination Cell. Continuing
its simulation and virtual reality endeavor begun in 1992, the Depth
and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory took part in 1995 to
1998 Precision/Rapid Counter-Multiple Rocket Launcher Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstrations that were conducted by the
Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Project Office at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia. The demonstrations were designed to furnish creative and

63
innovative solutions to operational problems in response to combat-
ant commanders’ and Office of Secretary of Defense requirements.
At the time, about 70 percent of North Korea’s armed forces along
the demilitarized zone were forward deployed. Such deployment in-
cluded long-range field artillery and 240-millimeter multiple rocket
launchers that were located in hardened mountainside sites. These
systems had rapid emplacement, firing, and displacement capabili-
ties; posed a threat to US and South Korean military forces; pro-
vided little reaction time and few indicators of an impending strike;
and would need to be eliminated in the event of war. To offset these
strengths, the demonstrations focused on deep strike capabilities of
the Army Tactical Missile System I (the original Army Tactical Mis-
sile System that became operational in 1991 as a replacement to
the conventional Lance missile), the Army Tactical Missile System
IA that had a Global Positioning System in its guidance system to
increase accuracy at long ranges and became operational in 1998,
and Army Tactical Missile II that was under development. Army
Tactical Missile II would carry the Brilliant Antiarmor Munition,
a precision munition that was also under development. Ultimately,
the demonstrations validated the ability of current and emerging
advanced technologies to defeat a North Korean multiple rocket
launcher attack within hours after a conflict began.93
As this advanced concept technology demonstration was con-
cluding, the Department of Defense approved the Theater Precision
Strike Operations Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration on
21 November 1997. This new addition for Fiscal Year 1998 was in
response to the Joint Forces Land Component Commander’s require-
ment for an enhanced capability for theater precision engagements
and fires. As part of the demonstration, the Depth and Simultaneous
Attack Battle Laboratory supported Foal Eagle, Reception, Staging,
Onward Movement and Integration, SummerEx, Ulchi Focus Lens,
and other exercises between 1998 and 2001. The exercises exhib-
ited new capabilities to enhance interoperability among Army, Navy,
and Air Force automated systems; improve counterfire; upgrade au-
tomated methods for deconflicting airspace; update information on
potential targets; and enhance predictive battle damage assessment.94

64
 While the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory
and other TRADOC battle laboratories tested doctrine, organization,
and emerging equipment employing advanced concept technology
demonstrations and advanced technology demonstrations as a part
of Joint Venture, advanced warfighting experiments capped Joint
Venture. In April 1994, the Army conducted the Desert Hammer VI
Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the National Training Center,
California—the first of several advanced warfighting experiments
that would be conducted through 1997. Using a brigade-level task
force from the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the demonstra-
tion tested digital command and control systems and corresponding
tactics, techniques, and procedures in a field setting. Through two
weeks of intense, almost non-stop, simulation-enhanced force-on-
force battles, the experiment clearly verified digitization’s capability
to increase lethality and tempo.95
Addressing Desert Hammer VI of 1994, Major General John
A. Dubia, Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 1993 to
1995, explained the Field Artillery’s role in the experiment. Des-
ert Hammer VI provided the Field Artillery with the opportunity
to unveil its newest system, the M109A6 self-propelled 155-mil-
limeter howitzer with digital and shoot-and-scoot capabilities that
protected it from enemy counterfire. Called the Paladin, the howit-
zer far exceeded the performance of field artillery in previous Na-
tional Training Center rotations. The howitzer also represented the
greatest opportunity to rethink field artillery tactics since Gustavus
Adolphus gave each regiment its own accompanying artillery piece
in the 1630s, according to Lieutenant Colonel William M. Brans-
ford, who commanded the 4th Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regi-
ment. During the exercise, Paladins from the 24th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) easily outpaced and outperformed the predecessor
M109A2/A3 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer, which de-
pended on wire and analog communications. Major General Dubia
also pointed out that the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle rep-
resented a quantum leap forward and would begin development in
the fall of 1994 and be fielded in 1999. A mockup of the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System and the Initial Fire Support

65
Automation System likewise showed their ability to take the Field
Artillery into the 21st Century with dramatic improvements in digi-
tized command and control.96
Over the next several years, the Army scheduled additional ad-
vanced warfighting experiments. Between February and September
1995, Task Force 2000—organized in the Field Artillery School in
August 1994 to oversee the school’s participation in modernization
activities—took part in the Focused Dispatch Advanced Warfight-
ing Experiment for the heavy forces at Fort Knox, Kentucky. This
follow-on to Desert Hammer VI consisted of a series of construc-
tive and virtual simulations and a field training exercise with a por-
tion of the forces live and a part portrayed in virtual and construc-
tive simulations. The experiment centered on developing digitized
doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for armored and
mechanized forces. It also illustrated the advantages and disadvan-
tages of sensor-to-sensor links and the importance of careful fire
support planning and proper clearance of fires when employing
sensor-to-shooter links.97
Subsequently, Task Force 2000 played a part in the November
1995 Warrior Focus Advanced Warfare Experiment for light forces
at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. Warrior
Focus compared the performance of a conventional, non-digitized
light task force to a fully digitized light task force and found the latter
to be superior in performance. In particular, it revealed the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System’s ability to support fast tempos
and the imperative to digitize the Advanced Towed Cannon Artillery
System that was under development (later designated as the M777
towed 155-millimeter howitzer) as well as the requirement for the
Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder to lase and designate tar-
gets for precision munitions that were being developed.98
Subsequently, the Army conducted the Prairie Warrior 96 Ad-
vanced Warfighting Experiment and followed it with the Prairie
Warrior 97 Advanced Warfighting Experiment. Carried out at the
US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, both highlighted fires as a potentially dominant force on
the 21st Century battlefield. They also confirmed the necessity to
preserve division artillery as the command and control headquar-

66
ters of the division’s fire support assets as well as the requirement
for two field artillery brigades to reinforce the fires of a committed
division. Equally as important, the experiments allowed students at
the college to employ the Field Artillery’s most advanced future ca-
pabilities—the Crusader self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer, the
Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition, and the High Mobility Artil-
lery Rocket System, which were in varying stages of development.
The experiments confirmed that these systems were essential for
expanding and dominating battlespace, that division artillery could
plan and execute attacks much like a maneuver brigade, that the
division artillery structure was essential, and that information tech-
nologies enhanced division artillery and fire support capabilities.99
Building on the 1996 to 1997 advanced warfighting experi-
ments, the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment tested
a modernized brigade combat team of two heavy battalions, one
light infantry battalion, and a brigade support slice to demonstrate
the potential improvements created by digitization. The March 1997
experiment provided information for Force XXI on operational and
organizational concepts as well as materiel acquisition opportunities
and assessed the doctrinal, training, leadership, organization, mate-
riel, and soldier impacts of information-age technologies.100
On a smaller scale, the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting
Experiment offered a glimpse of the Field Artillery’s future. After
noting that the school was still sifting through the vast expanse of
data, Major General Leo Baxter, Chief of Field Artillery from 1997
to 1999, noted late in 1997 that the fire support system was “ca-
pable of shaping battlespace and setting the conditions for decisive
maneuver.”101 In fact, fires were critical for successful operations
because they eliminated the enemy’s capability to fight in a coher-
ent manner.102
These advanced warfighting experiments carried out during
the late 1990s confirmed the ability of digital information technol-
ogy to increase the lethality, survivability, and operating tempo of
ground forces, including fire support. As a result, the Army pushed
to develop digital systems and conducted an advanced warfighting
experiment to test the Division XXI that would exploit information
and communications technology to provide situational awareness

67
and increased combat effectiveness as well as permit reducing the
size of the division by 15 percent.103
On 15 March 1995, General Reimer designated the 2d Armored
Division (reflagged in January 1996 as the 4th Mechanized Infantry
Division), Fort Hood, Texas, as the Army’s experimental force to
conduct the Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment and
placed it under the operational control of the US Army Training and
Doctrine Command.104 Held at Fort Hood in November 1997, the
Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment capped the multi-
year heavy forces experimentation effort and evaluated a conceptual
digitized mechanized division, including emerging field artillery
systems. Every divisional platform was equipped with a computer
that was linked to the tactical Internet. The experiment clearly dem-
onstrated that digitization permitted the commander to see where
friendly and enemy units were on the battlefield for enhanced situ-
ational awareness; allowed the division to cover the battlespace of
a current corps; and enabled reducing the number of tanks, infan-
try fighting vehicles, and personnel without sacrificing lethality and
survivability to promote expeditionary capabilities that had been the
province of the Army’s light forces. The successful experiment led
the Army to convert the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) into a
digital division by 2000.105
For the Field Artillery, lessons emerged quickly from the Di-
vision XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment. Fire support initia-
tives—the Brilliant Antitank and Sense-and-Destroy Armor muni-
tions, the Crusader, the Firefinder AN/TPQ-37 Block II radar, and
the M270A1 launcher—under development and the Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System being fielded provided seamless cov-
erage of the division’s battlespace. The advanced warfighting ex-
periment demonstrated the ability of division artillery with its three
howitzer battalions (54 howitzers) and one Multiple Launch Rocket
System battalion (18 launchers) with assistance from two reinforc-
ing field artillery brigades of two howitzer battalions (36 howitzers)
and one Multiple Rocket Launcher System battalion (18 launchers)
to pave the way for decisive maneuver by killing hostile armor.106
Acknowledging that the Division XXI Advanced Warfighting
Experiment of 1997 focused on the heavy division, the Army con-

68
currently recognized the imperative to modernize its light forces for
contingency operations and force projection. Prompted by this im-
perative, the Army decided in 1998 to digitize its light forces and
organized the Rapid Force Project Initiative Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations. Based on the success of these demon-
strations, the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) participated
in the Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment
in September 2000. The effort was part of the Millennium Challenge
conducted by the Joint Forces Command to test ways to improve
contingency force capabilities and serve as the foundation for light
force modernization.107 Conclusions indicated that digitization im-
proved situational awareness and enhanced lethality and versatility
in light forces as they did with the heavy forces. As the US Army
Training and Doctrine Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat
Developments noted in October 2000, the digitized light force dem-
onstrated the ability to collect and exploit digital information and
achieved demonstrable improvements over the non-digital force.108
With the disappearance of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat
in Europe, the Force XXI Campaign Plan played a critical role in
adapting the Army and the Field Artillery to a new international
environment. Using battle laboratory assets, Force XXI tests and
experiments demonstrated the potential of a digitized, strategically
mobile, force projection ground force with unprecedented situation-
al awareness and the capability to dominate the battlefield of the
21st Century. For the Field Artillery, Force XXI reinforced the key
role of field artillery fire support and the importance of systems be-
ing fielded and those in various stages of development.

The Army After Next

As the Army pushed forward with Force XXI, it initiated the
third reform effort. Early in 1996, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen-
eral Dennis R. Reimer, and the US Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand Commanding General, General William W. Hartzog, launched
the Army After Next campaign plan to help Army leadership craft
a vision of future Army requirements. Force XXI would field tech-
nologies for the near term and an Army that was smaller and more
deployable than the Army of Excellence of the 1980s and 1990s and

69
was becoming a reality as the 1990s came to a close. The Army After
Next, also known as Objective Force, would be its successor—en-
visioning technologies for 2025 and creating a rapidly deployable,
digitized force with unprecedented offensive capabilities.109
A 1996–97 study by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency developed suggestions for the Army After Next that were
briefed to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command in October
1997. Then in mid-1998, General Hartzog unveiled the Army After
Next blueprint at a Pentagon presentation. The blueprint formulated
a three-axis experimental plan to carry it beyond Force XXI—offi-
cially called Army XXI—to the Army After Next of 2025. The light
axis centered on developing new equipment and force structure for
the light contingency forces. The mechanized axis focused on field-
ing the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) as the Army’s first digi-
tized division and III Corps as the first mechanized corps during the
first decade of the 21st Century to complete the Force XXI effort.
The strike axis outlined creating a highly deployable brigade-size
force to bridge the lethality and survivable gap between the early
entry or light forces and campaign or mechanized forces.110
The incentive behind the strike axis stemmed from the Army’s
experience during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
which highlighted the necessity to change the Army dramatically.
Deploying a heavy brigade to the Persian Gulf took 18 days in
1990. In the future, US military forces would not have the luxury
of taking so long shipping and organizing sufficient combat power
into theater to prevent a major conflict. Potential enemies would not
permit the Americans to build up their forces at their leisure and
establish the terms of fighting. With this conclusion in the mind, the
Army, the Defense Science Board, the Army Science Board, Army
After Next studies, and other mid-1990s studies concluded that the
American military would have to force its way into the theater of
operations against armed opposition and would require a mobile,
modular, deployable force in the future.111
As of 1998, neither the Army’s light forces nor its mechanized
forces had the ability to deter or defeat an aggressor in the manner
envisioned. Force XXI’s enhanced firepower, command and control,
and survivability added early entry capabilities, and possessed stra-

70
tegic mobility. However, a Force XXI light force still lacked suffi-
cient power to defeat a mechanized force. Force XXI also improved
the mechanized forces’ command and control, strategic mobility,
survivability, and lethality. However, the heavy forces still required
prepositioned equipment to enhance strategic mobility. Task Force
2000 action officers at the Field Artillery School and the US Army
Training and Doctrine Command observed a critical deficiency. The
Army lacked the capability to respond rapidly and effectively to re-
gional hotspots with a medium force. During the previous two de-
cades, the emphasis on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact caused
the Army to organize heavy divisions for combat in Europe and light
divisions for combat in other parts of the world.112
After two years of conceptual and developmental work, the US
Army Training and Doctrine Command initiated strike force experi-
mentation in 1998 to develop and field an adaptable, rapidly deploy-
able force that would be decisive upon arrival and capitalize on the
best of the light and mechanized forces. It would serve as a test bed
for developing capabilities that would meet the Army’s long-term
transformation objectives. The force would have 3,000 to 5,000 Sol-
diers and be equipped and trained to deploy anywhere in the world
in four to seven days by air or sea in response to a wide spectrum of
threats and contingencies—from early entry to peacekeeping opera-
tions. Equally important, the force would be more survivable, lethal,
and maneuverable than existing early entry forces and would pres-
ent a smaller and more sustainable profile than current heavy force
designs. Although the deployable time of four to seven days cer-
tainly did not meet the 18-hour goal established by General Reimer,
it eclipsed the 18 days required for the Army to deploy a heavy force
to the Persian Gulf in Operation Desert Shield in 1990.113
The Army examined four options to meet the requirement for
a lethal strike force that minimized the weakness of the light and
heavy forces while maximizing their strengths. First, the Army
could modernize the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment with near-term,
off-the-shelf technology. Second, the Army could develop a proto-
type strike force by anticipating capabilities and technologies that
land forces would require 25 to 30 years in the future. Third, the
Army could upgrade the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment with leap-

71
ahead technology. Fourth, the Army could design a force with force
packaging and tactical tailoring that would be capable of intervening
rapidly and decisively. As the US Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand noted, options one through three centered on forming a stand-
ing organization and promoting unit cohesion as primary goals. In
comparison, the fourth option focused on creating a highly deploy-
able headquarters that could command and control a tailored force
of Army of Excellence or Force XXI capabilities.114 Commenting
on the options, General John N. Abrams, the US Army Training and
Doctrine Command Commanding General, observed in October
1998: “We’re probably going to have a blend of these ideas.”115
As General Reimer explained early in 1999, the Army planned
to use the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment to create a strike force that
would provide an adaptive, near-term, early entry force capable of
rapid strategic deployment. The regiment in effect would become a
headquarters that was capable of being task-organized. Once field-
ed, the strike force would serve as a prototype for testing organiza-
tional structures, operational concepts, and critical Army After Next
leader and Soldier skills.116
In early 1999, the final force structure design did not exist for
a strike force that would be composed of modular units and employ
advanced digital information technology to provide timely informa-
tion. However, the Field Artillery School moved out to develop a
strike force field artillery headquarters Effects Coordination Cell that
would assemble real-time information, process that information, and
apply the appropriate effects (lethal and nonlethal) to the required
battlespace. Specifically, the Chief of the school’s Task Force 2000,
Colonel Jerry C. Hill, remarked that the headquarters effects coordi-
nation node would have three major functional areas: an intelligence
and targeting cell, a lethal effects cell, and a nonlethal effects cell.
These cells would give the commander the desired effect, such as
disrupting an enemy supply line or removing a communications cen-
ter through air strikes, field artillery, or other methods.117
While designing its Effects Coordination Cell (later renamed
the Fires Effects Coordination Cell), the school anticipated creating
a composite field artillery battalion of the High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System, the Advanced Technology Cannon Artillery System

72
(later renamed M777 towed 155-millimeter howitzer), a platoon of
AN/TPQ-47 radars, a terminal effects coordination platoon, and an
electronic attack platoon for the Strike Force. While the rocket sys-
tem would provide long-range fires, the cannon system would fur-
nish close support operations. Functioning as part of the command
post, the effects coordination platoon would have state-of-the-art
communications equipment and would plan, coordinate, and syn-
chronize lethal and nonlethal effects from space, sea, air, or ground
delivery systems throughout the battlespace.118
As the Army worked on designing the Strike Force and the
school was planning which fire support systems would be part of the
Strike Force, the Army fielded its first heavy digital division as part
of the Joint Venture portion of the Force XXI and the Army After
Next modernization effort. Based on the successful Division XXI
Advanced Warfighting Experiment of 1997 and the tasking of the
Chief of Staff of the Army, the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
finished converting to the digitized force structure in 2000. The fol-
lowing year, the digitized 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) dem-
onstrated its go-to-war capability under a realistic and demanding
scenario in division capstone exercises in March and September
2001.119 Commenting on the March 2001 exercise, the division’s
commanding general, Major General Benjamin S. Griffin, noted,
“the DCX [Division Capstone Exercise] provided us with a continu-
ous operation in a tactical environment to challenge our communi-
cation systems, our digital systems, and our warfighting systems,
against a very, very competent OPFOR [opposing force].”120
The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) successfully per-
formed in both 2001 exercises, which validated transforming the
division into a digital combat force and its ability to contribute to
the III Armored Corps’ counteroffensive capability. The exercises
highlighted the digitized division’s improved situational awareness,
battlespace dominance, and ability to defeat the enemy at a time and
place of the division’s choosing. The exercises also demonstrated
the Field Artillery’s key role in setting the conditions for maneuver
success on the battlefield. Further, they underscored its ability to
provide timely and accurate fires as well as mass fires at critical
phases of the fight throughout the depth of the battlefield using the

73
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System that processed in-
formation rapidly and accurately and that was at the forefront of
digitization in the Army, according to General Griffin.121
As the 2001 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) exercises in-
dicated, the Field Artillery underwent significant changes during
the 1990s. Although several years would pass before field artillery
precision munitions, effects-based fires, and light, deployable sys-
tems and equipment for power projection from the United States to
worldwide crises would become a reality, the Field Artillery aggres-
sively started moving into the digital age that would improve fire
support responsiveness and effectiveness by processing information
more quickly than ever before and becoming more mobile without
sacrificing lethality to support power projection.

74
 NOTES

1. U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2000, Posture State-
ment File, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC), 19–21;
U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1999, Posture Statement File,
x, 4–5, 42, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001,
Posture Statement File, 2, HRDC; Statement on the Posture of the U.S.
Army for Fiscal Year 1998 (Extract), Posture Statement File, 4–6, HRDC;
DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 31–37; DA,
Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1987, 11; DA, Historical Summary
for Fiscal Year 1996, 47; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1992,
13–14, 116–35; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, 42–43;
1994 TRADOC Annual Command History (ACH), 123; Brigadier Gen-
eral Leo J. Baxter, “Field Artillery: Vision 2020,” Field Artillery, Decem-
ber 1994, 10; Gregory Fontenot, et al., On Point: US Army in Operation
Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press,
2004), 5.
2. Janice E. McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Ar-
tillery: 1775–2003 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military His-
tory, 2007), 317; Major General Fred F. Marty, “State-of-the-Branch Ad-
dress,” Field Artillery, December 1991, 2.
3. Major General William F. Ward, “Performance in Panama Un-
derscores Readiness,” Army, October 1990, 104–13; Major General Don-
ald Burdick, “An Essential Element of National Strategy,” Army, October
1990, 116–21.
4. U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1997 (Extract), Pos-
ture Statement File, 7–8, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal
Year 2000, Posture Statement File, 18, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary
for Fiscal Year 1995, 53–58; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year
1996, 83; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, 71–72; DA, His-
torical Summary for Fiscal Year 1999, 61; Briefing, “Senior Field Artil-
lery Advisors Council,” 1995, HRDC.
5. John J. Todd and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Holt, “Army Sci-
ence Board Study: How Much Field Artillery is Enough?” Field Artillery,
June 1995, 20–25; Major General Randall L. Rigby, “Fires for Division
XXI,” Field Artillery, November–December 1995, 3.
6. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 2003,
50, HRDC; Major General Randall L. Rigby, “3x6-2x9 MLRS Transi-
tion,” Field Artillery, September–October 1996, 18–21; Todd and Holt,
“Army Science Board Study,” 20–25; U.S. Army Posture Statement for
Fiscal Year 2000, Posture Statement File, 18, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture
Statement for Fiscal Year 1997 (Extract), Posture Statement File, HRDC;
Burdick, “An Essential Element of National Strategy,” 118; Briefing, “Se-
nior Field Artillery Advisors Council,” 1995, HRDC; Captain Lawrence T.
Hall and Captain Michael A. Sharp, “MLRS NET for the ARNG,” Field

75
Artillery, March–April 1996, 44–45; McKenney, The Organizational His-
tory of the Field Artillery, 317.
7. Major General Fred F. Marty, “State-of-the-Branch 1992,” Field
Artillery, November–December 1992, 1; Brigadier General William C.
Bilo, “A Decisive Victory for Strategic Victory,” Field Artillery, March–
April 1995, 22; Boyd L. Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973–
1991 (Fort Sill, OK: Office of the Command History, 1994, reprinted by
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 16.
8. Hall and Sharp, “MLRS NET for the ARNG,” 44–45; 2001 USA-
FACFS ACH, 39–40; Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8
December 2003, 113; Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence M. Terranova, Chief,
New Equipment Training Division, DOTD, interview by author, 27 Janu-
ary 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “G3/G4 Biweekly Update Re-
port 27 October 2004,” HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Bi-weekly Up-
date,” 12 October 2004, HRDC; McKenney, The Organizational History
of Field Artillery, 1775–2003, 217.
9. Message, Chris Klein, DCD, to author, “3x6/2x9 Transition,”
28 February 1997, HRDC; Rigby, “3x6-2x9 MLRS Transition,” 18–21;
Major General Randall L. Rigby, “Mapping the Future: FA State of the
Branch,” Field Artillery, November–December 1996, 4; Briefing, “3x6-
2x9,” January 1997, HRDC; Briefing, “AC/RC Rebalancing and TAA-11
Field Artillery Allocation Rules,” 26 August 2003, HRDC; Major General
Randall L. Rigby, “1996 Senior Fire Support Conference: Focusing Fires
for Force XXI,” Field Artillery, May–June 1996, 18; Terranova, interview,
27 January 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “NET Input to 2004
Annual Command History,” 3 February 2005, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ment, “Updates to Original NSTD Command History,” 10 February 2004,
HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence M. Terranova, interview by author,
30 January 2004, HRDC; Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, 16,
71; McKenney, The Organizational History of the Field Artillery, 317–19.
In the Army of Excellence of the 1980s, the heavy division had 72 M109
howitzers as direct support and 9 MLRS launchers as general support.
Corps Artillery had M110 howitzers and MLRS launchers.
10. Rigby, “3x6 Cannon-2x9 MLRS Transition,” 18.
11. Rigby, “FA State of the Branch 1996,” 4.
12. Marty, “State-of-the-Branch Address 1992,” 2; Information Pa-
per, “MLRS,” undated, MLRS File, HRDC; Field Manual 6-60, MLRS
Operations, 23 April 1996, MLRS File, HRDC; Table of Organization
and Equipment, 23 April 1999; Major General Leo J. Baxter, “Meeting
the Future: State of the Field Artillery 1998,” Field Artillery, November–
December 1998, 1–6; “Transition,” Field Artillery, September–October
1996, 18–21; Rigby, “Mapping the Future: FA State,” 1; Lieutenant Colo-
nel Richard R. McPhee, “The Divisional MLRS Battalion in the DAWE,”
Field Artillery, May–June 1998, 38–40; Fact Sheet, “M270 MLRS Self-
Propelled Loader/Launchers,” undated, Force XXI File, HRDC; Briefing,

76
“AC/RC Rebalancing and TAA-11 Field Artillery Allocation Rules, 26
August 2003, HRDC.
13. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December
2003, 54.
14. U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Volume II, G27.
15. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December
2003, 75; U.S Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year (FY) 1995, Pos-
ture Statement File, 84, HRDC; 1991 USAFACFS ACH, 184; U.S. Army
Modernization Plan, Volume II, G2-G6; 1994 TRADOC ACH, 136–38.
16. U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Volume II, G16.
17. Fact Sheet, “AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Weapon Locating Sys-
tem,” undated, Firefinder File, HRDC; “Eyes for the King of Battle,”
http://www.infoage.org/ffsilver, Firefinder File, HRDC; 1986 USAFA-
CFS Annual Historical Review (AHR), 88–91; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder
II Radars,” 12 November 1987, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder Radar,”
31 December 1987, HRDC; Disposition Form, “Trip Report - FF Blk II
Design Review,” 13 August 1987, HRDC; Disposition Form, “Trip Re-
port - Design/Inprogress Review Firefinder Block II,” 5 October 1987,
HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder Product Improvement Program,” 4 Au-
gust 1988, HRDC; Major David F. McFarren, TSM Target Acquisition,
interview by author, 7 February 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Distribution of
Firefinder AN/TPQ-37 Radars,” 16 September 1988, HRDC; Fact Sheet,
“Firefinder Improvement Program,” 22 November 1987, HRDC; Fact
Sheet, “Firefinder Improvement Program,” 13 September 1989, HRDC;
Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, interview by author, 22 Febru-
ary 1990, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder Block IIB Material Change,” 20
November 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder Block IIB Configuration
Decision,” 25 October 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Impact of FY90 Bud-
get Cuts on Firefinder Block II,” 21 September 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet,
“Firefinder Q-36 Improvement (Block II),” 20 August 1991, HRDC; Fact
Sheet, “Firefinder Q-36 Improvement Program (Block II),” 14 January
1992, HRDC; Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, interview by au-
thor, 5 February 2002, HRDC.
18. “Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update,” Field Artil-
lery, December 1990, 53; Input to the Commanding General’s Monthly
Update to TRADOC, 15 February 1991, HRDC; Ron Anderson, TSM
Target Acquisition, interview by author, 7 March 1991, HRDC; Fact
Sheet, “Firefinder Radar Product Improvement Programs,” 23 June 1995,
HRDC; Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, interview by author, 11
March 1996, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder Radars, AN/TPQ-36 and 37,”
21 February 1995, HRDC; Memorandum for Brigadier General Dean R.
Ertwine, “Suspension of Q36(V)8 Fielding,” 7 January 1999, HRDC; Ron
Anderson, Firefinder Program Manager, TSM Target Acquisition, inter-
view by author, 17 February 1999, HRDC; Gordon Wehri, Chief, Target
Acquisition Branch, Materiel, Requirements, and Integration Division, Di-

77
rectorate of Combat Developments (DCD), interview by author, 6 March
2000, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Firefinder,” 21 January 1999, Firefinder File,
HRDC.
19. Fact Sheet, “ATACS/COBRA Program,” 3 September 1991,
HRDC; Fact Sheet, “ATACS,” 14 January 1992, HRDC; Fact Sheet,
“ATACS, 3 September 1991, HRDC; Anderson, interview, 17 February
1999; Wehri, interview, 6 March 2000; Operational Requirements Docu-
ment for the AN/TPQ-47 Firefinder Radar, November 1999, HRDC; Fact
Sheet, “Firefinder AN/TPQ-47 (formerly AN/TPQ-37 P3I Block II),” un-
dated, Firefinder File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Artil-
lery Locating Radar,” undated, Firefinder File, HRDC; Baxter, “Meeting
the Future,” 1; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 86; Email with Attachment, “TPO
Sensors History,” 27 March 2007, HRDC. The replacement system for the
Q-37 went through several different names: the Advanced Target Acquisi-
tion Counterfire System in 1990–1991, the Advanced Firefinder System in
1992, the Firefinder AN/TPQ-37 Block II Pre-planned Product Improve-
ment Program in 1993, the AN/TPQ-37 Block II in 1996, and the AN/
TPQ-47 in 1998.
20. Fact Sheet, “Bradley Fighting Vehicle System,” 9 August 2002,
BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “M2/M3 Series Bradley Fighting Vehi-
cle,” 9 August 2002, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Bradley Fighting
Vehicle Upgrade,” 26 March 2002, BFIST File, HRDC; Scott Gourley,
“M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle,” Army, July 2002, 51–52.
21. Fact Sheet, “Bradley Fighting Vehicle (M2A3),” 26 November
2001, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “BFIST Upgrade,” 26 March 2002,
BFIST File, HRDC; Gourley, “M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle,”
51–52; Fact Sheet, “MA2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Sys-
tems,” 9 August 2002, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “The A3 Bradley
Fighting Vehicle,” undated, BFIST File, HRDC; Email, “BFIST/Striker,”
27 February 2002, HRDC; Captain Robert S. Hribar, Material and Train-
ing Integration Division, FDIC, interview by author, 19 February 2002,
HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Bradley Program Overview,” 5–7 June 2001, HRDC;
Fact Sheet, “BFIST,” 2002, HRDC; Memo, “None,” undated, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History,”
24 March 2005, HRDC.
22. DA, Procurement Programs (Extract), FY 2003 Budget Estimate,
February 2002, 396; Major General Michael D. Maples, “2002 State of
the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, November–December 2002, 4; Ma-
jor Neil J. Hamill, Material Requirements and Integration Division, DCD,
interview by author, 17 February 1998, HRDC; “BFIST is on the Way,”
Field Artillery, May–June 1997, 45; Message, “Answers to Questions,” 18
February 1998, HRDC; “Striker/Reconnaissance Team,” Field Artillery,
January–February 1996, 38; Hibar, interview,19 February 2002; Email,
“BFIST/Striker, 27 February 2002.
23. 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFA-

78
CFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 145–46; 2004 USAFACFS ACH,
98–99. See footnotes in respective histories for detailed documents.
24. Major Roger A. Rains, “Readiness: The Field Artillery Takes
Aim,” Army, March 1985, 41; Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Browder A.
Willis, “HELP for the M109 Self-Propelled Howitzer,” Field Artillery
Journal, May–June 1983, 35–37; Decision Coordinating Paper, 155-mm
SP Howitzer (HIP), November 1983, 2–3, HRDC; Briefing, “155-milli-
meter Self-propelled Howitzer Improvement Program,” undated, HRDC;
Colonel (Retired) Anthony Pokorny, “Take the Tech,” Field Artillery
Journal, September–October 1984, 21; Briefing, “Fire Support,” January
1988, HRDC; Division Support Weapon System (DSWS) Main Report (S/
NOFORN WNINTEL), extract, July 1983, 4–16, material used is unclas-
sified, HRDC; Decision Coordinating Paper, 155-millimeter SP Howitzer
(HIP), November 1989, 3, 5–6, HRDC; Willis, “HELP for the M109 Self-
Propelled Howitzer,” 35–37; “HELP Program Continues,” Field Artillery
Journal, January–February 1983, 47
25. Fact Sheet, “M109A6 Paladin Self-propelled Howitzer,” un-
dated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Paladin Self-propelled howitzer, M109A6,”
undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Paladin,” undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Pal-
adin 155-millimeter Self-propelled Howitzer,” undated, HRDC; Lieuten-
ant Colonel Kerry J. Loudenslager and Captain Ryan J. LaPorte, “Paladin
Platoon Operations versus Battery Operations,” Field Artillery, January–
February 2001, 16–19.
26. Briefing, “Advanced Field Artillery System,” 9 April 1986,
HRDC.
27. U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Volume II, G18–G19. Also see
FNs 60–71, 112–16, 1996 USAFACFS ACH.
28. Government Accountability Office Report, “Army Armored Sys-
tems,” 6 June 1997, 10–13, HRDC.
29. Briefing, “Crusader: The Army XXI Firepower Revolution,” 2
February 1999, HRDC; Message with Enclosures, “Meeting with General
Riscassi,” 2 October 1997, HRDC. This message contains the letters that
General Baxter sent to members of the National Defense Panel explaining
the revolutionary status of the Crusader—trying to win their support and
prevent funding reductions.
30. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December
2003, 85; Fact Sheet, “Crusader,” 15 August 2002, Crusader File, HRDC;
Fact Sheet, “Crusader 155mm Self-propelled Howitzer,” 15 August 2002,
Crusader File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Crusader Advanced Field Artillery
System,” undated, Crusader File, HRDC.
31. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 2003,
86; Steve Johnson, TSM Cannon, DCD, interview by author, 10 March
1994, HRDC; Memorandum, “Mission Need Statement for a Lightweight
155-millimeter Howitzer,” 27 May 1993, HRDC; Steve Johnson, TSM
Cannon, DCD, interview by author, 15 February 1995, HRDC; Memoran-

79
dum for Record, “Staff Input,” 12 April 1995, HRDC.
32. Memorandum, “Mission Need Statement for a Lightweight
155-millimeter Towed Howitzer.”
33. Memorandum, “Mission Need Statement for a Lightweight
155-millimeter Towed Howitzer;” Memorandum of Agreement between
the Department of the Army, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Opera-
tions and Plans, Force Development, and U.S. Marine Corps, Combat De-
velopment Command, “Army and Marine Corps Agreement on the Joint
Development of a Lightweight 155-millimeter Howitzer,” 18 October
1993, HRDC; USAFAS Program and Project Summary Sheets, 1 February
1994, 1-1-1-2, HRDC; Johnson, interview, 10 March 1994; Steve John-
son, TCM Cannon, DCD, interview by author, 21 February 1996, HRDC.
34. Email with Attachment, “LW155,” 1 March 2001, HRDC; An-
drew Koch, “General Dynamics to Develop TAD System,” Jane’s Defense
Weekly, 27 September 2000, 8; Email, “LW155 Info,” 16 February 2001,
HRDC; Fact Sheet, “TAD,” undated, HRDC; “The XM777 Lightweight
155-millimeter Howitzer,” Army, October 2000, 303–304; John Yager,
TSM Cannon, DCD, interview with attachment by author, 16 February
2001, HRDC.
35. Briefing, “LW155 and TAD,” 5 March 2002, HRDC; Briefing,
“Program Status Review of LW155,” 26 February 2002, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “LW155,” 10 March 2003, HRDC; 2002 USAFACFS
ACH, 67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 84; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 72.
36. 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 115–16; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 65;
2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 66.
37. Draft White Paper, U.S. Army Missile Command, Advanced Sys-
tems Concept Office, “Low Intensity Conflict Rocket System,” 17 January
1990, HRDC.
38. Draft White Paper, “Low Intensity Conflict Rocket System;” Op-
erational and Organizational Plan for the HIMARS, 21 December 1990,
HRDC; Memorandum for Commander, TRADOC, “Final Draft Opera-
tional and Organizational Plan for HIMARS,” 1 August 1990, HRDC.
39. Message, Commandant USAFAS to Commander TRADOC,
“MLRS for Contingency Forces,” 10 April 1990, HRDC.
40. Message, Commander XVIII Airborne Corps to Commander
Forces Command (FORSCOM), “Requirement for HIMARS in XVIII
Corps,” 16 September 1991, HRDC.
41. Message, Commander TRADOC to Commander FORSCOM,
“Requirement for HIMARS in XVIII Airborne Corps,” 6 November 1991,
HRDC.
42. Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Gentry and Major Cullen G. Bar-
bato, “HIMARS: Firepower for Early Entry Forces,” Field Artillery, Janu-
ary–February 1999, 19.
43. Lieutenant General William F. Kernan, interview by Patrecia S.
Hollis, Field Artillery, January–February 1999, 3.

80
 44. Information Paper, “HIMARS,” 27 February 2002, HIMARS File,
HRDC; Information Paper, “HIMARS,” 2001, HIMARS File, HRDC; In-
formation Paper, “HIMARS,” 23 December 1999, HIMARS File, HRDC;
Information Paper, “HIMARS,” 2000, HIMARS File, HRDC.
45. Major Patrick J. Sutherland, TSM RAMS, interview with attach-
ment by author, 24 February 2000, HRDC; Fiscal Year (FY) 99 Annual
Report (Extract); Report (Summary), Director of Operational Testing and
Evaluation, “MLRS M270A1 Launcher,” 12 February 1999, HRDC.
46. Fact Sheet, “MLRS Launcher Improvements,” 1998, HRDC;
“M270A1 Production to Begin,” MLRS Dispatch, Third Quarter 1998, 5,
HRDC; Report (Summary), “MLRS M270A1 Launcher;” Sutherland, in-
terview, 24 February 2000; Email with Attachment, “MLRS,” 13 March
2000, HRDC; Jeff Froysland, TSM RAMS, interview by author, 2 March
2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Rockets,” 6 March 2000,
HRDC; Memorandum for Director, TSM RAMS, “Coordination of 1999
USAFACFS ACH, 29 March 2000, HRDC; Interview, Froysland, interview
by author, 21 February 2001, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS In-
put for 2000 Annual Command History,” 22 February 2001, HRDC.
47. 1995 USAFACFS ACH, 130–31.
48. 1995 USAFACFS ACH, 130; Fact Sheet, “ATACMS,” 1998,
HRDC; Interview with Major Jay Hilliard, TSM RAMS, 5 February 1999,
HRDC; Report (Summary), Director of Operational Testing and Evalua-
tion, “ATACMS Block IA,” 12 February 1999, HRDC; Briefing, “Preci-
sion Guided Missiles and Rocket Review,” 15 April 2008, ATACMS File,
HRDC; “Field Artillery and Mortar Systems,” Army, October 2005, 326–
36; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual His-
tory,” 12 April 2012, HRDC; Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS Deputy
Director, interview by author, 10 February 2011, HRDC. See 2010 USA-
FAS AH for history of ATACMS from the early 1990s to 2009, 105–110.
49. Report (Summary), “ATACMS Block IA,” 12 February 1999.
50. Integrated Logistics Support Plan for the BAT Submunition, July
1994, 1–2, HRDC.
51. Integrated Logistics Support Plan for the BAT Submunition, July
1994, 1–2, HRDC.
52. 1994 USAFACFS ACH, 200–15; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 149–
51; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 111–13; 2012 USAFAS ACH, 97.
53. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, CFE Negotiation
on Conventional Arm Forces in Europe, 1989, 1–2, HRDC; U.S. Army,
A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond, January 1990, HRDC; Bill
Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studies Division, Directorate of Combat De-
velopments (DCD), interview by author, 23 February 1990, HRDC; U.S.
Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), Conventional Forces-Europe
Reductions, Initial Overview and the Field Artillery Perspective, 18 Sep-
tember 1989, 5–10, HRDC; USAFAS, Fighting at Parity in Post-CFE Eu-
rope, undated, HRDC; Anne W. Chapman et al., Prepare the Army for

81
War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command,
1973–1998 (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, U.S. Army Train-
ing and Doctrine Command, 1998), 155–64; John L. Romjue, American
Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History
Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996), 21–27. Note:
Twenty-two members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact signed the
Conventional Forces Europe Treaty in November 1990 after the dissolu-
tion of the Warsaw Pact and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.
54. Briefing, “Challenges for Field Artillery,” 26 April 1990, HRDC;
Draft Trends and Implications for U.S. Army’s Future AirLand Battle, 30
January 1991, 1–3, HRDC; General Carl E. Vuono, “Change, Continuity,
and the Future of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, June 1991, 6–10;
General John W. Foss, “AirLand Battle-Future,” Army, February 1991,
20; Briefing, “Fire Support and AirLand Battle Future, 12 February 1991,
HRDC; U.S. Army Modernization Plan, Volume 2, G–7; 1991 U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Annual Command History
(ACH), 6; The Army Modernization Plan, Volume I, January 1993, 2–3,
HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1995, 8, 18, HRDC;
John S. Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S. Army,
1989–2005 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army,
2011), 35, 38, 41, 44–49, 65, 93; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year
1992, 12–18; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, 42; U.S.
Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1999, Posture Statement File, 2,
4, HRDC; Statement on the Posture of the U.S. Army for Fiscal Year 1997
(Extract), 12–13, HRDC; The Army Modernization Plan, January 1993,
3; “Field Artillery Units Worldwide,” Field Artillery, December 1989,
pullout; Harry E. Rothmann, Forging A New National Military Strategy
in A Post-Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff (Carlisle
Barracks, PA, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 2–4;
Fact Sheet, “AirLand Battle Future,” 16 April 1990, HRDC; Fact Sheet,
“Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,” 15 April 1990, HRDC; Foss,
“AirLand Battle-Future,” 20–21; Briefing, “Challenges for the Field Artil-
lery,” 26 April 1990, HRDC; Briefing, “Fire Support and AirLand Battle-
Future,” 12 February 1991, HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5, AirLand
Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Airland Battle for the Strategic
Army of the 1990s and Beyond, 1 August 1991, 1, HRDC; Memorandum,
“Draft AirLand Operations Concept Paper,” undated, HRDC; 1991 TRA-
DOC ACH, 57–58; Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold
War, 24, 26.
55. Briefing, “Challenges for Field Artillery;” Draft Trends and Im-
plications for U.S. Army’s Future AirLand Battle, 1; Vuono, “Change,
Continuity, and the Future of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, 6–10;
Foss, “AirLand Battle-Future,” Army, 20; Briefing, “Challenges for the
Field Artillery,” 26 April 1990; Briefing, “Fire Support and AirLand Battle
Future, 12 February 1991; Fact Sheet, “AirLand Battle Future,” 16 April

82
1990; Fact Sheet, “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, 15 April 1990;
Briefing, “Fire Support and AirLand Battle Future, 12 February 1991;
TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5, AirLand Operations, 1 August 1991, 1; Mem-
orandum, “Draft AirLand Operations Concept Paper,” undated.
56. Colonel John W. Reitz, “A Fire Supporter’s Guide to FM 100-5,”
Field Artillery, December 1993, 10–15; Romjue, American Army Doc-
trine for the Post-Cold War, 26, 35, 37, 96–112; FM 100-5, Operations,
June 1993.
57. Fact Sheet, “AirLand Battle Future,” 16 April 1990, HRDC;
Foss, “AirLand Battle-Future,” 24; Briefing, “Challenges for the Field
Artillery,” 26 April 1990, HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, AirLand
Operations, 1 August 1991, 16–25; Reitz, “A Fire Supporter’s Guide to
FM 100-5,” 10–15; FM 100-5, Operations, 6-1–7-14; Romjue, American
Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 26.
58. Browder Willis, Deputy Director, Systems Integration and Priori-
ties Division, DCD, interview by author, 19 May 1992, HRDC; Briefing,
“Joint Precision Strike through a Gunner’s Eyes,” undated, HRDC; Mem-
orandum for Record, “Comments on Draft AirLand Operations and Joint
Precision Interdiction/Joint Precision Strike Section for Annual Historical
Review,” 21 May 1992, HRDC; Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the
Post-Cold War World, 33.
59. Information Paper, “Comments on FM 100-5 Preliminary Draft,”
undated, HRDC.
60. Information Paper, “Comments on FM 100-5 Preliminary Draft;”
Message, DA to Commander FORSCOM et al., “Joint Warfighting,” 21
July 1992, HRDC; Briefing, “How and Why the Army Shoots Deep,”
24 July 1992, HRDC; Briefing, “FM 100-5 Updated,” 14 January 1993,
HRDC.
61. A Concept for Depth and Simultaneous Attack (Draft), 28 May
1993, 1, 2, 5, 10, 11, HRDC; Major General John A. Dubia, “A Vision for
Fire Support in the 21st Century: State of the Branch, 1993,” Armed Forc-
es Journal, May 1991, 37; Memorandum for Commanding General, “Pre-
liminary Draft of FM 100-5,” 25 September 1992, HRDC; Concept Paper,
“Depth and Simultaneous Attack,” undated, HRDC; Preliminary Draft, “A
Concept for Depth and Simultaneous Attack,” 21 December 1992, HRDC;
Memorandum for Chief of Staff, “Visit to Fort Rucker,” 27–29 January
1992, HRDC; Message, Marty to Franks, “Comments on FM 100-5 Pre-
liminary Draft,” undated, HRDC; Bill Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studies
Branch, DCD, interview by author, 1 February 1993, HRDC; Briefing,
“FM 100-5 Update,” 14 January 1993, HRDC.
62. Rittenhouse, interview, 1 February 1993; Briefing, “FM 100-5
Update,” 14 January 1993, HRDC; Romjue, Army Doctrine for the Post-
Cold War, 99.
63. DA, Historical Summary for 1993, 41–42; Romjue, American
Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 112; Chapman et al., Prepare the

83
Army for War, 63; Benjamin King, Victory Starts Here: A Short 40-Year
History of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Fort Leaven-
worth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms
Center, 2013), 33–34; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 8.
64. Letter with Attachment, author to Major General Fred Marty, 10
September 2003, 59, HRDC; Briefing, “Fire Support and AirLand Bat-
tle-Future,” 12 February 91, HRDC; C. William Rittenhouse, “Operation
FireStrike,” Field Artillery, February 1991, 33–37; Rittenhouse, interview,
11 February 1991.
65. Letter with Attachment, author to Marty, 10 September 2003,
HRDC; Rittenhouse, “Operation Firestrike,” 33–37; Leighton L. Duits-
man, “Army TACMS,” Field Artillery, January–February 1991, 38–41;
Rittenhouse, interview, 11 February 1991; Briefing, “Fire Support and
AirLand Battle-Future,” 12 February 1991; Major General Fred F. Marty,
“Deep Operations,” Field Artillery, April 1993, 1–2; Reitz, “A Fire Sup-
porter’s Guide to FM 100-5,” 10–15; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 1 August
1991, 1–9; FM 100-5, Operations, 1-4–1-5; DA, Historical Summary for
Fiscal Year 1993, 42; Brown, Kevlar Legions, 93; Major Mark B. Wroth,
“Legal Mix VII: Directions for the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, De-
cember 1991, 42–43. See Romjue’s American Army Doctrine for the Post-
Cold War, 38–99, for an in-depth discussion of the 1993 writing of FM
100-5.
66. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 90, 103, 123; Romjue, American Army
Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 137; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal
Year 1992, 11–12; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, 128;
DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, 54; “Force XXI: A Revo-
lution and Evolution in Military Affairs,” ArmyLink News, 17 July 1996,
Force XXI File, HRDC; Lieutenant General Paul E. Menoher Jr., “Force
XXI: Redesigning the Army through Warfighting Experiments,” Military
Intelligence, 1996, Force XXI File, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Clyde El-
lis, “Army Training XXI,” draft article, 1–2, HRDC; TRADOC Warrior
XXI Campaign Plan (Extract), November 1995, 1–2, HRDC; TRADOC,
Warnet XXI Action Plan (Extract), January 1996, 2, HRDC; TRADOC,
Warfighter XXI Campaign Plan (Extract), 1995, 2, HRDC; Colonel David
C. White and Lieutenant Colonel Clyde W. Ellis, “Army Training XXI,”
Field Artillery, March–April 1996, 8–10; Romjue, American Doctrine
for the Post-Cold War, 138–39; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year
1994, 53; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1995, 37; Chapman, et
al., Prepare the Army for War, 64; James L. Yarrison, The Modern Louisi-
ana Maneuvers (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army,
1999), 12, 13, 24, 25, 56; 1994 TRADOC Annual Command History, 23;
Colonel Donald L.W. Kerr, “Depth and Simultaneous Attack: One Battle
Lab Helping Forge the Army’s Future,” Field Artillery, April 1993, 35;
DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, 129; King, Victory Starts
Here, 34; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 6–7.

84
 67. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 90; Romjue, American Army Doctrine
for the Post-Cold War, 73–77, 137; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal
Year 1995, 40; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1992, 11–12; DA,
Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1992, 11–12; Yarrison, The Modern
Louisiana Maneuvers, 24–25; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 8–9; 1994 U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command Annual History, 21.
68. “Fort Sill Joins Forces with Battlelab Plan,” Fort Sill Cannoneer,
24 September 1992, 1.
69. “Fort Sill Joins Forces with Battlelab Plan,” 1.
70. “Fort Sill Joins Forces with Battlelab Plan,” 1.
71. Email with Attachment, “Fires Battle Lab History 2010,” 8 April
2011, HRDC.
72. Fact Sheet, “ATCD, Korea,” 3 May 1994, HRDC; Briefing,
“Joint Precision Strike Precision,” 1994, HRDC; Captain Douglas P. Van-
gordon, DSA Battle Lab, interview by author, 10 March 1995, HRDC;
Memorandum for Director, JPSD Task Force, “Operational Input for STS
FY94 Demonstration,” 21 February 1995, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “JPSD P/
RC MRL ACTD,” 21 February 1997, HRDC; JPSD Office, P/RC MRl
OCONUS Demonstration, 1996, 5, HRDC; Memorandum for Command
Historian, “Staff Input to 1995 Annual Command History,” 25 March
1996, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Fires Battle Lab History 2010,” 8
April 2011, HRDC; Yarrison, The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers, 23.
73. Kerr, “Depth and Simultaneous Attack: One Battle Lab Helping
Forge the Army’s Future,” 35; Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab,
Horizontal Integration of Precision Strike Capabilities: Rapid Response
Initiatives, 17 June 1993, 1–2, hereafter cited as Summary Report, HRDC.
74. Summary Report, 17 June 1993, 6–8.
75. Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Extract), October 1993, iii, 1,
HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1999, 2.
76. DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, 54.
77. DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, 53; DA, Histori-
cal Summary for Fiscal Year 1995, 37; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal
Year 1999, 41; 1994 TRADOC Annual History, 17.
78. General Gordon R. Sullivan, “A New Force for a New Century,”
Army, May 1994, 26.
79. Sullivan, “A New Force for a New Century,” 26; Depth and Si-
multaneous Attack Battle Laboratory Project Summary, Force XXI, 3 May
1994, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1999, 41; Yarrison,
The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers, 57, 83.
80. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 139–
41; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993, 41; DA, Historical
Summary for Fiscal Year 1992, 12; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal
Year 1994, 53; Chapman, et al., Prepare the Army for War, 29–30; TRA-
DOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, 1 August 1994, preface,
HRDC.

85
 81. FM 3.0, Operations; B. Bielinski, Doctrine Branch, WIDD, US-
AFAS, interview by author, 20 June 1999, HRDC; B. Bielinski, interview
by author, 1 February 2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Trip Report
from Semi-Annual Army Doctrine Conference,” 26 May 1999, HRDC; B.
Bielinski, interview with attachment by author, 6 February 2001, HRDC;
Information Paper, “New Numbering System for Fire Support and Field
Artillery Manuals,” 26 June 2000, HRDC.
82. Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, “Fires: The Cutting Edge for
the 21st Century,” Field Artillery, May–June 1998, 22–23; Major Gregory
A. Palka, TF2000, interview by author, 20 March 1999, HRDC; Briefing,
“The Effects Coordination Cell,” 24 March 1999, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Ex-
perimentation Program,” 24 March 1999, HRDC.
83. “Futurists in the Field,” Missiles, Munitions, and Armor 2, 1999,
18.
84. “Futurists in the Field,” 19.
85. Message with Attachment, “ECC Info Requested,” 23 March
1999, HRDC.
86. Stricklin, “Fires: The Cutting Edge for the 21st Century,” 22–23;
Palka, interview, 30 March 1999; Briefing, “The Effects Coordination
Cell,” 24 March 1999; Fact Sheet, Future Fires Command and Control
Concept Experimentation Program,” 24 March 1999, HRDC; Baxter,
“Meeting the Future: State of the Field Artillery,” 1.
87. Briefing, “The Effects Coordination Cell,” 24 March 1999; Brief-
ing, “Future Fires Command and Control Concept Experimentation Pro-
gram,” 9 December 98, HRDC; Memorandum for Major Gregory A. Pal-
ka, “SME Review of ECC for 1998 Annual Command History,” 31 March
1999, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Future Fires Command and Control Concept
Experimentation Program,” 24 March 1999, HRDC; Message with At-
tachment, “ECC Info Requested,” 23 March 1999, HRDC; Lieutenant
Colonel Peter R. Baker, TF 2000, interview by author, 23 March 2000,
HRDC; Email with Attachment, “BL History,” 14 March 2000, HRDC.
88. Baker, interview, 23 March 2000; “Medium-weight Units to Take
Advantage of Effects-Based Operations,” Inside the Army, 10 April 2000,
6–8, HRDC.
89. Baker, interview, 23 March 2000; Email with Attachment, “Bat
Lab Input to 2000 Annual Command History,” 20 April 2001, HRDC.
90. Colonel Jerry C. Hill and Major Carl R. Trout, “Effects-Based
Fire Support Coordination and Execution,” Field Artillery, November–De-
cember 2000, 6–7; Email with Attachment, “Bat Lab Input to 2000 Annual
Command History,” 20 April 2001; Email with Attachment, “BL History,”
1 March 2002, HRDC; Major General Toney Stricklin, “State of the Field
Artillery 2000: Looking Ahead to the Objective Force,” Field Artillery,
November–December 2000, 1–3; Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) William
A. Ross, “F2C2 Experiments for Rapid Transformation to Effects-Based
Fires,” Field Artillery, November–December 2000, 16–18.

86
 91. Hill and Trout, “Effects-Based Fire Support Coordination and
Execution,” 7.
92. Hill and Trout, “Effects-Based Fire Support Coordination and
Execution,” 7.
93. Fact Sheet, “JPSD P/RC MLR ACTD,” 21 February 1997,
HRDC; Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Office, P/RC MLR OCO-
NUS Demonstration, 1996, 5, HRDC; Memorandum for Command His-
torian, “Staff Input to 1995 Annual Command History,” 25 March 1996,
HRDC; Andreas Parsch Information Paper, “Lockheed Martin MGM-140
ATACMS,” 2006, ATACMS File.
94. Email with Attachment, “Bat Lab Input to 2000 Annual Com-
mand History”, 20 Apr 01, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “Battle Lab
Input to 1998 Annual Command History,” 22 March 1999, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “TSPO History Piece,” 8 March 2000, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “BL History”, 1 March 2002, HRDC.
95. DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994, 54.
96. Memorandum with Enclosure, “Draft Operational Concept for
Field Artillery Experimentation in Task Force XXI,” 30 January 1995,
HRDC; Memorandum with Enclosures, “USAFAS Heavy Advanced Warf-
ighting Experiment Focused Dispatch Support Plan,” 7 February 1995,
HRDC; Message, Commandant USAFAS to Commander USACAC, et
al., “Establishment of Task Force 2000,” 7 September 1994, HRDC; Brig-
adier General Leo J. Baxter, “Field Artillery: Vision 2020,” Field Artillery,
December 1994, 14; Memorandum for Record, “Task Force 2000 Mission
Analysis,” 8 August 1994, HRDC; Major General John A. Dubia, “Force
XXI and the Field Artillery: State of the Branch 1994,” Field Artillery,
December 1994, 2; Memorandum for Record, “Lieutenant Colonel Jim
Carafano’s Thoughts on Adding an Organization,” 1994, HRDC; Lieuten-
ant Colonel William M. Bransford, “Fire Support and Desert Hammer VI:
The Advanced Warfighting Experiment,” Field Artillery, October 1994,
40–43.
97. Dubia, “Force XXI and the Field Artillery,” 2; Briefing, “TF
2000 Overview,” January 1996, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Focused Dispatch
Advanced Warfighting Experiment,” 23 October 1995, HRDC; Major
Vince C. Weaver Jr., “Fires in AWE Focused Dispatch: A Step Toward
Task Force XXI,” Field Artillery, March–April 1996, 38–40; Briefing,
“Fires for Force XXI,” 1995, HRDC; Major General Leo J. Baxter, “Hon-
ing the Edge: State of the Field Artillery 1997,” Field Artillery, Novem-
ber–December 1997, 1.
98. Message, “TF2000 Command History,” 7 February 1997, HRDC;
Lieutenant Colonel Theodore S. Russell Jr. and Major Harold H. Worrell
Jr., “Focus on Light Force XXI: AWE Warrior Focus,” Field Artillery,
May–June 1996, 36–39; Fact Sheet, “Warrior Focus AWE,” 23 October
1995, HRDC; Briefing, “Fires for Force XXI,” 1995; Briefing, “Task
Force 2000,” January 1996, HRDC; 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Cen-

87
ter and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History, 145–46; 2001
USAFACFS ACH, 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 89; 2003 USAFACFS
ACH, 110; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 98–99.
99. Fact Sheet, “Prairie Warrior 95 AWE,” 23 October 1995, HRDC;
Briefing, “Task Force 2000,” January 1996; Baxter, “Honing the Edge,” 1;
Message, “TF2000 Command History,” 7 February 1997; Prairie Warrior
1996, Key Fire Support Insights (Extract), taken from Executive Sum-
mary, Final Report, HRDC; Dubia, “Force XXI and the Field Artillery,”
3; Memorandum with Enclosures, “Draft Operational Concept for Field
Artillery Experimentation in Task Force XXI,” 30 January 1995, HRDC;
Memorandum with Enclosure, “Draft USAFAS Prairie Warrior 95 Ad-
vanced Warfighting Experiment Support Plan,” 10 January 1995, HRDC.
100. TF XXI Experiment Directive (Extract), undated, 1–2, HRDC;
Proposed Operational Concept for Field Artillery Experimentation in
Task Force XXI (Draft), undated, HRDC; Message, “CSA 97-05 Random
Thoughts While Running,” 30 April 1997, HRDC; Task Force XXI Final
Report, Executive Summary, October 1997, 2–3, HRDC; Colonel Thomas
R. Goedkoop and Captain Barry E. Venable, “Task Force XXI: An Over-
view,” Military Review, March–April 1997, 71; Colonel Steven A. Emi-
son, “Post Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment,” Army
Research, Development, and Acquisition, September–October 1997, 2–5;
see TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, 1 August 1994, for
background information, HRDC.
101. Baxter, “Honing the Edge,” 1.
102. Task Force XXI Final Report, Executive Summary, October
1997, 8, HRDC; Briefing, “Task Force 2000 in Support of AWE,” Febru-
ary 1998, HRDC; Baxter, “Honing the Edge,” 1; Briefing, “Force XXI,”
14 April 1997, HRDC; Dennis Steele, “Task Force XXI Advanced Warf-
ighting Experiment at NTC,” Army, May 1997, 14–22; Dennis Steele,
“AWE: Testing Soldiers and Equipment,” Army, June 1997, 26–38.
103. Message, “TF2000 Command History,” 7 February 1997; Ma-
jor Vince C. Weaver, “Fires in AWE Focused Dispatch: A Step Toward
Task Force XXI,” Field Artillery, March–April 1996, 38–40; Briefing,
“Force XXI,” undated; Lieutenant Colonel Theodore S. Russell Jr. and
Major Harold H. Worrell Jr., “Focus on Light Force XXI: AWE Warrior
Focus,” Field Artillery, May–June 1996, 36–39; Task Force XXI Final
Report, Executive Summary, October 1997, 2–3, HRDC; Goedkoop and
Venable, “Task Force XXI: An Overview,” 71; “TRADOC Commander
Reveals Some Results of Recent Force XXI AWE,” ArmyLink News, 8
October 1997, Force XXI File, HRDC; Hanna, “Task Force XXI;” U.S.
Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, 24–25, Posture Statement
File, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1996, 4.
104. U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, 24–25, Pos-
ture Statement File, HRDC; Letter with Attachment, author to Marty, 10
September 2003, HRDC; Brown, Kevlar Legions, 91–97; DA, Historical

88
Summary for Fiscal Year 1996, 63–64; Anne W. Chapman, et al., Prepare
the Army for War, 31.
105. U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, 24–25;
Memorandum, “Division XXI AWE and First Digital Division Fielding
Taskers,” 22 April 1997, HRDC; Briefing, “Improving the Interim Di-
vision Design: Adjusting for Task Force XXI,” undated, HRDC; Brief-
ing, “Fires: The Cutting Edge,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “Task Force
2000 in Support of AWE,” February 1998; Major Henry J. Hester Jr. and
Major Dean Mengel, Task Force 2000, interview by author, 30 January
1998, HRDC; Memorandum for Mengel, “1997 USAFACFS ACH,” 12
February 1998, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Division XXI AWE Insights,” un-
dated, in Senior Fire Support Conference Packet, 9–13 February 1998,
HRDC; “Division AWE Will Be Basis for 21st Century Fighting Force,”
ArmyLink News, 28 October 1997, Force XXI File, HRDC; Director, Op-
erational Test and Evaluation, Fiscal Year 1997 Annual Report (Extract),
“Battlefield Digitization: Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Be-
low, and the Tactical Internet,” Force XXI File, HRDC; Brown, Kevlar
Legions, 103; U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, 24–25,
Posture Statement File, HRDC; Dennis Steele, “Dust, Digits, and Steel:
Launching Warfare’s Future,” Army, June 2001, 21–36; “4th ID Shows
Info Superiority at DCX,” ArmyLink News, 17 April 2001, HRDC; “Army
Demonstrated Information Superiority at DDCX,” TRADOC News Ser-
vice, 16 April 2001, HRDC; “First Digitized Division to be Challenged
at NTC Exercise,” ArmyLink News, 19 March 2001, HRDC; Government
Accountability Office Report, “Army Needs to Update Fielding Plan for
First Digitized Corps,” July 2000, 3. Note that the Army designated the
2d Armored Division as the experimental force for the AWEs in 1994 and
later designated the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) as the experimen-
tal force at Fort Hood, Texas, and that the Army fielded its first digitized
division, the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division, in 2001.
106. Briefing, “Task Force 2000 in support of AWE,” February 1998;
Fact Sheet, “Division XXI AWE, 1 July 1996, HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet
525-71, Force XXI Division Operations Concept, 13 May 1996, HRDC;
Briefing, “Improving the Interim Division Design,” undated, HRDC;
Study Plan for Division XXI (Extract), October 1996, 1, HRDC; Briefing,
“Proposed Force XXI Division Design, 26 February 1996, HRDC; Brief-
ing, “Force XXI,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “Organization Charts Di-
vision XXI,” 1997, HRDC; Briefing, “Army’s First Digitized Division,”
undated, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Joint Venture Video teleconference,”
27 May 1997, HRDC; Colonel David P. Valcourt and Lieutenant Colonel
Lester C. Jauron, “Division Redesign: Fires for Force XXI,” Field Artil-
lery, July–August 1997, 24; Memorandum, “Division XXI AWE and First
Digital Division Fielding Taskers,” 22 April 1997; Briefing, “Improving
the Interim Division Design: Adjusting for Task Force XXI,” undated,
HRDC; Briefing, “Force XXI,” 29 April 1997; Mengel, interview, 30 Jan-

89
uary 1998; Memorandum for Mengel, “1997 USAFACFS ACH,” 19 Feb-
ruary 1998, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Division XXI AWE Insights,” undated,
in Senior Fire Support Conference Packet, 9–11 February 1998, HRDC.
107. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December
2003, HRDC; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 82–83; U.S. Army Posture State-
ment for Fiscal Year 2001, 25, Posture Statement File, HRDC. See FN 40
in the 2000 USAFACFS ACH for a complete listing of documents.
108. TRADOC System Manager (TSM), All Source Analysis Sys-
tem, Newsletter, October 2000, HRDC; TSM, All Source Analysis Sys-
tem, Newsletter, January 2001, HRDC; U.S. Army Posture Statement for
Fiscal Year 2001, 25; Joint Venture, TRADOC DCD Newsletter, “JCF
AWE,” HRDC.
109. Lieutenant Colonel James J. Carafano, ed., “Strike Force Op-
erational Concept Paper,” Soldiers are Our Credentials: The Collected
Works and Select Papers of the Thirty-third Chief of Staff of the Army
(Washington, D.C.: The US Army Center of Military History, 2000), 254,
256.
110. Dennis Steele, “The Army XXI Heavy Division: First Blueprint
of the Future Army,” Army, July 1998, 33–35; Briefing (Extract), “Army
Experimentation Campaign Plan,” 1998, HRDC; Annual Report (Extract),
“Army After Next,” 7 December 1998, ii, HRDC; Memorandum for Lieu-
tenant Colonel Charles Hernandez, TF2000, “SME Review of AECP for
1998 Annual Command History,” 31 March 1999, HRDC; DARPA Study,
1 May 1997, HRDC.
111. Memorandum for Hernandez, “SME Review of AECP for 1998
Annual Command History,” 31 March 1999, HRDC; Information Paper,
“U.S. Army Strike Force,” 4 March 1999, HRDC; TRADOC News Ser-
vice, “Army Eyes New Swift Deployment Headquarters,” 4 March 1999,
HRDC; Jim Caldwell, “Strike Force to be Army’s ‘Futures’ Test Bed,”
Army News Service, 2 March 1999; Major Wayne A. Green, “Interim
Strike Force Headquarters Digital LNO Nodes: Force Tailoring Enablers,”
School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, May 1999, 1.
112. Briefing (Extract), “Army Experimentation Funding Campaign
Plan,” 1998, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hernandez, TF2000, in-
terview by author, 2 March 1999, HRDC; Major Christopher Mack and
Major William M. Raymond Jr., “Strike Force: Fires for the Future,” Field
Artillery, November–December 1998, 16–17.
113. Mack and Raymond, “Strike Force,” 16–17; Information Paper,
“U.S. Army Strike Force,” 2 March 1999, HRDC; “Strike Force Army’s
‘Future’ Test Bed,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 4 March 1999, 2a; “The Strike
Force Operational Concept,” 254.
114. Message, “Army Experimental Campaign Plan, 29 September
1998, HRDC; Jason Sherman, “Lighten Up,” Armed Forces Journal Inter-
national, October 1998, 57–59.

90
 115. Sherman, “Lighten Up,” 57–59; Memorandum for Hernandez,
“SME Review of AECP for 1998 Annual Command History,” 31 March
1999.
116. “The Strike Force Operational Concept Paper,” 254–63; “The
Army After Next: Revolutionary Transformation,” Soldiers are Our Cre-
dentials, 270–73.
117. Message with Attachment, “Strike Force Effects Coordination
Node, 25 March 1999, HRDC; “Schoolhouse Developing ‘Effects’ Head-
quarters,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 4 March 1999, 2a; Fact Sheet, “Strike
Force Headquarters Effects Coordination Node Development: A Depth
and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab and Task Force 2;” “The Army Af-
ter Next: Revolutionary Transformation,” Soldiers are Our Credentials,
270–73; Issue Submission Force, undated, HRDC.
118. Mack and Raymond, “Strike Force,” 18–19.
119. Briefing, “Digitization: A Warfighter’s Perspective, 20 June
2001, HRDC; Major Michael Rauhut, “Put Me In, Coach: From Experi-
mental Force to Deployable Unit, The Transition of the 4th Infantry Divi-
sion (Mechanized),” Army, June 2002, 65–70; Message with Attachment,
“Strike Force Effects Coordination Node, 25 March 1999, HRDC; “Army
Eyes New Swift Deployment Headquarters,” TRADOC News Service, 4
March 1999, HRDC; Colonel Jerry Hill, DAC Futures Director, interview
by author, 22 February 2000, HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fis-
cal Year 2000, 41–42; Memorandum for Lieutenant Colonel Charles Her-
nandez, “SME review of AECP for 1998 Annual Command History,” 31
March 1999; Message, “Army Experimental Campaign Plan,” 29 Septem-
ber 98, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Army Experimental Funding Cam-
paign Plan,” 1998, HRDC; Briefing, “Division Capstone Experimental
Campaign Plan Video Teleconference,” 29 February 1998, HRDC; Steele,
“The Army XXI Heavy Division: First Blueprint of the Future Army,”
34; Memorandum for Record, “1st Quarter Significant Activities for Ma-
jor Raymond,” 12 January 1999, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “1st
Quarter FY99 Significant Activities,” 19 January 1999, HRDC; Memoran-
dum for Assistant Commandant, “Third quarter Significant Activities,” 31
March 1999, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Ewing, TF2000, interview
by author, 27 March 2000, HRDC; Memorandum for Lieutenant Colonel
Charles Hernandez, “SME Review of AECP for 1998 Annual Command
History, 31 March 1999; Message, “Army Experimental Campaign Plan,”
29 September 1998, HRDC; Briefing, “Division Capstone Exercise,” 16
February 1999, HRDC; Briefing, “Army Experimental Campaign Plan
Video Teleconference, 29 February 1998, HRDC; Study Plan for the Divi-
sion Capstone Exercise (Extract), January 2000, 2, HRDC.
120. “4th ID Shows Info Superiority at DCX,” ArmyLink News, 17
April 2001, HRDC.
121. “4th ID Shows Info Superiority at DCX,” ArmyLink News;
“Army Demonstrates Information Superiority at DCX,” TRADOC News

91
Service, 16 April 2001; “First Digitized Division to be Challenged at NTC
Exercise,” ArmyLink News, 19 March 2001; “Division Capstone Exercise
II,” TRADOC Public Affairs Office, undated; Email, “DCX,” 11 March
2002, HRDC; Briefing, “Digitization: A Warfighter’s Perspective,” 20 June
2001, HRDC; Message with Attachment, “Strike Force Effects Coordina-
tion Node,” 25 March 1999, HRDC; “Army Eyes New Swift Deployment
Headquarters,” TRADOC News Service, 4 March 1999, HRDC; Colonel
Jerry Hill, DAC Futures Director, interview by author, 22 February 2000,
HRDC; DA, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 2000, 41–42; Memoran-
dum for Hernandez, “SME review of AECP for 1998 Annual Command
History,” 31 March 1999; Message “Army Experimental Campaign Plan,”
29 September 1998, HRDC; Briefing, “Division Capstone Experimental
Campaign Plan Video Teleconference, 29 February 1998, HRDC; Mem-
orandum for Record, “1st Quarter Significant Activities for Major Ray-
mond,” 12 January 1999, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “1st Quarter
FY99 Significant Activities,” 19 January 1999, HRDC; Memorandum for
Assistant Commandant, “Third quarter Significant Activities,” 31 March
1999, HRDC; Ewing, interview, 27 March 2000; Patrecia S. Hollis, “Digi-
tizing the Army for the Objective Force,” Field Artillery, March–April
2002, 2–4.

92
 Chapter 3

Transforming the Force

As the sweeping Force XXI and Army After Next efforts to

implement the lessons of the Gulf War and carry the Army and the
Field Artillery into the 21st Century began unfolding, the Army’s
modernization priorities suddenly shifted. Called Transformation of
the Army, this new course proposed to create medium forces with
the lethality of the heavy forces, the strategic mobility of the light
forces, and the ability to exploit the Information Age battlefields
of the 21st Century. The centerpiece of the modernization effort
focused on developing the self-contained modular brigade combat
team and introducing Future Combat Systems made up of light-
weight, networked weapon platforms.

The Beginnings
During the latter years of the 1990s, a crisis erupted in Kosovo.
To provide additional support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion’s Operation Allied Force actions against the former Yugoslavi-
an government during the unrest in Kosovo, General Wesley Clark,
the 1997–2000 Supreme Allied Commander Europe of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, decided in March 1999 to deploy Task
Force Hawk from Germany to Kosovo. Composed primarily of AH-
64A Apache helicopters, the task force had the mission of augment-
ing the ongoing air campaign that was employing Air Force assets.
The effort was not going well because poor weather hampered fly-
ing. On 4 April 1999, a Pentagon official announced the task force’s
deployment, indicating that it would be on the ground in Macedo-
nia within eight days. Eighteen days and 475 C-17 aircraft sorties
later, the task force had 51 Apache helicopters and Multiple Launch
Rocket System M270 launchers in place in Macedonia and was
mission-capable. Because the routes from Macedonia into Kosovo
were restricted by mountainous terrain and because the Serbs had
strengthened their air defenses there anticipating an attack, heavy
field artillery suppressive fires would be required to get the aviators

93
through. While such fires would risk substantial politically unac-
ceptable collateral damage, flying without them would entail risk
and produce an intolerable number of friendly casualties. As the
weather cleared, fixed-wing bombing efforts picked up. Meanwhile,
cooperation with the Kosovo Liberation Army produced better tar-
get information. Target acquisition assets deployed with Task Force
Hawk generated targets more quickly than the airmen could attack
them. However, Serbian resistance was eroding, making ground
combat unwarranted. As a result, Apache missions with their associ-
ated risks did not prove necessary.1
The failure to employ the Apaches and the length of time re-
quired to get the task force into theater prompted the Army’s critics
to speak out. They challenged the Army’s relevance in light of the
air campaign success and portrayed the Force XXI modernization
effort as being too slow and deliberate. Meanwhile, the Quadren-
nial Defense Review characterized the modernization effort as being
too limited in scope. Pre-positioning material configured unit sets
and enhancements in sea and airlift boosted strategic mobility, but
nothing had been done to alter the weight and size of the Army’s
equipment. The Army’s near-term approach to strategic mobility
had been to move the heavy forces more rapidly and make the light
forces more lethal while the long-term goal envisioned making the
heavy forces platforms lighter. Meanwhile, General Dennis J. Re-
imer, Chief of Staff of the Army, initiated a promising Strike Force
experiment with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment to capitalize on
advanced information technologies and integrating assets from the
heavy, light, and sustainment forces. However, these efforts did not
address the weight of the heavy forces, which relied on the 72-ton
M-1 Abrams tank and the 55-ton Crusader 155-millimeter self-pro-
pelled howitzer that was under development.2
When he became the chief of staff of the Army in mid-1999,
General Eric K. Shinseki espoused General Reimer’s modern-
ization vision that he had helped fashion as vice chief of staff of
the Army. At the same time, he faced criticism about Task Force
Hawk’s slow deployment and from the Quadrennial Defense Re-
view, which advocated more comprehensive modernization than
General Reimer had initiated. This forced General Shinseki to ad-

94
dress the deficiencies clearly manifested by the task force. In June
1999, he explained that the Army aspired to be the most respected
and most feared ground force to those who threatened United States
vital interests. This required the Army to improve its strategic re-
sponsiveness, develop a clear long-term strategy to improve op-
erational jointness, implement Joint Vision 2010 goals (centered
on achieving dominance across the spectrum of military operations
and as the US Army’s conceptual template for future joint warfight-
ing), and produce leaders for joint warfighting. The Army also had
to integrate the active and reserve components completely; staff its
combat units; and provide for the well-being of its soldiers, civil-
ians, and family members.3
Although he recognized the importance of each goal, General
Shinseki faced the imperative of improving strategic responsiveness
to mitigate the adverse fallout from Task Force Hawk. From the
general’s perspective, the world situation demanded a strategically
responsive Army capable of operating throughout the range of con-
flict. Specifically, it required more versatile, lethal, and survivable
forces than ever before. It had to have early entry forces capable
of operating jointly without access to fixed forward bases and the
power to slug it out and win campaigns decisively. Shinseki noted,
“At this point in our march through history, our heavy forces are too
heavy and our light forces lack staying power. Heavy forces must be
more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logisti-
cal footprint, and light forces must be more lethal, survivable, and
tactically mobile.”4
Over the next several months, General Shinseki refined his
vision—called the Transformation of the Army and sometimes re-
ferred to as the Army Transformation, the name of the effort initi-
ated by General Reimer. In August 1999, General Shinseki’s Trans-
formation included developing lighter, more deployable forces and
equipment as well as standing up two Initial Brigade Combat Teams
at Fort Lewis, Washington, to serve as a test bed for new ideas, force
structure, weapons, and equipment. A major element of the Initial
Brigade Combat Team effort would be to test off-the-shelf tracked
and wheeled vehicles that appeared to offer the desired characteris-
tics; this would give the transformation a quick start.5

95
 Along with the Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, the gen-
eral wanted to convert the Army into a more dominant and strategi-
cally responsive force and outlined his ideas to achieve this.6 “To
this end,” he told the attendees of the 45th Annual Meeting of the
Association of the United States Army on 12 October 1999, “we will
begin immediately to turn the entire Army into a full spectrum force
which is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on
the spectrum of operations.”7 As the Director of the Transformation
Axis at Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command,
Fort Monroe, Virginia, Colonel Joseph Rodriguez, and the Director
of the Battle Laboratory Integration, Technology, and Concepts at
the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Colonel Michael K.
Mahaffey, noted in December 1999 that General Shinseki desired
lighter heavy forces and heavier light forces and wanted to erase
the distinction between them.8 This involved building a totally new
force structure around combat systems with the survivability of the
Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle but the strategic mo-
bility of light systems so that an independent combat brigade could
deploy anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division within 120
hours, and five divisions within 30 days.9
From Shinseki’s perspective, the Army had a bifurcated force.
It possessed equipment, such as the Abrams tank and Bradley fight-
ing vehicle, and divisions that had been designed for the Cold War
and European combat against the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat but
could not go everywhere and had light forces that lacked the lethal-
ity or survivability to be placed in the middle of a high-intensity
conflict. In view of combat and contingency operations in the 1990s,
the Army needed a totally new force structure to handle future wars
with survivable but deployable combat systems.10
The Transformation of the Army represented an abrupt change
in the trajectory that modernization had been travelling for 20 years;
it abandoned the emphasis on heavy and light divisions with their
respective equipment and weapon systems. By the fall of 1999, Gen-
eral Shinseki had devised a three-prong developmental program.
The first Legacy Force consisted of digitizing existing systems, such
as the Bradley fighting vehicle and Abrams tank, to enhance situ-
ational awareness and introducing the Crusader 155-millimeter self-

96
propelled howitzer and the Comanche helicopter. The Interim Force
would provide crossover capabilities between the Legacy Force and
the Objective Force, build and deploy brigade-sized units of inter-
mediate weight-equipped weapons and equipment with the most ad-
vanced information technologies that were available, and revolve
around the Stryker Brigade Combat Team composed of medium-
weight vehicles. The Objective Force reflected a vision of future
warfare that would center on technologies yet to be developed, be
built around the Future Combat System, a vehicle platform with dif-
ferent variants, consist of readily deployable forces, and support the
full spectrum of conflict. Of the three prongs, the Interim Force and
the Objective Force received the most attention and occupied the
focal point of modernization.11
General Shinseki launched Transformation with the Initial
Force that would pave the way for the Interim Force. Fielded be-
tween 2000 and 2003, the Initial Force would be composed of two
Initial Brigade Combat Teams at Fort Lewis that would be the proto-
types for others to follow and would be equipped with off-the-shelf
equipment and vehicles. Some equipment already in the Army’s
inventory would be adapted to meet existing requirements. The
initial brigades also would be retrofitted with the Interim Armored
Vehicle, a medium-weight armored vehicle, when it was fielded to
become part of the Interim Force.12 As US Army Training and Doc-
trine Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments,

Figure 3: Crusader self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer.

Source: US Army photo by Boyd L. Dastrup.

97
Major General Daniel R. Zanini explained in November 1999 that
the Army planned to equip the Interim Force with Interim Armored
Vehicles between 2003 and 2010. Next, the Army would introduce
the Objective Force with breakthrough technologies beginning in
2008, with complete conversion around 2032.13
The Army pointed out that the three prongs would be paral-
lel and complementary but distinct for about a decade.14 At a No-
vember 2000 briefing, General Shinseki explained that the Army
had started work on the Initial Force late in 1999. Concurrent with
this, the Army set out to modernize and recapitalize select current
capabilities in the Legacy Force that was composed of heavy and
light forces and was organized and equipped during the Cold War.
Modernizing centered on developing new systems with improved
warfighting capabilities. Additionally, the intent was to recapital-
ize by restoring aging fielded systems to a like-new condition and
simultaneously adding improvements, such as advanced informa-
tion technology, to address capability shortcomings. As General
Shinseki noted, modernizing and recapitalizing the Legacy Force
would extend Army capabilities into the future and guarantee near-
term fighting capabilities. From the general’s perspective, the March
2001 Division Capstone Exercise Phase I at the National Training
Center, Fort Irwin, California, validated the Legacy Force effort.15
Other Army officers shared the same conclusions about the
exercise. Digitizing the Legacy Force permitted soldiers to move
over battlespace that was larger than the Army of Excellence’s bat-
tlespace of the 1990s and allowed officers to leverage information.
In 21 April 2001 comments about digitization, the Commander of
the 4th Infantry Division artillery, Colonel Ben Allen, noted that
digital command and control systems provided situational aware-
ness because the division always knew where it was in relation to
the enemy and could exploit that information. Ultimately, the exer-
cise illustrated the importance of information dominance furnished
by command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance systems as well as their prominent
role in the Transformation of the Army.16
For the Field Artillery School, the Division Capstone Exercise
Phase I strengthened the Field Artillery’s role in the Legacy Force.

98
In the November–December 2001 Field Artillery, Brigadier Gen-
eral William F. Engel, who was the school’s Assistant Commandant
from 1999 to 2001, noted the Legacy Force’s dependence on fire
support and the importance of fielding the next-generation Crusader
self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer under development and the
Multiple Launch Rocket System M270A1 launcher under develop-
ment to Legacy Force units to complement the M109A6 (Paladin)
self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer.17
As the Army worked to digitize the Legacy Force, the Interim
Armored Vehicle fielding would initiate phase two (Interim Force)
of transformation that would culminate when the last Interim Bri-
gade Combat Team was fully manned, equipped, and trained. While
Objective Force scientific and technological research and develop-
ment would continue, the two Initial Brigade Combat Teams would
be retrofitted with Interim Armored Vehicles to become Interim Bri-
gade Combat Teams; they would join four Interim Brigade Com-
bat Teams, including an Army National Guard brigade. The Inter-
im Force would bridge the gap between the Legacy Force and the
Objective Force. These six Interim Brigades would complement
the Legacy Force and maximize lethality and survivability while
increasing tactical, operational, and strategic maneuver; they also
could be transported anywhere in the world within 96 hours and
complement light or mechanized forces in a major regional contin-
gency operation.18
For the Field Artillery, the Initial and Interim Brigade Combat
Teams’ organization revealed a shocking ambivalence about the fu-
ture role of fire support. Although field artillery was not included in
the working draft organization of the Initial Brigade Combat Team,
designers conceded its requirement and projected the need to procure
an Interim Armored Vehicle-based self-propelled 155-millimeter
howitzer for the team sometime in the near future. During a Decem-
ber 1999 briefing at the Pentagon, US Army Training and Doctrine
Command representatives pointed out that they did not know ex-
actly what type of field artillery would be a part of the brigade in
the future. For the present, the Initial Brigade Combat Team would
not have any field artillery, because existing weapons systems were
too heavy and lacked strategic deployability. Leaving field artillery

99
out introduced risk, because the brigade’s organic mortars simply
lacked the ability to handle indirect fire support requirements.19
Analysis by the Field Artillery School highlighted the Initial
Brigade Combat Team’s fire support deficiency and strengthened ar-
guments for including fire support in the initial brigade. In December
1999, the school pointed out in stark terms that the brigade would be
vulnerable to counterfire and unacceptable high casualties without
organic fire support beyond mortars. Based on this scrutiny, the US
Army Training and Doctrine Command revamped fire support in the
Initial and Interim Brigade Combat Teams in January 2000. It made
fire support teams and sections organic to the brigades, created a
Fires and Effects Coordination Cell to coordinate fire support, and
added target acquisition radars. For weapons, the command includ-
ed six deployable High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems M142
launchers, which were basically a small Multiple Launch Rocket
System that shot six rockets rather than 12 in the Initial Brigade, as
well as 18 Interim Armored Vehicle-based self-propelled 155-mil-
limeter howitzers in the Interim Brigade. According to the school,
the proposed fire support organization would increase the volume
of fire, provide close support, furnish proactive and reactive coun-
terfire, and deliver shoot-and-scoot capabilities without sacrificing
strategic and operational mobility.20
Placing the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System in the Ini-
tial Brigade Combat Team, however, failed to diminish the risk. As
of February 2000, the Army had only four High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System prototypes—three at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and
one at a factory in Dallas—and did not anticipate receiving the first
production systems until 2002 at the earliest. For the near term, the
Initial Brigade Combat Team would not have any fire support. To
address this unacceptable situation, the Field Artillery School pro-
posed substituting the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer for the
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. General Shinseki concurred.
On 3 March 2000, he resolved to use the M198 because of the deci-
sion to use off-the-shelf equipment if possible and because of the
pressing requirement for organic fire support in the Initial Brigade.
As outlined in April 2000, the M198 battalion in the Initial Brigade
Combat Team would consist of three firing batteries of six howitzers

100
each for a total of 18 howitzers in the battalion, a headquarters and
headquarters battery, a target acquisition platoon of Firefinder AN/
TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars, and a medical platoon.21
Eventually, the Army planned to replace the M198 with mod-
ern technology. Although the Army still maintained that an Interim
Armored Vehicle-based self-propelled howitzer would be the ideal
for the Interim Force, the Army opted to replace the M198 with the
lightweight towed 155-millimeter howitzer (type classified as the
M777), a joint developmental program with the US Marine Corps.
The imperative to have fire support in the Interim Brigade com-
pelled the Army to reverse its earlier rejection of the M777 because
it lacked the agility of a self-propelled howitzer and was not de-
signed to fit on a C-130 aircraft with its prime mover. Yet, employ-
ing the M777 would be consistent with the Army’s desire to employ
off-the-shelf or near-off-the-shelf equipment and would facilitate
a transition to the Interim Armored Vehicle-based 155-millimeter
self-propelled howitzer. When it was fielded, the Interim Armored
Vehicle-based howitzer would replace the M777; the new weapon
would possess the mobility and survivability equal to the maneuver
force and would provide the lethality, precision engagement, and
extended range to furnish responsive and accurate fires throughout
the battlespace.22
While the Field Artillery School pushed the fire support im-
perative with the M198 and M777, the Army stood up its first Initial
Brigade Combat Team. Starting in April 2001, the 3d Brigade, 2d
Infantry Division converted to the Initial Brigade Combat Team de-
sign and achieved initial operational capability in December 2001.
Although it had been constituted from a traditional light brigade, the
3d Brigade demonstrated warfighting competency, the ability to per-
form as a unit, and the basic soundness of the initial brigade concept
during testing in September 2001.23
Subsequently, the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division trans-
formed to the Initial Brigade Combat Team design—with initial op-
erational capability in December 2002. Both brigades trained using
combat vehicles on loan from Canada and were scheduled to adopt
Interim Armored Vehicles in the near future to make them Interim
Brigade Combat Teams. Major General James M. Dubik, US Army

101
Training and Doctrine Command Deputy Commanding General for
Transformation, explained that the Initial Brigade Combat Teams
represented a short-term goal and the first step in transforming the
Army to make it more deployable without losing survivability. The
second step centered on forming Interim Brigade Combat Teams.24
As work on the Initial Brigade Combat Teams moved forward,
the Interim Brigade Combat Team began taking shape in 2000. The
brigade would need to participate in the full spectrum of conflict
ranging from a major theater war to small scale contingency in an
urban/close terrain setting and have core capabilities of high tactical
mobility and robust dismounted assault. Given these requirements,
the Army planned to organize it as a combined arms, self-contained,
mounted infantry organization with the ability to reach throughout
the battlespace as required. Major organic sub-elements would in-
clude three motorized, combined arms infantry battalions with or-
ganic mortar companies; a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition squadron; an anti-tank company; a field artillery battal-
ion of three firing batteries, a target acquisition platoon, a headquar-
ters and headquarters battery, and a meteorological section; a survey
company; a signal company; and a brigade headquarters and head-
quarters company.25
This notional design would help ensure responsive and pro-
active lethal and nonlethal fires. To accomplish this, the Interim
Brigade Combat Team’s field artillery would be outfitted with the
latest technology. Because the Interim Armored Vehicle-based self-
propelled 155-millimeter howitzer would not be available, the field
artillery battalion would have 12 M198s divided into three batteries
of four howitzers each. Plans were to use the M777 to replace the
M198 in 2005, organized into a battalion of three batteries of six
cannons each for a total of 18 in the battalion, and would be replaced
by the Interim Armored Vehicle-based howitzer in the near future.
These weapon systems, especially the self-propelled howitzer, and
other field artillery systems would possess mobility and survivabil-
ity that would be equal to the maneuver force and furnish lethal,
precision fires.26
To ensure effects coordination and precision fires for the Initial
and Interim Brigade Combat Teams and the Interim Division under

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development, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command made
the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell central to the Field Artil-
lery’s fire support role. This represented a significant break from
the existing fire support organization. At the brigade level, the cell
would perform the traditional functions of the fire support element;
obtain guidance from the commander about the desired effects; and
then plan, prepare, and direct the execution of the desired effects uti-
lizing organic and non-organic means. Unlike the existing fire sup-
port element, the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell would provide
expanded access to joint assets; furnish an ability to plan, coordi-
nate, and employ lethal and nonlethal effects; perform a counterfire
function; and focus on effects-based fires.27
Work on the Interim Brigade produced results by 2002. Af-
ter becoming the first Initial Brigade Combat Team in 2001, the 3d
Brigade, 2d Infantry Division received its Stryker Interim Armored
Vehicles in May 2002 to become a self-contained Interim Brigade
Combat Team. The vehicles were named after Medal of Honor win-
ners Private First Class Stuart S. Stryker, who served in World War
II, and Specialist Robert F. Stryker, who served in Vietnam. Redes-
ignated as the Stryker Brigade Combat Team in June 2002 (also
called Stryker Brigade Combat Team one), the 3d Brigade under-
went a field training exercise early in 2003. The unit trained on the
new armored vehicles; retained some “in-lieu-of” equipment; and
underwent successful squad, platoon, and company evaluations in
2003. With this, Transformation of the Army entered the second, or
Interim Force, phase.28
While work on the Interim Brigade Combat Team moved for-
ward, the Army started developing an Interim Division. As a Feb-
ruary 2001 draft organizational and operational plan outlined, the
division would provide the joint force commander with a strategi-
cally responsive, early-entry ground force that would be optimized
for offensive operations and could support operations in any opera-
tional environment, such as a major theater of war or small-scale
contingency.29 Equipped with Interim Armored Vehicles, the divi-
sion would be organized around three brigade combat teams, one
air cavalry brigade, a division artillery of three battalions of 18
M777s each and one battery of nine High Mobility Artillery Rocket

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Systems M142 launchers, one engineer regiment, and one division
maneuver sustainment brigade. Division troops would consist of
a military intelligence battalion, a signal battalion, and an air de-
fense artillery battery.30 As organized, division would be deployable
within 120 hours, capable of fighting across the full spectrum of
conflict, and normally deployed as part of a joint task force. Equally
important, the division would expand the core capabilities of the
Initial and Interim Brigades, be combat operational on arrival in
theater, have an offensive orientation, and have overmatching op-
erational and tactical mobility.31
From the perspective of the Army, the Interim Forces would
provide operational and strategic advantages. An October 2000 Army
Transformation briefing explained that the Interim Forces would
ensure combat overmatch for American forces until the Objective
Force capabilities could be fielded beginning in 2008 and would not
be an experimental force for testing concepts. They would be fully
trained and deployable and would provide warfighting capability.32
Equally important, the Interim Force would give the Army the abil-
ity to get forces on the ground quickly with the requisite combat
power to influence a potential crisis. Although the Interim Force,
including an interim armored cavalry regiment, would fill a capa-
bility gap with a highly deployable force, most of the Army would
still consist of Legacy Forces until the Army started introducing the
Objective Force in 2010.33
As a concept for the Interim Division emerged, the Army began
work on the Objective Force. The development and fielding of the
Future Combat System formed the heart of the Objective Force. The
Future Combat System would consist of agile and fast unmanned
and manned platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles and field
artillery that would be tied together by a sophisticated communi-
cations system and automation.34 After fielding the Future Combat
System during the second decade of the 21st Century, the Army
would transform its Legacy and Interim Forces into the Objective
Force over a period of several years—focused on achieving capa-
bilities rather than being platform driven as the Army had been for
years. The Objective Force would make the Army the world’s pre-
eminent land force for a broad range of missions—from support, in-
cluding homeland security, to decisive warfighting—at every point

104
on the military spectrum and would also include multi-functional
and specialized units, such as a Strike Unit of Action, consisting of
aviation, intelligence, target acquisition, and fires.35
An operational concept for fighting with the Objective Force
unfolded over a period of several months beginning in 2000 and
continuing into 2001. Although all levels of command remained
undefined, two basic conceptual echelons emerged by November
2001—Unit of Employment and Unit of Action. Comparable to a
division and above organization, a Unit of Employment would be
an offensively oriented, versatile, multi-dimensional force capable
of performing a variety of roles and missions. For example, it would
perform tasks assigned to Army of Excellence divisions and higher
echelons, link Army ground and joint air forces, and orchestrate
joint campaigns as required. Tailored to the mission, a Unit of Em-
ployment would also resource and execute combat operations; des-
ignate objectives; coordinate with multi-service, interagency, multi-
national, and non-governmental activities; and employ long-range
fires, aviation, and sustainment. The Unit of Employment would
also provide command, control, communications, computers, intel-
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as well as tactical direc-
tion to Units of Action. In addition, the Unit of Employment would
provide forces to Units of Action to augment their organic forces
based on its mission and tactical requirements and would be capable
of performing joint operations.36
A Unit of Action or Brigade Combat Team would have a fixed
organization, be the tactical formation of the Objective Force, and
be comparable to brigade and lower echelons in the Army of Excel-
lence. As outlined in the draft November 2001 TRADOC Pamphlet
525-3-91, The Objective Force, a Unit of Action would be the small-
est combined arms unit that could be committed independently. It
would close with the enemy and destroy it with integrated fire, ma-
neuver, and tactical assault. The core of the Unit of Action would be
three combined arms combat battalions. However, the modularity
and Objective Force were only concepts as late as 2003.37
As the force structure for the Objective Force began taking
shape in 2001, the Army envisaged a new operational environment.
Unlike the Army’s existing force that was designed, equipped, and

105
trained to confront an enemy that conducted highly centralized mili-
tary operations, Objective Force units would face an entirely differ-
ent operational environment in the 21st Century.38 At one end of the
spectrum of conflict, creative and adaptive opponents would employ
strategies to destroy American resolve by attacking the homeland,
killing innocent civilians, and conducting prolonged operations. At
the other end was the possibility of a major theater war. While the
enemy would still retain the ability to fight in massed formations,
American military forces could no longer depend on the enemy to
array its forces in predictable formations. The enemy would seek
advantages of weather and terrain, take sanctuary in complex ter-
rain, employ terrain masking, and protect high-payoff targets by
shielding them among non-combatants. Behind this wide spectrum
of conflict would be the information revolution and technological
advances that promised breakthroughs in surveillance and commu-
nications to create immense bases of knowledge for military plan-
ning and execution unprecedented in scope, volume, and accuracy.39
To fight successfully in the new operational environment, the
Army would have to see first, understand first, act first, and finish
decisively. To see first meant detecting, identifying, and tracking the
individual components of enemy units and preventing the enemy
from doing the same against Army forces. To understand first fo-
cused on following and anticipating the enemy’s intentions. To act
first involved initiating decisive engagement at the Army’s chosen
time and place, while to finish decisively denoted well-timed as-
saults, exploiting successes, and denying the enemy the opportunity
to regroup or to continue the fight.40
Addressing this new battlefield, Major General Michael D. Ma-
ples, who was the Commandant of the Field Artillery School from
2001 to 2003, talked about the increased requirement for true synergy
between fire support and maneuver. In the September–October 2002
Field Artillery, he wrote, “A commander may employ his maneuver
force to attain positions of tactical advantage in order to employ his
fires most effectively. In other circumstances, it may be the effects of
fires that will permit the effective maneuver of forces.”41
Tasked by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command to
serve as the center for fires and effects, the Field Artillery School

106
developed the concept of networked fires in 2002 to provide the
required synergy between the maneuver arms and fire support.42 As
explained by US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet
523-3-90, networked fires would be a triad of relevant sensors, ef-
fects capabilities, and battle command that would enable dynamic
on-demand lethal and nonlethal fires as well as effects to be applied
at the time and place of the commander’s choosing. To accomplish
this, all sensors and shooters would be linked through the battle
command system, which would permit vertical and horizontal inte-
gration and select the appropriate lethal or nonlethal effect upon re-
ceiving target information from the sensors. Ultimately, networked
fires would focus on the effects and not the platform by applying the
right delivery system or mix of systems to achieve the desired effect,
called effects-based fires.43
Adopting new indirect fire systems and munitions would facili-
tate effects-based fires. To do this, the Army would eliminate Leg-
acy Force systems, such as the M102 towed 105-millimeter howit-
zer, the M109A6 (Paladin) self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer,
the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer, and the Multiple Launch
Rocket System, from the Army’s arsenal as the new systems came
on board. Over a period of years, the total number of fire support
platforms would be reduced from 10 in the Current Force structure
to 4 in the Objective Force. When the transition had been completed
by 2032, the field artillery force would consist of the Future Com-
bat System Non-Line-of-Sight-System Cannon, the Future Combat
System Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (a rocket system), the
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the Crusader. If the
82d Airborne Division and the 101st Air Assault Division remained
unique, the school planned to keep the M119A1 towed 105-milli-
meter howitzer or replace it with a follow-on weapon system. Ad-
ditionally, the school stressed the importance of precision and smart
munitions—primarily the Excalibur Unitary munition for 155-milli-
meter howitzers, the Multiple Launch Rocket System Smart Tactical
Rocket, and the Army Tactical Missile System.44
Despite the promising future, Transformation of the Army
dealt the Field Artillery a serious blow.45 Late in 1999, the Army
terminated the Multiple Launch Rocket System Smart Tactical

107
Rocket and Army Tactical Missile System IIA programs to help
fund forming the medium weight brigades and procuring appropri-
ate weapon systems; additionally, it made the Army Tactical Mis-
sile System II the carrier for Brilliant Anti-armor submunition and
even contemplated discontinuing the Crusader because it was too
heavy and cumbersome.46
General Shinseki backed the Crusader because he liked its ca-
pabilities and its resupply vehicle, though he disliked their collec-
tive weight of more than 100 tons. Because General Shinseki want-
ed them to be an integral member of the Army’s dominant maneuver
force, the Army restructured the Crusader program in December
1999. It reduced the weight of the howitzer and its resupply vehicle
to make them more strategically deployable without losing their key
performance parameters to keep them a part of the modernizing the
Field Artillery. In other words, the Army intended to field the lighter
Crusader and the M270A1 under development to the Legacy Force
even though most of it would be composed of M109A6 howitzers
and M270 launchers.47
While digitization was a critical aspect of the transformation
effort and ensured a place for the Advanced Field Artillery Tacti-
cal Data System in the long-term, the Army and the Field Artil-
lery did not anticipate losing the Crusader as soon as they did. The
Army designated the Crusader as a Legacy to Objective Force sys-
tem based on its 2000–2001 redesign to satisfy weight concerns
that emerged in 1999; however, the debate over the system’s future
arose again in 2002.48 As some critics in the Department of Defense
suggested, the system represented a Cold War weapon and “old-
think approach to warfare” and should be eliminated as the Army
transitioned to the medium weight force. Advocates still maintained
that the Crusader had a place in the Army’s weapon inventory. In
reality, the 55-ton howitzer and its 45-ton resupply vehicle lacked
the desired strategic mobility and were more attuned to Cold War
than projected future requirements.49
In the midst of this debate, Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-
feld canceled the Crusader program on 8 May 2002. He believed
that it did not fit with the new threats of cyber war and terrorism,
desired even more nimble and mobile forces for the 21st Century,

108
and planned to transfer the savings created by its cancellation to
new technologies.50 This permitted the Department of Defense and
the Department of the Army to reallocate the funding from the ter-
minated Crusader to support the Transformation of the Army. The
extra money would be used to accelerate the development of the Fu-
ture Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon and Future Combat
System Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, which were vital aspects
of transformation; the Excalibur 155-millimeter family of precision
munitions; the precision Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System
rocket; the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System; and the M777
155-millimeter towed howitzer. The emphasis on developing such
munitions and light, mobile weapon systems reflected the lessons
learned from military operations in Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan where the accuracy and responsiveness of precision
weapons had been critical and had been impressive and where mo-
bility reigned supreme.51
As the Crusader developmental program and the proposals for
new weapon systems with strategic mobility indicated, the Transfor-

Figure 4: M109A6 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer.

Source: US Army photo by Staff Sergeant Jon Cupp.

109
mation of the Army altered the direction of field artillery moderniza-
tion. General Shinseki planned to create a modular Army equipped
with medium weight systems with strategic deployability and the
attributes of Cold War heavy armored systems. Strategically deploy-
able, survivable, and lethal field artillery systems would replace the
heavy systems fielded during the Cold War; would be the wave of
the future; and would arm new, lethal, modular organizations. A new
Field Artillery would arise that would contrast remarkably with its
Cold War ancestor.

Changing of the Guard

Upon becoming the Chief of Staff of the Army in August 2003,
General Peter J. Schoomaker likewise acknowledged the pressing
requirement to make the Army more responsive to United States
national security requirements of the 21st Century. He noted the
positive work accomplished through mid-2003, understood the im-
perative to fight the global war on terrorism, recognized the need to
accelerate transformation, and added his twist to the process.
As of 2003, the post-Cold War Army lacked the required flex-
ibility and responsiveness to meet worldwide crises. In support of
military operations during the past five years, for example, the Army
had to modify its corps and divisions by dismantling or reorganiz-
ing them for operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Philip-
pines. This often left behind forces that were essentially inoperable.
Using existing formations required time-consuming restructuring
before deploying. This difficulty coupled with the need to employ
land forces immediately with little time to reorganize caused General
Schoomaker to alter the transformation pace and direction that Gen-
eral Shinseki had started in 1999 and would take years to complete.
Schoomaker replaced the Legacy Force and the Interim Force with
the Current Force. He also replaced the Objective Force with the Fu-
ture Force and started quickening the pace of fielding select Future
Force capabilities to enhance the Current Force so that it would be
relevant and ready to conduct major combat operations across the
full spectrum of conflict. The most critical feature of Schoomaker’s
effort was reorganizing the Army’s force structure around the modu-
lar combat brigade team.52

110
 General Kevin Byrnes, commanding general of the US Army
Training and Doctrine Command, noted that in 2003, General Schoo-
maker made a significant departure from General Shinseki’s Legacy
Force, Interim Force, and Objective Force concepts. In 1999, the
Army created a leisure transformation process that ran from the Leg-
acy Force to Interim Force to the Objective Force and that would
last into the third decade of the 21st Century. Given the 1999–2001
international political scenario, this seemed to be satisfactory. The 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington
DC reaffirmed the imperative to transform and also provided a sense
of urgency. The Army had to initiate change faster than initially antic-
ipated without risking the Current Force for the Future Force. Future
capabilities had to be developed more rapidly and integrated into the
Current Force rather than at some indeterminate time in the future.53
Later in 2003, the Capabilities Development Directorate at US
Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Futures Center described
the process of implementing Schoomaker’s Current Force to Future
Force initiative. First, the Army had to identify promising capabilities
that were under development and get them to the field rapidly. For
example, unmanned aerial vehicles and robots under development
might not have the desired capabilities until 2010, but they could be
employed by current leaders to furnish improved capabilities while
the objective system was being developed. Second, the Army needed
to integrate lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operat-
ing Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and other operations into doc-
trine, organization, training, leadership, and materiel more rapidly
and also become more joint-oriented than previously.54
As it sped up the process to introduce new technology, the
Army began implementing lessons learned from recent combat op-
erations by restructuring brigades, divisions, corps, and echelons-
above corps. Revamping its main combat unit, the division, was
a high priority. Throughout most of the 20th Century, the division
served as the Army’s primary fighting organization. Formed with
a standard number of brigades or regiments and a division base of
specialty troops, the division fought battles to gain tactical advan-
tage under the command of a corps. Although its battles typically
took place over considerable space, the division’s brigades operated

111
close to each other and depended on each other for reinforcement.
Normally, the brigade had three or four combat maneuver battalions
and received its specialty support from division-level units, such as
division artillery. Even though doctrine stressed that brigade orga-
nization should be flexible, the tendency for habitual relationships
between the combat brigades and their supporting units led to de
facto fixed organizations that proved to be valuable in combat.55
Building on tactical experience from the last years of the 20th
Century and wanting more flexibility for a force projection army,
the Army abandoned the division as its primary fighting unit. Ap-
proved by the Chief of Staff of the Army in 2003, the combined
arms maneuver brigade would replace the division, including the
Interim Division under consideration, as the main combat unit. It
would be self-contained and have three variants: a heavy (armored/
mechanized) brigade, an infantry brigade, and a Stryker brigade.
These modular maneuver brigades would be approximately the size
of 2003 task-organized brigades; would be stand-alone warfight-
ing elements; would have organic maneuver, fires, reconnaissance,
and logistics subunits; and would have a fixed table of organization
and equipment. For fire support, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team
would have 16 towed 105-millimeter howitzers (the M119 until a
better towed 105-millimeter could be developed), one AN/TPQ-36
radar, four Lightweight Countermortar Radars under development,
one Profiler system that was a state-of-the-art meteorological sys-
tem, and two Improved Positioning Azimuth Systems which were
self-contained azimuth positioning systems for survey. The Heavy
(later renamed Armored) Brigade Combat Team would have 16 self-
propelled 155-millimeter howitzers (Paladin), an AN/TPQ-37 (Ver-
sion eight) radar, an AN/TPQ-36 radar, four Lightweight Counter-
mortar Radars, one Profiler, and two Improved Positioning Azimuth
Systems. Equipped with the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer
as an interim solution until the M777 towed 155-millimeter howit-
zer could be fielded, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team would com-
prise the third standard maneuver brigade.56
The Army began converting to modular Brigade Combat Teams
in 2003 with the goal of completing the conversion for the active
force and the National Guard force by 2010. The 3d Infantry Divi-

112
sion, which had just returned in September 2003 from a deployment
to Iraq, converted to the modular brigade concept and successfully
tested it in March 2004 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin,
California. Subsequently, the Army switched the 101st Airborne Di-
vision in 2004 and 10th Mountain Division in 2005 to modular bri-
gades. By the end of 2006, the Army had 44 Brigade Combat Teams
in the active force with more being formed and 28 Brigade Combat
Teams in the Army National Guard. In view of this restructuring,
Major General David Valcourt, who was the Fort Sill (Oklahoma)
Commanding General and Commandant of the Field Artillery School
from 2003 to 2005, made the formation of fires battalions for the Bri-
gade Combat Team as the Field Artillery’s first priority.57
Although forming organic fires battalions for the Brigade
Combat Team had the potential to create synergy between maneu-
ver and fire support, modularization had a negative side. By dissolv-
ing corps artillery and division artillery, modularization eliminated
senior field artillery headquarters relationships and responsibility at
the corps and division levels. Further, it assumed that the Brigade
Combat Team could provide sufficient readiness and administrative
oversight for their organic fires battalions and that the fires brigades
could function as a force field artillery headquarters. Also, the cre-
ation of a brigade combat team with its organic fires battalion placed
responsibility for fire support training on the brigade commander,
who was neither trained nor resourced to train field artillery officers
and Soldiers in their core competencies. It moved the field artillery
battalion commander to the maneuver brigade to become a staff of-
ficer as well as the fire support coordinator. This left battery com-
manders without any direct senior leadership.58
If the transformation proceeded as planned, the Army would
have four brigade combat team (initially called Units of Action) vari-
ants by 2018: the Heavy (Armored) Brigade Combat Team, the In-
fantry Brigade Combat Team, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and
the Future Combat System Brigade Combat Team with an organic
battalion of 18 Future Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight cannons
divided into three batteries of six cannons each, 60 Future Combat
System Non-Line-of-Sight Launch Systems (a rocket system), un-
manned aerial vehicles, and multi-mission radars. The Future Combat

113
System Brigade Combat Team would have fully equipped units and
advanced command and control capabilities and would be deployable
on C-130, C-17, and C-5 aircraft to provide the desired responsive-
ness, deployability, agility, and versatility to meet full-spectrum op-
erations worldwide. After all these modular brigades became opera-
tional, the Army would shift from a division-based to a brigade-based
force capable of being tailored rapidly and effectively to close with
and destroy the enemy. Each Brigade Combat Team could operate
individually or collectively under control of a division headquarters.59
As outlined in the 23 January 2004 Unit of Employment Op-
erations White Paper and refined in the 20 March 2004 Unit of
Employment White Paper, the Army meanwhile planned to create
modular headquarters for commanding the Brigade Combat Teams
by restructuring its divisions, corps, and echelons above corps. They
would be streamlined into two echelons: the Unit of Employment
(UEy) and Unit of Employment (UEx). The UEy would serve as
the theater, operational-level, land force and joint support organiza-
tion; and the UEx would function as the primary warfighting head-
quarters above the Brigade Combat Teams. Most likely commanded
by a lieutenant general, the UEy would consolidate most functions
performed by the corps and Army service component commands
into a single operational echelon and would be the primary vehicle
for Army support to the regional component commander’s area of
responsibility. Equally important, the UEy that was approved for
standing up in November 2004 would be modular with the ability to
be tailored, would command land forces in major operations, would
support the rest of the joint team, would provide army capabilities
to the combatant commander, and would tailor and support the UEx
that had been approved for standing up in September 2004.60
The Unit of Employment Operations White Paper also outlined
the UEx structure. As envisioned, the UEx would lack a fixed struc-
ture beyond its headquarters, because it would be completely modu-
lar and could be deployed as a pure headquarters without subordi-
nate units. As a result, its supporting brigades—an aviation brigade,
a battlefield sustainment brigade, a maneuver enhancement brigade,
a fires brigade, and a battlefield sustainment brigade—would be at-
tached or assigned depending on the operations. Each brigade would

114
have organic signal and sustainment capabilities. In addition, the
UEx could control a mix of Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams for different missions as well as six or more Brigade
Combat Teams in protracted stability operations. Given its modular-
ity, the UEx could adjust its organization for each operation. When
the restructuring was complete, the Army would have Brigade Com-
bat Teams and UEx and UEy units of employment to replace the
existing brigade, division, corps, and army echelons of command.61
The Army further modified the UEy and UEx in 2005. It des-
ignated the UEy as an Army-level organization with a lieutenant
general in command and the UEx as either a division- or corps-level
command under a major general or a lieutenant general depending
on its mission. As further explained late in 2005, the three-star UEx
would be organized as an operational level unit, could function as
the headquarters for a joint force land component, could provide
command and control for two or more two-star UExs, and could
function as an Army force as part of a joint force. The two-star UEx
would still be modular, would be the warfighting headquarters, and
could control up to six Maneuver Brigade Combat Teams.62
In 2006, the Army inched closer to completing work on the
UEy and UEx. During the year, the Army developed a corps design
(UEy) with a headquarters, a special troops battalion, and a tactical
command post. The design also provided for a Fires and Effects Cell
(also called a fire support cell) to integrate lethal and nonlethal fires;
provide target production; and receive, prioritize, and action subor-
dinate requests for fires and effects, among other responsibilities.
The Army never completed work on the corps design as initially
intended. In November 2007, the Chief of Staff of the Army decided
to make the corps a tactical headquarters rather than an operational
headquarters as had been the initial aim. This forced the Field Ar-
tillery School and other Army agencies to start over on the corps
design in 2008. They made it a tactical and operational organiza-
tion for command and control of major combat operation functions,
comparable to the old corps.63
Meanwhile, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command
finished the modular (UEx) division headquarters design and force
structure complete with a main command post, a tactical command

115
post, a special troops battalion, and Fires and Effects Cell that would
provide services similar to the corps fires cell. Representatives pre-
sented it to the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus,
on 2 August 2006 for review and approval. General Petraeus ap-
proved it and the US Army Training and Doctrine Command then
sent the design to Forces Command and the Army’s divisions for
staffing. The design added new capabilities, such as electronic war-
fare, psychological warfare, and information operations, to more
traditional division functions.64 In mid-2007 following intense dis-
cussions, the Army approved the division redesign complete with
maneuver enhancement, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acqui-
sition, aviation, fires, and sustainment brigades and without a divi-
sion artillery to coordinate and train subordinate field artillery bat-
talions in the Brigade Combat Teams.65
As delineated in the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, the
fires brigade played a critical role in the modular division although it
might not be stationed with the division. It would plan, prepare, ex-
ecute, and assess combined arms operations to provide close support
and precision strike for the joint force commander, the division, and
the Brigade Combat Teams. The fires brigade could be task-organized
with additional units, such as rocket and cannon battalions, depending
on the situation. Its organic units included a headquarters and head-
quarters battery, a Fires and Effects Cell for planning and executing
lethal and nonlethal effects, a support battalion for logistical support,
a signal company, a target acquisition battery with four AN/TPQ-37
Firefinder radars and two Lightweight Countermortar Radars, and
an unmanned aerial vehicle company. With its organic rocket bat-
talion—either Multiple Launch Rocket System or High Mobility Ar-
tillery Rocket System—the fires brigade could provide long-range
fires to support the division in shaping the battlespace and conducting
counterstrikes. However, the bulk of the fires from the fires brigade
would come from assigned assets. Typically, this would be two rocket
battalions and two cannon battalions. In some instances, the fires bri-
gade would reinforce the Brigade Combat Teams with fires.66
To accomplish its close support mission, the fires brigade would
normally employ a mix of cannon, rocket, and missile systems. This

116
mix provided the brigade with the ability to furnish lethal effects
while simultaneously limiting collateral damage; they also provided
precision close support, among other functions. For such effects, the
brigade would have to depend on joint fires. To eliminate this depen-
dency and gap in fire support, the Army allotted armed unmanned
aerial vehicles to provide the fires brigade with the precision organ-
ic capability to support shaping and close support operations. They
also could penetrate threat airspace during day and night operations
in all kinds of weather. As outlined in the December 2004 opera-
tional concept, the armed unmanned aerial vehicle would provide
flexible, responsive precision close support fire to destroy critical
enemy capabilities and shape subordinate unit operations. Equally
important, the fires brigade’s armed unmanned aerial vehicles would
provide flexible, responsive physical damage assessment of attack
operations and long-range target acquisition capabilities.67
The first fires brigade that was not organic to the division—stood
up on 16 December 2004—was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division
(Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas, with the 2d Battalion, 20th Field
Artillery Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System) as an organic
element. In 2004–05, the Field Artillery School anticipated a total
of 12 fires brigades in the Total Force. Although General Valcourt
consistently stated that in a perfect world each division would have
a fires brigade, circumstances determined otherwise. Force struc-
ture constraints dictated a smaller number of fires brigades than the
number of divisions. As the fires brigades were stood up, the Army
deactivated division artilleries, corps artilleries, and Army National
Guard brigade headquarters. Recognizing the importance of the fires
brigade to division commanders for training and readiness, the Army
acknowledged the need for more than initially projected in 2004–
05. The Total Army Analysis 2015 established the requirement for
three more brigades to meet the increasing demand for their services.
Funding constraints prevented the Army from getting the three ad-
ditional fires brigades, forcing it to settle for two. As of May 2011,
the Army had seven fires brigades in the active force and seven in the
reserve force for a total of 14 brigades. These supported 10 active
component divisions and eight reserve component divisions.68
Thus, during the final years of General Schoomaker’s tenure and
nearing the end of the first decade of the 21st Century, the Army had

117
moved farther down the road of transformation by outlining concrete
force structure and system acquisition plans to restructure the force
radically. Through critical restructuring actions, the Army proposed
to abandon the existing fixed division and brigade structure for divi-
sions, which had the ability to be modified as required, and discard-
ed the division as the primary combat unit for the modular Brigade
Combat Team. Modularity promised to give the Army more flexibil-
ity than previously by permitting it to task-organize without tearing
apart existing units and to organize forces for a specific mission.

Systems for Transformation

New weapons systems formed a key aspect of the Transforma-
tion of the Army. In 1999, General Shinseki initiated a plan to equip
the Interim Brigade Combat Team with a family of medium-weight
armored vehicles, called the Interim Armored Vehicle, and the Ob-
jective Force with the Future Combat System. This plan would cre-
ate medium weight weapon systems that were as mobile as the light
systems and as lethal as the heavy systems, would support power
projection, and would create an army that could dominate the Infor-
mation Age battlefield of the 21st Century.
As the centerpiece of its near-term transformation effort, the
Army needed to acquire the Interim Armored Vehicle, which would
be capable of immediate employment upon arrival in the theater of
operations and would maximize commonality. To accomplish this,
the Army hosted vehicle demonstrations in December 1999 and Jan-
uary 2000 at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Manufacturers displayed their
medium weight armored vehicles to give a sense of what was avail-
able and possible. Nine contractors exhibited 35 different systems.
Of these nine, only three manufacturers submitted tracked systems,
and the only American firm was United Defense L.P., which pro-
duced nine variants of the M113 personnel carrier and the M8 ar-
mored gun system—a light tank system that the Army had canceled
on the eve of production.69
Following up, the Army held a series of June 2000 events to
grade the performance and endurance of the 35 systems by run-
ning them through various tests to identify the most suitable one. As
Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Shenk, the Interim Armored Vehicle

118
Program Manager at the Tank-automotive & Armaments Command,
Dearborn, Michigan, explained, the Army used the tests to identify a
family of vehicles that was air transportable, was capable of imme-
diate employment upon arrival in the theater of operations, and had
the greatest degree of commonality. Other desired characteristics in-
cluded low sustainment costs, fuel economy, and maintainability.70
Deciding on the vehicle provoked a controversy. Even before
the official selection process began, General Shinseki expressed his
opinion in October 1999—indicating that he preferred a wheeled
vehicle as a solution. This challenged the cultural bias against
wheeled vehicles because the Army had favored tracks for combat
vehicles at least since World War II. Tracked vehicle proponents
feared that wheeled vehicles would be favored in the Interim Ar-
mored Vehicle competition at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Mary-
land, and argued that tracked vehicles with their low ground pres-
sure and greater traction offered better cross-country capabilities
than wheeled vehicles. In the meantime, wheeled vehicle propo-
nents pointed out that wheeled vehicles were simpler to maintain,
were more reliable, and offered speed and agility while the sup-
porters of tracked vehicles insisted that the Army would be foolish
to go with wheeled vehicles just for their speed when they were
vulnerable to getting stuck in mud and slowed down by rocks and
other terrain over which tracks would glide. Reflecting a moderate
position, Lieutenant Colonel Dana Pittard of the 3d Brigade, 2d
Infantry Division that was converting to the Initial Brigade Combat
Team organization at Fort Lewis, Washington, articulated his view
in October 2000. He espoused adopting the best vehicle—whether
it ran on wheels or tracks. Discussions through much of 2000 noted
both merits and liabilities for each type of vehicle. Likewise, initial
testing demonstrated the wheeled vehicle’s ability to travel faster
on the road and the tracked vehicle’s cross-country superiority but
failed to determine a clear winner, according to Colonel Shenk. Es-
sentially, adopting either one meant tradeoffs.71
After assessing the various candidates for its Interim Armored
Vehicle, the Army announced its decision on 17 November 2000. It
chose the Light Armored Vehicle III that was built by General Mo-
tors Defense and General Dynamics Land Systems, was already in

119
production, and was employed by the US Marine Corps, the Canadi-
an forces, the Saudi Arabian military, and the Australian army as the
Interim Armored Vehicle platform. The company would manufac-
ture its Light Armored Vehicle III in two variants: the infantry carrier
vehicle and the mobile gun system. Both would be wheeled. The
Light Armored Vehicle III would offer commonality and be the base-
line for eight additional configurations (the mortar carrier vehicle;
the anti-tank guided missile vehicle; the reconnaissance vehicle; the
fire support vehicle; the engineer squad vehicle; the commander’s
vehicle; the medical evacuation vehicle; and the nuclear, biological,
and chemical reconnaissance vehicle) to reduce the logistical bur-
den.72 Moreover, both variants could move at 60 miles per hour and
travel in convoys at 40 miles per hour to provide the Interim Brigade
Combat Team with tactical speed on the battlefield. Other benefits
included strategic mobility via a C-130, low sustainment costs, and
quiet operation that would permit stealthy movement in battle.73
A little more than two years after it selected the Light Armored
Vehicle III as the Interim Armored Vehicle, the Army saw the fruits
of its labors in 2002. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the Army
named the vehicle Stryker after two Medal of Honor recipients.74 On
12 April 2002, General Shinseki accepted the first vehicle on be-
half of the Army. Slated to be the workhorse of the Interim Brigade
Combat Team, the vehicle represented the first of 2,000 to be deliv-
ered over the next decade. The system would provide the Interim
Brigades with more firepower and protection than existing vehicles
but would be more deployable than the M2 Bradley Fighting Ve-
hicle and the M2 Abrams that were currently in the inventory.75 At
the acceptance ceremony, General Shinseki noted, “It [the Stryker]
resonates with what we expect it will give to the Army—a quick
strike capability with greater staying power.”76
Millennium Challenge 2002, a joint Army-Air Force exer-
cise, reinforced General Shinseki’s optimism by demonstrating the
Stryker’s deployability. During the July–August 2002 exercise, the
Army airlifted a company of four Strykers via C-17 from Fort Lewis
to an intermediate staging base. Then they were loaded onto C-130s
and airlifted to an airfield in the middle of the National Training
Center, Fort Irwin, California, where the Army conducted a joint
interoperability exercise with the Marine Corps. From the Army’s

120
perspective, the exercise reaffirmed the vehicle’s deployability even
though some material deficiencies were noted that required fixing.77
The vehicle was a battlefield “enabler,” according to the Army.78
Echoing this, General Shinseki remarked at the 4 September 2002
Association of the US Army meeting, “Stryker’s performance dur-
ing Millennium Challenge at the National Training Center demon-
strated the bridge for bringing together our rapidly deploying and
versatile light forces and our lethal, survivable heavy forces.”79
Additional tests buttressed General Shinseki’s observation.
During a series of operational evaluations in 2003, the Stryker dem-
onstrated its strategic mobility once again. Arrowhead Lightning I,
an operational evaluation of the Stryker vehicle and the Stryker Bri-
gade Combat Team conducted at the National Training Center, em-
ployed six Air Force National Guard C-130 aircraft to fly 16 sorties
on 1 April 2003 from the Southern California Logistics Airport to
Bicycle Lake Army Airfield, a dirt landing strip at the National Train-
ing Center, then 21 more sorties on 2 April 2003. Altogether the Air
Force National Guard transported 30 fully loaded Stryker vehicles
with their crews to participate in a 10-day operational evaluation of
the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Divi-
sion) to determine the vehicle’s operational readiness. Subsequently,
the Stryker team transported Stryker vehicles by land, air, and sea
to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, to
participate in Arrowhead Lightning II. As a part of the test, the Army
shipped 130 Stryker vehicles to the Fort Sill railhead facility; they
arrived on 26 and 27 April 2003. After loading the vehicles onto
railcars, Fort Sill and Fort Lewis personnel shipped them to Fort
Polk. Observations from this certification exercise indicated that the
Stryker vehicle and the brigade performed well and met the Army’s
criteria and along with Millennium Challenge ended any opposition
to the Light Armored Vehicle III serving as the Interim Armored Ve-
hicle.80 Subsequently, Stryker vehicles and brigades started deploy-
ing to Iraq in December 2003 in support of Operation Iraq Freedom.
Later, the Field Artillery School received six Strykers in April 2004
and November 2004 for training purposes.81
Meanwhile, work on the Future Combat System for the Objec-
tive Force moved forward with the goal of introducing leap-ahead

121
technologies and operational capabilities. To field the Future Com-
bat System, the Army and Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency launched a collaborative effort in May 2000 to define and
demonstrate the Future Combat System. The Future Combat Sys-
tem would supplant the Stryker and be the primary weapon/troop
carrying platform for the Objective Force. As the centerpiece of the
Objective Force, the Future Combat System would be a family of
vehicles with four primary functions of indirect fire, direct fire, in-
fantry carrier, and sensor; have manned and unmanned variants; and
be a system of battlefield capabilities. Ultimately, the Future Com-
bat System would make the heavy forces lighter and the light forces
more lethal, reduce logistical demands, function in the operational
environment of the future, enable the Objective Force to dominate
ground combat across the entire spectrum of operations, and en-
hance the Army’s ability to conduct decisive tactical maneuver.82
In May 2002, a vital component of the Future Combat System
program received an unexpected windfall when Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld terminated the Crusader program. He used
savings from the terminated program to accelerate development of
the Future Combat System cannon for the Objective Force.83 Out
of this development emerged a concept technology demonstration
program. United Defense and General Dynamics were the principle
contractors to examine technological possibilities, furnish a mate-
rial solution for the cannon, deliver block one capability by Fiscal
Year 2008, and develop a strategy to achieve the objective solution.
Six months later, the Army completed a study to determine the can-
non’s requirements. Then in December 2002, the Army established
a maximum range of 30 to 40 kilometers, a minimum range of 3 to
4 kilometers, and a rate of fire of 6 to 10 rounds a minute plus auto-
matic ammunition handling of all current and developmental muni-
tions, interoperability with other Future Combat System systems,
and C-130 deployability.84
Late in 2002 and into early 2003, the Army outlined various
options to field the block one Future Combat System Cannon, of-
ficially called the Future Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight Can-
non. Initially, the Army had four potential self-propelled variants—a
tracked and a wheeled 105-millimeter howitzer and a tracked and

122
a wheeled 155-millimeter howitzer. While either caliber was vi-
able and while either tracks or wheels were also viable, the Army
planned to select the best existing design features to field a demon-
stration model by October 2003 to serve as the basis of the block
one cannon.85
To meet the deadline, the Field Artillery School merged the
four variants early in 2003. Based on additional study, the school
produced one option—a 155-millimeter caliber weapon system with
a band track. Major General Michael D. Maples, who was the Com-
mandant of the Field Artillery School from 2001 to 2003, explained
the concept and the rationale for the selection on 29 January 2003.
A single piece of steel-reinforced rubber would replace the conven-
tional articulated steel tracks and thus offer increased mobility over
wheeled versions during cross-country operations, be lighter than a
wheeled variant, and meet the Future Combat System operational
requirements for highway speed. The 155-millimeter caliber also
would provide greater lethality and shoot more munition types.86
General Maples cautioned, “This. . .is not a recommendation to
make a final decision on caliber or chassis design.”87
Within a few months, contractor United Defense Industries in-
troduced and tested a cannon prototype at Yuma Proving Ground,
Arizona. The prototype featured a modified XM777 155-millime-
ter howitzer tube mounted on a platform that had been designed
by United Defense’s Ground Systems Division, a fully automated
ammunition loading system, and a magazine that held 24 100-pound
projectiles. The platform used a band-track system and was pro-
pelled by a hybrid electric diesel engine to provide improved mobil-
ity and reduced fuel consumption. In August 2003, the prototype
successfully fired its first round. By the end of October 2003, the
prototype had fired 140 rounds.88
Meanwhile in March 2003, the Army acknowledged the dif-
ficulty of designing the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon that would be
deployable in a C-130 aircraft and searched for satisfactory compro-
mises. A cannon that fully complied with the Future Combat System
operational requirements would far exceed the weight restriction of
20 tons and thus would not be C-130 deployable. In view of this, the
Army conducted numerous analyses during the rest of 2003 to find

123
a design that would meet the transportability requirements but re-
tain the desired combat requirements. Some suggested design com-
promises were to eliminate automated resupply, reduce the caliber
of the 155-millimeter tube to decrease the range capability, use a
105-millimeter tube instead, limit the armor, and deploy the cannon
with a limited amount of fuel and ammunition on board. As might be
expected, the Army found these concessions to be unsatisfactory.89
In December 2003, the Army formed a team of experts from
government and private industry to examine capability versus trans-
portability. A month later, the team reported significant shortfalls
in expected capabilities of combat platforms that could be moved
on C-130s. It became clear that some requirements had to be modi-
fied to achieve C-130 transportability.90 Recognizing the difficulty
of achieving the weight limitations, the Program Manager for Future
Combat System, Unit of Action, Brigadier General Charles Cart-
wright, stopped work on the 20-ton version in November 2004 in
favor of work on a 24-ton version.91
Meanwhile in May 2004, the Army and Field Artillery made a
key decision on the caliber of the cannon. Based on careful analysis,
they opted for a 38-caliber, 155-millimeter howitzer. The 155-mil-
limeter howitzer tube was 58 percent more effective against person-
nel targets than the 105-millimeter tube under consideration and 82
percent more effective against materiel targets than a 105-millimeter
tube. Also, the Army and Field Artillery selected the 38-caliber tube
over the longer 39-caliber tube—trading four kilometers of range
using the M549 rocket-assisted projectile to save 1,367 pounds. This
would make the cannon C-130 deployable with about 25 percent of
its basic load of ammunition and still satisfy operational requirements
for transportability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability.92
As the Army examined the transportability and caliber issues,
it restructured the Future Combat System program to meet congres-
sional guidance and get new technology to the force faster. Restruc-
turing would accelerate the most critical and promising technologies
within the program so the Army could more quickly insert Future
Combat System technology into the operational force.93 Equally im-
portant, the cannon became the lead Future Combat System manned
ground vehicle variant.94

124
 After two years of developmental work on the cannon, Con-
gress reduced funding for the Future Combat System program in
2007, prompting the Army to restructure its modernization efforts
again. It reduced the number of Future Combat System platforms
from 18 to 14 and extended the timeline for buying and fielding the
systems to stay within budget.95 As initially planned, the first Fu-
ture Combat System Brigade Combat Team would have initial op-
erational capability in 2010, with the prototype Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon being delivered in 2008. Although the fielding schedule was
still being worked on, 2007 briefings showed changes. The initial
operational capability for the first Future Combat System Brigade
Combat Team would be 2014 under the new timeline, with full op-
erational capability in 2017; the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon was still
the lead variant in the Future Combat System family of systems;
the cannon would have a common chassis with the Future Combat
System family of vehicles and have similar interoperability, mobil-
ity, and survivability characteristics; and the cannon would leverage
work done with the Crusader program.96
In 2008, Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon passed crucial milestones.
BAE Systems placed the cannon on the Future Combat System
manned ground vehicle that was the common platform for the eight
manned variants. A unique mission module would be mounted and
shown for the first time at the National Mall, Washington, D.C., in
June 2008. After final laboratory testing on the prototype, BAE de-
livered it to the Army test site in August 2008 and the Army fired
the first round on 17 September 2008. The Army continued testing
through the rest of the year and planned to receive four more pro-
totypes for testing.97 Major General Peter M. Vangjel, who was the
Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence from 2007
to 2009, commented in December 2008 about the cannon’s signifi-
cance: “It is therefore imperative that we support NLOS-C.”98
Notwithstanding this success, General Vangjel’s strong sup-
port, and the overall solid progress of the Future Combat System de-
velopment program, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced
on 6 April 2009 that he would restructure program. He intended to
accelerate select technologies to the Brigade Combat Teams and
planned to cancel the manned ground vehicle component of the pro-

125
gram with its eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on
a common chassis to replace the M1 Abrams tank, the M1 Bradley
infantry fighting vehicle, and the M109 Paladin self-propelled how-
itzer. As he explained, the manned ground vehicle program did not
adequately reflect counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat les-
sons from Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary Gates further criticized
the Future Combat System program because it did not include mine-
resistant, ambush-protected vehicles. Following Secretary Gates’s
announcement, the Department of Defense issued an acquisition
decision memorandum on 23 June 2009 that halted the Future Com-
bat System program and cancelled work on the Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon to save money.99
Work on the Future Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight
Launch System accompanied development of the Non-Line-of-
Sight Cannon. Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, who was the
Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 1997 to
1998, outlined the school’s vision of the future for fire support in
the May–June 1998 Field Artillery. Among other things, he pro-
posed an advanced fire support system that would be a family of
precision missiles. They would be capable of attacking with preci-

Figure 5: Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon. Source: US Army photo

courtesy of Tank-automotive and Armaments Command.

126
sion or loitering over the target area before attacking with precision
and would not require a large, heavy, expensive and crew-intensive
launch platform.100
Out of this vision evolved the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency NetFires technology demonstration program. Lock-
heed-Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing Corporation began work in 1998
to establish an initial concept. In 1999, the Depth and Simultaneous
Attack Battle Laboratory at Fort Sill became the US Army Training
and Doctrine Command’s proponent to give the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency and the contractor teams the information
needed to develop critical design parameters and system character-
istics. One year later in August 2000, Lockheed-Martin and Raythe-
on started fabricating the system for a Precision Attack Missile and
a Loiter Attack Missile. NetFires—later renamed the Future Combat
System Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System to avoid confusion with
Fort Sill’s Networked Fires concept—would consist of a container/
launch unit with 15 containerized missiles and an on-board com-
puter and communications system. The Non-Line-of-Sight Launch
System would deliver the Loiter Attack Missile with a range of 70
kilometers plus a loitering time of approximately 30 minutes and the
Precision Attack Missile with a maximum range of 40 kilometers.101
Over a period of several years beginning in 2001, the Non-
Line-of-Sight Launch System development program designed, fab-
ricated, tested, and demonstrated container-launched missiles that
would provide massive, responsive, precision firepower early in a
conflict. The system would be shipped in its launching container;
would require no additional launch support equipment; and could
be fired remotely from a truck, a variety of other platforms, or the
ground. The missiles would be ready to fire almost immediately—a
much faster response time and a higher potential rate of fire than
possible with current howitzers or missile launchers—and would
provide a precision non-line-of-sight capability. Equally important,
it would be one of 18 Future Combat Systems core systems and
would be organic to the Future Combat System Brigade Combat
Team in the Objective Force.102
Although development was progressing on the container/
launch unit and the missiles for operational testing in 2010 and full

127
operational capability in 2013, Congress considered terminating the
program but decided to modify acquisition. The Defense Autho-
rization Bill for Fiscal Year 2005 subsequently cut the program’s
funding by $15 million, accelerated work on the Precision Attack
Missile, and slowed work on the Loiter Attack Missile. The bill re-
tained the Loiter Attack Missile in the science and technology base
for further maturation and permitted moving the Precision Attack
Missile further into development because its technology was easier
to integrate with the Current Force than the Loiter Attack Missile.103
Following the funding modification, the Army revamped its
fielding plan with the intent to field the Precision Attack Missile and
container/launch unit by 2008. To get it to the field as soon as pos-
sible, the Army accelerated development in phases or blocks, with
prototypes developed in each one. Moving into the next phase or
block meant that the prototype had to meet specific performance
parameters. Also, as one of the first three Future Combat System
systems to be employed in the Current Force, the Non-Line-of-
Sight Launch System with the Precision Attack Missile would be
incorporated into the fires battalion of the Heavy (Armored) Brigade
Combat Team. This organization later would be transformed into
a modular brigade and finally became the Future Combat System
Brigade Combat Team in 2014.104
Notwithstanding developmental progress after 2005, the De-
partment of Defense announced an abrupt change in the Non-Line-
of-Sight Launch System. After the Precision Attack Missile failed
to hit four of six targets during a test in January–February 2010,
the Army determined fixing the system’s problems would delay the
program more than a year. Further, a review of the precision muni-
tions portfolio determined that the missile was unaffordable and
would not provide a cost-effective precision fire capability. Due
to these various factors, the Army opted to pursue other capabili-
ties to engage a moving target in all weather conditions in order
to fulfill the operational requirement defined for the Non-Line-of-
Sight Launch System. The Department of Defense concluded that
the system was no longer required. In view of this, Secretary of the
Army John H. McHugh recommended cancelling the program. The
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logis-

128
tics, Ashton Carter, approved and authorized the program cancella-
tion on 13 May 2010.105
At the beginning of the 21st Century, the Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon System and the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System prom-
ised to revolutionize the branch, give it unprecedented lethality and
tactical mobility, make it deployable for power projection, and be a
vital part of the modular force. The demise of these systems during
the first decade of the century left the branch with the less futuristic
M777 and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System—and without
the potential for medium-weight weapon systems that were critical
parts of transformation. The M777 cannon and the High Mobility
Rocket System offered strategic mobility but did not make a radical,
innovative departure from their respective predecessors, which were
the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer and the Multiple Launch
Rocket System. The Field Artillery’s future that envisioned pioneer-
ing weapon systems arming a modular force had disappeared. Mod-
ularization would go on without key field artillery systems.

129
 NOTES

1. John S. Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S.

Army 1989-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, US Army,
2011), 169–70.
2. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 170–71.
3. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 191; Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army, 23
June 1999, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC); Email
with Attachment, “CSA Expands on Presentation to AUSA in Oct,” 1 Feb-
ruary 2000, HRDC; Email, “Initial Bde-Historical Reporting,” 22 Decem-
ber 1999, HRDC; Briefing, “Transformation Campaign Plan,” 19 January
2000, HRDC; Joint Vision 2010, 1, HRDC.
4. Intent of the Chief of Staff, 23 June 1999, HRDC.
5. Email with Attachment, “Information Paper,” 6 January 2000,
HRDC; Briefing, “Transforming the World’s Best Army into a Full Spec-
trum Force . . . Strategically Responsive and Dominant,” 10–11 January
2000, HRDC; The Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational
Concept, 6 January 2000, 6, HRDC; Briefing, “Brigade Combat Team Fire
Support,” January 2000, 10, HRDC.
6. “Army Announces Vision for the Future,” US Army News Re-
lease, 12 October 1999, HRDC.
7. General Eric K. Shinseki, Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon,
45th Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, 12
October 1999, HRDC.
8. Briefing, “Status of Brigade Combat Team Development at Fort
Lewis and the Planned Performance Demonstration at Fort Knox,” 16 De-
cember 1999, HRDC.
9. Email with Attachment, “CSA Expands on Presentation to AUSA
in Oct;” “Army Announces Vision for the Future,” US Army News Re-
lease; Information Memo, Department of the Army, “Stryker Interim Ar-
mored Vehicle (IAV) Program Success,” 3 May 2002, IAV File, HRDC.
10. Email with Attachment, “CSA Expands on Presentation to AUSA
in Oct.”
11. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 197–98; Richard L. Kugler, “Case Study
in Army Transformation: Creating Modular Forces,” Case Studies in Na-
tional Security Transformation Number 14, April 2008, 13, HRDC; Ben-
jamin King, Victory Starts Here: A Short 40-Year History of the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2013), 21–22.
12. Brown, Kevlar Legions, 202; “Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-
dures Work on New Vision to Start Soon,” Inside the Army, 29 November
1999, HRDC; Briefing, “Status of Brigade Combat Team Development at
Fort Lewis and the Planned Performance Demonstration at Fort Knox,”
16 December 1999, HRDC; Briefing, “Brigade Combat Team Fire sup-
port,” January 2000, HRDC; “Complete Fielding of the Army’s Objective

130
Force 32 Years Away, TCP Says,” Inside the Army, 31 July 2000, HRDC;
U.S. Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 (Extract), Chapter
Two, HRDC; Briefing, “Equipping the Brigade Combat Team,” 21 Janu-
ary 2000, HRDC.
13. “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Work on New Vision to
Start Soon,” Inside the Army, 29 November 1999, 8–9, HRDC; Briefing,
“Status of Brigade Combat Team Development at Fort Lewis,” 16 Decem-
ber 1999; Briefing, “Brigade Combat Team Fire Support,” January 2000,
HRDC; “Complete Fielding of the Army’s Objective Force,” Inside the
Army, 1, 16.
14. Information Paper, “AUSA Transform Panel Briefing,” 26 Octo-
ber 2000, HRDC; Brown, Kevlar Legions, 197.
15. Briefing, “Recapitalization of the Legacy Force,: 17 Octo-
ber 2000, HRDC; Briefing, “Army Transformation,” 17 October 2000,
HRDC; 2001 Army Modernization Plan (Extract), Executive Summary,
11, 24, HRDC; Testimony, General Shinseki before Senate Armed Servic-
es Committee, 10 July 2001, HRDC; Information Paper, “CSA Remarks
at AUSA Seminar,” 8 November 2001, HRDC.
16. US Army Public Affairs Office Information Paper, “Power of
Digitization Proves Worth During Army Force on Force Exercise, 18 April
2001, HRDC; Information Paper, “4th ID shows Info Superiority in Divi-
sion Capstone Exercise,” 20 April 2001, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “DCX
I Observations,” 25 April 2001, HRDC; “Digital World meets Combat
During Desert Exercise,” American Forces Information Service, 18 April
2001, HRDC.
17. Brigadier General William F. Engel, “Transforming Fires for the
Objective Force,” Field Artillery, November–December 2001, 9–13.
18. 2001 Army Modernization Plan (Extract) 10–21, HRDC; In-
formation Paper, “AUSA Transform Panel Briefing,” 26 October 2000,
HRDC; Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002, HRDC.
19. “New Brigade Won’t Feature Organic Aviation or Cannon Capa-
bilities,” Inside the Army, 29 November 1999, 1, 8, HRDC; Briefing, “Sta-
tus of Brigade Combat Team Development,” 16 December 1999; Email,
“IBCT,” 6 March 2000, HRDC.
20. Briefing, “Transforming the World’s Best Army into a Full Spec-
trum Force . . . Strategically Responsive and Dominant,” 10–11 January
2000, HRDC; Briefing, “Brigade Combat Team Fire Support,” January
2000, HRDC; Email, “Description of Medium Armored Vehicle Variants
for IBCT,” 11 January 2000, HRDC; Organizational and Operational Con-
cept, the Brigade Combat Team, 6 January 2000, 20, 21, 23–24, HRDC;
Email, “IBCT,” 6 March 2000, HRDC; Major General Toney Stricklin,
“Transforming the FA and the Force,” Field Artillery, March–April 2000,
1; IBCT Organizational and Operational Concept (Extract), 29 January
2000, HRDC; Briefing, “IBCT Personnel and Equipment,” 29 January
2000, HRDC.

131
 21. Organizational and Operational Concept, The Brigade Combat
Team, 6 January 2000, 23–24; Briefing, “Brigade Combat Team Fire Sup-
port,” January 2000, HRDC; Email, “IBCT,” 6 March 2000; Major Gen-
eral Toney Stricklin, “The Field Artillery in Transformation,” Field Artil-
lery, September–October 2000, 1–2; Email, “Transformation,” 15 March
2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Medium Weight Force Fires and
Effects Coordination Organizational and Operational Concept,” 15 May
2000, HRDC; BCT Organizational and Operational Concept (Extract), 18
April 2000, HRDC.
22. Stricklin, “Transforming the FA and Force,” 1–2; “Army Post-
pones Plans to Outfit BCTs with Self-propelled Howitzers,” Inside the
Army, 3 July 2000, 1, 5, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Transforma-
tion,” 15 May 2000, HRDC; Interim Brigade Combat Team Organiza-
tional and Operational Concept Document (Extract), Chapter 8, HRDC;
Stricklin, “The Field Artillery in Transformation,” 1–2.
23. “Army’s First IBCT Exceeds Expectation during Warfighter Ex-
ercise,” Inside the Army, 15 October 2001, 1, 11, HRDC; “BCT More Dif-
ficult for Enemy Forces, but OPFOR Finds Some Holes,” Inside the Army,
15 October 2001, 12, HRDC; Colonel Steven L. Bailey, “Fires for the
IBCT,” Field Artillery, November–December 2001, 5–8; “Army Official-
ly Begins Transformation to Initial Brigade Combat Team,” Fort Lewis
Press Release, 13 April 2000, HRDC; Briefing, “IBCT Organizational and
Operational,” 8 January 2002, HRDC.
24. “Initial Brigade Combat Teams Are First Step in Creating Objec-
tive Force,” Army News Service, Summer 2000, Initial Brigade Combat
Team File, HRDC; “Army Officially Begins Creation of Initial Brigade
Combat Teams,” Army News Service, Summer 2000, Initial Brigade
Combat Team File, HRDC.
25. Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operation-
al Document (Extract), June 2000, Chapter 3, 19–20, Chapter 8, 1–12,
HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Field Artillery Futures Update,” 2002, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002.
26. Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational
Document (Extract), June 2000, Chapter 3, 19–20, Chapter 8, 1–12; Brief-
ing (Extract), “Field Artillery Futures Update,” 2002; Email with Attach-
ment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002.
27. Organizational and Operational Concept, the Brigade Combat
Team, 6 January 2000, 43–45; Organizational and Operational Concept,
the Brigade Combat Team, 3 February 2000, 42–44; Memorandum for
Record, “Telephone Conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Lackey,
TF2000,” 17 May 2000, HRDC; Stricklin, “Transforming the FA and the
Force,” 1; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, “First
Quarter FY00 SIGACTS,” 18 January 2000, HRDC.
28. Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Sharp, Task Force XXI, USAFAS,
interview by author, 26 February 2003, HRDC; SBCT Monthly Bulle-

132
tin, January 2003, 1, HRDC; SBCT Monthly Bulletin, November 2002,
1–2, HRDC; Operational Evaluation Plan for the 1st SBCT as Required
by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 3 February
2003, 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, HRDC; Government Accountability Office Report,
“Military Transformation,” May 2002, 4, 5, 8, HRDC; IBCT Monthly
Bulletin, June 2002, 1, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Interim Brigade
Combat Team,” 27 February 2003; News Briefing, “IBCT and IAVs,” 17
May 2001, HRDC; “Army Statement on GAO Interim Armored Vehicle
Protest Recommendation,” US Army News Release, 9 April 2001, HRDC;
“Army Selects GM to Make Interim Armored Vehicle,” Army Link News,
20 November 2000, HRDC; “Army Orients Interim Force Toward Pacific
Rim to Achieve Balance,” Inside the Army, 16 July 2001, 1, 11, HRDC;
Information Paper, “IAV,” 2001, HRDC; “Army Announced Name for In-
terim Armored Vehicle,” Army News Release, 27 February 2002, HRDC.
29. Interim Division Organizational and Operational Plan, February
2001, 1, 5, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002;
Briefing, “None,” 12 October 2001, HRDC; Interim Division Organiza-
tional and Operational Plan, February 2001, 4, 10, 23, 25, HRDC.
30. Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002; Briefing,
“None,” 12 October 2001; Interim Division Organizational and Opera-
tional Plan, February 2001, 4, 10, 23, 25, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“Transformation,” 15 May 2000, HRDC.
31. Email with Attachment, “Requirements Review Committee,” 27
March 2000, HRDC.
32. Briefing, “Army Transformation,” 17 October 2000, HRDC;
Briefing (Extract), “MRI, Army Transformation and Combat Health Sup-
port,” 2 March 2001, HRDC.
33. Briefing, “Army Transformation,” 17 October 2000; Briefing
(Extract), “MRI, Army Transformation and Combat Health Support,” 2
March 2001, HRDC.
34. Email with Attachment, “Objective Force Portion of the 2002
Annual Command History,” 11 April 2003, HRDC.
35. Briefing, “Army Transformation,” 17 October 2000; 2001 Army
Modernization Plan (Extract), 29–33, HRDC; White Paper, “Concept for
the Objective Force, November 2001,” 1–8, HRDC; General Account-
ability Office Report, “Military Transformation,” November 2001, 9; In-
formation Paper, “AUSA Transform Panel Briefing,” 26 October 2000,
HRDC; Engel, “Transforming Fires for the Objective Force,” 9–13; Email
with Attachment, “Objective Force Portion of the 2002 Annual Command
History,” 11 April 2003; The Army Budget for FY 2004, US Army News
Release, 3 February 2003, HRDC.
36. Email with Attachment, “Objective Force Portion of the 2002
Annual Command History,” 11 April 2003; Memorandum for Director,
FDIC, “Coordination of 2002 USAFACFS Annual Command History,”
14 April 2003, HRDC.

133
 37. Memorandum for Director, FDIC, “Coordination of 2002 US-
AFACFS Annual Command History,” 14 April 2003; 2001 USAFACFS
ACH, 61–62.
38. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-9 (Draft), 6 November 2001, 6–7,
HRDC.
39. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-9 (Draft), 6 November 2001, 8, 11;
White Paper, “Concepts for the Objective Force,” November 2001, 3, 6,
HRDC.
40. 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 63.
41. Major General Michael D. Maples, “The FA and the Objective
Force: An Uncertain but Critical Future,” Field Artillery, September–Oc-
tober 2002, 2.
42. Maples, “The FA and the Objective Force,” 3; Email with At-
tachments, “Objective Force and Unit of Action,” 30 March 2003, HRDC.
43. Briefing, “Networked Fires,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “Net-
worked Fires,” 20 September 2002, HRDC; Maples, “The FA and the Ob-
jective Force,” 4; Email, “UA ORG Design EXSUM,” 30 March 2003,
HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-9, Objective Force Operational and
Organizational Plan for the Maneuver Unit of Action, 22 July 2002, 43–46,
HRDC; Briefing, “Transforming the Army to the Objective Force, Status
Report,” 8 January 2002, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon
and O&O Crosswalk,” 30 March 2003, HRDC; Briefing, “Transforming
the Army to the Objective Force,” 18 April 2002, HRDC; The Objective
Force in 2015 White Paper, 8 December 2002, HRDC; Maples, “The FA
and the Objective Force,” 4; Major (Retired) George A. Durham, Lieuten-
ant Colonel (Retired) Frank T. Myers II, and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired)
Charles L. Hernandez, “The FCS-Based Force in the Future Battle,” Field
Artillery, March–April 2002, 10–13; Email, “US ORG Design EXSUM,”
30 March 2003, HRDC; Briefing, “Transforming the Army to the Objec-
tive Force, Status Report,” 8 January 2002.
44. Briefing, “Transforming Field Artillery and Fire Support for the
21st Century,” February 2001, HRDC; The Field Artillery Modernization
and Transformation Plan, January 2001, 29–66, HRDC; Email with At-
tachment, “Cmd History,” 19 April 2001, HRDC.
45. “Army Announces Vision for the Future,” US Army News Re-
lease, 12 October 1999, HRDC; Vision Statement, 23 June 1999, HRDC;
CSA Remarks at Dwight D. Eisenhower Luncheon, AUSA, 22 October
2002, CSA Remarks File, 5, HRDC.
46. Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 5 January 2000, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “Special Report,” 4 January 2000, HRDC; Major
Stephen Hitz, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 7 March 2000, HRDC;
“Secretary of the Army Says Crusader Still Viable,” Army Link News, 15
November 1999, HRDC; U.S Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year
2001, Posture Statement File, 30, HRDC. In 2003, the Army terminated
funding the Army Tactical Missile System II with the Brilliant Anti-Armor

134
munition upon deciding to employ unmanned aerial vehicles to carry the
munition.
47. Email with Attachment, “Manuscript Review,” 8 December 2003,
102, HRDC; Briefing, “Recapitalization of the Legacy Force,” 17 October
2000, HRDC; Briefing, “Army Transformation, 17 October 2000, HRDC;
2001 Army Modernization Plan (Extract), Executive Summary, 11, 24,
HRDC; Testimony, General Shinseki before Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, 10 July 2001, HRDC: Information Paper, “CSA Remarks at AUSA
Seminar, 8 November 2001, HRDC; Engel, “Transforming Fires for the
Objective Force,” 9–13; Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 1 March
2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 5 March 2000, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “Future of Heavy Systems,” 6 January 2000,
HRDC; Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 1999 Annual Re-
port (Extract), “Crusader,” HRDC; Major Donald L. Barnett, “Crusader
Target Weight: 38 to 42 Tons,” Field Artillery, March–April 2000, 34–36.
48. 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 83–86; Fact Sheet, “Timeline of Events,”
undated, HRDC.
49. Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 5 January 2000, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “Article from DA PAO,” 10 January 2000, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “New Weapons System,” 6 January 2000, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “Special Report,” 4 January 2000, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “Escalation,” 14 February 2000, HRDC; 2001 USAFA-
CFS ACH, 55–65; Email with Attachment, “LegIntObj2,” 1 April 2002;
Briefing, “None,” 12 October 2001, HRDC; Interim Division Organiza-
tional and Operational Plan, February 2001, 4, 10, 23, 25, HRDC; Email,
with Attachment, “Prepared Opening Remarks for Major General Maples,
20 February 2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Crusader,” 11 March
2003, HRDC.
50. “Rumsfeld Pulls Plug on Big Gun,” Reuters, 8 May 2002, HRDC;
“Rumsfeld Dumps Crusader, Defends Decision,” CNN, 9 May 2002,
HRDC; “Crusader Howitzer Gets the Axe,” Army Link News, 8 May 2002,
HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Discussion to the Crusader Alternative,”
May–Jun 2002, HRDC; “GAO: Crusader Needs Mature Technology, Not
Weight Reduction,” Inside the Army, 4 March 2002, 1, 11, HRDC; Memo-
randum for Secretary of the Army, “Crusader Artillery Program Termina-
tion,” 13 May 2002, HRDC; Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army,
“Request for Extension of Submission of Crusader Information,” 20 May
2002, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Timeline of Events,” undated, HRDC.
51. “Defense Discusses Crusader Alternatives,” Defense Link, 15
May 2002, HRDC; “Pentagon Already Has Plans for How to Spend Cru-
sader Billions,” Inside the Army, 6 May 2002, 1, 13, 14, HRDC; Doug
Brown, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 6 February
2003, HRDC; Department of Defense FY 2003 Budget Amendment for
Crusader Termination (Extract), May 2002, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ment, “Crusader,” 11 March 2003, HRDC. In 2004, the Army cancelled

135
work on the Comanche helicopter because developmental costs continued
to rise and it did not fit with the future of the Army; it more closely fit the
Cold War paradigm than the current and future operational battlefield, and
the Army chose to concentrate on unmanned aerial vehicles.
52. General Peter J. Schoomaker Speech with slides, December
2003, HRDC; “Focus Task Force ‘Jump Starting’ Future,” Army Public
Affairs, 27 January 2004, HRDC; Department of the Army (DA), “The
Way Ahead,” 2003, 15, HRDC; General Peter J. Schoomaker Speech, 7
October 2003, HRDC; “Initiatives to Improve Education System That Has
Served the Army Well,” Army News Service, 23 April 2004, HRDC; Army
Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0, October 2004, 1-1,
1-6, HRDC; Briefing, “Modular Army Overview,” 5 April 2004, HRDC;
“Focus Task Force ‘Jump Starting’ Future,” Army Public Affairs; “Future
Force,” GlobalSecurity.org, 25 February 2004, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Fo-
cus Areas,” 25 February 2004, HRDC; DA, 2003 U.S. Army Transforma-
tion Road Map (Extract), undated, Executive Summary, 11, HRDC; Don
Bankston, Task Force XXI, FDIC, interview by author, 2 March 2004,
HRDC; Memorandum with Attachment for Director, FDIC, 20 April
2004, HRDC.
53. General Kevin Byrnes Speech, 15 October 2003, HRDC.
54. “Focus Task Force ‘Jump Starting’ Future,” 27 January 2004;
Interview, author with Bankston, 2 March 2004.
55. 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 63; Army Comprehensive Guide to
Modularity, 1-13, 1-14; White Paper, “Unit of Employment Operations,”
20 March 2004, 10, HRDC.
56. Briefing, “Chief of Field Artillery Update, November–December
2004, HRDC; White Paper, “Unit of Employment Operations,” 20 March
2004, 10–11, HRDC; “Army Announces FY05 and FY06 Modular Bri-
gade Force Structure Decision,” US Army News Release, 23 July 2004,
HRDC; Briefing, “Modular Army Overview;” Briefing, “U.S. Field Artil-
lery in Transformation,” undated, HRDC; US Army, 2004 Army Transfor-
mation Roadmap (Extract), July 2004, 3-2, 3-3, HRDC.
57. Email with Attachment, “Transformation of the Army,” 4 April
2005, HRDC; Interview, author with Bankston, 2 March 2004; “Army to
Reset into Modular Brigade-Centric Force,” Army News Service, 24 Feb-
ruary 2004, HRDC; Briefing, “U.S. Field Artillery in Transformation,” un-
dated, HRDC; Briefing, “Chief of Field Artillery Update,” November–De-
cember 2004, HRDC; Report, “U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for
Congress,” 24 January 2007, 3, 10, HRDC; US Army, 2004 Army Trans-
formation Roadmap (Extract), July 2004, 3-3, HRDC.
58. 2007 US Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAF-
COEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 26; Colonel Kevin M. Batule
and Colonel (Retired) Theodore J. Janosko, “Training the Full-Spectrum
BCT FSCOORD,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2008, 26–28, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “FSCOORD Course,” 10 February 2009, HRDC; Staff

136
Action Sheet, 10 July 2009, HRDC; White Paper, “The King and I: The
Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to provide Fire Support to
Maneuver Commanders,” undated, 1–3, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Sean
Bateman and Major Steven Hady, “King of Battle Once Again: An Orga-
nizational Design to Effectively Integrate Fires in Support of the Tacti-
cal, Operational, and Strategic Force,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2013,
23–25.
59. White Paper, “Unit of Employment Operations,” 23 January
2004, 7–8, HRDC; “Units of Action,” TRADOC News Service, 25 Febru-
ary 2004, HRDC; Briefing, “Recommended Design Balanced,” 23 Janu-
ary 2004, HRDC; Briefing, “Approved Infantry UA,” 23 February 2004,
HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90 (Extract), U.S. Army Objective
Force Operational and Organizational Plan, Maneuver Unit of Action, 30
June 2003, 1-5, 1-6, 3-2, 3-32, HRDC; Coordinating Draft of TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-3-9, 8, 9; Email with Attachment, “Transformation of the
Army,” 24 March 2004, HRDC; Memorandum with Attachment for Di-
rector, FDIC, 20 April 2004, HRDC.
60. Daniel L. Bankston, FDIC, interview by author, 3 March 2005,
HRDC; White Paper, “Unit of Employment Operations,” 20 March 2004,
9–12, HRDC; Briefing, “U.S. Field Artillery in Transformation,” un-
dated, HRDC; Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9,
1-10; Briefing, “Modular Army Overview;” White Paper, “Unit of Em-
ployment Operations,” 23 January 2004, 7–8, HRDC; “Units of Action,”
TRADOC News Service; Briefing, “Recommended Design Balanced,” 23
January 2004, HRDC; Briefing, “Approved Infantry UA,” 23 February
2004, HRDC; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90 (Extract), 1-5, 1-6, 3-2, 3-32;
Coordinating Draft of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-9, Future Force Fires
and Effects Concept of Operation, 7 November 2003, 8, 9, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “Transformation of the Army,” 24 March 2004, HRDC;
Memorandum with Attachment for Director, FDIC, 20 April 2004, HRDC.
61. Briefing, “How the UEx Fights,” 29 March 2004, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “Transformation of the Army,” 4 April 2005, HRDC;
Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, 1-16, 1-17, HRDC; White Pa-
per, “Unit of Employment Operations,” 20 March 2004, 57–59, HRDC.
62. Email with Attachment, “FA Vision and Transformation,” 4 April
2006, HRDC; Daniel L. Bankston, FDIC, interview by author, 13 March
2006, HRDC; Fires Brigade Operational and Organizational Plan (Ex-
tract), 26 July 2005, 8–11, HRDC; US Army, 2004 Army Transformation
(Extract), July 2004, 3–6, HRDC.
63. Major Michael Hughes, Concepts Branch, CDID, interview
by author, 9 April 2009, HRDC; Daniel L. Bankston, Chief, Concepts
Branch, CDID, interview by author, 9 April 2009, HRDC; Information
Paper, “Theater Army 5.1 Redesign Implications for Corps Fires Cells,”
29 January 2009, HRDC; Briefing, “Theater Army Redesign 5.2 Update,”
17 February 2009, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Transformation Por-

137
tion of the 2008 Annual Command History,” 14 May 2009, HRDC; Dan-
iel L. Bankston, Chief, Concepts Branch, CDID, interview by author, 27
March 2008, HRDC; Briefing, “Corps Headquarters Redesign Update,”
13 April 2007, HRDC; Briefing, “Corps Headquarters Redesign,” 13 June
2007, HRDC.
64. Daniel L. Bankston, interview by author, 28 February 2007,
HRDC; Briefing, “Revised Modular Division Design, Final Requirements
Determination Briefing,” 8 January 2007, HRDC; Minutes, 23rd Modular-
ity Video Teleconference, 9 August 2006, HRDC; Minutes, 24th Modular-
ity Video Teleconference, 11 October 2006, HRDC; Email, “Transforma-
tion Portion of 2006 Annual Command History,” 30 April 2007, HRDC;
Briefing, “Modularity Overview,” 28 April 2006, HRDC.
65. Lieutenant Colonel Telford E. Crisco Jr., “The Modular Force:
Division Operations,” Military Review, January–February 2006, 95–100;
Bankston, interview, 27 March 2008; US Army, 2004 Army Transforma-
tion Roadmap (Extract), July 2004, 3–6, HRDC.
66. Fires Brigade Operational and Organizational Plan (Extract), 26
July 2005, 12–29; Briefing, “Fires Brigade,” 16 December 2005, HRDC.
67. Email with Attachment, “Transformation Portion of 2006 Annual
Command History,” 30 April 2007, HRDC.
68. Captain Michael M. Stump, “4th ID Stands Up Army’s First
Fires Brigade,” Field Artillery, January–February 2005, 27; “Brigade
Combat Teams,” Field Artillery, November–December 2005, 40–45; Cap-
tain William H. Ward, “The Army’s First Fires Brigade,” Field Artillery,
November–December 2005, 20; Report, “U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign:
Issues for Congress,” 24 January 2007, 4, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“Transformation Portion of 2006 Annual Command History,” 30 April
2007, HRDC; “U.S. Army Field Artillery Units,” Fires Bulletin, January–
February 2013, 47–59, 76–90; Email with Attachment, “Transformation
Portion of the 2008 Annual Command History,” 14 May 2009, HRDC;
Major General Peter M. Vangjel, “The FA Campaign Plan,” Fires Bulletin,
July–September 2008, 1–3; Colonel Samuel R. White Jr., “The Fires Bri-
gade: A Critical Capability in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” Fires Bulletin,
May–June 2008, 41–45.
69. Directorate of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract), FY 2002,
IAV File, HRDC; Director of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract), FY
2001, IAV File, HRDC.
70. 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 75–76.
71. Press Conference with Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera and
Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, 12 October 1999,
HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Jane’s Today,” 11 October 2000, HRDC;
“IAV Competition Reveals No Huge Differences Between Wheels,
Tracks,” Inside the Army, 17 July 2000, 1, 11, HRDC; “Chosen Vehicle
Less Important than New Concept, Observers Say,” Inside the Army, 9
October 2000, 7–9, HRDC; “Kern Says Vehicle Award Does Not Settle

138
Debate over Wheels and Tracks,” Inside the Army, 20 November 2000,
6, HRDC; Edward F. Bruner, “Army Transformation and Modernization:
Overview and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 4
April 2001, IAV File, 6, HRDC.
72. Director of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract) FY 2000, IAV
File, HRDC; Director of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract) FY 2001,
IAV File, HRDC.
73. Director of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract) FY 2000; Direc-
tor of Test and Evaluation Report (Extract) FY 2001; “Testing of New In-
terim Vehicle May Upset Army’s Fielding Schedule,” Inside the Army, 20
November 2000, 1, 6, HRDC; Thomas M. Petty, “Transformation: From a
Heavy to a Lighter Family of Armored Fighting Vehicles,” US Army War
College, 2011, IAV File, 15, HRDC.
74. Sharp, interview by author, 26 February 2003; SBCT Monthly
Bulletin, January 2003, 1; SBCT Monthly Bulletin, November 2002, 1–2;
Operational Evaluation Plan for the 1st SBCT, 3 February 2003, 1, 2, 8,
9, 10, 12; Government Accountability Office Report, “Military Trans-
formation,” 4, 5, 8; IBCT Monthly Bulletin, June 2002, 1; Email with
Attachment, “Interim Brigade Combat Team,” 27 February 2003; News
Briefing, “IBCT and IAVs,” 17 May 2001; “Army Statement on GAO
Interim Armored Vehicle Protest Recommendation,” 9 April 2001; “Army
Selects GM,” Army Link News, 20 November 2000; “Army Orients In-
terim Force,” Inside the Army, 16 July 2001, 1, 11; Information Paper,
“IAV,” 2001 “Army Announced Name for Interim Armored Vehicle,” 27
February 2002.
75. “Army Accepts First U.S.-built Stryker,” Army Link News, 15
April 2002, HRDC; Information Memo, Department of the Army, “Stryker
Interim Armored (IAV) Program Success,” 3 May 2002, IAV File, HRDC.
76. CSA Remarks at IAV Rollout Ceremony, 12 April 2002, 3,
HRDC.
77. Transcript of Stryker Facts Media Roundtable, US Army News
Release, 15 October 2002, 3, 18, HRDC; “Army Transports Stryker on
C-130,” Army Link News, 24 June 2002, HRDC; “First Units Train with
Stryker IAVs,” Army Link News, 1 July 2002, HRDC; “First Stryker Ar-
rives at Fort Lewis,” US Army News Release, 3 June 2002, HRDC; “Army
Begins Fielding of Strykers,” Army Link News, 29 May 2002, HRDC;
“Stryker Facts Media Roundtable October 15 and Stryker Air Deploy-
ability Demonstration October 16,” US Army News Release, 10 October
2002, HRDC; “Narrative of Stryker Air Deployability Demonstration,”
US Army News Release, 16 October 2002, HRDC.
78. “Strykers Boost Infantry Tactics at NTC,” Army Link News, 6
August 2002, HRDC.
79. Speech, Eric K. Shinseki, 4 September 2002, 5, HRDC.
80. “Strykers on Road to Certification,” Army Link News, 31 March
2003, HRDC; “8 Stryker Variants move on C-130s to NTC,” ArmyLink

139
News, 4 April 2003, HRDC; “Stryker Brigade Completes Arrowhead
Lightning I at NTC,” Army Link News, 14 April 2003, HRDC; “Stryker
Brigade Combat Team in Action at JRTC,” Army News Release, 5 May
2003, HRDC; “Stryker to Fill Interim, Middleweight Army Gap,” TRA-
DOC PAO, 9 May 2003, HRDC; “Stryker Brigade Moves Across Country
for Evaluation at Polk,” Army Link News, 15 May 2003, HRDC; “Stryker
Brigade Completes Certification Exercise,” Army Link News, 2 June 2003,
HRDC; “Sill Hosts Stryker Deployment Certex,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 8
May 2003, 1a, 2a; “Stryker to Fill Interim Middleweight Army Gap,” Fort
Sill Cannoneer, 8 May 2003, 2a; Defense Contract Management Agency,
Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle, Spring/Summer 2003, IAV File, HRDC.
81. Colonel G. Keith Herring, “Flagship Sill: A Power Projection
Platform for 100-Plus Years,” Field Artillery, March–June 2004, 19–21;
Fact Sheet, “Stryker 8-Wheel Drive Armoured Combat Vehicles,” USA,
4 February 2005, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Army Completes Stryker Brigade
Certification,” undated, HRDC; DPTM SIGACTS, 30 April 2004, HRDC;
DPTM SIGACTS, 12 October 2004, HRDC.
82. “DARPA and Army Select Contractors for Future Combat Sys-
tems Programs,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense News Re-
lease, 9 May 2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Transformation
Interview,” 15 September 2000, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Army
Programs and Transformation Hearing,” 16 March 2000, HRDC; “The
Real Battle Could Be the One for Money on the Hill,” Army Times, 28
February 2000, 28; “The Army Hooah Guide to Army Transformation,”
Army, February 2001, 21–42; Mission Need Statement for FCS, 2 Novem-
ber 2001, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FCS Industry Day,” 9 November
2001, HRDC.
83. Email with Attachment, “Testimony,” 20 February 2003, HRDC;
“Authorizers Grant $293 million for FCS Non-line-of-Sight Cannon,” In-
side the Army, 18 November 2002, 14–15, HRDC.
84. Email with Attachment, “FCS Cannon,” 11 March 2003, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “Deputy Commanding General Sends,” 4 Decem-
ber 2002, HRDC; Briefing, “FCS Cannon Concept Technology Demon-
stration Update,” December 2002, HRDC.
85. Email with Attachment, “FCS Cannon;” Email, “FCS Cannon,”
25 February 2003, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander TRADOC,
“FCS Cannon Demonstrator,” 29 January 2003, HRDC; Major Charles J.
Emerson, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 20 February 2003, HRDC.
86. Email with Attachment, “FCS Cannon,” 11 March 2003; Email,
“FCS Cannon,” 25 February 2003, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander
TRADOC, “FCS Cannon Demonstrator,” 29 January 2003.
87. Memorandum for Commander TRADOC, “FCS Cannon Dem-
onstrator,” 29 January 2003.
88. “Future Howitzer is Not Son of Crusader,” National Defense,
May 2003; United Defense News Release, 8 September 2003, HRDC;

140
United Defense News Release, 22 October 2003, HRDC; United Defense
News Release, 30 July 2003, HRDC.
89. Major Charles J. Emerson, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 5
March 2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon Design Pa-
per v5,” 15 December 2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “NLOS Can-
non Excerpt-Valcourt Brief,” 3 January 2004, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ment, “Trip Report,” 5 February 2004, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“Draft Minutes from Briefing to Brigadier General Valcourt,” 8 January
2004, HRDC.
90. Email with Attachment, “Trip Report,” 5 February 2004, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon Entry for the 2003 Annual Com-
mand History,” 7 May 2004, HRDC.
91. Major Charles J. Emerson, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 2
March 2005, HRDC; Briefing, “NLOS Cannon Update,” undated, HRDC;
“Army, Boeing, SAIC Accelerate Future Combat Systems’ Contribution
to the Current Force,” Boeing News Release, 22 July 2004, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon,” 14 March 2005, HRDC.
92. Doug R. Brown, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon, interview by
author, 16 February 2005, HRDC; Major Charles J. Emerson, Major Mark
H. Laflamme, and Colonel (Retired) James E. Cunningham, “NLOS Sys-
tems for the Modular and Future Forces,” Field Artillery, November–De-
cember 2005, 7–11; Major General David Valcourt, “Issues and Answers:
NLOS-C Caliber Decision, Today’s Modularity, Counterfire, and Sound
Bytes,” Field Artillery, July–August 2004, 1–3; Briefing, “Non-Line-of-
Sight Cannon Caliber Decision,” 10 May 2004, HRDC; Emerson, inter-
view by author, 2 March 2005, HRDC.
93. “Army Accelerates Selected FCS Capabilities,” US Army News
Release, 22 July 2004, HRDC; “Army Moves Up Fielding of Future
Combat Systems,” Army News Service, 23 July 2004, HRDC; Fact Sheet,
“Army Moves Up Fielding of Future Combat Systems,” undated, HRDC;
Briefing, “NLOS Cannon Update,” undated; Email with Attachment,
“NLOS Cannon,” 14 March 2005.
94. Email with Attachment, “NLOS Cannon,” 14 March 2005; Brief-
ing, “NLOS Cannon Update,” undated; Emerson, interview, 2 March
2005; Fact Sheet, “Army Moves Up Fielding of Future Combat Systems,”
undated.
95. Major Vincent J. Tolbert, TCM Cannon, interview with attach-
ment by author, 27 February 2007, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “BAE Systems
Fires First Round from NLOS Cannon Firing Platform,” 31 October 2006,
HRDC; Fact Sheet, “NLOS Cannon Firing Platform,” 27 February 2007,
HRDC; Major Vincent J. Tolbert, “NLOS Cannon: Meeting the Demands
of Future Combat,” Field Artillery, March–April 2006, 10–12; Fact Sheet,
“FCS Program Unveils BAE Systems NLOS Cannon Platform,” 2 Oc-
tober 2006, HRDC; “Army Takes Deliver of Cannon-firing Platform for
FCS Manned Ground Vehicles,” Army News Release, 29 September 2006,

141
HRDC; Fact Sheet, “BAE Systems First Round from NLOS Cannon Fir-
ing Platform,” 2 November 2006, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “NLOS Cannon and
Mortar WSAR 28 August–1 September 2006, undated, HRDC; TCM Can-
non FY 2006 Accomplishments, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Histori-
cal Update,” 31 March 2008, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “NLOS-C
Historical Comments,” 3 April 2008, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“Historical Update,” 31 March 2008, HRDC.
96. Email with Attachment, “Historical Update,” 31 March 2008,
HRDC; Information Paper, “FCS FY08 Program Adjustments,” undated,
HRDC.
97. Briefing, “Cannon Smart Book,” 30 January 2009, HRDC; BAE
Information Paper, 13 June 2008, HRDC; BAE Information Paper, undat-
ed, HRDC; BAE Information Paper, 6 October 2008, HRDC; FCOE, Fort
Sill on the Move, 15 December 2008, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“NLOS Cannon April 2009,” 6 April 2009, HRDC.
98. FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 15 December 2008.
99. Congressional Research Service, “Army Future Combat Sys-
tem Spin-outs and Ground Combat Vehicle: Background and Issues for
Congress,” 30 November 2009, 3, HRDC; TCM Cannon Newsletter, June
2009, HRDC; DOD News Release, 23 June 2009, HRDC.
100. Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, “Fires: The Cutting Edge for
the 21st Century,” Field Artillery, May–June 1998, 22–28.
101. Email with Attachment, “BL History,” 5 March 2002, HRDC;
Fact Sheet, “NLOS-LS/NetFires,” 12 December 2002, HRDC; Fact Sheet,
“NLOS-LS,” 10 December 2003, HRDC; Briefing, “NetFires/NLOS-LS,”
20 February 2004, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launcher Up-
grade and NLOS-LS,” 1 March 2004, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“History Update,” 3 June 2004, HRDC; Memorandum with Attachment
for Director TSM RAMS, “Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual
Command History,” 4 April 2005, HRDC.
102. Email with Attachment, “BL History,” 5 March 2002, HRDC;
Durham and Cunningham, “NetFires,” 5–9; Email with Attachment, “Ad-
ditional History for 2000,” 25 February 2003, HRDC; Briefing, “NetFires/
NLOS-LS,” 20 February 2004; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launch-
er Upgrade and NLOS-LS,” 1 March 2004, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ment, “History Update,” 3 June 2004; “DOD Says Budget Cut, Ending
NLOS-LS would be Detrimental to FCS,” Inside the Army, 12 July 2004,
3; “Army Considering Cuts to FCS Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,”
Inside the Army, 12 May 2004, 1, 6, 7; Memorandum with Attachment for
Director TSM RAMS, “2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History,” 4
April 2005, HRDC.
103. Memorandum with Attachment for Director TSM RAMS,
“2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History,” 4 April 2005; Fact Sheet,
“Lockhart Raytheon JV Gets Billion Dollar Non-Line of Sight Contract,”
23 March 2004, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Netfire Limited Liability Company

142
Receives $1.1 Billion Contract for System Development,” 22 March 2004,
HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,” 27–28
October 2004, HRDC; Captain Samual S. Ancira and Major Mark H.
Laflamme, TSM RAMS, interview with attachment by author, 25 Febru-
ary 2005, HRDC; Emerson, Laflamme, and Cunningham, “NLOS Sys-
tems for the Modular and Future Forces,” 7–11; Email with Attachment,
“Non-Line of Sight Launch System,” 28 February 2005, HRDC; Memo-
randum with Attachment for Director TSM RAMS, “2004 USAFACFS
Annual Command History,” 4 April 2005.
104. Email with Attachment, “Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,”
28 February 2005, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Future Combat Systems:
FCS Documentation Plan and Spiral KPP Concept,” undated, HRDC;
Briefing, “NLOS-LS Program Update,” 8 September 2004, HRDC; In-
terview with Attachment, author with Ancira and Laflamme, 25 February
2005; Email with Attachment, “NLOS-LS,” 28 February 2005; Memo-
randum with Attachment for Director TSM RAMS, “2004 USAFACFS
Annual Command History,” 4 April 2005.
105. “Army Cancels Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,” DOD
News Release, 13 May 2010, HRDC; “Army Asks to Cancel NLOS-LS,”
Army Times, 23 April 2010, HRDC; Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS,
Deputy Director, interview by author, 10 February 2011, HRDC.

143
 Chapter 4

A New Century and the War on Terrorism

On a calm, beautiful 11 September 2001 morning, Americans

started their normal weekday in New York City and Washington D.C.
As the 9/11 Commission Report of 2004 indicated, some were mak-
ing their way across lower Manhattan, New York City, to the Twin
Towers in World Trade Center complex where they were employed.
About 200 miles to the south in Washington D.C., civilian and mili-
tary personnel began their busy days in the Pentagon. Across the
Potomac River, Congress reconvened after a summer break while
the President of the United States, George W. Bush, jogged to open
his day while visiting Sarasota, Florida. None of these people—or
Americans in general—even remotely considered the possibility of
a terrorist attack.
On 11 September 2001, 19 al-Qaeda terrorists brought the tran-
quility of the day to an abrupt halt when they flew airplanes into
American landmarks in suicidal attacks. Two airplanes, American
Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the
North and South towers of the World Trade Center respectively.
Within two hours, both towers collapsed—causing the partial or
complete collapse of other World Trade Center complex buildings
and significant damage to 10 major buildings in the vicinity. The
third airplane, United Airlines Flight 77, slammed violently into the
Pentagon, killing passengers as well as civilians and military per-
sonnel in the building. The fourth airplane, United Airlines Flight
93, plowed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after pas-
sengers overwhelmed the hijackers and prevented the flight from
reaching its destination, which was assumed to be the White House.
All onboard were killed. Approximately 3,000 people died in the
attacks, including the 19 hijackers. The attacks sent many people to
fiery and untimely deaths and propelled the country toward a war
on terrorism with the support of the international community, which
also expressed outrage over the attacks.

145
Global War on Terrorism and the Field Artillery
President Bush and his staff responded resolutely to the at-
tacks. On 11 September 2001, he told his advisors that the United
States would not only attack the perpetrators but also any countries
that harbored them. This put Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Ara-
bia on alert for possible American military action. The following
day, President Bush refined his position. In a 12 September 2001
meeting with the National Security Council, he stressed that the
United States was “at war with a new and different kind of enemy”
and urged the council to develop a strategy to eliminate the terror-
ists and punish those who supported them; he gradually forged a
coalition of nations to destroy al-Qaeda, the sponsor of the attacks,
and its supporters.1
Beginning early in October 2001, the Coalition launched Op-
eration Enduring Freedom, a military campaign against the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan that backed al-Qaeda. US forces relied on
special operation forces and air power for fire support in the initial
stages because field artillery officers and Soldiers in the 10th Moun-
tain Division (Light) and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
deployed without their field artillery. The intention was to keep the
American logistical footprint as small as possible, because Amer-
ican leadership believed that the mission could be accomplished
with organic mortars together with Army, Air Force, Marine, and
Navy aviation assets. Even though mortars and aviation provided
effective fire support, Operation Enduring Freedom generated an
intense professional dialogue about the absence of field artillery
during the initial days of fighting and the short-coming of joint fires
for troops in close contact. In March 2002, Operation Anaconda,
the final large-scale combat operation of Operation Enduring Free-
dom, was an overwhelming success by destroying the last remnants
of the Taliban. It also served as a prime example of the limitations
of airpower. During Operation Anaconda as in previous operations,
ground forces relied on Air Force A-10 aircraft and Army AH-64
Apache helicopters and mortars for close support. All provided ef-
fective fires, but troops on the ground recognized the need for re-
sponsive close support from field artillery—unavailable during the
conflict. All participants in Operation Enduring Freedom agreed

146
that Soldiers and Marines required effective fires in all weather and
in all terrain, and this meant field artillery fires. Based on this, 82d
Airborne Division fire supporters (field artillery officers and Sol-
diers) arrived in June 2002 with their M119 towed 105-millimeter
howitzers and 120-millimeter mortars to replace the fire supporters
from the 10th Mountain Division (Light) and the 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault).2
Notwithstanding the lack of field artillery in its early days, Op-
eration Enduring Freedom of 2001–02 produced impressive results.
By the end of 2002, the Taliban and al-Qaeda were no longer capable
of conducting major military operations. In view of this, Secretary
of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld declared in May 2003 that major
combat operations in Afghanistan had been completed. American
forces would begin rebuilding the country while maintaining peace
and order. Unfortunately, 2001–02 operations only served as the
opening of a lengthy nation building and counterinsurgency cam-
paign that continued into the second decade of the 21st Century to
establish democracy as an alternative to Islamic extremism.3
Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein refused to comply with United
Nations resolutions to disarm and eliminate his weapons of mass
destruction. When he and his sons Uday and Qusay refused to leave
Iraq, President Bush and American allies initiated military action,
called Operation Iraqi Freedom, to remove Saddam Hussein from
power. On 19 March 2003, Coalition military forces launched a de-
capitation strike with cruise missiles and bombs dropped by F117
aircraft against Saddam and his top lieutenants while Coalition air
forces struck long-range artillery emplacements, air defense sites,
and surface-to-surface missile sites. Patriot air defense missiles,
meanwhile, intercepted and destroyed two Iraqi missiles.4
The following day on 20 March 2003, Coalition forces that
included more than 400,000 US military personnel stood ready to
end the tyrannical rule of Saddam Hussein.5 US Central Command
assembled US Army forces under the V Corps that was commanded
by Lieutenant General William S. Wallace. The V Corps—initially
composed of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault), and a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division
and later adding the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)—attacked.

147
To the east, the I Marine Expeditionary Force struck across the
Kuwait-Iraq border to secure the Rumaylah Oil Field and then ad-
vanced along Highway 8 to An Nasiriyah, crossed the Euphrates
River, and moved to Baghdad as American and Australian Special
Forces secured Iraq’s western desert to suppress Scud missile at-
tacks on Israel. Meanwhile, the British 1st Armoured Division and
the British 3d Commando Brigade secured the area around Basra.6
On 20 March 2003, a field artillery bombardment along the
Kuwait-Iraq border paved the way for the maneuver forces, which
were led by three heavy brigade combat teams from the 3d Infan-
try Division (Mechanized); together they assaulted into Iraq. The
2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket
System) from Fort Sill’s 214th Field Artillery Brigade opened the
ground war when it fired Army Tactical Missile System I and IA
(long-range precision field artillery missiles) at enemy corps, divi-
sion, and corps artillery command posts stretching from Al Basrah
to An Nasiriyah to Amarah. After this opening salvo, the battalion
launched more missile strikes against Iraqi 11th Infantry Division
air defense artillery and counterbattery assets near An Nasiriyah.
During the initial attacks of the ground war, the battalion fired 63
Army Tactical Missile System strikes into Iraq and destroyed po-
litical targets, such as Ba’ath Party and Fedayeen Saddam Head-
quarters, enemy air defense sites, and command and control centers
deep within enemy territory up to 200 kilometers. Meanwhile, the
41st Field Artillery Brigade and 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery
Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System) of the 3d Infantry Divi-
sion (Mechanized) fired preemptive counterfire missions against the
Iraqi 11th Infantry Division and 14th Infantry Division artilleries
and the Iraqi 6th Tank Division artillery positioned from Al Bas-
rah to An Nasiriyah. These fires shaped the battlefield by destroying
critical command and control nodes and enemy headquarters.7
Early the following day on 21 March 2003, the 3d Infantry Di-
vision’s (Mechanized) ground attack under the cover of long-range
missile fires began in earnest. The 3d Infantry Division (Mecha-
nized) had the goal to advance as rapidly and expeditiously as possi-
ble to Baghdad—deliberately bypassing cities and securing bridges
for follow-on forces.8

148
 From the initial destruction of border observation posts to si-
lencing enemy indirect fire systems, massed fires from the 3d In-
fantry Division’s (Mechanized) organic M109A6 self-propelled
155-millimeter howitzers (Paladins) and Multiple Launch Rocket
System M270A1 launchers, close air support, and air interdiction
allowed the division to maneuver freely after crossing into Iraq on
21 March 2003.9 Once the breach had been made, the division raced
north along the Euphrates River on roads toward An Nasiriyah. As
the division’s 3d Brigade Combat Team approached Tallil Airbase
outside of An Nasiriyah to lure Iraqi forces into a trap, it ran into
unexpected stiff resistance from the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division.
The 3d Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) Paladins (M109A6 self-

Figure 6: Operation Iraqi Freedom map.

Source: Produced by Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

149
propelled 155-millimeter howitzers) from the 1st Battalion, 10th
Field Artillery Regiment and 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Reg-
iment furnished direct support to the division’s 3d Brigade Combat
Team and the 1st Brigade Combat Team while the division’s 1st
Battalion, 39th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket
System) provided counterfire. Combined, maneuver and field artil-
lery forces defeated elements of the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division
on 21–22 March 2003 at Tallil Airbase, capturing enemy prisoners
of war in the process. After taking control of the bridges around
the city that spanned the Euphrates River, the 3d Infantry Division
(Mechanized) continued its race toward Baghdad—leaving the I
Marine Expeditionary Force’s Task Force Tarawa to seize An Na-
siriyah on 23 March 2003.10
As elements of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) assault-
ed Tallil Airbase, the 3d Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) 3d Squad-
ron, 7th Cavalry and the 2d Brigade Combat Team raced through the
desert northward beyond An Nasiriyah toward As Samawah and An
Najaf, which composed the outer ring of defense surrounding Bagh-
dad and was defended by the Republican Guard.11 With reinforcing
fires from the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple
Launch Rocket System) from the 214th Field Artillery Brigade, the
cavalry squadron made the first contact with enemy defenses at As
Samawah and was joined by the brigade combat team. Together,
they encountered fierce enemy resistance that included mortar and
field artillery fire. Near As Samawah, A Battery, 1st Battalion, 9th
Field Artillery Regiment from the 3d Infantry Division (Mecha-
nized) engaged human waves of Fedayeen paramilitary fighters at
1,400 meters on 22 March 2003 as it supported Task Force 1-64’s
mission to clear enemy bunkers and forces. Meanwhile the divi-
sion’s 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple Launch
Rocket System) fired rockets in support of the cavalry squadron that
was fighting a tenacious enemy willing to go to its death. After about
two days of intense fighting that witnessed the enemy employing in-
nocent men, women, and children as human shields, these elements
of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) secured As Samawah on
24 March 2003 and left enemy guerrilla fighters as the only resis-
tance. This prompted Central Command to commit a brigade from

150
the 82d Airborne Division to mop up the remaining resistance and
protect the 3d Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) lines of commu-
nication so that the division could continue its drive north toward
Karbala and then Baghdad.12
To the north of As Samawah in An Najaf that also sat astride
the Euphrates River with several key bridges across the river, about
3,000 soldiers from Saddam Hussein’s Al Qut Division armed with
rocket-propelled guns and AK-47 rifles as well as paramilitary forces
waited for the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st Brigade Combat Team,
and the 2d Brigade Combat Team. Providing fire support, Ameri-
can field artillery employed Multiple Launch Rocket System fires in
danger close missions (shooting at enemy targets less than 450 me-
ters from friendly forces) with great effectiveness. This action kept
friendly soldiers alive to engage enemy soldiers who had come out
of their defensive positions to attack the Americans. Coupled with
close air support and direct fires from the maneuver arms, rocket
fires from the 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple
Launch Rocket System) of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized)
destroyed enemy strongholds, including one city block that con-
tained a Ba’ath Party headquarters building and troop barracks, ap-
proximately 2,000 Fedayeen fighters, and around 100 vehicles; they
also took possession of the bridges to the north and south of the city,
with fighting tapering off by 27 March 2003.13
Before victory could be claimed at An Najaf, a blinding sand-
storm with accompanying rain squalls blasted the area from Bagh-
dad to the Persian Gulf on 24–27 March 2003. Winds reached a
speed of 45 miles per hour and covered everything with a thick coat
of sand. Field artillery officers and Soldiers from the 1st Battalion,
10th Field Artillery Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division (Mecha-
nized) referred to those days, especially 25–26 March 2003, as the
Mars Days because the orange glow created by the blowing dust
resembled a science fiction movie scene of life on distant planets.14
Despite its potential to stop operations, the storm presented a
critical tactical opportunity. Besides permitting Central Command
to refit, refresh, and resupply its ground forces and establish a large
logistical base, it allowed the Coalition’s long-range unmanned
aerial vehicles to watch the Iraqis concentrate their forces and then

151
begin redeploying them toward the V Corps and the I Marine Ex-
peditionary Force. Coordinates that were passed from unmanned
aerial vehicles allowed high-flying B-1 bombers and fighter bomb-
ers to attack Iraqi forces with infrared-guided bombs that could see
through the blowing sand.15
During the sandstorm, field artillery systems furnished effec-
tive fires. The 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment (Multiple
Launch Rocket System) of the 214th Field Artillery Brigade and
other field artillery units conducted numerous missions in support of
the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 101st Airborne Division
(Air Assault), and the I Marine Expeditionary Force. To maintain
operational tempo, for example, the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artil-
lery Regiment (Multiple Launch Rocket System) fired more than 50
missile strikes at various targets. One fire mission from the battalion
came in support of the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry that was feint-
ing to cross the Euphrates River near An Najaf to draw Republic
Guard forces out of Baghdad. The feint worked; field artillery fires
destroyed a large number of enemy vehicles moving south from
Baghdad under the cover of the storm to reinforce An Najaf.16
As the sandstorm lifted, the 101st Airborne Division (Air As-
sault) relieved the 1st Brigade Combat Team and the 2d Brigade
Combat Team of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) at An Najaf
on 28 March 2003 so that they could continue their march on Bagh-
dad. Here, the airborne division experienced its first major combat
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.17
During the battle for An Najaf, the 101st Airborne Division’s
(Air Assault) 1st Brigade Combat Team’s and 2d Brigade Combat
Team’s field artillery effectively employed indirect fires against con-
firmed enemy targets, enemy snipers, and observers on rooftops. For
example, the division detached C Battery from its general support 1st
Battalion, 377th Field Artillery Regiment, a M198 towed 155-mil-
limeter artillery unit, to support its own M119 towed 105-millimeter
firing batteries from the 3d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regi-
ment, the 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, and 2d Bat-
talion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment. The division pushed these
batteries right behind the armor formations to the outskirts of the
city to engage the enemy at relatively short ranges and ensure fire
support coverage of the entire city.18

152
 While elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
fought around An Najaf, the 82d Airborne Division destroyed rem-
nants of Republic Guard and Saddam Fedayeen forces that were dis-
rupting lines of communication along Highway 8 in As Samawah.
During that fight, fire support from the 2d Battalion, 319th Field Ar-
tillery Regiment’s two M119 towed 105-millimeter howitzer batter-
ies repeatedly executed danger close missions by attacking enemy
targets within 450 meters of friendly forces.19
As the 82d Airborne Division battled around As Samawah,
the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) pushed toward the Karbala
Gap. The Gap was about 50 miles south of Baghdad between the
Salt Sea (Lake Razaza) to the west and the Euphrates River to the
east. Defended by the Baghdad Division and elements of the Nebu-
chadnezzar Division, the Gap provided the only open approach to
Baghdad that would avoid the urban sprawl in the Euphrates River
Valley and serve as a solid supply route. To break through the Gap,
the V Corps conducted five simultaneous attacks. The 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized) attacked along the Euphrates River toward
Al Hillah to draw Iraqi forces away from the Gap where the main
attack would cross the Euphrates River, while the 3d Squadron, 7th
Cavalry moved to the mouth of the Gap. The 101st Air Assault Divi-
sion continued fighting in An Najaf to secure it as the 82d Airborne
Division maintained its attack at As Samawah. An element of the
101st Air Assault Division meanwhile conducted an armed recon-
naissance to the south of the Salt Sea.20
Early in April 2003—under the cover of violent counterfire
missions from V Corps field artillery and the effective employ-
ment of precision munitions—the 1st Brigade Combat Team, the
2d Brigade Combat Team’s Task Force 4-64, and the 3d Brigade
Combat Team from 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) attacked the
Karbala Gap. As the 2d Brigade Combat Team of the 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized) drew enemy forces away from the Karbala
Gap toward Al Hillah supported by violent fires from the 1st Bat-
talion, 9th Field Artillery, the brigade combat teams and task force
attacked through the Karbala Gap toward Baghdad to the east of the
Euphrates River. In the meantime, M270A1 launchers from the 3d
Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery

153
Regiment engaged nine enemy targets in the town of Karbala with
rockets. At the same time, the division’s 1st Battalion, 41st Field
Artillery Regiment bombarded enemy positions in the town and the
Karbala Gap on 1 April 2003 with 155-millimeter rounds.21 Over
a period of 12 hours, field artillery fires destroyed 6 T-72 tanks, 13
armored personnel carriers, and 15 air defense weapons. This ac-
tion devastated the Medina Division of the Republican Guard and
enemy defenses in general. As a team, M270A1 launchers in the
meantime combined with Air Force close air support to destroy 60
enemy vehicles and 15 field artillery weapons, set the conditions for
encircling Baghdad, and establish the setting for the eventual col-
lapse of the Iraqi government.22
As the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) attacked through the
Karbala Gap, the 101st Airborne Division’s (Air Assault) 1st Bri-
gade Combat Team and the 2d Brigade Combat Team eliminated
remaining guerilla resistance to the south at An Najaf. The brigades
employed armor, field artillery fire support, and army aviation while
methodically moving through the city. They eliminated resistance;
destroyed ammunition, equipment, and weapons; and seized key
strong points then secured the city early in April 2003.23
Subsequently, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
launched an attack on Al Hillah (ancient Babylon) to the north of
An Najaf. Division artillery provided nine batteries in support of
the 3d Brigade Combat Team’s direct support battalion. Specifically,
the 3d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment received reinforc-
ing fires from the 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment; a
battery from the 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment; and
C Battery, 1st Battalion, 377th Field Artillery Regiment. Before the
3d Brigade Combat Team attacked Al Hillah on 8 April 2003, these
field artillery units massed rounds on single targets, fired as many
as eight batteries simultaneously, and moved within the outskirts of
the city. This permitted the 105-millimeter howitzers to range the
entire city in support of the maneuver arms and played a key role in
defeating enemy forces in the city.24
The 82d Airborne Division, meanwhile, protected vulner-
able supply lines created by the rapid advance of the 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized) and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force from
attacks by remnants of Republican Guard and Saddam Fedayeen

154
forces. With support from the 307th Engineers, the 2d Battalion,
319th Field Artillery Regiment established two battery fire bases
three kilometers southwest of As Samawah and received reinforc-
ing infantry to help with battery defense if required. Immediately
after occupying its position, B Battery, 2d Battalion, 319th Field
Artillery Regiment opened fire on enemy mortars and positions
on 29 March 2003. The battalion later furnished fire support when
the division’s 2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment as-
saulted the city after crossing the Euphrates River. The battalion
fired more than 1,000 rounds in support of the liberation of As
Samawah on 2 April 2003.25
As the 82d Airborne Division finished liberating As Samawah
and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) eliminated the remain-
ing resistance at An Najaf and Al Hillah, the 3d Infantry Division
(Mechanized) attacked Baghdad on 3 April 2003 with a field artil-
lery preparation from organic assets and counterfire from the 214th
Field Artillery Brigade and Army Tactical Missile Systems from the
41st Field Artillery Brigade. Close air support and Multiple Launch
Rocket System and cannon fires supported the division’s 1st Brigade
Combat Team attack on the Saddam International Airport, later re-
named Baghdad International Airport. The 1st Battalion, 41st Field
Artillery Regiment from 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) fired 26
missions on enemy strongholds, killing two T-72 tanks, destroying
numerous bunkers and buildings, and suppressing enemy positions.
Meanwhile, the division’s 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery Regi-
ment and the 214th Field Artillery Brigade’s 2d Battalion, 4th Field
Artillery (Multiple Launch Rocket System) engaged Special Repub-
lican Guard forces on the airfield complex. Multiple Launch Rocket
System fires followed by cannon fires immediately preceded Task
Force 3-69’s attack. Along with other attacks, this effort helped con-
solidate US forces around Baghdad and the airport. On 10 April 2003,
the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the I Marine Expedition-
ary Force completed defeating enemy forces in the city, relying on
fire support for counterfire and close support to the maneuver arms.26
In just 18 days, the V Corps battled its way from the Kuwait-Iraq
border to Baghdad; major combat action ended on 10 April 2003.27
Many people thought that the fight would be long and that the enemy

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would possibly employ weapons of mass destruction. However, it
was a swift victory for Coalition forces—with American field artil-
lery performing brilliantly, according to the Center for Army Les-
sons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The 3d Infantry Division
(Mechanized) fired almost 14,000 155-millimeter rounds, includ-
ing more than 120 Sense-and-Destroy-Armor precision munitions.
The 101st Airborne Division’s (Air Assault) field artillery shot 516
rounds, while the 2d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment of the
82d Airborne Division fired more than 4,000 rounds. Most of those
rounds came in support of light infantry in urban operations.28
Reflecting on his division’s operations, the Commanding Gen-
eral of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Major General Bu-
ford Blount III, gave credit to his fire support. Joint fires and field
artillery paved the way for success and permitted his division to de-
feat the enemy and move from the Kuwait-Iraq border to Baghdad,
where it occupied the Baghdad International Airport.29
The 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 101st Airborne Di-
vision (Air Assault), and the 82d Airborne Division fought their way
along the Euphrates River to Baghdad and the 4th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) rushed forward from Kuwait as a follow-on force in
April 2003. Simultaneous with these efforts to help secure Iraq after
law and order had collapsed, other Coalition combat forces invaded
Iraq. Composed of the 1st Marine Division, Task Force Tarawa, the
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and the British 1st Armoured Division,
the I Marine Expeditionary Force under the command of Lieutenant
General James Conway crossed the Kuwait-Iraq border on 21 March
2003. Covering the ground forces, field artillery fires from the 11th
Marine Regiment engaged the Iraqi 51st Mechanized Infantry Divi-
sion and the Iraqi III Regular Army Corps artillery, including the
corps command and control node and long-range fires capabilities;
the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division; and the Iraqi 6th Armored Division.
The Marines defeated the Iraqis and secured the nearby oil infra-
structure. Meanwhile, I Marine Expeditionary Force concentrated
deep shaping fires on the Iraqi IV Regular Army Corps near Amarah
and the Baghdad Republican Guard Infantry Division near Al Kut
on its drive toward An Nasiriyah as the British 1st Armoured Divi-
sion fought for Al Basrah.30

156
 In the midst of this fighting, Task Force Tarawa received an or-
der to conduct a relief in place of 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized)
in the vicinity of Tallil Airbase and the Highway 1 bridge across the
Euphrates River west of An Nasiriyah. On the morning of 23 March
2003, lead elements of the task force reached the city, where light
fighting was anticipated. Instead, the Marines encountered fierce
combat, depending on the 1st Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment for
fire support. The battle raged the next day with fire support coming
from the 1st Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment and I Battery, 3d Bat-
talion, 10th Marine Regiment. On 25 March 2003, a raging sand-
storm restricted fire support to field artillery fires. Once unmanned
aerial vehicles could get into the air on 26 March 2003 and provide
accurate targeting information, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marine Regi-
ment broke up an enemy attack of 2,000 and killed about 200 enemy
soldiers. Fighting reached a crescendo on 26 March 2003, with fire
missions declining the rest of the month. Only a few pockets of re-
sistance around An Nasiriyah remained, and those were cleared out
by the first week of April 2003.31
During the conflicts, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized)
had seized Highway 1 bridges over the Euphrates River to the west
of the city and the bridge northwest of the city. Taking advantage of
the situation, the 1st Marine Division led by the 3d Light Armored
Reconnaissance Battalion and the 5th Regiment Combat Team con-
tinued its drive north toward Ad Diwaniyah. On 23 March 2003, the
division crossed the Euphrates River and pressed along Highway
1 toward Ad Diwaniyah. The following day, a blinding sandstorm
reduced visibility to nearly zero, preventing close air support. Fire
support from the 11th Marine Regiment protected the division’s
lead elements from mortar and surface attack that day. During the
next six days, the 11th Marine Regiment faced deteriorating weath-
er conditions caused by the sandstorm, enemy mortar attacks, and
repeated probes by Fedayeen death squads. Despite the challenges,
the regiment continued to provide counterfire and suppressive fires
along the division’s main supply route, Highway 1, to keep it open.
On 31 March 2003, the division seized the Hantush Airstrip on
Highway 1 near Ad Diwaniyah as enemy resistance weakened. One
day later, the 5th Regiment Combat Team pushed eastward from Ad

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Diwaniyah along Highway 27 that linked Highway 7 with Highway
6 and captured a vital crossing over the Saddam Canal. On 2 April
2003, the regiment seized the bridge across the Tigris River so that
the division could skirt around Al Kut from the west.32
Simultaneously, the 1st Marine Division’s 1st Regiment Com-
bat Team and the 7th Regiment Combat Team moved north along
Highway 6 to Al Kut. The 1st Regiment Combat Team fixed the Al
Kut defenders from the south as the 7th Regiment Combat Team at-
tacked from the north. Once these units drew near to Al Kut, fierce
fighting broke out on 3 April 2003. The 11th Marine Regiment field
artillery destroyed enemy field artillery batteries, fortified positions,
and a Baghdad Republican Guard regimental headquarters. They
also helped crush the last remaining conventional capability around
the city and cut the line linking Baghdad with Al Basrah. After par-
ticipating in isolating the city, the 1st Marine Division turned its
attention on 5 April 2003 to Baghdad; meanwhile, the 5th Regiment
Combat Team took the lead and drove up Highway 6 with massed
fire support from the 2d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment and the 3d
Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment as required.33
Upon reaching the approaches to Baghdad on 5 April 2003,
Marine field artillery participated in cordoning off the city and pro-
vided counterfire against Iraqi artillery. Anticipating that the city
would be rigorously defended, Marine fires quickly decimated Iraqi
defenses, causing them to crumble. By 10 April 2003, Marine field
artillery had few targets to engage and fighting was effectively over
as Saddam’s regime collapsed. The Marines then were ordered to
Tikrit, where they quickly neutralized enemy forces there. The con-
ventional war was over.34
In a relatively short period of time, US military forces and Amer-
ican allies brought Saddam’s regime to its knees. Beginning during
the latter days of March 2003 and ending during the first days of April
2003, they aggressively drove from the Kuwait-Iraq border and de-
cisively defeated Iraqi ground forces that resisted their advance. The
war reinforced the imperative of combined arms operations in which
field artillery and maneuver arms formed an impressive team.

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Time of Reflection
On the heels of the 2003 combat operations came reflection
about the Field Artillery’s ability to provide responsive indirect
fires. After reading many after action reports from Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Major General Michael D. Maples, who was the Com-
mandant of the US Army Field Artillery School from 2001 to 2003,
commented about Field Artillery’s contributions. In the Septem-
ber–October 2003 Field Artillery, he wrote, “Artillery played a key
and essential role. Every commander cited artillery as indispensable
during the fight.”35 In a brief report addressing this observation, the
Center for Army Lessons Learned concurred, “Maneuver realizes
the importance of FS [fire support] and how an effective integration
of FS can add to the overall scheme of maneuver. Maneuver, at first,
was hesitant to mass FA [field artillery] fires but after initial con-
flicts would not go into areas unless it was preceded by FA prep.”36
Repeatedly, field artillery units shifted fires around battlefields
to permit the maneuver arms to advance or destroy the enemy.37 In
its after action report, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) point-
ed out, “Field artillery, close air support (CAS), and air interdic-
tion (AI) were instrumental in allowing the freedom of maneuver.”38
During the battle of As Samawah, for example, the 82d Airborne
Division recounted close support’s ability to fix the enemy in place
so that it could not flee. Once the enemy had been fixed in place,
the division brought in close air support if additional fires were re-
quired to complete its destruction. “Any enemy trying to escape was
immediately identified by KW [OH-58 Kiowa Warrior helicopters]
who could either adjust artillery to destroy the escaping element or
attack the escaping element directly,” the 82d Airborne Division re-
corded.39 However, the division explained, “During combat opera-
tions in As Samawah, ground-based fire support assets were the only
reliable fire support system capable of responding to the dynamic
nature of the enemy situation.”40 Responsive fires came within min-
utes after a call for fire.41
In a memorandum to the commander of the 325th Airborne
Infantry Regiment of the 82d Airborne Division, Lieutenant Colonel
Steven J. Smith of the 2d Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery

159
Regiment reinforced the importance of field artillery fire support.
Colonel Smith wrote that the use of field artillery indirect fires dur-
ing the battle of As Samawah was critical because they set the con-
ditions for the offensive operations to follow. “The Artillery was
able to destroy a TST [time-sensitive target] that could have been
lost if we waited for fixed or rotary wing assets; OH58’s simply did
not have the firepower to destroy the target.”42
Writing in the September–October 2003 Field Artillery, the 3d
Infantry Division (Mechanized) artillery commander, Colonel Thom-
as G. Torrance, and the Deputy Fire Support Coordinator for the 3d
Infantry Division (Mechanized), Lieutenant Colonel Noel T. Nicolle,
expressed comparable thoughts about close support. “Despite the be-
lief by some that the Field Artillery. . .has ‘walked away from the
close fight,’ maneuver commanders in the 3d Infantry Division will
argue otherwise—13,923 155-mm rounds and 794 MLRS [Multiple
Launch Rocket System] rockets. . .in OIF back[ed] them up.”43
In some instances, however, the maneuver arms did not require
massed fires. In a lengthy 29 April 2003 after action report, the 1st
Battalion, 9th Field Artillery Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division
(Mechanized) noted, “The Battalion was able to provide effective
observed fires on most Iraqi targets with only battery-level missions.
The Iraqi force was spread across the battlefield in small pockets
of resistance rather than large mechanized forces in well-prepared
defenses.”44 In many instances, a battery one-volley or two-volley
caused the enemy to surrender. The battalion only massed battalion-
level fires on radar acquisitions sent from division artillery.45
Counterfire also proved just as effective. In a brief report fol-
lowing the war, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) recorded,
“Cannon artillery and counter fire operations were repeatedly of ma-
jor value in support of maneuver forces and in destroying enemy
mortars and artillery.”46 Similarly, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Brian L.
Borer and Lieutenant Colonel Nicolle, both from the 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized), wrote that during Operation Iraqi Freedom,
the 3d Division Artillery engaged in an overwhelming successful
counterfire effort. In 21 days, they processed more than 1,800 hos-
tile acquisitions with no record of 3d Division Soldiers killed due
to Iraqi mortar, cannon or rocket fire.47 They noted that the 3d Divi-

160
sion Artillery fired 74 general support counterfire missions with an
estimated battle damage assessment of more than 150 enemy artil-
lery systems destroyed and 700 enemy killed in action.48 After the
war the Assistant Division Commander of the 3d Infantry Division
(Mechanized), Brigadier General Lloyd J. Austin III, pointed out
that his division fired 91 counterfire missions in 21 days to support
the close fight.49
The V Corps Commanding General, Lieutenant General Wil-
liam S. Wallace, commented that the Multiple Launch Rocket Sys-
tem was very effective in counterfire. “Every time the enemy tried
to mass his artillery, he got whacked with something,” he recounted
in an interview with the editor of the Field Artillery.50
Although doctrine called for high-angle fires in an urban en-
vironment, field artillery officers and Soldiers preferred low-angle
fires from field artillery systems as their method of choice. On 21
July 2003, the 82d Airborne Division wrote that 105-millimeter
fires used in conjunction with accurate target location were effec-
tive and limited collateral damage. During combat action in As Sa-
mawah, 82d Airborne Division elements employed field artillery
and organic mortars in and around built-up areas with great effec-
tiveness. In the battle for Baghdad, indirect fires also helped reduce
enemy strongpoints in buildings that could not be taken out by di-
rect fires alone. For example, Task Force 3-15 of the 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized) that fought along Highway 8 in Baghdad
employed indirect fires to destroy enemy-occupied buildings and
secure their objectives with a minimal casualty rate. Limited vis-
ibility and close-in fighting compelled the task force to use danger
close missions. During the battles, it started danger close missions
at 400 to 600 meters in front of friendly forces and walked the
rounds to within 200 meters in order to destroy enemy positions.
This was done by keeping the friendly forces buttoned up and situ-
ationally aware of the mission.51
As a few field artillery officers noted, urban conditions in Iraq
permitted employing low-angle field artillery systems in urban war-
fare. Except for Baghdad, most buildings in Iraqi cities were no
more than three stories in height and did not require high-angle
fires from mortars to fire over them. The longer range of low-angle

161
fires from field artillery systems decreased the number of moves,
permitted indirect fire coverage, and provided greater accuracy than
mortars. Although they recognized the value of field artillery in an
urban environment, field artillery officers conceded that unique
challenges still existed; they urged more study and review before
making indirect fires from field artillery systems a critical part of
urban warfare doctrine.52
Equally important, field artillery units delivered fires at a higher
rate and greater volume per system than their Operation Desert Storm
predecessors in 1991. While 54 M109A6 (Paladin) self-propelled
155-millimeter howitzers fired 13,941 rounds, eight M198 towed
155-millimeter howitzers shot 516 rounds. Sixty-two M119 towed
105-millimeter howitzers hurled 4,107 projectiles at enemy targets.
On average, the 155-millimeter howitzers responded to a call for fire
in less than one minute. In comparison, their Operation Desert Storm
predecessors took around three minutes to engage the enemy after a
call for fire. Seventy-three M270A1 launchers fired 857 rockets and
414 Army Tactical Missile Systems I, with the missiles engaging a
target in less than seven minutes on average after a call for fire. This
was 53 minutes faster than Army Tactical Missile System I attacks in
Operation Desert Storm. From 20 March 2003 to 10 April 2003, field
artillery units fired more than 450 Army Tactical Missile Systems (I
and Ia) in support of joint combat operations. They also launched 13
Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile Systems as part of the
initial battlefield preparation prior to the ground campaign.53
During the early years of the 21st Century, the Army adopted the
Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System, which was
developed based on lessons learned in Kosovo in 1999. In that con-
flict, it became clear that commanders required a long-range weapon
with precision attack capabilities to deliver a single 500-pound high
explosive warhead using Global Positioning System guidance to
engage a point target with minimal collateral damage in areas of
dense foliage, deep snow cover, and built-up urban environments.
The Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System deliv-
ered interim capabilities until the Army Tactical Missile System Ia
Unitary could be fielded in the next couple of years. It provided the
corps and joint task force commander with the capability to attack

162
time-sensitive targets where collateral damage, fratricide, bomblet
dud rates, or aircraft risk might be a concern and participated in the
initial battlefield preparation that allowed the Operation Iraqi Free-
dom ground campaign to begin in March 2003.54
Just as important, the Army Tactical Missile System provided
all-weather fire support. During the Mother of All Sandstorms (24–
27 March 2003) with 100-meter visibility and winds gusting up to
50 knots with thousands of Iraqi paramilitary in the area, “Ground-
based indirect fires (Army Tactical Missile System) were absolutely
critical,” according to Brigadier General Austin.55 This organic fire
support capability allowed the ground commander to maneuver his
forces out of contact while setting the conditions for his next fight
and gave him the flexibility to adapt to overcome the actions of an
interactive, thinking enemy.56
In fact, during the Mother of All Sandstorms, the 3d Infantry
Division (Mechanized) depended on indirect fires to kill the enemy.
The maneuver arms caused the enemy to move so that intelligence
assets could identify the enemy’s exact location. Once this had
been accomplished, indirect fires from field artillery and mortars
destroyed the enemy.57 Along these lines, Lieutenant Colonel Terry
Ferrell of the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, the 3d Infantry Division
(Mechanized) noted that the only system capable of assisting the
squadron in adverse weather conditions was the M270A1 launcher.
Also, the M119 towed 105-millimeter howitzer provided accurate
indirect fires in support of maneuver forces 24 hours a day with no
limitations due to weather.58 As General Blount and other senior of-
ficers pointed out, massed Army field artillery fires, regardless of the
weather, remained the key to victory as they had been in past wars.59
To complement this impressive capability, US Marine field artillery
systems battered the enemy with 19,587 rounds.60
A relatively new organization, the Fires Effects Coordina-
tion Cell facilitated massing fires for the maneuver commanders
in all weather. The cell was first envisioned by Major General Leo
J. Baxter, who was the Commandant of the Field Artillery School
from 1997 to 1999, and put into operation by his successor, Ma-
jor General Toney Stricklin (1999 to 2001). It provided the same
functions as the fire support element but added new ones. Besides

163
coordinating indirect fires, the cell had the ability to conduct infor-
mation operations, furnish deep operations previously done by the
corps Deep Operations Coordination Cell, and coordinate nonle-
thal effects using electronic warfare and nonlethal munitions. These
functions previously were beyond the purview of the fire support
element at the brigade.61
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, the Fires Effects Co-
ordination Cell did not function as intended by Generals Baxter and
Stricklin. General Wallace noted that though it performed well, non-
lethal effects such as civil affairs and information operations needed
to be integrated into the cell. “The FECC [Fires Effects Coordination
Cell] should be the manager of all effects on the battlefield,” he said.62
As much as doctrine proved to be sound and the Fires Effects
Coordination Cell functioned well, Operation Iraqi Freedom also
validated the effectiveness of field artillery systems that had been
introduced since Operation Desert Storm of 1991. Fielded after Op-
eration Desert Storm, the M109A6 Paladin self-propelled 155-mil-
limeter howitzer delivered responsive accurate fires within a couple
of minutes of receiving a call-for-fire, stayed abreast of the maneu-
ver forces, and had the ability to shoot from anywhere.63 Colonel
Torrance and Lieutenant Colonel Nicolle of the 3d Infantry Division

Figure 7: Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicle.

Source: US Army photo by Sergeant First Class Gerald Mitchell.

164
(Mechanized) wrote, “The combat performance of the M109A6 Pal-
adin was magnificent. It is an extremely capable system that consis-
tently put rounds downrange in less than two minutes after mission
receipt, even while on the march.”64
Other major field artillery systems received equally positive re-
views. In the September-October 2003 Field Artillery, Torrance and
Nicolle commented: “The M7 BFIST [Bradley Fire Support Team
vehicle] performed brilliantly. For the first time, the artillery com-
munity has a vehicle that allows FISTs [Fire Support Teams] to keep
up with their maneuver counterparts and remain in the fight.”65 The
M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle gave the company fire sup-
port officer the ability to remain well forward in maneuver forma-
tions without compromising safety and initiated 407 of the 657 di-
rect support fire missions for the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized).
In view of this, the division declared the M7 to be a winner.66 In
counterfire fights, the M270A1 launcher that was just being fielded
also lived up to its advance billing. Capable of being configured to
shoot Army Tactical Missile System missiles, M270A1 launchers
permitted V Corps artillery to engage deep targets accurately and
more responsively than close air support. During the “Shock and
Awe” attack that opened Operation Iraqi Freedom combat opera-
tions, Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System mis-
siles destroyed enemy army headquarters with precision and served
well in deep operations.67 The High Mobility Artillery Rocket Sys-
tem also made its debut. Linked with Firefinder AN/TPQ-36 and
AN/TPQ-37 radars, the system provided fires for special operations
forces as they maneuvered on the western front, while the Sense-
and-Destroy Armor Munition brought cannon field artillery into the
precision age.68
Another major new system since Operation Desert Storm, the
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System demonstrated its
utility. From the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) artillery’s per-
spective, the system passed with “flying colors.”69 It permitted pass-
ing fire commands digitally and rapidly to provide timely, accurate,
and lethal fires in support of maneuver forces.70 V Corps artillery
also pointed out that the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Sys-
tem “performed well throughout the operation.”71 Along the same

165
lines, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) noted that the system
“proved battle worthy in technical and tactical fire direction.”72
Notwithstanding this, the system exhibited deficiencies as did
other field artillery systems. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
System hardware was cumbersome, and its software also caused
some problems.73 Every time a new problem with the software arose,
the contractor created a new patch or version. Multiple software ver-
sions added to the issues. Discussing this, the 3d Battalion, 320th
Field Artillery Regiment, noted, “If an NCO [noncommissioned of-
ficer] leaves for Drill Sergeant, Recruiting or some other duty that
takes him out of Field Artillery for a year or more, he must be re-
trained upon his return because of the new version or patches that
have come out.”74 This prompted the battalion to write that the Ad-
vanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System and the artillery com-
munity needed to “slow down on the patches and look at a replace-
ment.”75 Another unit, 2d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment,
pointed out that because of the numerous software changes and up-
grades, operators had not been able to master the system’s many
functions and troubleshooting procedures.76 In sum, the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System needed to be more user-friendly
to reduce operational unit training time. The 1st Battalion, 9th Field
Artillery Regiment expressed comparable thoughts in its after ac-
tion report. They indicated the system lacked the ability to perform
fire missions at optimal speeds and noted that its software was not
efficient and its hardware was not powerful enough. However, they
noted that overall the system functioned well.77
Munitions and weapons also displayed shortcomings that re-
quired modifying. In an after action report after the offensive from
the Kuwait-Iraqi border to Baghdad, V Corps commented that cur-
rent Multiple Launch Rocket System range and precision limitations
“do not allow for firing in the proximity of friendly troops or in areas
of potential collateral damage. This unnecessarily makes close air
support a more viable option for the maneuver commander.”78 Ex-
pediting the production and delivery of the Guided Multiple Launch
Rocket System Unitary and the Dual-Purpose Improved Conven-
tional Munition, both under development, would improve range and
precision. Reflecting this line of thinking, the 3d Infantry Division

166
(Mechanized) also urged increasing the range of cannon and rocket
artillery, which were consistently outranged by Iraqi field artillery;
further, they recommended developing more precision munitions
that would greatly enhance flexibility and lethality.79
Notwithstanding the limitations of the Advanced Field Artil-
lery Tactical Data System and the Dual-Purpose Improved Conven-
tional Munition, the 2003 invasion and rapid advance to Baghdad
demonstrated that the Field Artillery was indispensable. Regardless
of the weather, field artillery cannons, rockets, and missiles pro-
vided effective and responsive counterfire and close support to si-
lence enemy indirect and direct fire systems so that the maneuver
arms could move relatively unscathed. Meanwhile the Sense-and-
Destroy-Armor Munition, the Army Tactical Missile System I and
IA, and the Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System
furnished precision capabilities to minimize collateral damage, en-
gage small targets, and complement massed fires. In short, combat
operations validated 1990s modernization efforts that had improved
field artillery mobility and lethality.

The Insurgency and the Field Artillery

The insurgency that followed the 2003 Iraq invasion and Op-
eration Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan had a threefold impact
on the Field Artillery. First, it forced the Army to accelerate field-
ing of precision munitions, such as the Precision Guidance Kit,
the Excalibur 155-millimeter precision munition, and the Guided
Multiple Launch Rocket System munition. These would make the
Field Artillery more lethal on the 21st Century battlefield and mini-
mize collateral damage that undermined the American effort to gain
the support of the Iraqi people. The Army also needed to acceler-
ate fielding of sensors with the ability to locate targets precisely.
Second, the insurgency emphasized nonstandard missions, such as
civil affairs and patrolling, at the expense of fire support. Lacking
opportunities to provide fire support, field artillery officer and Sol-
dier core competencies deteriorated, which prompted the Field Ar-
tillery School to initiate programs to restore skills. Third, the Army
required joint fires observers to coordinate close air support and
joint fires in Iraq and Afghanistan.

167
 Although it had been working to introduce precision muni-
tions since the 1970s, the Army only produced a limited number
and types. For example, the laser-designated Copperhead 155-mil-
limeter munition employed during Operation Desert Storm had a
slow response time, and the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition
that was initially designed to attack Soviet armor was expensive.
Restrictive American rules of engagement during Operation Endur-
ing Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom were designed to mini-
mize noncombatant injuries and death as well as collateral damage
to non-military targets. Aware of this concern, adversaries dispersed
their forces and often occupied positions in or near populated areas
to discourage the Americans from employing field artillery. Such
tactics placed a premium on precision munitions to engage enemy
targets and forces without collateral damage. As a result, the Army
accelerated developing and fielding of these munitions.
Because the high cost of Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition
restricted its use during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army pur-
sued a less expensive precision munition. On 20 November 2003,
the Commanding General of the US Army Training and Doctrine
Command tasked the US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill
to head a working group of military and industry representatives to
conduct the Precision Effects Study. The study determined current
or near-current precision engagement solutions and selected those
with the best payoff for field artillery and mortar assets, with the
goal of fielding the new technology within 24 to 36 months.80
Although various suggestions emerged, the course-correcting
fuse, renamed Precision Guidance Kit in 2005, offered much prom-
ise. Based on analysis of the proposed solutions during the first
part of 2004, the center concluded that the Precision Guidance Kit
would vastly improve the accuracy of 105-millimeter and 155-mil-
limeter projectiles by using the Global Positioning System to pro-
vide location during flight and make trajectory corrections as re-
quired. The fuse would also drive down the size of the logistical tail
by reducing the number of rounds required for each engagement,
would transform a “dumb projectile” into a “smart projectile,” and
would be cost effective.81
As of 2006, the Army planned to field the Precision Guidance
Kit in three increments. Increment I would permit the projectile

168
to hit within 50 meters of the target, address urgent operational
needs in the Global War on Terrorism, and be fielded in 2010. In-
crement II would minimize Global Positioning System interference
and jamming; improve accuracy to 30 meters; address the entire
155-millimeter family of platforms, munitions, and propellants;
and be fielded in 2013. Increment III would add the 105-millime-
ter family of platforms, munitions, and propellants and would be
fielded in 2014.82
Developmental problems forced the Army to push back field-
ing. After the Precision Guidance Kit fuse failed early in 2010, a
team organized to investigate the situation pointed to design prob-
lems and recommended terminating the program or letting it slip so
that fielding would be later than initially planned. In December 2010,
the Army Systems Acquisition Review Board approved allowing the
program to slip to make minor design changes and then field the Pre-
cision Guidance Kit Increment I in 2014 rather than 2010 as initially
scheduled. The other increments would be fielded subsequently.83
Meanwhile, the Department of the Army G-3 directed an urgent
material release on 17 May 2011 that accelerated fielding Increment
I with reduced reliability to support Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan. Based on a successful flight test in August–Septem-
ber 2011, the Army decided in March 2012 to fast-track fielding
Increment I from 2014 to 2013. This decision gave the Precision
Guidance Kit two developmental tracks—the baseline program and
the urgent material release program. As the Army fielded the urgent
material release in 2013–2014, it continued developing the baseline
fuse with the objective of introducing it in 2020.84
Determined to increase the range of its cannon artillery without
sacrificing accuracy, the Army concurrently explored adopting the
XM982 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile. As initially
planned in 1995 and 1996, Excalibur would be a fire-and-forget
projectile with a Global Positioning System receiver and unit guid-
ance package that would allow the projectile to fly extended ranges
(50 kilometers) to shape the close battle and improve survivability
because it would be able to hit within six meters of the target. The
projectile’s modular design would permit carrying the Dual-Purpose
Improved Conventional Munition for area targets; the Sense-and-

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Destroy-Armor Munition for counterfire against self-propelled artil-
lery or armor; or the Unitary Munition, a single high-explosive war-
head for soft or hard precision targets. After it was fielded, Excalibur
would give the Field Artillery improved fire support capabilities;
be compatible with all digitized 155-millimeter howitzers, includ-
ing the Crusader self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer under de-
velopment; reduce fratricide; and be fielded with the Dual-Purpose
Improved Conventional Munition in 2006, the Sense-and-Destroy-
Armor Munition in 2007, and the Unitary in 2010.85
Several years into development, insufficient funding and the
early 2000 termination of the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition
program prompted the Army to limit Excalibur’s initial development
to the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition. However,
priorities shifted due to the fear of duds and collateral damage, the
need for precision, and the Transformation of the Army process that
was underway, especially the creation of the Initial Brigade Combat
Team. In December 2000, Major General Toney Stricklin, the Com-
mandant of the US Army Field Artillery School from 1999 to 2001,
recommended switching Excalibur’s initial development from the

Figure 8: M777 towed 155-millimeter howitzer.

Source: US Army photo by Chuck Wullenjohn.

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Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, which often left un-
exploded bomblets, caused collateral damage, and was perceived to
be too dangerous to civilians and soldiers alike. He suggested switch-
ing to the Unitary warhead. Concurring with General Stricklin, the
Excalibur Program Manager subsequently deferred work on the Dual-
Purpose Improved Conventional Munition warhead in January 2001
and designated the Unitary as the primary Excalibur warhead because
it would produce low collateral damage. This decision raised Uni-
tary’s importance after it had languished as a low priority for years.86
To get Excalibur to the field as quickly as possible to meet re-
quirements generated by the Global War on Terrorism, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense subsequently tasked the Program Man-
ager for Excalibur to accelerate fielding by employing “spiral de-
velopment.”87 This approach would deliver sequential, increasing
capability over time until the objective requirements were met. As
announced by the Army Acquisition Executive on 28 August 2002,
Unitary Excalibur Increment I would be fielded to the M777 towed
155-millimeter howitzer in 2006. Increment II or the enhanced
Unitary Excalibur with more capabilities would be fielded to the
Future Combat System Cannon under development in 2008, while
Increment III would satisfy the original munition requirements and
would be fielded in 2010 or 2011.88
Studies in 2002 and 2003 validated Unitary Excalibur develop-
ment. As a precision munition, it destroyed point targets and high-
value area targets at extended ranges in complex terrain and urban
environments from dispersed locations and would fill existing de-
ficiencies, such as the inability to destroy point targets and restrict
collateral damage. In view of the current operational environment
in Afghanistan and Iraq, such capabilities would be crucial for US
joint military forces to succeed.89
As the studies indicated, Excalibur offered other distinct ad-
vantages. The June 2002 Achieving Transformation in Fire Support
Study determined that the firepower of existing Army field artillery
systems would be improved much more with precision munitions,
such as the Excalibur and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Sys-
tem munition, than by investing in Crusader, which was being de-
veloped as the next-generation self-propelled 155-millimeter how-

171
itzer. Also, the July 2002 Alternative Indirect Fire Study concluded
that Excalibur Unitary was more effective against a wider variety of
targets and at a greater range than current munitions—even when
used with current target acquisition capabilities. The warhead would
be less expensive because it could be used in smaller numbers than
non-precision munitions. Subsequently, the March 2003 Non-Line-
of-Sight Mix Study noted that Excalibur Unitary would greatly
enhance the lethality of the current cannon force and validated the
need for the munition. Ultimately, Excalibur and other precision
munitions would provide more capability at equal or less cost than
fielding the Crusader.90
Along with the studies, the Coalition Forces Land Component
Command endorsed the urgent needs statement for the Excalibur in
August 2004—creating the requirement to rush the munition to the
operational forces. Although the product of the accelerated program
would not satisfy the objective round capabilities, it met the urgent
needs statement and created a parallel development program for
Excalibur. Essentially, the urgent needs statement required splitting
Increment I into two parts. Increment Ia-1, the urgent requirement
munition, would provide the theater forces with an immediate need
capability and have less capability. Increment Ia-2, the objective
program, would have improved reliability and improved counter-
measures and would be fielded to M777A2 155-millimeter towed
howitzer and Paladin units.91
The urgent requirement Excalibur quickly demonstrated its
value in combat. Following new equipment training, the 1st Cav-
alry Division conducted the first operational firing of the munition
on 5 May 2007 at a well-known insurgent safe house in Bagh-
dad, Iraq. Elements from the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment
teamed with the 1st Battalion, 82d Field Artillery Regiment to de-
stroy the safe house with one Excalibur round. At the end of 2007,
other American operational units had fired the urgent requirement
Excalibur in Operation Iraqi Freedom, while Canadian forces had
fired it in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In February
2008, American forces began firing the urgent requirement Excali-
bur in Operation Enduring Freedom when units equipped with the
M777A2 deployed to Afghanistan.92

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 Improvement efforts with the Multiple Launch Rocket Sys-
tem meanwhile focused on enhancing munitions to give them better
range and precision. Although the Multiple Launch Rocket System
performed well in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, its rockets and
their submunitions raised serious questions. During the war, many
Iraqi artillery assets outranged their Coalition counterparts, includ-
ing Multiple Launch Rocket System munitions. Also, the high dud
rate of Multiple Launch Rocket System submunitions raised con-
cerns about the safety of soldiers passing through the impact ar-
eas. Together, the proliferation of long-range rocket systems and the
high dud rate led to the requirement for an Extended Range Multiple
Launch Rocket System rocket with a range of 45 kilometers and a
lower submunition dud rate.93
After the Army started producing the extended-range rocket
with the M77 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition in
2001 to meet the range requirements identified in Operation Des-
ert Storm, it began developing an extended-range Guided Multiple
Launch Rocket System rocket that could be fired from the M270A1
launcher under development and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket
System M142 launcher also under development. The accuracy of
the traditional free-flight Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket de-
graded as the range to the target increased. In contrast, the guided
rocket’s Global Positioning System-aided inertial navigation system
improved accuracy from a minimum range of 15 kilometers to a
maximum of 60 to 70 kilometers to attack area and point targets.
The range depended on warhead weight and type of propellant. The
guided rocket would also enhance the ability to conduct precision
strikes, reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target,
and give the rocket an additional 15-kilometer range beyond the Ex-
tended Range Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket. Such a range
would permit hitting more targets and make the weapon system
more survivable, because the rocket launcher could be positioned
farther from the target. However, technical problems in 2000 and
rising production costs caused the program to slip, with the initial
operational capability moved from 2000 to 2006.94
A restructured schedule prompted the Army to hold a Special
Army Systems Acquisition Review Council in November 2001 to

173
justify further development. As an integral part of the review, the
1982 Nunn-McCurdy Act required the Army to determine if a sys-
tem was essential to national security, calculate whether an alterna-
tive with equal or greater capability was available, ascertain if the
program was adequately staffed to control costs, and assess if unit
costs were reasonable. If the Army failed to answer the questions
satisfactorily, development would be stopped. After the review fa-
vorably answered the questions, development continued.95
Even before operational testing could be completed on the
Guided Unitary Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket, Lieuten-
ant General Thomas F. Metz, the Commander of the Multi-National
Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and also Commander of the US
Army III Corps, sent the Army an operational needs statement for
the rocket on 28 March 2004. After the Army denied the request on
13 September 2004, General Metz sent the Army an urgent needs
statement for the rocket on 12 October 2004. He indicated that his
forces required a precision, all-weather, low-caliber, high-explosive
Multiple Launch Rocket System munition to integrate into joint fires
in an urban environment, attack high pay-off targets, and provide
large area coverage and that the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
System Unitary rocket met those requirements.96
On 6 January 2005, the Army endorsed General Metz’s request
and accelerated work on the rocket to provide it sooner than 2006.97
On 9 and 10 September 2005, B Battery, 3d Battalion, 13th Field Ar-
tillery Regiment fired a six-rocket mission at an insurgent safe house
in an urban environment at 53 kilometers. They destroyed it, killing
insurgents in the process, and shot another two-round mission in the
same area that killed more insurgents. One day later, A Battery, 3d
Battalion, 13th Field Artillery Regiment shot six rockets at a bridge
and destroyed it. In all instances, collateral damage to surrounding
buildings was almost non-existent, according to participants.98
For precision munitions such as the Guided Unitary Multiple
Launch Rocket System rocket to perform to their capabilities, they
required sensors with the ability to locate a target precisely. Early
in the 1990s, fire supporters employed the Ground/Vehicular Laser
Locator Designator to lase targets for precision munitions, meaning
the Copperhead laser-designated munition. Because it weighed 107

174
pounds, the system reduced the mobility of light fire support teams,
did not meet their needs, and was not man-portable. In response to
the noted deficiencies, the US Army Field Artillery School acquired
the tripod-mounted Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder to re-
place the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locater Designator. In its target lo-
cation configuration, the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder
weighed about 20 pounds, had the ability to locate targets accurately
out to 10 kilometers, and could see the battlefield with a near all-
weather capability at shorter ranges.99 In 2002, the Army fielded 15
low-rate initial production rangefinders to the 82d Airborne Division
in Afghanistan after years of developmental work and completed
fielding of full-rate production rangefinders in 2011.100
Seeking performance improvements and further weight reduc-
tion to enhance mobility for light units in view of Afghanistan com-
bat operations, the Army introduced the improved accuracy tripod-
mounted Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder II (named to
distinguish it from the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder
I). Fielding began in 2011 to units supporting Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan.101
The mounted Fire Support Sensor System complemented this
effort. It integrated the laser designation module from the Light-
weight Laser Designator Rangefinder onto the Long-Range Ad-
vanced Scout Surveillance System. The Army mounted the system
on Knight and Bradley fire support vehicles and started fielding in
2006. With the Fire Support Sensor System, the Army possessed
the most capable observation, target location, and designation sen-
sor on the battlefield.102
Besides encouraging an accelerated pace for developing and
acquiring precision munitions and sophisticated sensors with the
ability to locate targets precisely, the insurgency in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan prompted the Field Artillery School to reexamine its
field artillery training for field artillery Soldiers. Beginning early in
2005, the Field Artillery School observed that core competencies of
officers attending the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course had
been degraded. A school survey revealed that 90 percent of the stu-
dents had not participated in qualification-table training and that
50 percent had not executed fire missions since attending the Field

175
Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course as second lieutenants. This
forced career course instructors to furnish remedial training so that
the students could satisfactorily complete the course. Recognizing
the seriousness of the training issues, the Assistant Commandant
of the School, Colonel James M. McDonald, signed a memoran-
dum of instruction on 28 November 2005 to redesign the Field
Artillery Captain’s Career Course. In a bold move, Colonel Mc-
Donald stopped teaching the course to modernize it by eliminating
Soviet-style tactics from the curriculum. The collaborative process
involved the entire school and included students with insurgency
experience as well as input from the field. The redesign endeavor
optimized the course to ensure that the right competencies were be-
ing taught to prepare officers for insurgency warfare, that the most
effective teaching methodologies were being utilized, and that the
most effective training aids were being employed.103
Redesigning the school’s curriculum went beyond moderniz-
ing the 2005–2006 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course under
Colonel McDonald. With the 2003 rise of the insurgency in Iraq,
field artillery Soldiers devoted the bulk of their time to nonstandard
missions, such as patrolling, providing base defense, and convoy
operations. Because only a few field artillery units provided fire sup-
port, field artillery core competencies atrophied. As outlined in the
20 July 2006 Army Campaign Plan Update, the Vice Chief of Staff
of the Army, General Richard A. Cody, understood the effect of non-
standard missions. He directed the US Army Training and Doctrine
Command to assess the competency of field artillery lieutenants to
determine if nonstandard missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom had degraded their basic branch skills
and if they required additional or refresher training. Along with oth-
er Army leaders, General Cody understood the perishability of field
artillery core skills; he noted they needed to be used to be retained.104
Tasked by General Cody to look at the skill levels of lieuten-
ants, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command expanded the
review to include staff sergeants, sergeants first class, captains, and
majors and directed the Field Artillery School to determine the im-
pact of nonstandard missions. The Field Artillery School surveyed
field artillery tactical commanders, school instructors, and Field Ar-

176
tillery Captain’s Career Course students in July 2006 to determine
how seriously field artillery skills had been degraded. The survey in-
dicated that although nonstandard missions reinforced basic leader
skills, they caused lieutenants to lose branch technical skills of fire
direction, fire support, and weapon-specific platoon leader skills.105
The survey also found that nonstandard missions eroded core skills
for noncommissioned officers and hampered unit readiness. Major
General David C. Ralston, who was the Commanding General of
the US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill from 2005 to 2007,
concluded in a 7 August 2006 memorandum to General Cody that
officers and noncommissioned leaders at all levels had experienced
the atrophy of field artillery skills.106
In his memorandum, Major General Ralston outlined ways to
address the problem. He suggested the Field Artillery School could
increase the length of the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course to
allow more time to retrain senior lieutenants and captains in branch
core competencies after having limited or no tactical experience
with these functions since graduating from the basic course. Also,
the school proposed to bring entire battalions back to proficiency
after spending 18 or more months performing non-field artillery
missions by sending mobile training teams to unit locations as re-
quired, a resource intensive solution, or by using the Fires Knowl-
edge Network to provide web-based “reach back” training to Sol-
diers and units in the field.107
To implement the potential retraining options, Major General
Ralston chartered the Field Artillery War on Terrorism Reset Task
Force on 23 August 2006 to develop a plan to reset the Field Artil-
lery force through institutional and unit training as proposed to Gen-
eral Cody. Regarding institutional training, the Noncommissioned
Officer Education System, the Officer Education System, and the
Warrant Officer Education System were to focus on core field artil-
lery and leader skills more than they had done—without expanding
training time or increasing training costs because the Army would
reject such measures. In March 2007, the Noncommissioned Of-
ficer Academy incorporated a four-day, live-fire exercise into its
Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course for Military Occupational
Specialties 13B30 (Cannon Crewmember) and 13M30 (Multiple

177
Launch Rocket System Crewmember); during the exercise, students
would practice core competency tasks of training their subordinates
to execute field artillery tasks.108
Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School energized its master
gunner program to help offset the war on terrorism’s adverse im-
pact on core field artillery skills. In 1997–1998, the Army created
the master gunner position as part of reforming the noncommis-
sioned officer force structure. The Army required the master gun-
ner to be a sergeant first class with at least one year of experience as
a firing or ammunition platoon sergeant and directed the individual
to serve as the commander’s and command sergeant major’s weap-
on system expert on training, safety, and maintenance operations.
Assigned to the battalion’s S-3 (operations), the person assisted
in training, crew certifications, and other duties. Specifically, the
master gunner executed certifications, certified commanders and
senior leaders, supervised section or crew certifications of launch-
er/howitzer sections, and helped train Soldiers to function on their
particular weapon system. As of 2005, master gunners served in
Military Occupation Specialties 13B (Cannon Crewmember) and
13M (Multiple-Launch Rocket Crew Member). Despite the de-
manding responsibilities and required expertise, the master gunner
never received any formal instruction and relied on self-study to
develop individual skills.109
When the Global War on Terrorism adversely impacted the Field
Artillery, the Army realized the need to provide training for master
gunners. The Field Artillery Master Gunner Division had been orga-
nized in 2005 to help train master gunners and digital master gunners
as well as help field artillery units maintain proficiency. Beginning
in 2006, the division conducted a two-week course for master gun-
ners on cannon and rocket systems and for digital master gunners on
fire direction systems. The courses taught current doctrine, training
management, crew-served weapons, and small arms. Field artillery-
specific instruction taught master gunners and digital master gunners
how to implement unit training and certification programs; they were
the weapon system experts for all assigned weapons of the units, in-
cluding small arms, or were the unit’s fire direction experts.110

178
 The restructuring team from the Field Artillery School and
Noncommissioned Officer Academy also focused on master gunner
responsibilities for preparing the Soldier for the Noncommissioned
Officer Education System. The unit master gunner (a sergeant first
class) and the section chiefs would ensure that the Soldier received
quality 10-, 20-, and 30-level Military Occupational Specialty train-
ing to prepare the individual for the Primary Leader Development
Course, officially renamed the Warrior Leader Course by the School
and Academy in 2005. During this course, the Soldier (corporal or
specialist) would receive additional 30-level training in prepara-
tion for eventual attendance at the Basic Noncommissioned Officer
Course, unofficially called the Noncommissioned Officer Intermedi-
ate Course by the school and academy, and the Advanced Noncom-
missioned Officer Course, unofficially called the Noncommissioned
Officer Advanced Course by the school and academy.111
Major General Peter M. Vangjel, who succeeded Major Gen-
eral Ralston as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School from
2007 to 2009, shared his predecessor’s view that fortifying the mas-
ter gunner program and Noncommissioned Officer Education Sys-
tem courses was a step in the right direction to train Soldiers in field
artillery core competencies. Supporting Major General Vangjel’s
Field Artillery Campaign Plan, the Directorate of Training and Doc-
trine in the Field Artillery School and the Noncommissioned Officer
Academy designed a plan to increase Field Artillery Noncommis-
sioned Officer Education System course lengths to reset Soldiers in
core skills; improve skill proficiency; incorporate additional train-
ing, such as nonlethal fires; and address current and emerging core
competency requirements.112
Approved by Major General Vangjel, the plan addressed sev-
eral key issues. Course length for the eight Field Artillery Military
Occupational Specialties would expand as much as three weeks. Ex-
pansion was the most critical for 13B Cannon Platoon Sergeant and
13D Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems Specialist in the Advanced
Noncommissioned Officer Course and in 13B Cannon Section Chief
and 13F Fire Support Specialist in the Basic Noncommissioned Of-
ficer Course. Regardless of the course, expansion emphasized mas-
tering rather than just becoming acquainted with skills and aimed to

179
develop critical thinking and adaptive, flexible leadership. Accord-
ing to the Command Sergeant Major Dean J. Keveles, the Comman-
dant of the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, the longer courses
helped restore core field artillery skills and made graduates more
adaptable to a complex operating environment of the first decade of
the 21st Century.113
The expanded Noncommissioned Officer Academy courses
that were approved by the US Training and Doctrine Command on
10 July 2008 and began in 2009 played a vital role in transforming
noncommissioned officer education. On 1 October 2009, the Acad-
emy’s Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course was redesignated as
the Advanced Leader Course and its Advanced Noncommissioned
Officer Course was redesignated as the Senior Leader Course. Be-
yond the name changes and increasing course length by an aver-
age of two weeks to accommodate more training, the course focus
shifted from squad to squad/platoon in the Advanced Leader Course
and from platoon to platoon/battery in the Senior Level Course.114
Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School tackled the atrophy of
officer corps skills. In 2008, the Field Artillery Captain’s Career
Course went through its third major redesign to keep it relevant with
the contemporary operating environment. The first February 2006
redesign, directed by Colonel McDonald, had answered the chal-
lenges, demands, and skills required by the contemporary operat-
ing environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. The second redesign that
Major General Ralston implemented in February 2008 met the chal-
lenges of a corps of young officers who lacked field artillery expe-
rience, aligned the program of instruction with emerging doctrine,
and revamped training to stay abreast of the changing contemporary
operating environment. It also added a new command and control
module, more in-depth instruction on coordinating nonlethal fires,
updated counterinsurgency theory as well as planning and applica-
tion instruction, and integrated more practical exercises to upgrade
core competency skills. This was particularly critical for students
who did not have fire support opportunities in their initial assign-
ments in Iraq or Afghanistan.115
Even though the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course rede-
signs since 2006 had kept pace with emerging doctrine, three critical

180
gaps still existed in 2008 that led to a third redesign. Surveys con-
ducted in December 2007 identified that two out of three captains
who reported to the course had not performed traditional company-
grade field artillery tasks or basic field artillery skills that they had
learned in the Basic Officer Leader’s Course; deployments stressed
non-standard missions at the expense of core field artillery missions.
In 2008, almost 60 percent of the captains who attended the Field
Artillery Captain’s Career Course had not performed a traditional
field artillery job, lacked competency in core field artillery skills
and the skills to be integrators of nonlethal fires as required by Field
Manual 3-0, and required assignment-oriented training.116
To close these training gaps, the Field Artillery School increased
the length of the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course in 2008. The
first class under this third redesign was conducted starting in 2009.
The previous 20-week course only familiarized students with many
skills. This was particularly true concerning resetting field artillery
captains with their core competencies—the most pressing concern
being the atrophy of lethal skills. In view of this, Major General
Vangjel supported a two-phase expansion program for the career
course. The first phase or short-term fix would expand the course to
24 weeks. The additional weeks would immerse student officers in
practical applications to develop needed skills to become experts at
coordinating lethal fires at the battalion level and delivering lethal
fires at the battery level. The first phase of expansion would fix two
of the three gaps—core competency and assignment-oriented train-
ing. The second or long-term solution would extend the course to 36
weeks and address the gap of integrating nonlethal fires. According
to Major General Vangjel, integrating nonlethal fires was a required
core competency—a sentiment that was echoed by the Combined
Arms Center Commander, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell
IV, at the Fires Seminar in 2008. However, costs prevented expand-
ing the course to 36 weeks.117
Revamping and expanding the training to 24 weeks to ensure
competency in core skills paid dividends for officers. By 2012, cap-
tains received five weeks of US Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand common core; four weeks of gunnery, advanced fire direc-
tion officer responsibilities, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data

181
System, and weapons training; and 14 weeks of tactical and staff
instruction. This instruction provided situation-based practical exer-
cises on field artillery core competencies and other learning method-
ologies to develop agile and adaptive leaders for the full-spectrum
battlefield who were technically proficient to serve as a battery com-
mander, a battalion/brigade fire support officer, a field artillery bat-
talion fire direction officer, or a battalion/brigade/brigade combat
team staff officer. They also learned to coordinate lethal and non-
lethal fires at the battalion level, with an emphasis on lethal effects
that included employing precision munitions and providing fire sup-
port coordinator tasks and responsibilities.118
Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School restructured unit train-
ing to ensure that it met the organization’s needs for trained field ar-
tillery officers and Soldiers. In a 2 October 2006 briefing to the US
Army Training and Doctrine Command Deputy Commanding Gen-
eral, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, the school outlined us-
ing paper-based training support packages, mobile training teams,
video teleconferences, and web-based distance learning packages,
among other means, for unit training. For unit-oriented reset train-
ing to succeed, each unit had to determine its needs so that the
school could identify training products, assets, and methods; obtain
funding; and prioritize training.119
While reset institutional training was still a one-size-fits-all
approach, reset unit training support required a totally different
methodology. The training revolved around reach-back services
and mobile training teams. As it evolved in 2006 and 2007, reach-
back capabilities exploited the Internet. Soldiers could access more
than 1,000 hours of interactive multi-media training subdivided by
military occupational specialty and skill level by logging onto the
Army Knowledge Network, later renamed Army Knowledge On-
line. For more robust training, the school provided mobile train-
ing teams. Unlike the normal mobile training team that taught a
specific program of instruction regarding new equipment, reset
mobile training was geared to individual unit needs. For example,
one team taught refresher training on manual gunnery and the Ad-
vanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System to the 18th Fires Bri-
gade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Another team trained the 2d

182
Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Wainwright, Alaska,
in manual gunnery, survey, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical
Data System, and the countermortar radar. Other teams conducted
similar training with the 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regi-
ment at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 4th Battalion, 320th Field Ar-
tillery Regiment at Fort Campbell; and 4th Battalion, 319 Field
Artillery Regiment in Afghanistan.120
The Field Artillery Master Gunner Division that had recently
moved from the school’s Directorate of Training and Doctrine to the
428th Field Artillery Brigade also sent reset mobile training teams
to units. During 2007, the division helped field artillery certifica-
tion and qualification by using the coach-teach-mentor methodol-
ogy. While visiting a unit, the division’s team mentors established
a certification plan. After meeting with the unit’s leadership, the
team conducted workshops with the master gunner, operations ser-
geant, and platoon sergeants; meanwhile the digital master and his
noncommissioned officers participated in a workshop to reset their
skills. On the last day of training, the team divided unit personnel
into working groups to facilitate developing a draft digital cannon
or Multiple Launch Rocket System certification program. The Field
Artillery Master Gunner Home Page complemented this initiative.
The page had all points of contact and up-to-date examples of unit
certification programs and standing operation procedures as well as
changes in the Field Artillery. Also, the division supported the two-
week Field Artillery Master Gunner and Digital Master Course that
taught current doctrine, training management, crew-served weap-
ons, and small arms to cannon and rocket crewmembers and cannon
and rocket fire direction specialists.121
Reset efforts continued unabated in 2008. Mobile training
teams supplied training to noncommissioned officers in all military
occupational specialties, trained the trainer, and developed subject
matter expertise to help field artillery units regain core skills. For
example, one mobile training team focused on training master gun-
ners to ensure that the commander had a weapon system expert on
training, safety, ammunition, and resupply and maintenance opera-
tions and to give a battalion an individual with the skills to help re-
set the unit. Besides training master gunners, mobile training teams

183
provided reset training to 15 active component and National Guard
battalions as well as 18 batteries at unit home station and in the-
ater. The training included field artillery safety, manual gunnery,
the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, the Improved
Position and Azimuth Determining System, Military Occupational
Specialty 13B Cannon Crewmember, and M198 155-towed artil-
lery specific crew drill.122
With help from the US Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand, Major General Vangjel funded two contract mobile training
teams—the Battery and Below Mobile Training Team and the Col-
lective Training Evaluation Team—at the end of 2008. This was a
major breakthrough for the reset effort. Through the end of the year,
the school paid for reset mobile training teams by taking resources
from other activities to fund the team. In some instances, the school
took mobile training team instructors from the instructional base.
By funding two contract mobile training teams, the school ended the
practice of stripping resources from one activity to support another;
instead, it now had dedicated reset mobile training teams.123
Both teams had the mission of restoring fires warfighting skills
and field artillery core competencies and began conducting train-
ing in 2009. While the Battery and Below Mobile Training Team
focused on leader training and train-the-trainer instruction cover-
ing cannon battery operations, the Collective Training Evaluation
Team concentrated on collective and leader training on core field
artillery skills and tasks at the platoon, battery, and battalion levels.
Specifically, the teams deployed to the home station and developed,
planned, and executed platoon, battery, and battalion fire support
element/fire support team, combat observation lasing team, and fire
direction center training. Such training enhanced the unit’s ability to
operate within a full-spectrum environment.124
Over the next three years, both training teams furnished in-
valuable unit reset training that continued to be a high priority for
the Field Artillery School and underwent a critical reorganization.
Budget cuts in 2011 forced the school to merge them to form the
Field Artillery Mobile Training Assistance Team that continued the
mission of its predecessor organizations.125

184
 Meanwhile, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan demonstrated the warfighting potential of
integrated joint fires. Coordinating joint attack of targets, synchro-
nizing fires with maneuver, providing land fires to support aviation,
achieving synergistic fires and effects, executing time-sensitive tar-
geting, and deconflicting joint fires required joint standards and joint
training. Major General Michael D. Maples, the Commandant of the
Field Artillery School from 2001 to 2003, noted late in 2003 that to
achieve the intent of emerging doctrine and realize the full potential
of indirect fires and effects initially discussed in the Field Artillery
School in the 1990s, the Army and joint forces would need to train
extensively on the integration, coordination, and application of joint
fires. This would require a universal observer from any service or
special operation forces who would be capable of applying any ef-
fect from any service in any environment. Renamed the joint fires
observer in 2005, the observer would be a trained service member
who would request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires to
include field artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire. Additionally, this
individual would be authorized to provide targeting information
and conduct terminal guidance operations in support of Types 2 and
3 close air support when a joint terminal attack controller was not
physically located with the forward observer and when the situation
required immediate assistance from available close air support.126
Because the maneuver arms were not able to access joint fires
in the form of close air support in Iraq and Afghanistan due to short-
ages of joint terminal attack controllers, the Air Force and Army
increased their efforts to train joint fires observers. The Air Force
planned to increase the number of joint terminal attack controllers
in sufficient numbers to have one at the maneuver company by 2012
by training more at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. In contrast, the
Army envisioned using the joint fires observer at the maneuver
platoon level as the eyes of the joint terminal attack controller in
the field. Recognizing that the joint fires observer course conduct-
ed by the 57th Operations Group at Nellis Air Force Base would
not produce sufficient numbers of graduates to satisfy its require-
ments, the Army resolved to train its own. As agreed upon by the Air

185
Force and Army, Fort Sill developed a joint fires observer course.
After the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate conducted a
successful pilot course at Fort Sill in September 2005 using resourc-
es from the 138th Fighter Wing of the Oklahoma Army National
Guard, the Army and Air Force signed a 14 November 2005 memo-
randum of agreement to support the Fort Sill course. Thus, two joint
fires observer courses—one at Nellis Air Force Base and one at Fort
Sill—existed in 2005. Two years later in 2007, Nellis Air Force Base
stopped teaching its course. To compensate, Fort Sill increased its
capacity to train joint fires observers employing Joint and Combined
Integration Directorate resident and mobile training.127
Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, who was the Comman-
dant of the Field Artillery School from 2010 to 2011, was influenced
by the lessons learned from the Afghanistan and Iraq combat op-
erations and the requirement for more joint fires observers than the
mobile and resident training teams could provide. As a result, he in-
troduced an initiative in mid-2011 to add joint fires observer famil-
iarization training in the school. As a result, the school developed a
20-hour online joint fires observer course for all second lieutenants
and integrated an overview of joint fires observer training into the
Basic Officer Leader’s Course; however, these actions did not pro-
duce certified joint fires observers. Later, Brigadier General Brian J.
McKiernan, who was the Commandant of the Field Artillery School
from 2012 to 2013, added a joint fires observer assignment-orient-
ed training course following the Basic Officer Leader’s Course for
second lieutenants who had graduated from the basic course and
were assigned to a brigade combat team. Assignment-oriented train-
ing began in January 2012 and produced certified observers. Con-
strained by limited resources, only 48 second lieutenants received
assignment-oriented training in 2012 and 2013.128
Recognizing the need for more joint fires observers, Brigadier
General Christopher F. Bentley, who became the Commandant of the
Field Artillery School in June 2013, integrated joint fires observer
training into the Basic Officer Leader’s Course in July 2014 to certify
second lieutenants as joint fires observers. However, the inclusion
of this training forced the school to decrease gunnery instruction,
causing gunnery scores to drop. Subsequently, the school modified

186
joint fires observer training to familiarization training that was less
extensive than certification training and increased its gunnery train-
ing. Regardless, joint fires observer training in the basic course com-
plemented the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate’s resident
and mobile training teams joint fires observer training.129
As the joint fires observers training reflected, the war on terror-
ism of the first decade of the 21st Century significantly influenced
the Field Artillery. It accelerated fielding precision munitions that
were not scheduled to be introduced until the second decade of the
21st Century and forced the Field Artillery School to enhance train-
ing in core field artillery skills that had deteriorated in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan because of the deleterious impact of nonstandard missions
on officers and Soldiers. The war also stimulated the Field Artillery
to develop the joint fires observer. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
basically pushed the Field Artillery into an age of precision muni-
tions and joint operations.

187
 NOTES
1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
“The 9/11 Commission Report,” 22 July 2004, 1–14, 330–32; Donald P.
Wright, et al., A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Op-
eration Enduring Freedom, October 2001–September 2005 (Fort Leav-
enworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms
Center, 2010), 1, 31, 173; Christopher N. Koonz, ed., Enduring Voices:
Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003–2005
(Washington DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 2008), 1; Stephen
A. Carney, Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington,
DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 2011), 34–123.
2. Wright, et al., A Different Kind of War, 1, 173; Koonz, ed., En-
during Voices, 1; Major General Michael D. Maples, “2002 State of the
Field Artillery,” Field Artillery, November–December 2002, 1–4; Lieu-
tenant Colonel Christopher F. Bentley, “Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition
Fire Support in Operation Enduring Freedom,” Field Artillery, Septem-
ber–October 2002, 10–14; Interview, Patrecia Slayden Hollis and Robert
H. McElroy, Interview with Major General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, Field
Artillery, September–October 2002, 5–9. See Sean Naylor’s Not a Good
Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berk-
ley Caliber Books, 2005) for an excellent, in-depth account of Operation
Anaconda.
3. Wright, et al., A Different Kind of War, 1, 173, 174; Koonz, ed.,
Enduring Voices, 1, 3, 173.
4. “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Chronology,” Army, May 2003, 47;
Report, “Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, 4 August 2003, Historical Re-
search and Document Collection (HRDC), 1–8; Gregory Fontenet, et al.,
On Point: US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 86; Report (Extract), “The Instant
Lessons of the Iraq War,” 14 April 2003, 20-2.
5. Report, “Operation Iraqi Freedom by the Numbers,” 30 April
2003, 3, HRDC; Briefing, “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Free-
dom,” undated, HRDC.
6. Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Bat-
tle (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 246; John J. McGrath, The
Brigade: A History, Its Organization and Employment in the US Army
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 111–15.
7. Colonel Theodore J. Janosko and Lieutenant Colonel Robert G.
Cheatham Jr., “The Sound of Thunder: VCA in Operation Iraqi Freedom,”
Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 33–38; Report, “2-4th FA OIF
Summary,” undated, HRDC; Fontenet, et al., On Point, 87, 108; John J.
McGrath, The Brigade, 111–14.
8. Lieutenant Colonel William G. Pitts, “Overview: Field Artillery
in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003,

188
2–4; Major Robert W. Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder
in OIF,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 17–22; Janosko and
Cheatham, “The Sound of Thunder,” 33–38; McGrath, The Brigade, 113.
9. Report (Extract), “AAR 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized),
Chapter 12, HRDC.
10. Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder in OIF,”
17–22; Memorandum for Record, “1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 May
2003, 7–11, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “Operation Hammer Cobra II,” 20
March–8 April 2003, HRDC; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 87–89, 115–23;
Pitts, “Overview: Field Artillery in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 2–4; Mc-
Grath, The Brigade, 117–18.
11. Colonel Thomas G. Torrance and Lieutenant Colonel Noel T.
Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq: The 3d Div Arty in OIF,” Field Artillery,
July–August 2003, 30; Email with Attachment, “214th FA Bde OIF AAR,
20 May 2003,” HRDC; Briefing, “3ID (M) Command Brief,” undated,
HRDC; Captain Rhett A. Taylor, et al., “MLRS AFATDS and Communi-
cations: Lessons Learned in OIF,” Field Artillery, July–August 2003, 36,
HRDC; “3d ID Drives Toward Assault on Baghdad,” Army News Service,
27 March 2003, HRDC; “3d ID Raiders Advance Far into Iraq,” Army
News Service, 26 March 2003, HRDC; Patrecia S. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF:
Fires for the Distributed Battlefield,” Field Artillery, September–October
2003, 10–12; Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder in OIF,”
17–22; Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: A Mili-
tary History (Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 2003),
100; McGrath, The Brigade, 117–18.
12. Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder,” 17–22;
Briefing (Extract), “Operation Hammer Cobra II,” 20 March–8 April
2003, HRDC; Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 128; Fontenot, et al., On
Point, 123–35.
13. Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder,” 17–22;
Janosko and Cheatham, “The Sound of Thunder: VCA in Operation Iraqi
Freedom,” 33–38; Report, “1-9th FA Historical Summary,” undated,
HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth D. Gantt, “Decisive Fires, Decisive
Victory: 1-9 FA in OIF,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 29–32;
“3ID Roots Out Hornet’s Nest of 3,000 Iraqis,” Army Link News, 2 April
2003, HRDC; Hollis, “3d ID in OIF,” 10–12; Memorandum for Record,
“1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 May 2003, 16; Murray and Scales, The
Iraq War, 100; Fontenet, et al., On Point, 195–209.
14. Memorandum for Record, “1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1
March 2003, 18; Report, “2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery OIF Summary,”
undated, HRDC.
15. Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 171–72; McGrath, The Bri-
gade, 121.
16. “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Chronology,” Army, May 2003,
47–50; Report, “2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery OIF Summary,” undated,

189
HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 May
2003, 21–23.
17. Briefing (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Free-
dom,” undated; Colonel William L. Greer, Major Martin J. Holland, and
Captain Charles W. Kean, “101st Div Arty: Fighting with Artillery Fires in
an Urban Environment,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 13–16.
18. Greer, Holland, and Kean, “101st Div Arty,” 13–16; Briefing
(Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated;
Report, “3-320th FA Operation Iraqi Freedom AAR Comments,” undated,
HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Free-
dom,” undated; “TF 3-69 Leads 3ID to Outskirts of Baghdad,” Army News
Service, 6 April 2003, HRDC; “3d ID Raiders Advance Far into Iraq,”
Army News Service, 26 March 2003, HRDC; “3ID Roots Out Hornet’s
Nest of 3,000 Iraqis,” Army News Service, 2 April 2003; Report (Extract),
“The Instant Lessons of the Iraq War,” 32, 34, 35; Rooker, “Historical
Recounting of Marne Thunder,” 17–22; Report, “1-9th Field Artillery His-
torical Summary,” undated, HRDC.
19. Briefing (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Free-
dom,” undated, HRDC; “TF 3-69 Leads 3ID to Outskirts of Baghdad,”
Army News Service, 6 April 2003; “3d ID Raiders Advance Far into Iraq,”
Army News Service, 26 March 2003, HRDC; “3ID Roots Out Hornet’s
Nest of 3,000 Iraqis,” Army News Service, 2 April 2003; Report (Extract),
“The Instant Lessons of the Iraq War,” 32, 34, 35; Rooker, “Historical
Recounting of Marne Thunder,” 17–22; Greer, Holland, and Kean, “101st
Div Arty,” 13–16; Captain Benjamin R. Luper, “82d Airborne Artillery
in the Battle of As Samawah,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003,
39–41; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 212–219.
20. Briefing (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi
Freedom,” undated; Report, “1-9th Field Artillery Historical Summary,”
undated, HRDC; Report, “1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 May 2003,
33–34; Fontenot, et al., On Point, 212, 258–259.
21. Report, “1-9 FA Historical Summary, undated, HRDC; Gantt,
“Decisive Fires,” 29–32; Report (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom, undated, HRDC; Report, sub: Instant Lessons Learned
of the Iraq War,” 39; Report, “1-10 FA Unit History of OIF.”
22. Briefing (Extract), “The Road to Victory in Operation Iraqi Free-
dom,” undated; Briefing, “3ID Command Brief,” undated, HRDC; Report
(Extract), “The Instant Lessons of the Iraqi War,” 40, 41, 48, 49; Report,
“1-10 FA Unit History of OIF,” 1 May 2003, 45–47; Fontenot, et al., On
Point, 245–46.
23. Greer, Holland, and Kean, “101st Div Arty,” 13–16; Report, “3-
320 FA Operations Iraqi Freedom AAR Comments,” undated, HRDC;
Fontenet, et al., On Point, 265–72.
24. Greer, Holland, and Kean, “101st Div Arty,” 13–16; Report, “3-
320 FA Operations Iraqi Freedom AAR Comments,” undated.

190
 25. Luper, “82d Airborne Artillery in the Battle of As Samawah,”
39–41.
26. Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thunder in OIF,” 17–
22; Report, “1-41 Field Artillery Historical Summary, undated, HRDC;
Report (Extract), “The Instant Lessons of the Iraqi War,” 47–55; Report,
“1-41 FA Operation Iraqi Freedom Day-by-Day History, undated, HRDC;
Janosko and Cheatham, “The Sound of Thunder,” 33–38; Report, “2d Bat-
talion, 4th Field Artillery OIF Summary, undated, HRDC.
27. Pitts, “Overview,” 2–4; Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne
Thunder in OIF,” 17–22; Janosko and Cheatham, “The Sound of Thun-
der,” 33–38.
28. Pitts, “Overview,” 2–4.
29. Briefing, “3ID (M) OIF Lessons Learned,” undated; Torrance and
Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 30–35; Briefing (Extract), “The Road
to Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom, undated, HRDC; “TF 3-69 Leads
3ID to Outskirts of Baghdad,” Army News Service, 6 April 2003, HRDC;
“3d ID Raiders Advance Far into Iraq,” Army News Service, 26 March
2003, HRDC; “3ID Roots Out Hornet’s Nest of 3,000 Iraqis,” Army News
Service, 2 April 2003, HRDC; Report (Extract), “The Instant Lessons of
the Iraq War,” 32, 34, 35; Rooker, “Historical Recounting of Marne Thun-
der in OIF,” 17–22; Briefing, “3d Infantry Division Live Briefing from
Iraq, 15 May 2003, HRDC.
30. “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 47; Pitts, “Overview,” 2–4; Report
(Extract), “The Instant Lessons of the Iraq War,” 23–26, 31; Rooker, “His-
torical Recounting of Marne Thunder in OIF,” 17–22; Murray and Scales,
The Iraq War, 65; Fontenet, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 87–90; Todd S.
Brown, Battle Ground Iraq: Journal of a Company Commander (Wash-
ington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 2007), 11; Lieutenant
Colonel Paul M. Andrus, Lieutenant Colonel Randol D. Rule, and Ma-
jor Robert J. Terselic, “I MEF Fires in OIF,” Field Artillery, March–June
2004, 26–30. Note: The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was sched-
uled to enter Operation Iraqi Freedom through Turkey and attack from
the north, but Turkey refused passage. This compelled redeploying the
division through Kuwait. As a result, it did not participate in the rush to
Baghdad as initially planned. It arrived after the initial combat operations
had been completed and occupation was beginning.
31. Walker, “Marine Artillery in the Battle of An Nasiriyah,” 24–28.
32. Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Melillo, “Cannon Cockers at War:
The 11th Marines in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Field Artillery, Septem-
ber–October 2003, 24–28; Major Walker M. Field, “Marine Artillery in
the Battle of An Nasiriyah,” Field Artillery, November–December 2003,
26–30; Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Andrus, Lieutenant Colonel Randol
D. Rule, and Major Robert J. Terselic, “I MEF Fires in OIF,” Field Artil-
lery, March–June 2004, 26–30; Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Groen, et
al., With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003 (Quantico, VA: History

191
Division, Marine Corps University, 2006), 174, 177, 178, 184, 218–220;
Fontenot, et al., On Point, 88.
33. Melillo, “Cannon Cockers at War,” 24–28; Groen, et al., With the
1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003, 254–55, 257.
34. Melillo, “Cannon Cockers at War,” 24–28; Andrus, et al., “I MEF
Fires in OIF,” 26–30; Groen, et al., With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq,
2003, 331–32.
35. Major General Michael D. Maples, “FA Priorities after OIF,”
Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 1; Email, “Consolidated Listing
of Links to OIF Observations, 13 August 2003, HRDC.
36. Report, “Operation Iraqi Freedom, Artillery, undated, HRDC.
37. Briefing (Extract), “Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned,
24 October 2003, HRDC.
38. Report (Extract), “AAR 3d Infantry Division,” Chapter 12.
39. Memorandum for Commander, V Corps, “Lessons Learned by
82d Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 1 May 2003, 12,
HRDC.
40. Memorandum for Commander, V Corps, “Lessons Learned by
82d Airborne Division,” 12.
41. Memorandum for Commander, V Corps, “Lessons Learned by
82d Airborne Division,” 12.
42. Memorandum for Commander, 325th AIR 82d Airborne Divi-
sion, 17 April 2003, HRDC.
43. Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 32.
44. Memorandum for Record, “1-9FA Bn AAR,” 29 April 2003, 16,
HRDC.
45. Memorandum for Record, “1-9FA Bn AAR,” 3, 17.
46. Report, “101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Interim Lessons
Learned in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated, HRDC.
47. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Brian L. Borer and Lieutenant Colonel
Noel T. Nicolle, “Acquisition: 3d ID Counterfire in OIF,” Field Artillery,
September–October 2003, 42.
48. Borer and Nicolle, “Acquisition: 3d ID Counterfire,” 42.
49. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF,” 10–12.
50. Patrecia S. Hollis, “Trained, Adaptable, Flexible Forces Equal
Victory in Iraq,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 6.
51. Report (Extract), “82d Airborne Division After Action Review,”
21 July 2003, Fires Chapter, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, “1-9 FA Bn
AAR, 29 April 2003, 7, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander, 325th Air-
borne Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division; Greer, Holland, and Kean,
“101st Div Arty,” 16; Report (Extract), “AAR 3d Infantry Division,” 16.
52. Greer, Holland, and Kean, “101st Div Arty,” 13–16.
53. Briefing, “U.S. Army Operation Iraqi Freedom Observations,
Quick Look,” 26 August 2003, HRDC; Briefing, “OIF Total Artillery
Rounds Fired,” undated, HRDC; Memorandum for Commandant, USA-

192
FAS, “Desert Storm Rounds Fired,” 20 August 91, HRDC.
54. Email Message with Attachment, “History Update, 3 June 2004,
HRDC; “Field artillery and Mortar Systems,” Army, October 2005, 327–
28; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “ATACMS,” 2011, HRDC.
55. Patrecia S. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF,” 12; Fact Sheet, “Quick Re-
action Unitary ATACMS Missile,” 20 February 2003, HRDC; Email
Message with Attachment, “ATACMS-BAT,” 24 February 2003, HRDC;
Memorandum for Director, TSM RAMS, with Attachment, “Coordination
of 2002 Annual Command History,” 18 March 2003, HRDC.
56. Email with Attachment, “ATACMS and BAT Input to 2003 An-
nual Command History,” 21 April 2004, HRDC.
57. Report (Extract), “Instant Lessons of the Iraq War,” 11; Hollis,
“Trained, Adaptable, Flexible Forces Equal Victory in Iraq,” 5–9.
58. Memorandum for Commander, 325th Airborne Infantry Regi-
ment, 82d Airborne Division; Memorandum for Commander, V Corps,
“Lessons Learned by the 82d Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi
Freedom,” 12.
59. Briefing, “3ID (M) OIF Lessons Learned;” Briefing (Extract),
“Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned.”
60. Maples, “FA Priorities after OIF,” 1; Briefing, “OIF Total Artil-
lery Rounds Fired,” undated, HRDC; Report (Extract), “U.S. Army OIF
Study Group Observations,” undated, HRDC.
61. 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFA-
CFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 93–94.
62. Hollis, “Trained, Adaptable, Flexible Equal Victory in Iraq,” 7.
63. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF,” 10; Briefing (Extract), “Fires in the Close
Fight: OIF Lessons Learned,” 7 October 2003, HRDC; Briefing (Extract),
“Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned.”
64. Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 31.
65. Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 31.
66. Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 31; Briefing
(Extract), “Fires in the Close Fight;” Report (Extract), “AAR, 3d Infantry
Division,” undated, 21, HRDC.
67. Hollis, “Trained, Adaptable, Flexible Forces Equal Victory in
Iraq,” 6, 8; Report (Extract), “AAR, 3d Infantry Division,” 19; Report
(Extract), “V Corps AAR,” undated, 3, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“214th FA Bde OIF AAR;” Pitts, “Overview,” 4; Interview, Lieutenant
Colonel William G. Pitts, DOTD, USAFAS, with Colonel Thomas G. Tor-
rance, Commander, 3d Infantry Division Artillery, revised version, 21 Au-
gust 2003, HRDC; Interview, Lieutenant Colonel William G. Pitts, DOTD,
USAFAS, with Colonel Theodore J. Janosko, Commander, V Corps Artil-
lery, revised version, 21 August 2003, HRDC.
68. Pitts, “Overview,” 4; Briefing, “Fires in the Close Fight;” Report,
“OIF, Arty Lessons Learned,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “3d Infantry Di-
vision Commander Live Briefing from Iraq,” 15 May 2003, 8, HRDC.

193
 69. Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 32.
70. Email with Attachment, “214th FA Bde AAR;” Taylor, et al.,
“MLRS AFATDS and Communications,” 36–39; Torrance and Nicolle,
“Observations from Iraq,” 32.
71. Report (Extract), “Field Artillery Lessons Learned from Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom,” undated, 4, HRDC.
72. Report (Extract), “AAR, 3d Infantry Division,” 28.
73. Memorandum for Record, “AAR Comments for Combat Opera-
tions in Iraq,” 17 April 2003, HRDC.
74. Report, “3-320th FA Operation Iraqi Freedom AAR Comments.”
75. Report, “3-320th FA Operation Iraqi Freedom AAR Comments.”
76. Memorandum for Commander, 325th AIR, 82d ABN DIV.
77. Memorandum for Record, “1-9 FA Bn AAR,” 18; Torrance and
Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq,” 32; Email, “214th FA Bde OIF AAR;”
Report (Extract), “OEF/OIF Lessons Learned,” 17 October 2003, HRDC.
78. Report (Extract), “Field Artillery Lessons Learned from Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom,” 7.
79. Report (Extract), “Field Artillery Lessons Learned from Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom,” 7; Report, “AAR 3d Infantry Division,” 24–252.
80. Email with Attachment, “TCM Cannon Input,” 19 April 10,
HRDC; Approved Precision Effects Study Plan, undated; Memorandum
for Commander, USAFACFS, et al., “Precision Effects Study,” 20 No-
vember 2003, HRDC; Precision Effects Study Announcement, undated,
HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Precision Effects,” undated, HRDC; Sandra I. Er-
win, “Cannons, Rocket and Missiles: A Growth Industry in the Army,”
National Defense, 1 October 2014; Thomas Hills, Senior Analyst, Analy-
sis Branch, FDIC, interview by author, 23 May 2005, HRDC; Approved
Precision Effects Study Plan, undated, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“Precision Effects Study,” 23 May 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“TCM Cannon Input.”
81. Email with Attachment, “Precision Effects Study,” 23 May 2005;
Major General David P. Valcourt, “Issues and Answers: NLOS-C Caliber
Decision, Today’s Modularity, Counterfire, and Sound Bytes,” Field Artil-
lery, July–August 2004, 1–3; Routing Sheet, undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet,
“Rankings of 24 Proposals,” undated, HRDC; Briefing, “Precision Ef-
fects Study Results for TRADOC Commander,” 4 February 2004, HRDC;
Briefing, “Phase II – Precision Effect Study Recommendations,” undated,
HRDC; Briefing, “Courses of Action for Accelerated Course Correct-
ing Fuse Development,” 30 April 2004, HRDC; Memorandum for Com-
mander, TRADOC, Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Approval of
the PGK Capability Development Document,” 22 January 2007, HRDC;
Briefing, “PGK Increment I Capabilities Development Document,” 12
May 2006, HRDC; Capability Development Document for the PGK (Ex-
tract), January 2007, Executive Summary, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“PGK, 105mm precision munition, and ACAAP,” 28 March 2007, HRDC.

194
 82. Briefing, “TCM Cannon,” 2 November 2009, HRDC; Capabil-
ity Development Document for the PGK (Extract), 11 July 12, Executive
Summary, HRDC; Major John S. Moorhead, “Precision Guidance Kits
(PGKs): Improving the Accuracy of Conventional Cannon Rounds,” Field
Artillery, January–February 2007, 31–33; System Training Plan for PGK,
10 February 2006, 1, HRDC; Briefing, “PGK Increment I Capabilities De-
velopment Document,” 12 May 2006, HRDC.
83. Don Durant, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 3 March
2011, HRDC; Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, interview with attachments
by author, 22 February 2012, HRDC; Memorandum for Program Execu-
tive Officer for Ammunition, “Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the
XM1156 Precision Guidance Kit Increment I,” 21 January 2011, HRDC.
84. Interview with Attachment, author with Worth, 22 February
2011; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army, “Acceleration
and Urgent Materiel Release for XM 1156 Precision Guidance Kit,” 17
May 2011, HRDC; Interview, author with Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A.
Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 February 2013, HRDC;
DOT&E Information Paper, “PGK,” 2012, HRDC; Memorandum for
Commander, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Approval
of Capability Development Document in lieu of Capabilities Production
Document for the Precision Guidance Kit,” 11 July 2012, HRDC.
85. “The XM892 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile,”
Army, October 2000, 304; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon,
interview by author, 8 February 2001, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Excalibur,”
21 February 2001, HRDC; PEO Ground Combat Support Systems, Ma-
jor General John F. Michitsch, interview by author, 2000, HRDC; Major
Danny L. Sprengle, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 26 February 2001,
HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Excalibur,” 2 March 2001, HRDC;
Email, “Command History Coordination,” 6 April 2001, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “Excalibur’s Role,” 30 April 2004, HRDC.
86. Sprengle, interview, 26 February 2001; Email, “Command Histo-
ry Coordination,” 6 April 2001, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Army Contract Boosts
Raytheon Excalibur Program,” 17 October 2000, HRDC; Email with At-
tachment, “TSMC Input,” 13 April 2001, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“Excalibur,” 2 March 2001; Email, “None,” 12 March 2002, HRDC; Major
Danny J. Sprengle, TSM Cannon, interview by author, 6 February 2002,
HRDC; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon, interview by au-
thor, 4 February 2002, HRDC; Information Paper, “Excalibur and Trajec-
tory Correctable Munitions Program Merger,” 21 November 2001, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “Excalibur,” 20 February 2002, HRDC.
87. Email with Attachment, “Excalibur History,” 12 February 2003,
HRDC.
88. Email with Attachment, “Excalibur,” 13 February 2003, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “Excalibur History,” 12 February 2002, HRDC;
Memorandum for Commander, TRADOC, “Operational Requirements

195
Document,” 20 August 2002, HRDC; Memorandum for Deputy Chief of
Staff, “Request for Approval for Change 2 to the Operational Require-
ments Document for the Precision Engagement Projectile, Excalibur,” 12
February 2003, HRDC.
89. Email with Attachment, “Excalibur History,” 30 April 2004,
HRDC.
90. Email with Attachment, “Excalibur History,” 30 April 2004. Sec-
retary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cancelled the Crusader program in
2002 because it did not meet current and future field artillery needs and
transferred savings to other technologies.
91. Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 December 2010,
HRDC.
92. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 26, HRDC; Se-
lected Acquisition Report (Extract) 31 December 2010, HRDC.
93. 1999 USAFACFS Annual Command History (ACH), 126; John
K. Yager and Jeffrey L. Froysland, “Improving the Effects of Fires with
Precision Munitions,” Field Artillery, March–April 1997, 5–7; “Extended
Range for MLRS Rockets in the Works,” Field Artillery, April 1992, 39;
Program Executive Officer, Tactical Missiles, M270 Family of Munitions
Modernization Plan (Extract), February 1993, HRDC.
94. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Froysland, “Transformation: Bring-
ing Precision to MLRS Rockets,” Field Artillery, March–April 2003, 17–
19; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Munitions,” 11 March 2003, HRDC.
95. 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 93–94; Jeff Froysland, TSM RAMS,
interview by author, 4 February 2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“Update on MLRS Rocket History,” 1 April 2003, HRDC.
96. Jeffrey L. Froysland, TSM RAMS, interview with attachments
by author, 8 March 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Rocket
Input to 2005 Annual Command History,” 8 March 2006, HRDC.
97. Jeff Froysland, TSM RAMS, interview by author, 10 February
2006, HRDC; “Lockheed Martin Delivers First Lot of Guided MLRS Uni-
tary Rockets,” Global Investor, 26 May 2005, HRDC; “Lockheed Martin
Completes Delivery of First Low-Rate Production Guided MLRS Rockets
to the U.S. Army,” Lockheed News Release, 16 May 2005, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “MLRS Rocket Input to 2005 Annual Command His-
tory,” 8 March 2006, HRDC.
98. Jeff Froysland, TCM RAMS, interview with attachment by au-
thor, 10 April 2007, HRDC.
99. 2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFA-
CFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 145–46.
100. 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 89; 2003
USAFACFS ACH, 110; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 98–99; 2005 USAFA-
CFS ACH, 93–94; Information Paper, “LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012,” HRDC.
101. 2008 US Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (US-
AFCOEFS), ACH, 131; Email with Attachment, “TPSO Sensor History

196
for 2010,” 22 February 2010, HRDC; U.S. Army Field Artillery School
(USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Information Paper, “LLDR AN/PED-
1,” 2012, HRDC.
102. 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 96. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 91; 2008
USAFCOEFS ACH, 129; Email with Attachment, “TPSO History for
2010,” 22 February 2010, HRDC; “Ground Combat System,” Army, Oc-
tober 2011, 338; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, October 2009, 355;
Raytheon Information Paper, “FS3,” 2011, HRDC.
103. Briefing (Extract), “U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort
Sill,” 1 February 2006, HRDC; Memorandum for AC, USAFACFS,
“Memorandum of Instruction for USAFACS Course(s) Redesign,” 28
November 2005, HRDC; Memorandum, “Memorandum of Instruction
for USAFACS Course(s) Redesign,” 28 November 2005, HRDC; Brief-
ing (Extract), “U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School,” 23 Janu-
ary 2006, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Course Redesign,” 9 February
2006, HRDC; Colonel James M. McDonald, AC, USAFAS, interview by
author, 26 January 2006, HRDC; Memorandum, “Memorandum of In-
struction for USAFACS Redesign,” 28 November 2005, HRDC; Brief-
ing (Extract), “United States Field Artillery Center, Fort Sill,” 23 January
2006, HRDC; Email, “Review of Manuscript,” 2 January 2016, HRDC.
104. Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Jeffrey L. Moyes, “MTTs:
Resetting FA Core Competencies,” Fires Bulletin, July–September 2008,
10–11; Major General David C. Ralston, “2006: State of the Field Artil-
lery,” Field Artillery, November–December 2006, 5; Briefing, “FA War on
Terrorism Reset,” 22 November 2006, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Loyd
Gerber, Reset Task Force, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, interview
by author, 7 February 2007, HRDC; Briefing, “CG Update,” 18 September
2006, HRDC.
105. Memorandum for VCSA, “Response to VCSA Tasker to Assess
FA Lieutenant Training,” 7 August 2006, HRDC; TRADOC Tasking Or-
der, “TRADOC #IN 00564 - Armor and Field Artillery Branch Reviews,”
29 August 2006, HRDC.
106. Memorandum for VCSA, “Response to VCSA Tasker to Assess
FA Lieutenant Training.”
107. Memorandum for VCSA, “Response to VCSA Tasker to Assess
FA Lieutenant Training;” Information Paper, “FA Competency Review,”
undated, HRDC.
108. Briefing, “FA War on Terrorism Reset,” 22 November 2006;
Interview, author with Gerber, 7 February 2007, HRDC; Briefing, “School
Updated,” 2 October 2006, HRDC; Information Paper, “FA Competen-
cy Review,” HRDC; Briefing, “Commander’s Call,” 22 February 2007,
HRDC; Briefing, “Restoring Core Competencies,” undated, HRDC.
109. Briefing, “Field Artillery Master Gunner Course,” 1 February
2006, HRDC; Memorandum for Commader, TRADOC, “Justification for
Training Growth,” 19 January 2005, HRDC; Briefing, “The Field Artil-

197
lery Master Gunner’s Course,” 2005, HRDC; Briefing, “The Field Artil-
lery Master Gunner’s Course, Training Management and Development
Plan,” 2005, HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Master Gunner Course,” 13
June 2005, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Master Gunner Division,” 2
February 2006, HRDC.
110. Mission/Task Analysis for Mission/Task Analysis Develop-
ment and Development of Artillery Tables (Extract), 16 August 2004, 1,
HRDC; Briefing, “The Field Artillery Master Gunner’s Course,” 2005;
Master Sergeant (Retired) Gregory D. Plant, DOTD, interview by author,
1 February 2006, HRDC.
111. Sergeant Major Edwin V. Blount, Training Development Di-
vision, DOTD, interview with attachment by author, 23 January 2006,
HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Master Gunner Course,” 17 January
2006, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander TRADOC, “Justification for
Training Growth,” 19 January 2005, in Briefing for Lieutenant General
David Petraeus (Extract), CG/CAC, 23 January 2006, HRDC; “Master
Gunner Division Created,” Field Artillery, September–October 2005, 37;
Interview, author with Plant, 1 February 2006.
112. Command Sergeant Major Dean Keveles, “NCOES: Restoring
NCO Core Competency,” 20–21, HRDC; Briefing, “NCOEs Expansion
and Transformation,” 5 September 2008, HRDC; Briefing, “The Require-
ment,” 30 May 2008, HRDC.
113. Jim Tice, “NCO Training Overhaul,” Army Times, 22 Decem-
ber 2008; Keveles, “NCOES: Restoring NCO Core Competency,” 20–21;
Briefing, “NCOEs Expansion and Transformation,” 5 September 2008,
HRDC; Memorandum (Draft) for Commanding General, TRADOC,
“Field Artillery Branch Assessment,” 5 May 2008, HRDC; Briefing, “The
Requirement,” 30 May 2008.
114. Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7, 3d Quarter October
2009, 10, HRDC; Command Sergeant Major Joseph D. Smith, “The Senior
NCO’s Perspective on the State of the Fires Center of Excellence,” Fires
Bulletin, November–December 2009, 1–2; Fires Center of Excellence
CSM Newsletter (Extract), March 2010, 12, HRDC; FCoE CSM News-
letter (Extract), Fires-7, November 2009, 13, HRDC; Keveles, “NCOES:
Restoring NCO Core Competency,” 20–21; Briefing, “NCOEs Expansion
and Transformation,” 5 September 2008, HRDC; Briefing, “The Require-
ment,” 30 May 2008.
115. 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (US-
AFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 44.
116. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher P. Talcott, Major Cornelius L.
Morgan, and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Scott W. McKnight, “PME for FA
Officers and Warrant Officers,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2009, 34–37;
Information Paper, “Extension of FACCC Training,” 20 November 2007,
HRDC; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 44.
117. 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 45; Talcott, Morgan, and McKnight,

198
“PME for FA Officers and Warrant Officers,” 34–37.
118. Email with Attachment, “428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual
History,” 19 February 2013, HRDC.
119. Briefing, “FA War on Terrorism Reset,” 22 November 2006,
HRDC; Interview, author with Gerber, 7 February 2007; Briefing, “School
Updated,” 2 October 2006; Information Paper, “FA Competency Review,”
HRDC.
120. Briefing, “Commander’s Call,” 22 February 2007, HRDC; In-
terview with Attachment, author with Lieutenant Colonel Loyd Gerber
and Lieutenant Colonel David Vineyard, Task Force Reset, 29 January
2008, HRDC; Briefing, “Restoring Core Competencies,” undated, HRDC.
In 2007, the Rand Corporation conducted a study about leader skill com-
petencies and reached the same conclusions as the 2006 TRADOC and
Department of the Army studies. See Email with Attachment, “Reset Rand
Study,” 29 January 2008, HRDC; Email, “Reset Task Force,” 6 March
2008, HRDC.
121. Lieutenant Colonel Loyd A. Gerber, “Reset: Rebuilding FA
Core Competencies for Future Full-Spectrum Operations,” Field Artillery,
March–April 2007, 14–18; Command Sergeant Major William S. High,
“The FA Master Gunner and Reset of the Redeployed FA Battalion,” Field
Artillery, January–February 2007, 1–3.
122. Command Sergeant Major Joseph D. Smith, “The FA NCO:
Absolutely Mission Essential,” Fires Bulletin, July–September 2008,
4–5; Moyer, “MTTs: Resetting FA Core Competencies,” 10–11; Briefing,
“Field Artillery Reset,” 3 October 2008, HRDC.
123. Email with Attachment, “Reset Input to 2008 Annual Command
History,” 17 February 2009, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel David S. Lee,
Chief, FA Lessons Learned/FA Reset, DOTD, interview by author, 17 Feb-
ruary 2009, HRDC.
124. Major General Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery:
Today and Tomorrow, Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, October–De-
cember 2008, 1–8; Briefing, “Field Artillery CTET,” 5 December 2008,
HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training,” 10 Decem-
ber 2008, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Reset Input to 2008 Annual
Command History,” 11 February 2009, HRDC.
125. 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 31–32; 2009 USAFAS AH, 32;
Briefing, “Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training,” 3 June 2010, HRDC;
Briefing, “Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 3 May 2010, HRDC;
Chris Atkinson, Executive Officer, 1-30 Field Artillery, 428 FAB, inter-
view by author, 27 January 2012, HRDC; Information Paper, “Techwise,
Fire Support Coordinator Course Gets Facelift,” 6 April 2012, HRDC;
Briefing, “Maneuver Pre-command Course,” 1 February 2012, HRDC.
126. Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, “Fires: The Cutting Edge for
the 21st Century,” Field Artillery, May–June 1989, 22–27; Major General
Michael D. Maples, “The FA and the Objective Force: An Uncertain But

199
Critical Future,” Field Artillery, September–October 2002, 1–4; 2004 U.S.
Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command
History (ACH), 47; Colonel Michael A. Longoria, USAF, Lieutenant Col-
onel Wayne Andrews, and Lieutenant Colonel Steven P. Milliron, “Joint
Fires Observer,” Field Artillery, September–October 2005, 30–34. Type 1
Close Air Support (danger close) is when the risk of fratricide requires the
controller to acquire the attacking aircraft and target visually. Type 2 Close
Air Support is when visually acquiring the target is not possible. Type 3
Close Air Support is when the attacking aircraft imposes a low risk of frat-
ricide. See Major General David P. Valcourt, Brigadier General Robert T.
Bray, and Command Sergeant Major Tommy Williams, “State of the Field
Artillery,” Field Artillery, November–December 2004, 1–5.
127. FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, November 2009, 19,
HRDC; Email, “Governor’s Report 2010,” 22 February 2011, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “Air Force 2010,” 22 February 2011, HRDC; In-
terview with Attachments, author with Lieutenant Colonel Rustan S. Sch-
wichtenberg, Commander, 138th Combat Training Flight, JACI, 22 Febru-
ary 2011, HRDC; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 48; Information Paper, “JFO
Course Information,” 1 December 2005, HRDC; Email, “JFOs,” 10 Janu-
ary 2006, HRDC; Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, and the U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Air and Space Operations, and the United States Special Operations
Command, Director, Operations Support Group for Joint Fires Observer,
14 November 2005, HRDC; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Op-
erations and Training, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations,
13 October 2005, HRDC; Email, “JFO Information,” 10 January 2006;
Email, “Number of JTACs Required,” 10 January 2006, HRDC; Memo-
randum for Commander, TRADOC, “Commander’s Statement – FY06
TRADOC Budget Guidance,” undated, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“JFO and 138th Flight Input to 2010 Annual History,” 28 February 2011,
HRDC; Interview with Attachment, author with Lieutenant Colonel Mi-
chael A. Todd, JACI, 10 February 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“JFO in 2011,” 16 February 2012, HRDC; Captain M.A. Markham, “The
Need for Joint Fires Observer Program,” 19 February 2008, HRDC.
128. Email, “Joint Fires Observer Course and Joint Fires Observer
Team,” 2 March 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “JFO in 2011,” 16
February 2012, HRDC; Briefing, “FA BOLC B Course POI Review,” 2011,
HRDC; Briefing, “BOLC/JFO Integration,” 2011, HRDC; Email with At-
tachment, “JACI History,” 7 March 2013, HRDC; Sharon McBride, “Joint
Fires Observer: Shouldn’t be ‘on the job’ Training,” Fires Bulletin, No-
vember–October 2011, 20–23; Briefing, “BOLC Brief to CG,” 21 April
2011, HRDC; Email, “SITREP,” 7 July 2011, HRDC; Colonel Gary Hisle,
Director, Joint and Combined Integration Directorate, interview by author,
12 January 2012, HRDC; Major Elijah M. Ward, et al., “Modern Men of
Mars: The Evolution of Junior Fire Supporters,” Fires Bulletin, January–

200
February 2012, 36–41; Email with Attachment, “428th FAB Input to US-
AFAS Annual History,” 19 February 2013, HRDC; “Fort Sill Educators
Look at Air Force Pilot Training Practices,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 10 Oc-
tober 2013; JACI Opord, 1 October 2012, HRDC; Briefing, “428th Field
Artillery Brigade PCC Overview,” 13 September 2013, HRDC; Christo-
pher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery
Brigade, interview by author, 31 January 2014, HRDC; Email, “Joint Fires
Observer Course and Joint Fires Observer Team,” 2 March 2012, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “JFO in 2011,” 16 February 2012, HRDC; Brief-
ing, “FA BOLC B Course POI Review,” 2011, HRDC; Briefing, “BOLC/
JFO Integration,” 2011, HRDC
129. Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artil-
lery,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2012, 14–16; Briefing (Extract), “Field
Artillery Commandant’s Huddle,” 14 November 2013, HRDC; “Fort Sill
Educators Look at Air Force Pilot Training Practices,” Fort Sill Cannon-
eer, 10 October 2013; Email with Attachment, “FA Cmdt SITREP,” 1 Au-
gust 2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Cmdt SITREP,” 29 August
2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “FA Cmdt SITREP,” 21 November
2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “FA Cmdt SITREP,” 19 December
2013, HRDC; Briefing, “FA BOLC B Redesign COA Decision Brief to
FA Cmdt,” 29 October 2013, HRDC; “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update,
December 2013, 1, 3–5; Email with Attachment, “428 FAB Input to 2013
USAFAS Annual History,” 22 February 2014, HRDC; Michael Dooley,
Deputy Commander, 428th FAB, interview by author, 24 January 2014,
HRDC; Interview, author with Atkinson, 31 January 2014; Lieutenant
Colonel Fernando Montoya, XO, 428th FAB, interview by author, 14 Jan-
uary 2015, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “FA Commandant SITREP,”
14 August 2014; Email with Attachment, “FA Commandant SITREP,” 11
September 2014, HRDC; Briefing, “FABOLC Class 6-14 Overview,” 12
September 2014, HRDC.

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 Chapter 5

More Modernization

The Global War on Terrorism and Transformation of the Army

prompted the Field Artillery to extend its modernization effort be-
yond adopting precision munitions and creating the joint fires officer.
The Field Artillery introduced new targeting systems for counterfire
and sensors for locating targets accurately, developed a precision
fires training program, embraced nonlethal fires and effects as a core
competency for officers and soldiers to complement lethal fires and
effects, and continued improving precision munitions and weapon
platforms. Just as important, the branch implemented force structure
changes by reinstituting division artillery.

Lethal and Nonlethal Targeting

During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the op-
erational environment emphasized mobility and the escalating re-
quirement to replace aging AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefind-
er radars with their limited scan capabilities. Responding to these
priorities, the Army initiated work to replace the older equipment
with state-of-the-art radars. To decrease developmental costs, the
Futures Development and Integration Center at Fort Sill, Oklaho-
ma, opted to modernize the Q-36 radar as the Enhanced AN/TPQ-
36 (EQ-36) truck-mounted radar with a range of 500 meters to 60
kilometers. The center also wanted to reduce crew size require-
ments as compared to the Q-36 and Q-37 radars and ensure the
replacement was capable of detecting projectiles fired from mortar,
field artillery, and rocket systems and employing a 90-degree or
360-degree sector search.1
Before work on the radar could be completed, an urgent mate-
rial release request in 2008 caused the Army to field the less capable
Quick Response Capability EQ-36 radar to support Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2010, the Army sent
Quick Response Capability EQ-36s to Iraq and Afghanistan to ef-
fectively pinpoint incoming threat indirect fire for counterfire.2

203
 Subsequently in 2011, the Army changed the EQ-36 radar’s des-
ignation to the AN/TPQ-53 and made it a program of record radar.
Mounted on a five-ton truck, the Q-53 reduced operational and sup-
port costs from those of the Q-36 and Q-37 radars, had a range of 500
meters to 60 kilometers, could be emplaced in five minutes, could be
displaced in two minutes, had an auto-leveling system, had a crew of
four, had 90-degree and 360-degree search capability, and was linked
by digital tactical radios to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
System for mission processing.3 The Army began fielding the Q-53
radar in 2016 as a replacement to the legacy Q-36 and Q-37 radars.4
Although it planned to replace the Firefinder Q-37 radar—first
fielded in the 1970s and modernized several times—the Army ac-
knowledged during the first decade of the 21st Century that the Q-37
would be around for several more years despite its obsolescence and
associated sustainment expenses. To extend the aging Q-37’s usable
life, the Army upgraded it for employment by the Heavy and Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams and the fires brigades by incorporating reli-
ability and maintainability initiative kits in 2011 to 2012; the kits
would reduce sustainment costs and increase the system’s life span
beyond its scheduled retirement date of 2019.5
The Army simultaneously pushed to introduce the Lightweight
Countermortar Radar to complement the larger Q-36, Q-37, and
Q-53 radars. Because the existing Q-36 and Q-37 radars lacked the
ability to scan 360 degrees and did not have the mobility required
to accompany light and early entry forces, the Special Operations
Forces expressed a critical need for a lightweight countermortar
radar capable of scanning 360 degrees to detect short-range mortars
rapidly for counterfire. This led to the development of the Quick
Response Capability Lightweight Countermortar Radar (AN/TPQ-
48), which was specially designed to support the Special Opera-
tions Forces and Ranger units. A man-portable system with a range
of 1,000 to 7,000 meters, the Q-48 could search 360 degrees to
detect and track mortar fire within 100 yards of their points of ori-
gin—permitting counterfire to destroy fleeing improvised shooters,
including those in urban areas.6
In 2004, the Army started fielding the Q-48 to Special Opera-
tions Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and initiated development of the

204
Q-49 (Q-48 Version II), a successor system. With a target location
error of 100-plus meters, the Q-48 radar met the immediate needs of
deployed US Special Operations Command forces to locate mortars;
however, improved accuracy would be needed for future versions.
Fielded in 2005–2006, the Q-49 provided more rugged hardware and
better software to locate a target within less than 75 meters to facili-
tate counterfire against enemy indirect fire systems.7
Two years later in 2008, US Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand Program Office Sensors at Fort Sill wrote and staffed a docu-
ment to develop the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (AN/TPQ-
50/Q-48 Version III) to track threat indirect fire systems and provide
greater force protection capabilities. The Q-50 could be mounted on
a vehicle, a feature that facilitated movement between two points
and permitted rapid operational configuration. After successful Feb-
ruary and March 2012 testing at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona,
the Army fielded the Q-50 radar beginning in 2013.8

Figure 9: AN/TPQ-50 countermortar radar.

Source: US Army photo by Staff Sergeant Steven Littlefield.

205
 As of 2013, the Field Artillery had five target acquisition ra-
dars—Q-36, Q-37, Q-48/49, Q-50, and Q-53, with a modernization
plan for each. To guide radar acquisition in an era of constrained re-
sources, the Field Artillery recognized the imperative to streamline
radar acquisition. This led to a 2013 strategy to reduce the number
of radars and provide a way forward to accomplish the branch’s core
mission of detecting and tracking rockets, mortars, and cannon pro-
jectiles. In the near term (2015–2019), the Army planned to merge
the short-range Q-48/49 radars (not programs of record) into the pro-
gram of record Q-50 radar for short-range detection, retire the Fire-
finder Q-36 and Q-37 radars, and leave only the Q-53 for long-range
target acquisition. This would reduce field artillery radars from five
to two—the Q-50 and Q-53 that were already fielded. These radars
provided the Field Artillery with 360-degree target acquisition capa-
bility, increased range, improved mobility, improved deployability,
and decreased sustainment requirements compared with previous
radars. They also gave the branch network capabilities to employ
multiple counterfire radars to detect a target for more precise target
location, reduced target location error, and made counterfire even
more lethal. However, they could only detect a shooting indirect fire
system. Silent systems remained invisible.9
Modernizing the Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle for the
heavy forces and the Knight vehicle for the heavy and light forces
complemented the new radars. Late in the 1970s, a US Army Train-
ing and Doctrine Command working group, Close Support Study
Group II, met to optimize observed fire support for the maneuver
forces. Besides reaffirming that the Fire Support Team created in the
mid-1970s was still needed to integrate fire support with the maneu-
ver arms at the company level, the group recommended fielding a
mobile fire support vehicle that would ensure reliable, secure com-
munications and be able to stay abreast of the maneuver forces.10
After funding had become available in the 1990s and the ma-
neuver arms had received their Bradleys, the Army started equip-
ping the Field Artillery with the Bradley with a fire support mission
package as a replacement for the M981 Fire Support Vehicle. As of
1995–1996, combat and materiel developers envisioned two mod-
els—the M7 and M7A1. While the M7 would integrate a fire sup-

206
port mission package onto a modified Bradley A2 Operation Desert
Storm chassis, the M7A1 would be more advanced and incorporate
a fire support mission package on a digitized Bradley M3A3 chas-
sis. After several years of developmental work and funding-driven
program changes, the project manager redesignated the M7A1 as
the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle (M2A3) and fielded it to
counterattack units starting in 2004 as a complement to the M7 that
entered the Army’s inventory in 2000.11
Cognizant of the M7’s limitations, the Army opted in 2010 to
upgrade the Bradley M2, M3, and M7 to the M2A2 Operation Desert
Storm-Situational Awareness configuration. This program brought
the M7 close to the A3 by integrating the latest digitized electronics
to provide optimal situational awareness, network connectivity, and
enhanced communications hardware. This gave the Field Artillery
two modernized Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle variants with
the ability to designate targets accurately for precision munitions.12
Designed to maximize the employment of precision munitions,
the Combat Observation Lasing Team also employed the M981 Fire
Support vehicle. Besides lacking mobility and stealth, the M981 that
had been designed for armored and mechanized forces presented a
unique signature for the light forces that used the High Mobility Mul-
tipurpose Wheeled Vehicle as their scout vehicles. In response to this
discrepancy, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command approved
a change to the Fire Support Vehicle Operational Requirements Doc-
ument that the Field Artillery School initially wrote in April 1997.
The edited version would leverage fire support vehicle technology
for the heavy and light forces. In the revised document, the Field
Artillery School retained the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle for
the heavy forces and recommended integrating the fire support mis-
sion equipment package onto a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle chassis—known as the Striker—for the Combat Observation
Lasing Team in the heavy and light forces. This would provide the
team with unprecedented mobility, flexibility, and stealth. Also, the
Striker would be less conspicuous because it would present a common
signature with other High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle-
equipped light forces, save Bradley assets for fire support teams, and
reduce operating costs for the Combat Observation Lasing Team.13

207
 Early in 1999, the Army type-classified the system as the
M707 Striker (mounted on the M1025 High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle). The Army fielded it to the 82d Airborne Divi-
sion in 2002 and to other active component units and Army National
Guard units in 2003–2004. As noted earlier, the Army renamed the
Striker as the Knight in 2002 to avoid confusion with the Stryker
Brigade Combat Team.14
In December 2005, the Program Manager Office determined
that the M1025 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle and
its replacement, the M1114 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle, could not support the Knight program. Because of armor
added to protect against improvised electronic device attacks in Iraq,
neither vehicle with the field artillery mission equipment package
would be safe to operate. The increased vehicle weight created ex-
cessive operating restrictions. In January 2006, the Futures Devel-
opment and Integration Center at Fort Sill urged finding a suitable
replacement. Subsequently on 17 April 2006, the Army G-3/5/7 vali-
dated Third Army’s operational needs statement to provide the 10th
Mountain Division with five Knight systems on a more survivable
platform than the existing one. This encouraged the Product Manag-
er Fire Support Systems to change the platform of the M707 Knight
system from the M1114 to the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle.15
Subsequently, the Army purchased eight M1117 Armored Se-
curity Vehicles and designated them as the M1200 Armored Knight,
equipping them with laser designators for precision targeting for
employment by the Combat Observation Lasing Team. In Octo-
ber 2007, the 10th Mountain Division received five M1200s. One
month later, the 101st Airborne Division took delivery of its first
four M1200 vehicles. The Army began fielding the vehicles in Feb-
ruary 2008 to Armored Brigade Combat Teams, Infantry Brigade
Combat Teams, Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and battlefield sur-
veillance brigades; deliveries continued into 2013.16
Although developing a strategic fielding plan for new target
acquisition radars for counterfire and updating Bradley Fire Support
Team and Knight Vehicles were critical for precision targeting, the
Field Artillery still required the ability to locate the target accurately.
Early in 2014, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, Comman-

208
dant of the Field Artillery School and Chief of Field Artillery for the
Army from 2013 to 2014, remarked that accurate target location was
the branch’s number one priority. Led by Brigadier General Bent-
ley, the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill and the Field Artil-
lery School conducted a thorough examination of accurate predicted
fires that were developed by the German army in World War I and
that the American army had adopted after the war.17
During the early years of the 21st Century, the Fires Center of
Excellence and the Field Artillery School recognized that Global
Positioning System, digitized field artillery systems, and near-pre-
cision and precision munitions allowed the Field Artillery to be
precise in all aspects of the five requirements for accurate predict-
ed fires (accurate target location, firing location, weapon and am-
munition information, accurate meteorological information, and
accurate computational procedures). As Brigadier General Bentley
pointed out on 6 May 2014, automated systems and near-precision
and precision munitions permitted modifying the term from the
five requirements for accurate predicted fire to the five require-
ments for accurate fire. Technology allowed the Field Artillery to
be precise. The branch no longer needed to predict where a near-

Figure 10: M1117 Armored Security Vehicle.

Source: US Army photo by Staff Sergeant Kimberly Hackbarth.

209
precision or precision munition would hit, which was a significant
change from the 100-year-old process of forecasting the impact
points of ballistic munitions.18
Raising target location standards accompanied transforming
the five requirements for accurate predicted fire to the five require-
ments for accurate fire. As the Field Artillery School explained in
the fall of 2014, precision targeting was “non-negotiable.”19 With
this vision, the school created the ratio of 80:10:10. The school
determined that forward observers had to acquire an accurate grid
coordinate 80 percent of the time. This meant achieving a Cat-
egory I (6-meter target location error) and a Category II (15-meter
target location error) or a precision grid coordinate 80 percent of
the time, achieving a Category IV (50-meter target location error)
10 percent of the time, and achieving a Category V/VI (200-meter
target location error) 10 percent of the time. The school clarified,
“This 80:10:10 ratio defines for us as professional Artillerymen
the term accurate in the first requirement for accurate Fires. It also
defines for us, as a profession of arms, how we train, certify and
deliver accurate target locations in support of strategic, operational
and tactical Fires.”20
For the dismounted forward observer to provide accurate tar-
get location and size, the Field Artillery School and Brigadier Gen-
eral Bentley acknowledged the importance of taking advantage of
portable target designator systems already fielded and those sched-
uled for fielding in the near future. As the Global War on Terror-
ism demonstrated, the Field Artillery furnished responsive, effec-
tive fires with the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary
employing deliberate targeting methods while the Air Force utilized
the Joint Direct Attack Munition effectively for deliberate targeting.
Deliberate targeting involved attacking targets that were detected,
identified, and developed in sufficient time to schedule actions in a
tasking cycle. In contrast, dynamic targeting at the Army battalion
and below involved attacking fleeting targets quickly. Although the
Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces could refine
grid coordinates for precision strikes, it generally resided at levels
above the dismounted forward observer. Also, some dismounted
forward observers preferred maps, binoculars, and compasses rather

210
than automated targeting designators. This limited the ability to ob-
tain a precise coordinate location and minimized the effectiveness of
coordinate locating munitions or precision munitions, which were
employed frequently in deliberate and dynamic targeting missions
and implementing the 80:10:10 targeting ratio.21
Influenced by this deficiency, the Army and Field Artillery
reaffirmed the necessity to employ sensors capable of pinpoint-
ing a target location for a precision munition to hit. On 21 Sep-
tember 2010, the Army and the Field Artillery launched action to
upgrade the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 2 that was
being fielded; the equipment could be employed by mounted or dis-
mounted forces and had the ability to locate a target accurately for
precision munitions. However, the designator required improved ac-
curacy to support current and future precision munitions. To support
this requirement, the Army adopted the Lightweight Laser Designa-
tor Rangefinder 2H and retrofitted the Lightweight Laser Designa-
tor Rangefinder 1 and 2 as the 2H. Fielded beginning in 2014, the
new system permitted the dismounted soldier to call for fire with
precision munitions and reduced target location error from approxi-
mately six meters to two meters.22

Figure 11: Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder.

Source: US Army photo by Technical Sergeant Brian E. Christiansen.

211
 The pursuit of accurate target location and size also prompted
development of a Joint Effects Targeting System for the dismounted
forces. In June 2004, the Army/Marine Corps Board directed the
services to develop a common laser-targeting device requirement.
In response, the Army began developmental work on the handheld,
binocular-like Joint Effects Targeting System. The system would
consist of a Target Location Designation System and a Target Ef-
fects Coordination System. A forward observer equipped with the
Joint Effects Targeting System with Target Location Designation
System capabilities could recognize targets out to ranges of 3,000
meters during the day and 1,300 meters during the night—with
sufficient accuracy to employ precision munitions without men-
suration. The Target Effects Coordination System software would
provide blue force situational awareness on friendly and hostile mil-
itary forces and communications interface with effects providers. In
October 2006, the Department of Defense designated the Army as
the lead for the system. The Army awarded developmental contracts
in March 2013 and scheduled fielding for 2016, but technical and
budgetary challenges pushed fielding back to 2018.23
Until the Joint Effects Targeting System could be fielded, the
Army relied on the Quick Reaction Capability Hand-Held Targeting
Device starting in 2013. It provided the dismounted forward observ-
er with the ability to designate targets accurately within the stan-
dards required to employ precision munitions. The device bridged
the gap between the existing target designation capability of 2013
and the futuristic Joint Effects Targeting System.24
The Army developed and fielded the Fire Support Sensor System
as it introduced the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 2H for
the mounted and dismounted forward observer and as it worked to
acquire the Joint Effects Targeting System for the dismounted for-
ward observer. In 2005, the Army began fielding the Fire Support
Sensor System by fitting the system on the Knight vehicle employed
by Combat Observation Lasing Teams. Beginning in 2007, the Army
integrated the Fire Support Sensor System onto the M3A3 Bradley
Fire Support Team Vehicle. While radars gave the Field Artillery im-
proved counterfire capabilities on a mobile battlefield as well as net-
worked capabilities, the target sensors gave the Field Artillery the

212
ability to locate a target more accurately and facilitate exploiting pre-
cision munitions to complement unguided munitions.25
Precision munitions including the Guided Multiple Launch
Rocket System rocket and the Excalibur 155-millimeter munition,
the reduction of the number of howitzers and rocket launchers in
service, and the requirement to reduce or eliminate collateral dam-
age highlighted the need to reduce the target location error through
improved sensors and appropriately trained Soldiers who would use
them.26 As early as Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Army ac-
knowledged that it lacked the ability to mensurate coordinates by
absolutely measuring the height, latitude, and longitude of a point
on the earth; these skills were critical to reduce target location error
and ensure effective employment of coordinate-seeking or precision
munitions. At the time, the Army relied on the Air Force to derive
mensurate coordinates. Generally, it took up to 24 hours from the
time that target information reached the Air Force until it came back
to the Army for engaging. Pushing to reduce the turnaround time,
the 75th Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division devel-
oped a process in 2005–2006 to mensurate coordinates using Rain-
storm, a National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency-validated tool.
This reduced turnaround time to minutes.27
However, a critical capability gap still existed. The Army
lacked institutional training for target coordinate mensuration (the
process to locate a target precisely), weaponeering (the process
to determine the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal
weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given
target), and collateral damage estimation (the process for estimating
collateral damage and casualties from conventional weapons and
precision, unguided, and cluster munitions). To eliminate this gap,
the Army designated the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill as
its functional manager for precision fires. Then in 2008, the Fires
Center of Excellence made the Joint and Combined Integration Di-
rectorate its lead agency for developing a precision fires training
program for target coordinate mensuration, weaponeering, and col-
lateral damage estimation; graduates would be certified by the Na-
tional Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, a combatant command, or a
combat support agency.28

213
 After several months of hard work, the Joint and Combined
Integration Directorate implemented a basic precision fires training
program in September 2010. This program trained fire supporters to
conduct target coordinate mensuration, weaponeering, and collateral
damage estimation through three venues. The first venue utilized pri-
mary military education for Military Occupational Specialty 13F Fire
Support Specialist, Military Occupational Specialty 131A targeting
warrant officers, and Military Occupational Specialty 13A field artil-
lery officers to provide this training so that operational units could
employ precision and conventional indirect fires accurately, achieve
first-round target effects, and mitigate collateral damage. For the sec-
ond venue, functional courses trained Military Occupational Special-
ist 13F Fire Support Specialists and Military Occupational Specialty
131A warrant officers who did not receive this training as part of their
primary military education, as well as other services, partner nations,
and individuals in targeting positions. Mobile training teams, the
third venue, furnished unit training. Precision fires training in 2011
satisfied joint standards requirements and led to certification in target
mensuration or collateral damage estimation or both. The National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency accredited the Target Coordinate
Mensuration program in 2011, and the Joint Targeting School accred-
ited the Collateral Damage Estimation program that same year. These
gave the Army the ability to certify soldiers and others in target coor-
dinate mensuration and collateral damage estimation.29
Armed with these certifications, the Fires Center of Excellence
expanded its precision fires training. Directed by Major General
David D. Halverson, its commanding general, the Fires Center of
Excellence added precision fires courses in the Warrant Officer
Instruction Branch and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy
in 2012. The Warrant Officer Instruction Branch taught a Target
Mensuration Only (taught only mensurating target coordinates) and
Weaponeering in the Warrant Officer Basic Course as well as Tar-
get Mensuration Only in the Warrant Officer Advance Course. Both
courses provided Collateral Damage Estimation instruction, while
the Noncommissioned Officer Academy integrated Target Mensu-
ration Only into its Military Occupational Specialty 13F Advanced
Leader Course and the Military Occupational Specialty 13F Senior

214
Leader Course and added Weaponeering and Collateral Damage
Estimation to its Military Occupational Specialty 13F Senior Lead-
er Course. In the meantime, functional courses taught by the Field
Artillery School and mobile training teams bridged the gap for sol-
diers who did not have precision fires training in their professional
military education.30
Subsequently, the Field Artillery School increased its precision
fires training even more under Brigadier General Bentley’s guid-
ance. In October 2013, the school set Target Mensuration Only and
Collateral Damage Estimation certification as a requirement for
graduation from its warrant officer courses.31
As precision fires training requests from the field increased,
the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate’s Targeting Division
meanwhile developed a course of action to increase the number of
trained personnel while maintaining its ability to support resident
training and mobile training teams. After a series of 2012 meetings,
Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, Field Artillery School Com-
mandant, decided to give Target Mensuration Only and Weapon-
eering instruction responsibility to the Warrant Officer Instruction
Branch and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy. Directorate pre-
cision fires course instructors trained and certified instructors. This
allowed Joint and Combined Integration Directorate precision fires
instructors to focus on resident and mobile training team courses.32
Concurrently, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate
obtained assistance from the Field Artillery Commandant’s Office to
market its unit precision fires program so that soldiers in operational
units would have the opportunity to become certified Target Men-
suration Only instructors. Thanks to this initiative, operational units
could certify soldiers in Target Mensuration Only while also provid-
ing a certified analyst capable of maintaining currency.33
On 1 February 2013, the 101st Air Assault Division developed
the first unit precision fires program capable of creating analysts
outside of the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate’s preci-
sion fires courses. This capability allowed the unit and the Army
to save training dollars because it did not require precision fires
mobile training teams. With the success of the 101st Air Assault
Division’s program, 1st Armored Division, 10th Mountain Divi-

215
sion, 82d Airborne Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Cavalry
Division established their own unit precision fires programs to cer-
tify analysts and maintain the capability to grow and sustain Target
Mensuration Only.34
Besides developing a precision fires training program to train
soldiers to deliver precision munitions at Fort Sill and in opera-
tional units, the Field Artillery’s role in nonlethal targeting greatly
expanded during the first decade of the 21st Century.35 Since the
1990s, maneuver commanders had looked to their fire supporters to
integrate lethal and nonlethal effects; however, combat operations
early in the 21st Century took the Field Artillery beyond an infor-
mal arrangement for integrating lethal and nonlethal effects to one
based on formal doctrine. Doctrine required field artillery officers
and soldiers to look across a broad spectrum of targeting by integrat-
ing information operations, electronic attack, psychological opera-
tions, military deception, public affairs, and other nonlethal effects
as required to complement lethal precision or conventional fires and
to change their mindset. Field artillery officers and soldiers had to
determine whether lethal effects or nonlethal effects would meet the
desired effect rather than narrowly focusing lethal fires and effects
as had been the practice for years.36
In response, the Field Artillery School developed a three-week
Tactical Information Operations Course for brigade and below. The
course taught students to identify the target then select the appropri-
ate lethal or nonlethal effects that would achieve the commander’s
desired result. Geared for staff sergeants through lieutenant colo-
nels, the course focused on basic information operations, including
electronic warfare, cultural awareness, and operational security.37
Concurrently, the Field Artillery School added other nonlethal
courses. In 2005, it introduced a Joint Fires and Effects Course. Al-
though funding constraints forced the school to stop teaching the
course in 2013, the initial offering covered the skills and processes
to apply and integrate the full range of operational lethal and nonle-
thal fires and effects; it also prepared students for the effects-based
approach methodology to combat operations. A few years later in
2007, the Field Artillery School created a Fire Support Coordina-
tor Course to equip fire support coordinators with the right skills to

216
integrate lethal and nonlethal effects. Despite the course’s success
over its two years, budget cuts forced the school to eliminate both
the class and its mobile training team counterpart during the latter
months of 2011. To mitigate the training gap, the school incorpo-
rated one week of fire support coordinator training into the Field
Artillery Captain’s Career Course. The school also added lethal and
nonlethal fires and effects into the Noncommissioned Officer Educa-
tion System and Warrant Officer Education System.38
At the same time, the Field Artillery ventured into electronic
warfare as a part of its nonlethal mission. On 30 October 2003, the
Department of Defense concluded that electronic warfare capabili-
ties had to be improved to meet advances in the application and the
use of the electromagnetic spectrum to deny adversarial situational
awareness, disrupt command and control, and develop targeting so-
lutions to defeat weapons while protecting the United States’ elec-
tronic capabilities from being successfully attacked. Subsequently
on 15 May 2004, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command
Commanding General designated the Combined Arms Center Com-
manding General at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the Army’s speci-
fied proponent for electronic warfare. Then on 23 November 2004,
the Combined Arms Center Commanding General, Lieutenant Gen-
eral William S. Wallace, selected the US Army Field Artillery Cen-
ter and Fort Sill as the lead for the Army’s electronic warfare attack
for brigade, division, and corps. Working with the Combined Arms
Center, Fort Sill developed a plan early in 2005 to revitalize elec-
tronic warfare within the Army; establish roles and responsibilities
for electronic warfare functions; and begin the process of updating
electronic warfare doctrine, organization, training, material, lead-
ership, personnel, and facilities. Initial analysis indicated that the
responsibilities between information officers and fires coordinators
were not clear, that joint electronic attack planning and coordination
were largely ignored, and that there were multiple proponents for
various aspects of electronic warfare. Equally important, electronic
attack training did not meet current doctrine or organizations; and
fire support coordinators lacked training on integrating and synchro-
nizing electronic warfare assets. Only formal training could over-
come these deficiencies.39

217
 Based on this conclusion, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,
General Peter W. Chiarelli, took action. In May 2006, he directed
the Army G-3 to establish electronic warfare as an enduring core
warfighting competency within the Army and directed the G-3 to
develop an electronic warfare force structure and operational con-
cepts to strengthen the Army’s strategic vision and support the
ground force component commander. This would enhance the Ar-
my’s ability to counter electronic threats proactively, help integrate
lethal and nonlethal capabilities across the Army, and mitigate the
threat that America’s enemies would employ electromagnetic spec-
trum, such as improvised explosive devices that had been so deadly
in the War of Terrorism.40
To meet the immediate requirement for electronic warfare per-
sonnel, the Combined Arms Center directed the US Army Intelligence
Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the Fires Center of
Excellence at Fort Sill (known as the US Army Field Artillery Center
and Fort Sill until 2005) to create electronic warfare courses. In 2006,
the Intelligence School developed a Tactical Electronic Warfare Prac-
tioners Course that awarded an additional skill identifier 1K and fo-
cused on countering radio-controlled improvised explosive devices.
Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School conducted a pilot Army Opera-
tional Electronic Warfare Course in October 2006 and January 2007
to train electronic warfare officers to plan, integrate, synchronize, and
execute electronic warfare according to the commander’s scheme of
maneuver. This course awarded an additional skill identifier 1J.41
The Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course served as a
bridging strategy until an electronic warfare force structure could
be stood up. In preparation for a proposed electronic warfare func-
tional area, the Combined Arms Center directed the Fires Center
of Excellence in August 2008 to construct an electronic warfare
officer functional course, an electronic warfare integrator course
for warrant officers, and an electronic warfare integrator course for
enlisted personnel. This would permit the Army to field its own
electronic warfare personnel to replace those provided by the Air
Force and Navy.42
In concert with this tasking, the Fires Center of Excellence
taught four electronic warfare courses to satisfy Functional Area 29

218
training requirements for officers, Military Occupational Specialty
290A for warrant officers, and Military Occupational Specialty 29E
for enlisted soldiers by 2011. While the Army Operational Warfare
Electronic Warfare Course still provided an additional skill identi-
fier 1J to furnish deploying units with battalion and brigade elec-
tronic warfare personnel, the Functional Area 29 course prepared of-
ficers to serve as Army electronic warfare officers from the brigade
to the Army Service Component command level. The course also
provided training in the essential core skills necessary to perform
electronic warfare functions in support of the commander’s concept
of the operations. Additionally, it prepared electronic warfare offi-
cers to participate in electronic warfare operations at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels in a variety of Army and joint orga-
nizations. Meanwhile, the Electronic Warfare Warrant Officer Tech-
nician Military Occupational Specialty 290A course trained warrant
officers to serve as electronic warfare integrators; and the Electronic
Warfare Sergeant Noncommissioned Officer Course Military Occu-
pational Skill 29E prepared enlisted soldiers to serve as Army elec-
tronic warfare specialists.43
However, the Field Artillery and Field Artillery School were
only responsible for electronic warfare for a few years. In 2011,
the Army transferred electronic warfare from the fires warfighting
function to the mission command warfighting function as part of its
Army Doctrine 2015 effort. Though the Fires Center of Excellence,
Field Artillery School, and Field Artillery were no longer respon-
sible for electronic warfare, their responsibility for nonlethal fires
and effects remained.44
To this end, the Combined Arms Center Commanding General,
Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, and the Fires Center
of Excellence Commanding General, Major General Peter M. Van-
gjel (2007–2009), addressed the importance of nonlethal effects.
Lieutenant General Caldwell told leaders at the 2008 fires confer-
ence that providing nonlethal effects was now a core competency of
field artillery officers and soldiers. In his vision of the future, Major
General Vangjel reinforced this competency.45 A few years later, the
August 2012 version of Army Doctrinal Publication 3-09 explained
that the fires warfighting function included deliberate and dynamic

219
targeting to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects against ground tar-
gets.46 Army doctrine solidified the responsibility for field artillery
officers and soldiers to supply lethal and nonlethal effects equally as
well. Field artillery officers and soldiers no longer had the option to
consider nonlethal fires and effects. According to doctrine, they had
to view it as a viable option and not as an afterthought as the practice
had been for years.47
Making nonlethal fires and effects a core competency for field
artillery officers and soldiers reflected the Field Artillery’s signifi-
cant transformation during the first two decades of the 21st Cen-
tury. For the previous two centuries, the Field Artillery focused on
massed, lethal fires and effects to destroy targets and demonstrated
little concern for collateral damage and noncombatant deaths. Be-
cause of increasing concern about collateral damage, field artillery
officers and soldiers were forced to look across a broad spectrum of
targeting; this required a new mindset. They had to consider nonle-
thal fires and effects as a viable alternative to lethal fires and effects.

Munitions, Platforms, and Command and Control

Concurrent with its doctrinal transformation, the Field Artil-
lery needed to replace cluster munitions with munitions that did not
produce collateral damage as well as field updated precision muni-
tions, upgrade firing platforms, and modernize mission command
systems. These measures would ensure that the branch would re-
main competitive in a world of rapidly changing technology and
emerging threats.
Over the years, cluster munitions generated controversy. They
dispensed a large number of submunitions imprecisely over an ex-
tended area; lacked self-destruct capability; had the potential to re-
main hazardous for decades; and produced collateral damage to in-
frastructure, Soldiers, and civilians. Armies first used them in World
War II, and at least 21 countries had employed them since. In the
1960s and 1970s, the United States used them in Southeast Asia.
The International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that 9 to
27 million cluster munitions remained unexploded in Laos alone.
In the years since, the Soviets had utilized them in Afghanistan in
the 1970s and 1980s, while the British employed them in the Falk-

220
land Islands in the 1980s. Subsequently, the United States employed
cluster bombs in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the 21st
Century during its Global War on Terrorism.48
Frustrated with the futile attempts to prohibit or restrict the use
of cluster munitions, a group of nations led by Norway reached an
agreement to ban them. In December 2008, 94 countries signed the
Convention on Cluster Munitions, which banned their development,
production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling. By December
2009, 103 countries had signed the convention. The United States,
Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan, however, did not
participate in the talks that led to the agreement and abstained from
signing the convention.49
In fact, the United States initially resisted bans against em-
ploying cluster munitions. As early as May 2008, Acting Assistant
Secretary of Political-Military Affairs Stephen Mull said the United
States relied on cluster munitions as an important part of its de-
fense strategy and preferred pursuing technological fixes to ensure
that unexploded munitions would not be viable once a conflict was
over. Moreover, if cluster munitions were eliminated, he argued,
more money would be spent on new weapon systems, ammunition,
and logistical resources to replace them. The United States further
stated that most militaries would increase the use of massed field
artillery and rocket barrages, which would increase the destruction
of infrastructure.50
US leaders acknowledged that unexploded cluster munitions
could cause unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure
and recognized worldwide opposition to the Dual-Purpose Improved
Conventional Munition that was an American field artillery cluster
munition. Instead of eliminating the munition, the Department of
Defense changed its cluster munition policy to require the military
to design and procure cluster munitions with a 99-percent reliabil-
ity rate, meaning that one percent or less of its bomblets would not
detonate after they were dispensed from the carrier shell. In its 19
June 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to
Civilians memorandum, the Department of Defense officially an-
nounced a moratorium on the production and employment of cluster
munitions that would leave more than one percent duds after arm-

221
ing. As soon as possible but no later than one year from 9 July 2008,
the military and combatant commands would commence removing
all cluster munitions from the active inventory that exceeded op-
erational planning requirements or for which there would be no op-
erational planning requirements. All excess cluster munitions would
be demilitarized as soon as practicable. After 2018, United States
military departments and combatant commands could only employ
cluster munitions that would result in no more than one percent un-
exploded ordnance after arming. Previously, employing cluster mu-
nitions that exceeded the one-percent threshold had to be approved
by the combatant commander.51
The Army recognized the need for the Guided Multiple Launch
Rocket System Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition and
noted that the Unitary munition that was a single high-explosive
warhead did not provide the same capability and effect. With this
in mind, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7, Lieuten-
ant General James D. Thurman, announced in June 2008 that the
Army had decided to transition to an alternative warhead capability
as soon as technologically and programmatically feasible. Subse-
quently, the Army announced its intention to procure the Guided
Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary rocket in lieu of the Dual-
Purpose Improved Conventional Munition warhead and develop a
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead.52
After several years of development and successful testing
demonstrated the munition’s reliability and accuracy, the Army an-
nounced in 2014 that the 200-pound Guided Multiple Launch Rock-
et System Alternative Warhead contained approximately 160,000
preformed tungsten fragments, eliminated the possibility of any un-
exploded ordnance, and met the 2008 Department of Defense policy
on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians memoran-
dum. Equally important, the Army initiated full production in 2015.53
As the Army worked to acquire the Guided Multiple Launch
Rocket System Alternative Warhead, it upgraded its arsenal of Army
Tactical Missile Systems (a long-range field artillery missile), focus-
ing on limiting collateral damage in keeping with the Department of
Defense policy on cluster munitions. In response to an urgent need
statement from Headquarters, US Forces Korea, the Army fielded

222
the Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Missile System in 2001 to
complement the Army Tactical Missile System I and Ia. The I and Ia
had anti-personnel and anti-material cluster submunitions that did not
comply with the Department of Defense cluster munition policy and,
therefore, could not be employed after 2018. The Quick Reaction
Unitary, often called the Army Tactical Missile System Ia Unitary,
had a deep strike capability for responsive precision employment in
areas of dense foliage, deep snow cover, and built-up urban environ-
ments. With a range of 270 kilometers and a single 500-pound high-
explosive warhead, it engaged point targets with minimal collateral
damage at ranges comparable to the Army Tactical Missile System
Ia, provided the corps and joint task force commander with the capa-
bility to attack time-sensitive targets, and augmented the Army Tacti-
cal Missile System I and Ia strikes that helped pave the way for the
2003 ground campaign in Operation Iraqi Freedom.54
Despite operational successes with the Army Tactical Missile
System I and Ia and the Quick Reaction Unitary Army Tactical Mis-
sile System, insufficient funding prompted the Assistant Secretary
of the Army, Claude M. Bolton Jr., to sign a memorandum to termi-
nate the Army Tactical Missile System. His action cancelled con-
tracts, and production facilities were closed out after final deliveries
had been made in 2008.55
As of 2010, the Army had an inventory of approximately 2,000
Army Tactical Missile Systems. This included the I and Ia, the
Unitary (M48 and M57), and the Army Tactical Missile System II
that was never fully operational. Nearly 65 percent of the missiles
failed Department of Defense cluster munition policy compliancy
requirements and could not be employed after 2018. To ensure that
the stockpile of Army Tactical Missile Systems I and Ia with 2016
expiration dates and the Unitary with a 2021 expiration date were
available for employment, the Army designed a service life exten-
sion program in 2009 to extend the life of the I and Ia missiles by
10 years. By refurbishing or replacing propulsion and navigation
systems and replacing the non-compliant I and Ia warheads with the
Unitary warhead, the service life extension program would provide
time to complete an analysis and develop a successor to the Army
Tactical Missile System.56

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 Understanding that the service life extension program did not
satisfy long-term precision fires requirements, the 27 September
2013 US Army Training and Doctrine Command Capability Needs
Analysis noted the imperative to develop a long-range precision
fires strategy. Without the Army Tactical Missile System, the Army
lacked the capability to engage targets out to 499 kilometers and de-
stroy strategic targets. Although viable options existed to eliminate
the capability gap—ranging from joint assets to restarting the Army
Tactical Missile System production—the Fires Center of Excellence
at Fort Sill advocated developing a new missile because it would be
the most cost-effective alternative for fielding a missile with long-
range capability; they designed a block strategy to develop the new
weapon in a timely and affordable manner.57
As of 2015, the first block or increment would hit targets from
70 to 300 kilometers and would have two missiles per missile pod.
This would not require any modifications to the current Army Tacti-
cal Missile System launcher or pod. Additionally, it would permit
fielding the missile in 2022 and after the end of the Army Tactical
Missile System’s shelf life. Initial capabilities would include 24/7
all-weather precision area and time-sensitive capability to destroy
tactical or strategic targets.58 The second increment or block would
take advantage of emerging technologies to engage targets beyond
300 kilometers. This range would most likely come from improved
motor, lightweight airframe, and propulsion technologies.59
Removing the Army’s arsenal of cluster munitions extended
to the 155-millimeter Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Muni-
tion. To save money and prevent wasting the M483 Dual-Purpose
Improved Conventional Munition carrier shell, the Army formu-
lated a plan in 2011 to recycle the carrier shell as a replacement
for aging or less capable munitions. The first munition using this
recycle concept was the M1122 training round for the 155-milli-
meter howitzer. The M1122 replaced the M804 Low-cost Indirect
Fire Training Round and then the M107 training round in 2012.
Other munitions using the recycled M483 included the M1123 In-
frared Illuminating Projectile and M1124 Visible Light Illuminat-
ing Projectile. A third round was the M110A3 White Phosphorous
Smoke Projectile.60

224
 As the Army and the Field Artillery initiated steps to eliminate
cluster munitions, they continued work on the Precision Guidance
Kit, a fuse with a Global Positioning System package that would
turn a non-guided munition into a smart one as well as the Ex-
calibur precision munition to minimize collateral damage and re-
duce the number of rounds to destroy a target. Following successful
testing, the urgent material release Precision Guidance Kit began
fielding in March 2013. The Army sent the fuse to M777 towed-
155-millimeter howitzer and M109 self-propelled 155-millimeter
howitzer units in Afghanistan. The fuse achieved near-precision
target effects when it was screwed onto the nose of a conventional
155-millimeter projectile.61
Meanwhile, the Army continued developing a program-of-re-
cord Precision Guidance Kit fuse. In May 2015, it successfully com-
pleted an initial operational test and evaluation that demonstrated
the fuse’s operational effectiveness, accuracy, operational suitabil-
ity, and survivability. This permitted moving the fuse into full-rate
production and adding anti-jamming capabilities to the fuse.62
The Field Artillery School concurrently continued participat-
ing in developing precision Excalibur Ia-2 and Ib that would be im-
provements over the Excalibur Ia-1 that had been fielded in Iraq and
Afghanistan as an urgent material requirement. The Excalibur Ia-1
had a range of 24 kilometers, while the Excalibur Ia-2 had a range
of 37 kilometers and better accuracy. The Army concluded fielding
Excalibur Ia-2 in 2012. Although funding constraints reduced the
number to be produced, the Army Acquisition Executive approved
full-rate production of Excalibur Ib on 25 June 2014.63
Introducing new weapon systems complemented developing
new munitions. After several years of work in the 1990s, the con-
tractor delivered prototypes of the XM777 towed 155-millimeter
howitzer, also called the Lightweight 155. Unveiled at Picatinny
Arsenal, New Jersey, in June 2000, the first prototypes held great
promise. The howitzers’ reduced size and weight permitted towing
by the same prime mover used to tow the M198 towed 155-mil-
limeter howitzer and allowed two howitzers to fit into a C-130 air-
craft for strategic deployability. Additionally, the XM777 (desig-
nated as the M777) could be emplaced in three minutes or less, be

225
displaced in two minutes or less, and fire faster than the M198—
with a range of 30 kilometers.64
Fielding the M777 with a conventional optical fire control
system began as planned. On 19 January 2005, the Marine Corps
received its first howitzers and conducted its first live fire at Fort
Sill. Other howitzers were fielded to the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines
at Twenty Nine Palms, California, and the 2d Battalion, 11th Ma-
rines at Camp Pendleton, California. On 19 December 2005, Colo-
nel John M. Sullivan Jr., the 11th Marine Regiment Commander,
certified that the Marine Corps had achieved its initial operational
capability with the M777.65
Work on the software for the Towed Artillery Digitization pack-
age subsequently produced a sophisticated towed howitzer. Early in
the fall of 2006, the Army tested an M777 digital fire control system
at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. After successful software
and material testing, Major General William M. Lenaers, US Army
Tank Command Life Cycle Management Command Commanding
General, proceeded with full material release of the XM777E1 as
the M777A1 in January 2007.66

Figure 12: M119A2 towed 105-millimeter howitzer.

Source: US Army photo by First Lieutenant Jonathan J. Springer.

226
 Shortly afterward, the Army upgraded the M777A1 with soft-
ware improvements to fire the Excalibur precision munition and re-
designated it as the M777A2. Fielding of the howitzer began in July
2007 and continued into 2010. At the same time, the Army retrofit-
ted the M777 and the M777A1 as the M777A2. Then on 13 January
2008, C Battery, 3d Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment fired
the first Excalibur in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
from the M777A2; and later the 2d Battalion, 11th Field Artillery
Regiment fired the first Excalibur from the howitzer in Operation
Iraqi Freedom on 26 April 2008.67
After creating the Infantry Brigade Combat Team with its
organic fires battalion in 2002, the Army required more towed
105-millimeter howitzers than in its inventory. This led to a June
2004 decision by a general officer steering committee to rebuild and
refit old M102 towed 105-millimeter howitzers and press them into
service. Pressured by the US Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand and the US Army Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill, the gen-
eral officer steering committee reevaluated the decision in August
2004 and ordered production of new M119A2 towed 105-millime-
ter howitzers to fill the shortages.68 Based on successful testing, the
Army subsequently granted new production full materiel release
for the M119A2 on 10 June 2008 and began fielding.69
With the fielding of the digitized M777A1 towed 155-millime-
ter howitzer and the phasing out of the M102 towed 105-millimeter
howitzer, the M109A5 self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer, and
the M198 towed 155-millimeter howitzer, the M119A2 would be
the only howitzer in the Army’s inventory without digital capabili-
ties. This would exacerbate the capability gap between the Infantry
Brigade Combat Team that was equipped with the M119A2 and the
Stryker Brigade Combat Team that was equipped with the M777A1.
The lack of digital capabilities with the M119A2 would also prevent
the howitzer from using the Precision Guidance Kit fuse. The lack
of precision, in turn, would lead to less accuracy; make dispersed
operations more difficult to perform; and decrease the survivability
of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team. Influenced by these reasons,
the Field Artillery School, the US Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand, and the Army G-8 (Programming and Materiel Integration)

227
developed the requirement in 2007 to digitize the M119A2 along the
lines of the M777A1. Later on 24 January 2008, the Program Execu-
tive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, and Major General Peter M.
Vangjel, the commanding general of the US Army Fires Center of
Excellence and Fort Sill from 2007 to 2009, approved digitizing the
M119A2 to give it the same self-locating, self-orienting, and digital
communications capabilities as the M777A1 and M109A6 (Pala-
din) self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer. The Army designated
the digitized M119A2 as the M119A3.70
Fielding the M119A3 began in 2013 when the 3d Battalion,
319th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the
1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Campbell, Ken-
tucky; and the 1st Battalion, 78th Field Artillery Regiment, 428th
Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, received their howitzers as part of
a six-year fielding plan. With this action, all the Army’s towed artil-
lery had digital capabilities for the first time.71
Weapons platform modernization also included the M109A6
(Paladin) self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer. In the fall of 2007,
the US Army and BAE Systems signed a memorandum of understand-
ing establishing a public-private partnership to develop and sustain
the Army’s M109 Family of Vehicles—the M109A6, the M992A2
Field Artillery Ammunition Resupply Vehicle, and the Paladin Oper-
ations Center Vehicle—through the Paladin Integrated Management.
Then in May 2008, they signed a contract to design and develop the
Paladin Integrated Management M109 system of vehicles.72
The Army intended for Paladin Integrated Management to im-
prove readiness, avoid component obsolescence, and increase sus-
tainability of the M109 platforms to mitigate size, weight, and pow-
er gaps required to support Heavy Brigade Combat Teams through
2037. Operationally, upgrades would make the howitzer faster,
more maneuverable, more sustainable, and more lethal as well as
reduce the logistics footprint and operational and support costs. To
achieve these objectives, Paladin Integrated Management would
leverage commonality with Future Combat System’s Non-Line of
Sight Cannon and the Heavy Brigade Combat Team’s Bradley fight-
ing vehicle. For example, Paladin Integrated Management would
use the Bradley’s engine, transmission, and track/suspension sys-

228
tem and incorporate select technologies from the Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon—including but not limited to the automated projectile ram-
mer and modern electric-gun drive system to replace the current hy-
draulic elevation and azimuth drives that were designed in the early
1960s. Once delivered to the field, the Paladin Integrated Manage-
ment M109 family of vehicles would give the Heavy Brigade Com-
bat Team upgraded capabilities, including more maneuverability, a
higher rate of speed, increased crew survivability, and improved de-
livery of accurate and timely fires. Then when Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates cancelled the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon in April
2009, the Paladin Integrated Management became the Army’s num-
ber one modernization effort.73
Meanwhile, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command
stripped the Paladin Operations Center Vehicle from Paladin Inte-
grated Management and tied it to a command and control vehicle
to replace the M113, the M577, and the M1068 vehicles. In August
2009, the Army awarded a contract to BAE to produce seven Pala-
din Integrated Management vehicles – five self-propelled howitzers
and two carrier ammunition tracked vehicles. Five months later on
20 January 2010, the company unveiled its first M109 Paladin Inte-
grated Management prototype howitzer.74

Figure 13: M109 Paladin Integrated Management howitzer.

Source: US Army photo by Sergeant Sean Harriman.

229
 Over the next several years, the Army ran the Paladin Inte-
grated Management howitzer through various tests to determine
its suitability, reliability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability,
among other things. After successful 2010 and 2011 tests, the Pro-
gram Executive Office Ground Combat Systems announced that the
howitzer had passed a major hurdle when the Defense Acquisition
Executive approved production on 18 October 2013. The howit-
zer moved into low-rate initial production in 2014, with full-rate
production scheduled for 2017 and the first unit equipped in 2017.
While its cannon remained the same as the M109A6, the Paladin
Integrated Management howitzer—designated the M109A7 in
2015—had a new chassis, engine, transmission, suspension system,
and steering system.75
Modernizing the M270 and M142 launchers paralleled cannon
developments. After fielding the M270A1 in 2002, the Army upgrad-
ed it. During 2005, the Army introduced the Improved Weapon Inter-
face Unit, which was required for firing the Guided Multiple Launch
Rocket System munition—both the Dual-Purpose Improved Con-
ventional Munition and Unitary.76 In 2005, the Army also completed
other significant modification projects, including the Environmental
Control Unit and Auxiliary Power Unit. The launcher cab’s exist-
ing ventilation system did not meet Manpower Personnel Integration
requirements for a crew during firing and silent watch operations in
all weather. Additionally, multiple radios and electronic equipment
in the cab generated heat. To address these issues, the Army installed
the Environment Control Unit to control adverse climate conditions
and permit the maximum use of radios and computer systems as well
as the Auxiliary Power Unit to reduce maintenance time and costs,
provide electricity, and permit the launcher to remain powered while
in the hide area with the main engine shut off.77
Meanwhile, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated
that the threat had changed, requiring greater protection for the
M270 crew. As explained in the January–February 2016 Fires Bul-
letin, the Improved Armored Cab would support current and future
operations and provide greater protection against mines, improvised
explosive devices, enemy artillery fragmentation and direct attack
from small arms. Based on 2015 testing, the Army concluded that

230
the Improved Armored Cab would furnish crew protection on par
with the High Mobility Army Rocket System cab.78
With the increasing need for better communications over long
distances, the Army also initiated development of a long-range
communication system for the Multiple Launch Rocket System
and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. As of 2006, digi-
tal messages to the launchers were transmitted from the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System via a Single Channel Ground
and Airborne Radio System. This message flow was sequential
from command and control node to command and control node.
Line-of-sight radio communications limited the distance between
each command and control node. Although there were advantages
to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, re-
duced effectiveness of time-sensitive targets by taking a long time
to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to
complete a fire mission. The long-distance communication system
as employed by 2015 integrated high-frequency radios and satel-
lites to permit units to receive and send secure voice and digital
fire missions over extended distances, reduced the physical and
electronic footprint by expanding reach, and provided tactical flex-
ibility when positioning launchers.79
Referred to as the “Big Three Modifications,” the Modular
Launcher Communications System, Driver’s Vision Enhancement,
and Blue Force Tracker gave soldiers three hardware upgrades that
enhanced battlefield operation of the M270 mission. The Driver’s
Vision Enhancement allowed drivers to conduct day and night op-
erations and maneuver in smoke, fog, dust, or other battlefield ob-
scurants, while the Blue Force Tracker delivered greater situation-
al awareness through a small screen that showed the locations of
friendly units as well as other battlefield intelligence.80
Concurrently, the Army pushed a fire control system upgrade.
In addition to upgrading the obsolete fire control system, the upgrade
provided fire control system software and hardware commonality
between the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System M142 launcher
and M270A1 launcher by taking advantage of the latest technology
and better processors to enhance mission processing and make the
fire control system more user-friendly. These modernization pro-

231
grams made the M270A1 more modern, survivable, and sustainable
for the 21st Century battlefield.81
As it updated the M270A1, the Army fielded the High Mobil-
ity Artillery Rocket System M142 launcher beginning in 2005.82
Just as fielding began, the Army approved a 20 October 2005 urgent
need statement by the 3d Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and XVIII Airborne Corps identifying
the need for increased crew protection to counter the threat of small
arms fire, field artillery fragments, and land mines in the Global
War on Terrorism. Even with armor, the cab still had to meet C-130
transportability requirements while achieving Standardization
Agreement (STANAG) level II armor requirements. Developed in
2005–2006 to meet the urgent need statement, the near-term armor
solution used the Low Signature Armored Cab developed for use
with the family of medium tactical vehicles. The Army designated
the modified M142 as the Low-Signature Armored Cab-High Mo-
bility Artillery Rocket System. The system’s appliqué armor con-
sisted of 43 pieces of armor that could be installed on the cab in
less than two hours and removed in less than one hour.83 Then late
in 2006, the Army initiated work on the Increased Crew Protection
to provide even greater crew protection. After test results indicated
that the cab met the critical operational criteria, the Army awarded
BAE Systems the contract for 64 Increased Crew Protection cab
up-armor kits in 2009. Retrofitting all M142 launchers with cab
was completed in 2012.84
As the Army developed the crew protection cab up-armor
kit, it introduced hot panel capability for the M142. This allowed
the launcher software to receive positional updates while in flight
aboard a C-130 or C-17 aircraft—giving the M142 a true roll off
and fire capability and allowing for greater flexibility to project
force on the battlefield.85
For the past 20 years, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical
Data System Increment I tied together the Field Artillery’s system
of systems—weapons, sensors, and support systems—and served
as the Field Artillery’s primary mission command system. It pro-
cessed, analyzed, and exchanged combat information and furnished
fully automated support for planning, coordinating, controlling, and

232
executing fires and effects. Increment I supported mortars; field ar-
tillery cannons, rockets, and missiles; close air support; attack avia-
tion; and naval surface fire support systems and was integrated with
80 different battlefield systems from the US Army, Marine Corps,
Navy, and Air Force as well as German, French, Turkish, and Italian
fire support command and control systems.86
In June 2011, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council ap-
proved the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Incre-
ment II to replace Increment I. Increment II was designated as a
software modification effort Version 7.0 and was slated for initial
fielding in 2019. Then the fires command and control migration
strategy would move all field artillery command and control systems
under the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System around
2019–2025. These systems included the Pocket-sized Forward En-

Figure 14: M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System.

Source: US Army photo by John Hamilton.

233
try Device that forward observers and fire support teams used to
compose, edit, transmit, receive, store, and display messages; pro-
cess data; and monitor status as well as conduct, plan, and execute
fire support missions. Other systems were the Lightweight Tactical
Fire Direction System (Centaur), a backup system to the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System; the Forward Observer System;
and the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System that
was also a command and control system tool.87
The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, the Pocket-
sized Forward Entry Device, Centaur, other digitized command and
control systems, and digital-capable firing platforms were signifi-
cant developments for the Field Artillery. They pushed the branch
further into the age of precision munitions and digitization to com-
plement conventional unguided munitions.

Force Structure and Doctrine

At the beginning of the 21st Century, the Army significantly
overhauled its force structure. As previously discussed, it introduced
the modular brigade combat team as its basic fighting organization
to replace the division; placed a fires battalion within the Brigade
Combat Team; furnished fires brigades to support brigade combat
teams, divisions, corps, or joint task forces; and created functional
brigades. The Army also wrote new doctrine.
The formation of the Brigade Combat Team with its organ-
ic field artillery battalion and the elimination of division artillery
abolished senior field artillery command headquarters at the divi-
sion and corps. This action left the force with an inadequate number
of force field artillery headquarters to support divisions and corps
and to integrate fires and training and readiness oversight. Specifi-
cally, seven active component fires brigades supported 14 divisions
and corps headquarters as well as the Eighth US Army in Korea.
Under the modular concept, the Brigade Combat Team would pro-
vide training, readiness, and administrative oversight to its organic
fires battalion, while the fires brigades would function as a force
field artillery headquarters for divisions, corps, or joint task forces.
However, the Field Artillery School and field artillery officers and
Soldiers knew that the Brigade Combat Team would not provide

234
such oversight and thus challenged the Brigade Combat Team con-
cept. When the school opposed the concept, the Chief of Staff of the
Army acknowledged at a Pentagon meeting that some things would
be broken, but he basically dismissed the concerns—adding that it
was important to move forward. Operational experience reinforced
the school’s and field artillery officers’ and Soldiers’ fears about the
Brigade Combat Team’s ability to furnish training, readiness, and
administrative oversight.88
As the Army projected returning to combined arms operations
and executing regionally aligned force missions, the modular design
created several capability gaps. The echelon above brigade mission
command field artillery force structure and organizational design
did not sufficiently meet the combatant commander requirements
as part of the joint force. It lacked the ability to integrate and syn-
chronize fires effectively at the division and the corps in support of
unified land operations. The organization also failed to provide fires
battalion training and readiness oversight in the Brigade Combat
Teams and could not provide consistent fire support certifications
and leader development. This led to skill atrophy and neglected or
misused fire support Soldiers. Major General James M. McDonald,
who was the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence
from 2012 to 2014, submitted a force design update to the Army in
December 2012 to re-establish field artillery command headquarters
in echelons above brigade at division and corps levels.89
The proposal established a division artillery without organic
firing units for each active component division. The division artil-
lery would be assigned to each active component division; would
be stationed with the division; and would coordinate, integrate, and
synchronize fires to achieve the division commander’s objectives.
Meanwhile, the division artillery commander would serve as the
fire support coordinator for the division. Moreover, division artillery
could be tailored with a variety of fires battalions (rocket and can-
non), unmanned aerial systems, and counter-rocket artillery; integrate
and deliver fires; and furnish mission command to train and certify
the Brigade Combat Team fires battalion and fires cell.90
Also, the proposal provided a field artillery brigade to be as-
signed to each active component corps as well as one to the US

235
Eighth Army in Korea. The brigade would coordinate, integrate,
and synchronize fires; provide long-range precision fires to the
corps; and give the corps/US Eighth Army commander a headquar-
ters that could plan, prepare, execute, and assess fires in support of
operations. Additionally, it would provide counterstrike capability
throughout the corps area of operations; and the field artillery bri-
gade commander would serve as the fire support coordinator for the
corps. In addition, the corps field artillery brigade would train and
certify its subordinate field artillery battalions and allocate them to
the division as required to provide reinforcing fires.91
In October 2013, the Army approved the echelon above brigade
force design update. It created 10 division artilleries that would be
assigned to the 10 active component divisions and retained four ac-
tive component fires brigades that would be assigned to each corps
and the Eighth Army. Later, the Army authorized redesignating fires
battalions in the Brigade Combat Team and echelons above Brigade
Combat Teams as field artillery battalions. To standardize naming
convention within field artillery units, Major General McDonald
also changed the fires brigade to the field artillery brigade.92
The Fires Center of Excellence force design update also modi-
fied the existing field artillery brigade in the Army National Guard
with the same organizational design as the active component. The
Army National Guard field artillery brigades would provide flexibil-
ity to the Total Army and perform the same functions as the active
component field artillery brigades. However, they would be aligned
with Army National Guard divisions for training affiliation, be capa-
ble of serving as a division artillery to support Army National Guard
divisions during deployment, or provide reinforcing and counter-
fire capability to active component corps and joint task forces. The
brigade’s primary function included coordination, integration, syn-
chronization, employment of fires, and long-range precision fires to
the corps. The number and mix of field artillery battalions assigned
to the brigade would vary depending on mission and number as well
as type of divisions assigned to the corps.93
In 2014, the Army started standing up division artillery; the last
one stood up in 2016. Late in 2014, the Army converted the 212th
Field Artillery Brigade to the 1st Armored Division Artillery and

236
the 42d Field Artillery Brigade to the 3d Infantry Division Artillery.
It also activated the 82d Airborne Division Artillery, 101st Air As-
sault Division Artillery, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, 2d Infan-
try Division Artillery, and 3d Infantry Division Artillery. US Army
Forces Command noted that the Army’s decision to implement field
artillery brigades and division artilleries would provide the Field
Artillery with the capabilities to plan, synchronize, and coordinate
strategic, operational, and tactical fires in support of the unified
land commander and provide mission command for the training and
readiness of attached field artillery units. This action would effec-
tively reverse 12 years of continuing atrophy of field artillery skills
as well as erosion of leader and professional development within the
fires warfighting function—from basic section/platoon level skills
to the ability to mass and synchronize fires in support of the maneu-
ver commander. The division artillery commander of the 3d Infantry
Division, Colonel John O’Grady, pointed out that the return of divi-
sion artillery reflected the Army’s commitment to strengthen core
skills that had been eroded by modularity and combat operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan.94
Many senior officers expressed apprehension that standing up
division artilleries was a return to the old division artillery with its
organic firing units that had existed through 2004 when modulariza-
tion changed fire support organization. Brigadier General William
A. Turner, who was the Commandant of the Field Artillery School
and Chief of Field Artillery from 2014 to 2016, reassured maneu-
ver Brigade Combat Team commanders about the positive aspects
of the new division design. They would not lose their organic field
artillery battalions to division artillery. Rather, the new division ar-
tillery would modernize the Field Artillery by adopting emerging
technologies and empower the Brigade Combat Team’s field artil-
lery battalion by moving fire support personnel from the maneu-
ver battalion to the field artillery battalion. Division artillery would
also plan, prepare, execute, and assess combined arms operations to
provide close support and precision strike for the division; consist
of a headquarters and headquarters battery, a signal platoon, and a
target acquisition platoon; provide command oversight for training
management and certification of Brigade Combat Team field artil-

237
lery battalions and fire support cells; and provide an effective field
artillery force structure for full-spectrum operations.95
Writing new doctrine paralleled the development of the divi-
sion artillery. On 23 August 2011, the US Army Training and Doc-
trine Command Commanding General, General Robert W. Cone,
issued Doctrine 2015 guidance. Once completed, Doctrine 2015
would give the Army well-defined enduring principles, tactics, and
standard procedures. The transition to Doctrine 2015 required all
doctrine publications to be reviewed and separated into new cat-
egories. General Cone noted that even though resources would be
constrained, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command had to
produce quality doctrine by its best and brightest. He concluded:
In summary, we need to make the development and imple-
mentation of Doctrine 2015 a priority. We must seize the
initiative we now enjoy as we reflect on this decade of war
our Army has fought. We have too many hard-earned les-
sons, and we must capitalize on the talent we have across
our force to ensure. . .our Army. . .can win upon arrival
[in theater].96

In his guidance, General Cone established key priorities. First,

he wanted Army doctrine publications and Army doctrine reference
publications to be completed by August 2012. Second, he directed
field manuals to be finished by December 2013. Third, he wanted
technique publications to be written by December 2015. To accom-
plish these goals, he authorized service schools, such as the Field
Artillery School, to increase their manning levels commensurate
with the workload and fill writing positions with the best qualified
personnel who would be competitive for battalion command and
beyond and had recent operational experience, subject matter exper-
tise, and a fundamental understanding of Army concepts.97
Besides increasing the number of people required to author the
publications, the Field Artillery School started writing its doctrinal
publications and Army doctrine reference publications, field manu-
als, and Army technique publications in 2011. On 6 January 2012,
the School submitted the initial draft of Army Doctrine Publication
3-09 and the initial draft of Army Doctrine Reference Publication

238
3-09 to the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
and initiated work on Field Manual 3-09, Field Artillery Opera-
tions, which focused on fire support tactics and procedures.98
Several months later in August 2012, the Army published and
distributed Army Doctrine Publication 3-09 and Army Doctrine Ref-
erence Publication 3-09, both written by a team from Forces Com-
mand, the Air Defense Artillery, and the Field Artillery. An Army
Doctrine Publication contained fundamental principles that guided
military forces’ actions and expressed them so that Army forces
could seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Army Doctrine Publi-
cation 3-09 incorporated air and missile defense as well as electron-
ic attack in the Army fires warfighting function; included fires from
other services; and provided fires doctrine that would enable the de-
velopment of interoperable, networked, and integrated systems that
could execute multiple missions. Army Doctrine Reference Publica-
tion 3-09, meanwhile, served as a doctrinal manual for commanders,
leaders, and staffs of the fires warfighting function and furnished
a comprehensive explanation of all doctrinal principles in support
of offensive and defensive tasks. In 2014, the Army revised Army
Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09 to include the new division ar-
tillery and field artillery brigade concepts to anchor them firmly in
doctrine then continued to make revisions in 2015.99 As of the end
of 2015, Army Doctrine Publication 3-09 and Army Doctrine Refer-
ence Publication 3-09 manuals were current after revisions.100
Meanwhile in February 2016, the School completed a draft of
Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09.90, Division Artillery
Operations and Fire Support for the Division. The manual explained
division artillery’s three primary tasks for the division’s fires warf-
ighting function as delivering fires; integrating all forms of Army,
joint, and multinational fires; and conducting targeting.101
Concurrently, the Field Artillery School distributed drafts of
Field Manual 3-09, Field Artillery Operations. With an intended
audience of maneuver commanders and their staffs, this revised
version of the 2011 Field Manual 3-09 covered field artillery op-
erations, fire support, fire support and the operations process, and
fire support coordination as well as other control measures in four
chapters. Published in April 2014, Field Manual 3-09 gave the

239
maneuver arms a single field manual on how the Field Artillery
supported the maneuver missions during unified land operations.
Later, the School updated the April 2014 Field Manual 3-09 based
on a 1 May 2014 Field Artillery Brigade/Division Artillery white
paper, which explained the role of the fire support coordinator and
division artillery.102
Over a period of 25 years, modernization represented by writ-
ing new doctrine, restoring division artillery, adopting nonlethal fires
and effects to complement lethal fires and effects, digitizing firing
platforms, introducing precision munitions, and fielding the Ad-
vanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System transformed the Field
Artillery. Early in the 1990s, the Field Artillery relied on massed fires
and a minimal amount of digitization. The modernized Field Artil-
lery of 2015 relied on sophisticated computers to provide responsive
lethal and nonlethal fires and effects and precision munitions.

240
 NOTES

1. Briefing, “The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acqui-

sition Radar,” undated, Historical Research and Document Collection
(HRDC); Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “Enhanced AN/TPQ-36
Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar,” undated, HRDC; Chief Warrant
Officer 4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, interview by author, 8 March 2013,
HRDC; DOT&E Information Paper, “EQ-36 Radar System,” undated,
HRDC.
2. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade,
interview by author, 13 April 2012, HRDC; PM Radars Information Pa-
per, “Q-37,” undated, HRDC; US Army Information Paper, “Enhanced
Q-36,” undated, HRDC; Information Paper, “EQ-36 Radar System,” 2011,
HRDC; “First US Army EQ-36 Radar Deploys to Iraq,” Defense News,
9 September 2010; Briefing, “The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire
Target Acquisition Radar,” undated; DOT&E Information Paper, Fiscal
Year (FY) 2010, HRDC; DOT&E Information Paper, “EQ-36 Radar Sys-
tem,” FY 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, “Army Technology,” 7 March
2012, HRDC; Information Paper, “TRADOC Capability Manager Fires
Brigade,” 29 November 2011, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract),
October 2011, 26, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “State of the Branch,” 19
May 2011, HRDC; Colonel David J. Brost, Director, TCM Fires Brigade,
interview by author, 6 March 2013, HRDC; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/
TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, March 2013, HRDC; Memorandum for Record
with Attachment, “Annual History,” 10 April 2013, HRDC; Jeff Froys-
land and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine
Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, March–
April 2013, 40–43; Briefing, “Fire Modernization Strategy Brief,” 26 April
2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade 2012,” 13
March 2014, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, 2013, HRDC.
3. Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 April 2012; FCoE CSM
Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 26, HRDC; DOT&E Information
Paper, “EQ-36 Radar System,” FY 2011; Information Paper, US Army,
undated, HRDC; Information Paper, “Army Technology,” 7 March 2012;
Briefing (Extract), “State of the Branch,” 19 May 2011; Colonel David J.
Brost, Director, TCM Fires Brigade, interview by author, 6 March 2013,
HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 March 2013; “Update on AN/
TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update; Froysland and Prochniak, “Train-
ing and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–43;
“Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 March 2013,
3; Briefing, “Fire Modernization Strategy Brief,” 26 April 2013; Email
with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade 2012,” 13 March 2014, HRDC;
Kris Osborn, “Army Fields Next-Generation Radar,” Army News, 17 Oc-
tober 2012; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “TPQ-53 Radar System,”
10 December 2014, HRDC; DOT&E Report (Extract), FY 2014, 137–38,

241
HRDC; DOT&E Report (Extract), FY 2011, 77–78, HRDC.
4. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade,
interview by author, 13 April 2012, HRDC; PM Radars Information Pa-
per, “Q-37,” undated, HRDC; US Army Information Paper, “Enhanced
Q-36,” undated, HRDC; Information Paper, “EQ-36 Radar System,” 2011,
HRDC; “First US Army EQ-36 Radar Deploys to Iraq,” Defense News,
9 September 2010, HRDC; Briefing, “The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Coun-
ter fire Target Acquisition Radar,” undated, HRDC; DOT&E Information
Paper, FY 2010, HRDC; DOT&E Information Paper, “EQ-36 Radar Sys-
tem,” FY 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, “Army Technology,” 7 March
2012; Information Paper, “TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade;”
FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 26, HRDC; Briefing (Ex-
tract), “State of the Branch,” 19 May 2011; Colonel David J. Brost, Di-
rector, TCM Fires Brigade, interview by author, 6 March 2013, HRDC;
“Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 March 2013;
Memorandum for Record with Attachment, “Annual History,” 10 April
2013, HRDC; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Com-
mand Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–43; Briefing, “Fire Mod-
ernization Strategy Brief,” 26 April 2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“TCM Fires Brigade 2012,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; Lockheed Martin
Information Paper, 2013; 2015 USAFAS AH, 104; “TRADOC Capabil-
ity Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, January–Febru-
ary 2016, 15–20, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM FAB-D History
Document,” 9 March 2016, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Q-53 Counterfire Target
Acquisition Radar System,” Fiscal Year 2015, HRDC.
5. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade,
interview by author, 13 April 2012, HRDC; Information Paper, Thales-
RaytheonSystems, 2010, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “State of the Branch,”
19 May 2011; Information Paper, “TRADOC Capability Manager Fires
Brigade;” Briefing, “Firefinder Radar AN/TPQ-37(V)8,” 2013, HRDC;
Chief Warrant Officer 4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, interview by author, 8
March 2013, HRDC; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine
Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–43; Email with Attach-
ment, “TCM Fires Brigade 2012,” 13 March 2014, HRDC.
6. Information Paper, SRC Tec, 2010, HRDC; Scott R. Gourley,
“Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Army, April 2002; Lieutenant Ju-
nior Grade (US Navy) Jason Calandruccio, , “Lightweight Counter-Mor-
tar Radar,” Defense Contract Management Agency News, Winter 2002,
HRDC; Briefing, “LCMR,” 21 October 2011, HRDC. AN/TPQ-48 was
the initial designation of the LCMR as noted in Scott R. Gourley, “Soldier
Armed,” Army, February 2011, 63–66.
7. Email with Attachment, “Updated Sensor History,” 15 March
2011, HRDC; Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” 63–66; Briefing, “LCMR,” 21
October 2011; Information Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undat-
ed, HRDC; Colonel David J. Brost, Director, TCM Fires Brigade, inter-

242
view by author, 6 March 2013, HRDC; Prochniak, interview by author, 8
March 2013.
8. Email with Attachment, “Updated Sensor History,” 15 March
2011, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 26, HRDC;
Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 April 2012; Briefing, “LCMR,” 21
October 2011; PM Radars Information Paper, “LCMR,” undated, HRDC;
Information Paper, “US Army Equipment,” undated, HRDC; Information
Paper, “PM Radars,” 16 January 2013, HRDC; Presolicitation Synopsis
for LCMR, 15 May 2012, HRDC; DAC for ARNG SITREP, April 2012,
HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “State of the Branch,” 19 May 2011; Infor-
mation Paper, “TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade;” Interview,
Dastrup with Brost, 6 March 2013; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training
and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–-43;
“Update on AN/TPQ 53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 March 2013,
3; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade 2012,” 13 March 2014,
HRDC; Kris Osborn, “Army Fields Next-Generation Radar,” Army News,
17 October 2012; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “TPQ-53 Radar
System,” 10 December 2014, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FA DPTMLPF,”
December 2015, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM FAB-D History
Document,” 9 March 2016, HRDC.
9. Daryl Youngman, “Fires Radar Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, March–
April 2013, 45–47; Briefing, “Field Artillery Modernization,” 1 May
2013, HRDC.
10. 2000 US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS)
Annual Command History (ACH), 138–39; 2004 US Army Field Artillery
Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 96.
Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cells History,” 9 April 2015, HRDC.
11. 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 140–43; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 86–
87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 106–07; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, 94; Scott
R. Gourley, “M7 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle,” Army, July 2002,
51–52; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 106–07; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 107;
2004 USAFACFS ACH, 94–95; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Octo-
ber 2002, 343–50.
12. 2009 USAFAS AH, 131–32; Email, “BFIST, Knight, etc., Input
to 2010 Annual History,” 9 March 2011, HRDC; Interview with Attach-
ment, Dastrup with Brown, 17 February 2011; FCOE CSM Newsletter
(Extract), Fires 7, October 2010, 10, HRDC; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Ex-
tract), March 2011, 30; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011,
27; BAE Information Paper, 13 August 2012, HRDC; Colonel Scott Pat-
ton, Director, TCM Fires Cell, and Gordon Wehri, TCM Fires Cell, inter-
view by author, 7 February 2013, HRDC; PEO Ground Combat Systems
Information Paper, “Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” undated, HRDC.
13. 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 144.
14. 2000 USAFACFS ACH, 145; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, 108;
2002 USAFACFS ACH, 88; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 108; 2004 USA-

243
FACFS ACH, 96.
15. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 90; 2008 US Army Fires Center of Ex-
cellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, 128.
16. 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 128; “Ground Combat Systems,”
Army, October 2011, 338–40; Information Paper, “M1200 Armored
Knight,” 11 March 2013, HRDC; Information Paper, “Armored Knight,”
undated, HRDC.
17. Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, “State of the Field Ar-
tillery,” Fires Bulletin, January–February 2014, 9–12. Brigadier General
Christopher F. Bentley, “From the Commandant’s Desk,” Redleg Update,
February 2014, 1; Captain Brock Lennon, “The Five Requirements for
Accurate Fires in the 21st Century,” Redleg Update, February 2014, 3–4;
Captain Brock Lennon, “Fire Requirements of Accurate Fire for the 21st
Century,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2014, 51, 58; Michael D. Grice, On
Gunnery: The Art and Science of Field Artillery from the American Civil
War to the Dawn of the 21st Century (Charleston, SC: Booksurge Publish-
ing, 2009), 105–12; Briefing, “The Five Requirements for Accurate Fire,”
26 April 2016, HRDC.
18. Lennon, “The Five Requirements for Accurate Fires,” 51, 58;
Briefing, “The Field Artillery: 2025 and Beyond,” 6 May 2014, HRDC.
19. “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier for the BCT and Division,” Fires
Bulletin, November–December 2014, HRDC.
20. “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier for the BCT and Division,” Fires
Bulletin. Also see Briefing, “The Field Artillery 2025 and Beyond,” 6 May
2014.
21. Interview with Attachments, Boyd L. Dastrup with Colonel
Craig M. Newman, Doug Brown, and Gordon Wehri, CDID, 1 March
2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Documents,” 7 February 2013,
HRDC; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, December
2012; Major Alex Mora and Scott McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the
Next Forward Observer Generation: Precision Fires Warrior,” Fires Bul-
letin, November–December 2013, 40–41; Bentley, “State of the Field Ar-
tillery,” 9–12.
22. Interview with Attachments, Boyd L. Dastrup with Doug Brown,
Deputy Director, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 February 2011, HRDC; Email,
“BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History,” 9 March 2011,
HRDC; Information Paper, “LLDR AN/PED-1,” 2012, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “Documents,” 7 February 2013; PEO Soldier Informa-
tion Paper, “LLDR,” 12 December 2012, HRDC; Brigadier General Brian
J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin,
March–April 2013, 6–9; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cell 2014
History,” 24 March 2014, HRDC; Bentley, “State of the Field Artillery,”
9–12; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Ob-
server Generation,” 40–41.
23. Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cells History,” 9 April

244
2015, HRDC.
24. Email with Attachment, “Documents,” 7 February 13; McKier-
nan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” 6–9; Email with Attach-
ment, “TCM Fires Cell 2014 History,” 24 March 2014; McKiernan, “Field
Artillery Modernization Strategy,” 6–9; Email with Attachment, “TCM
Fires Cells History,” 9 April 2015; Capabilities Development Document
for Joint Effects Targeting System (Extract), Executive Summary, 17 Janu-
ary 2013, HRDC; 2008 US Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill
(USAFCOEFS) ACH, 130; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oc-
tober 2010, 26; Email with Attachment, “TPSO Sensor History for 2010,”
22 February 2010, HRDC.
25. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 91; 2008 US Army Fires Center of Ex-
cellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, 129; Email with Attachment,
“TPSO History for 2010,” 22 February 2010, HRDC; “Ground Combat
System,” Army, October 2011, 338; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army,
October 2009, 355; Raytheon Information Paper, “FS3,” 2011, HRDC.
26. Information Paper, “The Maneuver Commander’s most versatile
and lethal weapon system, The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,”
undated, HRDC; Colonel John T. Smith, “Training for Joint Operations,”
Fires Bulletin, March–April 2013, 18–22.
27. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Thomas Taccia, JACI, interview by au-
thor, 23 February 2011, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Precision Fires
Course Input to 2010 Annual History,” 4 March 2011, HRDC.
28. Briefing, “Precision Fires Program Brief,” 2010, HRDC; Infor-
mation Paper, “Precision Fires Program,” October 2010, HRDC; Smith,
“Training for Joint Operations,” 18–22; Chief Warrant Officer 4 Thomas
Taccia, “The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” Infantry Bulletin,
June–August 2011, 9–11.
29. Information Paper, “Precision Fires Course,” 2010, HRDC; Brief-
ing, “Precision Fires Program Brief,” 2010, HRDC; Information Paper,
“Precision Fires Program,” October 2010, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with
Taccia, 23 February 2011; Email, “Courses,” 10 February 2012, HRDC;
Taccia, “The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” 9–11; Briefing
(Extract), “Precision Fires Program Brief,” 2 July 2012, HRDC; Brigadier
General Thomas S. Vandal, “Growing a New Field Artillery: Agile, Smart,
Deadly,” Fires Bulletin, September–October 2011, 4–5; Information Pa-
per, “TMO: Maintaining Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions,”
undated, HRDC.
30. Email, “JACI History,” 7 March 2013, HRDC; Personal account:
Chief Warrant Officer 5 Robert Tisdale, Precision Fires Division, FCoE,
February 2013, in Email with Attachment, “JACI History,” 7 March 2013,
HRDC; Smith, “Training for Joint Operations,” 18–22; Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, “Target Coordinate Mensuration Certifi-
cation and Program Accreditation,” 10 January 2013, HRDC.
31. Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, “Year in Review,”

245
Redleg Update, December 2013, 1, 3–5; Bentley, “State of the Field Artil-
lery,” 9–12.
32. Personal Account, Tisdale, February 2013; Smith, “Training for
Joint Operations,” 18–22; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruc-
tion, “Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification.”
33. Email with Attachment, “JACI History,” 7 March 2013; “TMO:
Maintaining Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions,” Redleg Up-
date, December 2012.
34. Email with Attachment, “JACI Input for USAFAS Annual His-
tory,” 13 February 2014, HRDC.
35. 2004 US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS)
Annual Command History (ACH), 45.
36. Colonel Frank J. Siltman and Lieutenant Colonel John Frisbie,
“Fire Support just got Harder: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Compe-
tency,” Fires Bulletin, July–September 2008, 6–8.
37. Email with Attachment, “History TIOC,” 12 February 2007,
HRDC; Email, “History TIOC,” 13 February 2007, HRDC; 2005 US Army
Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command His-
tory (ACH), 40; Briefing, “Tactical Information Operations Course After
Action Review,” 6 November 2006, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Tactical Infor-
mation Operations Course,” 22 January 2007, HRDC; Army Training Re-
quirements and Resources System, 22 January 2007, HRDC; Major Gen-
eral David C. Ralston, “The FA and COIN: Continuity and Adaptation,”
Field Artillery, July–August 2006, 1–3; Email with Attachment, “History
TIOC,” 12 February 2007; Briefing, “Tactical Information Operations
Course After Action Review,” 6 November 2006; Email with Attachment,
“History TIOC,” 12 February 2007; Email, “Tactical Information Opera-
tions Course,” 27 February 2007; Email with Attachment, “428 FAB Input
to 2013 USAFAS Annual History,” 22 February 2014, HRDC; Informa-
tion Paper, “FACCC,” 23 January 2014, HRDC; Siltman and Frisbie, “Fire
Support Just Got Harder,” 6–8; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 27; Colonel
Kevin M. Batule and Colonel (Retired) Theodore J. Janosko, “Training the
Full-Spectrum BCT FSCOORD,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2008, 26–28.
38. Batule and Janosko, “Training the Full-Spectrum BCT FSCO-
ORD,” 26–28; Theodore J. Janosko, FSCOORD Course Director, in-
terview by author, 9 January 2009, HRDC; Memorandum, “FSCOORD
Course Information Paper,” 20 November 2008, HRDC; Interview, Das-
trup with Janosko, 9 January 2009; Email with Attachment, “FSCOORD
Course,” 10 February 2009, HRDC; News Release, US Army Field Artil-
lery School, 27 September 2011, HRDC; Redleg Update, 1–12 October
2011, 3; Email with Attachment, “JACI and Joint Training,” 26 February
2007, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “JOFEC,” 17 January 2007, HRDC; Email with
Attachment, “History Brief,” 26 January 2007, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ment, “JACI’s Portion of the 2006 Annual Command History, 12 April
2007, HRDC; Siltman and Frisbie, “Fire Support Just Got Harder,” 6–8;

246
Email with Attachment, “JACI and Joint Training,” 26 February 2007,
HRDC; Fact Sheet, “JOFEC,” 17 January 2007, HRDC. In 2016 the Field
Artillery School started teaching the Joint Fires and Effects Course again
because of the demand for officers and Soldiers to provide lethal and non-
lethal effects.
39. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 43–44; Briefing, “Electronic Attack
Mission Analysis Brief, 23 February 05, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“JACI’s Portion of the 2006 Annual Command History,” 12 April 2007;
Alvin W. Peterson Jr., Northrup Gruman, EW Course Developer, inter-
view by author, 23 February 2007, HRDC.
40. Fact Sheet, “Electronic Warfare Career Field,” 14 January 2010,
HRDC; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News,
7 December 2006; Email, “HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order,”
2006, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel James J. Looney, EW-DOTD, interview
by author, 14 February 2011, HRDC; “New Career Field: Electronic War-
fare,” Army News.
41. Email, “EW MOS for Enlisted Soldiers and EW Functional Area
for Officers,” 23 February 2007, HRDC; Briefing, “Army Electronic War-
fare,” 4 January 2007, HRDC; Alvin W. Peterson Jr., Northrup Gruman,
EW Course Developer, interview by author, 23 February 2007, HRDC;
Fact Sheet, “Electronic Warfare Career Field,” 14 January 2010; Email,
“ HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order,” 2006; “Army Initiates Elec-
tronic Warfare Capability,” Army News, 7 December 2006, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “Electronic Operational Warfare Course,” 10 March
2009, HRDC.
42. Interview, Dastrup with Looney, 14 February 2011; CAC
OPORD 2008-231a Electronic Warfare Roles and Responsibilities, 18
August 2008, HRDC.
43. FCoE CSM Newsletter, October 2010, 14, HRDC; Briefing (Ex-
tract), “DOTD,” 23 March 2010, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Army Operational
Electronic Warfare Course,” 29 December 2010, HRDC; FIRES Forward,
January 2010, HRDC; “New Career Field: Electronic Warfare,” Army
News, 6 February 2009, HRDC; “Electronic Warfare a New Career Field,”
Army News, 27 January 2011, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Electronic
Warfare Course Input to Annual History,” 19 February 2011, HRDC; In-
terview, Dastrup with Looney, 19 January 2012; Army Doctrine Publi-
cation 3-0, 13; Email, “Electronic Warfare Input to Annual History,” 1
March 2012, HRDC; Email, “Book Review,” 22 February 2016, HRDC.
44. Interview, Dastrup with Looney, 19 January 2012; Army Doctrine
Publication 3-0, 13; Email, “Electronic Warfare Input to Annual History.”
45. Siltman and Frisbie, “Fire Support Just Got Harder: Adding Non-
lethal Fires as a Core Competency,” 6–8.
46. Army Doctrinal Publication 3-09, August 2012, 1.
47. Army Doctrinal Publication 3-09, 1.
48. Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Back-

247
ground and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 22 De-
cember 2009, 1–2, HRDC.
49. Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” 3–4.
50. Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” 3–4.
51. Memorandum, “DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unin-
tended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008, HRDC; Department of Defense
News Release, “Cluster Munitions Policy Released,” 9 July 2008, HRDC;
Donna Miles, “New Cluster Bomb Policy Aims to Reduce Collateral
Damage,” American Forces Press Service, 9 July 2008, HRDC.
52. 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 96;
Briefing (Extract), “Precision Guided Missiles and Rockets Program Re-
view,” 24 April 2007, HRDC; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7
(Extract), 3d Quarter 2009, 3; Briefing, “MLRS Family of Munitions,”
January 2009, HRDC.
53. Directorate of Testing and Evaluation FY 2014 Report (Extract),
109–110, HRDC; Briefing, “Fires Modernization Strategy Brief,” 26 April
2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Mu-
nitions History 2013,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Infor-
mation Paper, “Lockheed Martin Conducts Second Successful Production
Qualification Flight Test of GMLRS Alternative Warhead,” 3 February
2014, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, “Lockheed Martin
GMLRS Alternative Warhead Logs Successful Flight-Test Series, Shifts
to Next Testing Phase,” 16 April 2014, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Informa-
tion Paper, “Lockheed Martin Completes Successful Operational Flight
Tests of GMLRS Alternative Warhead,” 28 July 2014, HRDC; Briefing,
“Precision Fires Launcher and Munitions System Overview,” undated,
HRDC; DOT&E FY 2014 Report on Army Programs (Extract), HRDC.
54. Fact Sheet, “Quick Reaction Unitary ATACMS Missile,” 20 Feb-
ruary 2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “ATACMS-BAT,” 24 Feb-
ruary 2003, HRDC; Memorandum for Director, TSM RAMS, with At-
tachment, “Coordination of 2002 Annual Command History,” 18 March
2003, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “History Update,” 3 June 2004,
HRDC; Fact Sheet, “ATACMS Quick Reaction Unitary,” 10 February
2006, HRDC; Patrecia S. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF: Fires for the Distributed
Battlefield,” Field Artillery, September–October 2003, 12; Email with At-
tachment, “ATACMS and BAT Input to 2003 Annual Command History,”
21 April 2004, HRDC.
55. Leighton Duitsman, Deputy Director, TCM Fires Brigade, inter-
view by author, 10 February 2011, HRDC.
56. Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Ca-
pability Manager,” 40–44; Charles Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision
Fires Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2014, 22–23; Information
Paper, “ATACMS Service Life Extension Program,” 27 January 2010,
HRDC; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3d Quarter
2009, 3; Briefing, “MLRS Family of Munitions,” January 2009, HRDC.

248
 57. Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” 22–23.
58. Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” 22–23; Ma-
jor David Dykema, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Matt MacKenzie, and Captain
Justin Teague, “Advances of Precision Fires and Launchers,” Fires Bulle-
tin, March–April 2014, 55–58; Fires Division, Army Capabilities Integra-
tion Center, “Capabilities Development of Long-Range Precision Fires,”
HRDC.
59. Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” 22–23;
Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advances of Precision Fires and
Launchers,” 55–58.
60. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, interview
by author, 22 February 2012, HRDC; Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, in-
terview by author, 22 February 2012, HRDC; Doug Brown, Deputy Di-
rector, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 7 February 2012, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History,” 6 April
2012, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher,
TCM BCT Fires, interview by author, 11 February 2013, HRDC; Pica-
tinny Arsenal Information Paper, “Recycling Produces Cheaper, Safer,
Realistic Artillery Rounds, 5 October 2012, HRDC; “TCM BCT Fires Up-
date,” Redleg Update, July 2012; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TCM
BCT Fires, interview by author, 5 February 2013, HRDC; “Picatinny Re-
cycles Artillery Shells to Create Cheaper, Safer, more Reliable Training
Rounds,” Army News, 8 January 2013, HRDC; Mark Belcher, TCM BCT
Fires, interview by author, 25 February 2014, HRDC; Brown, interview,
7 February 2012.
61. Email with Attachment, “TCM Cannon Input,” 19 April 2010,
HRDC; Memorandum, “Acceleration and Urgent Materiel Release for
XM 1156 Precision Guidance Kit,” 17 May 2011, HRDC; DOT&E Infor-
mation Paper, “PGK,” 2012, HRDC; Audra Calloway, “Fort Bliss Soldiers
First to Fire Army’s New Near-precision Artillery Rounds,” Army News,
HRDC; Memorandum for Commander, TRADOC Army Capabilities In-
tegration Center, “Approval of Capability Development Document in lieu
of Capabilities Production Document for the Precision Guidance Kit,” 11
July 2012, HRDC; DOT&E Information Paper, “PGK,” 2013, HRDC;
Captain Cal A. Thomas and Sergeant First Class Jonathan S. Delong, “Re-
gaining our Luster: How Fort Sill Institutional Training is Improving to
meet Requirements for the 21st Century Field Artillery NCO,” Redleg Up-
date, August 2014, 5–9, HRDC; Operational Test and Evaluation Director,
Reasons Behind Program Delays, 2014 Update (Extract), 25 August 2014,
HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FA DOTMLPF Synchronization, 2 July 2014,
HRDC; Mark W. Belcher and Steven W. Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, inter-
view by author, 18 February 2015, HRDC.
62. DOT&E Information Paper, “PGK,” 2013; Operational Test and
Evaluation Director, Reasons Behind Program Delays, 2014 Update (Ex-
tract), 25 August 2014, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FA DOTMLPF Syn-

249
chronization,” 2 July 2014, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Belcher and
Worth, 18 February 2015; Memorandum for Major General Clark W. Le-
Masters Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/4, US Army Materiel Command,
“Full Materiel Release for Fuse, Multi-portion: Precision Guidance Kit,
M1156 (NA29),” 21 December 2015, HRDC; Email with Attachment,
“TCM BCT Fires History,” 10 March 2016, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “Preci-
sion Guidance Kit,” Fiscal Year 2015, HRDC.
63. Don DuRant, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 3 March
2011, HRDC; Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, interview by author, 1 March
2010, HRDC; TCM Newsletter, September 2009, HRDC; Briefing, “Proj-
ect Manager, Combat Ammunitions systems,” 28 October 2009, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “TCM Cannon Input,” 19 April 2010, HRDC;
DOT&E Information Paper, “Excalibur XM 982 Precision Engagement
Projectiles,” undated, HRDC; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31
December 2010, HRDC; Pack and Belcher, interview, 11 February 2013;
Donald DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager
Brigade Combat Team Fires: One-Stop Shop for All Things Cannon,”
Fires Bulletin, March–April 2013, 35–39; Briefing, “Precision Strike As-
sociation Excalibur Overview,” 2012, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FSCO-
ORD Seminar,” 29 August 2013, HRDC; Mark Belcher, TCM BCT Fires,
interview by author, 25 February 2014, HRDC; Information Paper, “Pica-
tinny Completes Excalibur 1a-2 Production, Transitions to 1b,” 14 April
2014, HRDC; TCM Newsletter, September 2009, HRDC; Briefing, “Proj-
ect Manager, Combat Ammunitions Systems,” 28 October 2009, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “TCM Cannon Input,” 19 April 2010, HRDC;
FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 26; Lieutenant Colo-
nel Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 22 February
2012, HRDC; Memorandum for TCM Cannon, Colonel Michael Hartig, 6
February 2012, HRDC; Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Pack and Mark W.
Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, interview by author, 12 February 2013, HRDC;
Raytheon Information Paper, “Raytheon’s Excalibur Ib Demonstrates Ac-
curacy during Flight Tests,” 24 October 2012, HRDC; Memorandum for
Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabili-
ties Integration Center, “Approval of the Precision Engagement Projec-
tile, Excalibur Ib Capability Production Document,” 18 December 2012,
HRDC; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Ammunition, “Ac-
quisition Decision Memorandum for Low Rate Initial Production of Incre-
ment Ib Excalibur M982E1,” 13 December 2012, HRDC; Email with At-
tachment, “Excalibur, PGK, and Future Cannon Munition Suite 2012,” 26
February 2013, HRDC; Information Paper, “US Army Awards Raytheon
$54 million for Excalibur Ib,” 10 September 2013, HRDC; Email with At-
tachment, “Excalibur and Munitions Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual His-
tory,” 28 February 2014, HRDC; Raytheon Information Paper, “Excalibur
Ib Enters Full Rate Production and Receives $52 million award,” 31 July
2014, HRDC; Briefing, “Excalibur Increment 1b Full Rate Production

250
ASARC Brief,” 25 June 2014, HRDC.
64. Briefing, “LW155,” 1998, HRDC; Scott Gourley, “Bolstering Fire
Support,” Armed Forces Journal International, December 2001, 46–48;
Email with Attachment, “LW155,” 7 March 2002, HRDC; Interview, Das-
trup with Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon, DCD, 4 February
2002, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with John Yager, TSM Cannon, DCD, 1
February 2002, HRDC; Briefing, “Arctic Task Model Study Results,” un-
dated, HRDC; Interview with Attachment, Dastrup with John Yager, TSM
Cannon, DCD, 11 February 2003, HRDC; Memorandum, “Independent
Assessment Report for the Operational Assessment of the LW155 mm
Howitzer,” 1 November 2002, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander,
Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity, “Evaluation of
XM777 LW155 EMD Howitzer Accuracy,” undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet,
“XM777 and TAD Significant Activities Report,” 21 May 2002, HRDC;
Fact Sheet, “Weekly Activities, 25 June–27 June 2002,” HRDC; Briefing,
“LW155 and TAD,” June 2002, HRDC; Email, “2003 USAFACFS Annual
Command History, LW155,” 10 May 2004, HRDC.
65. 2002 USAFACFS ACH, 67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 84; 2004
USAFACFS ACH, 72; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 64–65; 2006 USAFCO-
EFS ACH, 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 67.
66. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 64; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 64–65;
2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 66; Briefing, “LW 155 Towed Artillery Digiti-
zation,” 12 June 2007, HRDC.
67. 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 68–69; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 87–
88; Email with Attachment, “LW 155 Input to 2010 Annual History,” 16
March 2011, HRDC; M777 155-millimeter Ultralightweight Field Howit-
zer, United Kingdom, http://www.army-technology.com/projects/ufh, 30
January 2014, HRDC; 2009 USAFAS AH, 87; Briefing, “LW 155 Towed
Artillery Digitization,” 12 June 2007, HRDC.
68. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 66; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 66–67;
2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 69.
69. 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 89–90; 2009 USAFAS AH, 90–91.
70. 2006 USAFACFS ACH, 67–68; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 70;
2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 90; Information Paper, “M119A2,” 27 October
2010, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Digitized M119A2 Information
Paper/Airdrop Certification,” 29 February 2012, HRDC; Joseph Lipinski,
“Commonality of Towed Artillery Digital Fire Control Systems,” Army
AL&T, July–September 2010, 21–24.
71. Email with Attachment, “Historical M119A2,” 12 February
2013, HRDC; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TCM BCT Fires, interview
by author, 5 February 2013, HRDC; Email, “Historical M119A2,” 14 Feb-
ruary 2013, HRDC; Audra Calloway, “M119A2 Howitzer Upgrade Pro-
vides Quicker Firepower,” Army News, 6 December 2011; “Update on the
Digitized M119A3 Program,” Redleg Update, March 2013; Colonel (Re-
tired) Donald C. DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability

251
Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires: The One-Stop-Shop for All Things
Cannon,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2013, 35–39; “Fort Bragg First to
Receive upgraded M119 Howitzers,” Army News, 6 May 2013, HRDC;
Captain Dusty Gray, TCM BCT-Fires, interview by author, 27 February
2014, HRDC.
72. 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 70–71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 91.
73. Kris Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer,”
Army News, 6 September 2011; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 70–71; 2008
USAFCOEFS ACH, 91-92; 2009 USAFAS AH, 93-94; Interview with
Attachments, Boyd L. Dastrup with Major Jeffrey R. White, TCM BCT-
Fires, 25 February 2011, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “PIM Input for
Ft. Sill Historian 2012,” 21 March 2012, HRDC.
74. Interview with Attachments, Dastrup with White, 25 February
2011; Email with Attachment, “PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012.”
75. Email with Attachment, “PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012;”
Interview with Attachment, Dastrup with White, 13 March 2012; Kris Os-
born, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer;” PEO Ground
Combat Systems Information Paper, “Army’s Paladin Integrated Manage-
ment Program Reaches Successful Milestone C Decision,” 24 October
2013, HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Modernization Brief,” 26 April
2013, HRDC; “Paladin Hybridizes for Future Fleet,” Army News, 18 No-
vember 2013; Fires Forward, November 2013, HRDC; Email with At-
tachment, “M109 FOV Historical Record EXUM Compilation,” 6 March
2014, HRDC; Captain Dusty Gray, TCM BCT Fires, interview by author,
8 February 2013, HRDC; Briefing (Extract) Log Demo EAD Review, 15
January 2013, HRDC; “Update on the Paladin Integrated Management
Program,” Redleg Update, 2–13 February 2013, HRDC; Email, “PIM In-
put to 2012 USAFAS Annual History,” 22 February 2013, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “Dr. Dastrup Article,” 9 April 2013, HRDC; Briefing,
“Field Artillery Modernization Brief,” 26 April 2013, HRDC; Briefing
(Extract) Log Demo EAD Review, 15 January 2013, HRDC; Fires For-
ward, November 2013, HRDC; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract),
“Paladin Integrated Management,” 16 April 2014, HRDC; BAE Informa-
tion Paper, “M109A7,” undated, HRDC; Sam Tricoma, “Army Inducts
Self-propelled Howitzer into Low-rate Initial Production,” Army News,
19 May 2014.
76. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 72–73; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 75;
2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 77–78.
77. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 72–73; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 75;
2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 77–78.
78. Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launchers and Munitions,” 8
March 2013, HRDC; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Infor-
mation Paper, “Launchers,” 10 February 2014, HRDC; Briefing, “PFRMS
Launcher and Munitions System Overview,” 2012, HRDC; Froysland and
Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires

252
Brigade,” 40–44; Briefing, “PRRMS Launcher and Munition System
Overviews,” 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade
MLRS-Munitions History 2013,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; Major Matt
Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives Upgrades for Future,” Redstone
Rocket, 17 July 2013; Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advances of
Precision Fires and Launchers,” 5–8; Project Manager Precision Fires,
Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Precision Fires Rocket
and Missile Systems,” March 2015, HRDC; Program Executive Office In-
formation Paper, “Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems,” undated,
HRDC; “TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,”
Fires Bulletin, January–February 2016, 15–22, Briefing, “Program Ex-
ecutive Office, Precision Fires, Rockets and Missile Systems,” undated,
HRDC; Email with Attachment, “CDID 2016 FA History Submission,” 21
March 2017, HRDC.
79. 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 78; 2009 USAFAS AH, 104; “TRA-
DOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin,
January–February 15–22; Briefing, “Program Executive Office, Precision
Fires, Rockets and Missile Systems,” undated, HRDC.
80. “TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,”
15–22; Briefing, “Program Executive Office, Precision Fires, Rockets and
Missile Systems,” undated, HRDC.
81. Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launchers and Munitions,” 8
March 2013, HRDC; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Infor-
mation Paper, “Launchers;” Briefing, “PFRMS Launcher and Munitions
System Overview,” 2012, HRDC; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training
and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–44; Brief-
ing, “PRRMS Launcher and Munition System Overviews,” 2012, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History
2013,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives
Upgrades for Future;” Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advances of
Precision Fires and Launchers,” 5–8; Project Manager Precision Fires,
Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Precision Fires Rocket
and Missile Systems,” March 2015, HRDC; Program Executive Office In-
formation Paper, “Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems,” undated.
82. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 80; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 84; 2007
USAFCOEFS ACH, 87; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 106–07; Precision
Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Launchers.”
83. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 80–81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 85;
2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, 110–11.
84. 2005 USAFACFS ACH, 80–81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH,
85; 2007 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 108; 2009 USAFAS AH, 111; Pre-
cision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, “Launch-
ers;” Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advances in Precision Fires and
Launchers,” 5–8; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Com-
mand Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–44.

253
 85. 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 78; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, 101,
109; 2009 USAFAS AH, 104, 112; Email, “MLRS Launcher and HIMARS
2011,” 19 April 2012, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), March
2011, 28, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), October 2011, 25,
HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011,”
19 April 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “MLRS Launchers and
Munitions,” 8 March 2013, HRDC; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training
and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” 40–44; Brief-
ing, “PRRMS Launcher and Munition System Overviews, 2012, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History
2013,” 13 March 2014, HRDC; Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives
Upgrades for Future;” Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems In-
formation Paper, “Launchers;” Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31
December 2011, HRDC; Briefing, “PFRMS Launcher and Munitions Sys-
tem Overview,” 2012; Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advanced of
Precision Fires and Launchers,” 5–8; Program Executive Office, Precision
Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, undated, HRDC.
86. RDT&E Budget Justification, March 2014, HRDC.
87. USMC Systems Information Paper, “AFATDS I and II,” un-
dated; “AFATDS Version for US Army,” www.army-technology.com, 25
July 2012, HRDC; Briefing, “Field Artillery Modernization,” 1 May 2013,
HRDC; McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” 6–9; Brief-
ing, “Fire Support Modernization Brief,” 26 April 2013, HRDC; Brigadier
General Christopher F. Bentley, “Year in Review,” Redleg Update, 12–13
December 2013, 1–5; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cell 2014 His-
tory,” 24 March 2014, HRDC; Army RDT&E Project Justification, Febru-
ary 2012, HRDC; Army RDT&E Budget Item Justification, March 2014,
HRDC; Raytheon Information Paper, “JADOCS,” 2014; Email with At-
tachment, “TCM Fires Cells History,” 9 April 2015, HRDC; 2002 USA-
FACFS ACH, 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, 113; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH,
103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, 105; PEO Command, Control, Communi-
cations-Tactical Information Paper, “Family of Products,” HRDC; Kath-
ryn Bailey, “Handheld Fires App Lightens the Load for Forward Observ-
ers,” Army News, 20 December 2013.
88. Lieutenant Colonel Sean Bateman and Major Steven Hady, “King
of Battle Once Again: An Organizational Design to Effectively Integrate
Fires in Support of Tactical, Operational and Strategic Force,” Fires Bul-
letin, March–April 2013, 23–25; Shirley Dismuke, “The 2013 State of
Fires,” Fires Bulletin, July–August 2013, 14–15; Email with Attachment,
“Another DIVARTY Paper,” 18 March 2014, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ment, “Dr. Dastrup History,” 28 March 2014, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ment, “DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014, HRDC; Email, “Review of Manuscript,”
2 January 2016, HRDC.
89. Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014; Bateman and
Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” 23–25; Dismuke, “The 2013 State of

254
Fires,” 14–15; Email with Attachment, “Another DIVARTY Paper,” 18
March 2014; Email with Attachment, “Dr. Dastrup’s History,” 28 March
2014; James McClary, Concepts Development Division, Capabilities De-
velopment and Integration Directorate, interview by author, 18 March
2014, HRDC; Email, “Book Review,” 22 February 2016.
90. Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014; Bateman and
Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” 23–25; Dismuke, “The 2013 State of
Fires,” 14–15; Email with Attachment, “Another DIVARTY Paper,” 18
March 2014; Email with Attachment, “Dr. Dastrup’s History,” 28 March
2014.
91. Bateman and Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” 23–25; Email
with Attachment, “Another DIVARTY Paper,” 18 March 2014.
92. Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014; Memoran-
dum for Commanding General, TRADOC, “Renaming all Fires Battalions
and Fires Brigades,” 3 January 2014, HRDC; Email with Attachments,
“DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014; Army Staffing Form, 19 September 2013,
HRDC; Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 2 April 2014.
93. Email with Attachment, “DIVARTY,” 1 April 2014; Email with
Attachment, “Another DIVARTY Paper,” 18 March 2014; Email with At-
tachment, “DIVARTY,” 2 April 2014; “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier for
the BCT and Division,” Redleg Update, April 2014, 3–6.
94. FORSCOM Implementation Order 9 April 2014, HRDC; “Divi-
sion Artillery Returns to the Army,” Redleg Update, August 2014, 3–4;
White Paper, “Field Artillery Brigade and Division Artillery,” 1 May 2014,
HRDC; “Guns of Glory to return to Fort Campbell,” Fort Campbell Cou-
rier, 2 October 2014; “Artillery Forces Restructure at Fort Stewart with
Return of Division Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, November–December 2014;
“Col Christopher S. Moretti Assumes Command of 82d Airborne Divi-
sion Artillery,” Fayetteville Observer, 16 October 2014; Corey Dickstein,
“Marne Thunder DIVARTY Returns to 3ID,” Redleg Update, November
2014, 3.
95. USAFAS Information Paper, “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier
for the BCT and Division,” 30 April 2014, HRDC; Colonel William A.
Turner, “The Field Artillery Reorganization to Conduct Operational, Joint,
and Multination Fires,” Fires Bulletin, July–August 2014, 6–7; Email with
Attachment, “FA Cmdt SITREP,” 13 March 2014, HRDC.
96. Memorandum, “Doctrine 2015 Guidance,” 23 August 2011,
HRDC; Email, “Army Doctrine 2015,” 7 March 2012, HRDC.
97. Memorandum, “Doctrine 2015 Guidance,” 23 August 2011; Bo
Bielinski, FA Supervisor, Doc Div, DOTD, interview by author, 15 Febru-
ary 2012, HRDC; Email, “Army Doctrine 2015,” 7 March 2012.
98. Bielinski, interview by author, 15 February 2012; Briefing, “Field
Artillery Doctrine Update,” 20 January 2012, HRDC; Email, “Army Doc-
trine 2015,” 7 March 2012.
99. “DIVARTY Update,” Redleg Update, October 2014, 4; Briga-

255
dier General William Turner, “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” Redleg
Update, December 2014, 1–3, HRDC; “Update on Doctrine,” Redleg Up-
date, August 2012, 2; Briefing, “Doctrine 2015 Information Briefing,” un-
dated, HRDC; Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field
Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2012, 14–16; “Revised FM 3-09 is
in the Works,” Redleg Update, 2–13 February 2013, HRDC; Army Doc-
trinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-09 (Extract), Fires, August 2012,
Preface, HRDC; Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-09 (Extract), Fires,
Introduction, HRDC; “DIVARTY Update,” Redleg Update, October 2014,
4; Briefing (Extract), “Field Artillery Pre-command Course FSCOORD
Seminars,” 17 August 2014, HRDC.
100. “Update on Doctrine,” Redleg Update, August 2012, 2; Brief-
ing, “Doctrine 2015 Information Briefing,” undated, HRDC; Brigadier
General Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin,
May–June 2012, 14–16; “Revised FM 3-09 is in the Works,” Redleg Up-
date, 2–13 February 2013, HRDC; ADRP 3-09 (Extract), Fires, August
2012, Preface, Introduction; “DIVARTY Update,” Redleg Update, October
2014, 4; Briefing (Extract), “Field Artillery Pre-command Course FSCO-
ORD Seminars,” 17 August 2014, HRDC; Brigadier General William A.
Turner, “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, January–Febru-
ary 2015; Email, “FM 3-09,” 18 December 2015, HRDC; Email, “ADP
3-09, ADRP 3-09, and ADRP 3-09.90,” 18 December 2015, HRDC.
101. Army Technical Publication (ATP) 3-09.90, Division Artillery
(DIVARTY) Operations and Fire Support for the Division (Draft, Extract)
20 February 2015, HRDC; “Fires Forward,” March 2015, HRDC; Email,
“FM 3-09,” 18 December 2015, HRDC; Email, “ADP 3-09, ADRP 3-09,
and ADRP 3-09.90,” 18 December 2015.
102. “Revised FM 3-09 is in the Works” Redleg Update, February
2013; Sharon McBride, “FM 3-09 Field Artillery Operations and the Fire
Support is the ‘Go To’ Document for Maneuver and Fires Command-
ers,” Redleg Update, November 2013, 6; Brigadier General Christopher
F. Bentley, “2013 Year in Review,” Redleg Update, December 2013, 1–5;
“DIVARTY Doctrine Update,” 4, HRDC; Bentley, “State of the Field
Artillery,” 9–12; Command Sergeant Major Daniel Moriarty, “From the
Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, November 2014, 1–2,
HRDC; Turner, “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” 1–3; Briefing (Extract),
“Field Artillery Pre-command Course FSCOORD Seminars,” 17 August
2014, HRDC.

256
 Epilogue

Into the Future

Looking into the future, the Field Artillery School understood

in 2015 that it had to develop, evaluate, and institute future concepts,
doctrine, and capabilities for the Field Artillery to keep it abreast of
foreign field artilleries. To do this, the school would have to take
advantage of emerging technologies.
In 2015, the US Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, completed “Azimuth 2015: A Strategy for the Future of
Fires.” The strategy established a path to achieve mid- to long-range
objectives through three major lines of effort. Line of effort one in-
volved modernizing the Fires (Air Defense Artillery and Field Artil-
lery) force by developing Fires concepts and introducing new weapon
systems and equipment. Line of effort two encompassed producing
highly trained Fires Soldiers and Marines for the operational forces
by improving education and training; and line of effort three concen-
trated on upgrading Fort Sill’s training ranges and facilities.1
Modernizing the Fires force addressed developing concepts
and capabilities required for the current and future Field Artillery
and embodied working closely with industry, materiel developers,
research and development communities, and other Army commands
to introduce new systems and equipment. For the Field Artillery,
a strategy of one sensor, one shooter, and one mission command
system ranked high as a priority for the long term. One sensor, one
shooter, and one mission command system would shrink the Fires
footprint considerably. Sometime in the future, one artillery platform
would serve as an air defense artillery weapon system and as a field
artillery weapon system; one radar would be used for air defense
artillery and field artillery missions; and one mission control system
would provide command and control for both artillery branches.2
Continuing to enhance precision fires also fell under Field
Artillery modernization and was a key priority for Major General
John G. Rossi, who was commanding general of the Fires Center
of Excellence at Fort Sill from 2014 to 2016. Near-term fielding of

257
the Joint Effects Targeting System would improve precision field
artillery fires. This system would enable the dismounted observer
(forward observer, joint target attack controller, special operations
forces, and others) to acquire and engage targets as well as control
all available effects providers (field artillery, close air support, attack
aviation, and naval gunfire). With a Joint Effects Targeting System,
the forward observer could designate stationary targets out to five
kilometers and moving targets out to three kilometers for a precision
munition to attack and hit. Equally important, the system would re-
duce the length of time to mensurate (the process of locating a target
precisely on a map by longitude and latitude for a guided munition
to hit). With the Lightweight Laser Designated Rangefinder that was
currently being used, a forward observer took 20 to 30 minutes to
mensurate a target because coordinates had to be checked and re-
checked by the fire support chain of command before permission
was given to shoot a precision munition. The Joint Effects Target-
ing System—to be fielded by late 2018 or early 2019—promised
to reduce the time by sending coordinates digitally through the fire
support chain of command.3
A long-range precision fires system also played a prominent
role in modernizing the Field Artillery to keep it abreast of foreign
developments. In 2007, budget concerns prompted the Army to stop
production on the long-range precision Army Tactical Missile Sys-
tem. The system had been initially fielded in the 1980s and served
effectively in Operation Desert Storm of 1991 and Operation Iraqi
Freedom of 2003. This left the Army without a long-range precision
missile and created a serious capability gap as foreign militaries be-
gan fielding long-range precision missiles.4
In February 2013, the Army decided to develop a new long-
range precision missile. It would have a 500 or more kilometer range
with a 200 pound or larger warhead, be all-weather, leverage exist-
ing technologies, be compatible with M270A1 and M142 launchers
already in the inventory, sustain and advance Army missile capabil-
ity to 2050 and beyond, and be affordable. After three years of work,
the Army awarded a contract to Raytheon in 2016 to start develop-
ing the missile and field it sometime in the 2020s.5

258
 A long-range precision missile would also improve the Field
Artillery’s cross-domain precision fires capability. This emerging
warfighting concept aimed to employ air assets to attack ground at-
tack weapons, and ground attack weapons would provide fires for
air forces. This concept also included using Army cannon, rocket,
and missiles fires from land-based batteries combined with nonle-
thal effects across the land, air, maritime, space, and cyber domains
with the capacity to overmatch enemy capabilities.6
While developing a long-range precision missile was a long-
term solution to cross-domain Fires capability, the Army required a
short-term solution to strike maritime targets from land-based bat-
teries. In 2016, after two years of pressure from Congress, the Army
started investigating how to get back in the business of killing ships
from land-based batteries—the first such effort since the Coast Artil-
lery was abolished in 1950. Rather than developing a totally new
missile system or buying one on the global market for such a mis-
sion, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced on 28 October
2016 that the Department of Defense would upgrade the Field Artil-
lery’s Army Tactical Missile System to hit moving targets on land or
sea by integrating an existing seeker on its front. This would permit
hitting a moving target from the land domain up to 300 kilome-
ters into the maritime domain. For the Field Artillery, this capabil-
ity would be revolutionary because at present it could only attack a
stationary target with precision.7
Modernizing the Fires force also comprised efforts to exploit
revolutionary capabilities. In August 2010, Major General David D.
Halverson, who was the commanding general of the Fires Center of
Excellence from 2009 to 2012, hosted a panel of senior leaders and
retired general officers at Fort Sill to discuss the Army’s vulnerabil-
ity to directed energy and electrodynamics kinetic energy weapon
systems, often called electric fires. They noted deficiencies and rec-
ommended that the Army Space and Missile Defense Command/
Army Strategic Command provide an initial vulnerability assess-
ment to the Vice Chief of Staff, General Peter W. Chiarelli.8
In June 2011, the Army Space and Missile Defense Command
briefed General Chiarelli. Based on the briefing, he tasked the com-
mand to conduct a comprehensive electric fires assessment to iden-

259
tify current and emerging threat capabilities and recommend how to
fill any gaps in electric fires capabilities. He also directed the Fires
Center of Excellence to support the effort as a user representative.
Subsequently, the center assigned the Fires Battle Laboratory in its
Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate to take the
lead for this endeavor. After several months of study, the Fires Cen-
ter of Excellence and the Army Space and Missile Defense Com-
mand briefed General Chiarelli in January 2012 on their final assess-
ment on electric fires. He directed further study and charged them to
brief the incoming Vice Chief of Staff, General Lloyd J. Austin III.9
The Fires Center of Excellence briefed General Austin in Au-
gust 2012 about the state of electric fires in the Army and about Gen-
eral Chiarelli’s June 2011 recommendation to form an Electric Fires
Office under the Fires Battle Laboratory. General Austin concurred
with the recommendation. Then in November 2012, the Fires Cen-
ter of Excellence chartered the Electric Fires Office to work with
the Fires Battle Laboratory and the Army Space and Missile De-
fense Command, provide subject matter expertise, and coordinate
and conduct electric fires efforts across the Army. This effort would
address the Army’s capabilities to counter the threat with “game-
changing technologies.”10
In line with this, the Electric Fires Office coordinated the Ar-
my’s first electric fires seminar in February 2013 to examine “game-
changing technologies.” Participants discussed the potential impact
of electric fires on doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader-
ship, personnel, facilities, and policy. Additionally, they gained a
greater understanding of integrating electric fires into future plan-
ning, synchronization, and execution of missions. Specifically, sem-
inar panels presented papers on energy particle beams, high-power
microwaves, laser weapon systems, electro-chemical-thermal guns,
and electromagnetic launches, among other topics.11
As part of the electric fires effort, Fort Sill constructed an elec-
tric fires range. After several years of work beginning in 2013, Fort
Sill used its not-yet-completed electric fires range for the first time
in 2016. The range permitted developers to observe and examine
emerging electric fires technologies in a live-fire event as well as
evaluate the technology through modeling and simulation.12

260
 In April 2016, the Fires Battle Laboratory conducted the 2016
Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment at the range. This experi-
ment explored challenges with detecting, identifying, and defeating
threat unmanned aerial systems. These systems represented a great
danger because they had the potential to conduct reconnaissance and
deliver nuclear, biological, chemical, or conventional weapons. Spe-
cifically, the experiment exhibited Army’s High Energy Laser Mo-
bile Test Truck’s ability to acquire, track, engage, and destroy air and
ground targets. The truck, an initiative pursued by the Army Space
and Missile Defense Command, consisted of a truck-mounted laser
platform designed to track and shoot down incoming enemy un-
manned aerial systems, rockets, artillery, and mortars. During the
experiment, the truck employed a 10-kilowatt high-energy laser and
subsystems that shot down 15 unmanned aerial system targets. Future
plans included developing a 50- or 100-kilowatt high-energy laser.13
Addressing this and other electric fires technologies, Major
Michael Burke of the Capabilities Development and Integration
Directorate’s Requirements Determination Division explained in
2016 that electric fires experiments involved more than just inves-
tigating ways to shoot down incoming threats. They also encom-
passed electromagnetic launch technologies that used a magnetic
field created by electricity to launch field artillery projectiles with-
out the use of explosives or propellants. As the major explained,
electric fires represented long-term solutions to resolve field artil-
lery capability gaps.14
Concurrently, the Fires Battle Laboratory participated in a
study that examined the possibility of employing a next-generation
guided hypervelocity projectile fired from a 155-millimeter howit-
zer to intercept an aircraft. This would require allowing a traditional
field artillery platform to connect to an air defense network then
fire munitions capable of air engagements. Although BAE Systems
was working on developing such a munition, the Field Artillery con-
ceded that it was a long-term effort that was still in the science and
technology phase of development.15
Fires Azimuth 2015, therefore, outlined a broad plan to move
the Field Artillery into the future. Introducing the Joint Effects Tar-
geting System and a new long-range precision missile as well as

261
modifying the Army Tactical Missile System represented significant
improvements over field artillery systems of 2015. However, the
one shooter, one sensor, and one mission command system concept
as well as electric fires and a hypervelocity 155-millimeter muni-
tion promised to revolutionize the Field Artillery by taking it into a
totally new era—making a total break with 2015 systems.

262
 NOTES

1. “Fires Strategy 2015: A Strategy for the Future of Fires,” 2015,

1–2, 17, HRDC; Major General John G. Rossi, “The State of Fires,” Fires
Bulletin, January–February 2016, 1–4.
2. Rossi, “The State of Fires,” 1–4.
3. “Fires Strategy 2015: A Strategy for the Future of Fires,” 2015, 6,
26, HRDC; Doug Brown, Deputy Director, TCM BCT–Fires, interview
with attachments by author, 17 February 2011, HRDC; Email, “BFIST,
Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History,” 9 March 2011, HRDC; Infor-
mation Paper, “Joint Effects Targeting System,” 12 June 2012, HRDC; In-
formation Paper, “Joint Effects Targeting System Target Location Desig-
nation System,” undated, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “Documents,”
7 February 20 2013, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cells
History,” 9 April 2015, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “TCM Fires Cells
History,” 9 April 2015, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FA DOTMLPF,” 27
May 2015, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), “FA DOTMLPF,” December 2015,
HRDC; Information Paper, “Joint Effects Targeting System Production,”
31 October 2016, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “CDID 2016 FA His-
tory Submission,” 21 March 2017, HRDC; Meghann Myers, “This New
Targeting System Is Going to get Warheads on Foreheads in a Hurry,”
Army Times, 29 September 2016.
4. Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, 4 October 2016, HRDC;
Captain Joshua Urness, “Milley Addresses Attendees of AUSA Meeting,”
Fires Bulletin, AUSA Special Issue 2016, 4; Army Warfighting Challeng-
es, 2 December 2016, HRDC; Army Warfighting Challenges, 12 Octo-
ber 2016, HRDC; Fact Sheet, “History of Rockets and Missiles,” 2007,
26 February 2008, HRDC; Memorandum for Program Executive Office,
Missiles and Space, “Fiscal Year 2007 Termination Plans for the Army
Tactical Missile,” 11 June 2007, HRDC; Email, “ATACMS,” 25 February
2008, HRDC; Memorandum for Deputy Assistant Secretary, “FY07 Army
Tactical Missile System Program Termination Plan,” 16 February 2007,
HRDC; Email, “ATACMS,” 25 February 2008, HRDC; Email with At-
tachment, “MLRS Rocket and Missile 2007,” 25 March 2008, HRDC.
5. Charles Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” Fires
Bulletin, March–April 2014, 22–23; Information Paper, “Long Range Pre-
cision Fires,” 13 September 2016, HRDC; Information Paper, “US Army
Awards Raytheon Long Range Precision Fires Risk Mitigation Contract,”
23 August 2016, HRDC; Information Paper, “Long Range Precision
Fires,” undated, HRDC; Fires Division, Army Capabilities Integration
Center, “Capabilities Development of Long-Range Precision Fires,” 16
May 2014, HRDC; Major David Dykema, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Matt
MacKenzie, and Captain Justin Teague, “Advances of Precision Fires and
Launchers,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2014, 55–58; “Fires Forward,”

263
September 2016, HRDC; Briefing, “Portfolio Overview of the Precision
Strike Association,” 18 March 2015, HRDC.
6. Email with Attachment, “USAFAS History Report,” 10 March
2016, HRDC; “Fires Forward,” November 2016, HRDC; Army Warfight-
ing Challenges, 12 October 2016, HRDC; Email with Attachment, “CDID
2016 FA History Submission,” 21 March 2017, HRDC.
7. “Fires Forward,” November 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg, “Carter,
Roper Unveil Army’s New Ship-Killer Missile: ATACMS Upgrade,” Break-
ing Defense, 28 October 2016, accessed 25 January 2017, https://breaking-
defense.com/2016/10/army-atacms-missile-will-kill-ships-secdef-carter;
Email with Attachment, “CDID 2016 FA History Submission,” 21 March
2017, HRDC.
8. Susan Walker, Deputy Director, Fires Battle Laboratory, interview
with attachments by author, 28 March 2012, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ment, “FBL History 2011,” 6 March 2012, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ment, “Electric Fires Portion of the 2011 Annual History,” 2 April 2012,
HRDC; Electric Fires Request for Information, 27 June 2012, HRDC;
Email with Attachment, “Electric fires,” 20 March 2015, HRDC.
9. Walker, interview with attachments, 28 March 2012; Email with
Attachment, “FBL History 2011,” 6 March 2012; Email with Attach-
ment, “Electric Fires Portion of the 2011 Annual History,” 2 April 2012;
Email with Attachment, “Electric Fires,” 20 March 2015, HRDC; Email
with Attachment, “Electric Fires,” 12 March 2014, HRDC; J.D. Leopold,
“Campbell Takes Oath as Army’s Vice Chief of Staff,” Army News, 11
March 2013.
10. Memorandum for Record, “Establishment of the FCoE Elec-
tric Fires Office,” 21 November 2012, HRDC; Email with Attachments,
“Electric Fires,” 12 March 2014.
11. Fires Battle Laboratory History 2013, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ments, “Electric Fires,” 12 March 14; Email with Attachment, “Electric
Fires Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History,” 13 March 2014, HRDC.
12. 2015 USAFAS AH, 52–54; News Release, “Electric Fires Range
Approved for Use at Fort Sill,” 17 June 2015, HRDC; Email with Attach-
ment, “Electric fires v1 Doc,” 9 March 2016, HRDC.
13. Shane Sandstrom, “Fort Sill High-Tech Range Assessment
Approved,” Fires Bulletin, March–April 2016, 30–31; Captain Jeffrey
Jarimillo, “The Tactical Edge of Fires: Maneuver Fires Integration Ex-
periment,” Fires Bulletin, May–June 2016, 34–38; Fact Sheet, “High En-
ergy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator,” 28 December 2016, HRDC;
Army Missile and Space Defense Command Information Paper, “HEL
TVD,” January 2017, HRDC; Monthly Report, Electric Fires, 1–31 Jan-
uary 2016, HRDC; Monthly Report, Electric Fires, 1–31 March 2016,
HRDC; Jeff Crawley, “Electric Fires Seminar Focuses on Future Battle-
fields,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 5 March 2015; “Fires Forward,” May 2016,

264
HRDC; C. Todd Lopez, “Army Tests High Energy Laser in Exercise,”
Army News, 17 May 2016.
14. Crawley, “Electric Fires Seminar Focuses on Future Battlefields,”
Fort Sill Cannoneer; News Release, “Electric fires Range Approved for
Use at Fort Sill,” 17 June 2015; Email with Attachment, “Electric fires v1
Doc,” 9 March 2016; Shane Sandstrom, “Fort Sill High-Tech Range As-
sessment Approved,” 30–31; Jarimillo, “The Tactical Edge of Fires: Ma-
neuver Fires Integration Experiment,” 34–38.
15. Email with Attachment, “CDID 2016 FA History Submission,”
21 March 2016, HRDC; BAE Systems Information Paper, “HVP, Hyper
Velocity Projectile,” 2016, HRDC.

265
 Glossary

AAA Anti-aircraft Artillery

AAR After Action Review/After Action Report
AC Assistant Commandant
ACH Annual Command History
ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment
ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
ADA Air Defense Artillery
ADP Army Doctrinal Publication
ADRP Army Doctrinal Reference Publication
AECP Army Experimentation Campaign Plan
AHR Annual Historical Review
AI Air Interdiction
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
ARNG Army National Guard
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATP Army Technical Publication
AUSA Association of the United States Army
AWE Army Warfighting Experiment
BAT Brilliant Anti-armor Submunition
BCT Brigade Combat Team
BDE Brigade
BFIST Bradley Fire Support Team
BL Battle Laboratory
BOLC Basic Officer Leader Course
CAC Combined Arms Center
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAS Close Air Support
CB Counterbattery
CDID Capabilities Development and Integration Direc-
torate
CG Commanding General
CSA Chief of Staff of the Army
CSM Command Sergeant Major
DA Department of the Army
DAC Deputy Assistant Commandant

267
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCD Directorate of Combat Developments
DCX Division Capstone Exercise
DIVARTY Division Artillery
DOD Department of Defense
DOTD Directorate of Training and Doctrine
DOTE Directorate of Test and Evaluation
DOTLM Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, and
Materiel
DOTLMPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership,
Material, Personnel, and Facilities
DPICM Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition
DPTM Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization
DSWS Division Support Weapon System Study
ECC Effects Coordination Cell
ESPAWS Enhanced Self-propelled Artillery Weapon Study
EW Electronic Warfare
EXSUM Executive Summary
GAO Government Accountability Office
GMLRS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System
GPS Global Positioning System
FA Field Artillery
FATDS Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems
FCoE Fires Center of Excellence
FCS Future Combat System
FECC Fires Effects Coordination Cell
FDIC Futures Development and Integration Center
F2C2 Future Fires Command and Control
FIST Fire Support Team
FISTV Fire Support Team Vehicle
FM Field Manual
FORSCOM Forces Command
FSCAOD Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations De-
partment
FSCOORD Fire Support Coordinator
FY Fiscal Year
HE High Explosive
HELP Howitzer Extended Life Program

268
HEMMT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
HIP Howitzer Improvement Program
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
HRDC Historical Research and Document Collection
IAV Interim Armored Vehicle/Initial Armored Vehicle
IBCT Initial Brigade Combat Team/Interim Brigade
Combat Team
ID Infantry Division
IFSAS Initial Fire Support Automation System
JACI Joint and Combined Integration
JFO Joint Fires Officer
JPSD Joint Precision Strike Demonstration
JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center
LCMR Lightweight Countermortar Radar
LLDR Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder
LS Launch System
LW Lightweight
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MOS Military Occupational Skill
MTT Mobile Training Team
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO Noncommissioned Officer
NCOES Noncommissioned Officer Education System
NET New Equipment Training
NLOS Non-line-of-Sight
NLOS-C Non-line-of-Sight Cannon
NLOS-LS Non-line-of-Sight Launch System
NTC National Training Center
OCONUS Outside Continental United States
ODS Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm
OIC Officer in Charge
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPFOR Opposing Force

269
PEO Program Executive Office/Program Executive Of-
ficer
PGK Precision Guidance Kit
PIM Paladin Improvement Management
RC Reserve Component
RAMS Rockets and Missiles Systems
RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
RGFC Republican Guard Force Command
SADARM Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition
SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SIGACTS Significant Activities
SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SITREP Situation Report
SME Subject Matter Expert
SPLLS Self-Propelled Loader/Launcher
STANAG Standardization Agreement
TAA Total Army Analysis
TACFIRE Tactical Fire Direction System
TAD Towed Artillery Digitization
TCM TRADOC Capabilities Manager
TCP Transformation Campaign Plan
TF Task Force
TOC Tactical Operation Center
TPSO Theater Precision Strike Operations
TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSM TRADOC System Manager
US United States
USAF United States Air Force
USAFACFS United States Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill
USAFACS United States Field Artillery Center and School
USAFAS United States Army Field Artillery School
USAFCOEFS United States Fires Center of Excellence and Fort
Sill
USMC United States Marine Corps
VCSA Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
WIDD Warfighting Integration and Development Direc-
torate
XO Executive Officer

270
 Select Bibliography

This bibliography only contains the books and articles used to

write the book. For messages, fact sheets, information papers, re-
ports, emails, and other comparable documents, please see the notes
at the end of each chapter.

Manuscript Collections
Morris Swett Technical Library, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excel-
lence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
Historical Research and Document Collection, Historian’s Office,
U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill

Government Documents
Department of the Army, Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1987.
___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991.
___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1992.
___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1993.
___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1994.
___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1995.
___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1996.
___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1999.
___. Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 2001.
Government Accountability Office, “Army Armored Systems,” 6
June 1997, HRDC.
___. “Army Needs to Update Fielding Plan for First Digitized
Corps,” July 2000.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
“The 9/11 Commission Report,” 22 July 2004.
United States Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Annual
Command History/Annual Historical Review, 1986–2005.
United States Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill Annual
Command History, 2006–2008.
United States Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, “Fires
Strategy 2015: A Strategy for the Future of Fires,” 2015.
United States Field Artillery School Annual History, 2009–2015.

271
United States Army Field Artillery School, Annual Historical Sup-
plements, 1975, 1979, and 1983.
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. Annual Com-
mand History, 1991–1994.

Books
Brown, John S. Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the
U.S. Army 1989–2005. Washington, DC: Center of Military His-
tory, U.S. Army, 2011.
Brown, Todd S. Battle Ground Iraq: Journal of a Company Com-
mander. Washington DC: Center of Military History, US Army,
2007.
Carafano, James J., ed. Soldiers are Our Credentials: The Collected
Works and Select Papers of the Thirty-third Chief of Staff of the
Army. Washington, DC: The US Army Center of Military History,
2000.
Carney, Stephen A. Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Free-
dom. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army,
2011.
Chapman, Anne W., Carol J. Lilly, John L. Romjue, and Susan
Canedy. Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the
Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973–1998. Fort Mon-
roe, VA: Military History Office, US Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 1998.
Dastrup, Boyd L. Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973–1991. Fort
Sill, OK: Office of the Command Historian, 1994, reprinted by
the US Army Center of Military History, 2003.
___. Cedat Fortuna Peritis: A History of the Field Artillery School.
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2011.
Fontenot, Colonel (Retired) Gregory, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. De-
gen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn. On Point: US Army in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Stud-
ies Institute Press, 2004.
Friedman, Norman. Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait. Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.
Grice, Michael D. On Gunnery: The Art and Science of Field Artil-
lery from the American Civil War to the Dawn of the 21st Cen-
tury. Charleston, SC: Booksurge Publishing, 2009.

272
Groen, Michael S., and Contributors. With the 1st Marine Division
in Iraq, 2003. Quantico, VA: History Division, Marine Corps
University, 2006.
Herbert, Paul H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William
E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command
and General Staff College, 1988.
King, Benjamin. Victory Starts Here: A Short 40-Year History of the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Fort Leavenworth,
KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms
Center, 2013.
Koonz, Christopher N. ed., Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the
U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003–2005. Washington
D.C.: Center of Military History, US Army, 2008.
Malone, Henry O., ed. TRADOC Support to Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm: A Preliminary Study. Fort Monroe, VA:
Office of the Command Historian, 1992.
McGrath, John J. The Brigade: A History, Its Organization and Em-
ployment in the U.S. Army. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Stud-
ies Institute Press, 2004.
McKenney, Janice E. The Organizational History of the Field Artil-
lery: 1775–2003. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military
History, 2007.
Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: A
Military History. Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University
Press, 2003.
Naylor, Sean. Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Opera-
tion Anaconda. New York: Berkley Caliber Books, 2005.
Ott, Major General David E. Field Artillery: 1954–1963. Washing-
ton, DC: Department of the Army, 1975.
Romjue, John L. American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War.
Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, US Army Training and
Doctrine Command, 1996.
___. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of
Army Doctrine, 1973–1982. Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training
and Doctrine Command Historical Office, 1984.
___. The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army.
Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, US Army

273
 Training and Doctrine Command, reprinted by the US Army Cen-
ter of Military History, 1997.
Rose, Gideon. How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010.
Scales, Robert H. Jr., ed. Certain Victory: United States Army in the
Gulf War. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army,
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___. Firepower in Limited War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995.
Schubert, Frank L., and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. The Whirlwind War:
The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert
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Wright, Donald P., James R. Bird, Steven W. Clay, Peter W. Con-
nors, Scott C. Farquhar, Lynne Chandler Garcia, and Dennis F.
Van Wey. A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in
Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001–September 2005.
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army
Combined Arms Center, 2010.
Yarrison, James L. The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers. Washington,
DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1999.

Articles
Abrams, Creighton W. “The Gulf War and European Artillery.”
Journal of the Royal Artillery (Autumn 2001): 41.
Bailey, Colonel Steven L. “Fires for the IBCT.” Field Artillery (No-
vember–December 2001): 5.
Barnett, Major Donald L. “Crusader Target Weight: 38 to 42 Tons.”
Field Artillery (March–April 2000): 34.
Bateman, Lieutenant Colonel Sean, and Major Steven Hady, “King
of Battle Once Again: An Organizational Design to Effectively
Integrate Fires in Support of the Tactical, Operational, and Strate-
gic Force.” Fires Bulletin (March–April 2013): 23.
Batule, Colonel Kevin M., and Colonel (Retired) Theodore J. Janos-
ko, “Training the Full-Spectrum BCT FSCOORD.” Fires Bulletin
(May–June 2008): 26.
Baxter, Brigadier General Leo J. “Field Artillery: Vision 2020.”
Field Artillery (December 1994): 10.

274
Baxter, Major General Leo J. “Honing the Edge: State of the Field
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___. “Meeting the Future: State of the Field Artillery 1998.” Field
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Bentley, Brigadier General Christopher F. “State of the Field Artil-
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Bentley, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher F. “Afghanistan: Joint and
Coalition Fire Support in Operation Enduring Freedom.” Field
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Bilo, Brigadier General William C. “A Decisive Victory for Strate-
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Bransford, Lieutenant Colonel William M. “Fire Support and Desert
Hammer VI: The Advanced Warfighting Experiment.” Field Ar-
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Burdick, Major General Donald. “An Essential Element of National
Strategy.” Army (October 1990): 116.
Corn, Colonel Vollney B. Jr., and Captain Richard A. Lacquemont.
“Silver Bullets.” Field Artillery (October 1991): 10.
Crawley, Jeff. “Electric Fires Seminar Focuses on Future Battle-
fields.” Fort Sill Cannoneer (5 March 2015), www.army.mil.
Crisco, Lieutenant Colonel Telford E. Jr. “The Modular Force: Divi-
sion Operations.” Military Review (January–February 2006): 95.
Dismuke, Shirley. “The 2013 State of Fires.” Fires Bulletin (July–
August 2013): 14.
Dubia, Major General John A. “A Vision for Fire Support in the 21st
Century: State of the Branch, 1993.” Armed Forces Journal (May
1991): 37.
___. “Force XXI and the Field Artillery: State of the Branch 1994.”
Field Artillery (December 1994): 2.
Duitsman, Leighton L. “Army TACMS.” Field Artillery (January–
February 1991): 38.
Durham, Major (Retired) George A., and Colonel (Retired) James
E. Cunningham. “NetFires: Precision Effects for the Objective
Force.” Field Artillery (March–April 2002): 5.
Dykema, Major David, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Matt MacKenzie,
and Captain Justin Teague. “Advances of Precision Fires and
Launchers.” Fires Bulletin (March–April 2014): 55.

275
Emerson, Major Charles J., Major Mark H. Laflamme, and Colonel
(Retired) James E. Cunningham. “NLOS Systems for the Mod-
ular and Future Forces.” Field Artillery (November–December
2005): 7.
Emison, Colonel Steven A. “Post Task Force XXI Advanced Warf-
ighting Experiment.” Army Research, Development, and Acquisi-
tion (September–October 1997): 2.
Engel, Brigadier General William F. “Transforming Fires for the
Objective Force.” Field Artillery (November–December 2001):
9.
“Extended Range for MLRS Rockets in the Works.” Field Artillery
(April 1992): 39.
“Field Artillery Commanders.” Field Artillery (December 1991):
pullout.
“Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update.” Field Artillery
(December 1990): 53.
“Field Artillery and Mortar Systems.” Army (October 2005): 326.
“Field Artillery Units Worldwide.” Field Artillery (December 1989):
pullout.
“Forces Committed.” Military Review (September 1991): 80.
“Fort Sill Educators Look at Air Force Pilot Training Practices.”
Fort Sill Cannoneer (10 October 2013).
“Fort Sill Joins Forces with Battlelab Plan.” Fort Sill Cannoneer (24
September 1992): 1.
Foss, General John W. “AirLand Battle-Future.” Army (February
1991): 20.
Freedberg, Sydney J. “Carter, Roper Unveil Army’s New Ship-
Killer Strategy.” Breaking Defense, www.breakingdefense.com
(28 October 2016).
Froysland, Jeff and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Scott Prochniak. “Train-
ing and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade.”
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 About the Author

Boyd L. Dastrup, a native of Ogden, Utah, received his B.S.

from Weber State College, M.A. from Utah State University, and
Ph.D. from Kansas State University and is currently the US Army
Field Artillery School Historian. He has written The U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College: A Centennial History (1982),
Crusade in Nuremberg: Military Occupation, 1945–1949 (1985),
King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery
(1992, 1993), Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973–1991 (1994,
2003), The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook (1994), and Ce-
dat Fortuna Peritis: A History of the Field Artillery School (2011).
He has also written articles in A Guide to the Sources of United
States Military History (1998), The Oxford Companion to Ameri-
can Military History (1999), and Professional Military Education in
the United States: A Historical Dictionary (2000). Additionally, he
wrote “Artillery as a Result of World War One” in King of Battle:
Artillery in World War One (2016), “Artillery” in Oxford University
Press online bibliographies (2017), and articles in other journals and
anthologies and served as a subject matter expert for the History
Channel on “Dangerous Missions: Forward Observation” (2001)
and for the Discovery Channel on “Artillery Strikes” (2005).

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