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Towards a psychology of collective memory

a b
William Hirst & David Manier
a
New School for Social Research, New York, NY, USA
b
Lehman College, City University of New York, NY, USA
Version of record first published: 06 Mar 2008.

To cite this article: William Hirst & David Manier (2008): Towards a psychology of collective memory, Memory, 16:3,
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 MEMORY, 2008, 16 (3), 183200

Towards a psychology of collective memory

William Hirst
New School for Social Research, New York, NY, USA

David Manier
Lehman College, City University of New York, NY, USA
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This article discusses the place of psychology within the now voluminous social scientific literature on
collective memory. Many social scientists locate collective memories in the social resources that shape
them. For scholars adopting this perspective, collective memories are viewed as transcending individuals;
that is, as being ‘‘in the world’’. Others recognise that, in the final analysis, individuals must remember
collective as well as individual memories. These scholars treat collective memories as shared individual
memories. We attempt to bridge these two approaches by distinguishing between the design of social
resources and memory practices, on one hand, and on the other, the effectiveness of each in forming and
transforming the memories held by individuals and the psychological mechanisms that guide this
effectiveness.

The study of collective memory has grown collective memory resists clear definition, even
remarkably since Halbwachs (1992/1925) first the naysayers continue their research on the
discussed the topic approximately 80 years ago. topic.
There are currently thousands of articles on the Perhaps they are continuing their efforts, at
topic, mostly by social scientists other than least in part, because they recognise the close
psychologists (e.g., anthropologists, historians, relations between collective memory and collec-
political scientists, sociologists), and many of tive identity. Problems of memory are salient in
them written in the last 10 years. It is not always today’s world, be they struggles by Germans to
clear what these scholars mean by collective face the Holocaust, by South Africans to confront
memory*there is a widespread lament that the the legacy of apartheid, or by citizens in former
term is used imprecisely or promiscuously. Gillis communist countries to deal with those who
(1994) noted that (collective) ‘‘memory seems to collaborated with the former regimes (for related
be losing precise meaning in proportion to its literature, see Boranine, Levy, & Schelter, 1994;
growing rhetorical power’’ (p. 3). Gedi and Elam Habermas, 1986; Kritz, 1995; Rosenberg, 1995).
(1996) worried that the term collective memory Resolution of these troubling conflicts may not be
was replacing older, and perhaps more service- readily forthcoming, but the questions at stake
able, terms such as ritual. Fabian (1999) wrote are clear: How are collective memories of the past
that ‘‘the concept of [collective] memory may formed, shaped, reshaped, forgotten, and re-
become indistinguishable from either identity or newed? How can one talk about collective
culture’’ (p. 51). Berliner (2005) captured this memory in a way that encompasses situations as
general concern in his discussion of the ‘‘abuses of diverse as the Holocaust, apartheid, and
memory’’. But, notwithstanding that the term the velvet revolution, yet still say something

Address correspondence to: William Hirst, Department of Psychology, New School for Social Research, 66 W. 12th Street,
New York, NY 10003, USA. E-mail: hirst@newschool.edu
We thank the members of the New School Cognitive Science Laboratory for their helpful comments.

# 2008 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
http://www.psypress.com/memory DOI:10.1080/09658210701811912
 184 HIRST AND MANIER

meaningful about the concept itself? How do it has little bearing on the identity that Spa-
communities shape and reshape the collective niards hold as a community.
memories their members hold? Are there con- In addition to their increasing willingness to
straints on the power of communities to restruc- consider functionality, psychologists have become
ture collective memories? And what is the more comfortable in studying individuals as
relation between the memories an individual in embedded in complex social networks. Here we
a community holds of the past and the collective have in mind the recent work on situated cogni-
memories held by the community as a whole? tion (Aydede & Robbins, 2008), distributed
Answers to questions like these may not only learning (Lea & Nicoll, 2002; Fiore & Sales,
advance scholarly understanding of the formation 2007), extended mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998;
and maintenance of collective memory, but may Wilson & Clark, 2008), and a Vygotskian ap-
also provide a means of charting the tenacious proach to development (Fivush & Nelson, 2004).
hold a community’s memory of its past has on its The emerging interest of psychologists in collec-
present identity. tive identity and collective guilt is also relevant,
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How can psychology assist in answering these as well as the earlier work by Sherif (1936) on
critical questions? In particular, how might it social norms (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Bran-
help to address the question about the relation scombe & Doosje, 2004; Brewer & Gardner, 1996;
between the memories held by individuals and Deaux, 1996; Sherif, 1936; Simon & Klandemans,
those held by communities? Psychologists are 2001; Tajfel, 1974).
becoming increasingly well equipped to engage These interests in functionality and socially
these and related questions about collective embedded cognition have encouraged several
memory. First, they are more willing than in researchers to explore the phenomenon of col-
the past to embrace a functional perspective lective memory in some detail (Brockmeier, 2002;
when discussing cognitive mechanisms. Such an
Middleton & Brown, 2005; Middleton & Ed-
attitude is particularly important when studying
wards, 1990; Pennebaker, Paez, & Rimé, 1997;
collective memories because, as A. Assmann
Wertsch, 2002; see Smith & Semin, 2004; Thomp-
(1999) has argued, collective memories must be
son & Fine, 1999; for reviews of socially shared
defined in terms of the function they play in
cognition). Yet, even as psychologists move
society. Psychological work on the distinction
towards a fuller embrace of collective memory,
between autobiographical and episodic memory
they must recognise that not every scholar of
can serve as a guide in distinguishing collective
collective memory welcomes them. Some social
memories from ‘‘shared’’ memories or ‘‘col-
scientists see little to be gained by introducing
lected’’ memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000). Just as autobiographical memories are psychology’s trademark methodological individu-
individually held memories that bear on the alism into discussions about collective memory.
identity of an individual, collective memories As a result, a significant portion of the social
are widely held memories of community mem- science literature on collective memory proceeds
bers that bear on the collective identity of the in a manner that seems unaware of the role that
community (A. Assmann, 1999). If a memory is individuals, and their psychology, may play in the
widely held by members of a community, but formation and maintenance of collective mem-
has little meaning for the community, then it ories. Psychologists have two choices as they
should be treated as a ‘‘shared’’ or ‘‘collected review the now large body of social science
memory’’, but not a ‘‘collective memory’’ (Hirst research: They could turn their backs to it, or
& Manier, 2002; Manier & Hirst, 2007; Olick, they could find a way to bridge the various
1999). Thus, the memories of Spaniards for the disciplinary approaches to collective memory.
facts about the Madrid terrorist attack of 11 The present paper explores how this latter project
March 2004 are part of the Spanish collective might proceed, asking what contribution indivi-
memory because these memories shape Spanish duals can make in the formation and maintenance
collective identity. But although Spaniards also of a collective memory. In doing so, it seeks to
probably share a memory of the fact that find among the scholarly efforts that treat collec-
Princess Diana died in a car accident, this tive memories as being located ‘‘in the world’’ a
memory is probably not properly classified as place for the psychological desire to locate
part of the Spanish collective memory, because collective memories ‘‘in the individual’’.
 A PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 185

WHERE ARE COLLECTIVE MEMORIES the past and to maintain these representations. As
LOCATED? a result, some scholars conceive of collective
memory ‘‘not as a collection of individual mem-
According to Price-Williams (1975), the investi- ories or some magically constructed reservoir of
gation of human nature can be neatly divided ideas and images, but rather as a socially articu-
into studies of interpretation and studies of lated and socially maintained ‘reality of the past’’’
mechanisms. Research on human memory is no (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994, p. 54). The argument is that
exception. A large literature on both individual ‘‘a ‘collective memory’  as a set of ideas, images,
and collective memory engages questions of and feelings about the past  is best located not in
interpretation. Psychoanalysis, for instance, is the minds of individuals, but in the resources they
concerned with the interpretation of individual share’’ (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994, p. 4).
memories (Schafer, 1994); likewise, many studies From this perspective, students of collective
in oral history provide interpretations of collec- memory must avoid the temptation to ‘‘perceive
tive memories (e.g., Passerini, 1987; Thompson, and conceptualize collective memory exclusively
in terms of the psychological and emotional
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1978).
An equally large literature on both individual dynamics of individual remembering’’ (Kanstei-
and collective memory explores mechanisms. For ner, 2002, p. 185). Collective memories may not
collective memories, that means the processes by always behave according to the rules that govern
which collective memories are formed and main- individual memory. Kansteiner (2002) made this
tained. Scholars studying these issues may not point when he contrasted the consequences of
always use the word mechanism or process, but repressing trauma for individuals and for nations.
their discussions of the invention of traditions As he viewed it, when individuals repress trauma
(Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), the politics of they suffer negative consequences; on the other
memory (Bronkhorst, 1995; Hodgkin & Rad- hand, he opined that nations can ‘‘repress’’ their
stone, 2003; Rosenberg, 1995), and the social collective traumas with impunity.1 Irwin-Zarecka
conventions and practices surrounding memory (1994, p. 116) agreed with Kansteiner: ‘‘When
(Zerubavel, 1998), usually focus on mechanisms, speaking of social forgetting, we are best advised
albeit social or institutional rather than psycho- to keep psychological or psychoanalytical cate-
logical ones. gories at bay and to focus, rather, on the social,
political, and cultural factors at work.’’
J. Assmann (1995) also appears to be locating
collective memories outside the individual when
Memories ‘‘in the world’’
he draws a distinction between communicative
With their methodological individualism, it is and cultural memories. As the name indicates,
natural for psychologists to view collective mem- communicative memories are transmitted be-
ories as ‘‘shared individual memories’’, even if tween people through communication; for in-
they qualify this definition with functional con- stance, a joke told by one person to another, or
straints. For some social scientists, this emphasis an experience transmitted by a member of one
on individual memories is mistaken (e.g., Schud- generation to a member of the next. Commu-
son, 1995). Although we are no doubt simplifying nicative memories have something of the char-
a wide range of subtly different positions, we want acter of ‘‘everyday memories’’ that individuals,
here to examine what we view as the two ends of not collectivities, hold. For Assmann, they possess
a complex spectrum. One end of this spectrum a limited temporal horizon, rarely stretching
treats collective memories not as aggregated or beyond 100 years. On the other hand, cultural
shared individual memories, but as social repre- memories can last for centuries. Cultural mem-
sentations contained, not ‘‘in the head’’, but ‘‘in ories occur when communicative memories are
the world’’ (see Olick & Robbins, 1998, for a transformed into ‘‘objectivized culture’’, the ‘‘cul-
review of the sociology of collective memory). turally institutionalized heritage of a society’’
Olick (1999), for instance, suggested that collec- 1
tive memories can be treated as ‘‘patterns of Although Kansteiner relied on a Freudian conception of
repression, he ignored Freud’s (1963) contention that
publicly available symbols objectified in society’’ psychological processes in the individual parallel, on a
(p. 336). The focus here is on the efforts of society, microcosmic level, the macrocosmic processes that processes
not individuals, to form public representations of prevail in societies.
 186 HIRST AND MANIER

(Assmann, 1995, p. 130). They are located outside prism of his fellow travellers. When he is remem-
the individual, in the world. They are maintained bering alone, he still converses ‘‘virtually’’ with
through what Assmann called figures of memory his compatriots. And even if he travels alone, he
or what Nora (1996) has referred to as lieux de brings fellow travellers along in his imagination.
memoire (sites of memory)*that is, ‘‘cultural Every aspect of memorising or remembering
formations (texts, rites, monuments) and institu- reflects the social environment in which the
tional communication (recitations, practice, mnemonic activity takes place and the social
observance)’’ (Nora, 1996, p. 129). That is, they resources that this environment provides. As a
are maintained by objects in the world. Inasmuch result, memorising and remembering are social
as they are embedded within ‘‘objectivized cul- ‘‘all the way down’’. Even though it may be
ture’’, and not individuals, cultural memories are individuals who store and retrieve memories, it
not temporally bounded. Moreover, and impor- makes little sense to ‘‘locate’’ a collective mem-
tantly, they ‘‘preserve the store of knowledge ory within an individual. As Irwin-Zarecka (1994)
from which a group derives an awareness of its averred, it is best to locate a collective memory in
unity and peculiarity’’ (Nora, 1996, p. 130)*that the social resources that shape it.
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is, its identity. On this view, cultural memory, not Other scholars would locate collective memory
communicative memory, grounds the collective in social resources, not because of the socially
identity of a society. embedded nature of memory, but because that is
Communicative memories, then, appear to where they are. These resources would include
have a home within individuals and are commu- cultural artefacts and social practices, such as
nicated from one individual to another. Cultural rituals (Connerton, 1989). For these scholars, the
memories are ‘‘in the world’’, that is, in the figures concept of collective memory is divorced from
of memory that maintain them. To underscore any consideration of the individual. Here the
this point, Assmann distinguished between two claim differs little from those who seek to define
‘‘modes’’ in which cultural memories exist: po- culture, not as shared beliefs, but as public
tential and actual. Only in the actual mode can a symbols (e.g., Geertz, 1973). This is what allows
cultural memory shape a contemporary society’s Olick (1999) to claim that collective memories are
identity. An obscure text located in the sub- ‘‘patterns of publicly available symbols objecti-
basement of the National Archives might be fied in society’’. From this perspective one must
construed as a cultural memory, but only in a turn to the texts, memorials, and commemora-
potential mode. When a memory is ‘‘related to an tions that are produced and maintained by the
actual and contemporary situation’’ it enters the community or generation to understand the
mode of actuality (see Assmann, 1995, p. 130). collective memories formed by this community
Although Assmann does not speak here in terms or generation. How a community utilises mne-
of individuals, presumably cultural memories monic resources and how social forces shape
achieve the ‘‘mode of actuality’’ when individuals memory practices are among the critical ques-
become aware of them and actively make them tions. The salient issue is not so much how an
part of the society’s contemporary understanding individual reacts to a text or responds to a
of itself. commemoration, but how society works to re-
Scholars who locate collective memories ‘‘in configure the text or to incorporate a commem-
the world’’ are not denying that individuals, oration into its memory practices.
rather than groups or social resources, do the
remembering (e.g., see Crane, 1997). They have
no desire to repeat the error attributed to Memories ‘‘in the individual’’
McDougal (1920) and posit a ‘‘group mind’’ or
‘‘group memory’’. However, some of them view In the writings of those who locate collective
memory as being so socially encrusted that memories ‘‘in the world’’ it is often difficult to
individual memory cannot be separated from discern the place for the individual qua indivi-
social influences on memory. Halbwachs (1992/ dual. Olick (1999, 2007) and those who agree
1925), for instance, argued that the properties and with him seem to deny that considerations about
mechanisms of memory are not fixed and uni- the individual are likely to be relevant or helpful
versal, other than in some trivial ways, but are to the scholar of collective memory. And many
configured and reconfigured by social factors. A who are strongly influenced by Halbwachs
tourist remembers his trip to London through the (1992/1925) tend to see the individual as so
 A PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 187

embedded in a social context as to make it a visit to the Jefferson Memorial, but the image of
difficult to consider individual psychology out- Lincoln sitting Zeus-like in a building constructed
side this context. in the style of a Greek temple is likely to remain
Other scholars of collective memory, how- with even the most casual tourist for years after-
ever, descry that it is people memorising and wards. This lasting image, replicated in the mind
remembering, not social resources or practice. of each new tourist, may well serve as an anchor
Archives, commemorations, or memorials do for the collective memory that these visitors have
not memorise or remember*people do. When not only of the Lincoln Memorial, but also of
all is said and done, one must locate collective Lincoln himself.
memories not in the world, but in the minds of In keeping with this perspective, Mannheim
individuals. To be sure, the shared individual (1952) treated a generation not as an object in
memories constituting a collective memory must itself, but as a subjectively defined cohort. A
bear on a collectivity’s identity, but they are generation consists not of those who share similar
nevertheless just that*shared individual mem- experiences, but of those with similar perceptions
ories. A scholar can study the politics and and memories. Scholars study a generation, then,
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institutional rules surrounding the construction not by examining selected bits of text or other
and use of archives, but a scholar of collective media, but by surveying representatives of this
memory must also consider the consumer of the generation in order to uncover shared perceptions
archival material, for without the consumer and memory. Mannheim’s conception of a gen-
there is no memory, collective or otherwise. eration underscores what could be conceived of
Treating, as Assmann did, the material in the as a fundamental difference between those who
archive and the memories that a community treat collective memories as being ‘‘in the world’’
actively embraces as different modes of collec- and those who treat them as ‘‘in the head’’.
tive memory*one potential, the other actual* According to Mannheim, objective features of
blurs the crucial distinction between, on the one social or cultural structures do not define a
hand, resources for aiding in the process of generation, but shared perceptions and memories
memorising and remembering, and on the other of shared experiences do.
hand, the memory itself.
The world is replete with memorials and
museums, commemorations are held with great EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND SYSTEMS
frequency, and people constantly talk about the APPROACHES TO COLLECTIVE
past, either directly to one another or through the MEMORY
media. Some of these social resources effectively
shape the collective memory of a mnemonic The study of collective memories as ‘‘shared
community, whereas others remain ineffective. individual memories’’ is more than a tally of the
Thus, for some students of collective memory, the subjective states of individual community mem-
issue might be why some mnemonic resources bers. Consider what is often referred to as the
effectively promote the formation and alteration epidemiological approach to culture or, in the
of collective memories and others do not. Why, present case, collective memory (Sperber, 1996).
for instance, is it that the Lincoln Memorial, and Epidemiologists study how a disease spreads
its image of Lincoln, is so much more powerful across a population, until it reaches epidemic
and mnemonically salient than the Jefferson proportions. Chief questions for epidemiologists
Memorial, and its image of Jefferson? are: Why do some diseases rapidly spread across a
The answer to this question lies in part in population, whereas others die or remain con-
recognising that memorials can potentially fined to one person? Why do some diseases, once
change the memories of visitors one at a time, they reach epidemic proportion, last for a long
and thereby collectively all those who visit. If the period of time, whereas others quickly pass the
change in individual memory is substantial, and ‘‘crisis’’ stage? And what are the circumstances
similar across visitors, a memorial can effectively that lead a stable, enduring disease to disappear?
shape the collective memory. On the other hand, Scholars interested in the formation of a
if the change is minimal, or different across collective memory, then, can ask questions not
individuals, the effect on collective memory will only about the subjective state of individuals in a
also be minimal. The memory a person has of community, but also about the spread of a
Jefferson is probably not changed dramatically by memory across a population. That is, why do
 188 HIRST AND MANIER

some memories spread across a community, provided an environment for anonymous sex, and
whereas others remain isolated within an indivi- thereby the promiscuous spread of HIV.
dual? Why do some memories continue to be So it is with the study of the spread of a
widely shared for a long time, whereas others are memory. The reason why people remember
quickly forgotten? Under what conditions can Lincoln as god-like is in part a result of the type
long-held collective memories be collectively of memorials that have been built in his honour
forgotten?2 and the practice most Americans have of visiting
Students of epidemiology and collective mem- their capital and touring the monuments at its
ory cannot answer these questions simply by centre. The presence of the Lincoln Memorial in
surveying the diseases or memories held within the centre of Washington is a social factor, but the
a population in an attempt to determine the effectiveness of the Memorial also has to do with
subjective state of individuals in a community. its powerful imagery and the way this imagery
Rather they must explore the mechanisms that builds on human cognitive machinery to create a
facilitate (or inhibit) the spread of a memory. long-lasting memory. Not all types of memory
would necessarily find it easier to encode and
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Although simply identifying an epidemic, or a

community’s collective memory, may be impor- retain visual material over, for instance, verbal
tant, the mechanisms by which the spread occurs material. However, human memory does (Paivio,
are critical for controlling it. 1971). The mnemonic effectiveness of the Lincoln
This focus on mechanisms does not mean that Memorial takes advantage of this attribute of
scholars should concentrate entirely on indivi- human memory.
dual, internal machinery. The role of social forces At the heart of an epidemiological approach to
cannot be ignored. In order to understand the the psychology of collective memory is an under-
spread of a disease, or a memory, the epidemiol- standing that a memory spreads across a commu-
ogist, and the student of collective memory, must nity not by dint of societal memory practices and
consider both psychological mechanisms*the resources or by individual cognitive efforts, but
machinery of the individual*and cultural, social, through a complex interaction between the two,
historical, and situational mechanisms. what might be viewed as a system consisting of
Consider the AIDS epidemic in the gay com- brain in body in context.3 Such an epidemiological
munity in the United States. To understand this model and the accompanying systems approach to
epidemic, epidemiologists have explored biologi- collective memory would have no difficulty with
cal factors such as the long-term dormancy of the the claim that memory is ‘‘social all the way
HIV virus and the way in which the virus can down’’. Indeed, an epidemiological or systems
overcome immunological resistance. But they approach to collective memory begins with the
fully recognise that an appeal to biology gives premise that social and biological factors cannot
only a partial picture. Situational factors also be separated. Contrary to those who locate
need to be understood. Thus, epidemiologists collective memories in the world, scholars who
also take into consideration the use by many embrace an epidemiological or systems approach
gay men of bathhouses for sex. These bathhouses recognise that the spread of a memory is also
constrained by universal, biological mechanisms,
2
One version of an epidemiological approach is the study as well as social resources and practices.
of memes (Dawkins, 1976). There is an intense debate about To say that memory is ‘‘social all the way
whether a fundamental assumption of memetics*that the down’’, then, ought not to be to claim that there
mechanisms of transmission are limited to imitation*is too
are no psychological constraints. A hundred and
restrictive (Aunger, 2000). The present paper does not review
the growing literature on memes, population-based models of fifty years of psychological research has produced
culture, or epidemiological models of culture more generally numerous examples of how human memory has
(e.g., Blackmore, 1999; Gladwell, 2002; Richerson & Boyd, distinctive properties that differentiate it from,
2005; Sperber, 1996). We are only interested in exploring the for example, computer memory. These properties
extent to which the epidemiological approach can highlight
issues psychologists must consider when studying collective
place strong constraints on the efforts people
memory. We should note that the literature on ‘‘culture from
3
an epidemiological perspective’’ rarely discusses collective For this reason, we will use the term systems approach in
memory per se. We leave the issue of specifying the relation many cases when discussing the epidemiology of collective
between culture and collective memory unaddressed here, but memory, although the systems approach is much more general
see Manier and Hirst (2007; also Hirst & Manier, 2002) for a than the epidemiological approach. For a related perspective,
discussion of the different forms of collective memory. see Vygotksy, 1978.
 A PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 189

make to memorise and remember (Tulving & The design process

Craik, 2000). Culture may provide mnemonic
practices that distinguish one community from Those who assert that collective memories are ‘‘in
the other, and these will play an important role, the world’’ are interested in what we refer to as
but universal psychological constraints will also ‘‘design processes’’. They want to understand the
play a role in constraining the efficacy of these means by which sites of memory, mnemonic tools,
practices. or mnemonic practices are constructed, appro-
Consider, for instance, the mnemonic practices priated or, more generally, come into being, and
of the Kpelle of Western Africa (Cole & Scribner, how they are subsequently used as means of
1974). When given a list of categorisable words, shaping and reshaping memory. Why does a
they prefer to tell a story around them rather than ‘‘publicly available symbol’’ take the form that
to categorise them. Europeans and Americans it does? How does society maintain these sym-
will take advantage of semantic features to bols? What decisions were made about which
categorise the words. It is not that the Kpelle memories to maintain and how they might be
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are unable to categorise the words, it is simply reshaped? Who made the decisions? What were
that this is not a popular practice in Kpelle the processes underlying these decisions?
culture. However, this culturally based memory In her book on collective memory, national
practice is not mnemonically efficient. Human identity, and the formation of the nation state of
memory is so constructed that a categorised list of Israel, Y. Zerubavel (1995) examined the deci-
words is better remembered than a list of words sions underlying the construction of the collective
organised around a story (Bower, 1970). Because memory of the new state of Israel. Because they
of this universal, presumably biologically based, understood the threats that Israel faced and
principle of memory, the Kpelle (using less would face in the future, the forefathers and
efficient practices) remember the words less founders of Israel turned away from the more
well than if they had categorised them. A socially recent memories of intellectual brilliance asso-
derived memory practice is not always the more ciated with the Diaspora and emphasised more
efficient mnemonic tool. Biology constrains what distant historical memories of resistance from the
culture promotes. first and second century CE. They sought to
create an image of a nation of warriors*strong,
decisive, and independent sabras*rather than a
RECONCILING THE TWO country of intellectual, but passive and compliant,
APPROACHES Diaspora Jews. In developing her claims, Zeru-
bavel examined early Zionist writings and Israeli
An epidemiological or systems approach can history textbooks, both of which emphasised the
still treat collective memories as ‘‘shared indi- revolt of Bar Kohkba and the battle at Masada
vidual memories’’, but locate them, not ‘‘in the against the Romans. She also chronicled the
head’’ or ‘‘in the world’’, but in the interaction efforts to promote Masada as a tourist attraction
between what is out in the world and what is in and a place of national interest. In doing so, she
the head. When collective memories are viewed sought to articulate the decision making that
in this manner, their study involves at least two guided the design of the collective memory of
components: (1) the exploration of the design of Israel that eventually emerged.
the mnemonic or social resources, practices, or The commemoration of Lincoln has always
tools*that is, what is in the world*and (2) the involved complex decision making, for any com-
effectiveness of these instrumentalities, which memorator must decide whether Lincoln should
would include biological constraints on mnemo- be remembered as the ‘‘humble man’’ or the
nic practices and resources. In this way, it is ‘‘Great Emancipator’’. Intense debate over this
possible to view the two opposing approaches to issue, for instance, led to the construction of a
the study of collective memory (as well as those copy of the Parthenon in a park-like setting in
that fall in-between) not as representing incom- Hodgenville, Kentucky, Lincoln’s birthplace, but
patible claims about collective memory, but within this Parthenon, a replica of a log cabin.
rather as representing two sides of one collec- When official Washington began to consider
tive memory coin. building a memorial to Lincoln, the issue was not
 190 HIRST AND MANIER

so much how to depict the humble Lincoln, but In examining these ‘‘design processes’’, scho-
how to capture appropriately his greatness. The lars generally explore these ‘‘memory wars’’
result was a huge memorial in a central location through the careful examination of available
in Washington, modelled on a Greek temple and documents and other cultural artefacts. At the
a statute of Zeus. Although critics suggested that heart of many of these discussions lies the
the reference to ancient Greece, with its history of exercise of power. When Israel hebraicised the
slavery, might be an inappropriate historical basis names of the villages in Palestine, they were
for a memorial of the Great Emancipator, the clearly using their power as the ruling govern-
need to sanctify and celebrate the greatest ment to attempt to shape Palestinian collective
American in the most majestic setting possible memories (Swedenburg, 1995). Equally salient in
made such criticism easy to dismiss. most discussions is the antithesis of the exercise of
In exploring these conflicting versions of the power, namely the possibility of resistance. Pa-
collective memory Americans hold of Lincoln, lestinians have fought against Israel’s efforts to
Schwartz (2000) reviewed the debates and the change the town names by insisting on referring
to them by their earlier Arab names. In doing so,
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politics that surrounded the construction of both

the Hodgenville and Washington memorials. He they create an ‘‘unofficial’’, ‘‘vernacular’’, or
consulted the official records, examined the ‘‘subaltern’’ collective memory that can serve as
an alternative to the official one propagated by
memorials, described the political conflicts, and
the Israeli government (for discussions of these
finally put the debate at the turn of the century
concepts, see Bodnar, 1992; Stoler & Strassler,
into a historical context. Like Y. Zerubavel, he
2000; see also Foucault, 1997, for a discussion of
was focusing on what was out there in the world,
countermemory).
not the visitors to either memorial.
Undertaking what J. Assmann (1997) refers to
As a last example, consider the Viet Nam
as ‘‘mnemohistory’’, many scholars do not confine
Veterans Memorial. As Sturken (1997) recounted
themselves to a particular memorial or a parti-
the memory wars surrounding the construction of cular temporal period, but trace the way in which
the memorial (see also Wagner-Pacifici & collective memories have changed over time and
Schwartz, 1991), when Maya Lin won the compe- the political and social forces that were in play
tition for the memorials many objected, including that affected these changes. Thus, Olick (2007; see
Ross Perot. These critics believed that the mem- also Lebow, Kansteiner, & Fogu, 2006) charted
orial did not appropriately treat the veteran as the different ways that German political culture
heroic. Rather, its abstract V-shaped buried conceptualised the Nazi era in post-war Germany
structure, with its long list of names of the dead, and the societal changes that grounded these
struck many as sympathetic to the anti-war concepts. With a larger historical sweep, Assmann
sentiments that fractured the US during the war. (1997) tracked the changing views over the
Perot created a foundation to block the construc- centuries of Moses and Akhenaten and their
tion of Lin’s memorial. Lin’s supporters formed contributions to monotheism. Moses, a figure of
their own organisation. Veteran associations be- memory, may never have existed but serves as a
came split over the virtues of the memorial. In the legendary founder of Jewish religion; the Egyp-
end, two memorials were built: the Lin Memorial, tian pharaoh Akhenaten, a figure of history, was
with its evocative polished granite V, and a more lost to cultural memory for years but resurfaced
traditional memorial, with a realistic depiction of through the Napoleonic archaeological undertak-
three combat soldiers.4 In discussing this process, ings in Egypt. These newly accessed ‘‘memories’’
Sturken reviewed the relevant documents and have subsequently been reworked so that Akhe-
examined the contretemps that threaten to derail naten now serves as the precursor, if not the true
the project. father, of monotheism.
Finally, Lacqueur (1994) documented the
4
More recently, a third memorial has been placed on the changing ways in which the war dead are remem-
site. It is a memorial for women who served and died in the bered, describing the switch from pre-World War
Viet Nam war. The original ‘‘traditional’’ memorial had I memorials that focused mainly on remembering
struggled to capture the diversity of the armed forces in Viet
the leadership which guided a war to an effort
Nam by depicting white, black, and Hispanic soldiers. That
they were all men seems to have escaped the attention of its after World War I to build memorials to the
sculptor, Fredrick Hart. The newer memorial by Gleena ‘‘common soldier’’. The vast cemeteries of Ver-
Goodacre corrected this oversight. dun are a result of this changing attitude.
 A PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 191

These efforts are not simply interpretations of ing’’ of a conversation, just as they study the
an era or a description of an attitude in a designing of memorials or commemorations.
particular historical time period. Rather, they They might, for instance, examine the way that
are the careful articulations of the social forces, conversations unfold between experts and no-
the political considerations, and the efforts a vices, teachers and students, or between friends
community undertakes to maintain and shape (e.g., Andersson & Rönnberg, 1995; Dudokovic,
the past. Just as an architectural firm designs a Marsh, & Tversky, 2004; Pasupathi, Stallworth, &
memorial with the aim of remembering the dead, Murdoch, 1998). In doing so, they might articulate
so also societies, communities, and groups design the rules that govern the turn taking in these
cultural artefacts, including memorials, and devise situations or the conventions that govern when
memory practices, including commemorations, in conversational participants may or may not object
an attempt to ensure that they, as a collectivity, to what is said (Sachs, Schegloff, & Gail, 1974).
remember their past. At times, the design pro- Much of this might fall under what might be
cesses may be less deliberate and transparent viewed as the study of the ‘‘rituals’’ or social
than those taking place in an architectural firm, conventions of conversations (Givón, 2005;
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but the analogy still holds. Levinson, 1983). No single individual may have
Of course, in many cases, there is little hope of decided that students should not interrupt a
identifying an agent or articulating precisely the teacher in a classroom exchange, but the conven-
design process through which a tradition, ritual, tion is well established and has mnemonic con-
social resource, or mnemonic practice came into sequences. Similarly, there are social conventions
widespread use. Nevertheless, one can still de- that require people to tell the ‘‘whole truth and
scribe these social resources and practices and nothing but the truth’’ in some instances but, in
explore the social dynamics that led to their other instances, insist that people remain silent
construction or appropriation. There may be a (Zerubavel, 2005). The shape that a conversation
history explaining why there are parades down takes is as much a consequence of ‘‘design’’, from
Main Street each Fourth of July, for instance, but our perspective, as a tradition, a ritual, a com-
presently it is merely treated as a tradition and memoration, a memorial, or a textbook. The
followed as such. It is important for scholars of designing may not always be done with mnemonic
collective memory to describe carefully such consequences so clearly in mind, as is the case in
traditions and the ways in which they are prac- the design of a memorial, but the consequences
tised and to delve into how they came into being. for the formation of a collective memory are
In particular, they must examine the issue of nevertheless substantial.
agency when it comes to designing mnemonic
resources and practices.
Finally, the design process may not always Reacting to designs
involve a permanent cultural artefact. Mnemonic
resources and practices can be quite ephemeral. A psychologist reading this literature cannot help
Consider conversations. People often talk to being struck by how little emphasis is placed on
others in their community about past events of the person who is ‘‘consuming’’ a mnemonic
consequence to their community (Miller, 1994). resource or ‘‘performing’’ a memory practice.
In such instances, conversations can serve as a Social scientists dealing with these topics focus
decisive mnemonic resource for the spread of a almost exclusively on the political process or the
memory across a group (Fentress & Wickham, social conversation underlying the design of
1992; Wertsch, 2002). They do not have the mnemonic resources or the establishment of
materiality and certainly not the permanence of mnemonic practices. For instance, Y. Zerubavel
many cultural artefacts, such as memorials or (1995) never surveys the Israeli population to find
even commemorations. Assmann (1995) under- out what they actually remember about the past.
scored this point when he distinguished commu- In most of the discussions of the Lincoln Memor-
nicative from cultural memories. Nevertheless, ial and American collective memory, there is little
conversations may promote the formation of a attention given to whether the memorial actually
collective memory as much as, if not more than, a transforms American collective memories. Con-
textbook, a memorial, or a commemoration. cerns rest almost exclusively with why it was built
Those concerned with the design side of and why it was designed the way it was. Even for
collective memory can investigate the ‘‘design- something as ‘‘current’’ as the Viet Nam Veterans
 192 HIRST AND MANIER

Memorial, interest focuses on the design of the be transmitted across a community, take on a
memorial and the politics surrounding its design. similar, shared form, and be stable over the long
But does a history textbook, a memorial, term in order to properly be called a collective
indeed, any particular cultural practice or re- memory.
source, have an effect on the people who view or Consider transmission. In some instances, a
engage in them? Even though Kansteiner (2002) collective memory may be formed without any
advocated for a non-psychological examination of transmission. For instance, community members
mnemonic practices and resources, he did worry may experience the same event and encode it
that proponents of this approach had a ‘‘troubling similarly. In many other instances, however,
disregard for proof’’ (p. 192). He admitted that individually held memories must be transmitted
‘‘there remains the distinct possibility that monu- across a community before a collective memory is
ments, books, and films whose history has been formed. This transmission can take at least two
carefully reconstructed can quickly pass into forms. First, community members may experience
oblivion without shaping the historical imagina- the same event, but encode and remember it
tion of any individuals or social groups’’. How- differently. These different renderings can then be
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ever, although he identified this concern as a transmitted from one community member to
‘‘problem of reception’’, he moved quickly past it, another, transforming community members’
accepting that for a historian it would be im- memories in the process. Alternatively, commu-
possible for him to survey or interrogate those nity members may uniquely possess some infor-
from the distant past. mation, which they can then transmit to others.
For us, a full appreciation of collective memory Sociologists have studied this transmission
will never be achieved until the ‘‘problem of process in the context of network theory (Watts,
reception’’ is investigated. That is, one must take 2003). Network theorists are interested in the
the individual seriously, even if the individual is effectiveness of transmitting information across
deeply embedded in a social world. For a collec- different network structures. From their perspec-
tive memory to form, society must construct, tive, the connections between one community
maintain and, over time, reconfigure memory member and another, between one mnemonic or
practices and resources, but it is equally impor- social resource and another, and between mne-
tant for these practices and resources to be monic or social resources and community mem-
effective in altering the memories of members bers, could be agglomerated into a single network
of a community. The two extremes in the array of of nodes and connections. According to this
approaches to collective memory are, in the end, conceptualisation, each node would be either a
not incompatible. In fact, they complement each social or mnemonic resource or practice, on the
other. one hand, or an individual’s cognitive potential to
This call to examine how memory practices remember, on the other. Sperber and Hirschfeld
and resources alter the memories of community (2004) used the terms public representation and
members should not be taken merely as an mental representation, respectively, to describe
invitation to study any and all social aspects of this. We can view the weights of the connections
memory. When studying collective memory, re- between the nodes as the degree to which a public
searchers must explore social influences on mem- representation will lead to a new mental repre-
ory, such as the effect of a particular memorial on sentation or a mental representation will lead to a
a community member’s memory. However, they new public representation. Individuals are not
also need to understand when these social influ- usually linked directly. People transmit memories
ences lead to the transmission of a memory across by producing (albeit, not always accurately)
a group, the convergence of the memories of this public representations of their mental re-
community on a single rendering, and the stability presentations*public representations that could
of this rendering for the community (Sperber & be as diverse as a stable cultural artefact or simply
Hirschfeld, 2004). Such questions naturally arise a passing verbal utterance. These public repre-
when considering an epidemiological approach to sentations can, in turn, alter mental representa-
collective memory. Just as a virus must be tions. Of course, mental and public rep-
transmitted across a population, must come to resentations can change for ‘‘internal’’ reasons
be shared by this population, and must remain alone. Thus, a mental representation may simply
stable for a period of time in order to be rightly decay over time, regardless of its social context.
classified as an epidemic, so also must a memory Moreover, a public representation, such as a
 A PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 193

textbook, may change for reasons that have There is, for instance, a plethora of psychological
nothing to do with its function as a ‘‘repository research on whether a speaker can implant
of memories’’; for instance, when the text is memories into a listener (Echterhoff, Hirst, &
altered to conform to new editorial guidelines Hussy, 2005; Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003;
(Douglas, 1986). But, in many cases, changes in Meade & Roediger, 2002) or induce the listener
public representations occur through the influ- to forget (Cuc, Koppel, & Hirst, 2007). More
ence of mental representations, and the reverse. critically, psychological research has extensively
Sociologists have mainly been interested in explored the social and environmental conditions
how the structure of a network affects how easily that might make implantation and induced for-
information can flow through a network (Watts, getting easier or harder (e.g., Echterhoff et al.,
2003). The concept of ‘‘six degrees of separation’’ 2005). This paper is not the place to review this
comes out of this effort. Certain network struc- burgeoning literature. We want only to under-
tures may allow information to be transmitted score here that this work helps to identify the
from one arbitrarily chosen person to another cognitive mechanisms underlying the effective-
arbitrary individual in a few steps; others, in many ness with which information can be transmitted
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steps. The goal here is to understand better which across a community.

network structures will facilitate the flow of A collective memory can only be said to form
information and which will not. if a community converges on a shared rendering.
Network modelling assumes that the informa- As psychologists have known since Bartlett’s
tion is transmitted from node to node, and then (1934) seminal work, the fidelity of the transmis-
explores the efficiency of transmission for differ- sion of a memory is less than perfect. As a result,
ent network structures. The efficiency of different convergence cannot be guaranteed even in a
networks can largely be determined through tightly connected network. One can imagine
precise mathematical calculations. There is little situations in which the transmission chain would
psychology in this endeavour. Psychology enters need to loop through the group many times
the picture when, for instance, a scholars tries to before the group converges on a similar mnemo-
understand the motives behind transmission. Psy- nic representation. Once again, the structure of
chologists have discovered, for instance, that the network is important. One network could
people are more likely to tell another person allow for the quick transmission of a memory
about viewing an emotionally evocative film than across a network but not necessarily promote
a neutral film (Harber & Cohen, 2005; Luminet, convergence, whereas another network might
Bouts, Delie, Manstead, & Rimé, 2000) or to promote rapid convergence once transmission is
convey stereotype-consistent information over complete but make network-wide transmission
stereotype-inconsistent information (Lyons, difficult. But psychology may also play a role in
Clark, Kashima, & Kurz, 2007). They have also determining when convergence is easy or hard.
explored the motives underlying the spread of a For instance, the effect that a speaker has on her
rumor (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2006). In addition, own memory and the memory of a listener is
psychologists have examined issues surrounding more likely to be stronger when the speaker and
the content of transmission, in large part by listener are members of the same group than
exploring the dynamics by which individuals when they are members of different groups,
tune what they say to fit their audience and the thereby making it more likely that memories
effect this tuning has on the speaker’s memory will converge within a group than between
(Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz, & Groll, in press; distinct groups (Echterhoff et al., in press).
Marsh, Tversky, & Hutson, 2005). Finally, there is the issue of stability. Even if
Psychologists also understand something about convergence does occur, a collective memory
the effectiveness by which a speaker, or another might still fail to emerge. As we understand the
source of information, can alter the memories of a term, shared individual memories do not consti-
listener, or the recipient of information. The tute a collective memory unless they remain
weight assigned to connections in a network could stable over time. Assmann’s (1995) distinction
be viewed as capturing this effectiveness. What between communicative and cultural memories is
psychology can do is unpack the reasoning behind a theory of stability. Psychology comes into play
the assignment of a particular weight by identify- because certain memories are not only easier to
ing the cognitive mechanisms and psychological retain, but are more resistant to change than
principles that underlie them (e.g., Rubin, 1995). other memories. The dynamics of this resistance
 194 HIRST AND MANIER

has been thoroughly studied, often under labels A good example of work along these lines
such as interference theory. Although this work is deals with Mannheim’s (1952) observation that
rarely viewed in this fashion, it is central to different generations have different memories of
understanding a key element in the formation of the historical past. In exploring this ‘‘generation
collective memories. effect’’, Schuman and Scott (1989) asked a
The study of collective memory, then, does representative group of Americans to list the
not merely examine social influences on mem- one or two ‘‘national and world events or
ory. Rather it investigates the transmission of a changes’’ from the last 50 years that ‘‘seemed to
memory across a network of community mem- have been the most important’’. Each generation
bers and social resources, and the subsequent listed different events, with the listed event
convergence of this network onto a shared and usually occurring during the respondent’s ‘‘for-
stable representation of the past. Psychology mative’’ period*that is, 18 to 30 years of age. For
plays a critical role in understanding the under- example, respondents in their sixties at the time
lying dynamics of these processes.5 Its aim is not of the survey (1985) were approximately twice as
so much to conduct ‘‘market research’’ on the likely to mention World War II when compared
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mnemonic efficacy of, for instance, the Lincoln with respondents in their twenties. On the other
or the Jefferson Memorial. Rather it seeks to hand, respondents in their twenties were twice as
understand the psychological mechanisms that likely to mention the Viet Nam war as respon-
underlie this comparative effectiveness. That is, dents in their sixties. Schuman and Scott con-
the psychology of collective memory should cluded that each generation has its own memories
seek to establish general principles by examin- particular to that generation, as Mannheim had
ing the cognitive mechanisms, as well as the earlier averred.
social resources and practices, that guide and A psychological account of the generation
shape the formation and retention of collective effect might try to specify the mechanisms by
memories. which one generation comes to more easily access
specific newsworthy events and other generations
do not. At least two psychological mechanisms
METHODS OF RESEARCH might be involved. Schuman, Belli, and Bischop-
ing (1997) have argued that the generation in its
Four different methods occupy centre-stage in formative period encodes the generation-defining
what can be recognised as a psychology of events better and in more detail as the events
collective memory. We describe each briefly and unfold than do other generations. Again using the
supply one example of research employing the survey methodology, they asked participants from
described method. different generations to remember specific as-
pects of the Korean and Viet Nam wars and found
that respondents remembered more about the
war from their formative periods.
Method 1: Surveys Alternatively, Meksin, Koppel, and Hirst
(2005) posited that people are more likely to
If one wants to know if the Lincoln Memorial is discuss and read about generation-defining events
more effective than the Jefferson Memorial in not necessarily as the event unfolds, but subse-
shaping collective memory, then the most quent to the event. The nostalgic TV programmes
straightforward way to answer this question is aimed at the 1960s generation or 1970s genera-
to conduct a survey. Such surveys can not tion, for instance, are good examples of the desire
only function as ‘‘market research’’ on the effec- of each generational cohort to revisit the era of
tiveness of various memory practices and mne- their formative period. Schuman et al.’s data do
monic resources, but can also detect important not allow us to distinguish their explanation for
patterns in the distribution of memories across the generation effect from that of Meksin et al.’s,
communities. in as much as Schuman et al. asked people to
5
remember the generation-defining war decades
Psychology may also play a role in studying the design
after it occurred. Assuming that the terrorist
process. For instance, certain social institutions may take the
form that they do for evolutionary reasons or because of attack of September 11 would be a generation-
certain fundamental psychological capacity constraints defining event, Meksin et al. measured how well
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005). people initially encoded such events by examining
 A PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 195

the memories of 9/11 in a large sample of ogy might proceed. Hutchins noted that no single
Americans in a survey conducted a few days after person undertakes the act of navigating. Rather
the attack. They found that when it comes to facts the activity of navigating occurs within and grows
about the attack of 9/11, participants from 18 to out of the complex interactions among the crew.
30 years of age actually remembered less than It is not governed or determined by one person,
participants from 40 to 65 years of age, suggesting including the pilot, but a host of individuals, with
that the younger generation initially encoded the the actions of each depending on the actions of
event more poorly than older generations did. others. In other words, the navigation is the
We cannot resolve the psychological issues outcome of a system rather than any individual
surrounding the generation effect here. However, act of cognition. A full understanding of how a
we can underscore that, by using surveys, a pilot navigates a ship into harbour would need to
researcher can begin to unravel why some news- unravel all the complexity of this system and the
worthy events become emblematic for a genera- interdependencies of the crew. Hutchins at-
tion and others do not. The survey work does tempted to probe this complexity by on-site
more than describe the pattern of memory. It observations of a ship navigating into San Diego
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provides a method to explore in psychological Harbor. He did not focus on the cognition
terms why particular collective memories form. underlying the actions of a single crew member,
but rather explored the complex interactions
among crew members and how these interactions
Method 2: A systems approach led to effective navigation. The result was a
detailed understanding of how the crew, as a
Some scholars*especially those who view the group, accomplished the ship’s navigation, rather
mind as extended or see learning as distributed* than a model of the individual cognitive acts of
insist that the formation of a collective memory particular crew members.
should be studied ‘‘in the wild’’, through the
careful analysis of the formation and maintenance
of a collective memory as it unfolds in real time Method 3: Moving into the laboratory
(Hutchins, 1995). These scholars take seriously
the systems approach advanced earlier in this A methodological approach more familiar to
paper. They insist that researchers should not experimental psychologists seeks to control the
isolate a particular variable and then study its situation in which a collective memory might be
influence on, for instance, the transmission of a formed as much as possible; that is, the researcher
memory from one person to another. Rather, will go from observations about the formation of
given that individual variables are tightly and collective memories ‘‘in the world’’ to the con-
complexly interconnected, researchers must con- struction of well-controlled analogues in the
sider each variable and the relation among laboratory. In doing so, researchers often treat
variables as part of a complicated system, which social factors as another variable to manipulate,
must be viewed as a whole, and not in parts. In much like retention interval. The more controlled
doing so, researchers often adopt an anthropolo- the better, even if it means that the situation is
gical perspective and undertake an ethnographic not a faithful approximation of the ‘‘real world’’.
analysis of people participating in cognitive acts Much of the burgeoning experimental research
in everyday situations. The critical feature of this on social contagion is a good example of research
research is that it does not manipulate variables from this perspective (Basden, Basden, Bryner, &
as an experimenter might, but simply observes Thomas, 1997; Gabbert et al., 2003; Meade &
behaviour in complex situations. The resulting Roediger, 2002; Weldon, 2001; Weldon & Bellin-
models and theories, then, incorporate the ob- ger, 1997; Weldon, Blair, & Huebsch, 2000;
served complexity of the setting instead of Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). It focuses on how
attempting to chart causal relations between a a social source of information can alter memory.
few variables. In the laboratory studies of social contagion,
Perhaps the best-known example of this ap- participants read a story, talk to each other about
proach is Hutchins’s (1995) study of the naviga- what they have read, and then recall the story
tion of a ship into port. Although it is not individually. There is an independent variable
precisely a study of memory, it does nicely (the presence or absence of new information in
illustrate how the employment of this methodol- what one conversational participant says) and a
 196 HIRST AND MANIER

dependent variable (the degree to which other the norm of conversations for unshared informa-
conversational participants falsely remember hav- tion to emerge infrequently (Wittenbaum &
ing seen this newly introduced information in the Parks, 2001; Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996). This
original story). In order to control for some of the norm makes conversations (in general) less than
complexity of free-flowing conversations, the ideal as a medium for the formation of a new
interaction among conversational participants is collective memory.
often regimented and the number of participants Cuc et al. (2006) found that some conversa-
is kept to two. In some instances, the dyad tional dynamics lead to exceptions to this rule. In
consists of a participant and a confederate. In particular, they found that what was transmitted
Meade and Roediger (2002), for instance, there is within a group recounting, and what memories
only one experimental participant, a confederate the group converged on, depended on the pre-
who is instructed to introduce new information sence or absence of a dominant Narrator (a
into the memory of the participant, and the person who talks a lot in the conversation). In
‘‘conversation’’ between participant and confed- the absence of a dominant Narrator, the group
erate is an exchange in which they share turns, recounted mainly shared pre-group recollections
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recalling one item of information per conversa- (i.e., the pre-conversation consensus memory)
tional turn. The question in this literature is and, as a consequence, the post-group collective
whether the new information presented in the memory was essentially the same as the pre-group
conversation will spread across the group, infect collective memory. In the presence of a Narrator,
participants’ memories, and subsequently be fal- however, the group recounting promoted the
sely remembered as occurring in the original formation of a new collective memory. The group
story. The literature clearly establishes that such recounting now included the unshared pre-group
false recognitions are possible. recollections of the Narrator. As a consequence,
the post-group collective memory reflected the
Narrator’s distinctive rendering of the past rather
Method 4: Ecologically valid studies than the pre-group consensus among group
members.
In order to achieve more ecological validity in the Cuc et al. did not explore why someone may or
experimental setting, some researchers have les- may not adopt the role of Narrator. To a large
sened the controls somewhat, but nevertheless extent, this is a matter of social factors and is
still manipulated variables in a systematic fashion probably best treated, from our perspective, as a
(Neisser, 1978, 1997). Much of the literature on design issue. Cuc et al. did investigate the
group processes fits this model (e.g., Thompson, consequence of adopting (or not adopting) the
Levine, & Messick, 1999), as do many of the role of Narrator. In essence, they explored
studies on autobiographical memory (Conway & the mnemonic consequence of the design decision
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Rubin, 1996). Some of that led to the presence (or absence) of a
research on social contagion also follows this Narrator. That is, conversational effects on mem-
methodology by using free-flowing conversations ory are a consequence of the interaction between
instead of more carefully controlled conversation the (intentional or unintentional) decisions that
(Cuc, Ozuru, Manier, & Hirst, 2006; Gabbert led to the emergence of a Narrator and the effect
et al., 2003). his/her presence has on memory.
Once researchers take this step they can begin
to ask questions about how the social conventions
of conversations affect the degree to which a CONCLUSION
memory is transmitted across a group. That is,
design issues may define different conversational What, then, is the contribution individuals make
conventions, but different conventions may have to the formation and maintenance of a collective
different effects on memory. For instance, if a memory? And how does an answer to this
conversation is to promote the formation of a question shape the psychology of collective mem-
collective memory, then unshared information ory? We have treated collective memories as
(i.e., information unique to an individual conver- shared individual memories that shape collective
sational participant) should be introduced into identity. A key word here is shared. A community
the conversation, so that it can be transmitted to may construct, appropriate, or in some other
other conversational participants. However, it is manner arrive at social resources and mnemonic
 A PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY 197

practices. We have referred to this as the design mechanisms, in particular, general psychological
process. Many social scientists have taken it upon principles and social efforts to shape memory. We
themselves to understand this design process. have not been interested in how one person may
We have emphasised that the students of have lived through history, or may have reacted to
collective memory also need to understand the memorials, monuments, or texts. Rather, our
mnemonic effectiveness of the outcomes of the interest has been in understanding something
design process. Do memory resources and prac- more general, more universal*that is, the way
tices effectively shape and reshape collective our common biology leads to psychological con-
memories? And, more importantly, what are the straints on the efforts of society to shape and
psychological mechanisms that allow social re- reshape collective memories. For us, focusing on
sources to form and maintain collective mem- subjectivity without also exploring mechanisms is
ories? The contribution psychologists can make to an interpretive endeavour. It is much like what a
this endeavour is transparent. They can deter- therapist does in understanding the way an
mine not only the mnemonic efficacy of a individual navigates through life. It is a perfectly
particular social resource, but understand in reasonable, indeed, critical endeavour. We simply
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general terms the mechanisms that underlie not want to insist that there is much more to the study
simply social influences on memory, but the way of collective memory than an analysis of a
these social influences promote transmission, particular individual’s subjectivity.
convergence, and stability. As we noted, there As anyone who attends an interdisciplinary
are several methods for undertaking such an meeting on collective memory can testify, a quick,
investigation. unreflective judgement might conclude that psy-
There is a particular irony in finding a place for chologists and social scientists interested in mem-
psychology in the study of collective memory. ory are strange bedfellows, and in part, they
Many social scientists who want to view memory probably are. In this article we have striven to
in subjective terms and not as ‘‘objectivised show where there may be common ground
culture’’, as Assmann did, turned away from between them. The ineluctable overlap of interest
history to memory because they see history as between psychologists and other memory scholars
being mired in a positivist and modernist world- lies not simply in their shared interest in the
view (see Huyssen, 2003). For many of these subjective experience, but in the mechanisms that
social scientists, memory has a different connota- guide the formation and maintenance of collec-
tion, being more of a subjective and individual tive memory. As we have argued throughout this
experience. The past as represented in the sub- article, psychologists and social scientists both
jective consciousness of an individual may or may have something to contribute to the understand-
not have a veridical quality, may or may not ing of collective memory, and their joint coopera-
represent objective truth, may or may not be tion will be needed if this understanding is to be
connected with a narrative at the level of nations, advanced.
and is very unlikely to have any discernable
connection with grand historical narratives. These
First published online 30 January 2008
social scientists are likely to solicit oral histories,
not with the purpose of finding a normative
rendering of the past, as those who conduct
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