America in the World:
A History of U.S. Diplomacy and
Foreign Policy
By Robert Zoellick
Twelve Books, 2020
288 pp $28.00
ISBN: 9780316533539
Reviewed by Thomas Pickering
W
ith two endless wars still churning,
diplomacy has become or should
become a more important subject. that it could and should be supplemented with
After four decades of practice and two of mutually assured nuclear stability and security. We
intense retirement, I have gained a new perspective saw then that accidents and miscalculations, among
on this subject. Almost as old as war itself, and a them the Cuban events, were an existential danger.
rival for “oldest” profession, diplomacy—especially When Harry Truman was once asked, “What were
American diplomacy—adopted traditional practices America’s vital interests,” he replied, “survival and
in the 19th century, built on change in the 20th, and prosperity.” That strategic conclusion still applies
evolved in a new and challenging era at the begin- today, supplemented perhaps by adding, “and that of
ning of the 21st . our allies.”Increasingly, as the Insider shows us, we
For both diplomatic and military officers, the are being challenged by threats that no single field
challenge is to think through just how mutually of action alone—neither defense nor diplomacy nor
important and even mutually dependent their two development—is capable of answering. The Insider
respective pursuits have become in defense and has mapped well the evolution from the “no entan-
promotion of our national interest. This is but one of gling alliances” of George Washington’s Farewell
the many trenchant subjects our “Insider”—author Address in 1796, to our alliance and coalition
Robert Zoellick—treats with wisdom and careful creation of 1946–47, to the new multipolarity and
thought in a new and engrossing book. China challenge of 2021.
Decades ago, in the midst of the Cold War, World War II illustrated the strength of over-
particularly following the Cuban missile crisis, we whelming force united in a central alliance and
went from hiding children under desks to seeing an supported by a civilian structure that included diplo-
unfolding vision of potential global nuclear devas- macy from Argentia Bay (Atlantic Charter) to Yalta
tation. While mutually assured destruction was a (division of Europe). Axis unconditional surrenders
partial answer to that apocalyptic vision, we found led to an excursion in state rebuilding of friend and
Ambassador Thomas Pickering served more than four decades as a U.S. diplomat. He last served as Undersecretary of
State for Political Affairs. He also served as ambassador to the United Nations, the Russian Federation, India, Israel, and
Jordan, and holds the personal rank of Career Ambassador.
136 | BOOK RE V IE WS PRISM 9, NO. 2
foe alike and was perhaps the last time a victorious For the military, there now seem to be poten-
alliance—even when vexed by the Cold War—would tially two new major admonitions that join the
have the time and reason to manage a new order. “No land wars in Asia” aphorism of the 1950s and
The decades following the collapse of commu- 1960s: “Fight wars in defense of our homeland and
nism in 1991 reminded us that planetary extinction citizens,” and “Wars of choice should be a last resort
is a potentially man-made disaster but also that pure failing all else, most especially diplomacy.”Diploma-
military strength was not the quick and easy answer cy’s role is to be at the heart of problem-solving in
many had hoped it to be for major international order to avoid conflict. Diplomats have often told me
differences. Diplomacy helped advance a solution to that Americans have a special diplomatic advan-
a nuclear standoff in avoiding some accidents while tage of having a first-class military on their side of
we actually experienced near misses on both sides the negotiating table. A strong economy and widely
that were frightening and hidden for years under admired values and principles confer negotiating
President Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev. advantages. The military role in this case should be
Similarly, the notion that diplomacy is slow the development of leverage above and beyond sanc-
challenged America’s penchant for instant solu- tions, political steps, and other means of persuading
tions. The military on the other hand was thought, an opponent, but doing so in ways that never pose
unwisely, to be the kind of instant answer that we only the choice of going to war or backing down.
should use in Iraq and Afghanistan, due to our I have heard more than once from the four-star
misperception that a “unilateral moment” would level that “No negotiations now; we need more prog-
allow us to prevail alone and without allies and part- ress on the battlefield.” Whether this is a deep distrust
ners. This was despite the open lessons of the new, that diplomacy is compromise, and compromise may
unsolved equations of internal instability, religiously lose what is gained on the battlefield, is uncertain,
inspired violence, and spreading oppression. but there is a sense that it is a factor. So too is the idea
Indeed, new forms of warfare—asymmetry in that while the military will deliver on the battlefield,
combat actions, information and cyber operations, someone else must shape the ultimate outcome.
terror and woeful government action—led to the sti- Psychologically, there is a time as you gain
fling thinking that military victory alone would make strength and the other side realizes it, that you
a democratic solution whole and complete. Offensive must begin the engagement process. But if all of
strategies prevailed; exit strategies were absent. It was your leverage is expended in getting to the table, lit-
not long though before we turned to diplomats to do tle is left for gaining at the table. As in current-day
something they had hoped to avoid—state-building war, no negotiation ever ends with everything
under combat conditions. Our diplomacy had never you wanted when you began, but diplomacy is less
achieved the size, capacity, or interest to become a costly than violent conflict, and if pursued in a
colonial service. Together with the military, diplomats coordinated, whole-of-government fashion, some-
did their best, but it was not good enough. what more likely to resolve the issue at hand sooner
There is little acceptance in the United States and more favorably.
that diplomatic action to avoid wars is a first prior- The Insider writes cogently about this in the
ity, help to end them is a second, and picking up the aftermath of World War II, Vietnam, the Cold War,
pieces afterward is a third. No wars end without a and today’s two unfinished conflicts: “Yet the success
political result; it is better to shape the result than and effectiveness [of the U.S. military] can create
allow fate and inattention to do so. a temptation for American foreign policy. Civilian
PRISM 9, NO. 2 BOOK RE V IE WS 137
leaders may overestimate what military power can Columbia but was rebuffed by its citizens. In
accomplish (pp. 354). He continues: “… as Bundy the Trent Affair in 1861, when two Confederate
reflected [about Vietnam] decades later, ‘No one asks Commissioners en route to the United Kingdom
. . . what kind of war it will be and what kind of losses were taken off their ship by the Union Navy, the
must be expected.’ The military of 1965 are almost UK threatened conflict. In an astute observation to
always trained not to ask such [cowardly] questions.” Seward, after the latter had pushed toward confront-
(pp. 354) Later, Bundy also admitted that our most ing the UK, Abraham Lincoln said famously “One
trenchant error in Vietnam was to underestimate the war at a time Mr. Seward.” The latter diplomatically
dedication of the North to win both on the battlefield took the United States off the domestic hook by
and politically. The author concludes, “Ironically, the noting that the UK had historically taken sailors off
lessons learned by the U.S. military after Vietnam, American merchant ships to man the Royal Navy
and its professionalism, made U.S. military power and therefore returning the Confederates was a part
look like a potential answer to many subsequent dip- of historical U.S. policy.
lomatic problems.” (pp. 355) Charles Evans Hughes was Warren G.
The Insider brings personal experience to the Harding’s Secretary of State. He is rarely heard of
fore. His role in negotiating agreements and his deep or written about, and his efforts at arms control in
interest in and experience with economic power is a 1921 were later disparaged with the rise of Fascism
worthy addition to the traditional literature on the and war preparations, which caused them to be
history of American diplomacy, which tends to focus discarded in the 1930s. Inspired by the killing and
on either political security or on economic issues costly tragedy of World War I, he fought for sig-
without presenting the relevant and significant link- nificant limits on naval armaments and won. In a
ages between them. bold and unexpected U.S. plan, he proposed not just
Similarly, a portrayal of the work of Vannevar limits, but reductions in large naval vessels, suggest-
Bush in science and technology during and after ing destroying 66 U.S., British, and Japanese capital
World War II is a welcome and important addition ships of 1.8 million tons. The final result, made
to foreign policy, introduced at the suggestion of possible by careful planning and inspired public and
John Deutch at MIT. personal diplomacy, was close to his original pro-
The Insider presents biographies of leaders who posal and was implemented by the parties.
have contributed to American foreign policy but are Elihu Root, Secretary of State in the first decade
less well known to most Americans, including John of the 20th century for Theodore Roosevelt, was
Quincy Adams, William H. Seward, Charles Evans devoted to the codification and extension of interna-
Hughes, Elihu Root, and William L. Clayton. tional law and the establishment of the World Court,
Quincy Adams followed James Monroe as pres- which he helped to design after the Senate rejected
ident, and the doctrine named after Monroe. Adams the League of Nations. He never succeeded and died
was seconded by Henry Clay and together they set in 1937. Many of his proteges became judges on the
the groundwork for the “Good Neighbor” policy Court as early as 1921.
after a suggestion by Simon Bolivar, counterpart- William Clayton, called by the author the least
ing Monroe’s doctrine, and adopted years later by known of the architects of America’s new alliance
Franklin Roosevelt. policy, was a Tennessee businessman, free trader,
Seward, who negotiated the purchase of and assistant to Nelson Rockefeller in post–World
Alaska in 1867, also toyed with purchasing British War II efforts to integrate the U.S. and Latin
138 | BOOK RE V IE WS PRISM 9, NO. 2
American economies. He was particularly well
known for helping to arrange a delayed U.S. loan to
the UK at a time the island nation was attempting to
recover from the destruction and economic adver-
sity of World War II.
The book, written over 12 years and braced
with solid research, is a strong must read for anyone
interested in U.S. foreign policy. It brings special
insights into the Insider’s participation in the events
related in the final chapters in succinct and lucid
writing. It is particularly valuable for the many
analytical insights, often at the end of each chapter,
of a true Insider. Zoellick offers well-informed and
carefully crafted views, putting each of his chap-
ters into the long development of American foreign
policy, showing its overall evolution and the reasons
behind the changes. He is a close colleague of James
Baker, the old friend and adviser to George H.W.
Bush; he is to Baker what Baker was to Bush—an
advocate, adviser, and admirer. No book on such a
subject can escape without some controversy. I and
others have wondered at the choice of key personali-
ties who figure in the chapters rolled out historically,
many associated with conflicts. A significant focus
is on Thomas Jefferson’s acquisition of the Louisiana
territory from Napoleon’s France, with the Mexican
War of 1846–1848 treated only cursorily, as is the
War of 1812 and that with Spain. Richard Nixon,
George H.W. Bush, George W. Bush, and Barak
Obama are given center stages with Jimmy Carter
and Bill Clinton less so, and Trump, bald disdain.
The book should deservedly become a canon-
ical text for students and teachers of U.S. foreign
relations, American and foreign diplomats, and
importantly, the U.S. military.
PRISM 9, NO. 2 BOOK RE V IE WS 139
