JOURNAL OF MARITIME RESEARCH

Vol XXI. No. I (2024) pp 134–139

ISSN: 1697-4840, www.jmr.unican.es

The China-Taiwan Dispute: A Continuity of Conflict and Resolutions

Muhammad Iqhwan Madzli1,∗

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Article history: The geopolitical position of Taiwan at the crossroads of East and West has led to political imbalance.
Received 21 Aug 2023; The strong U.S. influence has portrayed Taiwan as a consequence of China’s unification efforts. Recent
in revised from 24 Aug 2023; Chinese military exercises in the region have raised concerns of conflict, affecting the stability. Escala-
accepted 02 Dec 2023. tion of military presence around the Taiwan Strait has been observed over time. Taiwan’s administrative
status under the People’s Republic of China has gradually weakened its self-governance. China asserts
Keywords:
Taiwan’s adherence to the 1992 Consensus, while historical claims and technological importance shape
Conflict, History, Geopolitics, USA,
its foreign policy. The historical context involves China’s takeover of Taiwan in 1945 after WWII, trig-
Taiwan.
gering civil conflict. Struggles over the Taiwan Straits emerged in 1953 between the People’s Republic
of China and the Republic of China, resulting in armed conflicts for control over strategic islands.
© SEECMAR | All rights reserved

1. Introduction. aligning support of its people. The statehood of Taiwan is ques-

tionable predicting two major power deficient to be inherent
Taiwan set-up on the crossroads amidst the east and the west in achieving peace and negotiation process. Hence, the public
represented unbalance political disorder. An overbearing dom- view regarding the U.S. suspicion the agreement by the effi-
ination from the U.S. objectify Taiwan as ramifications from cacy of U.S. policy are less credible in terms of safeguarding
China’s unification. The inevitable conflict raising concerns for the national sovereignty. Nancy Pelosi’s triggering visit Taiwan
Taiwan after China’s military exercise in the Straits recently this in 2022, coupled with her vow to safeguard Taiwan’s auton-
year probable to influence the undercurrents of the region. Over omy, were not warmly received with welcoming overtures from
the years, military presence around Taiwan Strait run into inten- the PRC, a country that proceeds to assert de-jure rule thru the
sification of the Taiwanese and Chinese forces. Taipei admin- island as part of its One-China Policy.3 China’s ambition to
istration under the People’s Republic of China (RPC) unoffi- maintain the Status Quo paradoxically against the One China,
cially announced since 1 st January 1979. The self-governing conferring the U.S. foreign policy over Taiwan informal ties
nation ties slowly transforming to its disadvantage at the hands been adversely intricate. The US-Taiwan-China relations drew
of mainland China. Lindsay Maizland (2023) stated Beijing ar- a sharp cognizance for policy-making decisions and delimita-
gues that Taiwan is obligated by the 1992 Consensus, an agree- tion of unity and freedom of sovereignty exercised by Taiwan.
ment signed among officials of the Chinese Communist Party China’s foreign policy pushed for ‘One Country, Two Systems’
(CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) faction that controlled Tai- and penetrating frequent military drills across the Straits.
wan at that point in time.2
In particular, Taiwan drives unprecedented security dilemma
and ruled-based order in strategizing democratic images and 2. Background of the Study.

1 Universiti
Reaffirming how China used to trail the pathway of ‘Holy
Utara Malaysia.
∗ Corresponding Duty’ in claiming Taiwan territory are undeniably important in
author: Muhammad Iqhwan Madzli. E-mail Address: iqh-
wanmadzli@yahoo.co.uk.

2 Lindsay Maizland. “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense”, Council 3 Fernandes Jacob. ”US AND TAIWAN.” Harvard Model Congress Europe

on Foreign Relations. (2023). Accessed May 18, 2023. 2023. (2023). Accessed May 18, 2023.
 Muhammad Iqhwan Madzli. / Journal of Maritime Research Vol XXI. No. I (2024) 134–139 135

China’s foreign policy. Indebting the last-pieces of domino quo whereby its aircraft and vessels fly without restriction and
effect, presume Taiwan listed as treasury to China’s techno- occasionally in the air and maritime space around Taiwan7 .
logical enhancement and development. Chinas seized the is- The current overarching dilemma, Xi Jinping command in
land in 1945 after the defeat of Japanese forces in World War capturing Taiwan to embrace motivating factors towards high-
Two sooner vented to Civil War within nationalist state move- end microchip and semiconductor industry as de-facto ascen-
ment headed by Chiang Kai-Shek, Kuomintang against Mao dency. Taiwan leading and manufacturing the most of microchips
Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party4 . The indicators of Tai- in the worlds – steering electronic production convening indus-
wan Straits predicaments began in 1953 between two parties, trial leap. China is hesitant about risking a confrontation that
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China might take away its economy of the greatest fundamental eco-
(ROC) occasioned in armed war ruling strategic islands across nomic treasure of the twenty-first century8 .
the Straits.
The contrasting ideologies in shaping China’s governance
– politically inspired via establishing identities in nationalistic 3. Theoretical Framework.
chronologies. The CCP fuse its power over the mainland and
launched the attack towards the Straits thoroughly in the early The management and resolution of Taiwan dispute requires
1950s. Despite the fact that the mainland of China hoped Tai- a sophisticated view in cater the national interests and its right
wan was part of its own nation, the United States accounted to external sovereignty for China, thus the United States re-
for Taiwan as the only government with legitimacy of China. emphasize the importance of Taipei administration that treats
Nevertheless, President Richard Nixon’s 1972 historic mission impetus of foreign policy denominator. A clash of identities
to Beijing ensued in deeper ties with (mainland) China, an or- mounting the consciousness between China and Taiwan respec-
dinance that President Jimmy Carter carried out, declaring re- tively delicate the tensions on synthesizing national manifesta-
lations with (mainland) China with support of the ”One China tion.
Policy.”5 With that, the policy acknowledge PRC as the main In particular, Taipei-Beijing relations avow the perspective
government and later on the U.S. permitted the affairs with Tai- of neoclassical realism theory. The rivalry of US-China de-
wan, namely the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. As stated from picting on the basis of internal features effect on their exter-
Stephen Yates (1999) by preventing core enmity, the US safe- nal behaviour, and analysing Taiwan issue as the focal point of
guarded Taiwan from forcing itself into debates with China amid main actor’s policy argumentation and interpretation. Notable
the potential of military invasion nor different kinds of intimi- to point out that foreign policy analysis deeply accounted to
dation6 . Beijing further claims on sovereignty over territory neoclassical realism concept. Neoclassical realism is a compar-
initiate to amalgamate with the mainland on any possible force atively intriguing approach to integrate structural realism’s fo-
included military exertion. The biggest flashpoint coming from cus on rigorous science and the explanatory dominance of the
the crisis impacted the long-standing role of the U.S. as well global system with classical realists’ devotion to the national
as multilateral economic west bloc. De-facto sovereignty hard- structures, vision difficulties, including governance dilemmas9 .
ening the limit of self-ruling government as non-recognized in- This perspective bound to revitalize China’s strength of the One
dependent country – a rising number of states have transferred China principal carriages a significant influence to the main-
diplomatic status from Taipei to Beijing throughout time, re- land policy. Realist doctrine uprise the power of politics and
ducing Taiwan alongside barely 15 allies in diplomatic relations view nation-state actor applies its dominant functions compete
by the end of 2021. to the United States present a struggle amidst the bipolar con-
The political and security confrontation of China-Taiwan trol. The dynamic of China’s national policy system encour-
adversely lead to confrontation of China-U. S affairs proxy. aged China’s foreign policy decisions. To maintain its immense
China’s view of Taiwan nowadays remains firmly as ever, when position, China starts to declare itself by determining its juris-
Xi Jinping itemized “reunification with Taiwan must be ful- diction throughout a rising amount regions in its national inter-
filled”, in addition to expansion of industrial revolution on mi- est, including not solely areas of conventional vitality includ-
crochip technologies – renowned the pioneering supplies of semi- ing Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet along with certain contested
conductor components. Caught the U.S. favouritism encircling regions like the South China Sea10 . Within the framework of
security measurements across its military bases, especially in
the island territories. Beijing leveraged Pelosi’s arrival to esca- 7 The Task Force on U.S.-China Policy. “Avoiding War Over Taiwan”. Pol-
late provocative military activity in apparent coordinated drills, icy Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations, School of Global Policy and
in addition to assign how examines to be an intriguing status Strategy, UC San Diego. (12 October 2022). Accessed May 18, 2023.
8 Ian Bremmer. “Why China Won’t Invade Taiwan Anytime Soon”. Ideas,

Time. (12 April 2023). Accessed May 18, 2023.

4 Brown David. “China and Taiwan: A really simple guide”. BBC News. 9 Norrin M. Ripsman. “Neoclassical Realism”. International
(July 2022). Accessed May 18, 2023. Studies Association and Oxford University Press. Oxford Re-
5 Global Specialty Insights Center Staff. “China-Taiwan Conflict: Increased search Encyclopedias. (13 June 2011). Accessed May 22, 2023.
Risk in the Region and Its Implications”. Insights, The Hartford. (2022). Ac- https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.36
cessed May 18, 2023. 10 Xiaodi Ye. “Rediscovering the Transition in China’s National
6 Stephen Yates. “Executive Summary: The Taiwan Relations Act After 20 Interest: A Neoclassical Realist Approach”. Journal of Current Chi-
Years: Keys to Past and Future Success”. Report Asia, The Heritage Founda- nese Affairs. Vol 48 (1) 76-105. (2019). Accessed May 22, 2023.
tion. (16 April 1999). Accessed May 18, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/1868102619876830
 Muhammad Iqhwan Madzli. / Journal of Maritime Research Vol XXI. No. I (2024) 134–139 136

neoclassical realism, autonomous and mediating elements de- offspring currently constitute arguably the most populated eth-
termine the foreign policy. Xi Jinping dealings with diplomatic nic communities on the territory. However, the Qing Dynasty
relations reserve a principle of ‘desires to achieve’ strives to had to surrender Taiwan to Japan, after the defeat in the First
accommodate: ( – fenfayouwei). Sino-Japanese War, 1895. A several decades later, Japan capit-
Therefore, assertive behaviour enclaves the pursuit power ulated Taiwan to the ROC during the World War II – within the
of China in legitimatize the state government stance. Tools consent of ruling given from the United States and United King-
for China anticipate the hegemony attain its hard power often dom. Chiang-Kai overdrawn the civil war in China which are
running the state of political-security and economic outflow. defeated and the leftovers, yet supporters escaped to Taiwan in
Neorealist recognises that governments are human-led organ- 1949. Meanwhile, the CCP established the PRC on mainland,
isations, and hence responding to external triggers might ap- as CCP never abandoned the use of force to bring Taiwan be-
pear improper11 . This emerge when a state’s government fails neath its domination. The scenario of this issue is the power
to recognise the predicament it is in. A state could opt for a of struggle and unclear status of independence that withdrawn
futile response to external pressures due to national economic its recognition and the UN transferred diplomatic recognition
or political restrictions that hinder the state machinery from ob- from Beijing government was dispel. Subsequently, 15 mem-
taining sufficient resources from its citizenry in order to com- ber states recognised Taipei administration tumbled consider-
pete effectively. ably due to distinction political system and legal status remains
unclear. Both parties argued on being part of a single China
Figure 1: Intervening variables. and professed as its only authorised representation12 . As com-
ponent of its democratic shift, publicly renounced its mission to
reconquer China’s mainland in 1991.

4.2. The Intensification of China’s Economic and Military Power.

A bilateral dispute fuelled fears in the tension of sovereignty
and acquisition of territorial integrity. Reckoning the economic
and military costs of Taiwan conflict is intensely alarming. Firstly,
China’s confidence to state claims over the economic gain ab-
Source: B.A. Lindenmann, Neoclassical Realism and Foreign solutely caught the global economic in terms of trade and busi-
Policy Analysis. “Cross-Strait Relations and International nesses disturbances. The Ukrainian conflict hastened China
Organizations”. (2014). Accessed May 22, 2023. DOI ambition to build a financial system that protect from the West-
10.1007/978-3-658-05527-1 2. ern sanctions13 . By developing a supplementary independent
financial system, China optimisms to lessen the bearing of sanc-
Neoclassical realist applies in the figure 1 stimulate state’s tions and guard its economy. Because of the deep interdepen-
structure and domestic rivalry and measuring the identity as dence of the Chinese-Taiwanese economies, certain economists
well as perception. The four key categories engage method- believe there is minimal prospect of China placing stronger eco-
ological approaches centred to distressing state’s ability and nomic penalties on Taiwanese enterprises, as it potentially harms
willingness. vital areas of the China economy14 . The impact of Taiwan’s
export easily cost a full-scale crisis to the overall region in eco-
4. Source of Problems. nomic performance and GDPs. Military power on the other
factor, positioned at the centre of Taiwan Straits ramped up
The tension within China-Taiwan escalation suffocates into the geopolitical strike. A war-game portrayed from Jinping’s
multi-layered complexities and paradox. The conflict has been ruling power – deterring the force and security alliance of the
exacerbated by the increasing military power of China. In fact, United States. The capacity to propel the US and its partner
China’s swiftly modernizing its military exercise, and recently nations into frontal conflict against China’s People’s Liberation
has the ability to launch a successful incursion of Taiwan. It Army, the world’s biggest the armed forces, resulting in becom-
is an attainable flashpoint that could ignite an overwhelming ing progressively well-equipped15 . China’s invasion to Taiwan
conflict. Therefore, there are three source of complications that territory overturns the status quo on advancing unilateralism.
contributed to the China-Taiwan conflict:
12 Julia Marinaccio. “Worth knowing about the Taiwan-China conflict”.
4.1. Historical Legacy.
News Archive, Faculty of Humanities. University of Bergen. (2022). Accessed
The settlers from China fleeing Taiwan since the 17th Cen- May 25, 2023. https://www.uib.no/en/hf/155944/worth-knowing-about-taiwan-
tury fronting hardships mostly originated were from Hoklo, Fu- china-conflict
13 Global Guardian. “It’s High Time Businesses Started Preparing for a
jian (Fukien) province. This proven in the modern times, the China-Taiwan Conflict”. (2022). Accessed May 25, 2023.
14 Gabriel Dominguez. “What would be the economic cost of a full-blown

Taiwan crisis?”. Business Analysis, The Japan Times. (2022). Accessed May
11 Sean Carver. “Sino-US Great Power Conflict from a Realist Per- 25, 2023.
spective”. Global Honors Theses. 84. (2021). Accessed May 22, 2023. 15 Ben Blanchard. “China-Taiwan: why tensions are rising and what could

https://digitalcommons.tacoma.uw.edu/gh theses/84 happen in 2023”. Asia Pacific, Reuters. (2022). Accessed May 25, 2023.
 Muhammad Iqhwan Madzli. / Journal of Maritime Research Vol XXI. No. I (2024) 134–139 137

Beijing taking benefit of the thrilling compression on Taiwan Figure 2: Mapping the People?s Liberation Army (PLA) Un-
likely to exert military forces comes both an offensive and de- precedented Seven Exercise Zones around Taiwan.
fensive validation. According to the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions (CFR) identified three possible military tactics that Bei-
jing use Taiwan under its command: air and sea confinement
across Taiwan, restricted attack offshore islands, and full-scale
invasion including large number of Chinese troops on Taiwan16 .

4.3. The long-standing policy of ”Strategic Ambiguity” on Tai-

wan.
The Unites States usefulness on ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ tapped
its status quo in supporting Taiwan and at the same time op-
timistically deter the China’s invasion. Whereas, the policy
contributed to relatively stable ties between the United States,
China, and Taiwan; whilst China could jeopardize Taiwan on a Source: Bonny Lin, et. al. ”Tracking the Fourth Taiwan Strait
regular basis, it did not perform a complete encroachment and Crisis”. China Power. (2022). Accessed May 27, 2023.
has not sought official autonomy17 . The impact over the rest of
the world together with uncertainty of small and middle pow-
ers – questioned its legitimacy and reassurances of Taiwan pro- new-fangled Taiwanese political party, ‘Democratic Progres-
tection in aligning the United States strategic framework. The sive Party’ (DPP) dated back in 2016. With the separatist refu-
doctrine is meant not solely to prevent China from deploying tation to ‘One China Policy’ This has irritated China, prompt-
force in opposition to Taiwan, nevertheless to discourage Tai- ing Beijing to enact tougher actions to maintain its stance on
wan from pursuing independence, because nor Beijing-Taipei Taiwan, which is an essential interest topic20 . Addressing the
can be guaranteed that the US might act to protect the island in Taiwan dispute and achieving China’s ”complete unification” is
the event of a confrontation18 . Nevertheless, China’s interpre- described as a ”historic mission” in the 2022 China’s defence
tation against Taiwan as provocative measurement discourages white paper.
the United States strategic ambiguity in undermining policies. Importantly, Taiwan self-protection instigate against Chi-
As Taiwan matters to the US, unofficial bilateral ties conserved nese pressure prompt to re-visit the implications with greater
more than a regular nation. Instead of Taiwan’s aggressiveness, considerations. The objections itself landing a collision over
the key driving cause for conflict might to be China’s perception major state’s compatibility role, as such US-China crucial ties
that it may penetrate at a realistic cost19 . economically and politically. China’s enthusiasm based on his-
torical arguments with winning the war could winning the peo-
ple’s heart. All parties are concerned regards unresolving issues
5. Conflict Dynamic.
particularly engaging Strait’s activities could harm the prospect
The dynamics possess in the Straits fuelled inevitable oc- of global economic revenues in developing technological ro-
currences flashing the power struggles via air and seas. Fig- bustness. Taiwanese and Western leaders are afraid that Bei-
ure 2 above exhibit territorial water submitting the most signif- jing’s armed forces actions would be accompanied by addi-
icant exercise series of military invasions encircle from multi- tional efforts intended for forging a different status quo sur-
ple directions to seven zones. Equally to infamous proposition rounding Taiwan21 . Ideology and hegemony brought China’s
called ‘Cross-Straits Relations’ debunked upheaval of geopo- contesting a durable hard-power in prevailing draconian admin-
litical congestion. Remembering the visit of Nixon to China istration and annex forceful exertion to Taiwan. In fact, the
does losing its momentum after more than 40 years. The rise PLA is going to be equipped in 2027, and Xi most likely begin
of Xi Jinping at the wheel of CCP, configure the dynamics of moves to accomplish the aspirations by 2030, as China’s pop-
China’s foreign policies – “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” acquired ulation matures, whereas seeking unifying to cement historic
a paradigm alteration. The dynamics seized a collision with reputation throughout the lifetime22 . Figure 3 below articulate
the strength of military assets in evaluation to three offensive
elements.
16 Peter Lyon & Michael Roi. “Military aggression against Taiwan by the

People’s Republic of China”. Potential scenarios and consequences, Defence

Research and Development Canada (DRDC). National Defence. (2023). Ac- 20 Soumyodeep Deb. “An Unavoidable Crisis: The Changing Dynamics of

cessed May 25, 2023. Cross-Straits Relations”. Institute for Security & Development Policy. (2023).
17 Model Diplomacy. “Strategic Ambiguity Toward Taiwan”. Council on Accessed May 28, 2023.
Foreign Relations. (2022). Accessed May 26, 2023. 21 Kathrin Hille & Demetri Sevastopulo. “China is ratcheting up pressure on
18 Nikkei Asia. “U.S maintains ‘strategic ambiguity’ over Taiwan: security Taiwan. What will the US do next?”. Financial Times. (2022). Accessed May
adviser. Indo-Pacific. (2022). Accessed May 26, 2023. 28, 2023.
19 Peter Devine. “Strategic Ambiguity Isn’t Working to Deter China on Tai- 22 Kyle Amonson & Dane Egli. “The Ambitious Dragon: Beijing’s Calculus

wan – It Will Invade Anyway. It’s Time to Commit”. Just Security. (2022). for Invading Taiwan by 2030,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 6, no. 3 (March–
Accessed May 27, 2023. April 2023): 37–53. Accessed May 28, 2023.
 Muhammad Iqhwan Madzli. / Journal of Maritime Research Vol XXI. No. I (2024) 134–139 138

Figure 3: China and Taiwan Armed Forces Comparison. established ARATS as a counterpart corresponding to facilitate
cooperation and dialogue Taiwan-China. Series of discussions
held under the purposes of agreements. Then, both de-facto
parties unable to reach a concluding agreement on the status of
Taiwan autonomy.

6.3. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.

A historical of heightened tensions across Taiwan Straits
turned PRC to garner expansion and sphere of influence vis-
à-vis the use of force embodied the military leverage. The
crisis led to a sum of international condemnations to China’s
intimidation. The movement act as wake-up call to China in
adopting coercive strategy – condemning response of the US-
Taiwan relationship. Tensions between China and Taiwan in-
creased ahead of the Taiwanese elections, the US responded by
installing the Seventh Fleet to the area24 . After the elections,
tensions reduced and the militaries were removed. Both sides
then worked to re-establish peaceful relations.

6.4. The 2008 Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework

Agreement (ECFA).
Source: David Brown. ”China and Taiwan: A really simple
guide”. China, BBC. (6 April 2023). Accessed May 30, 2023. Agreement was signed between Taiwan and China symbol-
ising landmark of the ECFA directed to investment and trade
functions. Imposing lower tariffs and barriers reimburse the
6. Conflict Resolution Approaches. economic payoffs under Free Trade Agreement (FTA) – carries
a suspension of strait crisis, thus PRC leverage the negotiation
The post-civil war does aspire China and Taiwan to made up process into substantive roundtable of discussions. Its goals to
important events and space for negotiation and diplomacy. In solemnize business opportunities and helps Taiwan on identical
the event of armed conflict, sea territorial base averts peaceful equilibrium in external trade, further encourage other states to
practice for both. It should be noted, there have been a number enhance the negotiable applications.
of former China-Taiwan conflict-resolution approaches, inclu-
sive of: 6.5. The 2016 Tsai Ing-wen Election.
Tsai-Ing Wen, a Taiwanese DPP politicians served as the
6.1. The 1992 Consensus.
President for Taiwan stimulate public-orientation in the issues
The inaugural unofficial agreement within China and Tai- of reckoning in cross-strait relations. Particularly, Tsai pop-
wan approved there is one and only China, nonetheless the clar- ulism in global progressive politics diverted PRC attention and
ification is differed taken into the precise context. The 1992 accused Tsai of seeking independence proclamation for Tai-
Consensus reached a compromise on the breakthrough of Cross- wan, yet challenging military existence in the Strait.
Strait’s relations resting two parties between KMT and CCP.
The definition to interpret on both governments claimed to be
the true rulers of ”China”: the ROC, established in 1912, and 7. Conflict Analysis.
the PRC, formed in 194923 . The endeavour to put emphasis on
This section discusses on conflict analysis that interlinked to
workable conversations did not represent, as critics claim, that
China-Taiwan conflict. Conflict analysis is a crucial feature of
the 1992 Consensus was determined on the two parties’ capac-
creating and conducting peacebuilding measures due to its cen-
ity to bypass challenging political issues.
tres around generating perception of circumstances in which a
peacebuilding action is sought25 . The potential direction of a
6.2. The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Associa- conflict caused from China and Taiwan respectively, state ac-
tion for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). tors assessing the initial stage of dispute and avoiding lesser
The ROC urge to establish a semi-official organization (in-
termediary body), the SEF from private division to deal thru
24 Shepperd Taryn. “1995–96: The Taiwan Strait Crisis”. In: Sino-US Re-
Strait issues. Density upon legal and political status formally
lations and the Role of Emotion in State Action. Studies in Diplomacy and
recognized and operated on 9 March 1991. The PRC in parallel International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, London. (2013). Accessed May
31, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137317728 3
25 Gloria Rhodes & Muhammad Akram. “Conflict analysis, learning from
23 Alyssa Resar. “The 1992 Consensus: Why it Worked and Why it Fell practice”. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 40(3), 333– 355. (2023). Accessed
Apart”. The Diplomat. (2022). Accessed May 30, 2023. June 1, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1002/crq.21371
 Muhammad Iqhwan Madzli. / Journal of Maritime Research Vol XXI. No. I (2024) 134–139 139

cost of peril. In the sense, understanding the process of a con- deemed much passable in reducing conflict through the lens of
flict sustaining policies and practice. In all-out war, the Strait cooperation and empathizing plausible structures of its struc-
paradoxes reasoned why the US constraint lack of support and tures and systems. Beijing pursues in conquest military bases
defence to Taiwan whenever the west must prudently ponder its across Taiwan borders, which strongly claims on the historical
strategy in the incident of Chinese military pressure. Figure 4 statement. This motivates Taiwan upscaling the needs of the US
shown the onion tool, encompass three concentric circles, con- using geographic and technological advantages to raise the cost
tingent on involving actors’ positions, interests, and needs as in of China. By deterrence, full-scale invasion could circumvent
the China-Taiwan conflict. Considering each dispute contains however with inconsistent sustainability. Potential for China
a minimum of two actors, the onion actor analysis necessitates responding the conflict are more likely due to rapid military
rightful negotiation26 . changes in strategizing growth. Thus, the conflict transforma-
tion by dynamics is particular to China as well as Taiwan since
Figure 4: Onion Actor Analysis ? actor?s position, interests and the onion analysis predict to comprehend both sides whether to
needs in the case study of China-Taiwan Conflict. raise or diplomatically in stringent manner, sharply residing to
address the needs and interests for both actors.

8. Resolutions and Suggestion.

To conclude, China-Taiwan partakes grand attention in the

case of conflict-resolution. Not every conflict potential to spark
a resolution hence the first or second-track of diplomacy have
the intelligence and ideas to propose a number of solutions. It
is noteworthy that Chinese PLA’s outbreak on Taiwan diverted
a complex issue with no-easy outcome. In 2021, the UN Res-
olution 2758 inaccurately misinterpret Taiwan as part of China
campaigning by PRC and formalizing on its “One China” Prin-
Source: S. Fisher, D. Ibrahim Abhi, J. Ludin, R. Smith, S.
ciple noticeably spreading fallacy into a point the UN member
Williams. ?Working Conflict: Skills and Strategies for
states strongminded towards Taiwan is a configuration of PRC.
Action?. Zed Books. (29 October 2020). Accessed June 1,
The conflict may impose different resolutions for the China-
2023.
Taiwan dispute. Which commonly includes:
Using Onion-Actor analysis, two actors hinged under the
8.1. Direct Negotiations.
pressure of the conflict. Underlying the interests reside in the
conflict resolution framework. The analysis tools employ a tex- This would entail China and Taiwan sitting down and dis-
tual model of critical relationship foremost in exchange to un- cussing face to face. This is the most straightforward method of
derstand each relationship. China’s potent territorial control in resolving the conflict, however it can also be exceptionally chal-
the usage of economy and political hotspot reconsolidate ex- lenging. Both parties must be open to compromise and make
positional view of status quo (China) versus transformational offerings.
liberation (Taiwan). Conflict analysis should be done within
the participatory subjective views. The transparency of posi- 8.2. Economic Cooperation.
tion for China in conquering Straits and defending Taiwan from Previously ongoing SEF and ARATS invalidity and lack of
the external influence formulate long-game preparation in ap- cohesion, a new merging cooperation in economic field stim-
prehending Taiwan in 2027. The nationalist government and uli a chance in working together in cross-advantage projects.
separatist self-governing island prompt to declaring its de-facto Which disseminate and switching skills and labour to the ex-
governance – via security postures. Amy Hawkins (2023) in- tent in building trust and goodwill, in addition helping to create
dicates Taiwan interests relying to reinforce help from the west a common interest in resolving the conflict.
prior to a future invasion27 . An intervention consolidates by
proxy, the US should focus on transforming the conflict and 8.3. Cultural Exchanges.
shifting for change. The enduring ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ pol-
China-Taiwan in public view equate in harmonious climate,
icy must re-visit and improvise the objectives of the US against
thus sharing the cultures with each other potentially benefit to
China, reiterating the latest presidency envisaged by Xi Jinping
breakdown prejudices and stereotypes. The soft power appli-
cation probably to assert a mutual understanding and empathy
26Kenneth Acha. “Conflict Analysis”. (n.d.). Accessed June 1, 2023.
between two sides ? indirectly softened the elites? aggression
27Amy Hawkins. “Taiwan foreign minister warns of conflict with China in in elevating further regional conflict and suspension of predica-
2027”. The Guardian. (2023). Accessed June 1, 2023. ment.